DELPHI CLASSICS

Thomas Hobbes

Collected Works

Series Ten

The Collected Works of

THOMAS HOBBES

(1588-1679)

Contents

The Books

Elements of Law, Natural and Politic
Of Liberty and Necessity
Answer to Sir William Davenant's Preface before Gondibert
De Cive
Leviathan
De Corpore
Six Lessons to the Professor of Mathematics
Seven Philosophical Problems
A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England
An Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall, Late Bishop of Derry
Three Papers Presented to the Royal Society Against Dr. Wallis
Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy
An Historical Narration concerning Hersey and the Punishment Thereof
Behemoth

The Translations

Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War
The Whole Art of Rhetoric

Translation of Homer's 'Iliad'
Translation of Homer's 'Odyssey'

The Poetry

De Mirabilis Pecci, Being the Wonders of the Peak in Darby-shire
The Life of Mr. Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
Historia Ecclesiastica Carmine Elegiaco Concinnata

The Autobiography

Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury

The Biographies

Thomas Hobbes by George Croom Robertson
Thomas Hobbes by Leslie Stephen

The Delphi Classics Catalogue

© Delphi Classics 2019

Version 1

Browse our Classical Music series

The Collected Works of

THOMAS HOBBES

By Delphi Classics, 2019

COPYRIGHT

Collected Works of Thomas Hobbes

First published in the United Kingdom in 2019 by Delphi Classics.

© Delphi Classics, 2019.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.

ISBN: 978 1 78877 965 4

Delphi Classics

is an imprint of

Delphi Publishing Ltd

Hastings, East Sussex

United Kingdom

Contact: sales@delphiclassics.com

DELPHI CLASSICS

www.delphiclassics.com

Parts Edition Now Available!

Parts Edition

Interested in *Thomas Hobbes*?

Did you know you can now purchase the Delphi Classics Parts Edition of this author and enjoy all the novels, plays, non-fiction books and other works as individual eBooks? Now, you can select and read individual novels etc. and know precisely where you are in an eBook. You will also be able to manage space better on your eReading devices.



The Parts Edition is only available direct from the *Delphi Classics* website.

For more information about this exciting new format and to try **free Parts Edition downloads**, please visit this link.

The Books

Malmesbury, a market town in Wiltshire — Thomas Hobbes was born in Westport, a village in Wiltshire, immediately west of Malmesbury. Westport no longer exists as a separate village and it is not named on modern maps. The built-up area was incorporated in the borough of Malmesbury in 1934.

Malmesbury and Westport from the Ordnance Survey one-inch map, first edition, 1828

Elements of Law, Natural and Politic

Thomas Hobbes was an accomplished pupil and in 1603 he enrolled at Magdalen Hall, the predecessor college to Hertford College, Oxford, where the principal was John Wilkinson, a Puritan, who had some influence on Hobbes' early development. The pupil appears to have followed his own curriculum and he was "little attracted by the scholastic learning", completing his B.A. degree in 1608. He was recommended by Sir James Hussey, his master at Magdalen, as tutor to William, the son of William Cavendish, Baron of Hardwick and began a lifelong connection with that family.

Acting as companion to the younger William in 1610, Hobbes took part in a grand tour of Europe, where he was exposed to European scientific and critical methods, offering a notable contrast to the scholastic philosophy that he had learned in Oxford. His scholarly pursuits at the time were aimed at a careful study of classic Greek and Latin authors. In June 1628, his employer Cavendish, then the Earl of Devonshire, died of the plague and the widowed countess dismissed Hobbes.

Over the next seven years, as well as tutoring, Hobbes expanded his knowledge of philosophy, awakening in him a curiosity in key philosophic debates. He visited Florence in 1636 and was later a regular debater in philosophic groups in Paris, conducted by Marin Mersenne. When Hobbes returned to England in 1637, he found it a country riven with discontent, disrupting him from the orderly execution of his philosophic plan. However, by the end of Charles I's calling of a Short Parliament in 1640, he had completed a short treatise entitled *The Elements of Law, Natural and*

Politic. It was not published and only circulated as a manuscript among his close associates. A pirated version was published ten years later.

The Elements of Law is formed of two parts: *Human Nature* and *De Corpore Politico*. It is Hobbes' first published philosophical work and was written in part as a response to the conflicts between Charles I and Parliament. The book details Hobbes' initial attempt to address political matters with deductive methods of geometry, providing a definition of sovereignty that remains central to Hobbes' later political works.

Although it appears that much of the text was written prior to the sitting of the Short Parliament, there are polemical pieces of the work that reveal the influences of the rising political crisis. Nevertheless, many of the elements of Hobbes' political thought would remain unchanged between the appearance of *The Elements of Law* and his magnum opus *Leviathan*, showing that the events of the English Civil War had little effect on his contractarian methodology.

When in November 1640 the Long Parliament succeeded the Short, Hobbes felt that he was in disfavour due to the circulation of his controversial treatise and so he fled to Paris. He would not return to England for eleven years.

Thomas Hobbes by John Michael Wright, c. 1670

CONTENTS

Dedication

PART I

Chapter 1: The General Division of Man's Natural Faculties
Chapter 2: The Cause of Sense
Chapter 3: Of Imagination and the Kinds Thereof
Chapter 4: Of the Several Kinds of Discursion of the Mind
Chapter 5: Of Names, Reasoning, and Discourse of the Tongue
Chapter 6: Of a Knowledge, Opinion and Relief
Chapter 7: Of Delight and Pain; Good and Evil
Chapter 8: Of the Pleasures of the Senses; Of Honour
Chapter 9: Of the Passions of the Mind
Chapter 10: Of the Difference Between Men In These Discerning Faculty and the Cause
Chapter 11: What Imaginations and Passions Men Have, at the Names of Things Supernatural
Chapter 12: How by Deliberation From Passions Proceed Men's Actions
Chapter 13: How by Language Men Work Upon Each Other's Minds
Chapter 14: Of the Estate and Right of Nature
Chapter 15: Of the Divesting Natural Right by Gift and Covenant
Chapter 16: Some of the Laws of Nature
Chapter 17: Other Laws of Nature
Chapter 18: A Confirmation of the Same Out of The Word of God
Chapter 19: Of the Necessity and Definition of a Body Politic

PART II

Chapter 20: Of the Requisites to the Constitution of a Commonwealth
Chapter 21: Of the Three Sorts of Commonwealth

Chapter 22: Of the Power of Masters
Chapter 23: Of the Power of Fathers, and of Patrimonial Kingdom
Chapter 24: The Incommodities of Several Sorts of Government Compared
Chapter 25: That Subjects are not Bound to Follow Their Private Judgments in Controversies of Religion
Chapter 26: That Subjects are not bound to follow the Judgment of any Authorities in Controversies of Religion which is not Dependent on the Sovereign Power
Chapter 27: Of the Causes of Rebellion
Chapter 28: Of the Duty of Them That Have Sovereign Power
Chapter 29: Of the Nature and Kinds of Laws

Dedication

To the Right Honourable William, Earl of Newcastle, Governor to the Prince his Highness, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council

MY MOST HONOURED Lord,

From the two principal parts of our nature, Reason and Passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, mathematical and dogmatical. The former is free from controversies and dispute, because it consisteth in comparing figures and motion only; in which things truth and the interest of men, oppose not each other. But in the later there is nothing not disputable, because it compareth men, and meddleth with their right and profit; in which as oft as reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against reason. And from hence it comes, that they who have written of justice and policy in general do all invade each other, and themselves, with contradiction. To reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way, but first, to put such principles down for a foundation, as passion not mistrusting may not seek to displace: And afterward to build thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature (which hitherto have been built in the air) by degrees, till the whole be inexpugnable. Now (my Lord) the principles fit for such a foundation, are those which I have heretofore acquainted your Lordship withal in private discourse; and which, by your command I have here put into method. To examine cases thereby, between sovereign and sovereign, or between sovereign and subject, I leave to them, that shall find leisure, and encouragement thereto. For my part, I present this to your Lordship, for the true, and only foundation of such science. For the style, it

is therefore the worse, because whilst I was writing I consulted more with logic, than with rhetoric. But for the doctrine, it is not slightly proved; and the conclusions thereof, are of such nature, as for want of them, government and peace have been nothing else, to this day, but mutual fear. And it would be an incomparable benefit to commonwealth, that every man held the opinions concerning law and policy, here delivered. The ambition therefore of this book, in seeking by your Lordship's countenance, to insinuate itself with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth, is to be excused. For myself, I desire no greater honour, than I enjoy already in your Lordship's known favour; unless it be, that you would be pleased in continuance thereof, to give me more exercise in your commands; which, as I am bound by your many great favours, I shall obey, being

My most honoured Lord

Your Lordship's most humble and obliged Servant

Thomas Hobbes

PART I

Chapter 1: The General Division of Man's Natural Faculties

1. THE TRUE and perspicuous explication of the Elements of Laws, Natural and Politic, which is my present scope, dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature, what is a body politic, and what it is we call a law. Concerning which points, as the writings of men from antiquity downward have still increased, so also have the doubts and controversies concerning the same, and seeing that true knowledge begetteth not doubt, nor controversy, but knowledge; it is manifest from the present controversies, that they which have heretofore written thereof, have not well understood their own subject.

2. Harm I can do none though I err no less than they. For I shall leave men but as they are in doubt and dispute. But intending not to take any principle upon trust, but only to put men in mind what they know already, or may know by their own experience, I hope to err the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too hasty concluding, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.

3. On the other side, if reasoning aright I win not consent (which may very easily happen) from them that being confident of their own knowledge weigh not what is said, the fault is not mine but theirs. For as it is my part to show my reasons, so it is theirs to bring attention.

4. Man's nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of nutrition, motion, generation, sense, reason, &c. For these powers we do unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of man, under these words, animal and rational.

5. According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his faculties into two sorts, faculties of the body, and faculties of the mind.

6. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up into these three heads, power nutritive, power motive, and power generative.

7. Of the powers of the mind there be two sorts, cognitive or imaginative or conceptive; and motive. And first of the cognitive.

8. For the understanding of what I mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the image thereof, and of all those things which he had before seen and perceived in it; every man by his own experience knowing that the absence or destruction of things once imagined, doth not cause the absence or destruction of the imagination itself. This imagery and representations of the qualities of things without us is that we call our cognition, imagination, ideas, notice, conception, or knowledge of them. And the faculty, or power, by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call power cognitive, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving.

Chapter 2: The Cause of Sense

1. HAVING DECLARED what I mean by the word conception, and other words equivalent thereunto, I come to the conceptions themselves, to show their difference, their causes, and the manner of their production as far as is necessary for this place.

2. Originally all conceptions proceed from the actions of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception. Now when the action is present, the conception it produceth is called SENSE, and the thing by whose action the same is produced is called the OBJECT of sense.

3. By our several organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the objects; for by sight we have a conception or image composed of colour or figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By hearing we have a conception called sound, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the object from the ear. And so the rest of the senses also are conceptions of several qualities, or natures of their objects.

4. Because the image in vision consisting in colour and shape is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause, that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell, or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the object, is worse

than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these four points:

(1) That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen.

(2) That that is nothing without us really which we call an image or colour.

(3) That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.

(4) That as in conception by vision, so also in the conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.

5. Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the sun and other visible objects by reJection in the water and in glasses, and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion: that colour and image may be there where the thing seen is not. But because it may be said that notwithstanding the image in the water be not in the object, but a thing merely phantastical, yet there may be colour really in the thing itself; I will urge further this experience: that divers times men see directly the same object double, as two candles for one, which may happen by distemper, or otherwise without distemper if a man will, the organs being either in their right temper, or equally distempered. The colours and figures in two such images of the same thing cannot be inherent both therein, because the thing seen cannot be in two places: one of these images thereof is not inherent in the object. But seeing the organs of sight are then in equal temper or equal distemper, the one of them is no more inherent than the other, and consequently neither of them both are in the object; which is the first proposition mentioned in the precedent section.

6. Secondly, that the image of any thing seen by reJection in glass or water or the like, is not any thing in or behind the glass, or in or under the water, every man may prove to himself; which is the second proposition.

7. For the third, we are to consider first, that upon every great agitation or concussion of the brain, as it happeneth from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye, whereby the optic nerve suffereth any great violence, there appeareth before the eyes a certain light, which light is nothing without, but an apparition only, all that is real being the concussion or motion of the parts of that nerve. From which experience we may conclude, that apparition of light without, is really nothing but motion within. If therefore from lucid bodies there can be derived motion, so as to affect the optic nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an image of light somewhere in that line by which the motion was last derived unto the eye; that is to say, in the object, if we look directly on it, and in the glass or water, when we look upon it in the line of reJection, which in effect is the third proposition, namely, That image and colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head.

8. But that from all lucid, shining and illuminated bodies, there is a motion produced to the eye, and, through the eye, to the optic nerve, and so into the brain, by which that apparition of light or colour is effected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the fire, the only lucid body here on earth, worketh by motion equally every way; insomuch as the motion thereof stopped or inclosed, it is presently extinguished, and no more fire. And farther, that that motion, whereby the fire worketh, is dilatation, and contraction of itself alternately, commonly called scintillation or glowing, is manifest also by experience. From such motion in the fire must needs arise a rejection or casting from itself of that part of the medium which is

contiguous to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back the other to the very eye; and in the same manner the exterior part of the eye (the laws of refraction still observed) presseth the interior. Now the interior coat of the eye is nothing else but a piece of the optic nerve, and therefore the motion is still continued thereby into the brain, and by resistance or reaction of the brain, is also a rebound in the optic nerve again, which we not conceiving as motion or rebound from within, think it is without, and call it light; as hath been already shewed by the experience of a stroke. We have no reason to doubt, that the fountain of light, the sun, worketh any other wise than the fire, at least in this matter, and thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here described. For where there is no light, there is no sight; and therefore colour also must be the same thing with light, as being the effect of lucid bodies: their difference being only this, that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye, or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies, and such as have no particular motion internal to alter it, we call it light. But when it cometh to the eyes by reflection from uneven, rough, and coarse bodies, or such as are affected with internal motion of their own, that may alter it, then we call it colour; colour and light differing only in this, that the one is pure, the other a perturbed light. By that which hath been said, not only the truth of the third proposition, but also the whole manner of producing light and colour, is apparent.

9. As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been described: so neither is sound in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is: that as a man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by multiplication of echoes, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and not being in one and the same place, cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them. Nothing can make any thing in itself: the clapper hath not

sound in it, but motion, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the bell so the bell hath motion, and not sound. That imparteth motion to the air; and the air hath motion, but not sound. The air imparteth motion by the ear and nerves to the brain; and the brain hath motion but not sound. From the brain it reboundeth back into the nerves outward, and thence it becometh an apparition without, which we call sound. And to proceed to the rest of the senses, it is apparent enough, that the smell and taste of the same thing, are not the same to every man, and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted, but in the men. So likewise the heat we feel from the fire is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the heat that is in the fire. For our heat is pleasure or pain, according as it is extreme or moderate; but in the coal there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last of the propositions is proved (viz.) That as in conception by vision, so also in the conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.

10. And from thence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.

Chapter 3: Of Imagination and the Kinds Thereof

1. AS STANDING water put into motion by the stroke of a stone, or blast of wind, doth not presently give over moving as soon as the wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth: so neither doth the effect cease which the object hath wrought upon the brain, so soon as ever by turning aside of the organ the object ceaseth to work; that is to say, though the sense be past, the image or conception remaineth; but more obscurely while we are awake, because some object or other continually plieth and soliciteth our eyes, and ears, keeping the mind in a stronger motion, whereby the weaker doth not easily appear. And this obscure conception is that we call PHANTASY or IMAGINATION: imagination being (to define it) conception remaining, and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense.

2. But when present sense is not, as in SLEEP, there the images remaining after sense (when there be any) as in dreams, are not obscure, but strong and clear, as in sense itself. The reason IS, because that which obscured and made the conceptions weak, namely sense, and present operation of the objects, is removed. For sleep is the privation of the act of sense, (the power remaining) and dreams are the imaginations of them that sleep.

3. The causes of DREAMS (if they be natural) are the actions or violence of the inward parts of a man upon his brain, by which the passages of sense, by sleep benumbed, are restored to their motion. The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the differences of dreams proceeding from the different accidents of man's body. Old men being commonly less healthful and less free from inward pains, are thereby more subject to

dreams, especially such dreams as be painful: as dreams of lust, or dreams of anger, according as the heart, or other parts within, work more or less upon the brain, by more or less heat. So also the descent of different sorts of phlegm maketh one to dream of different tastes of meats or drinks. And I believe there is a reciprocation of motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not only imagination begetteth motion in those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that sad imaginations nourish the spleen, then we see also a cause, why a strong spleen reciprocally causeth fearful dreams. And why the effects of lasciviousness may in a dream produce the image of some person that hath caused them. If it were well observed, whether the image of the person in a dream be as obedient to the accidental heat of him that dreameth, as waking his heat is to the person, and if so, then is such motion reciprocal. Another sign that dreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception or image to another: for when we are waking, the antecedent thought or conception introduceth, and is cause of the consequent, as the water followeth a man's finger upon a dry and level table. But in dreams there is commonly no coherence (and when there is, it is by chance), which must proceed from this, that the brain in dreams is not restored to its motion in every part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our thoughts appear like the stars between the flying clouds, not in the order which a man would choose to observe them in, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permit.

4. As when the water, or any liquid thing moved at once by divers movements, receiveth one motion compounded of them all; so also the brain or spirits therein, having been stirred by divers objects, composeth an imagination of divers conceptions that appeared. singly to the sense. As for example, the sense sheweth us at one time the figure of a mountain, and at

another time the colour of gold; but the imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden mountain. From the same cause it is, there appear unto us castles in the air, chimeras, and other monsters which are not in rerum natura, but have been conceived by the sense in pieces at several times. And this composition is that which we commonly call FICTION of the mind.

5. There is yet another kind of. imagination, which for clearness contendeth with sense, as well as a dream; and that is, when the action of sense hath been long or vehement: and the experience thereof is more frequent in the sense of seeing, than the rest. An example whereof is, the image remaining before the eye after a steadfast looking upon the sun. Also, those little images that appear before the eyes in the dark (whereof I think every man hath experience, but they most of all, that are timorous or superstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for distinction sake, may be called PHANTASMS.

6. By the senses (which are numbered according to the organs to be five) we take notice (as hath been said already) of the objects without us; and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice also some way or other of our conceptions. For when the conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again; that is to say, that we have had the same conception before; which is as much as to imagine a thing past; which is impossible to sense, which is only of things present. This therefore may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal, not external, as the rest, and is commonly called REMEMBRANCE.

7. For the manner by which we take notice of a conception past, we are to remember, that in the definition of imagination, it is said to be a conception by little and little decaying, or growing more obscure. An obscure conception is that which representeth the whole object together, but none of the smaller parts by themselves; and as more or fewer parts be

represented, so is the conception or representation said to be more or less clear. Seeing then the conception, which when it was first produced by sense, was clear, and represented the parts of the object distinctly; and when it cometh again is obscure, we find missing somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it past and decayed. For example, a man that is present in a foreign city, seeth not only whole streets, but can also distinguish particular houses, and parts of houses; departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he did, some house or turning escaping him; yet is this to remember the city; when afterwards there escapeth him more particulars, this is also to remember, but not so well. In process of time, the image of the city returneth, but as of a mass of building only, which is almost to have forgotten it. Seeing then remembrance is more or less, as we find more or less obscurity, why may not we well think remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of parts, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at great distance of place, and to remember at great distance of time, is to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at distance, the other by decay.

8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man can never know he dreameth; he may dream he doubteth, whether it be a DREAM or no: but the clearness of the imagination representeth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself, and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions past, that is to say, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which is impossible.

9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men wonder not in their dreams at places and persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would think it strange to be in a place wherein he never was before, and

remember nothing of how he came there. But in a dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The clearness of conception in a dream, taketh away distrust, unless the strangeness be excessive, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he awaketh.

10. Nor is it impossible for a man to be so far deceived, as when his dream is past, to think it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind,. and in such order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he findeth himself when he awaketh (all which may happen) I know no Kritirion or mark by which he can discern whether it were a dream or not, and do therefore the less wonder to hear a man sometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision.

Chapter 4: Of the Several Kinds of Discursion of the Mind

1. THE SUCCESSION of conceptions in the mind, their series or consequence of one after another, may be casual and incoherent, as in dreams for the most part; and it may be orderly, as when the former thought introduceth the latter; and this is discourse of the mind. But because the word discourse is commonly taken for the coherence and consequence of words, I will (to avoid equivocation) call it DISCURSION.

2. The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another, is their first coherence, or consequence at that time when they were produced by sense. As for example: from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, for the same cause; from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to church, from church to people, and from people to tumult. And according to this example, the mind may run almost from any thing to any thing. But as to the sense the conception of cause and effect succeed one another. so may they after sense in the imagination. And for the most part they do so. The cause whereof is the appetite of them, who, having a conception of the end, have next unto it a conception of the next means to that end. As when a man, from the thought of honour to which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of wisdom, which is the next means thereto; and from thence to the thought of study, which is the next means to wisdom, etc.

3. To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from any thing to any thing, there are of the other kind divers sorts. As first in the senses:

there are certain coherences of conceptions, which we may call RANGING. Examples whereof are: a man's casting his eye upon the ground, to look about for some small thing lost; the hounds casting about at a fault in hunting; and the ranging of spaniels. And herein we take a beginning arbitrarily.

4. Another sort of discursion is, when the appetite giveth a man his beginning, as in the example before adduced: where honour, to which a man hath appetite, maketh him to think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latins call sagacitas, SAGACITY, and we may call it hunting or tracing, as dogs trace the beast by the smell, and men hunt them by their footsteps; or as men hunt after riches, place, or knowledge.

5. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward, from the thought of the place where we miss it, to the thought of the place from whence we came last; and from the thought of that, to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called REMINISCENCE.

6. The remembrance of the succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an EXPERIMENT; whether the same be made by us voluntarily, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it; or not made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many experiments, is that we call EXPERIENCE, which is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed with what consequents.

7. No man can have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future is not yet. But of our conceptions of the past, we make a future; or rather, call past, future relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to see

like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then. As for example: because a man hath often seen offences followed by punishment, when he seeth an offence in present, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto. But consequent unto that which is present, men call future. And thus we make remembrance to be prevision or conjecture of things to come, or EXPECTATION or PRESUMPTION of the future.

8. In the same manner, if a man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to what he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth. As for example: he that hath seen the ashes remain after the fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been fire. And this is called CONJECTURE of the past, or presumption of fact.

9. When a man hath so often observed like antecedents to be followed by like consequents, that whensoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent; or when he seeth the consequent, he maketh account there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent, SIGNS one of another, as clouds are a sign of rain to come, and rain of clouds past.

10. This taking of signs from experience, is that wherein men do ordinarily think, the difference stands between man and man in wisdom, by which they commonly understand a man's whole ability or power cognitive. But this is an error; for these signs are but conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their assurance is more or less; but never full and evident; for though a man hath always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally. Experience concludeth nothing universally. If the signs hit twenty times for once missing, a man may lay a

wager of twenty to one of the event; but may not conclude it for a truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall conjecture best, that have most experience: because they have most signs to conjecture by; which is the reason that old men are more prudent, that is, conjecture better, caeteris paribus, than young. For, being older, they remember more; and experience is but remembrance. And men of quick imagination, caeteris paribus, are more prudent than those whose imaginations are slow: for they observe more in less time. And PRUDENCE is nothing else but conjecture from experience, or taking signs of experience warily, that is, that the experiments from which one taketh such signs be all remembered; for else the cases are not alike, that seem so.

11. As in conjectural things concerning past and future, it is prudence to conclude from experience, what is likely to come to pass, or to have passed already; so is it an error to conclude from it, that is so or so called. That is to say, we cannot from experience conclude, that any thing is to be called just or unjust, true or false, nor any proposition universal whatsoever, except it be from remembrance of the use of names imposed arbitrarily by men. For example: to have heard a sentence given (in the like case the like sentence a thousand times) is not enough to conclude that the sentence is just (though most men have no other means to conclude by); but it is necessary, for the drawing of such conclusion, to trace and find out, by many experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust, and the like. Farther, there is another caveat to be taken in concluding by experience, from the tenth section of the second chapter., that is, that we conclude not such things to be without, that are within us.

Chapter 5: Of Names, Reasoning, and Discourse of the Tongue

1. SEEING THE succession of conceptions in the mind are caused (as hath been said before) by the succession they had one to another when they were produced by the senses; and that there is no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must needs follow, that one conception followeth not another, according to our election, and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger. But man, who in this point beginneth to advance himself above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined and devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which when he seeth again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A MARK therefore is a sensible object which a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to remember thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense again. As men that have passed by a rock at sea, set up some mark, whereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.

2. In the number of these marks, are those human voices (which we call the names or appellations of things) sensible to the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we give those names or appellations. As the appellation white bringeth to remembrance the

quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us. A NAME or APPELLATION therefore is the voice of a man, arbitrarily imposed, for a mark to bring to his mind some conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.

3. Things named, are either the objects themselves, as man; or the conception itself that we have of man, as shape or motion; or some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive, not in him. As when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the name of unjust and infinite, which signify privation or defect either in the thing named, or in us that give the name. And to the privations themselves we give the names injustice and infiniteness. So that here be two sorts of names: one of things, in which we conceive something, or of the conceptions themselves, which are called POSITIVE; the other of things wherein we conceive privation or defect, and those names are called PRIVATIVE.

4. By the advantage of names it is that we are capable of science, which beasts, for want of them, are not; nor man, without the use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of her many young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, three, &c., which we call number; so neither would a man, without repeating orally, or mentally, the words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him.

5. Seeing there be many conceptions of one and the same thing, and for every several conception we give it a several name; it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of just, valiant, &c., for divers virtues, and of strong, comely, &c., for divers qualities of the body. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation. As to all things we see, we give the same name of visible; and to all things we see moved, we give the appellation of

moveable. And those names we give to many, are called UNIVERSAL to them all; as the name man to every particular of mankind: such appellations as we give to one only thing, are called individual, or SINGULAR; as Socrates, and other proper names; or, by circumlocution, as: he that writ the Iliad, for Homer.

6. This universality of one name to many things, hath been the cause that men think that the things themselves are universal. And do seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet somewhat else that we call man, (viz.) man in general, deceiving themselves by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth. For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter shall choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, have been, or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person himself chooseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing universal but names; which are therefore also called indefinite; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited or restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way.

7. The appellations that be universal, and common to many things, are not always given to all the particulars, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions and considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are not of constant signification, but bring into our minds other thoughts than those for which they were ordained. And these are called EQUIVOCAL. As for example, the word faith sometimes signifieth the same with belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which

maketh a Christian; and sometimes it signifieth the keeping of a promise. Also all metaphors are (by profession) equivocal. And there is scarce any word that is not made equivocal by divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.

8. This equivocation of names maketh it difficult to recover those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the drift, and occasion, and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves; but also in our own discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth not unto us our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call UNDERSTANDING.

9. Of two appellations, by the help of this little verb is, or something equivalent, we make an AFFIRMATION or NEGATION, either of which in the Schools we call also a proposition, and consisteth of two appellations joined together by the said verb is: as for example, this is a proposition: man is a living creature; or this: man is not righteous; whereof the former is called an affirmation, because the appellation living creature is positive; the latter a negation, because not righteous is privative.

10. In every proposition, be it affirmative or negative, the latter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this proposition, charity is a virtue, the name of virtue comprehendeth the name of charity (and many other virtues besides), and then is the proposition said to be TRUE or TRUTH: for, truth, and a true proposition, is all one. Or else the latter appellation comprehendeth not the former; as in this proposition, every man is just, the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is the name of the far greater part of men. And then the proposition is said to be FALSE, or falsity: falsity and a false proposition being the same thing.

11. In what manner of two propositions, whether both affirmative, or one affirmative, the other negative, is made a SYLLOGISM, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or propositions, though necessary, is but dry discourse: and this place is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be few men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any conclusion I shall hereafter make, in this discourse, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this place, that making of syllogisms is that we call RATIOCINATION or reasoning.

12. Now when a man reasoneth from principles that are found indubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right reason; but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any evident truth whatsoever, then is he said to have concluded against reason: and such a conclusion is called absurdity.

13. As the invention of names hath been necessary for the drawing of men out of ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary coherence of one conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated men into error: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit of words and ratiocination they exceed brute beasts in knowledge; by the incommodities that accompany the same they exceed them also in errors. For true and false are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere to propositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another.. as men have.

14. It is the nature almost of every corporeal thing, being often moved in one and the same manner, to receive continually a greater and greater easiness and aptitude to the same motion; insomuch as in time the same becometh so habitual, that to beget it, there needs no more than to begin it.

The passions of man, as they are the beginning of all his voluntary motions, so are they the beginning of speech, which is the motion of his tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions which are within themselves, and to that end. having invented language, have by that means transferred all that discursion of their mind mentioned in the former chapter, by the motion of their tongues, into discourse of words; and *ratio*, now, is but *oratio*, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word, the rest follow habitually, and are not followed by the mind. As it is with beggars, when they say their paternoster, putting together such words, and in such manner, as in their education they have learned from their nurses, from their companions, or from their teachers, having no images or conceptions in their minds answering to the words they speak. And as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power of those deceptions of sense, mentioned chapter 11 section 10, and also how unconstantly names have been settled, and how subject they are to equivocation, and how diversified by passion, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to rectify so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginning anew from the very first grounds of all our knowledge, sense; and, instead of books, reading over orderly one's own conceptions: in which meaning I take *nosce teipsum* for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.

Chapter 6: Of a Knowledge, Opinion and Relief

1. THERE IS a story somewhere, of one that pretended to have been miraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by St. Alban or other St., at the town of St. Alban's; and that the Duke of Gloucester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle, asked the man, What colour is this? who, by answering, It is green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though by his sight newly received he might distinguish between green, and red, and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight, which of them was called green, or red, or by other name. By this we may understand, there be two sorts of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else but sense, or knowledge original (as I have said at the beginning of the second chapter), and remembrance of the same; the other is called science or knowledge of the truth of propositions, and how things are called, and is derived from understanding. Both of these sorts are but experience; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from without; and the latter the experience men have of the proper use of names in language. And all experience being (as I have said) but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of the former, the register we keep in books, is called history. but the registers of the latter are called the sciences.

2. There are two things necessarily implied in this word knowledge; the one is truth, the other evidence; for what is not true, can never be known. For let a man say he knoweth a thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear to be false, he is driven to a confession, that it was not knowledge, but opinion. Likewise, if the truth be not evident, though a man

holdeth it, yet is his knowledge of it no more than theirs that hold the contrary. For if truth were enough to make it knowledge, all truths were known: which is not so.

3. What truth is, hath been defined in the precedent chapter; what evidence is, I now set down. And it is the concomitance of a man's conception with the words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination. For when a man reasoneth with his lips only, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind, out of a custom of so speaking; though he begin his ratiocination with true propositions, and proceed with perfect syllogisms, and thereby make always true conclusions; yet are not his conclusions evident to him, for want of the concomitance of conception with his words. For if the words alone were sufficient, a parrot might be taught as well to know a truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to truth, as the sap is to the tree, which so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive; when it forsaketh them, they die. For this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth; without it truth is nothing worth.

4. Knowledge, therefore, which we call SCIENCE, I define to be evidence of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense. For the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are always conceptions of the mind; nor can we remember those conceptions, without the thing that produced the same by our senses. The first principle of knowledge therefore is, that We have such and such conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus named the things whereof they are conceptions; the third is, that we have joined those names in such manner, as to make true propositions; the fourth and last is, that we have joined those propositions in such manner as they be concluding. And by these four steps the conclusion is known and

evident, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known. And of these two kinds of knowledge, whereof the former is experience of fact, and the latter evidence of truth: as the former, if it be great, is called prudence, so the latter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by ancient and modern writers, SAPIENCE or wisdom: and of this latter, man only is capable; of the former, brute beasts also participate.

5. A proposition is said to be supposed, when, being not evident, it is nevertheless admitted for a time, to the end, that joining to it other propositions, we may conclude something; and so proceed from conclusion to conclusion, for a trail whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible conclusion; which if it do, then we know such supposition to have been false.

6. But if running through many conclusions, we come to none that are absurd, then we think the supposition probable; likewise we think probable whatsoever proposition we admit for truth by error of reasoning, or from trusting to other men. And all such propositions as are admitted by trust or error, we are not said to know, but think them to be true: and the admittance of them is called OPINION.

7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out of trust to other men, they are said to believe it; and their admittance of it is called BELIEF, and sometimes faith.

8. It is either science or opinion which we commonly mean by the word conscience: for men say that such and such a thing is true upon, or in their consciences; which they never do, when they think it doubtful; and therefore they know, or think they know it to be true. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say. It remaineth then, that that word is used by them that have an opinion, not only of the truth of the thing, but also of their knowledge of it. So that conscience, as men commonly use the word,

signifieth an opinion, not so much of the truth of the proposition, as of their own knowledge of it, to which the truth of the proposition is consequent. CONSCIENCE therefore I define to be opinion of evidence.

9. Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt, than perfect and manifest knowledge. For as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of doubt: for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are (such as is a great part of our histories), unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him. And thus much of sense, imagination, discursion, ratiocination, and knowledge, which are the acts of our power cognitive, or conceptive. That power of the mind which we call motive, differeth from the power motive of the body. for the power motive of the body is that by which it moveth other bodies, which we call strength: but the power motive of the mind, is that by which the mind giveth animal motion to that body wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our affections and passions, of which I am now to speak.

Chapter 7: Of Delight and Pain; Good and Evil

1. IN THE eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, how conceptions or apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head; which motion not stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder that motion which is called vital; when it helpeth, it is called DELIGHT, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion within the head; and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful, or by some name equivalent; the Latins have *jucunda*, a *juvando*, from helping; and the same delight, with reference to the object, is called LOVE: but when such motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called PAIN; and in relation to that which causeth it, HATRED, which the Latin expresseth sometimes by *odium*, and sometimes by *taedium*.

2. This motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth. And this solicitation is the endeavour or internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is called APPETITE; when it displeaseth, it is called AVERSION, in respect of the displeasure present; but in respect of the displeasure expected, FEAR. So that pleasure, love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing.

3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good

and evil. Nor is there any such thing as *agathon aplox*, that is to say, simply good. For even the goodness which we attribute to God Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it. And the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word PULCHRITUDO, and the signs of evil, TURPITUDO; to which we have no words precisely answerable.

4. As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense, are delight, or pain, or appetite, or fear; so are also the imaginations after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pain.

5. As appetite is the beginning of animal motion toward something which pleaseth us; so is the attaining thereof, the END of that motion, which we also call the scope, and aim, and final cause of the same: and when we attain that end, the delight we have thereby is called FRUITION: so that *bonum* and *finis* are different games, but for different considerations of the same thing.

6. And of ends, some are called *propinqui*, that is, near at hand; others *remoti*, farther off. But when the ends that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be farther off, they are not called ends, but means, and the way to those. But for an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, and have disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a farther end. Those things which please us, as the way or means to a farther end, we call PROFITABLE; and the fruition of them, USE; and those things that profit not, VAIN.

7. Seeing all delight is appetite, and appetite presupposeth a farther end, there can be no contentment but in proceeding: and therefore we are not to

marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more riches, honours, or other power; so their appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost degree of one kind of power, they pursue some other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind any other. Of those therefore that have attained to the highest degree of honour and riches, some have affected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus in the art of a gladiator. And such as affect not some such thing, must find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play, or business. And men justly complain as of a great grief, that they know not what to do. FELICITY, therefore (by which we mean continual delight), consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering.

8. There are few things in this world, but either have a mixture of good and evil, or there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other, as for example: the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as are also labour and honour, for the most part. Now when in the whole chain, the greater part is good, the whole is called good; and when the evil over-weigheth, the whole is called evil.

9. There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof the one seemeth to affect the corporeal organ of sense, and that I call SENSUAL; the greatest whereof is that, by which we are invited to give continuance to our species; and the next, by which a man is invited to meat, for the preservation of his individual person. The other sort of delight is not particular to any part of the body, and is called the delight of the mind, and is that which we call JOY. Likewise of pains, some affect the body, and are therefore called the pains of the body, and some not, and those are called GRIEF.

Chapter 8: Of the Pleasures of the Senses; Of Honour

1. HAVING IN the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed that motion and agitation of the brain which we call conception, to be continued to the heart, and there to be called passion; I have thereby obliged myself, as far forth as I can, to search out and declare, from what conception proceedeth every one of those passions which we commonly take notice of. For the things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable ways; but men have taken notice of the passions they have from them in a very few, which also are many of them without name.

2. And first, we are to consider that of conceptions there are three sorts, whereof one is of that which is present, which is sense; another, of that which is past, which is remembrance; and the third, of that which is future, which we call expectation: all which have been manifestly declared in the second and the third chapter. And every of these conceptions is pleasure present. And first for the pleasures of the body which affect the sense of touch and taste, as far forth as they be organical, their conception is sense; so also is the pleasure of all exonerations of nature; all which passions I have before named sensual pleasures; and their contraries, sensual pains; to which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of odours, if any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part they are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come from others: the displeasure therefore, in these is a conception of hurt thereby as being unwholesome, and is

therefore a conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight of hearing, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby. Simple sounds please by continuance and equality, as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch that it seemeth an equality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is called harshness: such as is grating, and some other sounds, which do not always affect the body, but only sometimes, and that with a kind of horror beginning at the teeth. Harmony, or many sounds together agreeing, please by the same reason as unison, which is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any height, please by inequality and equality alternate, that is to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motions, where he also sheweth, that two sounds differing a fifth, delight the ear by an equality of striking after two inequalities; for the higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other striketh but twice. In the like manner he sheweth, wherein consisteth the pleasure of concord, and the displeasure of discord, in other differences of notes. There is yet another pleasure and displeasure of sounds, which consisteth in consequence of one note after another, diversified both by accent and measure: whereof that which pleaseth is called air. But for what reason succession in one tone and measure is more air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them may imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; for no air pleaseth but for a time, no more doth imitation. Also the pleasures of the eye consist in a certain equality of colour: for light, the most glorious of all colours, is made by equal operation of the object; whereas colour is (perturbed, that is to say) unequal light, as hath been said chap. II, sect. 8. And therefore colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are. And as harmony is a pleasure to the

ear, which consisteth of divers sounds; so perhaps may some mixture of divers colours be harmony to the eye, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by the ear, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is of another nature, and not (as these) conception of the present, but rejoicing in their own skill; of which nature are the passions of which I am to speak next.

3. Conception of the future is but a supposition of the same, proceeding from remembrance of what is Past; and we so far conceive that anything will be hereafter, as we know there is something at the present that hath power to produce it. And that anything hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power able to produce something; whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the passions whereof I am to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to say, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go any farther, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this power.

4. By this power I mean the same with the faculties of body and mind, mentioned in the first chapter, that is to say, of the body, nutritive, generative, motive; and of the mind, knowledge. And besides those, such farther powers, as by them are acquired (viz.) riches, place of authority, friendship or favour, and good fortune; which last is really nothing else but the favour of God Almighty. The contraries of these are impotences, infirmities, or defects of the said powers respectively. And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention.

5. The signs by which we know our own power are those actions which proceed from the same; and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such powers produce: and the acknowledgment of power is called HONOUR; and to honour a man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself. And HONOURABLE are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or excess above his concurrent in another. As for example:

- Beauty of person, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and other signs of natural heat, are honourable, being signs precedent of power generative, and much issue; as also, general reputation amongst those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same.

- And actions proceeding from strength of body and open force, are honourable, as signs consequent of power motive, such as are victory in battle or duel; et a avoir tue son homme.

- Also to adventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent of opinion of our own strength: and that opinion a sign of the strength itself.

- And to teach or persuade are honourable, because they be signs of knowledge.

- And riches are honourable; as signs of the power that acquired them.

- And gifts, costs, and magnificence of houses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches.

- And nobility is honourable by reflection, as signs of power in the ancestors.

- And authority, because a sign of strength, wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained.

- And good fortune or casual prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no less than that we attain unto us by industry.

And the contraries, or defects, of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or WORTH of a man. For so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the use of all it can do.

6. The signs of honour are those by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another. Such as these:-To praise; to magnify; to bless, or call happy; to pray or supplicate to; to thank; to offer unto or present; to obey; to hearken to with attention; to speak to with consideration; to approach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from; to give the way to, and the like; which are the honour the inferior giveth to the superior.

But the signs of honour from the superior to the inferior, are such as these: to praise or prefer him before his concurrent; to hear him more willingly; to speak to him more familiarly; to admit him nearer. to employ him rather. to ask his advice rather; to like his opinions; and to give him any gift rather than money, or if money, so much as may not imply his need of a little: for need of little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough for examples of the signs of honour and of power.

7. Reverence is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath a power to do unto us both good and hurt, but not the will to do us hurt.

8. In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions in particular, whereof we are to speak in the next chapter.

Chapter 9: Of the Passions of the Mind

1. GLORY, OR internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us. The signs whereof, besides those in the countenance, and other gestures of the body which cannot be described, are, ostentation in words, and insolency in actions; and this passion, by them whom it displeaseth, is called pride: by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just valuation of himself. This imagination of our power and worth, may be an assured and certain experience of our own actions, and then is that glorying just and well grounded, and begetteth an opinion of increasing the same by other actions to follow; in which consisteth the appetite which we call ASPIRING, or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion may proceed not from any conscience of our own actions, but from fame and trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is FALSE GLORY, and the aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill-success. Farther, the fiction (which also is imagination) of actions done by ourselves, which never were done, is glorying; but because it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is merely vain and unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some romant, or to be like unto some other man whose acts he admireth. And this is called VAIN GLORY: and is exemplified in the fable by the fly sitting on the axletree, and saying to himself, What a dust do I raise! The expression of vain glory is that we call a wish, which some of the Schoolmen, mistaking for some appetite distinct from all the rest, have called velleity,

making a new word, as they made a new passion which was not before. Signs of vain glory in the gesture, are imitation of others, counterfeiting attention to things they understand not, affectation of fashions, captation of honour from their dreams, and other little stories of themselves, from their country, from their names, and the like.

2. The passion contrary to glory, proceeding from apprehension of our own infirmity, is called HUMILITY by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, DEJECTION and poorness; which conception may be well or ill grounded. If well, it produceth fear to attempt any thing rashly; if ill, it may be called vain fear, as the contrary is vain glory, and consisteth in fear of the power, without any other sign of the act to follow, as children fear to go in the dark, upon imagination of spirits, and fear all strangers as enemies. This is the passion which utterly cows a man, that he neither dare speak publicly, nor expect good success in any action.

3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a good opinion of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of the forwardness which that passion begetteth, discover in himself some defect or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and this passion is called SHAME, by which being cooled and checked in his forwardness, he is more wary for the time to come. This passion, as it is a sign of infirmity, which is dishonour; so also it is a sign of knowledge, which is honour. The sign of it is blushing, which happeneth less in men conscious of their own defects, because they less betrary the infirmities they acknowledge.

4. COURAGE, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.

5. ANGER (or sudden courage) is nothing but the appetite or desire of overcoming present opposition. It hath been commonly defined to be grief

proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. REVENGEFULNESS is that passion which ariseth from an expectation or imagination of making him that hath hurt us, to find his own action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the height of revenge. For though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity and subjection of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Caesar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison: Hath he escaped me? To kill is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves of fear; revenge aimeth at triumph, which over the dead is not.

7. REPENTANCE is the passion that proceedeth from opinion or knowledge that the action they have done is out of the way to the end they would attain. The effect whereof is, to pursue that way no longer; but, by consideration of the end, to direct themselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion is grief. But the expectation or conception of returning again into the way, is joy. And consequently, the passion of repentance is compounded and allayed of both, but the predominant is joy, else were the whole grief; which cannot be. For as much as he that proceedeth towards the end, conceiveth good, he proceedeth with appetite. And appetite is joy, as hath been said, chap. VII, sect. 3.

8. HOPE is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minds: if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the

whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute privation of hope is DESPAIR, a degree whereof is DIFFIDENCE.

9. TRUST is a passion proceeding from belief of him from whom we expect or hope for good, so free from doubt that upon the same we pursue no other way. And distrust, or diffidence, is doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.

10. PITY is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's present calamity; but when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is the greater, because then there appeareth the more probability that the same may happen to us. For the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence also it is, that men pity the vices of some they never saw before; and therefore every proper man finds pity amongst women, when he goeth to the gallows. The contrary of pity is HARDNESS of heart, proceeding either from slowness of imagination, or from extreme great opinion of their own exemption of the like calamity, or from hatred of all, or most men.

11. INDIGNATION is that grief which consisteth in the conception of good success happening to them whom they think unworthy thereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they have, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the mind, these two, indignation and pity, are most easily raised and increased by eloquence; for the aggravation of the

calamity, and extenuation of the fault, augmenteth pity. And the extenuation of the worth of the person, together with the magnifying of his success (which are the parts of an orator), are able to turn these two passions into fury.

12. EMULATION is grief arising from seeing one's self exceeded or excelled by his concurrent, together with hope to equal or exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, ENVY is the same grief joined with pleasure conceived in the imagination of some ill fortune that may befall him.

13. There is a passion which hath no name, but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance we call LAUGHTER, which is always joy, but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, hath not hitherto been declared by any. That it consisteth in wit, or, as they call it, in the jest, this experience confuteth: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, therein there lieth no wit or jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must be new and unexpected. Men laugh often (especially such as are greedy of applause from every thing they do well) at their own actions performed never so little beyond their own expectation; as also at their own jests: and in this case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth from a sudden conception of some ability in himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at the infirmities of others, by comparison of which their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also men laugh at jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant discovering and conveying to our minds some absurdity or another. And in this case also the passion of laughter proceedeth from the sudden imagination of our own odds and eminence; for what is else the recommending ourselves to our own good opinion, by comparison with another man's infirmities or absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonour we

participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that men take it heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons, and where all the company may laugh together. For laughing to one's self putteth all the rest to a jealousy and examination of themselves; besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmities of another sufficient matter for his triumph.

14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another distortion of the face with tears, called WEEPING, is the sudden falling out with ourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and therefore children weep often; for seeing they think every thing ought to be given unto them which they desire, of necessity every repulse must be a sudden check of their expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they look for. For the same cause women are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to measure their power by the power and love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of the adversary; and such are the tears of reconciliation. Also pityful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding of those men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it proceedeth from in women and children.

15. The appetite which men call LUST, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a sensual pleasure, but not only that; there is in it also a delight

of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind, consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please. But this name lust is used where it is condemned: otherwise it is called by the general word love; for the passion is one and the same indefinite desire of the different sex, as natural as hunger.

16. Of love, by which is understood the joy a man taketh in the fruition of any present good, hath been already spoken in the first section of the seventh chapter, under which is contained the love men bear to one another, or pleasure they take in one another's company; and by which men are said to be sociable by nature. But there is another kind of LOVE, which the Greeks call Eros, and is that which we mean, when we say: that man or woman is in love. For as much as this passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but that it participateth of that indefinite love mentioned in the former section. But there is a great difference between the desire of a man indefinite, and the same desire limited ad hanc; and this is that love which is the great theme of poets. But notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word need; for it is a conception of the need a man hath of that one person desired. The cause of this passion is not always, nor for the most part, beauty, or other quality, in the beloved, unless there be withal hope in the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this: that in great difference of persons, the greater have often fallen in love with the meaner; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon something in their person, than those that trust to their expressions and service; and they that care less, than they that care more; which not perceiving many men cast away their services, as one arrow after another; till in the end together with their hopes they lose their wits.

17. There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good will or CHARITY. There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power, than to find himself able, not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity. In which, first, is contained that natural affection of parents to their children, which the Greeks call Storgi, as also that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers, is not to be called charity, but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or fear, which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning honourable love, delivered (according to his custom, in the person of Socrates) in the dialogue intituled Convivium, is this: that a man full and pregnant with wisdom, or other virtue, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And this is the idea of the then noted love of Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful; in which love, is not sought the honour, but issue of his knowledge; contrary to common love, to which though issue sometimes follow, yet men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should therefore be this charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet continent men have the passion they contain, as much or more than they that satiate the appetite; which maketh me suspect this platonic love for merely sensual; but with an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.

18. Forasmuch as all knowledge beginneth from experience, therefore also new experience is the beginning of new knowledge, and the increase of

experience the beginning of the increase of knowledge; whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him hope and matter of knowing somewhat that he knew not before. And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that happeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly call ADMIRATION; and the same considered as appetite, is called curiosity, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning faculties, man leaveth all community with beasts at the faculty of imposing names; so also doth he surmount their nature at this passion of curiosity. For when a beast seeth anything new or strange to him; he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer it, or flieth from it; whereas man, who in most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also the supposition of such causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all philosophy: as astronomy from the admiration of the course of heaven; natural philosophy from the strange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the degrees of curiosity proceed also the degrees of knowledge among men; for to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversion of little pleasure to consider, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplation of any strange accident, than whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Because curiosity is delight, therefore also all novelty is so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an opinion true or false of bettering his own estate. For in such case they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have while the cards are shuffling.

19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names; whereof some nevertheless have been by most men observed. For example: from what passion proceedeth it, that men take pleasure to behold from the shore the danger of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly in the whole sum joy, else men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both joy and grief. For as there is novelty and remembrance of own security present, which is delight; so is there also pity, which is grief. But the delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends.

20. MAGNANIMITY is no more than glory, of which I have spoken in the first section; but glory well grounded upon certain experience of power sufficient to attain his end in open manner. And PUSILLANIMITY is the doubt of that; whatsoever therefore is a sign of vain glory, the same is also a sign of pusillanimity. for sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one's end. To be pleased or displeased with fame true or false, is a sign of the same, because he that relieth upon fame, hath not his success in his own power. Likewise art and fallacy are signs of pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Also proneness to anger, because it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Also ostentation of ancestors, because all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they have it, than of another's. To be at enmity and contention with inferiors, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. To laugh at others, because it is affectation of glory from other men's infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Also irresolution, which proceedeth from want of power enough to contemn the little differences that make deliberations hard.

21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it holdeth not in every point, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose that we may thereby

both see and remember almost all the passions before mentioned. But this race we must suppose to have no other goal, nor no other garland, but being foremost. And in it:

To endeavour is appetite. To be remiss is sensuality. To consider them behind is glory. To consider them before is humility. To lose ground with looking back vain glory. To be holden, hatred. To turn back, repentance. To be in breath, hope. To be weary despair. To endeavour to overtake the next, emulation. To supplant or overthrow, envy. To resolve to break through a stop foreseen courage. To break through a sudden stop anger. To break through with ease, magnanimity. To lose ground by little hindrances, pusillanimity. To fall on the sudden is disposition to weep. To see another fall, disposition to laugh. To see one out-gone whom we would not is pity. To see one out-go we would not, is indignation. To hold fast by another is to love. To carry him on that so holdeth, is charity. To hurt one's-self for haste is shame. Continually to be out-gone is misery. Continually to out-go the next before is felicity. And to forsake the course is to die.

Chapter 10: Of the Difference Between Men In These Discerning Faculty and the Cause

1. HAVING SHEWED in the precedent chapters, that the imagination of men proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the brain, or some internal substance of the head; and that the passions proceed from the alteration there made, and continued to the heart: it is consequent in the next place (seeing the diversity of degree in knowledge in divers men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers temper of the brain) to declare what other causes may produce such odds, and excess of capacity, as we daily observe in one man above another. And for that difference which ariseth from sickness, and such accidental distemper, I omit the same, as impertinent to this place, and consider it only in such as have their health, and organs well disposed. If the difference were in the natural temper of the brain, I can imagine no reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal temper in the common organ (namely the brain) of all the senses.

2. But we see by experience, that joy and grief proceed not in all men from the same causes, and that men differ. much in constitution of body, whereby, that which helpeth and furthereth vital constitution in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth and crosseth it in another, and causeth grief. The difference therefore of wits hath its original from the different passions, and from the ends to which their appetite leadeth them.

3. And first, those men whose ends are some sensual delight; and generally are addicted to ease, food, onerations and exonerations of the

body, must of necessity thereby be the less delighted with those imaginations that conduce not to those ends, such as are imaginations of honour and glory, which, as I have said before, have respect to the future: for sensuality consisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the present, and taketh away the inclination to observe such things as conduce to honour; and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to knowledge or to other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency of power cognitive. And this is it which men call DULNESS; and proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from a grossness and difficulty of the motion of the spirits about the heart.

4. The contrary hereunto, is that quick ranging of mind described chap. IV, sect. 3, which is joined with curiosity of comparing the things that come into his mind one with another. In which comparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected similitude in things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place the excellency of FANCY: and from thence proceed those grateful similies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both poets and orators have it in their power to make things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to exact and perfect knowledge: and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of persons, places, and seasons; it is commonly termed by the name of JUDGMENT: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern; and both fancy and judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of wit, which seemeth a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiveness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.

5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call LEVITY, which betrayeth also mobility in the spirits, but in excess. An example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream, or some studied nonsense. The passion from which this proceedeth, is curiosity, but with too much equality and indifferency: for when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed.

6. The virtue opposite to this defect is Gravity, or steadiness; in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.

7. The extremity of dulness is that natural folly which may be called STOLIDITY: but the extreme of levity, though it be a natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man's observation, yet it hath no name.

8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Amathia, which is INDOCIBILITY, or difficulty of being taught; the which must needs arise from a false opinion that they know already the truth of that which is called in question. For certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the evidence is unequal of what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and right ratiocination delivered unto them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds; it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause therefore of indocibility, is prejudice; and of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men call MADNESS, which appeareth to be nothing else but some imagination of such predominance above all the rest, that we have no passion but from it. And this conception is nothing else but excessive vain glory, or vain dejection; as is most probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance, every one of them, from some pride, or some dejection of mind. As first we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was spiritual pride or madness. We have had divers examples also of learned madness, in which men have manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned madmen may be numbered (I think) also those that determine of the time of the world's end, and other such points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading of romants may produce in pusillanimous men. Also rage and madness of love, are but great indications of them in whose brains are predominant the contempts of their enemies, or their mistresses. And the pride taken in form and behaviour, hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of fantastic.

10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted follies. As it is a degree of the first, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself inspired, or to have any other effect in himself of God's holy spirit than other godly men have. Of the second, for a man continually to speak his mind in a cento of other men's Greek or Latin sentences. Of the third, much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of rage, a degree is malice; and of fantastic madness, affectation.

11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there be other

examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from too much vain fear and dejection: as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some other like imagination; and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.

Chapter 11: What Imaginations and Passions Men Have, at the Names of Things Supernatural

1. HITHERTO OF the knowledge of things natural, and of the passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give names not only to things natural, but also to supernatural; and by all names we ought to have some meaning and conception: it followeth in the next place, to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the mind we have, when we take into our mouths the most blessed name of GOD, and the names of those virtues we attribute unto him; as also, what image cometh into the mind at hearing the name of spirit, or the name of angel, good or bad.

2. Forasmuch as God Almighty. is incomprehensible, it followeth that we can have no conception or image of the Deity; and consequently all his attributes signify our inability and defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this: that there is a God. For the effects we acknowledge naturally, do necessarily include a power of their producing, before they were produced; and that power presupposeth something existent that hath such power; and the thing so existing with power to produce, if it were not eternal, must needs have been produced by somewhat before it; and that again by something else before that: till we come to an eternal, that is to say, to the first power of all powers, and first cause of all causes. And this is it which all men call by the name of GOD: implying eternity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotency. And thus all men that will consider, may naturally know that God is, though not what he is; even as a man though born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any imagination what kind of thing is fire;

yet he cannot but know that something there is that men call fire, because it warmeth him.

3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, seeing, hearing, speaking, knowing, loving, and the like; by which names we understand something in the men to whom we attribute them, we understand nothing by them in the nature of God. For, as it is well reasoned: Shall not God that made the eye, see? and the ear, hear? so is it also, if we say: shall God that made the eye, not see without the eye? and that made the ear, not hear without the. ear? or that made the brain, not know without the brain? or that made the heart, not love without the heart? The attributes therefore given unto the Deity, are such as signify either our incapacity, or our reverence; our incapacity, when we say: incomprehensible and infinite: our reverence, when we give him those names, which amongst us are the names of those things we most magnify and commend, as omnipotent, omniscient, just, merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but anthropopathos, that is to say, by descending to our manner of speaking: without which we are not capable of understanding him.

4. By the name of spirit we understand a body natural, but of such subtilty that it worketh not on the senses; but that filleth up the place which the image of a visible body might fill up. Our conception therefore of spirit consisteth of figure without colour; and in figure is understood dimension: and consequently, to conceive a spirit, is to conceive something that hath dimension. But spirits supernatural commonly signify some substance without dimension; which two words do flatly contradict one another. And therefore when we attribute the name of spirit unto God, we attribute it, not as a name of anything we conceive, no more than when we ascribe unto him sense and understanding; but as a signification of our reverence, who desire to abstract from him all corporeal grossness.

5. Concerning other spirits, which some men call spirits incorporeal, and some corporeal, it is not possible, by natural means only, to come to knowledge of so much, as that there are such things. We who are Christians acknowledge that there be angels good and evil; and that they are spirits, and that the soul of man is a spirit; and that these spirits are immortal. But, to know it, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same: it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, as it is said chap. VI, sect. 3; and all conception is imagination and proceedeth from sense: chap. III, sect. I. And spirits we suppose to be those substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledge spirits, yet doth it nowhere say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without dimensions and quantity; nor, I think, is that word incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the spirit, that it abideth in men; sometime that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and cometh and goeth; and that spirits are angels, that is to say messengers: all which words do consignify locality; and locality is dimension; and whatsoever hath dimension, is body, be it never so subtile. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, who hold angels and spirits for corporeal, than them that hold the contrary. And it is a plain contradiction in natural discourse, to say of the soul of man, that it is tota in toto, and: tota in qualibet parte corporis, grounded neither upon reason nor revelation; but proceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are called spectra, images that appear in the dark to children, and such as have strong fears, and other strong imaginations, as hath been said chap. III, sect. 5, where I call them phantasms. For taking them to be things really without us, like bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to bodies; what could they call them else, but incorporeal bodies? which is not a name, but an absurdity of speech.

6. It is true, that the heathens, and all nations of the world, have acknowledged that there are spirits, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it may be thought that a man by natural reason, may arrive, without the knowledge of Scripture, to the knowledge of this; that spirits are. But the erroneous collection thereof by the heathens may proceed, as I have said before, from ignorance of the causes of ghosts and phantasms, and such other apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their number of gods, their number of daemons good and bad; and for every man his genius; which is not the acknowledging of this truth: that spirits are; but a false opinion concerning the force of imagination.

7. And seeing the knowledge we have of spirits, is not natural knowledge, but faith from supernatural revelation, given to the holy writers of Scripture; it followeth that of inspiration also, which is the operation of spirits in us, the knowledge we have must all proceed from Scripture. The signs there set down of inspiration, are miracles, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture. As for example: the inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of his sacrifice. But the signs to distinguish whether a spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man or a tree be good or evil: namely actions and fruit. For there be lying spirits wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as with spirits of truth. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by the spirits. For miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them, Matt. 24, 24. And Saint Paul saith, Gal. 1, 8: Though an angel from heaven preach unto you otherwise, &c. let him be accursed. Where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the doctrine be true or no, by the angel; but whether the angel saith true or no, by the doctrine. So likewise, I Joh. cha vers. 1: Believe not every spirit: for false prophets are gone out into the world; verse 2: Hereby shall ye know the spirit of God: every spirit

that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; verse 3: And every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist; verse 15: Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God. The knowledge therefore we have of good and evil inspiration, cometh not by vision of an angel that may teach it, nor by a miracle that may seem to confirm it; but by conformity of doctrine with this article and fundamental point of Christian faith, which also Saint Paul saith 1 Cor. 3, 11, is the sole foundation: that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh.

8. But if inspiration be discerned by this point; and this point be acknowledged and believed upon the authority of the Scriptures: how (may some men ask) know we that the Scripture deserveth so great authority, which must be no less than that of the lively voice of God? that is, how we know the Scriptures to be the word of God? And first, it is manifest: that if by knowledge we understand science infallible and natural, such as is defined in the VI cha sect., proceeding from sense; we cannot be said to know it, because it proceedeth from the conceptions engendered by sense. And if we understand knowledge as supernatural, we cannot know it but by inspiration; and of that inspiration we cannot judge, but by the doctrine. It followeth therefore, that we have not any way, natural or supernatural, that knowledge thereof which can properly be called infallible science and evidence. It remaineth, that the knowledge we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is only faith. For whatsoever is evident either by natural reason, or by revelation supernatural, is not called faith; else should not faith cease, no more than charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the doctrine of Scripture. And, we are not said to believe, but to know those things which are evident.

9. Seeing then the acknowledgment of the Scriptures to be the word of God, is not evidence, but faith; and faith, chap. VI, sect. 7, consisteth in the

trust we have in other men: it appeareth plainly that the men so trusted, are the holy men of God's church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh; nor doth this imply that God is not the worker and efficient cause of faith, or that faith is begotten in man without the spirit of God; for all those good opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from hearing, and hearing from teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the work of God. For all the works of nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God. As for example Exod. 28, 3: Thou shalt speak unto all cunning men, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, that they make Aaron's garments for his consecration, that he may serve me in the priest's office. The faith therefore wherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God, in that sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and cunning in workmanship more than to another; and by which he effecteth also in other points pertaining to our ordinary life, that one man believeth that, which upon the same grounds another doth not; and one man reverenceth the opinion, and obeyeth the commands of his superiors, and others not.

10. And seeing our faith, that the Scriptures are the word of God, began from the confidence and trust we repose in the church; there can be no doubt but that their interpretation of the same Scriptures, when any doubt or controversy shall arise, by which this fundamental point, that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not called in question, is safer for any man to trust to, than his own, whether reasoning, or spirit; that is to say his own opinion.

11. Now concerning man's affections to Godward, they are not the same always that are described in the chapter concerning passions. For there, to love is to be delighted with the image or conception of the thing loved; but God is unconceivable; to love God therefore, in the Scripture, is to obey his commandments, and to love one another. Also to trust God is different from

our trusting one another. For when a man trusteth a man, chap. IX, sect. 9, he layeth aside his own endeavour; but if we do so in our trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him we disobey? To trust to God Almighty therefore is to refer to his good pleasure all that is above our own power to effect. And this is all one with acknowledging one only God; which is the first commandment. And to trust in Christ is no more, but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental article of our Christian faith. And consequently to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll ourselves on Christ, is the same thing with the fundamental point of faith, namely, that Jesus Christ is the son of the living God.

12. To honour God internally in the heart, is the same thing with that we ordinarily call honour amongst men: for it is nothing but the acknowledging of his power; and the signs thereof the same with the signs of the honour due to our superiors, mentioned chap. VIII, sect. 6 (viz.): to praise, to magnify, to bless him, to pray to him, to thank him, to give oblations and sacrifice to him, to give attention to his word, to speak to him in prayer with consideration, to come into his presence with humble gesture, and in decent manner, and to adorn his worship with magnificence and cost. And these are natural signs of our honouring him internally. And therefore the contrary hereof: to neglect prayer, to speak to him extempore, to come to church slovenly, to adorn the place of his worship less than our own houses, to take up his name in every idle discourse, are manifest signs of contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered (as we be here) to put off the shoes, as Moses at the fiery bush, and some other of that kind; which in their own nature are indifferent, till to avoid indecency and discord, it be otherwise determined by common consent.

Chapter 12: How by Deliberation From Passions Proceed Men's Actions

1. IT HATH been declared already, how external objects cause conceptions, and conceptions appetite and fear, which are the first unperceived beginnings of our actions: for either the action immediately followeth the first appetite, as when we do any thing upon a sudden; or else to our first appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen unto us by such actions, which is fear, and withholdeth us from proceeding. And to that fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear, alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. This alternate succession of appetite and fear, during all the time the action is in our power to do, or not to do, is that we call DELIBERATION; which name hath been given it for that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so long, as the action whereof we deliberate, is in our power; for so long we have liberty to do or not to do: and deliberation signifieth the taking away of our own liberty.

2. Deliberation therefore requireth in the action deliberated two conditions: one, that it be future; the other, that there be hope of doing it, or possibility of not doing it. For appetite and fear are expectations of the future; and there is no expectation of good without hope; nor of evil without possibility. Of necessaries therefore there is no deliberation. In deliberation the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called WILL (viz.) the last appetite will to do; the last fear will not to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say will and last will: for though a man express his present inclination

and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by word or writing; yet shall it not be accounted his will, because he hath liberty still to dispose of them otherwise; but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his will.

3. VOLUNTARY actions and omissions are such as have beginning in the will; all other are INVOLUNTARY or MIXED. Voluntary such as a man doth upon appetite or fear. involuntary such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another; mixed, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to prison he is pulled on against his will, and yet goeth upright voluntary, for fear of being trailed along the ground: insomuch that in going to prison, going is voluntary. to the prison, involuntary. The example of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary. for, there is nothing there involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the winds; what he himself doth, is no more against his will, than to fly from danger is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.

4. Voluntary also are the actions that proceed from sudden anger, or other sudden appetite, in such men as can discern of good and evil; for in them the time precedent is to be judged deliberation. For then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.

5. Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary. For a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word will; which is absurd, and insignificant.

6. Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the causes of appetite and of fear are the causes also of our will. But the propounding of benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and punishment, is the

cause of our appetite and of our fears, and therefore also of our wills, so far forth as we believe that such rewards and benefits, as are propounded, shall arrive unto us. And consequently, our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills. In which sense they say truly and properly that say the world is governed by opinion.

7. When the wills of many concur to some one and the same action, or effect, this concourse of their wills is called CONSENT; by which we must not understand one will of many men, for every man hath his several will; but many wills to the producing of one effect. But when the wills of two divers men produce such actions as are reciprocally resistances one to the other, this is called CONTENTION: and being upon the persons of one another, BATTLE; whereas actions proceeding from consent are mutual AID.

8. When many wills are involved or included in the will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many wills in one or more called UNION.

9. In deliberations interrupted, as they may be by diversion to other business, or by sleep, the last appetite of such part of the deliberation is called INTENTION, or purpose.

Chapter 13: How by Language Men Work Upon Each Other's Minds

1. HAVING SPOKEN of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every man by himself, without relation to others; it will fall fitly into this chapter, to speak of the effects of the same powers one upon another; which effects are also the signs, by which one taketh notice of what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these signs, some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited; as actions and gestures, especially if they be sudden; whereof I have mentioned some for example sake in the ninth chapter, at the several passions whereof they are signs; others there are that may be counterfeited: and those are words or speech; of the use and effect whereof I am to speak in this place.

2. The first use of language, is the expression of our conceptions, that is, the begetting in another the same conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called TEACHING; wherein if the conceptions of him that teacheth continually accompany his words, beginning at something from experience, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him know something, which he is therefore said to LEARN. But if there be not such evidence, then such teaching is called PERSUASION, and begetteth no more in the hearer, than what is in the speaker, bare opinion. And the signs of two opinions contradictory one to another, namely' affirmation and negation of the same thing, is called a CONTROVERSY; but both affirmations, or both negations, CONSENT in opinion.

3. The infallible sign of teaching exactly, and without error, is this: that no man hath ever taught the contrary; not that few, how few soever, if any. For commonly truth is on the side of the few, rather than of the multitude; but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that so discuss them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appeareth most manifestly to them that have considered the divers subjects wherein men have exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have proceeded; together with the diversity of the success thereof. For those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of magnitudes, numbers, times, and motions, and their proportions one to another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellences, wherein we differ from such savage people as are now the inhabitants of divers places in America; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish. For from the studies of these men hath proceeded, whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by navigation; and whatsoever we have beneficial to human society by the division, distinction, and portraying of the face of the earth; whatsoever also we have by the account of times, and foresight of the course of heaven; whatsoever by measuring distances, planes, and solids of all sorts; and whatsoever either elegant or defensible in building: all which supposed away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any controversy concerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched with conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The reason whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from most low and humble principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on slowly, and with most scrupulous ratiocination (viz.) from the imposition of

names they infer the truth of their first propositions; and from two of the first, a third; and from any two of the three a fourth; and so on, according to the steps of science, mentioned chap. VI, sect. 4. On the other side, those men who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and manners of men, that is to say, of moral philosophy, or of policy, government, and laws, whereof there be infinite volumes have been so far from removing doubt and controversy in the questions they have handled, that they have very much multiplied the same; nor doth any man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered two thousand years ago by Aristotle. And yet every man thinks that in this subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no study but that it accrueth to them by natural wit; though they play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of difference between teaching and persuading; the signs of this being controversy; the sign of the former, no controversy

4. There be two sorts of men that be commonly called learned: one is that sort that proceedeth evidently from humble principles, as is described in the last section; and these men are called mathematics; the other are they that take up maxims from their education, and from the authority of men, or of custom, and take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination; and these are called dogmatics. Now seeing in the last section, those we call mathematics are absolved of the crime of breeding controversy; and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused; the fault lieth altogether in the dogmatics, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any

evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.

5. The expression of those conceptions which cause in us the expectation of good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call COUNSELLING. And as in the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do, or not to do, the consequences of the action are our counsellors, by alternate succession in the mind; so in the counsel which a man taketh from other men, the counsellors alternately do make appear the consequences of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish amongst them all him that is counselled, with arguments whereupon to deliberate within himself.

6. Another use of speech is the expression of appetite, intention, and will; as the appetite of knowledge by interrogation; appetite to have a thing done by another, as request, prayer, petition; expressions of our purpose or intention, as PROMISE, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future; THREATENING, which is the promise of evil; and COMMANDING, which is that speech by which we signify to another our appetite or desire to have any thing done, or left undone, for reason contained in the will itself: for it is not properly said, Sic volo, sic jubeo, without that other clause, Stet pro ratione voluntas: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to the action, then is that command called a LAW.

7. Another use of speech is INSTIGATION and APPEASiNG, by which we increase or diminish one another's passions; it is the same thing with persuasion: the difference not being real. For the begetting of opinion and passion is the same act; but whereas in persuasion we aim at getting opinion from passion; here, the end is, to raise passion from opinion. And as in raising an opinion. from passion, any premises are good enough to infer the desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter

whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous. For not truth, but image, maketh passion; and a tragedy affecteth no less than a murder if well acted.

8. Though words be the signs we have of one another's opinions and intentions: because the equivocation of them is so frequent, according to the diversity of contexture, and of the company wherewith they go (which the presence of him that speaketh, our sight of his actions, and conjecture of his intentions, must help to discharge us of): it must be extreme hard to find out the opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other signification thereof but their books; which cannot possibly be understood without history enough to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to observe them.

9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto us two contradictory opinions whereof the one is clearly and directly signified, and the other either drawn from that by consequence, or not known to be contradictory to it; then (when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the former of his opinions; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly, whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory expressions of a man's intention and will, for the same reason.

10. Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another, intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith; if he speak unto him, either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth; he intendeth also to make him not understand what he saith; which is a contradiction of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.

11. Silence in them that think it will be so taken, is a sign of consent; for so little labour being required to say No, it is to be presumed, that in this case he that saith it not, consenteth.

Chapter 14: Of the Estate and Right of Nature

IN THE PRECEDENT chapters hath been set forth the whole nature of man, consisting in the powers natural of his body and mind, and may all be comprehended in these four: strength of body, experience, reason, and passion.

2. In this chapter it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our nature hath placed us, and what probability it hath left us of continuing and preserving ourselves against the violence of one another. And first, if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge between men of mature age, and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit, or in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger; since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a man's life; we may conclude that men considered in mere nature, ought to admit amongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed moderate.

3. On the other side, considering the great difference there is in men, from the diversity of their passions, how some are vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows, not only when they are equal in power, but also when they are inferior; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow, that those men who are moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force of others, that will attempt to subdue them. And from hence shall proceed a general diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another.

4. Farther, since men by natural passion are divers ways offensive one to another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in

others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison: till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body.

5. Moreover, considering that many men ‘s appetites carry them to one and the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common, nor divided, it followeth that the stronger must enjoy it alone, and that it be decided by battle who is the stronger. And thus the greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do nevertheless, through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke the rest, that otherwise would be contented with equality.

6. And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire bonum sibi, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and also the greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbs, both from death and pain. And that which is not against reason, men call RIGHT, or jus, or blameless liberty of using our own natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature: that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he hath.

7. And because where a man hath right to the end, and the end cannot be attained without the means, that is, without such things as are necessary to the end, it is consequent that it is not against reason, and therefore right for a man, to use all means and do whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body.

8. Also every, man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the means, and of the greatness of the danger. For if it be against reason, that I be judge of mine own danger myself, then it is reason, that another man be judge thereof. But the same reason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern me, maketh me also judge of that that

concerneth him. And therefore I have reason to judge of his sentence, whether it be for my benefit, or not.

9. As a man's judgment, in right of nature, is to be employed for his own benefit, so also the strength, knowledge, and art of every man is then rightly employed, when he useth it for himself; else must not a man have right to preserve himself.

10. Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can. For seeing all things he willeth, must therefore be good unto him in his own judgment, because he willeth them; and may tend to his preservation some time or other; or he may judge so, and we have made him judge thereof, sect. 8: it followeth that all things may rightly also be done by him. And for this cause it is rightly said: Natura dedit omnia omnibus, that Nature hath given all things to all men; insomuch, that jus and utile, right and profit, is the same thing. But that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had right to any thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath right to the same.

11. Seeing then to the offensiveness of man's nature one to another, there is added a right of every man to every thing, whereby one man invadeth with right, and another with right resisteth; and men live thereby in perpetual diffidence, and study how to preoccupate each other; the estate of men in this natural liberty is the estate of war. For WAR is nothing else but that time wherein the will and intention of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently declared; and the time which is not war is PEACE.

12. The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another (as we know also that it is, both by the experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our

ancestors, the old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil countries, where we find the people few and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of life, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured): he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate, as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself. For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men by nature equal, and able to destroy one another.

13. Seeing this right of protecting ourselves by our own discretion and force, proceedeth from danger, and that danger from the equality between men's forces: much more reason is there, that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh, and before there be necessity of battle. A man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule or govern, to do good to, or harm, hath right, by the advantage of this his present power, to take caution at his pleasure, for his security against that other in the time to come. He therefore that hath already subdued his adversary, or gotten into his power any other that either by infancy, or weakness, is unable to resist him, by right of nature may take the best caution, that such infant, or such feeble and subdued person can give him, of being ruled and governed by him for the time to come. For seeing we intend always our own safety and preservation, we manifestly contradict that our intention, if we willingly dismiss such a one, and suffer him at once to gather strength and be our enemy. Out of which may also be collected, that irresistible might in the state of nature is right.

14. But since it is supposed from the equality of strength and other natural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby, whilst he remaineth in the state of hostility and war; reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good, to seek after peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the

same; and to strengthen himself with all the help he can procure, for his own defence against those, from whom such peace cannot be obtained; and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto.

Chapter 15: Of the Divesting Natural Right by Gift and Covenant

1. WHAT IT is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon, by those that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of nature, do allege no more than this, that it is against the consent of all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations. But it is not agreed upon, who shall judge which nations are the wisest. Others make that against the law of nature, which is contrary to the consent of all mankind; which definition cannot be allowed, because then no man could offend against the law of nature; for the nature of every man is contained under the nature of mankind. But forasmuch as all men, carried away by the violence of their passion, and by evil customs, do those things which are commonly said to be against the law of nature; it is not the consent of passion, or consent in some error gotten by custom, that makes the law of nature. Reason is no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely their own good, which is the work of reason. There can therefore be no other law of nature than reason, nor no other precepts of NATURAL LAW, than those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same may be obtained, and of defence where it may not.

2. One precept of the law of nature therefore is this, that every man divest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature. For when divers men have right not only to all things else, but to one another's persons, if they use the same, there ariseth thereby invasion on the one part, and

resistance on the other, which is war; and therefore contrary to the law of nature, the sun whereof consisteth in making peace.

3. When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he either simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another man. To RELINQUISH it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it is his will no more to do that action, which of right he might have done before. To TRANSFER right to another, is by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will not to resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto before he transferred it. For seeing that by nature every man hath right to every thing, it is impossible for a man to transfer unto another any right that he had not before. And therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right, is no more but a declaring of the will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his right, to make benefit of the same, without molestation. As for example, when a man giveth his land or goods to another, he taketh from himself the right to enter into, and make use of the said land or goods, or otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given.

4. In transferring of right, two things therefore are required: one on the part of him that transferreth; which is, a sufficient signification of his will therein: the other, on the part of him to whom it is transferred; which is, a sufficient signification of his acceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the right remaineth where it was; nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his right to one that accepteth it not, doth thereby simply relinquish it, and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it; inasmuch as the cause of the transferring the same to one, rather than to another, is in that one, rather than in the rest.

5. When there appear no other signs that a man hath relinquished, or transferred his right, but only words; it behoveth that the same be done in words, that signify the present time, or the time past, and not only the time

to come. For he that saith of the time to come, as for example, to-morrow: I will give, declareth evidently, that he hath not yet given. The right therefore remaineth in him to-day, and so continues till he have given actually. But he that saith: I give, presently, or have given to another any thing, to have and enjoy the same to-morrow, or any other time future, hath now actually transferred the said right, which otherwise he should have had at the time that the other is to enjoy it.

6. But because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the mind, as hath been shewn chap. XIII, sect. 8 words spoken de futuro, when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by other signs, may be taken very often as if they were meant de praesenti. For when it appeareth that he that giveth would have his word so understood, by him to whom he giveth, as if he did actually transfer his right, then he must needs be understood to will all that is necessary to the same.

7. When a man transferreth any right of his to another, without consideration of reciprocal benefit, past, present, or to come; this is called FREE GIFT. And in free gift no other words can be binding, but those which are de praesenti, or de praeterito: for being de futuro only, they transfer nothing, nor can they be understood, as if they proceeded from the will of the giver; because being a free gift, it carrieth with it no obligation greater than that which is enforced by the words. For he that promiseth to give, without any other consideration but his own affection, so long as he hath not given, deliberateth still, according as the causes of his affections continue or diminish; and he that deliberateth hath not yet willed, because the will is the last act of his deliberation. He that promiseth therefore, is not thereby a donor, but doson; which name was given to that Antiochus, that promised often, but seldom gave.

8. When a man transferreth his right, upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, this is not free gift, but mutual donation; and is called CONTRACT.

And in all contracts, either both parties presently perform, and put each other into a certainty and assurance of enjoying what they contract for: as when men buy or sell, or barter; or one party performeth presently, and the other promiseth, as when one selleth upon trust; or else neither party performeth presently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should be any kind of contract besides these three. For either both the contractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other not.

9. In all contracts where there is trust, the promise of him that is trusted, is called a COVENANT. And this, though it be a promise, and of the time to come, yet doth it transfer the right, when that time cometh, no less than an actual donation. For it is a manifest sign, that he which did perform, understood it was the will of him that was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants and signs of the will, or last act of deliberation, whereby the liberty of performing, or not performing, is taken away, and consequently are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.

10. Nevertheless, in contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as that nothing be by either party performed for the present, when the contract is between such as are not compellable, he that performeth first, considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every thing for their benefit, doth but betray himself thereby to the covetousness, or other passion of him with whom he contracteth. And therefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no reason why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to perform afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that doubteth, shall be judge himself (as hath been said chap. XIV, sect. 8), as long as they remain in the estate and liberty of nature. But when there shall be such power coercive over both the parties, as shall deprive them of their private judgments in this point; then may such covenants be effectual;

seeing he that performeth first shall have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other, that may be compelled thereunto.

11. And forasmuch as in all covenants, and contracts, and donations, the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred, is necessary to the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is. impossible to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence, are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is. impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.

13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as are extorted from men by fear. As for example: whether, if a man for fear of death, have promised to give a thief an hundred pounds the next day, and not discover him, whether such covenant be obligatory or not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it is not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth no reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than that which we do for covetousness.

For both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that proceedeth from fear of death, no conditions of peace between enemies, nor any laws could be of force; which are all consented to from that fear. For who would lose the liberty that nature hath given him, of governing himself by his own will and power, if they feared not death in the retaining of it? What prisoner in war might be trusted to seek his ransom, and ought not rather to be killed, if he were not tied by the grant of his life, to perform his promise? But after the introduction of policy and laws, the case may alter; for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden, then he that promiseth anything to a thief, not only may, but must refuse to perform it. But if the law forbid not the performance, but leave it to the will of the promiser, then is the performance still lawful: and the covenant of things lawful is obligatory, even towards a thief.

14. He that giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth to one, and after giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth the same to another, maketh void the latter act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that right which he himself hath not; and that right he hath not, which he himself hath before transferred.

15. An OATH is a clause annexed to a promise, containing a renunciation of God's mercy, by him that promiseth, in case he perform not as far as is lawful and possible for him to do. And this appeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath (viz.) so help me God. So also was it amongst the heathen. And the form of the Romans was, Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh, as I kill this beast. The intention therefore of an oath being to provoke vengeance upon the breakers of covenants; it is to no purpose to swear by men, be they never so great, because their punishment by divers accidents may be avoided, whether they will, or no; but God's punishment not. Though it were a custom of many nations, to swear by the life of their princes; yet those princes being ambitious of divine honour,

give sufficient testimony, that they believed, nothing ought to be sworn by, but the Deity.

16. And seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not, and an oath is to no purpose, without fear of him they swear by; it is necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that form which himself admitteth in his own religion, and not in that form which he useth, that putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature, that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him, in any other form or name, than what their own (which they think the true) religion teacheth them.

17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the covenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater danger, and of greater punishment.

18. Covenants and oaths are de voluntariis, that is, de possibilibus. Nor can the covenantee understand the covenanter to promise impossibles; for they fall not under deliberation: and consequently (by chap. XIII, sect. 10, which maketh the covenantee interpreter), no covenant is understood to bind further, than to our best endeavour, either in performance of the thing promised, or in something equivalent.

Chapter 16: Some of the Laws of Nature

1. IT IS a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter, sect. 2, namely, That every man should divest himself of the right, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also were not a law of the same Nature, That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants which he maketh. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given?

2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call INJURY, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called UNJUST. For it is action or omission, without jus, or right; which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and

therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury: for injury consisteth in violation of covenant, by the definition thereof.

4. The names of just, unjust, justice, injustice, are equivocal, and signify diversely. For justice and injustice, when they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with no injury, and injury; and denominate the action just, or unjust, but not the man so; for they denominate him guilty, or not guilty. But when justice and injustice are attributed to men, they signify proneness and affection, and inclination of nature, that is to say, passions of the mind apt to produce just and unjust actions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust, not the action, but the passion, and aptitude to do such action is considered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust act; and an unjust man may have done justly not only one, but most of his actions. For there is an oderunt peccare in the unjust, as well as in the just, but from different causes; for the unjust man who abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth plainly that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil constitution, from whence punishments proceed; which would otherwise in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from whence they spring. This distinction therefore of justice, and injustice, ought to be remembered: that when injustice is taken

for guilt, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and when justice is taken for guiltlessness, the actions are just, and yet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are taken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and yet not all his actions so.

5. Concerning. the justice of actions, the same is usually divided into two kinds, whereof men call the one commutative, and the other distributive; and are said to consist, the one in proportion arithmetical, the other in geometrical: and commutative justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and barter. distributive, in giving to every man according to their deserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury, which is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality of things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that men (contrary to nature and reason) assume unto themselves above their fellows; of which inequality shall be spoken hereafter. And for commutative justice placed in buying and selling, though the thing bought be unequal to the price given for it; yet forasmuch as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are thereby both satisfied: there can be no injury done on either side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for distributive justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits; seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure: it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be further extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

6. It happeneth many times that a man benefitteth or contributeth to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less benefit or assistance to himself. For by necessity of nature every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto

himself. In this case it is a law of nature, That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his charity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate for his trusting. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to confer mutually to each other's defence, nor put themselves into each other's mercy upon any terms whatsoever. but rather abide the utmost and worst event of hostility. by which general diffidence, men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.

7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of this law of nature is not to be called injury; it hath another name (viz.) INGRATITUDE.

8. It is also a law of nature, That every man do help and endeavour to accommodate each other, as far as may be without danger of their persons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend themselves. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed from those passions, by which we strive to accommodate ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us: it followeth that that passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other, must be the cause of peace. And this passion is that charity defined chap. IX, sect. 17.

9. And in this precept of nature. is included and comprehended also this, That a man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong, upon his repentance, and caution for the future. For PARDON is peace granted to him, that (having provoked to war) demandeth it. It is not therefore charity, but fear, when a man giveth peace to him that repenteth not, nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in the time to come. For he that repenteth

not, remaineth with the affection of an enemy; as also doth he that refuseth to give caution, and consequently is presumed not to seek after peace, but advantage. And therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law of nature, nor is charity, but may sometimes be prudence. Otherwise, not to pardon upon repentance and caution, considering men cannot abstain from provoking one another, is never to give peace; and that is against the general definition of the law of nature.

10. And seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon when there is repentance, and caution for the future; it followeth that the same law ordaineth, That no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past, but of the benefit to come; that is to say, that all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person offending, or of others, by the example of his punishment; which is sufficiently apparent, in that the law of nature commandeth pardon, where the future time is secured. The same is also apparent by this: that revenge when it considereth the offence past, is nothing else but present triumph and glory, and directeth to no end; for end implieth some future good; and what is directed to no end, is therefore unprofitable; and consequently the triumph of revenge, is vain glory: and whatsoever is vain, is against reason; and to hurt one another without reason, is contrary to that, which by supposition is every man's benefit, namely peace; and what is contrary to peace, is contrary to the law of nature.

11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle (inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace); it must necessarily be implied as a law of nature, That no man reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem of any other. But this law is very little practised. For what is more ordinary than reproaches of those that are rich,

towards them that are not? or of those that sit in place of judicature, towards those that are accused at the bar? although to grieve them in that manner, be no part of the punishment for their crime, nor contained in their office; but use hath prevailed, that what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth, is also practised as lawful in the more mighty towards the less; though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance.

12. It is also a law of nature, That men allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one another. For he that alloweth that to one man, which he denieth to another, declareth his hatred to him, to whom he denieth; and to declare hatred is war. And upon this title was grounded the great war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer the Megareans, their neighbours, to traffic in their ports and markets, that war had not begun.

13. And this also is a law of nature, That all messengers of peace, and such as are employed to procure and maintain amity between man and man, may safely come and go. For seeing peace is the general law of nature, the means thereto, such as are these men, must in the same law be comprehended.

Chapter 17: Other Laws of Nature

1. THE QUESTION, which is the better man, is determinable only in the estate of government and policy, though it be mistaken for a question of nature, not only by ignorant men, that think one man's blood better than another's by nature; but also by him, whose opinions are at this day, and in these parts of greater authority than any other human writings (Aristotle). For he putteth so much difference between the powers of men by nature, that he doubteth not to set down, as the ground of all his politics, that some men are by nature worthy to govern, and others by nature ought to serve. Which foundation hath not only weakened the whole frame of his politics, but hath also given men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and hinder the peace of one another. For though there were such a difference of nature, that master and servant were not by consent of men, but by inherent virtue; yet who hath that eminency of virtue, above others, and who is so stupid as not to govern himself, shall never be agreed upon amongst men; who do every one naturally think himself as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to govern him. And when there was any contention between the finer and the coarser wits, (as there hath been often in times of sedition and civil war) for the most part these latter carried away the victory and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined how they can possibly live in peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake, nature hath ordained this law, That every man acknowledge other for his equal. And the breach of this law, is that we call PRIDE.

2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to every thing, so also was it, that he should retain his right to some things: to his own body (for example) the right of defending, whereof he could not transfer. to the use of fire, water, free air, and place to live in, and to all things necessary for life. Nor doth the law of nature command any divesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot be retained without the loss of peace. Seeing then many rights are retained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and the law of nature dictateth, Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same. For he that doth not so, alloweth not the equality mentioned in the former section. For there is no acknowledgement of the equality of worth, without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this allowance of aequalia aequalibus, is the same thing with the allowing of proportionalia proportionalibus. For when a man alloweth to every man alike, the allowance he maketh will be in the same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made. And this is it men mean by distributive justice, and is properly termed EQUITY. The breach of this law is that which the Greeks call Pleovezia, which is commonly rendered covetousness, but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word ENCROACHING.

3. If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is, That such things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation when the quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the thing to be used in common not sufficient for them that are to use it without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the rest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws of nature, without any other covenant antecedent; for a man may have given away his right of common, and so the case be altered.

4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the rule of nature must needs be one of these: lot, or alternate use; for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be imagined. And for alternate use, he that beginneth hath the advantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is no other way but lot: in things, therefore, indivisible and incommunicable, it is the law of nature, That the use be alternate, or the advantage given away by lot; because there is no other way of equality'. and equality is the law of nature.

5. There be two sorts of lots: one arbitrary, made by men, and commonly known by the names of lot, chance, hazard, and the like; and there is natural lot, such as is primogeniture, which is no more but the chance, or lot of being first born; which, it seemeth, they considered, that call inheritance by the name of cleronomia, which signifieth distribution by lot. Secondly, *prima occupatio*, first seizing or finding of a thing, whereof no man made use before, which for the most part also is merely chance.

6. Although men agree upon these laws of nature, and endeavour to observe the same; yet considering the passions of men, that make it difficult to understand by what actions, and circumstances of actions, those laws are broken; there must needs arise many great controversies about the interpretation thereof, by which the peace must needs be dissolved, and men return again to their former estate of hostility. For the taking away of which controversies, it is necessary that there be some common arbitrator and judge, to whose sentence both the parties to the controversy ought to stand. And therefore it is a law of nature, That in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein. For where every man is his own judge, there properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out his own right, it hath the same effect, as if

there were no right at all; and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy, and therefore the right of hostility remaineth.

7. AN ARBITRATOR therefore or judge is he that is trusted by the parties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth: first, that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in that case he is party, and ought by the same reason to be judged by another; secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if for favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than he thinketh right. And thirdly, that no man ought to make himself judge in any controversy between others, unless they consent and agree thereto.

8. It is also of the law of nature, That no man obtrude or press his advice or counsel to any man that declareth himself unwilling to hear the same. For seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is good or hurt of himself only, and not of his counsellor; and that counsel is a voluntary action, and therefore tendeth also to the good of the counsellor: there may often be just cause to suspect the counsellor. And though there be none, yet seeing counsel unwilling heard is a needless offence to him that is not willing to hear it, and offences tend all to the breach of peace: it is therefore against the law of nature to obtrude it.

9. A man that shall see these laws of nature set down and inferred with so many words, and so much ado, may think there is yet much more difficulty and subtlety required to acknowledge and do according to the said laws in every sudden occasion, when a man hath but a little time to

consider. And while we consider man in most passions, as of anger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and the like that tend to the excluding of natural equality, it is true; but without these passions, there is an easy rule to know upon a sudden, whether the action I be to do, be against the law of nature or not: and it is but this, That a man imagine himself in the place of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in his; which is no more but a changing (as it were) of the scales. For every man's passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in the scale of his neighbour. And this rule is very well known and expressed by this old dictate, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.

10. These laws of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in forbidding us to be our own judges, and our own carvers, and in commanding us to accommodate one another; in case they should be observed by some, and not by others, would make the observers but a prey to them that should neglect them; leaving the good, both without defence against the wicked, and also with a charge to assist them: which is against the scope of the said laws, that are made only for the protection and defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the law of nature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate this law in general, That those particular laws be so far observed, as they subject us not to any incommodity, that in our own judgments may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe them; and consequently requireth no more but the desire and constant intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless there be cause to the contrary in other men's refusal to observe them towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature is not in foro externo, till there be security for men to obey it; but is always in *foro interno*, wherein the action of obedience being unsafe, the will and readiness to perform is taken for the performance.

11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not numbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many precedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a law of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so alter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by changing the circumstances, that that which was reason before, may afterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For though every man be bound to allow equality to another. yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself inferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as. inferior, he breaketh not thereby that law of nature that commandeth to allow equality. In sum, a man's own consent may abridge him of the liberty which the law of nature leaveth him, but custom not; nor can either of them abrogate either these, or any other law of nature.

12. And forasmuch as law (to speak properly) is a command, and these dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands; they are not therefore called laws in respect of nature, but in respect of the author of nature, God Almighty.

13. And seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience, not he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he despiseth the law.

14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner that which displeaseth him evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking

of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of *malum paenae*, and malum culpae; for *malum paenae* is any pain or molestation of mind whatsoever; but *malum culpae* is that action which is contrary to reason and the law of nature; as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature that tend to our preservation, is that we call VIRTUE; and the habit of doing the contrary, VICE. As for example, justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants, injustice the contrary vice; equity that habit by which we allow equality of nature, arrogance the contrary vice; gratitude the habit whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others, ingratitude the contrary vice; temperance the habit by which we abstain from all things that tend to our destruction, intemperance the contrary vice; prudence, the same with virtue in general. As for the common opinion, that virtue consisteth in mediocrity, and vice in extremes, I see no ground for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage may be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be good; and extreme fear no vice when the danger is extreme. To give a man more than his due, is no injustice, though it be to give him less; and in gifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the reason. And so in all other virtues and vices. I know that this doctrine of mediocrity is Aristotle's, but his opinions concerning virtue and vice, are no other than those which were received then, and are still by the generality of men unstudied; and therefore not very likely to be accurate.

15. The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not. And the same is the sum of the law of nature; for in being sociable, the law of nature taketh place by the way of peace and society; and to be formidable, is the law of nature in war, where to be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power; and as the former consisteth in actions of equity and justice, the latter consisteth in

actions of honour. And equity, justice, and honour, contain all virtues whatsoever.

Chapter 18: A Confirmation of the Same Out of The Word of God

1. THE LAWS mentioned in the former chapters, as they are called the laws of nature, for that they are the dictates of natural reason; and also moral laws, because they concern men's manners and conversation one towards another; so are they also divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty; and ought therefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the word of God revealed in Holy Scripture. In this chapter therefore I shall produce such places of Scripture as appear to be most consonant to the said laws.

2. And first the word of God seemeth to place the divine law in reason; by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and understanding; as Psalm 40, 8: Thy law is in my heart. Heb. 8, 10: After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws in their mind; and Heb. 10, 16, the same. Psalm 37, 31, speaking of the righteous man, he saith, The law of God is in his heart. Psalm 19, 7, 8: The law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It giveth wisdom to the simple, and light unto the eyes. Jer. 31, 33: I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. And John I, the lawgiver himself, God Almighty, is called by the name of Logos, which is also called: verse 4, The light of men: and verse 9, The light which lighteth every man, which cometh into the world: all which are descriptions of natural reason.

3. And that the law divine, for so much as is moral, are those precepts that tend to peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of Scripture as these: Rom. 3, 17, righteousness which is the fulfilling of the

law, is called the way of peace. And Psalm 85, 10: Righteousness and peace shall kiss each other. And Matth. 5, 9: Blessed are the peacemakers. And Heb. 7, 2, Melchisedec king of Salem is interpreted king of righteousness, and king of peace. And, verse 21, our Saviour Christ is said to be a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec; out of which may be inferred: that the doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the fulfilling of the law to peace.

4. That the law of nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, that the priesthood of Melchisedec is everlasting; and by the words of our Saviour, Matth. 5, 18: Heaven and earth shall pass away, but one jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be fulfilled.

5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm 15, where the question being asked, verse 1, Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle, &c., it is answered, verse 4, He that sweareth to his own hindrance, and yet changeth not. And that men ought to be grateful, where no covenant passeth, Deut. 25, 4: Thou shalt not muzzle the Ox that treadeth out the corn, which St. Paul (1 Cor. 9, 9) interpreteth not of oxen, but of men.

6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the foundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table of the divine law, Matth. 22, 39, 4o: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets; which is not so to be understood, as that a man should study so much his neighbour's profit as his own, or that he should divide his goods amongst his neighbours; but that he should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and privileges that he himself enjoyeth; and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself; which is no more but that he should be humble, meek, and contented with equality.

7. And that in distributing of right amongst equals, that distribution is to be made according to the proportions of the numbers, which is the giving of

aequalia aequalibus, and proportionalia proportionalibus; we have Numb. 26, 53, 54, the commandment of God to Moses: Thous shalt divide the land according to the number of names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou shalt give less, to every one according to his number. That decision by lot is a means of peace, Prov. 18, 18: The lot causeth contention to cease, and maketh partition among the mighty.

8. That the accommodation and forgiveness of one another, which have before been put for laws of nature, are also law divine, there is no question. For they are the essence of charity, which is the scope of the whole law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend each other, is the doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. 7, 1: Judge not, that ye be not judged; (verse 3): Why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Also the law that forbiddeth us to press our counsel upon others further than they admit, is a divine law. For after our charity and desire to rectify one another is rejected, to press it further, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in the text last recited; as also Rom. 14, 12, 13: Every one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more, but use your judgment rather in this, that no man put an occasion to fall, or a stumbling block before his brother.

9. Further, the rule of men concerning the law of nature, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris, is confirmed by the like, Matth. 7, 12: Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you, that do you unto them: for this is the law and the prophets. And Rom. 2, 1: In that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, &c.

10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures, that these laws concern only the tribunal of our conscience; and that the actions contrary to them, shall be no farther punished by God Almighty, than as they proceed from negligence and contempt. And first, that these laws are made to the conscience,

appeareth, Matth. 5, 20: For I say unto you, except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Now the Pharisees were the most exact amongst the Jews in the external performance; they therefore must want the sincerity of conscience; else could not our Saviour have required a greater righteousness than. theirs. For the same reason our Saviour Christ saith: The publican departed from the temple justified, rather than the Pharisee. And Christ saith: His yoke is easy, and his burthen light; which proceeded from this, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom. 14, 23: He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat. And in innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty declareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and evil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law is dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less plain: that how many and how heinous actions soever a man commit through infirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong. For, At what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sins from the bottom of his heart, I will put all his iniquities out of my remembrance, saith the Lord.

11. Concerning revenge which by the law of nature ought not to aim, as I have said chapter XVI, section 10, at present delight, but at future profit, there is some difficulty made, as if the same accorded not with the law divine, by such as object the continuance of punishment after the day of judgment, when there shall be no place, neither for amendment, nor for example. This objection had been of some force, if such punishment had been ordained after all sins were past; but considering the punishment was instituted before sin, it serveth to the benefit of mankind, because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terror; and therefore such revenge was directed to the future only.

12. Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against the law divine; for God Almighty hath given reason. to a man to be a light unto him. And I hope it is no. impiety to think, that God Almighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of judgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here; notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now-a-days, to rational and moral conversation.

Chapter 19: Of the Necessity and Definition of a Body Politic

1. IN CHAP. XII, sect. 16, it hath been shewed, that the opinions men have of the rewards and punishments which are to follow their actions, are the causes that make and govern the will to those actions. In this estate of man therefore, wherein all men are equal, and every man allowed to be his own judge, the fears they have one of another are equal, and every man's hopes consist in his own sleight and strength; and consequently when any man by his natural passion, is provoked to break these laws of nature, there is no security in any other man of his own defence but anticipation. And for this cause, every man's right (howsoever he be inclined to peace) of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the necessary means of his preservation. And therefore till there be security amongst men for the. keeping of the law of nature one towards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is unlawful to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity; and this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutual aid and help of one another, whereby also followeth the mutual fear of one another.

2. It is a proverbial saying, inter arma silent leges. There is little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man's being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war: that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of

nature. And in old time we read that rapine was a trade of life, wherein nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives of those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely their oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all their other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was warranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves; so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary. For nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another's life. And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that betrayeth the conscience of one's own weakness; all men in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity have been predominated, have abstained from cruelty; insomuch that though there be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war is honour; and the right of war providence.

3. And seeing mutual aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear is necessary for peace; we are to consider how great aids are required for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear, as men may not easily adventure on one another. And first it is evident: that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little security; for the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible advantage.

4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless they all direct their actions to one and the same end; which direction to one and the same end is that which, chap. XII, sect. 7, is called consent. This consent (or

concord) amongst so many men, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a present conquest, or booty; and endure as long as that action endureth; nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and advantage one above another: it is impossible, not only that their consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace should last between themselves, without some mutual and common fear to rule them.

5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of certain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually live in such good order and government, for their common benefit, and are so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for peace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the experience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee, which is therefore reckoned amongst animalia politica. Why therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord, continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they? To which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about honour or acknowledgment of one another's wisdom, as there is amongst men; from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are contented therewith; but in a multitude of men, there are always some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter what they think. amiss; and divers of them strive to alter divers ways; and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech, and are therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want not. Fifthly, they have no

conception of right and wrong, but only of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another, nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord, such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant. And therefore no wonder if such irrational creatures, as govern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind, that do it by arbitrary institution.

6. It remaineth therefore still that consent (by which I understand the concurrence of many men's wills to one action) is not sufficient security for their common peace, without the erection of some common power, by the fear whereof they may be compelled both to keep the peace amongst themselves, and to join their strengths together, against a common enemy. And that this may be done, there is no way imaginable, but only union; which is defined chap. XII, sect. 8 to be the involving or including the wills of many in the will of one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of men, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of one COUNCIL; for a council is nothing else but an assembly of men deliberating concerning something common to them all.

7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do; and to do no action which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And farther.. in case it be a council whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man, being not voluntary,

but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey; and hereby, he that is to command may by the use of all their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and concord amongst themselves.

8. This union so made, is that which men call now-a-days a BODY POLITIC or civil society; and the Greeks call it polis, that is to say, a, city. which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit.

9. And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with common power over all the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members, instituted a subordinate union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually called CORPORATIONS; and their power such over the particulars of their own society, as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them.

10. In all cities or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their SOVEREIGN, and his power the sovereign power. which consisteth in the power and the strength that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves, by covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood: that to transfer a man’s power and strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called a SUBJECT, (viz.) to the sovereign.

11. The cause in general which moveth a man to become subject to another, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself, and a man may subject himself, to him that invadeth, or may invade him for fear of him; or men may join amongst themselves to subject themselves to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves the former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were naturally; from whence proceedeth dominion, paternal, and despotic and when they subject themselves the other way, by mutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for the most part called a commonwealth in distinction from the former, though the name be the general name for them both and I shall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterward of bodies politic, patrimonial and despotical.

PART II

Chapter 20: Of the Requisites to the Constitution of a Commonwealth

1. THAT PART of this treatise which is already past, hath been wholly spent, in the consideration of the natural power, and the natural estate of man; namely of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters; and how from thence proceed his actions in the twelfth; how men know one another's minds in the thirteenth; in what estate men's passions set them in the fourteenth; what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and lastly how a multitude of persons natural are united by covenants into one person civil or body politic. In this part therefore shall be considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof, otherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the last chapter, and last section of the former part, that there be two ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such erection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude.

2. Having in this place to consider a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both against one another, and against common enemies; and that by covenants, the knowledge of what covenants, they must needs make, dependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of their end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together, be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the

multitude, unless every man's hand, and every man's will, (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and yet fight amongst themselves; whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act: it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chap. XIV, sect. 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing: and therefore meum and tuum hath no place amongst them.

3. The first thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every man to consent to something by which they may come nearer to their ends; which can be nothing else imaginable but this: that they allow the wills of the major part of their whole number, or the wills of the major part of some certain number of men by them determined and named; or lastly the will of some one man, to involve and be taken for the wills of every man. And this done they are united, and a body politic. And if the major part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they said to be a DEMOCRACY, that is to say a government wherein the whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars, then are they said to be an OLIGARCHY, or ARISTOCRACY; which two words signify the same

thing, together with the divers passions of those that use them; for when the men that be in that office please, they are called an aristocracy, otherwise an oligarchy; wherein those, the major part of which declare the wills of the whole multitude, being assembled, are the sovereign, and every man severally a subject. Lastly if their consent be such, that the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills of them all, then is their government or union called a MONARCHY; and that one man the sovereign, and every of the rest a subject.

4. And those several sorts of unions, governments, and subjections of man's will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that is to say, for all future time, or for a time limited only. But forasmuch as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the perpetual benefit and defence of them that make it; which therefore men desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that be temporary, and consider those that be for ever.

5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves; and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. And therefore when there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this security; it is to be understood that every man's right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him. And contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment and discretion, to make use of his force; it is to be understood that every man hath the like, and consequently that there is no commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a

commonwealth, a man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.

6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called laws; and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion, there is no fear; the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them, are set at liberty, and have no law but from themselves.

7. This power of coercion, as hath been said chap. XV, sect. 3, of the former part, consisteth in the transferring of every man's right of resistance against him to whom he hath transferred the power of coercion. It followeth therefore, that no man in any commonwealth whatsoever hath right to resist him, or them, on whom they have conferred this power coercive, or (as men use to call it) the sword of justice; supposing the not-resistance possible. For (Part I. chapter XV, sect. 18) covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour.

8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without; if there be not some means found, to unite their strengths and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of the whole; whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible, for their defence. Now seeing that every man hath

already transferred the use of his strength to him or them, that have the sword of justice; it followeth that the power of defence, that is to say the sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the sword of justice: and consequently those two swords are but one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.

9. Moreover seeing to have the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have the use thereof depending only on the judgment and discretion of him or them that have it; it followeth that the power of judicature (in all controversies, wherein the sword of justice is to be used) and (in all deliberations concerning war, wherein the use of that sword is required), the right of resolving and determining what is to be done, belong to the same sovereign.

10. Farther: considering it is no less, but much more necessary to prevent violence and rapine, than to punish the same when it is committed; and all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerning meum and tuum, right and wrong, good and bad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own judgments; it belongeth also to the judgment of the same sovereign power, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his, and what another's; what is good, and what bad; and what he ought to do, and what not; and to command the same to be observed. And these measures of the actions of the subjects are those which men call LAWS POLITIC, or civil. The making whereof must of right belong to him that hath the power of the sword, by which men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise they should be made in vain.

11. Farthermore: seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such sovereign power, can be able in person to hear and determine all controversies, to be present at all deliberations concerning common good, and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto,

whereby there will be necessity of magistrates and ministers of public affairs; it is consequent, that the appointment, nomination, and limitation of the same, be understood as an inseparable part of the same sovereignty, to which the sum of all judicature and execution hath been already annexed.

12. And: forasmuch as the right to Use the forces of every particular member, is transferred from themselves, to their sovereign; a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself: that to sovereign power (whatsoever it doth) there belongeth impunity.

13. The sum of these rights of sovereignty, namely the absolute use of the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws, supreme judicature and decision in all debates judicial and deliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with other rights contained in the same, make the sovereign power no less absolute in the commonwealth, than before commonwealth every man was absolute in himself to do, or not to do, what he thought good; which men that have not had the experience of that miserable estate, to which men are reduced by long war, think so hard a condition that they cannot easily acknowledge, such covenants and subjection, on their parts, as are here set down, to have been ever necessary to their peace. And therefore some have imagined that a commonwealth may be constituted in such manner, as the sovereign power may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit themselves. For example: they suppose a multitude of men to have agreed upon certain articles (which they presently call laws), declaring how they will be governed; and that done to agree farther upon some man, or number of men to see the same articles performed, and put in execution. And to enable him, or them thereunto, they allot unto them a provision limited, as of certain lands, taxes, penalties, and the like, than which (if mis-spent), they shall have no more, without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former. And thus they think they have made a commonwealth, in which it is unlawful for

any private man to make use of his own sword for his security; wherein they deceive themselves.

14. For first, if to the revenue, it did necessarily follow that there might be forces raised, and procured at the will of him that hath such revenue; yet since the revenue is limited, so must also be the forces; but limited forces, against the power of an enemy, which we cannot limit, are unsufficient. Whensoever therefore there happeneth an invasion greater than those forces are able to resist, and there be no other right to levy more, then is every man, by necessity of nature, allowed to make the best provision he can for himself; and thus is the private sword, and the estate of war again reduced. But seeing revenue, without the right of commanding men, is of not use, neither in peace, nor war; it is necessary to be supposed, that he that hath the administration of those articles, which are in the former section supposed, must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men; and what reason soever giveth him that right over any one, giveth him the same over them all. And then is his right absolute; for he that hath right to all their forces, hath right to dispose of the same. Again: supposing those limited forces and revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent use of them, to fail; and that for a supply, the same multitude be again to be assembled, who shall have power to assemble them, that is to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the supply hath that right (viz.) the right to compel them all; then is his sovereignty absolute: if not, then is every particular man at liberty to come or not; to frame a new commonwealth or not; and so the right of the private sword returneth. But suppose them willingly and of their own accord assembled, to consider of this supply; if now it be still in their choice, whether they shall give it or not, it is also in their choice whether the commonwealth shall stand or not. And therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force, in case they think it tend to their defence.

This device therefore of them that will make civil laws first, and then a civil body afterwards, (as if policy made a body politic, and not a body politic made policy) is of no effect.

15. Others to avoid the hard condition, as they take it, of absolute subjection, (which in hatred thereto they also call slavery) have devised a government as they think mixed of the three sorts of sovereignty. As for example: they suppose the power of making laws given to some great assembly democratical, the power of judicature to some other assembly; and the administration of the laws to a third, or to some one man; and this policy they call mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this estate of government they think the use of the private sword excluded.

16. And supposing it were so: how were this condition which they call slavery eased thereby? For in this estate they would have no man allowed, either to be his own judge, or own carver, or to make any laws unto himself; and as long as these three agree, they are as absolutely subject to them, as is a child to the father, or a slave to the master in the state of nature. The ease therefore of this subjection, must consist in the disagreement of those, amongst whom they have distributed the rights of sovereign power. But the same disagreement is war. The division therefore of the sovereignty, either worketh no effect, to the taking away of simple subjection, or introduceth war; wherein the private sword hath place again. But the truth is, as hath been already shewed in 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 precedent sections: the sovereignty is indivisible; and that seeming mixture of several kinds of government, not mixture of the things themselves, but confusion in our understanding, that cannot find out readily to whom we have subjected ourselves.

17. But though the sovereignty be not mixed, but be always either simple democracy, or simple aristocracy, or pure monarchy; nevertheless in the administration thereof, all those sorts of government may have place subordinate. For suppose the sovereign power be democracy, as it was sometimes in Rome, yet at the same time they may have a council aristocratical, such as was the senate; and at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch, such as was their dictator, who had for a time the exercise of the whole sovereignty, and such as are all generals in war. So also in a monarchy there may be a council aristocratical of men chosen by the monarch; or democratical of men chosen by the consent (the monarch permitting) of all the particular men of the commonwealth. And this mixture is it that imposeth; as if it were the mixture of sovereignty. As if a man should think, because the great council of Venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrates, ministers of state, captains, and governors of towns, ambassadors, counsellors, and the like; that therefore their part of the sovereignty is only choosing of magistrates; and that the making of war, and peace, and laws, were not theirs, but the part of such councillors as they appointed thereto; whereas it is the part of these to do it but subordinately, the supreme authority thereof being in the great council that choose them.

18. And as reason teacheth us, that a man considered out of subjection to laws, and out of all covenants obligatory to others, is free to do, and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth; every member being obedient to the will of the whole man; that liberty being nothing else but his natural power, without which he is no better than an inanimate creature, not able to help himself; so also it teacheth us: that a body politic of what kind soever, not subject to another, nor obliged by covenants, ought to be free, and in all actions to be assisted by the members, every one in their place, or at the least not resisted by them. For otherwise, the power of a body politic (the

essence whereof is the not-resistance of the members) is none, nor a body politic of any benefit. And the same is confirmed by the use of all nations and commonwealths in the world. For what nation is there or commonwealth wherein that man or council, which is virtually the whole, hath not absolute power over every particular member? or what nation or commonwealth is there, that hath not power and right to constitute a general in their wars? But the power of a general is absolute; and consequently there was absolute power in the commonwealth, from whom it was derived. For no person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another more power than himself hath.

19. In every commonwealth where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute sovereignty, as I have already shewed. But in what man or in what assembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to need some marks whereby it may be discerned. And first it is an infallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly of men, if there be no right in any other person natural or civil to punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot of right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that cannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest, and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure; which is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise he that in a commonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is dissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or dissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which there is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other, may make laws, or abrogate them, at his, or their pleasure, have the sovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to be made by right, the members of the commonwealth to whom they are made, are obliged to obey them; and consequently not to resist the

execution of them; which not-resistance maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this sovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates, judges, counsellors, and ministers of state. For without that power no act of sovereignty, or government, can be performed. Lastly, and generally. whosoever by his own authority independent can do any act, which another of the same commonwealth may not, must needs be understood to have the sovereign power. For by nature men have equal right; this inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the commonwealth. He therefore that doth any act lawfully by his own authority, which another may not, doth it by the power of the commonwealth in himself; which is absolute sovereignty.

Chapter 21: Of the Three Sorts of Commonwealth

1. HAVING SPOKEN in general concerning instituted policy in the former chapter, I come in this to speak of the sorts thereof in special, how every one of them is instituted. The first in order of time of these three sorts is democracy, and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon; which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy.

2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant, between the sovereign and any subject. For while the democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any multitude (which supposeth union and sovereignty already made), it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey, whatsoever the major part of their whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy; wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks by the name of Demus (*id est*, the people), from

whence cometh democracy. So that where, to the supreme and independent court, every man may come that will and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the people.

3. Out of this that hath been already said, may readily be drawn: that whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject of the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury. For first, injury (by the definition, Part I. chap. XVI, sect. 2) is breach of covenant; but covenants (as hath been said in the precedent section) there passed none from the people to any private man; and consequently it (viz. the people) can do him no injury. Secondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign demus shall do, is done by the will of every particular man subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore they style it injury, they but accuse themselves. And it is against reason for the same man, both to do and complain; implying this contradiction, that whereas he first ratified the people's acts in general, he now disalloweth some of them in particular. It is therefore said truly, volenti non fit injuria. Nevertheless nothing doth hinder, but that divers actions done by the people, may be unjust before God Almighty, as breaches of some of the laws of nature.

4. And when it happeneth, that the people by plurality of voices shall decree or command any thing contrary to the law of God or nature, though the decree and command be the act of every man, not only present in the assembly, but also absent from it; yet is not the injustice of the decree, the injustice of every particular man, but only of those men by whose express suffrages, the decree or command was passed. For a body politic, as it is a fictitious body, so are the faculties and will thereof fictitious also. But to make a particular man unjust, which consisteth of a body and soul natural, there is required a natural and very will.

5. In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the assembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof is always in one, or a

few particular men. For in such great assemblies as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give counsel what to do, but by long and set orations; whereby to every man there is more or less hope given, to incline and sway the assembly to their own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, where always, either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst themselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of necessity sway the whole; insomuch, that a democracy, in effect, is no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator.

6. And seeing a democracy is by institution the beginning both of aristocracy and monarchy, we are to consider next how aristocracy is derived from it. When the particular members of the commonwealth growing weary of attendance at public courts, as dwelling far off, or being attentive to their private businesses, and withal displeased with the government of the people, assemble themselves to make an aristocracy; there is no more required to the making thereof but putting to the question one by one, the names of such men as it shall consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality of vote, to transfer that power which before the people had, to the number of men so named and chosen.

7. And from this manner of erecting an aristocracy it is manifest that the few or optimates, have entered into no covenant, with any of the particular members of the commonwealth whereof they are sovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man that can be called injury to him, howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before, section 3. Farther it is impossible that the people, as one body politic should covenant with the aristocracy or optimates, on whom they intend to transfer their sovereignty;

for no sooner is the aristocracy erected, but the democracy is annihilated, and the covenants made unto them void.

8. In all aristocracies, the admission of such as are from time to time to have vote in the sovereign assembly, dependeth on the will and decree of the present optimates; for they being the sovereign, have the nomination (by the eleventh section of the former chapter) of all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors of state whatsoever, and may therefore choose either to make them elective, or hereditary, at their pleasure.

9. Out of the same democracy, the institution of a political monarch proceedeth in the same manner, as did the institution of the aristocracy (viz.) by a decree of the sovereign people, to pass the sovereignty to one man named, and approved by plurality of suffrage. And if this sovereignty be truly and indeed transferred, the estate or commonwealth is an absolute monarchy, wherein the monarch is at liberty, to dispose as well of the succession, as of the possession; and not an elective kingdom. For suppose a decree be made, first in this manner: that such a one shall have the sovereignty for his life; and that afterward they will choose a new; in this case, the power of the people is dissolved, or not. If dissolved, then after the death of him that is chosen, there is no man bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall, as private men, run together to make a new election: and consequently, if there be any man, who by the advantage of the reign of him that is dead, hath strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience, he may lawfully, or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do. If this power of the people were not dissolved, at the choosing of their king for life; then is the people sovereign still, and the king a minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole sovereignty in execution; a great minister, but no otherwise for his time, than a dictator was in Rome. In this case, at the death of him that was chosen, they that meet for a new election, have no new, but their old authority for the same. For they were the

sovereign all the time, as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings, that have procured from the people, that their children might succeed them. For it is to be understood, when a man receiveth any thing from the authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the people his subjects, but from the people his sovereign. And farther, though in the election of a king for his life, the people grant him the exercise of their sovereignty for that time; yet if they see cause, they may recall the same before the time. As a prince that conferreth an office for life, may nevertheless, upon suspicion of abuse thereof, recall it at his pleasure; inasmuch as offices that require labour and care, are understood to pass from him that giveth them as onera, burthens to them that have them; the recalling whereof are therefore not injury, but favour. Nevertheless, if in making an elective king with intention to reserve the sovereignty, they reserve not a power at certain known and determined times and places to assemble themselves; the reservation of their sovereignty is of no effect, inasmuch as no man is bound to stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble themselves without the sovereign authority.

10. In the former section is showed that elective kings, that exercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their life, either are subjects and not sovereigns; and that is, when the people in election of them reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or else absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their pleasure; and that is, when the people in their election hath declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the power of the elected king to assemble and dissolve them at such times, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of limitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the sovereign power (which whether it hath been practised anywhere or not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected against the rigour of sovereign power), and it is this: that the

people transfer their sovereignty upon condition. As for example: for so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then prescribe him. And here as before in elected kings, the question is to be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the people dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach of the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the deposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up; but are in the estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a democracy; and consequently: if he that is elected, by the advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able to compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of nature to warrant him, but also the law of nature to oblige him thereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that purpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their conditional king to account, at their pleasure, and deprive him of his government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the condition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no covenant with a subject, be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly for his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.

11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people, proceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath a double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of men, distinguished by the place of their habitation; as the people of England, or the people of France; which is no more, but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions, without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them, by which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it signifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or

one council, in the will whereof is included and involved the will of every one in particular; as for example: in this latter sense the lower house of parliament is all the commons, as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved, though they remain, they be no more the people, nor the commons, but only the aggregate, or multitude of the particular men there sitting; how well soever they agree, or concur, in opinions amongst themselves; whereupon they that do not distinguish between these two significations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved multitude, as belong only to the people virtually contained in the body of the commonwealth or sovereignty. And when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation, they usually give them the name of the whole nation. In which sense they say the people rebelleth, or the people demandeth, when it is no more than a dissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude, cannot he said to demand or have right to any thing. For where every man hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto; and when the particulars say: this is mine, this is thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there can be nothing whereof the multitude can say: this is mine; nor are they one body, as behoveth them to be, that demand anything under the name of mine or his; and when they say ours, every man is understood to pretend in several, and not the multitude. On the other side, when the multitude is united into a body politic, and thereby are a people in the other signification, and their wills virtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power, doth for them all demand and vindicate under the name of his, that which before they called in the plural, theirs.

12. We have seen how particular men enter into subjection, by transferring their rights; it followeth to consider how such subjection may

be discharged. And first, if he or they have the sovereign power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no doubt but every man is again at liberty, to obey or not; likewise if he or they retaining the sovereignty over the rest, do nevertheless exempt some one or more from. their subjection, every man so exempted is discharged. For he or they to whom any man is obliged, hath the power to release him.

13. And here it is to be understood: that when he or they that have the sovereign power, give such exemption or privilege to a subject, as is not separable from the sovereignty, and nevertheless directly retain the sovereign power, not knowing the consequence of the privilege they grant, the person or persons exempted or privileged are not thereby released. For in contradictory significations of the will (Part I. chap. XIII, sect. 9), that which is directly signified, is to be understood for the will, before that which is drawn from it by consequence.

14. Also exile perpetual, is a release of subjection, forasmuch as being out of the protection of the sovereignty that expelled him, he hath no means of subsisting but from himself. Now every man may lawfully defend himself, that hath no other defence; else there had been no necessity that any man should enter into voluntary subjection, as they do in commonwealths.

15. Likewise a man is released of his subjection by conquest; for when it cometh to pass, that the power of a commonwealth is overthrown, and any particular man, thereby lying under the sword of his enemy yieldeth himself captive, he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his obligation to the former. For no man can serve two masters.

16. Lastly, ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience; for no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom.

Chapter 22: Of the Power of Masters

1. HAVING SET forth, in the two preceding chapters, the nature of a commonwealth institutive, by the consent of many men together; I come now to speak of dominion, or a body politic by acquisition, which is commonly called a patrimonial kingdom. But before I enter thereinto: it is necessary to make known, upon what title one man may acquire right, that is to say, property or dominion, over the person of another. For when one man hath dominion over another, there is a little kingdom; and to be a king by acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired a right or dominion over many.

2. Considering men therefore again in the state of nature, without covenants or subjection one to another, as if they were but even now all at once created male and female; there be three titles only, by which one man may have right and dominion over another; whereof two may take place presently, and those are: voluntary offer of subjection, and yielding by compulsion; the third is to take place, upon the supposition of children begotten amongst them. Concerning the first of these three titles, it is handled before in the two last chapters; for from thence cometh the right of sovereigns over their subjects in a commonwealth institutive. Concerning the second title (which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of death), thereby accrueth a right of dominion. For where every man (as it happeneth in this case) hath right to all things, there needs no more for the making of the said right effectual, but a covenant from him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus cometh the victor to have a right of absolute dominion over the conquered. By which there is

presently constituted a little body politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which is called the MASTER, or lord; the other subject, which is called the SERVANT. And when a man hath acquired right over a number of servants so considerable, as they cannot by their neighbours be securely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.

3. And it is to be understood: that when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they shew the servant is not trusted. But covenant (Part I. chap. XV, sect. 9) supposeth trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without passion, is called a SLAVE. The Romans had no such distinct name, but comprehended all under the name of servus; whereof such as they loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at liberty, and admitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in their affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it was amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations; the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without covenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or other like forcible custody.

4. A master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment; and hath absolute dominion over both; and may say of his servant, that he is his, as he may of any other thing. And whatsoever the servant had, and might call his, is now the master's; for he that disposeth of the person, disposeth of all the person could dispose of; insomuch as though there be meum and tuum amongst servants distinct from one another by the

dispensation, and for the benefit of their master; yet there is no meum and tuum belonging to any of them against the master himself, whom they are not to resist, but to obey all his commands as law.

5. And seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him, is the property of the master, and every man may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at his pleasure, the master may therefore alienate his dominion over them,. or give the same, by his last will, to whom he list.

6. And if it happen, that the master himself by captivity or voluntary subjection, become servant to another, then is that other master paramount; and those servants of him that becometh servant, are no further obliged, than their master paramount shall think good; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate, disposeth of all he hath, and consequently of his servants; so that the restriction of absolute power in masters proceedeth not from the law of nature, but from the political law of him that is their master supreme or sovereign.

7. Servants immediate to the supreme master, are discharged of their servitude or subjection in the same manner that subjects are released of their allegiance in a commonwealth institutive. As first, by release; for he that captiveth. (which is done by accepting what the captive transferreth to him) setteth again at liberty, by transferring back the same. And this kind of release is called MANUMISSION. Secondly, by exile; for that is no more but manumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but punishment. Thirdly, by new captivity, where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience; for no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted,

but committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the obligation in foro interno, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way.

8. But servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate lord, are not thereby discharged of subjection to their lord paramount; for the immediate master hath no property in them, having transferred his right before to another, namely to his own and supreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant, doth he thereby release the servants of their obligation to him that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a release (which is the discharge of a covenant) the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made.

9. This right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another, so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures. For if a man in the state of nature, be in hostility with men, and thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill, according as his own conscience and discretion shall suggest unto him for his safety and benefit; much more may he do the same to beasts; that is to say, save and preserve for his own service, according to his discretion, such as are of nature apt to obey, and commodious for use; and to kill and destroy, with perpetual war, all other, as fierce, and noisome to him. And this dominion is therefore of the law of nature, and not of the divine law positive. For if there had been no such right before the revealing of God's will in the Scripture, then should no man, to whom the Scripture hath not come, have right to make use of those creatures, either for his food or sustenance. And it were a hard condition of mankind, that a fierce and savage beast should with more right kill a man, than the man a beast.

Chapter 23: Of the Power of Fathers, and of Patrimonial Kingdom

1. OF THREE ways by which a man becometh subject to another, mentioned section 2. chap. ult., namely voluntary offer, captivity and birth, the former two have been spoken of, under the name of subjects and servants. In the next place, we are to set down the third way of subjection, under the name of children; and by what title one man cometh to have propriety in a child, that proceedeth from the common generation of two, (viz.) of male and female. And considering men again dissolved from all covenants one with another, and that (Part I. chap. XVII, sect. 2) every man by the law of nature, hath right or propriety to his own body, the child ought rather to be the propriety of the mother (of whose body it is part, till the time of separation) than of the father. For the understanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his or their child, two things are to be considered: first what title the mother or any other originally hath to a child new born; secondly, how the father, or any other man, pretendeth by the mother.

2. For the first: they that have written of this subject have made generation to be a title of dominion over persons, as well as the consent of the persons themselves. And because generation giveth title to two, namely, father and mother, whereas dominion is indivisible, they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the father only, ob praestantiam sexus; but they shew not, neither can I find out by what coherence, either generation inferreth dominion, or advantage of so much strength, which, for the most part, a man hath more than a woman, should generally and universally

entitle the father to a propriety in the child, and take it away from the mother.

3. The title to dominion over a child, proceedeth not from the generation, but from the preservation of it; and therefore in the estate of nature, the mother in whose power it is to save or destroy it, hath right thereto by that power, according to that which hath been said Part I. chap. XIV, sect. 13. And if the mother shall think fit to abandon, or expose her child to death, whatsoever man or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same right which the mother had before; and for the same reason, namely for the power not of generating, but preserving. And though the child thus preserved, do in time acquire strength, whereby he might pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him, yet shall that pretence be thought unreasonable, both because his strength was the gift of him, against whom he pretendeth; and also because it is to be presumed, that he which giveth sustenance to another, whereby to strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof. For else it would be wisdom in men, rather to let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in their danger or subjection, when they are grown.

4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the absolute subjection of the mother: another, by some particular covenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection. By absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her child, according to section 6, chap. XXII whether he be the father thereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master in perpetuum.

5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and woman, there be some which are made for a time and some for life; and where they are for a time, they are covenants of cohabitation, or else of copulation only. And in this latter case, the children pass by covenants

particular. And thus in the copulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by covenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the females.

6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or for society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the woman called a CONCUBINE. And here also the child shall be his or hers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant; for although for the most part a concubine is supposed to yield up the right of her children to the father, yet doth not concubinate enforce so much.

7. But if the covenants of cohabitation be for society of all things, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both; without which (as hath been often said before) society cannot last. And therefore the man, to whom for the most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most part also the sole right and dominion over the children. And the man is called the HUSBAND, and the woman the WIFE; but because sometimes the government may belong to the wife only, sometimes also the dominion over the children shall be in her only; as in the case of a sovereign queen, there is no reason that her marriage should take from her the dominion over her children.

8. Children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by the father, or by the mother, or by whomsoever, are in most absolute subjection to him or her, that so bringeth them up, or preserveth them. And they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her dominion, by selling or giving them in adoption or servitude to others; or may pawn them for hostages, kill them for rebellion, or sacrifice them for peace, by the law of nature, when he or she, in his or her conscience, think it to be necessary.

9. The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants. And therein they are in equal estate; but the hope of those is greater than the hope of

these. For he that subjecteth himself uncompelled, thinketh there is reason he should be better used, than he that doth it upon compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth himself, though in subjection, a FREEMAN; whereby it appeareth, that liberty is not any exemption from subjection and obedience to the sovereign power, but a state of better hope than theirs, that have been subjected by force and conquest. And this was the reason, that the name that signifieth children, in the Latin tongue is liberi, which also signifieth freemen. And yet in Rome, nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others, as children in the family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers; and the father might kill his son by his own authority, without any warrant from the state. Freedom therefore in commonwealths is nothing but the honour of equality of favour with other subjects, and servitude the estate of the rest. A freeman therefore may expect employments of honour, rather than a servant. And this is all that can be understood by the liberty of the subject. For in all other senses, liberty is the state of him that is not subject.

10. Now when a father that hath children, hath servants also, the children (not by the right of the child, but by the natural indulgence of the parents) are such freemen. And the whole consisting of the father or mother, or both, and of the children, and of the servants, is called a FAMILY; wherein the father or master of the family is sovereign of the same; and the rest (both children and servants equally) subjects. The same family if it grow by multiplication of children, either by generation or adoption; or of servants, either by generation, conquest, or voluntary submission, to be so great and numerous, as in probability it may protect itself, then is that family called a PATRIMONIAL KINGDOM, or monarchy by acquisition; wherein the sovereignty is in one man, as it is in a monarch made by political institution. So that whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other. And

therefore I shall no more speak of them, as distinct, but as of monarchy in general.

11. Having shewed by what right the several sorts of commonwealths, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, are erected; it followeth to shew by what right they are continued. The right by which they are continued, is called the right of succession to the sovereign power; whereof there is nothing to be said in a democracy, because the sovereign dieth not, as long as there be subjects alive; nor in an aristocracy, because it cannot easily fall out, that the optimates should every one fail at once; and if it should so fall out, there is no question, but the commonwealth is thereby dissolved. It is therefore in a monarchy only, that there can happen a question concerning the succession. And first: forasmuch as a monarch, which is absolute sovereign, hath the dominion in his own right, he may dispose thereof at his own will. If therefore, by his last will, he shall name his successor, the right passeth by that will.

12. Nor if the monarch die without any will concerning the succession declared, is it therefore to be presumed that it was his will, his subjects which are to him as his children and servants, should return again to the state of anarchy, that is, to war and hostility; for that were expressly against the law of nature, which commandeth to procure peace, and to maintain the same. It is therefore to be conjectured with reason, that it was his intention to bequeath them peace, that is to say, a power coercive, whereby to keep them from sedition amongst themselves; and rather in the form of monarchy, than any other government; forasmuch as he, by the exercise thereof in his own person, hath declared that he approveth of the same.

13. Further, it is to be supposed his intention was, that his own children should be preferred in the succession, (when nothing to the contrary is expressly declared) before any other. For men naturally seek their own honour, and that consisteth in the honour of their children after them.

14. Again, seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue the government in his successors, as long as he may; and that generally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage, by which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are; it is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the contrary, he preferreth his male children before the female. Not but that women may govern, and have in divers ages and places governed wisely, but are not so apt thereto in general as men.

15. Because the sovereign power is indivisible, it cannot be supposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it should descend entirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed should be the eldest, assigned thereto by the lot of nature; because he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof. Besides, what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren, the odds shall be adjudged to the elder, because no subject hath authority otherwise to judge thereof.

16. And for want of issue in the possessor, the brother shall be the presumed successor. For by the judgment of nature, next in blood is next. in love; and next in love is next to preferment.

17. And as the succession followeth the first monarch, so also it followeth him or her that is in possession; and consequently, the children of him in possession shall be preferred before the children of his father or predecessor.

Chapter 24: The Incommodities of Several Sorts of Government Compared

1. HAVING SET forth the nature of a person politic, and the three sorts thereof, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; in this chapter shall be declared, the conveniences, and inconveniences, that arise from the same, both in general, and of the said several sorts in particular. And first, seeing a body politic is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular men, the benefit and damage thereof consisteth in the benefit or damage of being ruled. The benefit is that for which a body politic was instituted, namely, the peace and preservation of every particular man, than which it is not possible there can be a greater, as hath been touched before, Part I. chap. XIV, sect. 12. And this benefit extendeth equally both to the sovereign, and to the subjects. For he or they that have the sovereign power, have but the defence of their persons, by the assistance of the particulars; and every particular man hath his defence by their union in the sovereign. As for other benefits which pertain not to their safety and sufficiency, but to their well and delightful being, such as are superfluous riches, they so belong to the sovereign, as they must also be in the subject; and so to the subject, as they must also be in the sovereign. For the riches and treasure of the sovereign, is the dominion he hath over the riches of his subjects. If therefore the sovereign provide not so as that particular men may have means, both to preserve themselves, and also to preserve the public; the common or sovereign treasure can be none. And on the other side, if it were not for a common and public treasure belonging to the sovereign power, men's private riches would sooner serve to put them into confusion and war, than

to secure or maintain them. Insomuch, as the profit of the sovereign and subject goeth always together. That distinction therefore of government, that there is one government for the good of him that governeth, and another for the good of them that be governed; whereof the former is despotical (that is lordly); the other, a government of freemen, is not right; no more is the opinion of them that hold it to be no city, which consisteth of a master and his servants. They might as well say, it were no city, that consisted in a father and his own issue, how numerous soever they were. For to a master that hath no children, the servants have in them all those respects, for which men love their children; for they are his strength and his honour; and his power is no greater over them, than over his children.

2. The inconvenience arising from government in general to him that governeth, consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about the business of other men, that are his subjects; and partly, in the danger of his person. For the head always is that part, not only where the care resideth, but also against which the stroke of an enemy most commonly is directed. To balance this incommodity, the sovereignty, together with the necessity of this care and danger, comprehendeth so much honour, riches, and means whereby to delight the mind, as no private man's wealth can attain unto. The inconveniences of government in general to a subject are none at all, if well considered; but in appearance there be two things that may trouble his mind, or two general grievances. The one is loss of liberty; the other the uncertainty of meum and tuum. For the first, it consisteth in this, that a subject may no more govern his own actions according to his own discretion and judgment, or, (which is all one) conscience, as the present occasions from time to time shall dictate to him; but must be tied to do according to that will only, which once for all he had long ago laid up, and involved in the wills of the major part of an assembly, or in the will of some one man. But this is really no inconvenience. For, as it hath been shewed

before, it is the only means by which we have any possibility of preserving ourselves; for if every man were allowed this liberty of following his conscience, in such difference of consciences, they would not live together in peace an hour. But it appeareth a great inconvenience to every man in particular, to be debarred of this liberty, because every one apart considereth it as in himself, and not as in the rest; by which means, liberty appeareth in the likeness of rule and government over others; for where one man is at liberty, and the rest bound, there that one hath government. Which honour, he that understandeth not so much, demanding by the name simply of liberty, thinketh it a great grievance and injury to be denied it. For the second grievance concerning meum and tuum, it is also none, but in appearance only. It consisteth in this, that the sovereign power taketh from him that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other propriety, but use and custom. But without such sovereign power, the right of men is not propriety to any thing, but a community; no better than to have no right at all, as hath been shewed Part I. chap. XIV, sect. 10. Propriety therefore being derived from the sovereign power, is not to be pretended against the same; especially when by it every subject hath his propriety against every other subject, which when sovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that case they return to war amongst themselves. Those levies therefore which are made upon men's estates, by the sovereign authority, are no more but the price of that peace and defence which the sovereignty maintaineth for them. If this were not so, no money nor forces for the wars or any other public occasion, could justly be levied in the world; for neither king, nor democracy, nor aristocracy, nor the estates of any land, could do it, if the sovereignty could not. For in all those cases, it is levied by virtue of the sovereignty; nay more, by the three estates here, the land of one man may be transferred to another, without crime of him from whom it was taken, and without pretence of public benefit; as hath been done. And this without

injury, because done by the sovereign power; for the power whereby it is done, is no less than sovereign, and cannot be greater. Therefore this grievance for meum and tuum is not real; unless more be exacted than is necessary. But it seemeth a grievance, because to them that either know not the right of sovereignty, or to whom that right belongeth, it seemeth an injury; and injury, how light soever the damage, is always grievous, as putting us in mind of our disability to help ourselves; and into envy of the power to do us wrong.

3. Having spoken of the inconveniences of the subject, by government in general, let us consider the same in the three several sorts thereof, namely, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; whereof the two former are in effect but one. For (as I have shewed before) democracy is but the government of a few orators. The comparison therefore will be between monarchy and aristocracy; and to omit that the world, as it was created, so also it is governed by one God Almighty; and that all the ancients have preferred monarchy before other governments, both in opinion, because they feigned a monarchical government amongst their gods; and also by their custom, for that in the most ancient times all people were so governed; and that paternal government, which is monarchy, was instituted in the beginning from the creation; and that other governments have proceeded from the dissolution thereof, caused by the rebellious nature of mankind, and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented by human wit; I will insist only in this comparison upon the inconveniences that may happen to the subjects, in consequence to each of these governments.

4. And first it seemeth inconvenient, there should be committed so great a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the same; and some think it inconvenient eo nomine, because he hath the power. But this reason we may not by any means admit, for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by Almighty God, who without question hath more

power over every man, than can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore must be derived, not from the power, but from the affections and passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject; by which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss. And because an aristocracy consisteth of men, if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passion will be greater in an aristocracy, than a monarchy. But there is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but every man delivering his opinion at large, without interruption, endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better; and what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is possible; to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also is never without aim at his own benefit, or honour: every man's end being some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working upon the passions of the rest. And thus the passions of those that are singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many coals, though but warm asunder, being put together inflame one another.

5. Another inconvenience of monarchy is this: that the monarch, besides the riches necessary for the defence of the commonwealth, may take so much more from the subjects, as may enrich his children, kindred and favourites, to what degree he pleaseth; which though it be indeed an inconvenience, if he should so do; yet is the same both greater in an aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass; for there not one only, but many have children, kindred, and friends to raise; and in that point they are as twenty monarchs for one, and likely to set forward one another's designs mutually, to the oppression of all the rest. The same also happeneth in a democracy, if they all do agree; otherwise they bring in a worse inconvenience, (viz.) sedition.

6. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of dispensing with the execution of justice; whereby the family and friends of the monarch, may with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or oppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but many have power of taking men out of the hands of justice; and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves without farther speaking, as a tacit covenant: Hodie mihi, cras tibi.

7. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws; concerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that the laws may be altered, according as men's manners change, or as the conjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth shall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it proceedeth from the change, not of the occasion, but of the minds of him or them, by whose authority the laws are made. Now it is manifest enough of itself, that the mind of one man is not so variable in that point, as are the decrees of an assembly. For not only they have all their natural changes, but the change of any one man be enough, with eloquence and reputation, or by solicitation and faction, to make that law to-day, which another by the very same means, shall abrogate to-morrow.

8. Lastly, the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war. and to this are monarchies much less subject, than any other governments. For where the union, or band of a commonwealth, is one man, there is no distraction; whereas in assemblies, those that are of different opinions, and give different counsel, are apt to fall out amongst themselves, and to cross the designs of commonwealth for one another's sake: and when they cannot have the honour of making good their own devices, they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of their adversaries to prove vain. And in this

contention, when the opposite factions happen to be anything equal in strength, they presently fall to war. Wherein necessity teacheth both sides, that an absolute monarch, (viz.) a general, is necessary both for their defence against one another, and also for the peace of each faction within itself. But this aptitude to dissolution, is to be understood for an inconvenience in such aristocracies only where the affairs of state are debated in great and numerous assemblies, as they were anciently in Athens, and in Rome; and not in such as do nothing else in great assemblies, but choose magistrates and counsellors, and commit the handling of state affairs to a few; such as is the aristocracy of Venice at this day. For these are no more apt to dissolve from this occasion, than monarchies, the counsel of state being both in the one and the other alike.

Chapter 25: That Subjects are not Bound to Follow Their Private Judgments in Controversies of Religion

1. HAVING SHOWED that in all commonwealths whatsoever, the necessity of peace and government requireth, that there be existent some power, either in one man, or in one assembly of men, by the name of the power sovereign, to which it is not lawful for any member of the same commonwealth to disobey; there occurreth now a difficulty, which, if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for any man. to procure his own peace and preservation, because it maketh it unlawful for a man to put himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as is required thereto. And the difficulty is this: we have amongst us the Word of God for the rule of our actions; now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as shall be by them commanded; when the commands of God and man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather than man: and consequently the covenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.

2. This difficulty hath not been of very great. antiquity in the world. There was no such dilemma amongst the Jews; for their civil law, and divine law, was one and the same law of Moses: the interpreters whereof were the priests, whose power was subordinate to the power of the king; as was the power-of Aaron to the power of Moses. Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of amongst the Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles; for amongst these their severAl civil laws were the rules whereby not only righteousness and virtue, but also religion and the external worship of God, was ordered and approved; that being esteemed the true worship of God, which was kata ta nomima, (i.e.) according to the laws civil. Also those

Christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of Rome, are free from this question; for that they allow unto him (their sovereign) to interpret the Scriptures, which are the law of God, as he in his own judgment shall think right. This difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Christians only, to whom it is allowed to take for the sense of the Scripture that which they make thereof, either by their own private interpretation, or by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by public authority: they that follow their own interpretation, continually demanding liberty of conscience; and those that follow the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign of the commonwealth, requiring a power in matters of religion either above the power civil, or at least not depending on it.

3. To take away this scruple of conscience concerning obedience to human laws, amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of God in the Holy Scriptures; I propound to their consideration, first: that no human law is intended to oblige the. conscience of a man, but the actions only. For seeing no man (but God alone) knoweth the heart or conscience of a man, unless it break out into action, either of the tongue, or other part of the body; the law made thereupon would be of none effect, because no man is able to discern, but by word or Other action whether such law be kept or broken. Nor did the apostles themselves pretend dominion over men's consciences concerning the faith they preached, but only persuasion and instruction. And therefore St. Paul saith 2 Cor. 1, 24, writing to the Corinthians, concerning their controversies, that he and the rest of the apostles, had no dominion over their faith, but were helpers of their joy.

4. And for the actions of men which proceed from their consciences, the regulating of which actions is the only means of peace; if they might not stand with justice, it were impossible that justice towards God, and peace amongst men should stand together in that religion that teacheth us, that

justice and peace should kiss each other, and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obedience to human authority'. as Matth. 23, 2, 3, we have this precept: The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do. And yet were the Scribes and Pharisees not priests, but men of temporal authority. Again Luke 1 1, 17: Every kingdom divided against itself shall be desolate; and is not that kingdom divided against itself, where the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private opinion, or conscience; and yet those actions such as give occasion of offence and breach of peace? Again Rom. 13, 5, therefore you must be subject, not because of wrath only, but also for conscience sake. Titus 3, 1: Put them in remembrance, that they be subject to principalities and powers. 1 Peter 2, 3, 13-14: Submit yourselves unto all manner of ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king, as unto the superior, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent of him for the punishment of evil-doers. Jude, verse 8: These dreamers also that defile the flesh, and despise government, and speak evil of them that are in authority. And forasmuch as all subjects in commonwealths are in the nature of children and servants, that which is a command to them, is a command to all subjects. But to these St. Paul saith, Colos. 3, 20, 22: Children, obey your parents in all things; servants, be obedient to your masters according to the flesh, in all things. And verse 23: Do it heartily as to the Lord, These places considered, it seemeth strange to me, that any man in a Christian commonwealth should have any occasion to deny his obedience to public authority, upon this ground, that it is better to obey God than man. For though St. Peter and the apostles did so answer the council of the Jews that forbad them to preach Christ, there appeareth no reason that Christians should allege the same against their Christian governors, that command to preach Christ. To reconcile this seeming contradiction of

simple obedience to God and simple obedience to man, we are to consider a Christian subject, as under a Christian sovereign, or under an infidel.

5. And under a Christian sovereign we are to consider, what actions we are forbidden by God Almighty to obey them in, and what not. The actions we are forbidden to obey them in, are such only as imply a denial of that faith which is necessary to our salvation; for otherwise there can be no pretence of disobedience. For why should a man incur the danger of a temporal death, by displeasing of his superior, if it were not for fear of eternal death hereafter? It must therefore be enquired, what those propositions and articles they be, the belief whereof our Saviour or his apostles have declared to be such, as without believing them a man cannot be saved; and then all other points that are now controverted, and make distinction of sects, Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists,. Arminians, &c., as in old time the like made Paulists, Apollonians, and Cephasians, must needs be such, as a man needeth not for the holding thereof deny obedience to his superiors. And for the points of faith necessary to salvation, I shall call them FUNDAMENTAL, and every other point a SUPERSTRUCTION.

6. And without all controversy, there is not any more necessary point to be believed for man's salvation than this, that Jesus is the Messiah, that is, the Christ; which proposition is explicated in sundry sorts, but still the same in effect; as, that he is God's anointed; for that is signified by the word Christ; that he was the true and lawful king of Israel, the son of David; and Saviour of the world, the redeemer of Israel; the salvation of God; he that should come into the world, the son of God, and (which I desire by the way to have noted, against the new sect of Arians), the begotten Son of God, Acts 3, 13; Heb. 1, 5; 5, 5: the only begotten Son of God, John 1, 14, 18; John 3, 16, 18; 1 John 4, 9: that he was God, John 1, 1; John 20, 28: that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in him bodily. Moreover, the Holy One, the Holy One of God, the forgiver of sins, that he is risen from the dead: these

are explications, and parts of that general article, that Jesus is the Christ. This point therefore, and all the explications thereof are fundamental; as also all such as be evidently inferred from thence; as, belief in God the Father: John 12, 44: He that believeth in me, believeth not in me, but in him that sent me; I John 2, 23: He that denieth the Son, hath not the. Father. belief in God the Holy Ghost, of Whom Christ saith, John 14, 26: But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name; and John 15, 26: But when the Comforter shall come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth: belief of the Scriptures, by which we believe those points, and of the immortality of the soul, without which we cannot believe he is a Saviour.

7. And as these are the fundamental points of faith, necessary to salvation; so also are they only necessary as matter of faith, and only essential to the calling of a Christian; as may appear by many evident places of Holy Scripture: John 5, 39: Search the Scriptures, for in them you think to have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me. Now, forasmuch as by the Scripture is meant there the Old Testament (the New being then not written), the belief of that which was written concerning our Saviour in the Old Testament, was sufficient belief for the obtaining of eternal life; but in the Old Testament, there is nothing revealed concerning Christ, but that he is the Messiah, and such things as belong to the fundamental points thereupon depending; and therefore those fundamental points are sufficient to salvation, as of faith. And John 6, 28, 29: Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe in him, whom he hath sent. So that the point to be believed is, That Jesus Christ came forth from God, and he which believeth it, worketh the works of God. John 11, 26, 27: Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die. Believest thou this? She said unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of

God, which should come into the world. Hence followeth that he that believeth this shall never die. John 20, 31: But these things are written, that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through his name. By which appeareth that this fundamental point is all that is required, as of faith to our salvation. 1 John 4, 2: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: 1 John 5, 1: Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; and verse 4; Who is it that overcometh the world, but he that believeth, that Jesus is the Son of God? and verse 13: These things have I written unto you that believe in the name of the Son of God, that ye may know that ye have eternal life. Acts 8, 36, 37: The eunuch said, Here is water, what doth let me to be baptized? And Philip said unto him, If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. He answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. This point therefore was sufficient for the reception of a man to baptism, that is to say to Christianity. And Acts 16, 30: The keeper of the prison fell down before Paul and Silas, and said, Sirs, what shall I do to be saved? And they said, Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. And the sermon of St. Peter, upon the day of Pentecost, was nothing else but an explication, that Jesus was the Christ. And when they that heard him, asked him, What shall we do? he said unto them, Acts 2, 38: Amend your lives, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins. Rom. 10, 9: If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart, that God raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. To these places may be added: that wheresoever our Saviour Christ doth approve the faith of any man, the proposition believed (if the same be to be collected out of the text) is always some of these fundamental points before mentioned, or something equivalent; as the faith of the centurion, Matth. 8, 8: Speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed; believing he was omnipotent; the faith of the woman, which

had an issue of blood, Matth. 9, 21: If I may but touch the hem of his garment; implying, he was the Messiah; the faith required of the blind men, Matth. 9, 28: Believe you that I am able to do this? the faith of the Canaanitish woman, Matth. 15, 22, that he was the Son of David, implying the same. And so it is in every one of those places (none excepted) where our Saviour commendeth any man's faith; which because they are too many to insert here, I omit, and refer them to his inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied. And as there is no other faith required, so there was no other preaching; for the prophets of the Old Testament preached no other; and John the Baptist preached only the approach of the kingdom of heaven, that is to say, of the kingdom of Christ. The same was the commission of the apostles, Matth. 10, 7: Go preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand. And Paul preaching amongst the Jews, Acts 18, 5, did but testify unto the Jews, that Jesus was the Christ. And the heathens took notice of Christians no otherwise, but by this name that they believed Jesus to be a king, crying out, Acts 17, 6: These are they that have subverted the state of the world, and here they are, whom Jason hath received. And these all do against the decrees of Caesar, saying, that there is another king, one Jesus. And this was the sum of the predictions, the sum of the confessions of them that believed, as well men as devils. This was the title of his cross, Jesus of Nazareth, king of the Jews; this the occasion of the crown of thorns, sceptre of reed, and a man to carry his cross;. this was the subject of the Hosannas; and this the title, by which our Saviour, commanding to take another man's goods, bade them say, The Lord hath need; and by this title he purged the temple of the profane market kept there. Nor did the apostles themselves believe any more than that Jesus was the Messiah nor understand so much; for they understood the Messiah to be no more than a temporal king, till after our Saviour's resurrection. Farthermore, this point that Christ is the Messiah, is particularly set forth for fundamental by that word, or some

other equivalent thereunto in divers places. Upon the confession of Peter, Matth. 16, 16: Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God, our Saviour, verse 18, saith, Upon this rock will I build my Church. This point therefore is the whole foundation of Christ's church. Rom. 15, 20, St. Paul saith, So I enforced myself to preach the Gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should have built upon another man's foundation. I Cor. 3, 10, St. Paul when he had reprehended the Corinthians for their sects, and curious doctrines and questions, he distinguisheth between fundamental points, and superstruction; and saith, I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereupon; but let every man take heed how he buildeth upon it. For other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus the Christ. Colos. 2, 6: As you have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in him, rooted and builded in him, and stablished in the faith.

8. Having showed this proposition, Jesus is the Christ, to be the only fundamental and necessary point of faith; I shall set down a few places more to show that other points, though they may be true, are not so necessary to be believed, as that a man may not be saved though he believe them not. And first, if a man could not be saved without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies, which are now in agitation concerning religion, I cannot see how any man living can be saved; so full of subtilty, and curious knowledge it is, to be so great a divine. Why therefore should a man think that our Saviour, who Matth. 11, 30, saith, that his yoke is easy, should require a matter of that difficulty?. or how are little children said to believe? Matth. 18, 6; or how could the good thief be thought sufficiently catechised upon the cross? or St. Paul so perfect a Christian presently upon his conversion? and though there may be more obedience required in him that hath the fundamental points explicated upon him, than in him, that hath received the same but implicitly; yet there is no more faith required for salvation in one man than in another. For if it be true, that whosoever shall

confess with his mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in his heart that God raised him from the dead, shall be saved; as it is, Rom. 10, 9; and that whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; the belief of that point is sufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he be, forasmuch as concerneth faith. And seeing he that believeth not, that Jesus s the Christ, whatsoever he believe else, cannot be saved; it followeth that there is no more required to the salvation of one man, than of another, in matter of faith.

9. About these points fundamental there is little controversy amongst Christians, though otherwise of different sects amongst themselves. And therefore the controversies of religion, are altogether about points unnecessary to salvation; whereof some are doctrines raised by human ratiocination, from the points fundamental. As for example: such doctrines as concern the manner of the real presence, wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning the omnipotency and divinity of Christ, with the tenets of Aristotle and the Peripatetics concerning substance and accidents, species, hypostasis and the subsistence and migration of accidents from place to place; words some of them without meaning, and nothing but the canting of Grecian sophisters; and these doctrines are condemned expressly Col. 2, 8, where after St. Paul had exhorted them to be rooted and builded in Christ, he giveth them this further caveat: Beware lest there be any man that spoil you through philosophy and vain deceits, through the traditions of men, according to the rudiments of the world. And such are such doctrines, as are raised out of such places of the Scriptures, as concern not the foundation, by men's natural reason; as about the concatenation of causes, and the manner of God's predestination; which are also mingled with philosophy; as if it were possible for men that know not in what manner God seeth, heareth, or speaketh, to know nevertheless the manner how he intendeth, and predestinateth. A man therefore ought not to examine by reason any point,

or draw any consequence out of Scripture by reason, concerning the nature of God Almighty, of which reason is not capable. And therefore St. Paul, Rom. 12, 3, giveth a good rule, That no man presume to understand above that which is meet to understand, but that he understand according to sobriety'. which they do not who presume out of Scripture, by their own interpretation to raise any doctrine to the understanding, concerning those things which are incomprehensible. And this whole controversy concerning the predestination of God, and the freewill of man, is not peculiar to Christian men. For we have huge volumes of this subject, under the name of fate and contingency, disputed between the Epicureans and the Stoics, and consequently it is not matter of faith, but of philosophy; and so are also all the questions concerning any other point, but the foundation before named; and God receiveth a man, which part of the question soever he holdeth. It was a controversy in St. Paul's time, whether a Christian Gentile might eat freely of any thing which the Christian Jews did not; and the Jew condemned the Gentile that he did eat; to whom St. Paul saith, Rom. 14, 3: Let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath received him. And verse 6, in the question concerning the observing of holy days, wherein the Gentiles and the Jews differed, he saith unto them, He that observeth the day, observeth it to the Lord; and he that observeth not the day, observeth it not, to the Lord. And they who strive concerning such questions, and divide themselves into sects, are not therefore to be accounted zealous of the faith, their strife being but carnal, which is confirmed by St. Paul, 1 Cor. 3, 4: When one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal? For they are not questions of faith, but of wit, wherein, carnally, men are inclined to seek the mastery one of another. For nothing is truly a point of faith, but that Jesus is the Christ; as St. Paul testifieth, 1 Cor. 2, 2: For I esteemed not the knowledge of any thing amongst you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And 1 Tim. 6, 20,

21: O Timotheus, keep that which is committed unto thee, and avoid profane and vain babblings, and opposition of science falsely so called, which while some profess, they have erred, concerning the faith. 2 Tim. 2, 16: Stay profane and vain babblings, &c. Verse 17: Of which sort is Hymenaeus and Philetus, which as concerning the truth, have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already. Whereby St. Paul sheweth that the raising of questions by human ratiocination, though it be from the fundamental points themselves, is not only not necessary, but most dangerous to the faith of a Christian. Out of all these places I draw only this conclusion in general, that neither the points now in controversy amongst Christians of different sects, or in any point that ever shall be in controversy, excepting only those that are contained in this article, Jesus is the Christ, are necessary to salvation, as of faith; though as matter of obedience, a man may be bound not to oppose the same.

10. Although to the obtaining of salvation, there be required no more, as hath been already declared out of the Holy Scriptures, as matter of faith, but the belief of those fundamental articles before set forth; nevertheless, there are required other things, as matter of obedience. For, as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms (to avoid the punishment which kings may inflict) to acknowledge the right and title of the king, without obedience also to his laws; so also it is not enough to acknowledge our Saviour Christ to be the king of heaven, in which consisteth Christian faith, unless also we endeavour to obey his laws, which are the laws of the kingdom of heaven, in which consisteth Christian obedience. And forasmuch as the laws of the kingdom of heaven, are the laws of nature, as hath been shewed Part I. chap. XVIII, not only faith, but also the observation of the law of nature, which is that for which a man is called just or righteous (in that sense in which justice is taken not for the absence of all guilt, but for the endeavour, and constant will to do that which is just), not only faith, but this justice,

which also from the effect thereof, is called repentance, and sometimes works, is necessary to salvation. So that faith and justice do both concur thereto; and in the several acceptation of this word justification, are properly said both of them to justify; and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn. For not only he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his title, but also he that doth it upon the inordinateness of his passions, deserveth punishment. And when faith and works are separated, not only the faith is called dead, without works, but also works are called dead works, without faith. And therefore St. James, cha, 17, saith, Even so the faith, if it have no works, is dead in itself; and verse 26: For as the body without the spirit is dead, even so faith without works is dead. And St. Paul, Heb. 6, 1, calleth works without faith, dead works, where he saith, Not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works. And by these dead works, is understood not the obedience and justice of the inward man, but the opus Operatum, or external action, proceeding from fear of punishment, or from vain glory, and desire to be honoured of men; and these may be separated from faith, and conduce no way to a man's justification. And for that cause St. Paul, Rom. 4, excludeth the righteousness of the law, from having part in the justification of a sinner. For by the law of Moses, which is applied to men's actions, and requireth the absence of guilt, all men living are liable to damnation; and therefore no man is justified by works, but by faith only. But if works be taken for the endeavour to do them, that is, if the will be taken for the deed, or internal for external righteousness, then do works contribute to salvation. And then taketh place that of St. James, cha, 24: Ye see then, how that of works a man is justified, and not of faith only. And both of these are joined to salvation, as in St. Mark 1, 15: Repent and believe the Gospel. And Luke 18, 18, when a certain ruler asked our Saviour, what he ought to do to inherit eternal life, he propounded to him the keeping of the commandments; which when the

ruler said he had kept, he propounded to him the faith, Sell all that thou hast, and follow me. And John 3, 36: He that believeth in the Son, hath everlasting life. And He that obeyeth not the Son, shall not see life. Where he manifestly joineth obedience and faith together. And Rom: 1, 17: The just shall live by faith; not every one, but the just. For also the devils believe and tremble. But though both faith and justice (meaning still by justice, not absence of guilt, but the good intentions of the mind, which is called righteousness by God, that taketh the will for the deed) be both of them said to justify, yet are their parts in the act of justification to be distinguished. For justice is said to justify, not because it absolveth, but because it denominates him just, and setteth him in an estate or capacity of salvation, whensoever he shall have faith. But faith is said to justify, that is, to absolve; because by it a just man is absolved of, and forgiven his unjust actions. And thus are reconciled the places of St. Paul and St. James, that faith only justifieth, and a man is not justified by faith only; and shewed how faith and repentance must concur to salvation.

11. These things considered it will easily appear: that under the sovereign power of a Christian commonwealth, there is no danger of damnation from simple obedience to human laws; for in that the sovereign alloweth Christianity, no man is compelled to renounce that faith which is enough for his salvation; that is to say, the fundamental points. And for other points,. seeing they are not necessary to salvation, if we conform our actions to the laws, we do not only what we are allowed, but also what we are commanded, by the law of nature, which is the moral law taught by our Saviour himself. And it is part of that obedience which must concur to our salvation.

12. And though it be true, whatsoever a man doth contrary to his conscience, is sin; yet the obedience in these cases, is neither sin, nor against the conscience. For the conscience being nothing else but a man’s

settled judgment and opinion, when he hath once transferred his right of judging to another, that which shall be commanded, is no less his judgment, than the judgment of that other. so that in obedience to laws, a man doth still according to his conscience, but not his private conscience. And whatsoever is done contrary to private conscience, is then a sin, when the laws have left him to his own liberty, and never else. And then whatsoever a man doth, not only believing it is ill done, but doubting whether it be ill or not, is done ill; in case he may lawfully omit the doing.

13. And as it hath been proved, that a man must submit his opinions, in matters of controversy, to the authority of the commonwealth; so also is the same confessed by the practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it. For who is there differing in opinion from another, and thinking himself to be in the right, and the other in the wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same opinion that the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit his opinion also thereunto? or that would not be content, if not that one or a few men, yet that all the divines of a whole nation, or at least an assembly of all those he liketh, should have the power to determine of all the controversies of religion? or, who is there that would not be content, to submit his opinions, either to the pope, or to a general council, or to a provincial council, or to a presbytery of his own nation? And yet in all these cases he submitteth himself to no greater than human authority. Nor can a man be said to submit himself to Holy Scripture, that doth not submit himself to some or other for the interpretation thereof; or why should there be any church government at all instituted, if the Scripture itself could do the office of a judge in controversies of faith? But the truth is apparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only liberty of conscience, but of their actions; nor that only, but a farther liberty of persuading others to their opinions; nor that only for every man desireth,

that the sovereign authority should admit no other opinions to be maintained but such as he himself holdeth.

14. The difficulty therefore of obeying both God and man, in a Christian commonwealth is none: all the difficulty resteth in this point, whether he that hath received the faith of Christ, having before subjected himself to the authority of an infidel, be discharged of his obedience thereby, or not, in matters of religion. In which case it seemeth reasonable to think, that since all covenants of obedience are entered into for the preservation of a man's life, if a man be content, without resistance to lay down his life, rather than to obey the commands of an infidel; in so hard a case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. For no covenant bindeth farther than to endeavour; and if a man cannot assure himself to perform a just duty, when thereby he is assured of present death, much less can it be expected that a man should perform that, for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned eternally. And thus much concerning the scruple of conscience that may arise concerning obedience to human laws, in them that interpret the law of God to themselves. It remaineth, to remove the same scruple from them that submit their controversies to others, not ordained thereunto by the sovereign authority. And this I refer to the chapter following.

Chapter 26: That Subjects are not bound to follow the Judgment of any Authorities in Controversies of Religion which is not Dependent on the Sovereign Power

1. IN THE former chapter have been removed those difficulties opposing our obedience to human authority, which arise from misunderstanding of our Saviour's title and laws; in the former whereof, namely his title, consisteth our faith; and in the latter, our justice. Now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning his title and laws, may nevertheless have different opinions concerning his magistrates, and the authority he hath given them. And this is the cause why many Christians have denied obedience to their princes; pretending that our Saviour Christ hath not given this magistracy to them, but to others. As for example: some say, to the pope universally; some, to a synod aristocratical; some, to a synod democratical in every several commonwealth; and the magistrates of Christ being they by whom he speaketh: the question is, whether he speak unto us by the pope, or by convocations of bishops and ministers, or by them that have the sovereign power in every commonwealth.

2. This controversy was the cause of those two mutinies that happened against Moses in the wilderness. The first by Aaron and his sister Miriam, who took upon them to censure Moses, for marrying an Ethiopian woman. And the state of the question between them and Moses they set forth Numbers 12, 2, in these words: What hath the Lord spoken but only by Moses? hath he not spoken also by us? And the Lord heard this, &c., and punished the same in Miriam, forgiving Aaron upon his repentance. And this is the case of all them that set up the priesthood against the sovereignty.

The other was of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, who with two hundred and fifty captains gathered themselves together against Moses, and against Aaron. The state of their controversy was this: Whether God were not with the multitude, as well as with Moses, and every man as holy as he. For, Numb. 16, 3, thus they say, You take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation is holy,. every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them: wherefore then lift ye yourselves above the congregation of the Lord? And this is the case of them that set up their private consciences, and unite themselves to take the government of religion out of the hands of him or them, that have the sovereign power of the commonwealth; which how well it pleaseth God, may appear by the hideous punishment of Corah and his accomplices.

3. In the government therefore of Moses, there was no power neither civil nor spiritual, that was not derived from him; nor in the state of Israel under kings, was there any earthly power, by which those kings were compellable to any thing, or any subject allowed to resist them, in any case whatsoever. For though the prophets by extraordinary calling, did often admonish and threaten them, yet had they no authority over them. And therefore amongst the Jews, the power spiritual and temporal, was always in the same hand.

4. Our Saviour Christ, as he was the rightful king of the Jews in particular, as well as king of the kingdom of Heaven, in the ordaining of magistrates; revived that form of policy which was used by Moses. According to the number of the children of Jacob, Moses took unto him by the appointment of God, Numb. 1, 4, twelve men, every one of the chief of their tribe, which were to assist him in the muster of Israel. And these twelve, verse 24, are called the princes of Israel, twelve men, every one for the house of their fathers; which are said also Numb. 7, 2, to be heads over the houses of their fathers, and princes of the tribes, and over them that

were numbered. And these were every one equal amongst themselves. In like manner our Saviour took unto him twelve apostles, to be next unto him in authority; of whom he saith Matth. 19, 28, When the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his majesty, ye which follow me in the regeneration, shall sit also upon twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And concerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst themselves our Saviour saith, Matth. 20, 25: Ye know that the Lords of the Gentiles have domination over them, &c. Verse 26: But it shall not be so amongst you; but whosoever will be greatest among you, let him be your servant. And Matth. 23, 11: He that is greatest among you, let him be your servant. And a little before, verse 8, Be not called Rabbi; for one is your doctor Christ; and all ye are brethren. And Acts 1, in choosing of Matthias to be an apostle, though St. Peter used the part of a prolocutor, yet did no man take upon him the authority of election, but referred the same to lot.

5. Again, Moses had the command of God, Numb. 11, 16: Gather to me seventy men of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest that they are the elders of the people, and governors over them, and bring them into the tabernacle, &c. And Moses did accordingly, verse 24. And these were chosen to help Moses in bearing the burthen of the government, as appeareth verse 17 of the same chapter. And as the twelve princes of the tribes were according to the number of Jacob's children; so were the seventy elders according to the number of the persons that went down with Jacob into Egypt. In like manner our Saviour in his kingdom of Heaven, the church, out of the whole number of those that believed in him, ordained seventy persons, which peculiarly were called the seventy disciples, to whom he gave power to preach the Gospel and baptize.

6. In our Saviour's time therefore, the hierarchy of the church consisted, besides himself that was the head, of twelve apostles, who were equal amongst themselves, but ordained over others, as were the twelve heads of

the tribes; and seventy. disciples, who had every one of them power to baptize and teach, and help to govern the whole flock.

7. And whereas in the commonwealth instituted by Moses, there was not only a high-priest for the present, but also a succession and order of priests; it may be demanded why our Saviour Christ did not ordain the like? To which may be answered, that the high-priesthood, forasmuch as concerneth the authority thereof, was in the person of Christ, as he was Christ-King. So also was it in Moses, Aaron having the ministerial part only. For notwithstanding that Aaron was the high-priest, yet the consecration of him belonged to Moses, Exod. 29, 1. All the utensils of sacrifice, and other holy things, were ordered by Moses; and in sum: the whole Levitical law was delivered by God by the hand of Moses, who was to Aaron a God, and Aaron to him a mouth. And for the ministerial part, there could no highpriest be ordained but himself; for seeing our Saviour was himself the sacrifice, who but himself could offer him up? And for the celebration of that sacrifice for ever after, our Saviour annexed the priesthood to those whom he had appointed to govern in the church.

8. After the ascension of our Saviour, the apostles dispersed themselves for the spreading of the Gospel; and continually as they converted any number of men, in any city or region, to the faith, they chose out such as they thought fittest, to direct them in matter of conversation and life, according to Christ's law, and to explicate unto them that mystery of Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, to unfold unto them at large the office of the Messiah. And of those elders some were subordinate to others, according as the apostles, who ordained them, thought meet. So St. Paul gave power to Titus, to ordain elders in Crete, and to redress things that were amiss. So that Titus was both an elder, and ordained elders, Tit. 1. 5: For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest continue to redress the things that remain, and ordain elders in every city; where the word is katasteses, that is

constitute; whereby it appeareth that in the apostles' times, one elder had authority over another, to ordain and rule them. For 1 Tim. 5, 19, Timothy an elder, is made judge of accusations against other elders. And Acts 14, 23, the disciples are said to ordain elders for all the congregations of the cities they had preached in; and though the word there be cheirotonesantes, yet it signifieth not election by holding up of hands, but simply and absolutely ordination. For the ordinary choosing of magistrates amongst the Grecians, which were all either popularly governed, or else by oligarchy, being performed by holding up of hands, made that word be taken simply for an election or ordination howsoever made. And thus in the primitive church, the hierarchy of the church was: apostles; elders that governed other elders; and elders that ruled not, but their office was to preach, to administer the sacraments, to offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the name of the people. But at that time there appeared no distinction between the names of bishop and elder. But immediately after the apostles' time, the word bishop was taken to signify such an elder as had the government of elders, and other elders were called by the name of priests, which signifieth the same that elder doth. And thus the government of bishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve rulers, and seventy elders of Israel, in the twelve apostles and seventy disciples of our Saviour; in the ruling elders, and not ruling elders, in the time of the apostles.

9. And thus much of the magistrates over Christ's flock in the primitive church; for the office of a minister, or ministress, was to be subject to the flock, and to serve them in those things which appertain to their temporal business. The next thing to be considered is the authority which our Saviour gave to them, either over those whom they had converted, or those whom they were about to convert. And for these latter, which as yet were without the church, the authority which our Saviour gave to his apostles was no more but this: to preach unto them that Jesus was the Christ, to explicate the

same in all points that concern the kingdom of heaven, and to persuade men to embrace our Saviour's doctrine, but by no means to compel any man to be subject to them. For seeing the laws of the kingdom of heaven, as hath been showed, Part I. chap. XVIII, sect. 10, are dictated to the conscience only, which is not subject to. compulsion and constraint; it was not congruent to the style of the King of Heaven to constrain men to submit their actions to him, but to advise them only; nor for him that professeth the sum of his law to be love, to extort any duty from us with fear of temporal punishment. And therefore as the mighty men in the world, that hold others in subjection by force, are called in Scripture by the name of hunters; so our Saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw the world unto him, by subduing their affections, fishers; and therefore he saith to Peter and Andrew, Matth. 4, 19: Follow me, and I will make ye fishers of men. And Luke 10, 3: Behold, saith Christ, I send ye forth as lambs amongst wolves. And it were to no end to give them the right of compelling, without strengthening the same with greater power than of lambs amongst wolves. Moreover, Matth. 10, where our Saviour giveth a commission to his twelve apostles to go forth and convert the nations to the faith, he giveth them no authority of coercion and punishment, but only saith, verse 14: Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house, or that city, shake off the dust of your feet. Truly I say unto you, it shall be easier for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city. Whereby it is manifest, that all that the apostles could do by their authority, was no more than to renounce communion with them, and leave their punishment to God Almighty, in the day of judgment. Likewise the comparisons of the kingdom of heaven to the seed, Matth. 13, 3, and to the leaven, Matth. 13, 33, doth intimate unto us that the increase thereof ought to proceed from internal operation of God's word preached, and not from any law or compulsion of them that preach it. Moreover our

Saviour himself saith, John 28, 36, that his kingdom is not of this world; and consequently his magistrates derive not from him any authority of punishing men in this world. And therefore also, Matth. 26, 52, after St. Peter had drawn his sword in his defence, our Saviour saith, Put up thy sword into his place. For all that take the sword shall perish by the sword. And, verse 54, How then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, which say, that it must be so? showing out of the Scriptures, that the kingdom of Christ was not to be defended by the sword.

10. But concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over those who were already converted and within the church, there be that think it greater than over them without. For some have said (Bellarmin. Lib. de Rom. Pont. ca): Though the law of Christ deprive no prince of his dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal to Caesar, whilst kings were infidels and out of the church; yet when they became Christians, and of their own accord underwent the laws of the gospel, presently as sheep to a shepherd, and as members to the head, they became subject to the prelate of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Which, whether it be true or not, is to be considered by that light which we have from the Holy Scripture, concerning the power of our Saviour and his apostles, over such as they had converted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the commonwealth of the Jews in his magistrates, the twelve and the seventy; so did he also in the censure of the church, which was excommunication; but amongst the Jews, the church did put the excommunicated persons from the congregation, which they might do by their power temporal; but our Saviour and his apostles, who took upon them no such power, could not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place and congregation, into which he was permitted to enter by the prince, or sovereign of the place; for that had been to deprive the sovereign of his authority. and therefore the excommunication of a person subject to an earthly power, was but a declaration of the church, which did

excommunicate, that the person so excommunicated was to be reputed still as an infidel, but not to be driven by their authority out of any company he might otherwise lawfully come into. And this is it our Saviour saith, Matth. 18, 17: If he refuseth to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. So that the whole effect of excommunicating a Christian prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate him, depart, and banish themselves out of his dominion. Nor can they thereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him; for that were to deprive him of his dominion, which they may not do; for being out of the church, it is confessed by them that make this objection, and proved in the former section, that our Saviour gave no authority to his apostles to be judges over them. And therefore in no case can the sovereign power of a commonwealth be subject to any authority ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself. And though he be informed concerning the kingdom of heaven, and subject himself thereto at the persuasions of persons ecclesiastical, yet is not he thereby subject to their government and rule. For if it were by their authority he took that yoke upon him, and not by their persuasion, then by the same authority he might cast it off; but this is unlawful. For if all the churches in the world should renounce the Christian faith, yet is not this sufficient authority for any of the members to do the same. It is manifest therefore that they who have sovereign power, are immediate rulers of the church under Christ, and all others but subordinate to them. If that were not, but kings should command one thing upon pain of death, and priests another upon pain of damnation, it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand together.

11. And therefore there is no just cause for any man to withdraw his obedience from the sovereign state, upon pretence that Christ hath ordained any state ecclesiastical above it. And though kings take not upon them the ministerial priesthood (as they might if it pleased them) yet are they not so

merely *laic*, as not to have sacerdotal jurisdiction. To conclude this chapter: since God speaketh not in these days to any man by his private interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the interpretation of any power, above, or not depending on the sovereign power of every commonwealth; it remaineth that he speaketh by his vice-gods, or lieutenants here on earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings, or such as have sovereign authority as well as they.

Chapter 27: Of the Causes of Rebellion

1. HITHERTO OF the causes why, and the manner how, men have made commonwealths. In this chapter I shall show briefly, by what causes, and in what manner, they be again destroyed; not meaning to say anything concerning the dissolution of a commonwealth from foreign invasions, which is as it were the violent death thereof, I shall speak only of sedition, which is also the death of the commonwealth, but like to that which happeneth to a man from sickness and distemper. To dispose men to sedition three things concur. The first is discontent; for as long as a man thinketh himself well, and that the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his proceeding from well to better; it is impossible for him to desire the change thereof. The second is pretence of right; for though a man be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause of stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor any pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will never show it. The third is hope of success; for it were madness to attempt without hope, when to fail is to die the death of a traitor. Without these three: discontent, pretence, and hope, there can be no rebellion; and when the same are all together, there wanteth nothing thereto, but a man of credit to set up the standard, and to blow the trumpet.

2. And as for discontent, it is of two sorts: for it consisteth either in bodily pain present or expected, or else in trouble of the mind (which is the general division of pleasure and pain, Part I. chap. VII, sect. 9). The presence of bodily pain disposeth not to sedition; the fear of it doth. As for example: when a great multitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a

crime worthy of death, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for fear thereof. So also the fear of want, or in present want the fear of arrests and imprisonment, dispose to sedition. And therefore great exactions, though the right thereof be acknowledged, have caused great seditions. As in the time of Henry VII. the seditions of the Cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct of the Lord Audley, gave the King battle upon Blackheath; and that of the northern people, who in the same king's time, for demanding a subsidy granted in parliament, murdered the Earl of Northumberland in his house.

3. Thirdly, the other sort of discontent which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger of violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power, and that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto them. For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said, Part I. chap. IX, sect. 21) in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take it ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postponed to those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability to govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as slaves. Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and rule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common; and that can be no where but in the popular state, or democracy. And Aristotle saith well (lib. 6, ca of his Politics), The ground or intention of a democracy, is liberty; which he confirmeth in these words: For men ordinarily say this: that no man can partake of liberty, but only in a popular commonwealth. Whosoever therefore in a monarchical estate, where the sovereign power is absolutely in one man, claimeth liberty, claimeth (if the hardest construction should be made thereof) either to have the sovereignty in his turn, or to be colleague with him that hath it, or to have the monarchy changed into a

democracy. But if the same be construed (with pardon of that unskilful expression) according to the intention of him that claimeth, then doth he thereby claim no more but this, that the sovereign should take notice of his ability and deserving, and put him into employment and place of subordinate government, rather than others that deserve less. And as one claimeth, so doth another, every man esteeming his own desert greatest. Amongst all those that pretend to, or are ambitious of such honour, a few only can be served, unless it be in a democracy; the rest therefore must be discontent. And so much of the first thing that disposeth to rebellion, namely, discontent, consisting in fear and ambition.

4. The second thing that disposeth to rebellion, is pretence of right. And that is when men have an opinion, or pretend to have an opinion: that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them that have the sovereign power, or deprive him or them of the means to execute the same. Of which pretences there be six special cases. One is, when the command is against their conscience, and they believe it is unlawful for a subject at the command of the sovereign power to do any action, which he thinketh in his own conscience not lawful for him to do, or to omit any action, which he thinketh not lawful for him to omit. Another is, when the command is against the laws, and they think the sovereign power in such sort obliged to his own laws, as the subject is; and that when he performeth not his duty, they may resist his power. A third is, when they receive commands from some man or men, and a supersedeas to the same from others, and think the authority is equal, as if the sovereign power were divided. A fourth is, when they are commanded to contribute their persons or money to the public service, and think they have a propriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the sovereign power; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their goods and persons, no more than every man shall of himself think fit. A fifth, when the commands seem hurtful to the people; and they

think, every one of them, that the opinion and sense of the people is the same with the opinion of himself, and those that consent with him; calling by the name of people, any multitude of his own faction. The sixth is, when the commands are grievous; and they account him that commandeth grievous things, a tyrant; and tyrannicide, that is, the killing of a tyrant, not only lawful, but also laudable.

5. All these opinions are maintained in the books of the dogmatics, and divers of them taught in public chairs, and nevertheless are most incompatible with peace and government, and contradictory to the necessary and demonstrable rules of the same. And for the first, namely, that a man may lawfully do or omit any thing against his conscience, and from whence arise all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiastical government, it hath been plainly declared in the two last chapters, that such opinion is erroneous. For those two chapters have been wholly spent, to prove, that Christian religion not only forbiddeth not, but also commandeth, that in every commonwealth, every subject should in all things to the uttermost of his power obey the commands of him or them that is the sovereign thereof; and that a man in so obeying, doth according to his conscience and judgment, as having deposited his judgment in all controversies in the hands of the sovereign power; and that this error proceedeth from the ignorance of what and by whom God Almighty speaketh.

6. As for the second opinion which is: that the sovereign is in such sort obliged to his own laws, as the subject is; the contrary thereof hath been showed, Part II. chap. XX sections 7-12, by which it appeareth that the sovereign power is not to be resisted; that it carrieth the sword both of war and justice; that it hath the right of deciding all controversies, both judicial and deliberative; that it hath the making of all the laws civil; that it appointeth magistrates and public ministers, and that it implieth a universal

impunity. How can he or they be said to be subject to the laws which they may abrogate at their pleasure, or break without fear of punishment? And this error seemeth to proceed from this, that men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this word law, confounding law and covenant, as if they signified the same thing. But law implieth a command; covenant is but a promise. And not every command is a law, but only (Part I. chap. XIII, sect. 6) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action was commanded, not because it was hurtful of itself; and doing contrary to a command, were not at all hurtful, if there were not a right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they that have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot be so commanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and consequently no command can be a law unto them. It is an error therefore to think: that the power which is virtually the whole power of the commonwealth, and which in whomsoever it resideth, is usually called supreme or sovereign, can be subject to any law but that of God Almighty.

7. The third. opinion: that the sovereign power may be divided, is no less an error than the former, as hath been proved, Part II. chap. XX, sect. 15. And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. chap. I. De Republica, that they are not rightly to be called commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. For if one part should have power to make the laws for all, they would by their laws, at their pleasure, forbid others to make peace or war, to levy taxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave; and they that had the right to make peace and war, and command the militia, would forbid the making of other laws, than what themselves liked. And though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty hath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind of

government; yet monarchs have been thereby divers times thrust out of their possession. But the truth is, that the right of sovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they would, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest. As for example: if we should suppose the people of Rome to have had the absolute sovereignty of the Roman state, and to have chosen them a council by the name of the senate, and that to this senate they had given the supreme power of making laws, reserving nevertheless to themselves, in direct and express terms, the whole right and title of the sovereignty (which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable connexion between the sovereign power and the power of making laws), I say, this grant of the people to the senate is of no effect, and the power of making laws is in the people sill. For the senate understanding it to be the will and intention of the people, to retain the sovereignty, ought not to take that for granted, which was contradictory thereto, and passed by error. For, Part I. chap. XIII, sect. 9, in contradictory promises, that which is directly promised, is preferred before that which is opposite thereunto by consequence; because the consequence of a thing is not always observed, as is the thing itself. The error concerning mixed government hath proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men. And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union.

8. The fourth opinion (viz.): that subjects have their meum, tuum, and suum, in property, not only by virtue of the sovereign power over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the sovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the public, but what they please, hath been already confuted, by proving the absoluteness of the sovereignty;

and more particularly, Part II. chap. XXIV, sect. 2; and ariseth from this: that they understand not ordinarily, that before the institution of sovereign power meum and tuum implied no propriety, but a community, where every man had right to every thing, and was in state of war with every man.

9. The fifth opinion: that the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the sovereignty over them, is an error already confuted, Part II. chap. XXI, sect. 11, where it is showed, that when men say: the people rebelleth, it is to be understood of those particular persons only, and not of the whole nation. And when the people claimeth any thing otherwise than by the voice of the sovereign power, it is not the claim of the people, but only of those particular men, that claim in their own persons; and this error ariseth from the equivocation of the word people.

10. Lastly, for the opinion, that tyrannicide is lawful, meaning by a tyrant any man in whom resideth the right of sovereignty, it is no less false and pernicious to human society, than frequent in the writings of those moral philosophers, Seneca and others, so greatly esteemed amongst us. For when a man hath the right of sovereignty, he cannot justly be punished, as hath been often showed already, and therefore much less deposed, or put to death. And howsoever he might deserve punishment, yet punishment is unjust without judgment preceding, and judgment unjust without power of judicature, which a subject hath not over his sovereign. But this doctrine proceedeth from the Schools of Greece, and from those that writ in the Roman state, in which not only the name of a tyrant, but of a king, was hateful.

11. Besides discontent, to the disposing of a man to rebellion, and pretence, there is required, in the third place, hope of success, which consisteth in four points: 1. That the discontented have mutual intelligence; 2. that they have sufficient number; 3. that they have arms; 4. that they agree upon a head. For these four must concur to the making of one body of

rebellion, in which intelligence is the life, number the limbs, arms the strength, and a head the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same action.

12. The authors of rebellion, that is, the men that breed these dispositions to rebel in others, of necessity must have in them these three qualities: 1. To be discontented themselves; 2. to be men of mean judgment and capacity; and 3. to be eloquent men or good orators. And as for their discontent, from whence it may proceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I am to show now, first, how they may stand together; for it seemeth a contradiction, to place small judgment and great eloquence, or, as they call it, powerful speaking, in the same man: and then in what manner they both concur to dispose other men to sedition.

13. It was noted by Sallust, that in Catiline (who was author of the greatest sedition that ever was in Rome) there was Eloquentiae satis, sapientiae parum; eloquence sufficient, but little wisdom. And perhaps this was said of Catiline, as he was Catiline: but it was true of him as an author of sedition. For the conjunction of these two qualities made him not Catiline, but seditious. And that it may be understood, how want of wisdom, and store of eloquence, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we call wisdom, and what eloquence. And therefore I shall here again remember some things that have been said already, Part I. chap. V, VI. It is manifest that wisdom consisteth in knowledge. Now of knowledge there are two kinds; whereof the one is the remembrance of such things, as we have conceived by our senses, and of the order in which they follow one another. And this knowledge is called experience; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that ability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come, which men call prudence. This being so, it is manifest presently, that the author of sedition, whosoever he be, must not be prudent. For if he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the success which they

have had, who have been the movers and authors of sedition, either in this or any other state, he shall find that of one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have come to a reproachful end. The other kind of knowledge is the remembrance of the names or appellations of things, and how every thing is called, which is, in matters of common conversation, a remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves, concerning how to be understood of one another. And this kind of knowledge is generally called science, and the conclusions thereof truth. But when men remember not how things are named, by general agreement, but either mistake and misname things, or name them aright by chance, they are not said to have science, but opinion; and the conclusions thence proceeding are uncertain, and for the most part erroneous. Now that science in particular from which proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong, and what is good and hurtful to the being and well-being of mankind, the Latins call sapientia, and we by the general name of wisdom. For generally, not he that hath skill in geometry, or any other science speculative, but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the good and government of the people, is called a wise man. Now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation of the word, is sufficiently proved, in that it hath been already demonstrated, that no pretence of sedition can be right or just; and therefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of state, that is to say, unwise. It remaineth therefore, that they be such, as name things not according to their true and generally agreed-upon names; but call right and wrong, good and bad, according to their passions, or according to the authorities of such as they admire, as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others of like authority, who have given the names of right and wrong, as their passions have dictated; or have followed the authority of other men, as we do theirs. It is required therefore in an author of sedition, that he think right, that which is wrong; and profitable,

that which is pernicious; and consequently that there be in him *sapientiae parum*, little wisdom.

14. Eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say; and to that end we must have aid from the passions of the hearer. Now to demonstration and teaching of the truth, there are required long deductions, and great attention, which is unpleasant to the hearer; therefore they which seek not truth, but belief, must take another way, and not only derive what they would have to be believed, from somewhat believed already, but also by aggravations and extenuations make good and bad, right and wrong, appear great or less, according as it shall serve their turns. And such is the power of eloquence, as many times a man is made to believe thereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and damage, when he feeleth none, and to enter into rage and indignation, without any other cause, than what is in the words and passion of the speaker. This considered, together with the business that he hath to do, who is the author of rebellion, (viz.) to make men believe that their rebellion is just, their discontents grounded upon great injuries, and their hopes great; there needeth no more to prove, there can be no author of rebellion, that is not an eloquent and powerful speaker, and withal (as hath been said before) a man of little wisdom. For the faculty of speaking powerfully, consisteth in a habit gotten of putting together passionate words, and applying them to the present passions of the hearer.

15. Seeing then eloquence and want of discretion concur to the stirring of rebellion, it may be demanded, what part each of these acteth therein? The daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, desiring to restore their old decrepit father to the vigour of his youth, by the counsel of Medea chopped him in pieces, and set him a boiling with I know not what herbs in a cauldron, but could not make him revive again. So when eloquence and want of judgment go together, want of judgment, Like the daughters of Pelias, consenteth,

through eloquence, which is as the witchcraft of Medea, to cut the commonwealth in pieces, upon pretence or hope of reformation, which when things are in combustion, they are not able to effect.

Chapter 28: Of the Duty of Them That Have Sovereign Power

1. HAVING HITHERTO set forth how a body politic is made, and how it may be destroyed, this place requireth to say something concerning the preservation of the same. Not purposing to enter into the particulars of the art of government, but to sum up the general heads, wherein such art is to be employed, and in which consisteth the duty of him or them that have the sovereign power. For the duty of a sovereign consisteth in the good government of the people; and although the acts of sovereign power be no injuries to the subjects who have consented to the same by their implicit wills, yet when they tend to the hurt of the people in general, they be breaches of the law of nature, and of the divine Law; and consequently, the contrary acts are the duties of sovereigns, and required at their hands to the utmost of their endeavour, by God Almighty, under the pain of eternal death. And as the art and duty of sovereigns consist in the same acts, so also doth their profit. For the end of art is profit; and governing to the profit of the subjects, is governing to the profit of the sovereign, as hath been showed Part II. chapter XXIV, section 1. And these three: 1. the law over them that have sovereign power; 2. their duty; 3. their profit: are one and the same thing contained in this sentence, *Salus populi suprema lex*; by which must be understood, not the mere preservation of their lives, but generally their benefit and good. So that this is the general law for sovereigns: that they procure, to the uttermost of their endeavour, the good of the people.

2. And forasmuch as eternal is better than temporal good, it is evident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are by the law of nature obliged to further the establishing of all such doctrines and rules, and the commanding of all such actions, as in their conscience they believe to be the true way thereunto. For unless they do so, it cannot be said truly, that they have done the uttermost of their endeavour.

3. For the temporal good of people, it consisteth in four points: 1. Multitude. 2. Commodity of living. 3. Peace amongst ourselves. 4. Defence against foreign power. Concerning multitude, it is the duty of them that are in sovereign authority, to increase the people, in as much as they are governors of mankind under God Almighty, who having created but one man, and one woman, declared that it was his will they should be multiplied and increased afterwards. And seeing this is to be done by ordinances concerning copulation: they are by the law of nature bound to make such ordinances concerning the same, as may tend to the increase of mankind. And hence it cometh, that in them who have sovereign authority: not to forbid such copulations as are against the use of nature; not to forbid the promiscuous use of women; not to forbid one woman to have many husbands; not to forbid marriages within certain degrees of kindred and affinity: are against the Law of nature. For though it be not evident, that a private man living under the law of natural reason only, doth break the same, by doing any of these things aforesaid; yet it is manifestly apparent, that being so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind, that not to forbid the same, is against the law of natural reason, in him that hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve.

4. The commodity of living consisteth in liberty and wealth. By Liberty I mean, that there be no prohibition without necessity of any thing to any man, which was lawful to him in the law of nature; that is to say, that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but what is necessary for the good of the

commonwealth; and that well-meaning men may not fall into the danger of laws, as into snares, before they be aware. It appertaineth also to this liberty, that a man may have commodious passage from place to place, and not be imprisoned or confined with the difficulty of ways, and want of means for transportation of things necessary. And for the wealth of people, it consisteth in three things: the well ordering of trade, procuring of labour, and forbidding the superfluous consuming of food and apparel. All those therefore that are in sovereign authority, and have taken upon them the government of people, are bound by the law of nature to make ordinances consisting in the points aforenamed; as being contrary to the law of nature, unnecessarily, either for one's own fancy, to enthral, or tie men so, as they cannot move without danger; or to suffer them whose maintenance is our benefit, to want anything necessary for them, by our negligence.

5. For maintaining of peace at home, there be so many things necessarily to be considered, and taken order in, as there be several causes concurring to sedition. And first, it is necessary to set out to every subject his propriety, and distinct lands and goods, upon which he may exercise and have the benefit of his own industry, and without which men would fall out amongst themselves, as did the herdsmen of Abraham and Lot, every man encroaching and usurping as much of the common benefit as he can, which tendeth to quarrel and sedition. Secondly, to divide the burthens, and charge of the commonwealth proportionably. Now there is a proportionably to every man's ability, and there is a proportionably to his benefit by commonwealth: and this latter is it, which is according to the law of nature. For the burdens of the commonwealth being the price that we pay for the benefit thereof, they ought to be measured thereby. And there is no reason, when two men equally enjoying, by the benefit of the commonwealth, their peace and liberty, to use their industry to get their livings, whereof one spareth, and layeth up somewhat, the other spendeth all he gets, why they

should not equally contribute to the common charge. That seemeth therefore to be the most equal way of dividing the burden of public charge, when every man shall contribute according to what he spendeth, and not according to what he gets; and this is then done, when men pay the commonwealth's part in the payments they make for their own provision. And this seemeth not only most equal, but also least sensible, and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it. For there is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money, to the public, as to think they are overrated, and that their neighbours whom they envy, do thereupon insult over them; and this disposeth them to resistance, and (after that such resistance hath produced a mischief) to rebellion.

6. Another thing necessary for the maintaining of peace, is the due execution of justice; which consisteth principally in the right performance of their duties, on the parts of those, who are the magistrates ordained for the same by and under the authority of the sovereign power; which being private men in respect of the sovereign, and consequently such as may have private ends, whereby they may be corrupted by gifts, or intercession of friends, ought to be kept in awe, by a higher power, lest people, grieved by their injustice, should take upon them to make their own revenges, to the disturbance of the common peace; which can by no way be avoided in the principal and immediate magistrates, without the judicature of the sovereign himself, or some extraordinary power delegated by him. It is therefore necessary, that there be a power extraordinary, as there shall be occasion from time to time, for the syndication of judges and other magistrates, that shall abuse their authority, to the wrong and discontent of the people; and a free and open way for the presenting of grievances to him or them that have the sovereign. authority.

7. Besides those considerations by which are prevented the discontents that arise from oppression, there ought to be some means for the keeping

under of those, that are disposed to rebellion by ambition; which consist principally in the constancy of him that hath the sovereign power, who ought therefore constantly to grace and encourage such, as being able to serve the commonwealth, do nevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of modesty, without repining at the authority of such as are employed, and without aggravating the errors, which (as men) they may commit; especially when they suffer not in their own particular. and constantly to show displeasure and dislike of the contrary. And not only so, but also to ordain severe punishments, for such as shall by reprehension of public actions, affect popularity and applause amongst the multitude, by which they may be enabled to have a faction in the commonwealth at their devotion.

8. Another thing necessary, is the rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretence of right to rebellious actions; such as are: the opinion, that a man can do nothing lawfully against his private conscience; that they who have the sovereignty, are subject to the civil laws; that there is any authority of subjects, whose negative may hinder the affirmative of the sovereign power; that any subject hath a propriety distinct from the dominion of the commonwealth; that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign power; and that any lawful sovereign may be resisted under the name of a tyrant; which opinions are they, which, Part II. chap. XXVII, sect. 5-10, have been declared to dispose men to rebellion. And because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of time are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the sudden: they must therefore be taken away also, by time and education. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private and public teaching, and those teachers have received them from grounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities, from the doctrine of Aristotle, and others (who have delivered

nothing concerning morality and policy demonstratively; but being passionately addicted to popular government, have insinuated their opinions, by eloquent sophistry): there is no doubt, if the true doctrine concerning the law of nature, and the properties of a body politic, and the nature of law in general, were perspicuously set down, and taught in the Universities, but that young men, who come thither void of prejudice, and whose minds are yet as white paper, capable of any instruction, would more easily receive the same, and afterward teach it to the people, both in books and otherwise, than now they do the contrary.

9. The last thing contained in that supreme law, *salus populi*, is their defence; and consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of the subjects, of which hath been already spoken, and in which consisteth the means of levying soldiers, and of having money, arms, ships, and fortified places in readiness of defence; and partly, in the avoiding of unnecessary wars. For such commonwealths, or such monarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of ambition, or of vain-glory, or that make account to revenge every little injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they ruin not themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to expect.

Chapter 29: Of the Nature and Kinds of Laws

1. THUS FAR concerning the Nature of Man, and the constitution and properties of a Body Politic. There remaineth only for the last chapter, to speak of the nature and sorts of law. And first it is manifest, that all laws are declarations of the mind, concerning some action future to be done, or omitted. And all declarations and expressions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions, are either promissive, as I will do, or not do; or provisive, as for example, If this be done or not done, this will follow; or imperative, as Do this, or do it not. In the first sort of these expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second, consisteth counsel; in the third, command.

2. It is evident, when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration of a man's own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ; and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant

and a law, standeth thus: in simple covenants the action to be done, or not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the promise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not to do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not done, followeth after.

3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a paradox: that the command of him, whose command is a law in one thing, is a law in every thing. For seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in general, that is to say, in every thing.

4. That the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled, and that he who alloweth another to give him counsel, doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough; and yet men usually call counselling by the name of governing; not that they are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy many times those men that are called to counsel, and are therefore angry with them that are counselled. But if to counsellors there should be given a right to have their counsel followed, then are they no more counsellors, but masters of them whom they counsel; and their counsels no more counsels, but laws. For the difference between a law and a counsel being no more but this, that in counsel the expression is, Do, because it is best; in a law, Do, because I have right to compel you; or Do, because I say, do: when counsel which should give the reason of the action it adviseth to, becometh the reason thereof itself, it is no more counsel, but a law.

5. The names *lex*, and *jus*, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded; and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth us; and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another's liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different than restraint and liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a man doth that liveth in a commonwealth, *jure*,

he doth it *jure civili*, *jure naturae*, and *jure divino*. For whatsoever is against any of these laws, cannot be said to be *jure*. For the civil law cannot make that to be done *jure*, which is against the law divine, or of nature. And therefore whatsoever any subject doth, if it be not contrary to the civil law, and whatsoever a sovereign doth, if it be not against the law of nature, he doth it *jure divino*, by divine right. But to say, *lege divina*, by divine law, is another thing. For the laws of God and nature allowing greater liberty than is allowed by the law civil (for subordinate laws do still bind more than the superior laws, the essence of law being not to loose, but to bind): a man may be commanded that by a law civil, which is not commanded by the law of nature, nor by the law divine. So that of things done *lege*, that is to say, by command of the law, there is some place for a distinction between *lege divina* and *lege civili*. As when a man giveth an alms, or helpeth him that is in need, he doth it not *lege civili*, but *lege divina*, by the divine law, the precept whereof is charity. But of things that are done *jure*, nothing can be said done *jure divino*, that is not also *jure civili*, unless it be done by them that having sovereign power, are not subject to the civil law.

6. The differences of laws are according to the differences, either of the authors and lawmakers, or of the promulgation, or of those that are subject to them. From the difference of the authors, or lawmakers, cometh the division of law into divine, natural, and civil. From the difference of promulgation, proceedeth the division of laws into written and unwritten. And from the difference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth, it proceedeth, that some laws are called simply laws, and some penal. As for example: thou shalt not steal, is simply a law; but this: he that stealeth an ox, shall restore four-fold, is a penal, or as others call it, a judicial law. Now in those laws, which are simply laws, the commandment is addressed to every man; but in penal laws the commandment is addressed to the magistrate, who is only guilty of the breach of it, when the penalties

ordained are not inflicted; to the rest appertaineth nothing, but to take notice of their danger.

7. As for the first division of law into divine, natural, and civil, the first two branches are one and the same law. For the law of nature, which is also the moral law, is the law of the author of nature, God Almighty; and the law of God, taught by our Saviour Christ, is the moral law. For the sum of God's law is: Thou shalt love God above all, and thy neighbour as thyself; and the same is the sum of the law of nature, as hath been showed, Part I chap. XVIII. And although the doctrine of our Saviour be of three parts moral, theological, and ecclesiastical; the former part only, which is the moral, is of the nature of a law universal; the latter part is a branch of the law civil; and the theological which containeth those articles concerning the divinity and kingdom of our Saviour, without which there is no salvation, is not delivered in the nature of laws, but of counsel and direction, how to avoid the punishment, which by the violation of the moral law, men are subject to. For it is not infidelity that condemneth (though it be faith that saveth), but the breach of the law and commandments of God, written first in man's heart, and afterwards in tables, and delivered to the Jews by the hands of Moses.

8. In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, &c. For in these things private judgments may differ, and beget controversy. This common measure, some say, is right reason: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing to be found or known in rerum natura. But commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy, do

mean their own. But this is certain, seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man, or men, must supply the place thereof; and that man, or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power, as hath been already proved; and consequently the civil laws are to all subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the use and definition of all names not agreed upon, and tending to controversy, shall be established. As for example, upon the occasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be decided by Aristotle, or the philosophers, whether the same be a man or no, but by the laws. The civil law containeth in it the ecclesiastical, as a part thereof, proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical government, given by our Saviour to all Christian sovereigns, as his immediate vicars, as hath been said Part II. chap. XXVI, sect. 10.

9. But seeing it hath been said, that all laws are either natural or civil; it may be demanded, to which of these shall be referred that law, which is called martial law, and by the Romans disciplina militaris? And it may seem to be the same with the law of nature; because the laws by which a multitude of soldiers are governed in an army, are not consent, but continually changing with the occasion; and that is still a law, which is reason for the present, and reason is the law of nature. It is nevertheless true that martial law is, civil law. because an army is a body politic, the whole power whereof is in the General, and the laws thereof made by him; and though they still follow and change as reason requireth, yet it is not, as the reason of every private man (as in the law of nature), but as the reason of the General requireth.

10. When he, or they, in whom is the sovereign power of a commonwealth, are to ordain laws for the government and good order of the people, it is not possible they should comprehend all cases of controversy that may fall out, nor perhaps any considerable diversity of

them; but as time shall instruct them by the rising of new occasions, so are also laws from time to time to be ordained: and in such cases where no special law is made, the law of nature keepeth its place, and the magistrates ought to give sentence according thereunto, that is to say, according to natural reason. The constitutions therefore of the sovereign power, by which the liberty of nature is abridged, are written, because there is no other way to take notice of them; whereas the laws of nature are supposed to be written in men's hearts. Written laws therefore are the constitutions of a commonwealth expressed; and unwritten, are the laws of natural reason. Custom of itself maketh no law. Nevertheless when a sentence hath been once given, by them that judge by their natural reason; whether the same be right or wrong, it may attain to the vigour of a law; not because the like sentence hath of custom been given in the like case; but because the sovereign power is supposed tacitly to have approved such sentence for right; and thereby it cometh to be a law, and numbered amongst the written laws of the commonwealth. For if custom were sufficient to introduce a law, then it would be in the power of every one that is deputed to hear a cause, to make his errors laws. In like manner, those laws that go under the title of responsa prudentum, that is to say, the opinions of lawyers, are not therefore laws, because responsa prudentum, but because they are admitted by the sovereign. And from this may be collected, that when there is a case of private contract between the sovereign and the subject, a precedent against reason shall not prejudice the cause of the sovereign; no precedent being made a law, but upon supposition that the same was reasonable from the beginning.

And thus much concerning the Elements and general grounds of Laws Natural and Politic. As for the law of nations, it is the same with the law of nature. For that which is the law of nature between man and man, before the

constitution of commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.

Of Liberty and Necessity

MOLESWORTH 1840 EDITION

CONTENTS

TO THE SOBER AND DISCREET READER.

TO THE LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.

TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

MY REASONS.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

A TREATISE,

WHEREIN ALL CONTROVERSY CONCERNING

PREDESTINATION, ELECTION, FREE-WILL, GRACE, MERITS, REPROBATION, &c.

IS FULLY DECIDED AND CLEARED.

IN ANSWER TO A TREATISE WRITTEN BY THE BISHOP OF LONDONDERRY,

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

TO THE SOBER AND DISCREET READER.

IT MADE ST. Chrysostom tremble whenever he reflected on the proportion, which those that went the *narrow* way, bore to those which marched in the *broad,* how *many* were the called, and how *few* the chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a capacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This consideration certainly would make a man look upon the Holy Scriptures, among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of heaven, being all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor *man* in so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery. But when a man cometh to look into those transcendant writings, he finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of several countries; that though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly, that their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to persuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither *see*, *hear,* nor *conceive,* before all the present enjoyments this world can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those who endeavour to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man, not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of those, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, and to make them fit meat for the people; how that instead of renouncing the world, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions, leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people, to carry on designs and intrigues of state, and study the enjoyments of this world more than any other people: he will find some grounds to conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest

disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the world. The complaint is as true as sad; instead of acquainting the credulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited; they involve their consciences in the briars of a thousand needless scruples, they spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and accents, and raise endless controversies about things, (were men free from passion and prejudice), in themselves clear enough: and when they have canvassed their questions, till they are weary themselves, and have wearied hearers and readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own apprehensions; so that after all their pains, bandings, and implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.

The controversies betwixt *Rome* and the *Reformation* are long since beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood; so that if we speak of *Protestant* and *Catholic,* they are in a manner content to sit down with their present acquests: for as to conviction, he certainly is a *rare proselyte,* at whose conversion, *interest, humour, discontent, inclination,* are not admitted to the debate.

But to come yet nearer our purpose, let us consider our own fractions of fractions of *religion* here in England, where if that saying, that *it is better to live where nothing is lawful, than where all things,* be as true in *religion* as *policy*, posterity may haply feel the sad consequence of it. What, I pray, is the effect of so many *sermons, teachings, preachings, exercises,* and *exercising of gifts, meetings, disputations, conferences, conventicles, printed books,* written with so much distraction and presumption upon God Almighty, and abuse of his Holy Word? Marry this: it is the seminary of many vexatious, endless, and fruitless controversies, the consequence

whereof are jealousies, heart-burnings, exasperation of parties, the introduction of factions and national quarrels into matters of religion, and consequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides, they are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of *citizens,* who contract diseases for want of motion; they supply the building of pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the people from matters of state, and consequently from rebellion.

They find work for *printers,* &c if the parties interested are troubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to be scratched out of somewhat by way of contribution to the impression. Hence is the *stationer*'*s* shop furnished, and thence the *minister*'*s* study in the country who having found out the humour of his auditory, consults with his stationer, on what books his money is best bestowed; who very gravely, it may be, will commend *Cole upon the Philippians* before the excellent, but borrowed, *Caryl upon Job.* But as to any matter of conviction, we see every one *acquiesces* in his own sentiments, every one hears the teacher who is most to his humour; and when he hath been at church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home and censures him as he pleases.

To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and involuble volumes concerning *predestination, free-will, free-grace, election, reprobation,* &c., which fill not only our libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance, whereof the least thing we are to expect is *conviction;* every side endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in their hands as long as they can? What stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about *grace* and *merits;* and yet both pretend St. Augustin!

Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end but to vindicate that reputation of learning they have obtained in the world, endeavour to make good their tenets, though the other were the truer

opinion? Is truth then retired to that inaccessible rock that admits no approaches? Or are we all turned Ixions, and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain ourselves with the *clouds* of our own persuasions; of which unnatural coition, what other issue can there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions I shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great author, who answering the charge of *impiety* laid upon the holding of *necessity,* says thus; *If we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should he, but as they are, that is as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c.*

Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he in so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous works of the *priests and ministers,* and that in points of soul-concernment and Christian interest, as *predestination, free-will, grace, merits, election, reprobation, necessity,* and *liberty* of actions, and others, the main hinges of human *salvation;* and to do this, being a person, whom not only the averseness of his nature to engage himself in matters of controversy of this kind, but his severer study of the *mathematics,* might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; we may not stick to infer, that the *black-coats,* generally taken, are a sort of ignorant *tinkers,* who in matters of their own profession, such as is the *mending* and *soldering* of men's *consciences,* have made more *holes* than they found; nay, what makes them more impardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuity to acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been tampering about. I know this author is little beholden to the *ministers,* and they make a great part of the nation; and besides them, I know there are

many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible spirits: yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may seem to some; that this book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it treats of, than all the volumes, nay libraries, which the *priests, jesuits,* and *ministers* have, to our great charge, distraction, and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational man, that all the controversial labours concerning religion in the world, all the polemical treatises of the most ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples, or dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever ache with turning them over; but he shall be so resolved in mind, as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever become any of those enthusiastical *spiritati*, who, as the most learned Mr. White says, *expound Scripture without sense or reason,* and are not to be disputed with but with the same success as men write on sand, and trouble their neighbours with their dreams, revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No! Here is solid conviction, at least so far as the metaphysical mysteries of our religion will admit. If God be *omnipotent,* he is *irresistible;* if so, *just* in all his actions, though we, who have as much capacity to measure the justice of God's actions as a man born blind to judge of colours, haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble his head, whether he be predestinated or no? Let him live justly and honestly according to the *religion* of his *country,* and refer himself to God for the rest, since he is the potter, and may do what he please with the vessel. But I leave the reader to find his satisfaction in the treatise itself, since it may be I derogate from it by saying so much before it. This book, I doubt not, will find no worse entertainment than the *Leviathan*, both in regard of its bulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the *ministers* and *Catholic* party as that did. And yet here we must complain of want of sufficiency or ingenuity to acknowledge the truths or confute the errors of

that book; which till it is done, we shall not count the author an heretic. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and slander cast on him in *sermons* and private meetings, none hath put anything in print against him, but Mr. Rosse; one who may be said to have had so much learning, as to have been perpetually barking at the works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond seas I know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the *Catholics;* who building their *church* on other foundations than those of the *Scriptures,* and pretending *infallibility, certitude,* and *unity* in *religion,* cannot but be discontented that these prerogatives of religion are taken away, not only from *tradition,* that is to say, from the *church,* but also from the *Scriptures,* and are invested in the *supreme power* of the nation, be it of what persuasion it will.

Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that thou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou must accordingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou hast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many thousand sermons and exercises; and more than the *catechisms* and *confessions* of a thousand *assemblies* could furnish thee with: thou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the *cornered* caps of the *priests* and *jesuits,* and all the *black and white* caps of the *canting tribe;* to be short, thou art now acquainted with that man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou hast ever yet been acquainted with, what *profession, persuasion, opinion,* or *church* soever thou art of; of whom and his works make the best use thou canst. Farewell.

TO THE LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.

RIGHT HONOURABLE, I HAD once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop's objections to my book DE CIVE in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which, because I had never uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordship's and my Lord Bishop's desire that I should begin with the *latter,* I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordship's judgment.

And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument neither from *Scripture* nor from *reason,* that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.

The *preface* is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, *If I be free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause:* I deny that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say, *I was free* to write it, and, *It was not necessary* I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is *free* to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to 'do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a *necessity* that he shall have the *will* to do it, the action is necessarily to follow: and if there be a *necessity* that he shall have the *will* to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a *free agent,* that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his *will;* but, whether

the *will* to write, and the *will* to forbear, come upon him according to his *will,* or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this *liberty,* that I *can* do if I *will;* but to say, I can *will* if I *will,* I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his *preface.*

In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of *liberty,* and says he meaneth not *liberty* from *sin,* nor from *servitude,* nor from *violence;* but, from *necessity, necessitation, inevitability,* and *determination to one.*

It had been better to *define* liberty, than thus to *distinguish.* For I understand never the more what he means by *liberty;* and though he say he means *liberty* from *necessitation,* yet I understand not how such a *liberty* can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether *such* a liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of *exercise only,* which he calls a *liberty of contradiction,* namely of doing not good, or evil *simply,* but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil *respectively*, and a *liberty of specification and exercise also,* which he calls a liberty of *contrariety,* namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these *distinctions* his Lordship says he *clears the coast,* whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of *exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety,* but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the *liberty* of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into *two* squadrons, *one* of places *of Scriptures,* the *other* of *reasons*, which allegory he useth, I suppose,

because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his *forces* do look and *march* another way, and some of them *fight* amongst themselves.

And the first place of *Scripture,* taken from Numb xxx. 13, is one of those that look another way; the words are, *If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice cither to establish it or make it void.* For it proves no more but that the husband is a *free* and *voluntary agent,* but not that his *choice* therein is not *necessitated* or not *determined* to what he shall choose, by precedent *necessary* causes.

For if there come into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one's *hopes* and *fears, c*onsisteth the nature of *election.* So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently *choosing* and *necessity* are joined together.

The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2 Sam xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is *election* in *man,* but not proved that such *election* was not *necessitated* by the *hopes,* and *fears,* and considerations of *good* and *had* to follow, which depend not on the *will,* nor are subject to *election.* And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that *necessity* and *election* might stand together, and instance in the actions of *children, fools,* or *brute beasts,* whose *fancies,* I might say, are *necessitated* and *determined* to *one;* before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says that the actions of *children, fools, madmen,* and *beasts,* are indeed *determined,* but that they

proceed not from *election,* nor from *free,* but from *spontaneous agents.* As for example, that the *bee,* when it maketh honey, does it *spontaneously;* and when the *spider* makes his web, he does it *spontaneously,* but not by *election.*

Though I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what *children, fools, mad men,* and *beasts* do; yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by *spontaneous,* and how it differeth from *voluntary,* I will answer that *distinction,* and show that it f*ighteth* against its fellow arguments.

Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all *voluntary* actions, where the thing that induceth the *will* is not *fear,* are called also *spontaneous,* and said to be done by a man's *own* accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is *sponte,* and therefore the action is *spontaneous;* though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is *fear,* be not called *spontaneous.* But every *spontaneous* action is not therefore *voluntary,* for *voluntary* presupposes some precedent *deliberation,* that is to say, some *consideration,* and *meditation,* of what is likely to *follow*, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our *own* accord, and are therefore *spontaneous,* for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never *consulted* nor *deliberated* in ourselves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we *eat* and *walk,* or in anger *strike* or *revile,* which my Lord thinks *spontaneous,* but not *voluntary* nor *elective* actions, and with *such* kind of actions, he says *necessitation* may stand, but not with such as are *voluntary,* and proceed upon *election* and *deliberation.* Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from *spontaneity,* and which he

ascribes to *children, fools, madmen,* and *beasts,* proceed from *election* and *deliberation,* and that actions *inconsiderate, rash,* and *spontaneous,* are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as *wise,* or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord Bishop's argument concludeth, that *necessity* and *election* may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.

And first your Lordship's own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that *horses, dogs,* and other brute *beasts,* do *demur* oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that *deliberateth,* but one while *proceed* toward action, another while *retire* from it, as the *hope* of greater *good* draws him, or the *fear* of greater evil *drives* him away.

A *child* may be so young as to do what it does without all *deliberation,* but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be *deliberated* on the second time.

Fools and *madmen* manifestly *deliberate* no less than the *wisest* men, though they make not so good a *choice,* the images of things being by disease altered.

For *bees* and *spiders,* if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only *election,* but *art, prudence,* and *policy,* in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of *bees,* Aristotle says, *their life is civil.* —

Again, his Lordship is deceived, if he think any *spontaneous* action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action *voluntary* and *elective:* for even the setting of a man's foot, in the posture for *walking,* and the action of ordinary *eating,* was once *deliberated* of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became *easy* and *habitual,* so as to be done without

forethought; yet that does not hinder but that the act is *voluntary,* and proceedeth from *election.* So also are the *raskest* actions of *choleric* persons *voluntary* and upon *deliberation:* for who is there but very young children, that hath not *considered* when and how far he *ought,* or safely *may* strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such actions are *necessitated,* and the *fancy* of those that do them *determined* to the action they do, it follows out of his Lordship's own doctrine, that the liberty of *election* does not take away the *necessity* of *electing* this or that *individual* thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another.

The second argument from Scripture, consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another; the places are two: one is! Kings iii. 10, where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked *riches,* or *revenge,* did nevertheless ask *wisdom* at God's hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4: *After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?*

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is *election*, but do not disprove the *necessity,* which I maintain, of what they so elect.

The fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect; *If the decrees of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it he, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mi hi sic incredulus odi.*

That which I say *necessitated and determinated every action,* that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, *is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced.* This *concourse* of *causes,* whereof every one is

determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of *former* causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the *decree* of God.

But that the *foreknowledge* of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.

The *influence of the stars* is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor does the *concourse of all causes* make one simple *chain* or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of *objects* does *determine voluntary* agents, and *necessitates* the *will,* and consequently the *action;* but for *moral* efficacy, I understand not what he means. —

The last dictate of the judgment, concerning the good or bad, that may follow on any action, is not properly the *whole cause,* but the last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect *necessarily,* in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his *argument,* that *if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty:* I deny the consequence; for I make not only the *effect,* but also the *election,* of that particular effect *necessary,* inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have *election,* that is *liberty,* to do what he

hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his *will* or *power* to *choose* his *fancy,* or choose his *election* and *will.*

This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

The arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely: *If there he a necessity of all events, that it will follow*, *that, praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment*, *are all vain and unjust; and that if God, should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action*, *punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven and hell.*

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom ix. 20, 21. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down the very same objection in these words: *When they*, meaning Esau and Jacob, *were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz.* Rebecca) *that the elder should serve the younger,* &c. *What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that, willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God, that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be set firth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth.* Thus you see the caseput by St. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following:

Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God's *will,* or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or

that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus: *Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?* According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer my Lord's objection, and say, the *power* of God alone without other helps is sufficient *justification* of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly *just* or *unjust,* is not that by which God Almighty's actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.

For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his *power:* (Job xl. 9:) *Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?* (Job xxviii. 4): *Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?* and the like. So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. *Beasts* are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God's will they should be so. *Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly,* in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by distinguishing between *will* and *permission,* as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes

permit sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not *will* it, nor *necessitate* it.

I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the *action,* whatsoever action it be, but not the *sinfulness* or *irregularity* of it, that is, the *discordance* between the *action* and the *law.* Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the *will* to have a thing done, and the *permission* to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an *action* and the *sin* of that action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when *one* is *cause* both of the *action* and of the *law,* how *another* can be cause of the *disagreement* between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another's law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other *distinctions* can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau's or Pharaoh's actions proceeded from the w*ill* and *purpose* of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto my Lord's opinion: for I now hold nothing in all this question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.

OF THE ARGUMENTS from *reason,* the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno's beating of his man, which is therefore called *argumentum baculinum,* that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might he made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever he made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to he preached, but, what is true.

The first inconvenience he says, is this; *That the laws, which prohibit any action*, *will be unjust.*

2. *That all consultations are rain.*

3. *That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and madmen.*

4. That, praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, are in vain.

5, 6. *That counsels, acts, arms*, *books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain.*

To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds, as it were a reply to my answer foreseen, these words: *Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?* Wherein his Lordship says right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer, First, that the *necessity* of an *action* doth not make the *laws,* that prohibit it, *unjust.* To let pass, that not the *necessity,* but the *will* to break the *law,* maketh the action *unjust,* because the *law* regardeth the *will,* and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no *law* can possibly be *unjust,* inasmuch as every man maketh, by his consent, the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say, what *necessary* cause soever precede an *action,* yet if the action be *forbidden,* he that doth it *willingly* may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is *necessitated* to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?

To make the *law,* is therefore to make a *cause* of *justice,* and to *necessitate* justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to make such a law.

The intention of the *law* is not to grieve the *delinquent,* for that which is past, and not to be undone -, but to make him and others *just,* that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act *past,* but the *good to come;* insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were *necessary*? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their *actions* arc not *necessitated,* but because they are *noxious,* and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no

law, there no killing nor anything else can be unjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men; and for beasts we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being only *spontaneous,* and not *free,* are all *necessitated* and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make societies or commonwealths, we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the *commonwealth* hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the *law*, but remains from the first right of *nature,* which every man hath to preserve himself; for that the law doth not take the right away in the case of criminals, who were by the law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from *election;* but because it was *noxious* and contrary to men's preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest, inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men's *wills* such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the *necessity* of a *voluntary* action, cannot be inferred the *injustice* of the *law* that forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh *consultations* to be in *vain;* it is the *consultation* that *causeth* a man, and *necessitated* him to *choose* to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a *necessity* that an action shall be done, or that

any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what *cause* it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is *deliberation* or *consultation*, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if *more* and *less* had any place in *necessity.*

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that *admonitions* are in *vain;* for the admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that *praise, dispraise, reward, and punish ment* will be in *rain.* To which I answer, that for *praise* and *dispraise,* they depend not at all on the *necessity* of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to *praise,* but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state? that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from *necessity?* Things may be therefore *necessary,* and yet-*praise-worthy,* as also *necessary,* and yet *dispraised,* and neither of them both in vain, because *praise* and *dispraise,* and likewise *reward* and *punishment,* do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus (Lib n. 35) gives Cato, where he says that he was good by *nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit.*

To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that *counsels, arts, arms, instruments, books, study, medicines,* and the like, would be *superfluous*, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, *if*

the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts, arms, &c are the causes of these effects.

His Lordship's *third* argument consisteth in other *inconveniences,* which he saith will follow, namely, *impiety* and *negligence* of religious duties, as repentance, and *zeal* to God's service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things: I must, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the *necessity* of events does not of itself draw with it any *impiety* at all. For *piety* consisteth only in *two* things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his *power* as we can, for to honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power; the other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called *cultus,* or *worship of God.* He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God's *eternal will,* and consequently are *necessary,* does he not think God *omnipotent?* Does he not esteem of his *power* as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by *external* acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call *worship.* So that this opinion fortifies *piety* in both kinds, external and internal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for *repentance,* which is nothing else but a glad

returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and, again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the *necessity* of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of *repentance,* grief for the error, and joy for returning.

And for *prayer,* whereas he saith that the *necessity* of things destroy *prayer,* I deny it; for though *prayer* be none of the *causes* that *move* God's *will*, his will being unchangeable, yet since we find in God's word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. *Prayer* is the gift of God no less than the *blessing,* and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest that *thanksgiving* is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for God's blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, *thy will,* not our will, *be done,* and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus, *Father if it be thy will, let this cup pass,* &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to *move* but to *honour* God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.

The fourth argument from reason is this: the order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.

In which argument I observe, first a *contradiction;* for seeing he that *maketh* anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be *necessary*; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls *necessary* agents) and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call *free* agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call *contingents)*; but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his *election* necessarily determined to *one* by *former* causes, and that which is *contingent,* and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless *necessary* and depend on *precedent* necessary causes. For by *contingent,* men do not mean that which hath *no* cause, but that which hath not for cause anything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, *necessary, contingent,* and *free,* yet they may be *all* necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

To the first argument from reason, which is, *That if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away;* I answer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisted in this, that the *action* done proceed from our *will* and be against the *law.* A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was *necessary,* I do not say it was done *against* the will of the doer, but *with* his will, and *necessarily,* because man's will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a *sufficient,* and therefore a *necessary* cause,

and consequently every *voluntary* action was *necessitated.* An action therefore may be *voluntary* and a *sin,* and nevertheless be *necessary;* and because God may afflict by a right derived from his *omnipotence,* though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordship's objections both out of Scripture, and from reason.

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

HE SAYS A man may perhaps answer, that the *necessity* of things held by him, is not a *stoical* necessity, but a *Christian* necessity, &c. But this *distinction* I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make *stoical* and *Christian* two kinds of *necessity,* though they may be two kinds of *doctrine.* Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship's arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordship's in this place, as making against his own tenet. *Where all the causes,* saith he, *being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary.* For that which I call the *necessary* cause of any effect, is the *joining* together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one total cause. *V any of these*, saith he, *especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest* are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordship's own reason all effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the *first cause,* and necessary in respect of *second causes,* mine; it does, as his Lordship well notes, imply a contradiction. But the distinction of *free* into *free from*

compulsion, and *free from necessitation,* I acknowledge. For to be *free from compulsion* is to do a thing so as *terror* be not the cause of his *will* to do it; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it: as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do anything for *love,* or *revenge,* or *lust,* are *free from compulsion,* and yet their actions may be as necessary as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But *free from necessitation,* I say, no man can be, and it is that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.

This *distinction*, his Lordship says, uses to be *fortified* by two reasons, but they are not mine. The first he says, is, that it is granted by all divines, that an *hypothetical necessity,* or necessity upon supposition, may stand with *liberty.* That you may understand this, I will give you an example of *hypothetical necessity.* If *I shall live, I shall eat.* This is an *hypothetical necessity.* Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to *fortify* my distinctions with such reasons; let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easy and plain a thing, but withal false, with the grave usage of such terms as *hypothetical necessity,* and *necessity* upon *supposition,* and such like terms of Schoolmen, may be obscured and made to seem *profound learning.*

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of *free from compulsion,* and *free from necessitation,* he says is, that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our church, set down in

what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work *freely*, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a *freedom from compulsion,* and yet no *freedom from necessitation,* as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of *freedom* and *necessity*, supposing God and good angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine: *I confess,* saith he, *that God and good angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise not of specification.*

Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader: for it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot, hath none at all. Also *liberty,* as his Lordship says the Schools call it, of *exercise,* which is as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a *liberty,* which they call, of *specification,* that is to say, a liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive he hath liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the *Schools,* and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of *doctors* in the *Church,* hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over men's

reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between *free from compulsion* and *free from necessitation.*

The first is, that *election* is opposite not only to *coaction* or *compulsion,* but also *necessitation* or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground, or make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no *compulsion,* but the strength of *temptation* to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to *abstain,* it necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he *electeth* which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge *necessity;* but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not *causes* but *liberty* that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, fire doth not burn, because it burns of necessity.

The second argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that *voluntary* actions are *necessitated,* and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allegeth, as from the authority of the *Schools,* and that which rippeth up the bottom of the *question,* that there is a double act of the *will.* The one, he says, is *actus imperatus,* an act done at the command of the will, by some inferior faculty

of the soul; as to open or shut one's eyes; and this act may be compelled: the other, he says, is *actus elicitus,* an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to *will,* to *choose,* to *elect;* this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein, letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question, you may observe, first, that to compel a *voluntary* act, is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes: so that *actus imperatus,* here, might as easily have been said in English a *voluntary action,* but that they that invented the term, understood not anything it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that *actus elicitus,* is exemplified by these words, to *will,* to *elect,* to *choose,* which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a man's soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so is it also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his Lordship's distinction is, that a *voluntary* act may be done by *compulsion,* that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by *allurement,* or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as *necessarily* as foul means and threatening; it follows, that to *will* may be made as *necessary* as anything that is done by *compulsion.* So that distinction of *actus imperatus* and *actus elicitus* are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the *astrologer* deriveth his *necessity* from the *stars;* secondly, that the *physician* attributeth it to the *temper* of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is *in rerum naturâ,* which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, *external objects* presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions *necessary;* and says, the power such objections have over us, proceeds from our own fault: but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.

Further he says, *prayer, fasting*, &c may alter our *habits;* it is true, but when they do so, they are *causes* of the contrary *habit*, and make it *necessary*, as the former habit had been necessary, if *prayer, fasting,* &c had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is not easily surprised, as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, alone wept not; and of the philosopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry: and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for that philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from

weeping, nor for the philosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly his Lordship confesses, that the *dispositions* of objects may be *dangerous* to *liberty, but* cannot be *destructive.* To which I answer, it is impossible: for *liberty* is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesses, I may infer, it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that tenet in another sense than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing his Lordship, with reason, thinks untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the w*ill* follows the *last* opinion or *judgment* immediately preceding the *action*, concerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the *last* dictate of the understanding does *necessitate* the *action,* though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse's back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship allegeth against this, is first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says,

"Video menora, proboque,

Deteriora sequor."

But that saying, as pretty as it is, is not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action *necessarily* followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not *voluntary,* and by consequence, that *repentance* proceedeth from causes.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship's opinions about reconciling *liberty* with the *prescience* and *decrees* of God, otherwise than some *divines* have done, against whom, he says, he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only two things: one is, *That we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it.* And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, *that there are certain and* necessary causes *which make every man to* will *what he willeth, though he do not* yet conceive in what manner the *will* of man is *caused.* And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that *praise, dispraise, reward,* and *punishment, good* and *evil,* sequels of men's *actions* retained in *memory,* do frame and make us to the *election* of whatsoever it

be that we elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the *senses,* and *sense* from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence all *actions,* even of *free* and *voluntary* agents, are necesssary.

The other thing that he repeateth, is, that the best way to reconcile *contingence* and *liberty* with *prescience* and the *decrees* of *God,* is to subject future *contingencies* to the *aspect of God.* The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held *liberty* and *necessity,* that is to say, *liberty* and the *decrees* of *God,* irreconcileable, unless the *aspect of God,* which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse, signify somewhat else besides *God's will* and *decree,* which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that *presentiality* which they have in eternity, which he says cannot be done by them that conceive *eternity* to be an *everlasting succession,* but only by them that conceive it as an *indivisible point.* To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive *eternity* to be an *indivisible point,* or anything but an *everlasting succession,* I will renounce all that I have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls *eternity, nunc stans,* an *ever-abiding now;* which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it: they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their minds a *nunc stans,* which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship says, that God is not *just,* but *justice* itself; not *wise,* but *wisdom* itself; not *eternal, but eternity* itself; nor how he concludes thence, that *eternity* is a *point indivisible,* and not a *succession*, nor in what sense it can be said, that an *infinite point,* and wherein is no *succession,* can comprehend all *time,* though time be *successive.* These phrases I find not in the Scripture; I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up,

unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his Lordship's discourse, wherein I think not only his *squadrons of arguments,* but also his *reserve of distinctions,* are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my *reasons* for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of *art,* in plain English.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

FIRST I CONCEIVE, that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to *deliberate,* the doing it or abstaining *necessarily* follow *the present* thought he hath of the *good* or *evil* consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden *anger,* the *action* shall follow the thought of *revenge;* in sudden fe*ar,* the thought of *escape.* Also when a man hath time to *deliberate,* but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the *action* follows his opinion of the *goodness* or *harm* of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them *voluntary,* because those *actions* that follow immediately the *last* appetite, are *voluntary,* and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a *rash* action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were *voluntary*. For no *action* of a man can be said to be without *deliberation,* though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to *deliberate* all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of *anger,* shall nevertheless be justly put to *death,* because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual *deliberation,* and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from *election.*

Secondly, I conceive when a man *deliberates* whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to *consider* an action, is to imagine the

consequences of it, both *good* and *evil.* From whence is to be inferred, that *deliberation* is nothing else but *alternate* imagination of the *good* and *evil* sequels of an *action,* or, which is the same thing, alternate *hope* and *fear,* or alternate *appetite* to do or quit the action of which he *deliberateth.*

Thirdly, I conceive that in all *deliberations,* that is to say, in all alternate *succession* of contrary *appetites*, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other *appetites* to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called *intentions* and *inclinations*, but not *wills,* there being but one *will,* which also in this case may be called the *last will,* though the *intentions* change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those *actions,* which a man is said to do upon *deliberation*, are said to be *voluntary*, and done upon *choice* and *election,* so that *voluntary* action, and action proceeding from *election* is the same thing; and that of a *voluntary agent,* it is all one to say, he is *free,* and to say, he hath not made an end of *deliberating*.

Fifthly, I conceive *liberty* to be rightly defined in this manner: *Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent.* As for example, the water is said to descend *freely,* or to have *liberty* to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the *liberty* to ascend, but the *faculty* or *power*, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the *liberty* to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from *itself,* but from the *action* of some other immediate *agent* without itself. And that therefore,

when first a man hath an *appetite* or *will* to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the *cause* of his *will,* is not the *will* itself, but *something* else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of *voluntary* actions the *will* is the *necessary* cause, and by this which is said, the *will* is also *caused* by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that *voluntary* actions have all of them *necessary* causes, and therefore are *necessitated.*

Seventhly, I hold that to be a *sufficient cause*, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the *effect.* The same also is a *necessary* cause. For if it be possible that a *sufficient* cause shall not bring forth the *effect,* then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the *cause* was not *sufficient;* but if it be impossible that a *sufficient* cause should not produce the *effect,* then is a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause, for that is said to produce an effect *necessarily* that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced *necessarily;* for whatsoever is produced hath had a *sufficient* cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also *voluntary* actions are *necessitated.*

Lastly, that ordinary *definition* of a *free agent,* namely, *that a* free agent *is that, which, when all things are 'present which are needful to produce the* effect, *can nevertheless not produce it,* implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be *sufficient,* that is to say, *necessary,* and yet the *effect* shall not follow.

MY REASONS.

FOR THE FIRST five points, wherein it is explicated i, what *spontaneity* is;II, what *deliberation* is; III, what *will, propension,* and *appetite* are; iv, what a *free agent* is: v, what *liberty* is; there can no other proof be offered but every man's own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is *spontaneous,* a man *deliberates;* such is his *will,* that *agent* or that *action* is *free.* Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that *deliberation* is the *consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come;* that by *spontaneity* is meant *inconsiderate action,* or else nothing is meant by it; that *will* is the *last act of our deliberation;* that a *free agent* is he *that can do if he will,* and *forbear if he will;* and that *liberty* is *the absence of external impediments.* But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because *experience* and *matter of fact* are not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own *sense* and *memory.* For example, how can it be proved that to *love* a thing and to think it *good* is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that *eternity* is not *nunc stans* to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind?

Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin *without, a cause,* can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no

cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was *eternal.*

For the seventh point, which is, that all *events* have *necessary* causes, it is there proved, in that they have *sufficient* causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, *ames ace* upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been *necessary* before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a *beginning,* and consequently a *sufficient* cause to produce it, consisting partly in the *dice,* partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the *hand,* the measure of *force* applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the *table,* and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been *sufficient.* In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how *contingent* soever it seem, or how *voluntary* soever it be, is produced *necessarily,* which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. *It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain.* If therefore it be not *necessary* it shall rain, it is *necessary* it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, *it shall rain or not rain,* should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say, *one* of them is *necessary,* yet neither of them is *necessary*; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true *determinate,* but *indeterminate;* which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but

we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true *Titirice,* but neither of them, *Tu patulice.*

The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, *which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it;* or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as *freedom from necessity*, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an *agent,* it can *work;* and if it *work,* there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the *action,* and consequently the cause of the action is *sufficient;* and if *sufficient,* then also *necessary,* as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the *inconveniences,* which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of *necessity,* are avoided, and the *necessity* itself *demonstratively* proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the *inconvenience* of denying *necessity,* as that it destroyeth both the *decrees* and the *prescience* of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath *purposed* to bring to pass by *man,* as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have *liberty,* such as his Lordship affirmeth, from *necessitation,* might frustrate, and make not to come to pass, and God should either not *foreknow* it, and not *decree* it, or he should *foreknow* such things shall be, as shall never be, and *decree* that which shall never *come to pass.*

This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am, My most noble and most obliging Lord, Your most humble servant, Rouen,

Aug. 20, 1652.

THOMAS HOBBES.

Answer to Sir William Davenant's Preface before Gondibert

MOLESWORTH 1840 EDITION

SIR,

IF to commend your Poem, I should onely say (in general Terms) that in the choice of your Argument, the disposition of the parts, the maintenance of the Characters of your Persons, the dignitie and vigour of your expression, you have performed all the parts of various experience, readie memorie, clear judgement, swift and well govern'd fancie, though it were enough for the truth, it were too little for the weight and credit of my testimonie. For I lie open to two Exceptions, one of an incompetent, the other of a corrupted Witness. Incompetent, because I am not a Poet; and corrupted with the Honour done me by your Preface. The former obliges me to say something (by the way) of the Nature and Differences of Poesie.

As Philosophers have divided the Universe (their subject) into three Regions, Celestial, Aërial, and Terrestrial; so the Poets, (whose work it is by imitating humane life, in delightfull and measur'd lines, to avert men from vice, and incline them to virtuous and honourable actions) haue lodg'd themselves in the three Regions of mankind, Court,Citie, and Countrey, correspondent in some proportion, to those three Regions of the World. For there is in Princes, and men of conspicuous power (anciently call'd Heroes) a lustre and influence upon the rest of men, resembling that of the Heavens, and an insincereness, inconstancie, and troublesom humour of those that dwell in populous Cities, like the mobilitie, blustering, and impuritie of the

Air; and a plainness, and (though dul) yet a nutritive facultie in rural people, that endures a comparison with the Earth they labour.

From hence have proceeded three sorts of Poesie, Heroique, Scommatique, and Pastoral. Every one of these is distinguished again in the manner of Representation, which sometimes is Narrative, wherein the Poet himself relateth; and sometimes Dramatique, as when the persons are every one adorned and brought upon the Theatre, to speak and act their own parts. There is therefore neither more nor less than six sorts of Poesie. For the Heroique Poem Narrative (such as is yours) is call'd Epique Poem; The Heroique Poem Dramatique, is Tragedie. The Scommatique Narrative, is Satyre; Dramatique is Comedie. The Pastoral Narrative, is called simply Pastoral (anciently Bucolique) the same Dramatique, Pastoral Comedie. The Figure therefore of an Epique Poem, and of a Tragedie, ought to be the same, for they differ no more but in that they are pronounced by one, or many persons. Which I insert to iustifie the figure of yours, consisting of five books divided into Songs, or Cantoes, as five Acts divided into Scenes has ever been the approved figure of a Tragedie.

They that take for Poesie whatsoever is writ in Verse, will think this Division imperfect, and call in Sonets, Epigrams; Eclogues, and the like pieces (which are but Essayes, and parts of an entire Poem) and reckon Empedocies and Lucretius (natural Philosophers) for Poets, and the moral precepts of Phocelides Theognis, and the Quatrains of Pybrach, and the Historie of Lucan, and others of that kind amongst Poems; bestowing on such Writers for honour, the name of Poets, rather than of Historians, or Philosophers. But the subject of a Poem, is the manners of men, not natural causes; manners presented, not dictated; and manners feigned (as the name of Poesie imports) not found in men. They that give enterance to Fictions writ in Prose, erre not so much, but they erre: For Prose requiteth delightfulness, not onely of fiction, but of stile; in which if Prose contend

with Verse, it is with disadvantage and (as it were) on foot against the strength and wings of Pegasus.

For Verse amongst the Greeks was appropriated anciently to the service of their Gods, and was the Holy stile; the stile of the Oracles; the stile of the Laws; and the stile of Men that publickly recommended to their Gods, the vows and thanks of the people; which was done in their holy songs called Hymns; and the composers of them were called Prophets and Priests before the name of Poet was known. When afterwards the majestie of that stile was observed, The Poets chose it as best becoming their high invention. And for the Antiquitie of Verse, it is greater than the antiquitie of Letters. For it is certain, Cadmus was the first that (from Phoenicia, a Countrey that neighboureth Judea) brought the use of Letters into Greece. But the service of the Gods, and the Laws (which by measured Sounds were easily committed to the memorie) had been long time in use, before the arrival of Cadmus there.

There is besides the grace of stile, another cause why the ancient Poets chose to write in measured language, which is this. There Poems were made at first with intention to have them sung, as well Epick as Dramatick (which custom hath been long time laid aside, but began to be revived in part, of late years in Italie) and could not be made commensurable to the Voice or Instruments, in Prose; the ways and motions whereof are so uncertain and undistinguished, (like the way and motion of a Ship in the Sea) as not onely to discompose the best Composers, but also to disapoint sometimes the most attentive Reader, and put him to hunt counter for the sense. It was therefore necessarie for Poets in those times, to write in Verse.

The Verse which the Greeks, and Latines (considering the nature of their own languages) found by experience most grave, and for an Epique Poem most decent, was their Hexameter; a Verse limited, not onely in the length of the line, but also in the quantitie of the syllables. In stead of which we

use the line of ten Syllables, recompensing the neglect of their quantitie, with the diligence of Rime. And this measure is so proper for an Heroique Poem, as without some loss of gravitie and dignitie, it was never changed. A longer is not far from ill Prose, and a shorter, is a kind of whisking (you know) like the unlacing, rather than the singing of a Muse. In an Epigram or a Sonnet, a man may vary his measures, and seek glorie from a needless difficultie, as he that contrived Verses into the form of an Organ, a Hatchet, an Egg, an Altar, and a pair of Wings; but in so great and noble a work as is an Epique Poem, for a man to obstruct his own way with unprofitable difficulties, is great imprudence. So likewise to chuse a needless and difficult correspondence of Rime, is but a difficult toy, and forces a man sometimes for the stopping of a chink, to say somewhat he did never think; I cannot therefore but very much approve your Stanza, wherein the syllables in every Verse are ten, and the Rime Alternate.

For the choice of your Subject, you have sufficiently justified your self in your Preface. But because I have observed in Virgil, that the Honour done to Aeneas and his companions, has so bright a reflection upon Augustus Caesar, and other great Romans of that time, as a man may suspect him not constantly possessed with the noble spirit of those his Heroes, and believe you are not acquainted with any great man of the race of Gondibert, I adde to your Justification the puritie of your purpose, in having no other motive of your labour, but to adorn Virtue, and procure her Lovers; than which there cannot be a worthier design, and more becoming noble Poesie.

In that you make so small account of the example of almost all the approved Poets, ancient and modern, who thought fit in the beginning, and sometimes also in the progress of their Poems, to invoke a Muse, or some other Deitie, that should dictate to them, or assist them in their writings; they that take not the laws of Art, from any reason of their own, but from

the fashion of precedent times, will perhaps accuse your singularitie, For my part, I neither subscribe to their accusation, nor yet condemn that Heathen custom, otherwise than as accessarie to their false Religion. For their Poets were their Divines; had the name of Prophets, Exercised amongst the People a kind of spiritual Authoritie; would be thought to speak by a Divine spirit; have their works which they writ in Verse (the Divine stile) pass for the Word of God, and not of man; and to be hearkened to with reverence. Do not our Divines (excepting the stile) do the same, and by us that are of the same Religion cannot justly be reprehended for it? Besides, in the use of the spiritual calling of Divines, there is danger sometimes to be feared, from want of skill, such as is reported of unskilfull Conjurers, that mistaking the rites and ceremonious points of their art, call up such spirits, as they cannot at their pleasure allay again, by whom storms are raised that overthrow buildings, and are the cause of miserable wracks at Sea. Unskilfull Divines do oftentimes the like; For when they call unseasonably for Zeal, there appears a spirit of Cruelty; and by the like error instead of Truth, they raise Discord; instead of Wisdom, Eraud; instead of Reformation, Tumult; and Controversie instead of Religion. Whereas in the Heathen Poets, at least in those whose works have lasted to the time we are in, there are none of those indiscretions to be found, that tended to subversion, or disturbance of the Commonwealths wherein they lived. But why a Christian should think it an ornament to his Poem; either to profane the true God, or invoke a false one, I can imagin no cause, but a reasonless imitation of Custom, of a foolish custom; by which a man enabled to speak wisely from the principles of nature, and his own meditation, loves rather to be thought to speak by inspiration, like a Bag-pipe.

Time and Education begets Experience; Experience begets Memorie; Memorie begets Judgement, and Fancie; Judgement begets the Strength and

Structure; and Fancie begets the Ornaments of a Poem. The Ancients therefore fabled not absurdly, in making Memorie the Mother of the Muses. For Memorie is the World (though not really, yet so as in a Looking-glass) in which the Judgement, the severer Sister busieth her self in a grave and rigid examination of all the parts of Nature, and in registering by Letters their order, causes, uses, differences, and resemblances; Whereby the Fancie, when any work of Art is to be performed, finding her materials at hand and prepared for use, and needs no more than a swift motion over them, that what she wants, and is there to be had, may not lie too long unespied. So that when she seemeth to fly from one Indies to the other, and from Heaven to Earth, and to penetrate into the hardest matter, and obscurest places, into the future, and into her self, and all this in a point of time, the voyage is not very great, her self being all she seeks; and her wonderfull celeritie, consisteth not so much in motion, as in copious Imagerie discreetly ordered, and perfectly registered in the Memorie; which most men under the name of Philosophie have a glimpss of, and is pretended to by many that grosly mistaking her, embrace contention in her place. But so far forth as the Fancie of man, has traced the ways of true Philosophie, so far it hath produced very marvellous effects to the benefit of mankind. All that is beautifull or defensible in building, or marvellous in Engines and Instruments of motion; whatsoever commoditie men receive from the observations of the Heavens, from the description of the Earth, from the account of Time, from walking on the Seas; and whatsoever distinguisheth the Civilitie of Europe, from the Barbaritie of the American savages, is the workmanship of Fancy, but guided by the Precepts of true Philosophie. But where these precepts fail, as they have hitherto failed in the doctrine of moral Virtue, there the Architect (Fancy) must take the Philosophers part upon her self. He therefore that undertakes an Heroick Poem (which is to exhibit a venerable and amiable Image of Heroick virtue)

must not onely be the Poet, to place and connect, but also the Philosopher, to furnish and square his matter; that is, to make both Body and Soul, colour and shadow of his Poem out of his own Store: Which, how well you have performed I am now considering.

Observing how few the persons be you introduce in the beginning, and how in the course of the actions of these (the number increasing) after several confluences, they run all at last into the two principal streams of your Poem, Gondibert and Oswald, me thinks the Fable is not much unlike the Theater. For so, from several and far distant Sources, do the lesser Brooks of Lombardy, flowing into one another, fall all at last into the two main Rivers, the Po and the Adite. It hath the same resemblance also with a mans veins, which proceeding from different parts, after the like concourse, insert themselves at last into the two principal veins of the body. But when I considered that also the actions of men, which singly are inconsiderable, after many conjunctures, grow at last either into one great protecting power, or into destroying factions, I could not but approve the structure of your Poem, which ought to be no other than such, as an imitation of humane life requireth.

In the Streams themselves I find nothing but setled Valour, clean Honour, calm Counsel, learned Diversion, and pure Love save onely a torrent or two of Ambition, which (though a fault) has somewhat Heroick in it, and therefore must have place in an Heroick Poem. To shew the Reader in what place he shall find every excellent picture of Virtue you have drawn, is too long. And to shew him one, is to prejudice the rest; yet I cannot forbear to point him to the Description of Love in the person of Birtha, in the seventh Canto of the second Book. There has nothing been said of that Subject neither by the Ancient nor Modern Poets comparable to it. Poets are painters: I would fain see another painter draw so true, perfect and natural a Love to the Life, and make use of nothing but pure Lines, without the help

of any the least uncomely shadow, as you have done. But let it be read as a piece by it self, for in the almost equal height of the whole, the eminence of parts is Lost.

There are some that are not pleased with fiction, unless it be bold; not onely to exceed the work, but also the possibility of Nature: they would have impenetrable Armours, Inchanted Castles, Invulnerable Bodies, Iron Men, Flying Horses, and a thousand other such things, which are easily feigned by them that dare. Against such I defend you (without assenting to those that condemn either Homer or Virgil) by dissenting onely from those that think the Beauty of a Poem consisteth in the exorbitancy of the fiction. For as truth is the bound of Historical, so the Resemblance of truth is the utmost limit of Poetical Liberty. In old time amongst the Heathen such strange fictions, and Metamorphoses, were not so remote from the Articles of their Faith, as they are now from ours, and therefore were not so unpleasant. Beyond the actual works of Nature a Poet may now go; but beyond the conceived possibility of Nature, never. I can allow a Geographer to make in the Sea, a Fish or a Ship, which by the scale of his Map would be two or three hundred mile long, and think it done for ornament, because it is done without the precincts of his undertaking; but when he paints an Elephant so, I presently apprehend it as ignorance, and a plain confession of Terra incognita.

As the description of Great Men and Great Actions, is the constant design of a Poet; so the descriptions of worthy circumstances are necessary accessions to a Poem, and being well performed, are the Jewels and most precious ornaments of Poesie. Such in Virgil are the Funeral games of Anchises, The duel of Aeneas and Turnus, &c. and such in yours are The Hunting, The Battel, The Citie Mourning, The Funeral, The House of Astragon, The Library and the Temple, equal to his, or those of Homer whom he imitated.

There remains now no more to be considered but the Expression, in which consisteth the countenance and colour of a beautifull Muse; and is given her by the Poet out of his own provision, or is borrowed from others. That which he hath of his own, is nothing but experience and knowledge of Nature, and specially humane nature; and is the true and natural Colour. But that which is taken out of Books (the ordinary boxes of Counterfeit Complexion) shews well or ill, as it hath more or less resemblance with the natural, and are not to be used (without examination) unadvisedly. For in him that professes the imitation of Nature (as all Poets do) what greater fault can there be, than to bewray an ignorance of Nature in his Poem; especially having a liberty allowed him, if he meet with any thing he cannot master, to leave it out?

That which giveth a Poem the true and natural Colour consisteth in two things, which are; To know well, that is, to have images of Nature in the memory distinct and clear; and To know much. A sign of the first is perspicuity, property, and decency, which delight all sorts of men, either by instructing the ignorant, or soothing the learned in their knowledge. A sign of the latter is novelty of expression, and pleaseth by excitation of the mind; for novelty causeth admiration, and admiration curiosity, which is a delightfull appetite of knowledge.

There be so many words in use at this day in the English Tongue, that, though of magnifick sound, yet (like the windy blisters of a troubled water) have no sense at all; and so many others that lose their meaning, by being ill coupled, that it is a hard matter to avoid them; for having been obtruded upon youth in the Schools (by such as make it, I think, their business there (as ’tis exprest by the best Poet)

With terms to charm the weak and pose the wise, they grow up with them, and gaining reputation with the ignorant, are not easily shaken off.

To this palpable darkness, I may also adde the ambitious obscurity of expressing more than is perfectly conceived; or perfect conception in fewer words than it requires. Which Expressions, though they have had the honour to be called strong lines, are indeed no better than Riddles, and not onely to the Reader, but also (after a little time) to the Writer himself dark and troublesom.

To the property of Expression I referre, that clearness of memory, by which a Poet when he hath once introduced any person whatsoever, speaking in his Poem, maintaineth in him to the end the same character he gave him in the beginning. The variation whereof, is a change of pace, that argues the Poet tired.

Of the Indecencies of an Heroick Poem, the most remarkable are those that shew disproportion either between the persons and their actions, or between the manners of the Poet and the Poem. Of the first kind, is the uncomliness of representing in great persons the inhumane vice of Cruelty, or the sordid vice of Lust and Drunkenness. To such parts as those the ancient approved Poets, thought it fit to suborn, nor the persons of men, but of monsters and beastly Giants, such as Polyphemus, Cacus, and the Centaurs. For it is supposed a Muse, when she is invoked to sing a song of that nature, should maidenly advise the Poet, to set such persons to sing their own vices upon the Stage; for it is not so unseemly in a Tragedy. Of the same kind it is to represent scurrility, or any action or language that moveth much laughter. The delight of an Epique Poem consisteth not in mirth, but admiration. Mirth and Laughter is proper to Comedie and Satyre. Great persons that have their minds employed on great designs, have not leasure enough to laugh, and are pleased with the contemplation of their own power and virtues, so as they need not the infirmities and vices of other men, to recommend themselves to their own favour by comparison, as all men do when they laugh. Of the second kind, where the disproportion is

between the Poet, and the persons of his Poem, one is in the Dialect of the Inferiour sort of people, which is always different from the language of the Court. Another is to derive the Illustration of any thing, from such Metaphors or Comparisons as cannot come into mens thoughts, but by mean conversation, and experience of humble or evil Arts, which the person of an Epique Poem, cannot be thought acquainted with.

From Knowing much, proceedeth the admirable variety and novelty of Metaphors and Similitudes, which are not possible to be lighted on, in the compass of a narrow knowledge. And the want whereof compelleth a Writer to expressions that are either defac'd by time, or sullied with vulgar or long use. For the phrases of Poesie, as the airs of musick with often hearing become insipide, the Reader having no more sense of their force, than our Flesh is sensible of the bones that sustain it. As the sense we have of bodies, consisteth in change and variety of impression, so also does the sense of language in the variety and changeable use of words. I mean not in the affectation of words newly brought home from travel, but in new (and withal significant) translation to our purposes, of those that be already received; and in far fetcht (but withal apt, instructive and comly) similitudes.

Having thus (I hope) avoided the first Exception, against the incompetency of my Judgement, I am but little moved with the second, which is of being bribed by the honour you have done me, by attributing in your Preface somewhat to my Judgement. For I have used your Judgement no less in many things of mine, which coming to light will thereby appear the better. And so you have your bribe again.

Having thus made way for the admission of my Testimony, I give it briefly thus; I never yet saw Poem, that had so much shape of Art, health of Morality, and vigour and beauty of Expression, as this of yours. And but for the clamour of the multitude, that hide their Envy of the present, under a

Reverence of Antiquity, I should say further, that it would last as long as either the Aeneid, or Iliad, but for one Disadvantage, and the Disadvantage is this: The languages of the Greeks and Romans (by their Colonies and Conquests) have put off flesh and bloud, and are become immutable, which none of the modern tongues are like to be. I honour Antiquity, but that which is commonly called Old time, is Young time. The glory of Antiquity is due, not to the Dead, but to the Aged.

And now, whilest I think on't, give me leave with a short discord to sweeten the Harmony of the approaching close. I have nothing to object against your Poem; but dissent onely from something in your Preface, sounding to the prejudice of Age. 'Tis commonly said, that old Age is a return to childhood. Which me thinks you insist on so long, as if you desired it should be believed. That is the note I mean to shake a little. That saying, meant onely of the weakness of body, was wrested to the weakness of mind, by froward children, weary of the controulment of their parents, masters, and other admonitours. Secondly, the dotage and childishness they ascribe to Age, is never the effect of Time, but sometimes of the excesses of youth, and not a returning to, but a continual stay with childhood. For they that wanting the curiosity of furnishing their memories with the rarities of Nature in their youth, and pass their time in making provision onely for their ease, and sensual delight, are children still, at what years soever; as they that coming into a populous Citie, never going out of their Inn, are strangers still, how long soever they have been there. Thirdly, there is no reason for any man to think himself wiser to day than yesterday, which does not equally convince he shall be wiser tomorrow than today.

Fourthly, you will be forced to change your opinion hereafter when you are old; and in the mean time you discredit all I have said before in your commendation, because I am old already. But no more of this.

I believe (Sir) you have seen a curious kind of perspective, where, he that looks through a short hollow pipe, upon a picture containing divers figures, sees none of those that are there painted, but some one person made up of their parts, conveyed to the eye by the artificial cutting of a glass. I find in my imagination an effect not unlike it from your Poem. The virtues you distribute there amongst so many noble persons, represent (in the reading) the image but of one mans virtue to my fancy, which is your own; and that so deeply imprinted, as to stay for ever there, and govern all the rest of my thoughts and affections, in the way of honouring and serving you, to the utmost of my power, that am

Paris,January 10. 1650.

(SIR)

Your most humble and obedient Servant, THO. HOBS.

De Cive

1651 EDITION

The major treatise *De Cive* (On the citizen) was published in Paris originally in Latin in 1642, followed by two further Latin editions in 1647. The English translation of the work made its first appearance four years later under the title ‘Philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society’. The work anticipates important themes from *Leviathan*. A notable highlight is the now famous phrase ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ (war of all against all), which first appeared in *De Cive*.

The treatise forms the first part of a trilogy of works that deal with human knowledge, the other two works being *De Corpore* (On the Body), published in 1655 and *De Homine* (On man), published in 1658. Due to the political turmoil at the time of publication, especially the unrest leading up to the Civil War of 1642, Hobbes hastily completed the work, which would systematically come last. It comprises three parts: Libertas (liberty); Imperium (dominion); and Religio (religion). In the first part, Hobbes describes man’s natural condition, dealing with the natural laws; in the second, the necessity of establishing a stable government is explained. Finally, he deals with issues regarding religion.

Frontispiece of 'De Cive', engraved by Jean Matheus in 1642

CONTENTS

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, WILLIAM, EARLE OF DEVONSHIRE
The Author's Preface to the Reader
Chapter I: Of the state of men without Civill Society
Chapter II: Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts
Chapter III: Of the other Lawes of Nature I.
Chapter IV: That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law
Chapter V: Of the causes, and first begining of civill Government
Chapter VI: Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath the supreme power in the City
Chapter VII: Of the three kindes of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchie
Chapter VIII: Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant
Chapter IX: Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary Government
Chapter X: A comparison between 3. kinds of government, according to their severall inconveniences
Chapter XI: Places and Examples of Scripture of the Rights of Government agreeable to what hath been said before
Chapter XII: Of the internal causes, tending to the dissolution of any Government
Chapter XIII: Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule
Chapter XIV: Of Lawes and Trespasses
Chapter XV: Of the Kingdome of God, by Nature
Chapter XVI: Of the Kingdome of God under the Old Covenant
Chapter XVII: Of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant
Chapter XVIII: Concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven

John Aubrey (1626-1697) was an English antiquary, natural philosopher and writer. Hobbes was among Aubrey's early pupils.

PHILOSOPHICALL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

Or,

A Dissertation Concerning Man in his severall habitudes and respects, as the Member of a Society, first Secular, and then Sacred. Containing The Elements of Civill Politie in the Agreement which it hath both with Naturall and Divine Lawes.

In which is demonstrated, Both what the Origine of Justice is, and wherein the Essence of Christian Religion doth consist.

Together with

The Nature, Limits and Qualifications both of Regiment and Subjection.

By Thomas Hobbes.

London, Printed by J.C. for R. Royston, at the Angel in Ivie-Lane.

1651.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, WILLIAM, EARLE OF DEVONSHIRE

MY MOST HONOURED Lord

May it please your Lordship,

It was the speech of the Roman people (to whom the name of King had been render'd odious, as well by the tyrannie of the Tarquins, as by the Genius and Decretals of that City) 'Twas the speech I say of the publick, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the Censor were no more then such) That all Kings are to be reckon'd amongst ravenous Beasts. But what a Beast of prey was the Roman people, whilst with its conquering Eagles it erected its proud Trophees so far and wide over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiaticks, the Macedonians, and the Achaeans, with many other despoyled Nations, into a specious bondage, with the pretence of preferring them to be Denizons of Rome? So that if Cato's saying were a wise one, 'twas every whit as wise that of pontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the Companies of his Army, (in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla) cryed out, That Rome her selfe, as well as Sylla, was to be raz'd; for that there would alwayes be Wolves and Depraedatours of their Liberty, unlesse the Forrest that lodg'd them were grubb'd up by the roots. To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant. Wolfe. The first is true, if we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare Cities. In the one, there's some analogie of similitude with the Deity, to wit, Justice and Charity, the twin-sisters of peace: But in the other, Good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a Sanctuary the two daughters of War, Deceipt and Violence: that

is in plaine termes a meer brutall Rapacity: which although men object to one another as a reproach, by an inbred custome which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of other men, wherein, as in a Mirroir, all things on the left side appeare to be on the right, & all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left; yet the naturall right of preservation which we all receive from the uncontroulable Dictates of Necessity, will not admit it to be a Vice, though it confesse it to be an Unhappinesse. Now that with Cato himselfe, (a person of so great a renowne for wisdome) Animosity should so prevaile instead of Judgement, and partiality instead of Reason, that the very same thing which he thought equall in his popular State, he should censure as unjust in a Monarchical, other men perhaps may have leisure to admire. But I have been long since of this opinion, That there was never yet any more-then-vulgar-prudence that had the luck of being acceptable to the Giddy people; but either it hath not been understood, or else having been so, hath been levell'd and cryed downe. The more eminent Actions and Apothegms both of the Greeks and Romans have been indebted for their Eulogies not so much to the Reason, as to the Greatnesse of them, and very many times to that prosperous usurpation (with which our Histories doe so mutually upbraid each other) which as a conquering Torrent carryes all before it, as well publick Agents as publick Actions, in the streame of Time. Wisdome properly so call'd is nothing else but this, The perfect knowledge of the Truth in all matters whatsoever. Which being derived from the Registers and Records of Things, and that as 'twere through the Conduit of certain definite Appellations, cannot possibly be the work of a suddaine Acutenesse, but of a well-ballanc'd Reason, which by the Compendium of a word, we call philosophy. For by this it is, that a way is open'd to us, in which we travell from the contemplation of particular things to the Inference or result of universall Actions. Now look how many sorts of things there are which

properly fall within the cognizance of humane reason, into so many branches does the tree of philosophy divide it selfe. And from the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant, there hath been given to those branches a diversity of Names too: For treating of Figures, tis call'd Geometry. of motion, physick; of naturall right, Moralls; put all together, and they make up philosophy. Just as the British, the Atlantick, and the Indian Seas, being diversly christen'd from the diversity of their shoares, doe notwithstanding all together make up The Ocean. And truly the Geometricians have very admirably perform'd their part. For whatsoever assistance doth accrew to the life of man, whether from the observation of the Heavens, or from the description of the Earth, from the notation of Times, or from the remotest Experiments of Navigation; Finally, whatsoever things they are in which this present Age doth differ from the rude simplenesse of Antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe meerly to Geometry. If the Morall philosophers had as happily discharg'd their duty, I know not what could have been added by humane Industry to the completion of that happinesse, which is consistent with humane life. For were the nature of humane Actions as distinctly knowne, as the nature of Quantity in Geometricall Figures, the strength of Avarice and Ambition, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgar, as touching the nature of Right and Wrong, would presently faint and languish; And Mankinde should enjoy such an Immortall peace, that (unlesse it were for habitation, on supposition that the Earth should grow too narrow for her Inhabitants) there would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on the contrary, that neither the Sword nor the pen should be allowed any Cessation; That the knowledge of the Law of Nature should lose its growth, not advancing a whit beyond its antient stature; that there should still be such siding with the severall factions of philosophers, that the very same Action should bee decryed by some, and as much elevated by

others; that the very same man should at severall times embrace his severall opinions, and esteem his own Actions farre otherwise in himselfe then he does in others; These I say are so many signes, so many manifest Arguments, that what hath hitherto been written by Morall philosophers, hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the Truth; but yet have took with the world, not so much by giving any light to the understanding, as entertainment to the Affections, whilest by the successefull Rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the publick Wayes, which lye open to all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lot with high wayes and open streets; Some for divertisement, and some for businesse; so that what with the Impertinencies of some, and the Altercations of others, those wayes have never a seeds time, and therefore yield never a harvest. The onely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this; That amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy, there is not one that hath used an idoneous principle of Tractation: For we may not, as in a Circle, begin the handling of a Science from what point we please. There is a certain Clue of Reason, whose beginning is in the dark, but by the benefit of whose Conduct, wee are led as ‘twere by the hand into the clearest light, so that the principle of Tractation is to be taken from that Darknesse, and then the light to be carried thither for the irradiating its doubts. As often therefore as any writer, doth either weakly forsake that Clue, or wilfully cut it asunder, he describes the Footsteps, not of his progresse in Science, but of his wandrings from it. And upon this it was, that when I applyed my Thoughts to the Investigation of Naturall Justice, I was presently advertised from the very word Justice, (wich signifies a steady Will of giving every one his Owne) that my first enquiry was to be, from whence it proceeded, that any man should call any thing rather his Owne, then another mans. And when I found that this

proceeded not from Nature, but Consent, (for what Nature at first laid forth in common, men did afterwards distribute into severall Impropriations, I was conducted from thence to another Inquiry, namely to what end, and upon what Impulsives, when all was equally every mans in common, men did rather think it fitting, that every man should have his Inclosure; And I found the reason was, that from a Community of Goods, there must needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest, and from that Contention all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensue, which by the instinct of Nature, every man is taught to shun. Having therefore thus arrived at two maximes of humane Nature, the one arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest, the other proceeding from the rationall, which teaches every man to fly a contre-naturall Dissolution, as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to Nature; Which principles being laid down, I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion, in this little work of mine, first the absolute necessity of Leagues and Contracts, and thence the rudiments both of morall and of civill prudence. That Appendage which is added concerning the Regiment of God, hath been done with this intent, that the Dictates of God Almighty in the Law of nature, might not seem repugnant to the written Law, revealed to us in his word. I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse, not to meddle with the civill Lawes of any particular nation whatsoever, That is to say, I have avoyded coming a shore, which those Times have so infested both with shelves, and Tempests. At what expence of time and industry I have beene in this scrutiny after Truth, I am not ignorant; but to what purpose, I know not. For being partiall Judges of our selves, we lay a partiall estimate upon our own productions. I therefore offer up this Book to your Lordships, not favour, but censure first, as having found by many experiments, that it is not the credit of the Author, nor the

newnesse of the work, nor yet the ornament of the style, but only the weight of Reason, which recommends any Opinion to your Lordships Favour and Approbation. If it fortune to please, that is to say, if it be sound, if it be usefull, if it be not vulgar; I humbly offer it to your Lordship as both my Glory, and my protection; But if in any thing I have erred, your Lordship will yet accept it as a Testimony of my Gratitude, for that the means of study which I enjoyed by your Lordships Goodnesse, I have employed to the procurement of your Lordships Favour. The God of Heaven crown your Lordship with length of Dayes in this earthly Station, and in the heavenly Jerusalem, with a crown of Glory.

Your Honours most humble, and most devoted Servant, Tho. Hobbs.

The Author's Preface to the Reader

READER, I PROMISE thee here such things, which ordinarily promised, doe seeme to challenge the greatest attention, and I lay them here before thine eyes, whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated of, or the right method of handling it, or the honest motive, and good advice to undertake it, or lastly the moderation of the Authour. In this Book thou shalt finde briefly described the duties of men, First as Men, then as Subjects, Lastly, as Christians; under which duties are contained not only the elements of the Lawes of Nature, and of Nations, together with the true originall, and power of Justice, but also the very essence of Christian Religion it selfe, so farre forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it.

Which kinde of doctrine (excepting what relates to Christian Religion) the most antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity, either curiously adorned with Verse, or clouded with Allegories, as a most beautifull and hallowed mystery of Royall authority; lest by the disputations of private men, it might be defiled; Other philosophers in the mean time, to the advantage of mankinde, did contemplate the faces, and motions of things; others, without disadvantage, their natures, and causes. But in after times, Socrates is said to have been the first, who truly loved this civill Science, although hitherto not throughly understood, yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the Common weale, and that he set so great a value on this, that utterly abandoning, and despising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced this, as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde. After him comes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other

philosophers, as well Greeke, as Latine. And now at length all men of all Nations, not only philosophers, but even the vulgar, have, and doe still deale with this as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every Mother-wit, and to be attained without any great care or study. And which makes mainly for its dignity, those who suppose themselves to have it, or are in such employment, as they ought to have it, doe so wonderfully please themselves in its Idaea, as they easily brooke the followers of other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous, learned, skilfull, what you will; except prudent: for this Name, in regard of civill knowledge, they presume to be due to themselves onely. Whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of the persons who entertain them, or by the number of those who have written of them, or by the judgement of the wisest. certainly this must carry it, which so neerly relates to princes, and others engaged in the government of mankinde, in whose adulterate Species also the most part of men doe delight themselves, and in which the most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant. The benefit of it when rightly delivered (that is) when derived from true principles by evident connexion, we shall then best discerne, when we shall but well have considered the mischiefes that have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit and babling form; for in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits, if any errour escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any losse, but of time onely: but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens, that not onely from errours, but even from ignorance it selfe, there arise offences, contentions, nay even slaughter it selfe. Look now, how great a prejudice these are, such, and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality, truly declared. How many Kings (and those good men too) hath this one errour, That a Tyrant King might lawfully be put to death, been the slaughter of? How many throats hath this false position cut, That a prince for some causes may

by some certain men be deposed? And what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, That Kings are not superiours to, but administrators for the multitude? Lastly, how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of Kings be just or unjust, belongs to private men, and that before they yeeld obedience, they not only may, but ought to dispute them? Besides, in the morall philosophy now commonly received, there are many things no lesse dangerous then those, which it matters not now to recite. I suppose those antients foresaw this, who rather chose to have the Science of justice wrapt up in fables, then openly exposed to disputations: for before such questions began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already exercised the supreme power. They kept their Empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing the wicked, and protecting the good; likewise Subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men, but by the Lawes of the Realme; nor were they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority: yea they reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in a councell, as a certain visible divinity; therefore they little used as in our dayes, to joyn themselves with ambitious, and hellish spirits, to the utter ruine of their State; for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved; in truth, the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore it was peace, and a golden age, which ended not before that Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings. This I say, the Antients not only themselves saw, but in one of their fables, they seem very aptly to have signified it to us; for they say, that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he fell in love, and began to court Juno her selfe; offering to embrace her, he clasp't a clowd, from whence the Centaures proceeded, by nature halfe men, halfe horses, a fierce, a fighting, and unquiet generation;

which changing the names only, is as much as if they should have said, that private men being called to Counsels of State desired to prostitute justice, the onely sister and wife of the supreme, to their own judgements, and apprehensions, but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it, they have begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of morall philosophers, partly right and comely, partly brutall and wilde, the causes of all contentions, and blood-sheds. Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise, if any man now shall dispell those clowds, and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authenticall doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evill, besides the constituted Lawes in each Realme, and government; and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust, good or ill, is to be demanded of none, but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his Lawes; surely he will not only shew us the high way to peace, but will also teach us how to avoyd the close, darke, and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition, then which I know not what can be thought more profitable.

Concerning my Method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what I had to deliver, except I took my begining from the very matter of civill government, and thence proceeded to its generation, and form, and the first beginning of justice; for every thing is best understood by its constitutive causes; for as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheeles, cannot well be known, except it be taken in sunder, and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of States, and duties of Subjects, it is necessary, (I say not to take them in sunder, but yet that) they be so considered, as if they were dissolved, (i.e.) that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature is, in what matters it is, in what not fit to make up a civill government, and how men must be agreed among themselves, that intend to grow up into a well-grounded State. Having therefore

followed this kind of Method; In the first place I set down for a principle by experience known to all men, and denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other, and as by naturall right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength hee hath, toward the preservation of himself You will object perhaps, that there are some who deny this; truly so it happens, that very many do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against my self because I affirm that the same men confesse, and deny the same thing? In truth I do not, but they do, whose actions disavow what their discourses approve; of We see all countries though they be at peace with their neighbours, yet guarding their Frontiers with armed men, their Townes with Walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To what purpose is all this, if there be no feare of the neighbouring power? Wee see even in well-governed States, where there are lawes and punishments appointed for offendors, yet particular men travell not without their Sword by their sides, for their defences, neither sleep they without shutting not only their doores against their fellow Subjects, but also their Trunks and Coffers for feare of domestiques. Can men give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of other, and all, of all? How since they doe thus, and even Countreyes as well as men, they publiquely professe their mutuall feare and diffidence; But in disputing they deny it, thats as much as to say, that out of a desire they have to contradict others, they gainsay themselves. Some object that this principle being admitted, it would needs follow, not onely that all men were wicked (which perhaps though it seeme hard, yet we must yeeld to, since it is so clearly declar'd by holy writ) but also wicked by nature (which cannot be granted without impiety). But this, that men are evill by nature, followes not from this principle; for though the wicked were fewer then the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of

suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, selfe-defending, ever incident to the most honest, and fairest condition'd; much lesse do's it follow that those who are wicked are so by nature, for though from nature, that is from their first birth, as they are meerly sensible Creatures, they have this disposition, that immediately as much as in them lies, they desire and doe whatsoever is best pleasing to them, that either through feare they fly from, or through hardnesse repell those dangers which approach them, yet are they not for this reason to be accounted wicked; for the affections of the minde which arise onely from the lower parts of the soule are not wicked themselves, but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes, as when they are either offensive, or against duty. Unlesse you give Children all they aske for, they are peevish, and cry, I and strike their parents sometimes, and all this they have from nature, yet are they free from guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first, because they cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty; these when they come to riper yeares having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt, if they shall continue to doe the same things, then truly they both begin to be, and are properly accounted wicked; In so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy, or a man of a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age, when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience. Unlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evill, because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature, we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire, feare, anger, and other passions from nature, and yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature. The foundation therefore which I have laid standing firme, I demonstrate in the first place, that the state of men without civill society (which state we may properly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a meere warre of all against all; and in that warre all men have equall

right unto all things; Next, that all men as soone as they arrive to understanding of this hatefull condition, doe desire (even nature it selfe compelling them) to be freed from this misery. But that this cannot be done except by compact, they all quitt that right which they have unto all things. Furthermore I declare, and confirme what the nature of compacts is; how and by what meanes the right of one might be transfer'd unto another to make their compacts valid; also what rights, and to whom they must necessarily be granted for the establishing of peace, I meane what those dictates of reason are, which may properly be term'd the Lawes of nature; and all these are contain'd in that part of this booke which I entitle Liberty.

These grounds thus layd, I shew farther what civill government, and the supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by what meanes it becomes so, & what rights particular men, who intend to constitute this civill government, must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power, whether it be one man, or an assembly of men, that except they doe so it will evidently appeare to be no civill government, but the rights which all men have to all things, that is the rights of tarre will still remaine. Next, I distinguish the divers kindes of it, to wit, Monarchie, Aristocratie, Democratie, and paternall Dominion, and that of Masters over their Servants; I declare how they are constituted, and I compare their severall conveniences and inconveniences each with. other. furthermore, I unfold what those things are which destroy it, and what his or their duty is who rule in chiefe. Last of all, I explicate the natures of the Law, and of sinne, and I distinguish Law from Counsell, from compact, from that which I call Right; all which I comprehend under the title of Dominion.

In the last part of it which is entituled Religion, lest that right which by strong reason I had confirm'd the Soveraigne powers in the preceding discourse have over their Subjects, might seem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures, I shew in the first place how it repugns not the Divine

right, for as much as God overrules all rulers by nature, (i.e.) by the Dictates of naturall reason. In the second, for as much as God himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the Jewes by vertue of that antient Covenant of Circumcision. In the third, because God doth now rule over us Christians by vertue of our Covenant of Baptisme; and therefore the authority of Rulers in chiefe, or of civill government, is not at all, we see, contrary to Religion.

In the last place I declare what duties are necessarily requir'd from us, to enter into the Kingdome of Heaven; and of those I plainly demonstrate, and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ, according to the interpretation made by all, that the obedience which I have affirm'd to be due from particular Christian Subjects unto their Christian princes cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto Christian Religion. You have seene my Method, receive now the reason which mov'd me to write this; I was studying philosophie for my minde sake, and I had gathered together its first Elements in all kinds, and having digested them into three Sections by degrees, I thought to have written them so as in the first I would have treated of a body, and its generall properties; in the second of man and his speciall faculties, and affections; in the third, of civill government and the duties of Subjects: therefore the first Section would have contained the first philosophie, and certaine elements of physick; in it we would have considered the reasons of Time, Place, Cause, Power, Relation, Proportion, Quantity, Figure, and motion. In the second we would have beene conversant about imagination, Memory, intellect, ratiocination, appetite, till, good and Evill, honest and dishonest, and the like. what this last Section handles, I have now already shewed you. Whilest I contrive, order, pensively and slowly compose these matters, for I onely doe reason, I dispute not, it so happen'd in the interim, that my Country some few yeares before the civill tarres did rage, was boyling hot with questions concerning the rights of Dominion, and the obedience due from Subjects, the true

forerunners of an approaching tar. And was the cause which (all those other matters deferr'd) ripen'd, and pluckt from me this third part. Therefore it happens that what was last in order, is yet come forth first in time, and the rather, because I saw that grounded on its owne principles sufficiently knowne by experience it would not stand in need of the former Sections. I have not yet made it out of a desire of praise (although if I had, I might have defended my selfe with this faire excuse, that very few doe things laudably, who are not affected with commendation) but for your sakes Readers, who I perswaded my selfe, when you should rightly apprehend and throughly understand this Doctrine I here present you with, would rather chuse to brooke with patience some inconveniences under government (because humane affairs cannot possibly be without some) then selfe opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the publique; That, weighing the justice of those things you are about, not by the perswasion and advise of private men, but by the Lawes of the Realme, you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streames of your blood to wade to their owne power; That you will esteeme it better to enjoy your selves in the present state though perhaps not the best, then by waging tarre, indeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age, your selves in the meane while either kill'd, or consumed with age; Farthermore, for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civill Magistrate, and will be exempt from all publique burthens, and yet will live under his Jurisdiction, and look for protection from the violence and injuries of others, that you would not looke on them as fellow Subjects, but esteeme them for enemies, and spies, and that yee rashly admit not for Gods Word all which either openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so. I say more plainly, if any preacher, Confessor, or Casuist, shal but say that this doctrin is agreeable with Gods word, namely, That the chief ruler, nay any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chiefes command, or that Subjects may resist, conspire, or

covenant against the supreme power, that ye by no means beleeve them, but instantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasons, will also like my intention in writing this book.

Last of al, I have propounded to my self this rule through this whole discourse; First, not to define ought which concerns the justice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the laws. Next not to dispute the laws of any government in special, that is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to declare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly not to seem of opinion, that there is a lesse proportion of for obedience due to an Aristocraty or Democraty, then a Monarchy; though I have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth Chapter to gain a belief in men, that Monarchy is the most commodious government (which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated) yet every where I expresly say, that in all kind of Government whatsoever, there ought to be a supreme and equall power. Fourthly, not in any wise to dispute the positions of Divines, except those which strip Subjects of their obedience, and shake the foundations of civill government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus written, I would not presently expose to publique interest, wherefore I got some few copies privately disperst among some of my friends, that discrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous, hard, or obscure, I might correct, soften, and explain them.

These things I found most bitterly excepted against: that I had made the civill powers too large, but this by Ecclesiasticall persons; that I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience, but this by Sectaries; that I had set princes above the civil Laws, but this by Lawyers; wherefore I was not much moved by these mens reprehensions, (as who in doing this did but do their own business) except it were tye those knots so much faster.

But for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the principles themselves, to wit the nature of men, the authority or right of nature, the nature of compacts and contracts, and the originall of civill government, because in finding fault they have not so much followed their passions, as their common sense, I have therefore in some places added some annotations whereby I presumed I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts; Lastly I have endevoured to offend none beside those whose principles these contradict, and whose tender mindes are lightly offended by every difference of opinions.

Wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpnesse, and lesse of certainty then they ought to have, since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties, as the establishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country, may very charitably be allowed some liberty, it is his only request to ye Readers, ye will deign to receive them with an equall mind.

Chapter I: Of the state of men without Civill Society

I. THE FACULTIES of Humane nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds; Bodily strength, Experience, Reason, Passion. Taking the beginning of this following Doctrine from these, we will declare in the first place what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty, they are born apt for Society, and so preserve themselves against mutuall violence; then proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this businesse, and what are the conditions of Society, or of Humane Peace; that is to say, (changing the words onely) what are the fundamentall Lawes of Nature.

II. The greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning Commonwealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe, That Man is a Creature born fit* for Society: The Greeks call him Zoon politikon, and on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of Civill Society, as if for the preservation of Peace, and the Government of Mankind there were nothing else necessary, then that Men should agree to make certaine Covenants and Conditions together, which themselves should then call Lawes. Which Axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly False, and an Errour proceeding from our too slight contemplation of Humane Nature; for they who shall more narrowly look into the Causes for which Men come together, and delight in each others company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by Accident: For if by nature one Man should Love another (that is) as Man, there could no reason be return'd why every Man should not equally Love

every Man, as being equally Man, or why he should rather frequent those whose Society affords him Honour or Profit. We doe not therefore by nature seek Society for its own sake, but that we may receive some Honour or Profit from it; these we desire Primarily, that Secondarily: How by what advice Men doe meet, will be best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met: For if they meet for Traffique, it's plaine every man regards not his Fellow, but his Businesse; if to discharge some Office, a certain Market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of Jealousie in it then True love, and whence Factions sometimes may arise, but Good will never; if for Pleasure, and Recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stirre up laughter, whence he may (according to the nature of that which is Ridiculous) by comparison of another mans Defects and Infirmities, passe the more currant in his owne opinion; and although this be sometimes innocent, and without offence; yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the Society, as their own Vain glory. But for the most part, in these kind of meetings, we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examin'd, judg'd, condemn'd; nay, it is very rare, but some present receive a fling before they part, so as his reason was not ill, who was wont alwayes at parting to goe out last. And these are indeed the true delights of Society, unto which we are carryed by nature, (i.e.) by those passions which are incident to all Creatures, untill either by sad experience, or good precepts, it so fall out (which in many never happens) that the Appetite, of present matters, be dul'd with the memory of things past, without which, the discourse of most quick and nimble men, on this subject, is but cold and hungry.

But if it so happen, that being met, they passe their time in relating some Stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concernes himselfe; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too. if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell you miracles, if they have them,

if not, they'l fein them: Lastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser then others; if they meet to talk of Philosophy, look how many men, so many would be esteem'd Masters, or else they not only love not their fellowes, but even persecute them with hatred: So clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider Humane affaires, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory, whence the parties met, endeavour to carry with them either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have been conversant: The same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves, of Will, Good, Honour, Profitable. For when we voluntarily contract Society, in all manner of Society we look after the object of the Will, i.e. that, which every one of those, who gather together, propounds to himselfe for good; now whatsoever seemes good, is pleasant, and relates either to the senses, or the mind, but all the mindes pleasure is either Glory, (or to have a good opinion of ones selfe) or referres to Glory in the end; the rest are Sensuall, or conducing to sensuality, which may be all comprehended under the word Conveniencies. All Society therefore is either for Gain, or for Glory; (i.e.) not so much for love of our Fellowes, as for love of our Selves: but no society can be great, or lasting, which begins from Vain Glory; because that Glory is like Honour, if all, men have it, no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence; neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in my selfe; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himselfe, without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much farthered by mutuall help, since yet those may be better attain'd to by Dominion, then by the society of others: I hope no body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by Nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain Dominion, then to gaine Society. We must therefore resolve, that the Originall of all great, and lasting Societies, consisted not in the mutuall

good will men had towards each other, but in the mutuall fear* * they had of each other.

[Born fit] Since we now see actually a constituted Society among men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of congresse, and mutuall correspondence, it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this Doctrine, such a stumbling block before t he Readers, as to deny Man to be born fit for Society: Therefore I must more plainly say, That it is true indeed, that to Man, by nature, or as Man, that is, as soone as he is born, Solitude is an enemy; for Infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well, wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civill Societies are not meer Meetings, but Bonds, to the making whereof, Faith and Compacts are necessary: The Vertue whereof to Children, and Fooles, and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what Society is, cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in Infancy, are born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of minde, or want of education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have Infants, as well as those of riper years, an humane nature; wherefore Man is made fit for Society not by Nature, but by Education: furthermore, although Man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it followes not, that he therefore were Born fit to enter into it; for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equall conditions, without which there can be no Society, do yet desire it.

[The mutuall fear] It is objected: It is so improbable that men should grow into civill Societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endur'd each others looks: They Presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else then to be affrighted: I comprehend in this word Fear, a certain foresight of future evill; neither doe I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearfull. They who go to Sleep, shut their Dores; they who Travell carry their Swords with them, because they fear Theives. Kingdomes guard their Coasts and Frontiers with Forts, and Castles; Cities are compast with Walls, and all for fear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes; even the strongest Armies, and most accomplisht for Fight, yet sometimes Parly for Peace, as fearing each others Power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves, by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escaPe otherwise, but for the most part by Armes, and Defensive Weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth, they know each others Spirits; but then, if they fight, Civill Society ariseth from the Victory, if they agree, from their Agreement.

III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men, partly in their mutuall will of hurting: whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to our selves the least security: For if we look on men fullgrown, and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it) and how easie a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can doe equall things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equall; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the Civill Law.

IV. All men in the State of nature have a desire, and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemn'd; for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us, permits as much to others, as he assumes to himself (which is an argument of a temperate man, and one that rightly values his power); another, supposing himselfe above others, will have a License to doe what he lists, and challenges Respect, and Honour, as due to him before others, (which is an Argument of a fiery spirit:) This mans will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory, and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength; the other's, from the necessity of defending himselfe, his liberty, and his goods against this mans violence.

V. Furthermore, since the combate of Wits is the fiercest, the greatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this Contention; for in this case it is not only odious to contend against, but also not to consent; for not to approve of what a man saith is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speaketh; as in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from; which may appear hence, that there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Religion, and Factions of the same Commonweale, where the Contestation is Either concerning Doctrines, or Politique Prudence. And since all the pleasure, and jollity of the mind consists in this; even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph, and Vaunt it self; its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughter, or by Words, or by Gesture, or some signe or other. then which there is no greater vexation of mind; and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt.

VI. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet

divide it; whence it followes that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the Sword.

VII. Among so many dangers therefore, as the naturall lusts of men do daily threaten each other withall, to have a care of ones selfe is not a matter so scornfully to be lookt upon, as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done otherwise; for every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evill, but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills, which is Death; and this he doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no lesse then that whereby a Stone moves downward: It is therefore neither absurd, nor reprehensible; neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his Body, and the Members thereof from death and sorrowes; but that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right; Neither by the word Right is any thing else signified, then that liberty which every man hath to make use of his naturall faculties according to right reason: Therefore the first foundation of naturall Right is this, That every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.

VIII. But because it is in vaine for a man to have a Right to the end, if the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him; it followes, that since every man hath a Right to preserve himself, he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.

IX. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he is performing, be necessary to the preservation of his Life, and Members, or not, he Himself, by the right of nature, must be judg; for say another man, judg that it is contrary to right reason that I should judg of mine own perill: why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are equall by nature, will I judge also of things which doe belong to him; therefore it agrees with right reason (that is) it is the right of

nature that I judge of his opinion, (i.e.) whether it conduce to my preservation, or not.

X. Nature hath given to every one a right to all. That is it was lawfull for every man in the bare state of nature*, or before such time as men had engag'd themselves by any Covenants, or Bonds, to doe what hee would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possesse, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing Article whether it doth or not, in so much as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so) and by the 7. Article it appeares that by the right of Nature those things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to the protection of life, and members, it followes, that in the state of nature, To have all, and do all is lawfull for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying, Nature hath given all to all, from whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature, Profit is the measure of Right.

[In the meere state of Nature] This is thus to be understood: What any man does in the bare state of Nature is injurious to no man; not that in such a State he cannot offend God, or break the Lawes of Nature; for Injustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawes, such, as in the State of Nature there are none: Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindfull Reader in the Articles immediately foregoing; but because in certaine cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises, I will contract this Argument, and make it most evident to a single view; every man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the seventh Article. The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end by the eight Article: But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such

by the ninth Article. He therefore hath a right to make use, of and to doe all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation: wherefore by the judgement of him that doth it, the thing done is either right, or wrong; and therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare State of Nature, &c but if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the Lawes of Nature, as in the third Chapter of this Book is more at large declar'd. It hath been objected by some: If a Sonne kill his Father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, That a Sonne cannot be understood to be at any time in the State of Nature, as being under the Power and command of them to whom he ownes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely either his Fathers, or his Mothers, or his that nourisht him, as is demonstrated in the ninth Chapter.

XI. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common Right to all things; for the effects of this Right are the same, almost, as if there had been no Right at all; for although any man might say of every thing, This is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his Neighbour, who having equall Right, and equall power, would pretend the same thing to be his.

XII. If now to this naturall proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their Passions, but chiefly from a vain esteeme of themselves: You adde, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetuall jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us, with an intention to oppresse, and ruine, though he come with a small Number, and no great Provision;. it cannot be deny'd but that the naturall state of men, before they entr'd into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War of all men, against all men; for what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force, is fully declar'd either by Words, or Deeds? The time remaining, is termed PEACE.

XIII. But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of Man-kind, or of each single Man, a perpetuall War is: But it is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by Victory; for in this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a Miracle, if any, even the most strong should close up his life with many years, and old age. They of America are Examples hereof, even in this present Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which now indeed are become Civill, and Flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy'd of all that Pleasure, and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawfull for all men, he contradicts himself; for every man, by naturall necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a State, to be good for him. And so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this condition, and to get some fellowes; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.

XIV. Fellowes are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; By Constraint, when after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him either through feare of death, or by laying fetters on him: By consent, when men enter into society to helpe each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the Conqueror may by right compell the Conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper yeares a childe) unlesse he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting our selves according to our owne wills proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, its more consonant to reason, and more certaine for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure our selves by taking

caution; then, when they shall be full growne and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power againe by doubtfull fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, then by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy, and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men, That a sure and irresistible Power confers the right of Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things, that can be done, adheres essentially, and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.

XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i.e.) of War, by reason of that equality of power, and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right Reason; that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next Chapter.

Chapter II: Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts

I. ALL AUTHORS agree not concerning the definition of the Naturall Law, who notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their Writings. The Method therefore, wherein we begin from definitions, and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes; for the rest, if any man say, that somwhat is done against the Law of Nature, one proves it hence, because it was done against the generall Agreement of all the most wise, and learned Nations: But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of all Nations: Another hence, That it was done against the Generall consent of all Man-kind; which definition is by no means to be admitted; for then it were impossible for any but Children, and Fools, to offend against such a Law; for sure, under the notion of Man-kind, they comprehend all men actually endued with Reason. These therefore either doe Naught against it, or if they doe Ought, it is without their joint accord, and therefore ought to be excus'd; but to receive the Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them, who oftner Break, then Observe them, is in truth unreasonable: besides, Men condemne the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publickly commend what they privately condemne; and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear-say, then any Speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, then true Reason. And therefore it comes to passe, that whole Bodyes of people often doe those things by Generall accord, or Contention, which those Writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the Law of Nature. But

since all doe grant that is done by RIGHT, which is not done against Reason, we ought to judg those Actions onely wrong, which are repugnant to right Reason, (i.e.) which contradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning from true Principles; but that Wrong which is done, we say it is done against some Law: therefore True Reason is a certaine Law, which (since it is no lesse a part of Humane nature, then any other faculty, or affection of the mind) is also termed naturall. Therefore the Law of Nature, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right Reason*, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of Life, and Members, as much as in us lyes.

- [Right Reason.] By Right Reason in the naturall state of men, I understand not, as many doe, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage, or benefit of his neighbours. I call it Peculiar, because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e. the Civill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this Civill Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with His owne) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are done at His owne perill, but also for the measure of another mans reason, in such things as doe concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the wHole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation; but the Principles of Right

reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. articles of the first Chapter.

II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is, That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found; and where not, there to provide our selves for helps of War: For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes, that hath been newly prov'd above; But this is the first, because the rest are deriv'd from this, and they direct the wayes either to Peace, or self-defence.

III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this, That the right of all men, to all things, ought not to be retain'd, but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd, or relinquisht: for if every one should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade; and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them, (for every man, by naturall necessity, endeavours to defend his Body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body) therefore War would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of Peace, (i.e.) against the Law of Nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his Right to all things.

IV. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it, who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again, which before, by Right, he might have done; but he conveys it to another, who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before, with Right, have resisted him; but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was convey'd, he, to whom he convey'd it, had even then also

a right to all, whence he could not give any new Right: But the resisting Right he had, before he gave it, by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rights, is utterly abolisht: Whosoever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of men, he onely procures himself security, and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primitive Right: As for example, if any man shall sell, or give away a Farme, he utterly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme, but he does not so from others also.

V. But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onely of him that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the Right remaines: for if I would have given what was mine, to one who refus'd to accept of it, I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Right, or convey'd it to any man; for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this Man was in him onely, not in others too.

VI. But if there be no other Token extant of our will either to quit, or convey our Right, but onely Words; those words must either relate to the present, or time past; for if they be of the future onely, they convey nothing: for example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will give to morrow, declares openly that yet he hath not given it; so that all this day his right remains, and abides to morrow too, unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it: for what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; I doe give, or have given you this to be received to morrow, by these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his Right to receive it to morrow, is conveyed to him by me to day.

VII. Neverthelesse, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will; if yet to words relating to the future, there shall some other signes be added, they may become as valid, as if they had been spoken of the present: If therefore, as by reason of those other signes, it appear, that he

that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his Right, they ought to be valid; for the conveyance of right depends not on words, but (as hath been instanc'd in the 4. Article) on the declaration of the Will.

VIII. If any man conveigh some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift, or free Donation. But in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the present, or the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing Article: It must needs therefore be, that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will: But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that wils it; there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give it, except some benefit either already receiv'd, or to be acquir'd; but is suppos'd, that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift: It remains therefore, that a mutuall good turne without agreement be expected; but no signe can be given, that he, who us' d future words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood, as to oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reason, that those who are easily enclined to doe well to others, should be oblig'd by every promise, testifying their present good affection: And for this cause, a promiser in this kind, must be understood to have time to deliberate, and power to change that affection as well as he to whom he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that deliberates, is so farre forth free, nor can be said to have already given: But if he promise often, and yet give seldome, he ought to be condemn'd of levity, and be called not a Donour, but Doson.

IX. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveighing their Rights, is call'd a Contract. But in every Contract, either both parties instantly performe what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from

either to other; or the one performes, the other is trusted, or neither performe. Where both parties performe presently, there the Contract is ended, as soon as ’tis performed; but where there is credit given either to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called a COVENANT.

X. But the Covenant made by the party trusted with him, who hath already performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no lesse transfer the right of future time, then if it had been made by words signifying the present, or time past: for the others performance is a most manifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to be thus understood, which, because he hindred not, ’twas an evident token of his Will to performe. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit received (which are also Covenants) are Tokens of the Will; that is, (as in the foregoing Section hath been declared) of the last act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolisht, and by consequence are obligatory; for where Liberty ceaseth, there beginneth Obligation.

XI. But the Covenants, which are made in contract of mutuall trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there arise* a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid: for he that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their owne advantage, either by right, or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath Contracted; for it suites not with reason, that any man should performe first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable, or not, he that doubts it, must be judge of, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 9. Article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature, but

in a Civill State, when there is a power which can compell both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first performe; because, that since the other may be compell'd, the cause which made him fear the others non-performance, ceaseth.

[*Arise] For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the till not to performe from the other part, it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making Compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made.

XII. But from this reason, that in all Free-gifts, and Compacts, there is an acceptance of the conveighance of Right required: it followes, that no man can Compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance; and therefore we cannot compact with Beasts, neither can we give, or take from them any manner of Right, by reason of their want of speech, and understanding, Neither can any man Covenant with God, or be oblig'd to him by Vow, except so far forth as it appeares to him by Holy Scriptures, that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to accept of such like Vowes and Covenants, as being in Gods stead.

XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vain, who are in the state of nature, where they are not tyed by any Civill Law, (except by most certain Revelation the Will of God to accept their Vow, or Pact, be made known to them) for if what they Vow, be contrary to the Law of Nature, they are not tyed by their Vow, for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act; but if what is vowed, be commanded by some Law of nature, it is not their Vow, but the Law it self which ties them; but if he were free before his vow, either to doe it, or not doe it, his liberty remaines, because that the openly declar'd Will of the obliger is requisite to make an obligation by Vow, which in the case propounded is suppos'd not to be: Now I call him the Obliger to whom any one is tyed, and the Obliged him who is tyed.

XIV. Covenants are made of such things onely as fall under our deliberation, for it can be no Covenant without the Will of the Contractor, but the Will is the last act of him who deliberates; therefore they onely concerne things possible, and to come; no man therefore, by his Compact, obligeth himself to an impossibility. But yet, though we often Covenant to doe such things as then seem' d possible when we promis'd them, which yet afterward appear to be impossible, are we therefore freed from all obligation? The reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future incertainty receives a present benefit; on condition, that he return another for it: for his Will, who performes the present benefit hath simply before it, for its object, a certain good valuable with the thing promised; but the thing it selfe not simply, but with condition if it could be done; but if it should so happen, that even this should prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants therefore oblige us not to perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour. for this onely is, the things themselves are not in our power.

XV. We are freed from Covenants two wayes, either by performing, or by being forgiven: By performing, for beyond that we oblig'd not our selves. By being for-given, because he whom we oblig'd our selves to by forgiving, is conceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to him; for, forgiving, implies giving: that is, by the fourth Article of this Chapter, a conveyance of Right to him to whom the gift is made.

XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Compacts extorted from us, through fear, do oblige, or not: For example, If to redeeme my life, from the power of a Robber, I promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and that I will doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am tyed to keep promise, or not? But though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so, because it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises which

reduc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of none effect, (for it proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:) And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally true, that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received; and that to promisee and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for the redemption of my life, both to promise, and to give what I will of mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd therefore. by promises proceeding from fear, except the Civill Law forbid them, by vertue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawfull.

XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doe, or omit somewhat, and shall after Covenant the contrary with another; he maketh not the former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer Right to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to another; wherefore he can conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore tyed onely to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.

XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his Body; for there is in every man a certain high degree of feare through which he apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and therefore by naturall necessity he shuns it all he can, and 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arrived to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight, or fight. Since therefore no man is tyed to impossibilities, they who are threatned either with deathe (which is the greatest evill to nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to endure them. Farthermore, he that is tyed by Contract is trusted, (for Faith only is the Bond of Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are

fettered, or strongly guarded, which is a most certain signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non resistance by their Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way, none, neither is it ever needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterward kill him. But in a Civill State, where the Right of life, and death, and of all corporall punishment is with the Supreme; that same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment, but onely this, that no man offer to defend others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two Cities, there should a Contract be made, on condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we must presuppose another Contract of not killing before the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of Warre returnes; that is, an hostile state, in which all things are lawfull, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not resisting, we are oblig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for certaine Death is a greater evill then Fighting; but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse the least: By such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.

XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a bitter life; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear witnesse against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against his Father; nor any man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but

although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any compact, yet in a publique tryall he may, by torture, be forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'd his answer be true, or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.

XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of Gods mercy, unlesse he perform his word; which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans, Doe thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjects to Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings took upon them Divine Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power men might have a greater dread of breaking their Faiths, then that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their actions may lie hid.

XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth, who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to Swear by a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him. For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to Swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name then what is contain'd in the precepts of his own proper, that is, (as he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.

XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understand, that a bare Contract obligeth no lesse, then that to which we are Sworn; for it is the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punishment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull;

but it could not be unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God obligeth himselfe not to any punishment, because it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is this, To cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment, to make the more Conscience of their words and actions.

XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted, withall wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more then is necessary unto self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe, as to prejudice another. For an Oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of Gods anger, that is to say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who think, that by their own therefore violate their Faith, because they strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against those, who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.

Chapter III: Of the other Lawes of Nature I.

ANOTHER OF THE Lawes of Nature is, to performe Contracts, or to keep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of Nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain Peace; to conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as it shall happen to be done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe Our selves, what we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand to our Covenants, Or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.

II. Neither is there in this matter, any exception of the persons, with whom we Contract, as if they keep no faith with others; Or hold, that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he that Contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vaine, and it is against reason for a knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he affirms the Contract to be made in vain: He therefore, who Contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaine, and not in vaine, which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared Warre, Or a sure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action, Or omission) is called an INJURY: But that

action, or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action, or omission, signifie the same thing, and both are the same with breach of Contract and trust: And it seemes the word Iniury came to be given to any action, or omission, because they were without Right. He that acted, or omitted, having before conveyed bis Right to some other. And there is some likenesse between that, which in the common course of life we call Injury; and that, which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he, who by Arguments is driven to deny the Assertion which he first maintain'd, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weaknesse of mind does, or omits that which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doe, or omit, commits an Injury, and falls into no lesse contradiction, then he, who in the Schools is reduc'd to an Absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done, which is to will a thing done, and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An Injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

IV. From these grounds it followes, that an injury can be done to no man* but him with whom we enter Covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his Servant, who hath promis'd to obey him, to pay a summe of money, or carry some present to a third man; the Servant, if he doe it not, hath indeed damag'd this third party, but he injur'd his Master onely. So also in a civill government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no Contract, he damages him to whom the evill is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs: for if he, who receives the hurt, should expostulate the mischief. and he that did it, should answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather doe according to yours, then mine owne will, since I do not hinder, but you may

do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath no manner of pre-contract past, I see not, I confesse, what is reprehensible.

- [Injury can be done against no man] The word injustice relates to some Law: Injury to some Person, as well as some Law. For what's unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done, and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private Person, but the Magistrate only; sometimes also neither against the Magistrate, nor any private man, but onely against God; for through Contract, and conveighance of Right, we say, that an injury is done against this, or that man. Hence it is (which we see in all kind of Government) that what private men contract between themselves by word, or writing, is releast againe at the will of the Obliger. But those mischiefes which are done against the Lawes of the Land, as theft, homicide, and the like, are punisht not as he wills, to whom the hurt is done, but according to the will of the Magistrate; that is, the constituted Lawes.

V. These words just, and unjust, as also justice, and injustice, are equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Persons, another when to actions: When they are attributed to Actions, Just signifies as much as what's done with Right, and unjust, as what's done with injury: he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person, but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust thing, we doe not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to be just, signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to doe righteousnesse, or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and to be unjust, is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit; so as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing;

that of an action, or omission, another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just: But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the Law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext unto the Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his mind.

VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds; Commutative, and Distributive, the former whereof they say consists in Arithmeticall, the latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location, and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to Contracters, where, if there be an equall return made, hence they say springs a commutative justice: But this is busied about the dignity, and merits of men; so as if there be rendred to every man kata pen axian more to him who is more worthy, and lesse to him that deserves lesse, and that proportionably, hence they say ariseth distributive justice: I acknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality; to wit, that one is an equality simply so called, as when two things of equall value are compar'd together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the other is an equality, secundum, quod as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to an hundred men, 600 pounds are given to 60 men, and 400 to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400. But when it happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equall part, whence it is called an equall distribution: But such like equality is the same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for neither, if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, doe I injure the buyer, who sought, and desir'd them of me? neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesse, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either? which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies

in the Gospell. This therefore is no distinction of Justice, but of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd, but that Justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this onely; that since we are all equall by nature, one should not arrogate more Right to himselfe, then he grants to another, unlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally receiv'd by all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, then the breach of Faith, or Contract, as hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old saying, Volenti non fit iniuria (the willing man receives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. For grant, that a man be willing that that should be done, which he conceives to be an injury. to him; why then that is done by his will, which by Contract was not lawfull to be done; but he being willing that should be done, which was not lawfull by Contract, the Contract it self (by the 15. 5 Article of the foregoing Chapter) becomes void: The Right therefore of doing it returnes, therefore it is done by Right; wherefore it is no injury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall Law, is, That you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who out of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to endeavour, that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this meanes all beneficence, and trust, together with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among men, neither would there be ought of mutuall assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour. by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach of this Law is not a breach of trust, or contract, (for we suppose no Contracts to have pass'd among them)

therefore is it not usually termed an iniury, but because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other, it is called INGRATITUDE.

IX.The fourth precept of Nature, is, That every man render himself usefull unto others: which, that we may rightly understand, we must remember that there is in men, a diversity of dispositions to enter into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the Building, by reason of the diversity of their matter, and figure. For as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfe, neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together, or easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible, by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections, is commonly said to be uselesse, and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by Right onely, but even by naturall necessity is suppos'd, with all his main might, to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a Warre, because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending, he therefore acts against the fundamentall Law of Nature: Whence it followes (which wee were to shew) that it is a precept of nature; That every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks this Law may be called uselesse, and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulnesse, as having regard to this very Law.

X. The fift precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgive him who repents, and asketh pardon for what is past; having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of Peace to him that asketh it, after

he hath warr'd against us, & now is become penitent. But Peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains an hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future; that is, seeks not Peace, but oportunity, is not properly Peace but feare, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent, and that gives future caution, peace it selfe it seems is not pleasing; which is contrary to the naturall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall Law is, That in revenge. and punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past, but the future good. That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Article. Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be onely considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph, and glory of minde, which points at no end, (for it contemplates onely what is past; but the end is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is vain; That revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vaine glory, and therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason introduces a warre, and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature; It is therefore a precept of the Law of nature, that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward. Now the breach of this Law, is commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatred, and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives, (that I say not their Peace) then suffer reproach; it followes in the seventh place, That it is prescribed by the Law of nature, that no man either by deeds, or words, countenance, or laughter, doe declare himselfe to hate, or scorne another. The breach of which Law is called Reproach. But although nothing be more frequent then the scoffes and jeers of the

powerfull against the weak, and namely of Judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the Judges, yet these kind of men do act against the Law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the naturall, but civill state; for it hath been shewed before, Chap. I. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equall, and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civill Law. I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others onely to serve; as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptnesse, that is, a certain kind of naturall knowledge, or ignorance; which foundation is not onely against reason (as but now hath been shewed) but also against experience: for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe, then to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger doe contest, have these ever, or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equall by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequall, because they are like to contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, that they be esteemed as equall; and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature equall to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man, that he should part with some of his Rights, so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation, that he retain some others, to wit the Right of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of ayre, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth

this ninth dictate of the naturall Law, to wit, That what Rights soever any man challenges to himselfe, he also grant the same as due to all the rest: otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former Article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equall things to equalls, is the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals. The observation of this Law is called MEEKNES, the violation pleonexia, the breakers by the Latines are styled Immodici & immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature, That every man in dividing Right to others, shew himselfe equall to either party. By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selves, then we grant to others. We may take lesse if we will, for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse then another. For he that by favouring one before another, observes not this naturall equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Precept is called EQUITY; the breach, Respect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term it prosopolepsia.

XVI. From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh, Those things which cannot be divided, must be used in common, (if they can) and (that the quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he lists, but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proPortionally to the number of the users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot be divided, nor had in common, it is provided by the Law of nature (which may be the twelfth Precept) that the use of that

thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one onely by lot, and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it; For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found, but that of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbitrary, or naturall; Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders, and it consists in meer chance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek klironomia, as it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided, nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessour, as also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne, unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is; That safety must be assured to the mediators for Peace. For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of Reason is Peace. All the rest are means to obtain it, and without which Peace cannot be had. But neither can Peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety; it is therefore a dictate of Reason, that is, a Law of nature, That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace.

XX. Furthermore, because, although men should agree to make all these, and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts, and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done, were against the Law, or not, (which we call, the question of Right) whence will follow a fight between Parties, either sides supposing themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace (because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on) that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutuall

compacts to stand to his judgement in deciding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Arbiter. It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law, That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this ground, that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the controversie, we gather, that the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally, and what is just, onely for Peaces sake, and accidentally. and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by, the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would do: It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature, That no man must be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground followes in the seventeenth place, That no man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit, or glory, from the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes here, as in the foregoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe, to wit, whether that bee done or not, which is said to bee done, the naturall Law wills, that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike, that is, (because they affirm contradictories) that hee believe neither: He must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judgement of the fact, as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters, and Iudges of fact, That where firm and certain signes of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such witnesses, as seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood, That no contract or promise must Passe between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed, by vertue whereof he may

be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be oblig'd to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall. The Judge is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature re-counted in the 15. Article. To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgement, he should contend for the equity of it, except such Compact be of no force, the Controversie would remain after Judgement given, which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce. The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge to be dis-engaged, which is its 19 precept.

XXV. Farthermore, forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason, so as, unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature, it is manifest, that he, who knowingly, or willingly, doth ought, whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed, or weakned, he knowingly, and willingly, breaks the Law of nature: For there is no difference between a man who performes not his Duty, and him who does such things willingly, as make it impossible for him to doe it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who doe that which disturbs the mind from its naturall state; that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and Gluttons; we therefore sin in the 20 place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation, and safegard of our selves, will say, That the deduction of these Lawes is so hard, that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will they prove obliging: for Lawes, if they be not known, oblige not, nay, indeed are not Lawes. To this I answer, it's true,

That hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetousnesse, vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, doe hinder a man so, as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these Lawes, whilst those passions prevail in him: But there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind; At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and unlearn'd, then this only Rule, That when he doubts, whether what he is now doing to another, may be done by the Law of Nature, or not, he conceive himselfe to be in that others stead. Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact, being now cast into the other scale, disswade him as much: And this Rule is not onely easie, but is Anciently celebrated in these words, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris: Do not that to others, you would not have done to your self.

XXVII. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of present profit, are very unapt to observe these Lawes, although acknowledg'd by them, if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates, those not practising the same, surely they would not follow Reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procure themselves peace, but a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be imagin'd, that by Nature, (that is, by Reason) men are oblig'd to the exercise of all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others. We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd. We must therefore conclude, that the Law of Nature doth alwayes, and every where oblige in the internall Court, or that of Conscience, but not alwayes in the externall Court, but then onely when it may be done with safety.

The exercise of all these Lawes] Nay among these Lawes some things there are, the omission whereof (provided it be done for Peace, or Self-

preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfilling, then breach of the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those that doe all things, and plunders plunderers, doth equity; but on the other side, to doe that which in Peace is an handsome action, and becomming an honest man, is dejectednesse, and Poornesse of spirit, and a betraying of ones self in the time of War, But there are certain naturall Lawes, whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self; for I cannot understand what drunkennesse, or cruelty (that is, Revenge which respects not the future good) can advance toward Peace, or the preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what's just, and unjust, is not to be esteem'd by the Actions, but by the Counsell, and Conscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for Peace, for the preservation of our selves, is done with Right; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Law, and an injury against God.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige Conscience, may be broken by an act, not onely contrary to them, but also agreeable with them, if so be that he who does it be of another opinion: for though the act it self be answerable to the Lawes, yet his Conscience is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immutable, and eternall; What they forbid, can never be lawfull; what they command, can never be unlawfull: For pride, ingratitude, breach of Contracts (or injury), inhumanity, contumely, will never be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the Court of Conscience, where onely they oblige, and are Lawes. Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances, and the Civill Law, that what's done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it another. Yet Reason is still the same, and changeth not her end, which is Peace, and Defence; nor of the minde which the meanes to attaine them, to wit, those

vertues we have declar'd above, and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome, or Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd, because they require the endeavour onely, (but that must be true and constant) which who so shall performe, we may rightly call him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature, he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes, which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature. Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to, is a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the Morall. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know therefore, that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination, or aversion of them by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse Constitutions, Customes, Opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man commends, (that is to say, calls Good) the other undervalues, as being Evil; Nay, very often the same man at diverse times, praises, and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they doe, necessary it is there should be discord, and strife: They are therefore so long in the state of War, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they mete Good and Evill by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to be evill, and by consequence that Peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, doe agree concerning a future Good, which indeed is a work of Reason; for things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our Reason only. Reason declaring Peace to be good, it followes by the same reason, that all the necessary means to Peace be good also, and therefore, that Modesty, Equity,

Trust, Humanity, Mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to Peace) are good Manners, or habits, (that is) Vertues. The Law therefore, in the means to Peace, commands also Good Manners, or the practise of Vertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite, whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict consequence, many unfore-seen evills doe adhere) before the future, it happens, that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues, yet they disagree still concerning their Nature, to wit, in what each of them doth consist; for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions, which please them, are ever entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe that the same Action is prais'd by these, and call'd Vertue, and dispraised by those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers for this matter; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to Peace, and the evill in this, that it related to discord, they built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from the morall Law, and unconstant to it self; for they would have the nature of vertues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremes, and the vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is commended, and under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great, or little, or between both, makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more, of what is mine own, then I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of Morall Philosophy, whereof I have onely delivered such precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts of rationall nature, from whence spring other vertues: for

temperance also is a precept of Reason, because intemperance tends to sicknesse, and death. And so fortitude too, (that is) that same faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, (and which are more hardly declined then overcome) because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the Lawes of nature (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by Reason, of things to be done, and omitted; but a Law to speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him who by Right commands somewhat to others to be done, or omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) Lawes, as they proceed from nature; yet as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures, (as we shall see in the Chapter following) they are most properly called by the name of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right.

Chapter IV: That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law

I. THE SAME Law which is Naturall, and Morall, is also wont to be called Divine, nor undeservedly, as well because Reason, which is the law of Nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine Majesty, for the LAWES of his heavenly Kingdome, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and his holy Prophets and Apostles. What therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to confirme the same in this Chapter by holy writ.

II. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that the Divine Law is seated in right reason. Psalm 37, 30, 31. The mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdome, and his tongue will be talking of Iudgement: The law of God is in his heart. Jerem. 31. 33. I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. Psal. 19. 7. The law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soule. ver. 8. The Commandement of the Lord is Pure, and giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron. 30. 11. This Commandement which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off, &c. vers. 14. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thine heart; that thou maist doe it. Psal. 119. 34. Give me understanding, and I shall keep thy law. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. Proverbs 9. 10. The knowledge of the holy is understanding. John 1. 1. Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called the word. vers. 9. The same Christ is called the true light that ligiteth every man

that cometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have shewed before, are the lawes of nature.

III. But that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law of nature, namely, that Peace was to be sought for, is also the summe of the divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. 3. 17. Righteousnesse, (which is the summe of the law) is called the way of Peace Psal. 85. 10. Righteousnesse and Peace have kissed each other. Matth. 5. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God. And after Saint Paul in his 6. Chapter to the Hebrewes, and the last verse had called Christ (the Legislator of that law we treat of) an High-Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedeck; he addes in the following Chapter, the first verse, This Melchizedeck was King of Salem, Priest of the most high God, &c. vers. 2. First being by interpretation King of Righteousnesse, and after that also King of Salem, which is, King of peace. Whence it is cleare, that Christ the King in his Kingdome placeth Righteousnesse and Peace together. Psal. 34. Eschue evill and doe good, seek Peace and ensue it. Isaiah 9. 6, 7. Unto us a child is born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace. Isaiah 52. 7. How beautifull upon the mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth Peace, that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith unto Sion, thy God reigneth! 3 Luke 2. 14. In the Nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised God saying, Glory be to God on high, and in earth Peace, good will towards men. And Isaiah 53. 5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of our Peace. Isay 59. 8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace. The way of Peace they know not, and there is no judgement in their goings. Micah 5. 4, 5. speaking of the Messias, he saith thus, hee shall stand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the Majesty of the name of the Lord his God, and

they shall abide, for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth; And this man shall be your Peace, &c. Prov. 3. 1, 2. My sonne forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my Commandements, for length of dayes, and long life, and Peace, shall they adde to thee.

IV. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things, or concerning the introduction of meum & tuum, We perceive in the first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot, Gen. 13. 8. Let there be no strife I Pray thee, between thee and me, and between thy heard-men, and my heard-men, for we be brethren. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thy selfe I Pray thee from me. And all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours, as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between Mine, and Thine. for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

V. The same precepts establish the second law of nature of keeping trust: for what doth, Thou shalt not invade anothers right, import, but this? Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine; but expressely set down, Psal. 15. vers. 1. To him that asked, Lord who shall dwell in thy Tabernacle? It is answered, vers. 3, 4: He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not; and Prov. 6. 1. My sonne if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth.

VI. The third Law concerning gratitude is proved by these places, Deut. 25. 4. Thou shalt not muzzle the Oxe when he treadeth out the corn; which Saint Paul I. Cor. 9. 9. interprets to be spoken of men, not Oxen onely. Prov. 17. 13. Who so rewardeth evill for good, evill shall not depart from his house. And Deut. 20. 10, 11. When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim Peace unto it. And it shall be if it make thee answer

of Peace, and oPen unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Proverbs 3. 29. Devise not evill against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

VII. To the fourth Law of accommodating our selves, these precepts are conformable, Exod. 23. 4, 5. If thou meet thine enemies Oxe, or his Asse going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again; if thou see the Asse of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him, vers. 9. Also, thou shalt not oppresse a stranger. Prov. 3. 30. Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no harme. Prov. 15. 18. A wrathfull man stirreth up strife, but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife. 18. 24. There is a friend that sticketh closer then a brother. The same is confirmed, Luke 10. By the Parable of the Samaritan, who had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theeves, and by Christs precept, Matth. 5. 39. But I say unto you, that ye resist not evill, but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also, &c.

VIII. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are some. Matth. 6. 14. If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Math. 18. 21. Lord how oft shall my Brother sinne against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not till seven times, but till seventy times seven times: that is, toties quoties.

IX. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are pertinent which command us to shew mercy; such as Mat. 5. 7. Blessed are the mercifull, for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. 19. 18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But there are, who not onely think this law is not proved by Scripture, but plainly disproved

from hence, that there is an eternall punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where there is no place either for amendment, or example. Some resolve this objection by answering, That God, whom no law restrains, refers all to his glory, but that man must not doe so; as if God sought his glory, (that is to say) pleased himselfe in the death of a sinner. It is more rightly answered, that the institution of eternall punishment was before sin, and had regard to this onely, that men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come.

X. The words of Christ prove this seventh, Matth. 5. 22. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgement, and whosoever shall say unto his Brother Racha, shall be in danger of the Counsell, but whosoever shall say, thou foole, shall be in danger of hell fire. Prov. 10. 18. Hee that uttereth a slander is a foole. Prov. 14. 21. Hee that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth. 15. 1. Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. 22. 10. Cast out the scorner, and contention shall goe out, and reproach shall cease.

XI. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of humility, is established by these places. Mat. 5. 3. Blessed are the Poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of heaven. Prov. 6. 16, 19. These six things doth the Lord hate, yea seven are an abomination unto him: A proud look, &c. Prov. 16. 5. Every one that is proud is an abomination unto the Lord, though hand joyne in hand, he shall not be unpunished. 11. 2. When pride cometh, then cometh shame, but with the lowly, is wisdome. Thus Isay 40. 3. (where the comming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation towards his Kingdome) The voyce of him that cryed in the wildernesse, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make strait in the desart a high way for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain, and hill, shall be made low; which doubtlesse is spoken to men, and not to mountains.

XII. But that same Equity which we proved in the ninth place to be a Law of Nature, which commands every man to allow the same Rights to others they would be allowed themselves, and which containes in it all the other Lawes besides, is the same which Moses sets down, Levit. 19. 18. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self; and our Saviour calls it the summe of the morall Law, Mat. 22. 36. Master, which is the great Commandement in the Law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great Commandement, and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these two Commandements hang all the Law and the Prophets. But to love our neighbor as our selves, is nothing else, but to grant him all we desire to have granted to our selves.

XIII. By the tenth Law respect of Persons is forbid; as also by these places following, Mat. 5. 45. That ye may be children of your Father which is in Heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the Evill, and on the Good, &c. Collos. 3. 11. There is neither Greek, nor Jew, circumcision, nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, or Scythian, bond, or free, but Christ is all, & in all. Acts 10. 34. of a truth, I perceive, that God is no respecter of Persons. 2 Chron. 19. 7. There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of Persons, nor taking of gifts. Ecclus. 35. 12. The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of Persons. Rom. 2. 11. For there is no respect of Persons with God.

XIV. The eleventh Law, which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any expresse place in Scripture for it, or not; but the practise appears every where in the common use of Wels, Wayes, Rivers, sacred things, &c. for else men could not live.

XV. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a Law of Nature, That where things could neither be divided, nor possess'd in common, they should be

dispos'd by lot, which is confirmed as by the example of Moses, who by Gods command, Numb. 34. divided the severall parts of the land of promise unto the Tribes by Lot: So Acts I. 24. by the example of the Apostles, who receiv'd Matthias, before Justus, into their number, by casting LotS, and saying, Thou Lord, who knowest the hearts of all men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. 16. 33. The lot is cast into the lappe, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And which is the thirteenth Law, the Succession was due unto Esau, as being the First-born of Isaac, if himself had not sold it, (Gen. 25. 30.) or that the Father had not otherwise appointed.

XVI. Saint Paul writing to the Corinthians, Epist. 1. Cha. reprehends the Corinthians of that City for going to Law one with another before infidell Judges who were their enemies, calling it a fault, that they would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is against that Law, whereby we are commanded to be helpful to each other. But if it happen the Controversie be concerning things necessary, what is to be done? Therefore the Apostle, Ver. 5. speaks thus, I speak to your shame. Is it so that there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? He therefore, by those words confirmes that Law of Nature which we call'd the fifteenth, to wit, Where Controversies cannot be avoided, there by the consent of Parties to appoint some Arbiter, and him some third man; so as (which is the 16 Law) neither of the Parties may be judge in his own Cause.

XVII. But that the Judge, or Arbiter, must receive no reward for his Sentence, (which is the 17. Law) appears, Exod. 23. 8. Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous. Ecclus. 20. 29. Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Whence it followes, that he must not be more oblig'd to one part then the other, which is the 19. Law, and is also confirm'd, Deut. 1. 17. Ye shall not respect

Persons in Judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as the great; and in all those places which are brought against respect of Persons.

XVIII. That in the judgement of Fact, witnesses must be had, (which is the 18. Law) the Scripture not only confirmes, but requires more then one, Deut. 17. 6. At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeated, Deut. 19. 15.

XIX. Drunkennesse, which we have therefore in the last place numbred among the breaches of the Naturall Law, because it hinders the use of right Reason, is also forbid in sacred Scripture for the same reason. Prov. 20. 1. Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise. And Cha. 4, 5. It is not for Kings to drink wine, lest they drink, and forget the Law, and pervert the judgement of any of the afflicted: but that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroyes Judgement and Reason, it followes in the next Verse, Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let him drink, and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenesse, Luk. 21. 34. Take heed to your selves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharg'd with surfetting and drunkennesse.

XX. That we said in the foregoing Chapter, The Law of Nature is eternall, is also prov'd out of the fifth of S. Matth. 18. Verily I say unto you, till Heaven and Earth Passe, one jot, or one tittle, shall in no wise Passe from the Law, and Psal. 119. v. 160. Every one of thy righteous judgements endureth for ever.

XXI. We also said, That the Lawes of Nature had regard chiefly unto Conscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfill them. And although a man should order all his actions (so much as belongs to externall obedience) just as the Law commands, but not for the Lawes sake, but by reason of some punishment annext unto it, or out of

Vain glory, yet he is unjust. Both these are proved by the Holy Scriptures. The first, Esay 55. 7. Let the wicked forsake his way, and unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he wil have mercy upon him, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon. Ezek. 18. 31. Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you have transgressed, & make you a new heart, and a new spirit; for why will you die O house of Israel? By which, and the like places, we may sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds whose heart is right. The second out of the 29. of Isay 13. The Lord said, Forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips doe honour me, but have removed their heart far from me, therefore I will proceed, &c. Mat. 5. 20. Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteousnesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; and in the following verses our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God are broken, not by Deeds only, but also by the Will; for the Scribes and Pharises did in outward act observe the Law most exactly, but for Glories sake onely; else they would as readily have broken it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts the Will for the Deed, and that as well in good, as in evill actions.

XXII. That the Law of Nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares in the 11. Chapter of Saint Matthew 28, 29, 30. Come unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, &c. for my yoke is easie, and my burthen light.

XXIII. Lastly, the Rule by which I said any man might know whether what he was doing, were contrary to the Law, or not, to wit, what thou wouldst not be done to, doe not that to another, is almost in the self same words delivered by our Saviour, Mat. 7. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them.

XXIV. As the law of nature is all of it Divine, so the Law of Christ by conversion, (which is wholly explain'd in the 5, 6, and 7. Chapter of S. Matthewes Gospell) is all of it also (except that one Commandement of not marrying her who is put away for adultery, which Christ brought for explication of the divine positive Law, against the Jewes, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaicall Law) the doctrine of Nature: I say the whole Law of Christ is explain'd in the fore-named Chapters, not the whole Doctrine of Christ; for Faith is a part of Christian Doctrine, which is not comprehended under the title of a Law; for Lawes are made, and given, in reference to such actions as follow our will, not in order to our Opinions, and, Belief which being out of our power, follow not the Will.

Chapter V: Of the causes, and first begining of civill Government

I. It is of it selfe manifest, that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope, and feare, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good, or lesse evill, likely to happen to them by the breach, then observation of the Lawes, they'l wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security, and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly, or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the naturall lawes, though well understood, doe not instantly secure any man in their practise, and consequently, that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to every man that same primitive Right of selfe-defence, by such means as either he can or will make use of (that is) a Right to all things, or the Right of warre; and it is sufficient for the fulfiling of the naturall law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace Peace when it may be had.

II. It is an old saying, That all lawes are silent in the time of warre, and it is a true one, not onely if we speak of the civill, but also of the naturall lawes, provided they be referr'd not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by the third Chapter, Art. 29. And we mean such a war as is of all men against all men; such as is the meer state of nature; although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain oeconomy, which they called leotrikon, living by Rapine, which was neither against the law of nature, (things then so standing) nor voyd of glory to

those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custome was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from Oxen fit for plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry, which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were bound to doe thus by the law of nature, but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty, they might be suspected guilty of feare.

III. Since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is necessary for the preservation of Peace, and that for the exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary, it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security: for this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that each man provide himselfe of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain, then to meddle. But first it is plain, that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and hartens the enemy to attacque us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.

IV. Farthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on selfe-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compasse this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that divided in their opinions they will be an hinderance to each other, or if they agree well enough to some one action through hope of victory, spoyle, or revenge, yet afterward through diversity of wits, and Counsels, or emulation, and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torne and rent, as they will neither give mutuall help, nor desire peace, except they be constrained

to it by some common feare. Whence it followes, that the consent of many, (which consists in this onely, as we have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end, and the common good) that is to say, that the society proceeding from mutuall help onely, yeelds not that security which they seek for, who meet, and agree in the exercise of the above-named lawes of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who have once consented for the common good, to peace and mutuall help, may by fear be restrained, lest afterward they again dissent, when their private Interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.

V. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls Politique, not man only, but divers others; as the Ant, the Bee, &c. which though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract, and submit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, (that is to say) ensuing, or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civill government, and therefore those animals not to be termed politicall, because their government is onely a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civill government) one will. It is very true that in those creatures, living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of any thing more to secure it, and (by consequence) to preserve peace among them, then barely their naturall inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For first among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among men, among beasts no such matter. Next, the naturall appetite of Bees, and the like creatures, is conformable, and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private; but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the

enjoyment, more then that which others doe possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which are voyd of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser then others, endeavour to innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes, which is a meer distraction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evill as worse then in truth it is; But the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition; and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece it selfe. Fiftly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But those men are of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure to be idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they have gotten the victory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutall creatures is naturall, that of men by compact onely, (that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent, or contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security which is requisite to the exercise of naturall justice.

VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern Peace and selfe-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot.be done, unlesse every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either Man or Counsell, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the

common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in generall, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men who deliberate of what is to be done, or not to be done, for the common good of all men, is that which I call a COUNSELL.

VII. This submission of the wils of all those men to the will of one man, or one Counsell, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth, and strength, against any others whatsoever (for he is supposed still to retain a Right of defending himselfe against violence) and this is called UNION. But we understand that to be the will of the counsell, which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the Counsell consists.

VIII. But though the will it self be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions (for we will not to will, but to act) and therefore falls least of all under deliberation, and compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of an other, conveighs to that other the Right of his strength, and faculties; insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted hath so much power, as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity, and concord.

IX. Now union thus made is called a City, or civill society, and also a civill Person; for when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one Person, and by the word (one) it is to be knowne, and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own Rights and properties; insomuch as neither any one Citizen, nor all of them together (if we except him whose will stands for the will of all) is to be accounted the City. A CITY therefore (that we may define it) is one Person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the

power and faculties of each particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.

X. But although every City be a civill Person, yet every civill Person is not a City; for it may happen that many Citizens, by the permission of the City, may joyne together in one Person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civill Persons, as the companies of Merchants, and many other Convents; but Cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply, and in all things, but in certain things onely determined by the City; and on such termes as it is lawfull for any one of them to contend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality; which is by no means allowable to a Citizen against the City; such like societies therefore are civill Persons subordinate to the City.

XI. In every city, That Man, or Counsell, to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will (so as hath been declared) is said to have the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEFE COMMAND, or DOMINION; which Power, and Right of commanding, consists in this, that each Citizen hath conveighed all his strength and power to that man, or Counsell; which to have done (because no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner) is nothing else then to have parted with his Right of resisting. Each Citizen, as also every subordinate civill Person, is called the SUBJECT of him who hath the chiefe command.

XII. By what hath been sayed, it is sufficiently shewed, in what manner, and by what degrees many naturall Persons, through desire of preserving themselves, and by mutuall feare, have growne together into a civill Person, whom we have called a City. But they who submit themselves to another for feare, either submit to him whom they feare, or some other whom they confide in for protection; They act according to the first manner who are vanquished in warre, that they may not be slain; they according to the

second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from naturall Power, and may be called the naturall beginning of a City; the latter from the Counsell, and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is, that there are two kinds of Cities, the one naturall, such as is the paternall, and despoticall; the other institutive, which may be also called politicall. In the first the Lord acquires to himselfe such Citizens as he will; in the other the Citizens by their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves, whether he be one man, or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe. But we will speak in the first place of a City politicall or by institution, and next of a City naturall.

Chapter VI: Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath the supreme power in the City

I. WE MUST consider first of all what a multitude* of men (gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society) is, namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his owne will, and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd. And though by particular Contracts each single man may have his own Right, and Propriety, so as one may say This is mine, the other, That is his; yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a Person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more then anothers. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as it's one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be an Action, but as many actions, as Men. For although in some great Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City have taken up Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in Armes, or who consent to them. For the City, which is one Person, cannot take up Armes against it selfe. Whatsoever therefore is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judg'd to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that manner as hath been said, there remaines that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men and there is no place for Meum & Tuum, which is call'd Dominion, and Propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of the Naturall Laws.

[Multitude, &c.] The Doctrine of the Power of a City over it's Citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled: For such is the nature of a City, That a multitude, or company of Citizens, not onely may have command, but may also be subject to command, but in diverse senses; which difference I did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this first Article,, but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise; wherefore it seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to adde these few things. By Multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more then one, so as a multitude of men is the same with many men; The same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing, namely, one multitude; but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to either a severall; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it: therefore a Multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire Right, conveigh Right, act, have, Possesse, and the like, unlesse it be every one apart, and Man by Man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as Men. therefore a Multitude is no naturall Person; but if the same Multitude doe Contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all, then it becomes one Person; for it is endu'd with a will, and therefore can doe voluntary actions, such as are Commanding, making Lawes, acquiring and transferring of Right, and so forth; and it is oftner call'd the People, then the Multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. then we say the People, or Multitude, wills, commands, or doth any thing, it is understood that the City which Commands, tills and Acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which cannot be done, but in an Assembly; But as oft as any thing is said to be done by a Multitude of Men, whether great, or small, without the will of that man, or assembly of men,

that's understood to be done by a subjected People, that is, by many single Citizens together, and not proceeding from one till, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are Citizens, and Subjects, but not a City.

II. Next, we must consider that every one of the Multitude (by whose meanes there may be a beginning to make up the City) must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the Assembly, that be received for the will of all which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a Multitude of Men, whose Wills and Votes differ so variously. Now if any one will not consent, the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves constitute the City without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the City retaines its primitive Right against the Dissentour, that is, the Right of tar, as against an Enemy.

III. But because we said in the foregoing Chapter, the sixth Article, That there was requir'd to the security of men, not onely their Consent, but also the Subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to Peace and Defence; and that in that Union, and Subjection, the nature of a City consisted; We must discerne now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discuss'd, and stated in an Assembly of men, (all whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part) what things are necessary to Peace, and common defence: But first of all, it is necessary to Peace, that a man be so farre forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely, that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore comes not within deliberation. But care may be had there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security.

IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it: for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill.

V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or their near friends are to suffer.

VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men, and, by consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or Counsell, that Man or Counsell is necessarily understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City. For he that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells all men to all things which he himselfe wills; then which a greater command cannot be imagined.

VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are not united; and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one man, who hath the Right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many Citizens in all dangers, and on all occasions, as shall be

needfull for common defence against the certain number, and strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it expedient) to make peace with them. We must understand therefore, that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this right (which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to the same Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War, as that of Justice, even by the constitution it selfe of a City, and essentially, doe belong to the chiefe command.

VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party: for if the Power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgement, who could not execute his commands; or if he executed them by the power of another, he himselfe is not said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he is onely an Officer. All judgement therefore in a City belongs to him who hath the swords, (i.e.) to him, who hath the supreme authority.

IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more conduceth to Peace to prevent brawles from arising, then to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum & Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evill, honest and dishonest, and the like, which every man esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evill, that is

summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or the Lawes of the City, as being the Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future actions of his Citizens.

X. Furthermore, since the affaires of the City, both those of Warre, and Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man, or one Counsell, without Officers and subordinate Magistrates, and that it appertains to Peace, and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring counsels, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the City, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason, that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in War, and in Peace.

XI. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will, and that the will of doing, or omitting ought, depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the reward, or punishment, which a man conceives he shall receive by the act, or omission; so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each; wherefore by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of Peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to Citizens, by which they may imagine, that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City, that is, the commands of that man, or Counsell, to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawfull for to resist him, or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies, then him that yeelds obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of naturall death, another forbids it under pain of eternall death, and both by their own Right, it will follow that the Citizens, although innocent, are not onely by Right punishable, but that the City it selfe is altogether

dissolved; for no man can serve two Masters: nor is he lesse, but rather more, a Master, whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation, then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death. It followes therefore, that this one, whether Man, or Court, to whom the City hath committed the supreme Power, have also this Right, That he both judge what opinions* and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.

[Judge what opinions, & c.] There is scarce any Principle, neither in the worship of God, nor humane sciences, from whence there may not spring dissentions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war it selfe; neither doth this happen by reason of the falshood of the Principle, but of the disposition of men, who seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others: But though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme Power, that they Prove no hinderance to the publique peace. of these kind of opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place. There are certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted, they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the City, and that by Right they may, nay ought, to oppose, and fight against chiefe Princes, and dignities. Such are those, which whether directly, and openly, or more obscurely, and by consequence require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny not, but this reflects on that Power which many living under other government, ascribe to the chiefe head of the Church of Rome, and also on that, which elsewhere out of that Church, Bishops require in theirs, to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to themselves; for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourisht by this Root? The judgement therefore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not, and if they

be repugnant, the Power of prohibiting them to be taught, I doe here attribute to the civill authority; for since there is no man who grants not to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its Peace, and defence, and it is manifest, that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its Peace, it followes necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they be such, or not, must be referred to the City, that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.

XII. Last of all, from this consideration, that each Citizen hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in the City, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it followes manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punisht; for as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally; so neither can he punish him by Right, who by Right hath not sufficient power.

XIII. It is most manifest by what hath been said, That in every perfect City (that is, where no Citizen hath Right to use his faculties, at his owne discretion, for the preservation of himselfe, or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded) there is a Supreme Power in some one, greater then which cannot by Right be conferr'd by men, or greater then which no mortall man can have over himself. But that power, greater then which cannot by men, be conveigh'd on a man, we call ABSOLUTE*: for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City, That he can, unpunisht, doe any thing, make Lawes, judge Controversies, set Penalties, make use, at his own pleasure, of the strength, and wealth of men, and all this by Right, truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Cities which are, or ever have beene; for though it be sometimes in doubt, what Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet ever there is such a Command, and alwayes exercis'd, except in the time of Sedition, and Civill War, and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out of one: Now those seditious

persons who dispute against absolute Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to conveigh it on others; for removing this power, they together take away Civill Society, and a confusion of all things returnes. There is so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief Ruler, as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City, that is to say, so much as that Right of his may not be granted in vaine. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons it may sometimes, by Right, be deny'd, yet because a greater cannot be perform'd, we will call it SIMPLE. But the obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City, but mediately from hence, That, without obedience, the Cities Right would be frustrate, and by consequence there would be no City constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I give you Right to Command what you will; another, if I say, I will doe whatsoever you Command; and the Command may be such, as I would rather die then doe it; forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd, much lesse is he tyed to that, which to him is worse then death: if therefore I be commanded to kill my self, I am not bound to doe it; for though I deny to doe it, yet the Right of dominion is not frustrated, since others may be found, who being commanded, will not refuse to doe it; neither doe I refuse to doe that which I have contracted to doe. In like manner, if the Chief Ruler command any man to kill him, he is not tyed to doe it, because it cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant; nor if he command to execute a Parent, whether he be innocent, or guilty, and condemned by the Law, since there are others, who, being commanded, will doe that, and a Son will rather die, then live infamous, and hated of all the world. There are many other cases, in which, since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some, and not by others, Obedience may, by Right, be perform'd by these, and refus'd by those; and this, without breach of that absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler.

For in no case is the Right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by Right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that Right otherwise then right Reason requires, they sin against the Lawes of Nature, (that is) against God.

[Absolute] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the Citizens oppose it not, for in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a City; and even the unskilfull understand, that matters there are rul'd by Counsell. Yet monarchy is no lesse a City, then Democraty, and absolute Kings have their Counsellours, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their Power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided, but not recall'd. But it appears not to most men how a City is contain'd in the person of a King; and therefore they object against Absolute Command: First, that if any man had such a Right, the condition of the Citizens would be miserable: For thus they think, he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not already spoil'd and kill'd. But why should he doe thus? not because he can; for unlesse he have a mind to it, he will not doe it. till he, to please one, or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by Right, that is, without injury to them, he may doe it, yet can he not doe it justly, that is, without breach of the Naturall Lawes, and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which princes take. Next, if he could justly doe it, or that he made no account of his Oath, yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it, since he findes no good in it. But it cannot be deny'd but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly; but grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? for he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppresse all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that humane

affaires cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience it self is in the Citizens, not in the Government; for if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, that's to say, could they live according to the Lawes of Nature, there would be no need at all of a City, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not true, for all Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although they, who have the chief Command, doe not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and carelesse of what tends to the publique, cannot sometimes be drawn to performe their duties without the hazard of the City. therefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.

XIV. Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe; for he is already suppos'd to have what he can give himself; nor can he be oblig'd to himselfe, for the same party being both the obliged, and the Obliger, and the Obliger having power to release the obliged, it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe, because he can release himself at his own pleasure; and he that can doe this, is already actually free. Whence its plaine, that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes; for the Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City, by which, if she were engag'd, she should be engag'd to her selfe. Neither can the City be oblig'd to her Citizen, because, if he will, he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills, (for the will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the City); the City therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free; but the will of a Councell, or one who hath the Supreme Authority given him, is the will of the City; he therefore containes the wills

of all particular Citizens: Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes (for this is to be bound to himself) nor to any of his Citizens.

XV. Now because (as hath been shewn above) before the constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men, nor is there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same Right, claime as his own, (for where all things are common, there can be nothing proper to any man) it followes, that propriety receiv'd its beginning* when Cities receiv'd theirs, and that that onely is proper to each man which he can keep by the Lawes, and the power of the whole City, (that is) of him on whom its chief command is conferr'd. Whence we understand, that each particular Citizen hath a propriety, to which none of his fellow-Citizens hath Right, because they are tyed to the same Lawes; but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler (whose Commands are the Lawes, whose will contains the will of each man, and who, by every single person, is constituted the Supreme Judge) hath not a Right. But although there be many things which the City permits to its Citizens, and therefore they may sometimes goe to Law against their Chief; yet is not that action belonging to Civill Right, but to Naturall Equity; neither is it concerning what by Right he may doe* * who hath the Supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be done, and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.

- [Propriety receiv'd its beginning, &c.] What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in Fathers of Families, that objection is vaine, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse

Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things.

- [What by Right he may doe, &c.] As often as a Citizen is granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme, i.e. against the City, the question is not in that action, whether the City may, by Right, keep possession of the thing in controversie, but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it; for the Law is the declared will of the Supreme: since then the City may raise money from the Citizens under two Titles, either as Tribute, or as Debt, in the former case there is no action of Law allowed; for there can be no question whether the City have Right to require Tribute: in the latter it is allowed, because the City will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud, or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly; and therefore he that condemnes this place, saying, That by this doctrine it is easie for princes to free themselves from their Debts, he does it impertinently.

XVI. Theft, further, AduLtery, and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature; but what is to be called Theft, what further, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not to be determined by the naturall, but by the civill Law: for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but onely another mans goods is theft; but what is ours, and what anothers, is a question belonging to the civill Law. In like manner, not every killing of a man is further, but onely that which the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women Adultery, but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise it selfe is lawfull, but where there is no Right to make any compact, there can be no conveighance of it, and therefore there can no injury follow, as hath

been said in the second Chapter, Artic. 17. Now what we may contract for, and what not, depends wholly upon the civill Lawes. The City of Lacedoemon therefore rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should goe unpunisht; for it was nothing else, but to make a Law that what was so acquired should be their own, and not anothers. Rightly also is that man every where slain, whom we kill in warre, or by the necessity of selfe-defence. So also that copulation which in one City is Matrimony, in another will be judged Adultery. Also those contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen, doe not so in another, although of the same City. because that he who is forbidden by the City (that is by that one man, or Councell, whose the supreme power is) to contract ought, hath no Right to make any contract, and therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence, no Marriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was Matrimony: neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts, that they were made by an Oath, or Sacrament*, for those adde nothing to the strengthning of the contract, as hath been said above Cha. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft, what Murther, what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must be known by the civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the supreme authority.

- [That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament, &c.] Whether Matrimony bee a Sacrament (in which sense that word is used by some Divines) or not, it is not my purpose to dispute: Onely I say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together, i.e. granted by the civill Law, whether it be a Sacrament, or not, is surely a legitimate Marriage; but that copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage, since it is of t he essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract. There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the

> Jewes, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who permit no such contracts, but by a Law that they shall never be broke, Wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because Matrimony is a Sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple, to blesse, or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of Clergy-men; all the rest, namely who, when, and by what contracts Marriages may be made, pertains to the Lawes of the City.

XVII. This same supreme command, and absolute power, seems so harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what humane nature, and the civill Lawes are, and partly also through their default, who when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority, some of them will have a City well enough constituted, if they who shall be the Citizens convening, doe agree concerning certaine Articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved; and doe command them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them: to which purpose, and also to the repelling of a forraign enemy, they appoint a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a City thus constituted, that the Assembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or from time to time have a certain day, and place of meeting, that power will be perpetuall. But if they wholly dissolve, either the City dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of War, or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those

who shall transgresse the Lawes, whosoever, or how many soever they be that have it, which cannot possibly be without an absolute power: for he that by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what Citizens he pleaseth, hath such a power, as a greater cannot possibly be given by any Citizens.

XVIII. It is therefore manifest, that in every City there is some one man, or Councell, or Court, who by Right hath as great a power over each single Citizen, as each man hath over himselfe considered out of that civill state, that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited onely by the strength and forces of the City it selfe, and by nothing else in the world: for if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power; For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater power then he who is confin'd by them; now that confining power is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other greater then it selfe, and so we shall at length arrive to a power which hath no other limit, but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the Citizens together. That same is called the supreme command, and if it bee committed to a councell, a supreme councell, but if to one man, the supreme Lord of the City. Now the notes of supreme command are these, To make and abrogate Lawes. To determine War and peace, to know, and judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or by Judges appointed by him; to elect all Magistrates; Ministers, and Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe some one action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens to doe beside himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power: For those things which by Right may not be done by any one or many Citizens, the City it selfe can onely doe: He therefore that doth those things useth the Cities Right, which is the supreme power.

XIX. They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City, is

in relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man; But it appeares by what hath been already said, that he who is endued with such a power, (whether it be a man, or a Court) hath a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soule to the body. For it is the soule by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the City hath a will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is rather to be compared with the head, or one Counsellor, whose only Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsell, as the soules is to command.

XX. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by vertue of the compacts which each single Citizen, or subject, mutually makes with the other. but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again, and are broken; perhaps some may inferre hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together, the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference if it were true, I cannot discerne what danger would thence by Right arise to the supreme Commanders. For since it is supposed, that each one hath obliged himselfe to each other, if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to doe, he is bound notwithstanding; neither can any man without injury to me, doe that which by contract made with me, he hath obliged himselfe not to doe. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme power; wherefore there is no feare for Rulers in chiefe, that by any Right they can be despoyled of their authority. If notwithstanding it were granted, that their Right depended onely on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen, that they might be robbed of that Dominion under pretence of Right; for subjects being called either by the command of the City, or seditiously flocking together,

most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part. Which in truth is false; for it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults, but it proceeds from civill institution, and is then onely true, when that Man or Court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatnesse of their number, allowes those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them, and will have the major part of voyces, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust, to be as effectuall as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chiefe, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his Right, unlesse, weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain termes, that he renounces and abandons his government. Now because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of Citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole City, it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great Assembly of Citizens by the votes of the greater number; But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars, yet its Right depends not on that obligation onely; there is another tye also toward him who commands; for each Citizen compacting with his fellow, sayes thus, I conveigh my Right on this party, upon condition, that you passe yours to the same; by which means, that Right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man, or Councell, for the common benefit; wherefore what by the mutuall contracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of Right which every man is bound to ratifie to him that commands, the government is upheld by a double obligation from the Citizens, first that which is due to their fellow citizens, next that which they owe to their prince. Wherefore no

subjects how many soever they be, can with any Right despoyle him who bears the chiefe Rule, of his authority, even without his own consent.

Chapter VII: Of the three kindes of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchie

I. WE HAVE already spoken of a City by institution in its Genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of Cities, it is taken from the difference of the Persons, to whom the Supreme Power is committed; this Power is committed either to one Man, or Councell, or some one Court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a Councell of many men, consists either of all the Citizens, (insomuch as every man of them hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from whence there arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the Power is in a Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote, and it is call'd a DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a Councell, where not all, but some part onely have their suffrages, and we call it an ARISTOCRATY. The third is that, when the Supreme Authority rests onely in one, and it is stiled a MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called demos, The PEOPLE. In the second, the NOBLES. In the third, the MONARCH.

II. Now, although Ancient Writers of Politiques have introduc'd three other kindes of Government opposite to these, to wit, Anarchy or confusion to Democraty, Oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to Aristocraty, and Tyranny to Monarchy, yet are not these three distinct formes of Government, but three diverse Titles given by those who were either displeas'd with that present Government, or those that bare Rule. For men, by giving names, doe usually, not onely signifie the things themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like, whence it

happens that what one man calls a Democraty, another calls an Anarchy; what one counts an Aristocraty, another esteemes an Oligarchie. and whom one titles a King, another stiles him a Tyrant; so as we see these names betoken not a diverse kinde of Government, but the diverse opinions of the Subjects concerning him who hath the Supreme Power. For first, who sees not that Anarchy is equally opposite to all the forenam'd Formes? For that word signifies that there is no Government at all, that is, not any City. But how is it possible that no City should be the species of a City? Farthermore, what difference is there between an Oligarchie, which signifies the Command of a few, or Grandees, or an Aristocraty, which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads, more then that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seeme not good to all men? Whence it happens, that those persons, who by some are look'd on as the best, are by others esteem'd to be the worst of all men.

III. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be perswaded that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes of Cities, who though they would rather have the City subject to one, then many, yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd unlesse it accord with their judgements: But we must discover by Reason, and not by Passion, what the difference is between a King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not in this, That a Tyrant hath the greater Power, for greater then the Supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power, the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King, but his Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government some one Citizen should, by force, possesse himself of the Supreme Power, if he gain the consent of all the Citizens, he becomes a legitimate Monarch; if not, he is an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a King, who governs wel, and he a Tyrant that doth otherwise.

The case therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimately constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to Rule well, and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a King, if not, they count him a Tyrant. Wherefore we see a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse Formes of Government, but one and the self-same Monarch hath the name of a King given him in point of Honour, and Reverence to him, and of a Tyrant in way of contumely, and reproach. But what we frequently finde in bookes said against Tyrants, took its originall from Greek, and Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democraticall, and partly Aristocraticall, and therefore not Tyrants onely, but even Kings were odious to them.

IV. There are, who indeed doe think it necessary, That a Supreme Command should be somewhere extant in a, City. but if it should be in any one, either Man, or Councell, it would follow (they say) that all the Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certaine Form of Government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular, which they call a mixt Monarchie, or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest: For example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbitration of War, and Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the Lords, and contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of making Lawes too altogether, this kind of State would they call a mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a State, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of the private Sword, which certainly is much worse then any subjection whatsoever: But that there can be no such kind of Government

hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

But that there can be no such kinde of Government] Most men grant, That a Government ought not to be divided, but they would have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating, and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely Kings, but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the limits of the naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by others; which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the limits, must needs have some part of the Power, whereby they may be enabled to doe it, the Government is properly divided, not moderated.

V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form of Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of meeting a Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be determin'd by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and places, is a clear Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the Convent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they shall meet again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The People therefore retains the supreme power no longer then there is a

certain day and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever will, may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attributes any Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie, whereof one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents) makes demos, the People, the other (which is a plurality of voyces) to kratos or the power.

VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times, and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse distance, then that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power) the City may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the intervall, granted to some one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve the name of a City, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.

VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that the Persons contracting, must be in being before the contract it selfe. But the People is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any Person, but a multitude of single Persons; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain, because the People contains within its will, the will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe, and by

consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the City have been constituted, if the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit what the City should command to be done or omitted. Because therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the Subject and the People; it followes, that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also doe the like, as if every one should say thus, I give up my Right unto the People for your sake, on condition, that you also deliver up yours, for mine.

VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with supreme authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty, which gives up its Right unto it; where we must understand that certain men distinguisht from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other Character, are propounded to the People, and by plurality of voyces are elected; and being elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is conveighed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one Person, (its supreme authority being already transferred on these) is no longer now in being.

IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the Court of Nobles is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing subjects not contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts among themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence also they were tyed to that act of the People in resigning up its Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this Court, although elected by the People, be by it obliged to any thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved, as was declared

above, and the authority it had as being a Person utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.

X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, together with Democraty; First, that without an appointment of some certain times, and places, at which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is no longer a Court, or one Person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power; Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls, without prejudice to the supreme power, unlesse its administration be transferred to some one man: Now the reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth Article.

XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a monarchy is derived from the Power of the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its Authoritie on one man: Here also we must understand, that some one man, either by name, or some other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest, and that by a plurality of voyces the whole Right of the People is conveighed on him, insomuch as whatsoever the People could doe before he were elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person, but a rude multitude, as being only one before by vertue of the supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this one Man.

XII. And therefore neither doth the Monarch oblige himselfe to any for the command he receives, for he receives it from the People; but as hath been shewed above, the People, as soon as that act is done, ceaseth to be a Person; but the Person vanishing, all obligation to the Person vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the Monarch, by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the People should command them, (that is) to obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.

XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well from an Aristocraty, as a Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation, and consultation of affaires, that is, for the actuall exercise of it in all times, and places; For the People, or the Nobles not being one naturall Person must necessarily have their meetings. The Monarch who is one by nature, is alwayes in a present capacity to execute his authority.

XIV. Because we have declared above in the 7. 9. and 12. Articles, that they who have gotten the supreme command are by no compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily followes, that they can doe no injury to the subjects; for injury according to the definition made in the third Article of the third Chapter, is nothing else but a breach of contract: and therefore where no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the People, the Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict, and exact notion of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious as well to his fellow subjects, because each man hath compacted with the other to obey, as to his chief Ruler, in resuming that Right, which he hath given him, without his consent. And in a Democraty, or Aristocraty, if any thing be decreed against any Law of nature, the City it selfe (i.e.) the civill Person sinnes not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for sinne is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not of the politicall, which is artificiall; for if it were otherwise, they would be guilty, by whom the decree was absolutely disliked: But in a Monarchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes of nature, he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and the naturall are all one.

XV. The people who are about to make a Monarch, may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a certaine season;

and time determined; if simply, we must understand that he who receives it, hath the selfe-same power which they had, who gave it, on the same grounds: therefore that the People by Right could make him a Monarch, may he make another Monarch: insomuch as the Monarch to whom the command is simply given, receives a Right not of possession onely, but of succession also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his successor.

XVI. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have regard to somewhat more then the bare gift onely: First, whether the People conveighing its authority, left it selfe any Right to meet at certain times, and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether it were done, so as they might meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet onely at the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise. Suppose now the People had delivered up its Power to some one man for term of life onely; which being done, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed from the Counsell without making any order at all concerning the place where (after his death) they should meet again to make a new election. In this case it is manifest by the fifth Article of this Chapter, that the People ceaseth to be a Person, and is become a dissolute multitude, every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a naturall Right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse the supreme power to himselfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever therefore hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the Law of nature (set down in the Article of the third Chapter of not returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his death the City suffer not a dissolution, either by appointing a certain day, & place, in which those subjects of his who have a mind to it may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor: whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore who on this foresaid

manner hath received his command during life, hath an absolute Power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the people departed not from the election of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by vertue of the former Right; for all the supreme command (as Dominion) was in the People, but the use, and exercise of it was only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the Right. But if the People after the election of a temporarie Monarch, depart not from the Court before they have appointed certain times, and places to convene, during the time prescribed him (as the Dictators in ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one is not to be accounted a Monarch, but the Prime Officer of the People; and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his office even before that time, as the People of Rome did, when they conferred an equall power on Minutius Master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made Dictator. The reason whereof is, hat it is not to be imagined, that, whether Man or Counsell who hath the readiest, and most immediate power to act, should hold his command on such termes as not to be able actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it possible. Lastly, if the People having declared a temporary Monarch, depart from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for them to meet without the command of the Monarch, we must understand the People to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City anew, unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his Subjects on some certain times, since there remains no Person now in being, but at

his discretion, to whom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom it self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd to those times wherein the Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of commanding ceases, the Power remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir, going to his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the Succession; the People also electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole Dominion of the Country: Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administration of his Kingdome to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch, and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another, himself in the mean while waking, can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth; so the People, who during the time prescribed to the Temporary Monarch, doth by Right convene, may if they please, deprive the Monarch of his Authority. Lastly, the King, who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so the people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd, and the power remaines with him whom they have chosen.

XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath, or without it, is null: for all Compact is a conveyance of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power, and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens, That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it. Whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the Power, the promise must be valued as not made, (i.e.) of no effect.

XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the SuPreme Power. We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these bonds of obedience. And first of all this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority, hath now lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being conquer'd, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a Democraty, and Aristocraty cannot fail) if

there be no successour, all the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it were impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and salvage, (for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is Banisht: In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country, because he is tyed to observe those of the latter.

Chapter VIII: Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant

I. IN THE two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive, or fram'd Government, as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many, who by Contract and Faith mutually given, have oblig'd each other. Now followes, what may be said, concerning a naturall Government, which may also be call'd, Acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power, and naturall force. But we must know in the first place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a Little Kingdome a Family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other: There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract made between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man, or Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d is, If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else distrusting his own forces, (to avoid Death) promises the Conquerour, or the stronger Party, his Service, i.e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him; in which Contract the good which the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the naturall state of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue therefore of this promise,

there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him, is simply, and without any restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tyed, is call'd a SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD. Thirdly, there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by Generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter.

II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life spar'd him, is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord; for every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as to be able, if he desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his service, or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within Prisons, or bound within Irons, and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely, but by the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at this day un serviteur, and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations.

III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord ariseth not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, That he keeps him not bound, or imprison'd, for all obligation derives from Contract; but where's no trust, there can be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall liberty. so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had happen'd, he might not onely have made his escape, but also have kill'd his Lord, who was the preserver of his life.

IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by imprisonment, or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given above, because those serve not for the Contracts sake, but to the end they may not

suffer; and therefore if they flie, or kill their Lord, they offend not against the Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a plain signe, that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by any other obligation.

V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not, then over one that is bound, for he hath a Supreme Power over both, and may say of his Servant no lesse then of another thing, whether animate, or inanimate, This is mine; whence it followes, that whatsoever the Servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can by Right dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord; yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety, and Dominion over his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may keep, and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme Authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow subject.

VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself, and all that belongs to him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases; the Lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant, according to his own will and pleasure.

VII. Farthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive Government, namely, that he who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury; is true also concerning Servants, because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord; wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their wills, but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.

VIII. But if it happen that the Lord, either by captivity or voluntary subjection, doth become a Servant or Subject to another, that other shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of his Servants; Supreme Lord over these, immediate Lord over him. Now because not the Servant only, but also all he hath are his Lords; therefore his Servants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill Governments, the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature, and not constituted, but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.

IX. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a Subject in an institutive government, is freed from his subjection; First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same may the Lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION; which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly, if the Lord cast off his servant from him, which in a City is banishment; neither differs it from Manumission in effect, but in manner onely: for there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: In both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in equity the Lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successour, the Lord dying (suppose) without any Testament, or Heire, for no man is understood to be obliged, unlesse he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporall liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is

not given. But the Lord who himselfe serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme, for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme Lords.

X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same manner, that we doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and naturall strength; for if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one, by reason of that warre which is of all against all, to subdue, and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good, much more will the same be lawfull against Brutes; namely at their own discretion, to reduce those to servitude which by art may be tamed, and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetuall warre, as dangerous and noxious. Our Dominion therefore over beasts, hath its originall from the right of nature, not from divine positive Right: for if such a Right had not been before the publishing of the sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might not destroy them: Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same Right, that a man may slay a beast.

Chapter IX: Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary Government

I. SOCRATES IS a man, and therefore a living creature, is a right reasoning, and that most evident, because there is nothing needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the word Man be understood, because a living creature is in the definition it selfe of a Man, and every one makes up the proposition which was desired, namely this, Man is a living Creature; And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates his Father, and therefore his Lord, is perhaps a true inference, but not evident, because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father: wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident, that the connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent over his children, have brought no other argument then that of generation, as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is begotten by me, is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a triangle, it appeares presently without any farther discourse, that its angles are equall to two Rights. Besides, since Dominion (that is) supreme Power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two Masters, but two Persons male and female, must concurre in the act of generation, its impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation onely. Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place, enquire into the original of paternal Government.

II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature, in which, by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be accounted equall; There by right of nature the Conqueror is Lord of the conquered: by the

Right therefore of nature, the Dominion over the Infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power'd but it's manifest that he who is newly born is in the Mothers power before any others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed him up, or adventure him to fortune.

III. If therefore she breed him (because the state of nature is the state of warre) she is supposed to bring him up on this condition, that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; (which is) that he obey her. For since by naturall necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy; but each man is an enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord. But what some say, that in this case, the Father by reason of the preeminence of sexe, and not the Mother, becomes Lord, signifies nothing. For both reason shewes the contrary, because the inequality of their naturall forces is not so great, that the man could get the Dominion over the woman without warre. And custome also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons, have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of their children at their own wils, and at this day in divers places, women are invested with the principall authority. Neither doe their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they who have the supreme power, are not tyed at all (as hath bin shewed) to the civill lawes. Adde also that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the Father but by the testimony of the Mother; the child therefore is his whose the Mother will have it, and therefore hers; Wherefore originall Dominion over children belongs to the Mother, and among men no lesse then other creatures: The birth followes the belly.

IV. The Dominion passes from the Mother to others, divers wayes; first, if she quit and forsake her Right by exposing the child. He therefore that shall bring up the childe thus exposed, shall have the same Dominion over it, which the Mother had. For that life which the Mother had given it (not by getting, but nourishing it) she now by exposing, takes from it; Wherefore the obligation also which arose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made voyd. Now the preserved, oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a Mother, or of his service, as to a Lord; for although the Mother in the state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may recover her sonne again (namely by the same Right that any body else might doe it) yet may not the Sonne rightly transferre himselfe again unto his Mother.

V. Secondly, if the Mother be taken prisoner, her Sonne is his that took her, because that he who hath Dominion over the Person, hath also Dominion over all belonging to the Person; Wherefore over the Sonne also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter, in the fifth Article. Thirdly, if the Mother be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will also have the Dominion over him that is born of her. for he is Lord also of the Mother, who is bound to obey him, in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition; that he shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the contribution of both Parties, is the Fathers, in regard of the command he hath over the Mother; but if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a Subject, the children are the Mothers: for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her authority. And universally, if the society of the male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himselfe to the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.

VI. But in the state of nature, if a man, and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the Mothers for the reasons above given in the third Article, unlesse by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the Mother may by pact dispose of her Right as she lists, as heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves; but in a civill government, if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the Fathers; because in all Cities, viz. constituted of Fathers, not Mothers governing their families, the domesticall command belongs to the man, and such a contract, if it be made according to the civill Laws, is called MATRIMONY; but if they agree only to lye together, the children are the Fathers, or the Mothers variously, according to the differing civill Lawes of divers Cities.

VII. Now because by the third Article the Mother is originally Lord of her Children, and from her the Father, or some body else by derived Right, it is manifest that the Children are no lesse subject to those by whom they are nourisht, and brought up, then Servants to their Lords, and Subjects to him who beares the Supreme Rule; and that a Parent cannot be injurious to his Sonne as long as he is under his power. A Son also is freed from subjection on the same manner as a subject and servant are. For emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication with banishment.

VIII. The enfranchised son, or released servant, doe now stand in lesse fear of their Lord and Father, being deprived of his naturall and lordly power over them, and (if regard be had to true and inward Honour) doe Honour him lesse, then before. For Honour (as hath been said in the section above) is nothing else but the estimation of anothers power; and therefore he that hath least power, hath alwayes least Honour. But it is not to be

imagin'd that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things, as if he were become wholly his equall; It must therefore be ever understood, That he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a servant, sonne, or some colony, doth promise all those externall signes, at least whereby Superiours used to be Honour'd by their inferiours. From whence it followes, That the precept of honouring our Parents, belongs to the law of nature, not onely under the title of Gratitude, but also of Agreement.

IX. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a sonne, or between a subject, and a servant? Neither doe I know that any Writer hath fully declared what liberty, and what slavery is. Commonly to doe all things according to our own phancies, and that without punishment, is esteem'd to be liberty; not to be able to doe this, is judg'd bondage; which in a Civill Government, and with the peace of mankind cannot possibly be done, because there is no City without a Command, and a restraining Right. LIBERTY, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets, and hinderances of motion, as water shut up in a vessell is therefore not at liberty, because the vessell hinders it from running out, which the vessell being broken, is made free. And every man hath more or lesse liberty, as he hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself: as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, then he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part, and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this, and that side with hedges, or stone walls, lest he spoyle the vines, or corne, neighbouring on the high way. And these kinde of lets are externall, and absolute; in which sense all Servants, and Subjects are free, who are not fetter'd and imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary, which doe not absolutely hinder motion, but by accident; to wit, by our own choyce, as he that is in a ship is not so hindered, but he may cast himselfe

into the Sea, if he will: and here also the more wayes a man may move himselfe, the more liberty he hath, and herein consists civill liberty; for no man, whether subject, sonne, or servant, is so hindred by the punishments appointed by the City, the Father, or the Lord, how cruell soever, but that he may doe all things, and make use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life and health. For my part therefore I cannot finde what reason a meer servant hath to make complaints, if they relate onely to want of liberty, unlesse he count it a misery to be restrained from hurting himselfe, and to receive that life, (which by warre, or misfortune, or through his own idlenesse was forfeited) together with all manner of sustenance, and all things necessary to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he will be rul'd: for he that is kept in by punishments layd before him, so as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all things; is not opprest by servitude, but is governed and sustained. But this priviledge free subjects and sonnes of a family, have above servants, (in every government, and family, where servants are) that they may both undergoe the more honourable offices of the City or family, and also enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous. And herein layes the difference between a free subject, and a servant, that he is FREE, but a SERVANT is he who also indeed, who serves his City onely; serves his fellow subject: all other liberty is an exemption from the Lawes of the City, and proper only to those that bear Rule.

X. A Father, with his sonnes and servants growne into a civill Person by vertue of his paternall jurisdiction, is called a FAMILY. This family, if through multiplying of children, and acquisition of servants, it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the uncertain dye of warre, it cannot be subdued, will be termed an Hereditary Kingdome; which though it differ from an institutive Monarchy, being acquired by force in the original, & manner of its constitution; yet being constituted, it hath al the same

properties, and the Right of authority is every where the same, insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any thing of them apart.

XI. It hath been spoken, by what Right supreme authorities are constituted. Wee must now briefly tell you by what right they may be continued. Now the Right by which they are continued, is that which is called the right of SUCCESSION. Now because in a Democratie, the supreme authority is with the People, as long as there be any subjects in being, so long it rests with the same Person; for the People hath no Successour. In like manner in an Aristocraty, one of the Nobles dying, some other by the rest is substituted in his place; and therefore except they all dye together, which I suppose will never happen, there is no succession. The Querie therefore of the Right of Succession takes place onely in an absolute Monarchy. For they who exercise the supreme power for a time onely, are themselves no Monarchs, but Ministers of state.

XII. But first, if a Monarch shall by Testament appoint one to succeed him, the Person appointed shall succeed; for if he be appointed by the People, he shall have all the Right over the City which the People had, as hath been shewed in the 7. Chap. Art. 11. But the People might choose him; by the same Right therefore may he choose another; But in an hereditary Kingdome there are the same Rights as in an institutive; Wherefore, every Monarch may by his will make a successour.

XIII. But what a man may transferre on another by Testament, that by the same Right may he yet living, give, or sell away; To whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift, or sale, it is rightly made.

XIV. But if living, he have not declared his will concerning his successour by Testament, nor otherwise, it is supposed, First, that he would not have his Government reduced to an Anarchy, or the state of warre, (that is) to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he could not doe that

without breach of the Lawes of nature, whereby he was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing to the preservation of Peace, as also because if that had been his will, it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next, because the Right passeth according to the will of the Father, we must judge of the successour according to the signes of his will. It is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be under a Monarchicall Government rather then any other, because he himselfe in ruling, hath before approved of that state by his example, and hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it.

XV. Furthermore, because by naturall necessity all men wish them better from whom they receive glory, and honour, then others; but every man after death receives honour and glory from his children, sooner then from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a father intends better for his children, then any other persons. It is to be understood therefore, that the will of the father, dying without Testament, was, that some of his children should succeed him; yet this is to be understood with this proviso, that there be no more apparent tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custome may be one, for he that makes no mention of his succession, is supposed to consent to the customes of his Realme.

XVI. Among children the Males carry the preheminence, in the beginning perhaps, because for the most part (although not alwayes) they are fitter for the administration of greater matters, but specially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown a custome, because that custome was not contradicted; and therefore the will of the Father, unlesse some other custome or signe doe clearly repugne it, is to be interpreted in favour of them.

XVII. Now because the Sonnes are equall, and the power cannot be divided, the eldest shall succeed; for if there be any difference by reason of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy, for nature being judge, the most in

years (because usually it is so) is the wisest. But other judge there cannot be had. But if the Brothers must be equally valued, the succession shall be by lot. But primogeniture is a naturall lot, and by this the eldest is already prefer'd; nor is there any that hath power to judge, whether by this, or any other kind of lots the matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which contends thus for the first-born sonne, doth no lesse for the first born daughter.

XVIII. But if he have no children, then the command shall pass to his Brothers & Sisters, for the same reason, that the children should have succeeded if he had had them: for those that are nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest in benevolence; and to his brothers, sooner then his sisters, and to the elder sooner then the yonger; for the reason is the same for these which it was for the children.

XIX. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power, doe they also succeed to the Right of succession: for if the first-born dye before the Father, it will be judged, that he transferred his Right of succession unto his children, unlesse the Father have otherwise decreed it, and therefore the Nephewes will have a fairer pretence to the succession, then the Uncles. I say all these things will be thus, if the custome of the place (which the Father by not contradicting, will be judged to have consented to) doe not hinder them.

Chapter X: A comparison between 3. kinds of government, according to their severall inconveniences

I. WHAT DEMOCRATY, Aristocraty, and monarchy are, hath already been spoken, but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects Peace, and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages, and disadvantages of a City in generall, lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, then to constitute any civill society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civill government hath a most entire, but unfruitfull liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others, suffer al at anothers wil; but in a constituted City, every subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as suffices him to live well, and quietly, & there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a Right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one securely enjoyes his limited Right; Out of it, any man may rightly spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but one. Out of it we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a Dominion of Passions, war, fear, poverty, slovinlinesse, solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty. In it, the Dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.

II. Aristotle in his seventh book, and fourteenth Chapter of his Politiques saith, that there are two sorts of governments, whereof the one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to that of the Subjects; as if where Subjects

are severely dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government; which opinion may by no means be subscribed to, for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the Ruler, and the Subject; The Dammages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the Ruler, but those relate not to the government it selfe, being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institution of the City, they will then be truly called the inconveniencies of government, but they will be common to the Ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common; but the first and greatest benefit, Peace, and defence, is common to both, for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life, makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects; and in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a City, namely the slaughter of subjects, arising from Anarchy, both the Commander, and the Parties commanded, are equally concerned. Next, if the Ruler levie such a summe of vast monies from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves, and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength, and vigour, the disadvantage is as much his, as theirs, who with never so great a stock, or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects; but if he raise no more then is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equall to himselfe and his subjects, tending to a common Peace, and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way publick treasures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted, as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies, and mindes; for even thus the grievance would concern the Ruler; nor would it arise from the ill institution, or ordination of the government,

(because in all manner of governments subjects may be opprest) but from the ill administration of a well established government.

III. Now that Monarchy of the foresaid forms, of Democraty, Aristocraty, and Monarchy, hath the preheminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the Ancients preferr'd the Monarchicall state before all others, ascribing the Rule of the Gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs, and of Nations, the decrees of Princes were held for Laws; that paternall government instituted by God himselfe in the Creation, was Monarchicall. that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men out of the ashes of Monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of Kings, although I say these doe hold forth Monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they doe it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will passe them over.

Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the Ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus pointed at this. They say, that Prometheus having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver. which is, that by humane invention (which is signified by Prometheus) Laws and Justice were by imitation taken from Monarchy, by vertue whereof (as by fire removed from its naturall orbe) the multitude (as the durt and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a civill Person, which is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the Awthours and Abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus smart for it, that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.

IV. Some there are who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many, should so farre excell in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the Dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envie, while they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few commanded, unlesse they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equall Right, surely an Aristocraty must be unreasonable also. But because we have shewed that the state of equality is the state of warre, and that therefore inequality was introduc'd by a generall consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have voluntarily given more to,enjoyes more, is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his Unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.

V. But first, we must remove their opinion who deny that to be any City at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common Lord. In the 9. Artic. of the 5. Chapter, a City is defined to be one Person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all, insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single Person for the publick Peace and safety; and by the same article of the same Chapter, One Person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each servant is contained in the will of his Lord, as hath been declared in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter, so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will, and pleasure; it followes therefore that that must needs be a

city, which is constituted by a Lord, and many servants; neither can any reason be brought to contradict this which doth not equally combat against a City constituted by a Father, and his Sonnes; for to a Lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of sonnes; for they are both his honour, and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their Lords, then children to their Parents, as hath been manifested above in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter.

VI. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the Ruler, beside those monies necessary for publick charges, as the maintaining of publick Ministers, building, and defending of Castles, waging warres, honourable sustaining his own houshold, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sonnes, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confesse this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kindes of government, but are more tolerable in a Monarchy then in a Democraty; for though the Monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a Democraty, look how many Demagoges, (that is) how many powerfull Oratours there are with the people (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing) so many Children, Kinsmen, friends, & Flatterers, are to be rewarded; for every of them desire not onely to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits for the better strengthning of themselves. A Monarch may in great part satisfie his Officers and Friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his Subjects, I mean, without robbing them of any of those Treasures given in for the maintenance of War, and Peace; In a Democraty, where many are to be satisfied, and alwayes new ones, this cannot be done without the Subjects oppression. Though a Monarch may promote unworthy Persons, yet oft times he will not doe it; but in a Democraty all the popular men are therefore suppos'd to doe it, because it is necessary; for else, the

power of them who did it would so encrease, as it would not onely become dreadfull to those others, but even to the whole City also.

VII. Another grievance is, that same perpetuall fear of death which every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with himself that the Ruler hath power. not onely to appoint what punishments he lists on any Transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath, and sensuality, slaughter his innocent Subjects, and those who never offended against the Lawes. And truly this is a very great grievance in any forme of Government wheresoever it happens: (for it is therefore a grievance because it is; not, because it may be done) but it is the fault of the Ruler, not of the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not essentiall to Monarchie; yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd under one Ruler, then under the People: For Kings are onely severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent Counsells, or oppose them with reproachfull words, or controule their Wills; but they are the cause that that excesse of power which one Subject might have above another becomes harmlesse. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer, but such as are known to him, namely Courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent Charge; and not all neither, but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy; for they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly punisht. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that Reignes, he is out of danger: for the ambitious onely suffer, the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular Dominion there may be as many Nero's, as there are Oratours who sooth the People; for each one of them can doe as much as the People, and they mutually give way to each others appetite (as it were by this secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow) while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfie their lust, and private hatred, have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects.

Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realme, and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to have a care that the common-weale do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of Riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerfull party without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was usually practised in Democraties; for the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull, meerly because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime; and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a Kingdome. In this Democraty and Monarchy were eaven; yet differ'd they much in fame, because fame derives from the People, and what is done by many, is commended by many: and therefore what the Monarch does, is said to be done out of envie to their vertues, which if it were done by the People, would be accounted Politie.

VIII. There are some who therefore imagine Monarchy to bee more grievous then Democraty, because there is lesse liberty in that, then in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the Lawes (i.e.) the commands of the People, neither in Democraty, nor in any other state of government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few lawes, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden, there could be no Peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in Democraty then Monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the word liberty, may in large, and ample letters be written over the gates of any City whatsoever, yet is it not meant the Subjects, but the Cities liberty, neither can that word with better Right be inscribed on a City which is governed. by the people, then that which is ruled by a

Monarch. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding, they little consider; for if every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himselfe, as is commanded by the law of nature, that same naturall state would return again, in which all men may by Right doe all things, which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse then all kind of civill subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his single freedome, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the Dominion? for who so is freed from all bonds, is Lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a Popular, then in a Monarchicall State. That which deceives them, is the equall participation of command, and publique places; for where the authority is in the People, single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are parts of the People ruling; and they equally partake in publique Offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing Magistrates, and publique Ministers. And this is that which Aristotle aim'd at, himself also, through the custome of that time, mis-calling Dominion liberty, in his sixth Book, and second Chapter of Politiques. In a popular State there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were free out of this State. From whence, by the way, we may collect, That those Subjects, who in a Monarchy deplore their lost liberty, doe onely stomack this, that they are not receiv'd to the steerage of the Common-weal.

IX. But perhaps for this very reason some will say, That a Popular State is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall. because that, where all men have a hand in publique businesses, 'there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in humane nature, is to them who excell in such like faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most delightfull of all things.

But in a Monarchy, this same way to obtain praise, and honour, is shut up to the greatest part of Subjects; and what is a grievance, if this be none? Ile tell you: To see his opinion whom we scorne, preferr'd before ours; to have our wisedome undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain tryall of a little vaine glory, to undergoe most certaine enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better, or the worse); to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Counsells, and advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit; to neglect the affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a triall of wits, although those trialls are pleasant to the Eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them, unlesse we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in it.

X. Besides, there are many reasons why deliberations are lesse successefull in great Assemblies, then in lesser Councells; whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a Common-weal, we must not onely understand matters at home, but Forraign Affaires too: at Home, by what goods the Country is nourished, and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make Garrisons of; by what means Souldiers are best to be raised, and maintained; what manner of affections the Subjects bear toward their Prince, or Governours of their Country, and many the like: Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring Country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage, or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves, and what Counsell daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great Assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilfull (that I say not incapable) of them, what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent Opinions contribute to good Counsells, other then meer letts and impediments?

XI. Another reason why a great Assembly is not so fit for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long continued Speech, and to gain the more esteem from his Auditours, he polishes, and adornes it with the best, and smoothest language. Now the nature of Eloquence is to make Good and Evill, Profitable and Unprofitable, Honest and Dishonest, appear to be more or lesse then indeed they are, and to make that seem just, which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh. For this is to perswade; and though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true Principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which, for the most part, are erroneous; neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the Passions of their mindes to whom they speak; whence it happens that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the Man, but in the nature it selfe of Eloquence, whose end (as all the Masters of Rhetorick teach us) is not truth (except by chance) but victory, and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.

XII. The third reason why men advise lesse successfully in a great convent is, because that thence arise Factions in a commonweal, and out of Factions, Seditions, and Civill War; for when equall Oratours doe combat with contrary Opinions, and Speeches, the conquered hates the Conquerour, and all those that were of his side, as holding his Counsell, and wisedome in scorne: and studyes all meanes to make the advise of his adversaries prejudiciall to the State, for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Farthermore, where the Votes are not so unequall, but that the conquered have hopes by the accession of some few of their own opinion at another sitting to make the stronger Party, the chief heads do call the rest together; they advise apart how they may abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order each man shall speak, that

the same businesse may again be brought to agitation, that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a faction is inferiour in votes, and superiour, or not much inferiour in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft, and language, they attempt by force of armes, and so it comes to a civill warre. But some will say, these things doe not necessarily, nor often happen; he may as well say, that the chief Parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.

XIII. It followes hence, that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these, the Laws must needs be inconstant, and change, not according to the alteration of the state of affaires, nor according to the changeablenesse of mens mindes, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction, do convene; insomuch as the Laws do flote here, and there, as it were upon the waters.

XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience, that whereas it is oft of great consequence, that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect, and their power, and will, is as soon known abroad, as to the People it selfe commanding at home.

XV. These inconveniences which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies do so farre forth evince Monarchy to be better then Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great consequence are oftner trusted to be discussed by such like Committees, then in a Monarchy. Neither can it easily bee done otherwayes; for there is no reason why every man should not naturally rather minde his own private, then the publique businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the

reputation of being ingenuous, and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his Parents, to his wife, and children, rejoyce, and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour: As of old all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so well pleasing to his Mother. But if the People in a Democraty would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of Warre, and Peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of Magistrates, and publique Ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be confest, that in this particular, Democraty and Monarchy would be equall.

XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government then another, arise from hence, namely, because the government it self, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one, then many; or on the other side, to many, then to some few. For Government, is the power, the administration of it, is the. act. now the Power in all kind of government is equall; the acts only differ, that is to say the actions, and motions of a common-weale, as they flow from the deliberations of many, or few, of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his Officers; and therefore nothing hinders, but that the common-weale may be well governed, although the Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for affaires, who are endued with the publique Offices, and charges; And that which is said, Woe to the land whose King is a childe, doth not signifie the condition of a Monarchy to be inferiour to a Popular state, but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a Kingdome, that the King being a childe, it often happens, that many by ambition, and power, intruding themselves into publique counsels, the government comes

to be administred in a Democraticall manner, and that thence arise those infelicities which for the most part accompany the Dominion of the People.

XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute Monarchy is the best state of government, that not onely Kings, but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to Nobles, give the whole command of warre to one only, and that so absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way this must be noted also, that no King can give a Generall greater authority over his army, then he himselfe by Right may exercise over all his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the Camps. But what else, are many Common-wealths, then so many Camps strengthened with armes, and men against each other, whose state (because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may passe between them) is to be accounted for the state of nature, which is the state of War.

XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of our selves to be subject to some Man, or Councell, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, then one whose interest depends upon our safety, and welfare; and this then comes to passe when we are the inheritance of the Ruler; for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the Lands, and Monies of the Subjects are not onely the Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and active minds; which will be easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the Dominion of lesser Countries is valued, and how much easier it is for men to procure mony, then money men; nor doe we readily meet with any example that shewes us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his Prince been despoiled of his life, or goods, through the sole licenciousnesse of his Authority.

XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Monarchicall, with a Popular State; we have said nothing of Aristocracy; we may conclude of this, by what hath

been said of those, that, that which is hereditary, and content with the election of Magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which simply imitates the government of Monarchs most, and the People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and more lasting then the rest.

Chapter XI: Places and Examples of Scripture of the Rights of Government agreeable to what hath been said before

I. WE HAVE in the 6. Chapter, and the 2. Article, so derived the Originall of institutive, or politicall Government from the consent of the Multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be esteem'd as Enemies. Such was the beginning of Gods Government over the Jewes instituted by Moses, If ye will obey my voice indeed, & c. Ye shall be unto me a Kingdome of Priests, & c. And Moses came, and called the Elders of the People, & c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath spoken we will do, Exod. 19. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. Such also was the beginning of Moyses his power under God, or of his Vicegerency. And all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moyses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. Exod. 20. 18, 19. The like beginning also had Sauls Kingdome. When yee saw that Nahash King of the children of Ammon came out against you, yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall raign over us, when the Lord your God was your King; Now therefore behold the King whom yee have chosen, and whom yee have desired. 1 Sam. 12. 12. But the major part only consenting, and not all (for there were certain Sons of Belial, who said, How shall this man save us? and they dispised him, 1 Sam. 10. 27.) those who did not consent were put to death as Enemies; And the people said unto Samuel, Who is he that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men that we may put them to death. 1 Sam. 11:

II. In the same 6. Chapter, the 6. and 7. Articles, I have shewed, that all judgment and Wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who beares the Supreme Authority; that is to say, in a Monarchy, on a Monarch, or King; and this is confirmed by the Peoples owne judgement. Wee also will be like all the Nations, and our King shall JUDGE us, and goe out before us, and fight our BATTELS. 1 Sam. 8. 20. And what pertaines to judgements, and all other matters, whereof there is any controversie, whether they be Good, or Evill, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon. Give therefore thy Servant an understanding heart to JUDGE thy People, that I may discerne between GOOD and EVILL. 1. Kings 3. 9. And that of Absolom, There is no man deputed of the King to heare thee. 2. Sam. 15. 3.

III. That Kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been shewed above in the sixth Chapter, and the twelfth Article, King David also confirmes, who, though Saul sought to slay him, did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbad Abishai, saying, Destroy him, not. for who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed, and be innocent? 1 Sam: iv. 9. And when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, The Lord forbid (saith he) that I should doe this thing unto my Master the Lords Anointed, to stretchforth mine hand against him. 1 Sam. 24. 7. And commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to be put to death. 2 Sam. 1. 15.

IV. That which is said in the 17. Chapter of judges, at the 6. verse. In those dayes there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes (as though where there were not a Monarchy, there were an Anarchy or confusion of all things) may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of Monarchy above all other forms of government, unlesse that by the word King may perhaps be understood, not one man onely, but also a Court, provided that in it there reside a supreme power;

which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth Chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to doe what hee hath a minde, or whatsoever shall seem right to himselfe; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankinde, and therefore in all Government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent.

V. We have in the 8. Chapter, the 7. and 8. Article, said, that Servants must yeeld a simple obedience to their Lords, and in the 9. Chapter, Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience to their Parents. Saint Paul sayes the same thing concerning Servants, Servants obey in all things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye service, as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, fearing God. Colos. 3. 22. Concerning Sonnes, Children obey your Parents in all things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. Colos. 3. 20. Now as wee by simple obedience understand ALL THINGS which are not contrary to the Lawes of God; so in those cited places of Saint Paul, after the word ALL THINGS, we.must suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the Lawes of God.

VI. But that I may not thus by peecemeale prove the right of Princes, I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power, (namely that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects) And first out of the new Testament. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe, and doe. Mat. 23. 2. Whatsoever they bid you, (sayes he) observe, that is to say, obey simply: Why? Because they sit in Moyses seat; namely, the civill Magistrates, not Aaron, the Priests. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers, for there is no Power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. Rom. 13. 1. Now because the powers that were in

Saint Pauls time were ordained of God, and all Kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects, it followes that such a power was ordained of God. Submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King as supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them that are sent by him, for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that doe well, for so is the will of God. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Again Saint Paul to Titus, Put them in mind to bee subject to Principalities and Powers, to obey Magistrates, &c. Cha. vers. 1. What Principalities? Was it not to the Principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to the example of Christ himselfe, to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes belonged by hereditary Right, derived from David himselfe; He when he lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Caesar, and pronounced it to be due to him. Give unto Caesar (saith he) the things which are Caesars, and unto God, the things which are Gods. Mat. 22. 21. When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King, he required entire obedience. Goe (said he) into the village over against you, and straightway yee shall finde an Asse tyed, and a Colt with her, loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say ought unto you, yee shall say the Lord hath need of them. Mat: 2. This he did therefore by the right of being Lord, or a King of the Jewes. But to take away a subjects goods on this pretence onely, because the Lord hath need of them, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the old Testament are these, Goe thou near, and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall say, and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and doe it. Deut. 5. 27. But under the word all, is contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua. And they answered Joshua saying, ALL that thou commandest us, we will doe, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will goe; according as we hearkened unto Moyses in ALL things, so will we hearken unto thee, onely the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was

with Moyses; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy Commandement, and will not hearken unto thy words in ALL that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death. Joshua 1. 16, 17, 18. And the Parable of the Bramble. Then said all the trees unto the Bramble, Come thou, and reign over us; And the Bramble said unto the trees, If in truth yee anoint me King over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow. and if not, let fire come out of the Bramble, and devoure the Cedars of Lebanon. Judges 9. vers. 14, 15. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiese to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted to be Kings over us, unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the fire of a civill warre. But the Regall authority is more particularly described by God himselfe, in the 1. Sam. 8. vers. 9. &c. Shew them the Right of the King that shall reign over them, & c. This shall be the Right of the King that shall reign over you; he will take your Sons, and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall runne before his Chariots, & c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his Servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the KINGS RIGHT; neither was any man among the Jewes, no not the High Priest himselfe, exempted from this obedience. For when the King (namely Solomon) said to Abiathar the Priest, Get thee to Anathoth unto thine own fields, for thou art worthy of death, but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the Ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my Father was afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto the Lord. 1 Kings. 2. 26. It cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his Person at that time was any whit lesse acceptable to God.

Chapter XII: Of the internal causes, tending to the dissolution of any Government

I. HITHERTO HATH been spoken by what causes, and Pacts, Common-weals are constituted, and what the Rights of Princes are over their subjects; Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of naturall bodies, three things are to be considered, namely, internall disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the externall Agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and the action it selfe: So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves to our regard; First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace, wherewith the mindes of men are fitted and disposed; next their quality and condition who sollicite, assemble, and direct them already thus disposed, to take up armes, and quit their allegiance; Lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction it selfe. But one, and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, That the knowledge of good and evill belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equall Right, and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true, nay in the first Chapter, Article 9. we have demonstrated it. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown in cha. art. 9] that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evill, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the Legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evill; and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath the supreme power in the Commonweale, that is to say, the Monarch in a

Monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh Chapter, Article 2. out of the words of Solomon; for if private men may pursue that as good, and shun that as evill which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his? Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy People, that I may discern between good and evill. Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and evill, wicked are those, though usuall sayings, that he onely is a King who does righteously, and that Kings must not be obeyed, unlesse they command us just things, and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature onely being relative to some command, and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just, or unjust, proceeds from the right of the Magistrate: Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command, just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them; but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evill, desire to be even as Kings, which cannot be with the safety of the Common weale. The most ancient of all Gods commands is, Gen. 2. 15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations, Cha. vers. 5. Yee shall be as Gods, knowing good and evill; and Gods first expostulation with man, vers. 11. Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shamefull, except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill?

II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne, for he who doth so, contemns the Law. But we must distinguish: That is my sinne indeed, which committing, I doe beleeve to be my sinne; but what I beleeve to be another mans sin, I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me,

if I doe it, and he that commands me be by Right, Lord over me, I sinne not; for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince, conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken, I doe not therefore doe unjustly, but rather if I refuse to doe it, arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains onely to my Prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as any thing is commanded them, which either is, or seems to be unlawfull to them: for if they obey, they sin against their conscience, and if they obey not, against Right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the paines of the world to come; if they sinne against Right, they doe as much as in them lyes, abolish humane society, and the civill life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands, which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience; and it depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing Article; for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evill, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.

III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, That Tyrannicide is lawfull; Nay, at this day it is by many Divines, and of old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus onely at Athens, but those thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or without Right; if without Right, he is an enemy, and by Right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the

killing a Tyrant, but an enemy: if by Right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? For why doest thou call him a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is Monarchicall, we may hence discerne, namely, that by it every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement, and slain by the hand of every murtherous villain.

IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society, is theirs, who hold, That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Artic. 14. from this Argument, That a City can neither be bound to it self, nor to any subject; not to it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any Subject, because the single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the City will be free from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a City, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men, who have the Supreme Authority, for they make a City, which hath no being but by their Supreme Power. Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government, is evident from hence, that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against the Lawes, would return to each single Person: Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes, and together with it, all coercive jurisdiction, which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of Government. Yet this Errour hath great props, Aristotle, and others; who, by reason of humane infirmity, suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely;

but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of, Government, who thought that the constraining Power, the interpretation of Lawes, and the making of Lawes, (all which are powers necessarily belonging to Government) should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves. Now although particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement, and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate, yet this is onely then, when the question is not what the Magistrate may, but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe. As, when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject, the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life; but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it; but his will was, he should, if he brake the Law. else, his will was he should not: This therefore, that a Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate, is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes. On the contrary, it is evident, that he is not tied to his owne Lawes, because no man is bound to himself. Lawes therefore are set for Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler: however, by the ambition of Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate, but their Prudence.

V. In the fifth place, That the Supreme Authority may be divided, is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales. But diverse men divide it diverse wayes. For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace, and the benefits of this life, but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation, it happens, that Subjects measuring justice, not as they ought, by the Civill Lawes, but by the precepts and doctrines of them who, in regard of the Magistrate, are either private mens or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes, through fear falling into that which they most feared: Now what can be more pernicious to any state,

then that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting torments, be deterred from obeying their Princes, that is to say, the Lawes, or from being just? There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War, and Peace, unto one, (whom they call a Monarch) but the right of raising Monies they give to some others, and not to him: But because monies are the sinewes of War, and Peace, they who thus divide the Authority, doe either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them, in whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another, or if they doe really divide it, they dissolve the Government: for neither upon necessity can War be waged, nor can the publique Peace be preserved without Money.

VI. It is a common doctrine, That faith and holinesse are not acquired by study, and naturall reason, but are alwayes supernaturally infused, and inspired into men: which, if it were true, I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a Prophet; or lastly, why every man should not judge what's fit for him to doe, what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, then by the precepts of his Superiours, or right Reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good and Evil; which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments. This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian world, that the number of Apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite. And it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their Sermons, signifying just nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine; for he whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech, must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above.

VII. The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government, is this, That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods he is in possession of.

That is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but also of the Magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have a Lord over them, have themselves no Lordship, as hath been proved, Cha. Artic. 5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects, by the constitution of Government. Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no man had any Proper Right; all things were common to all men. Tell me therefore, how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate? How got the Magistrates it, but that every man transferred his Right on him? And thou therefore hast also given up thy Right to him; thy Dominion therefore, and Propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as he pleases; even as in a Family, each Son hath such proper goods, and so long lasting, as seeme good to the Father. But the greatest part of men who professe Civill Prudence, reason otherwise; we are equall (say they) by nature; there is no reason why any man should by better Right take my goods from me, then I his from him; we know that mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance of the publique; but let them, who require it, shew us the present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it. They who talk thus, know not, that what they would have, is already done from the beginning in the very constitution of Government, and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude, and yet not fashioned Government, they destroy the frame.

VIII. In the last place, it's a great hindrance to Civill Government, especially Monarchicall, that men distinguish not enough between a People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are Citizens, that is to say, Subjects. In a Democraty, and Aristocraty, the Citizens are the Multitude, but the Court is the People. And

in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the People. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truthes, do alwayes speak of a great number of men, as of the People, that is to say, the City; they say that the City hath rebelled against the King (which is impossible) and that the People will, and nill, what murmuring and discontented Subjects would have, or would not have, under pretence of the People, stirring up the Citizens against the City, that is to say, the Multitude against the People. And these are almost all the Opinions wherewith Subjects being tainted doe easily Tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of Government Majesty is to be preserv'd by him, or them who have the Supreme Authority, the crimen laesae Majestatis naturally cleaves to these Opinions.

IX. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man then Poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life, and honour; and though there be no man but knowes that riches are gotten with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the Evill Government, excusing their own sloth, and luxury, as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by publique exactions; But men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not onely labour that they may live, but fight too, that they may labour. Every one of the Jewes, who in Esdras his time built the Walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held the Sword in the other. In all Government we must conceive that the hand which holds the Sword is the King, or Supreme Councell, which is no lesse to be sustained, and nourisht, by the Subjects care and industry, then that wherewith each man procures himself a private fortune; and that Customes, and Tributes, are nothing else but their reward who watch in Armes for us, that the labours and endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to publick Persons, is not more just, then if they should say

that they are become in want by paying of their debts: But the most part of men consider nothing of these things, for they suffer the same thing with them who have a disease they call an Incubus, which springing from Gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, opprest, and stifled with a great weight: Now it is a thing manifest of it selfe, that they who seeme to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the Common-weal, are prone to be Seditious; and that they are affected with change, who are distasted at the present state of things.

X. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having little employment, want Honour and Dignity. All men naturally strive for Honour, and Preferment, but chiefly they who are least troubled with caring for necessary things. For these men are invited by their vacancy sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the Common-weal, sometimes to an easie reading of Histories, Politiques, Orations, Poems, and other pleasant Books; and it happens, that hence they think themselves sufficiently furnisht both with wit, and learning, to administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now because all men are not what they appear to themselves, and if they were, yet all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received to publique Offices, its necessary that many must be passed by. These therefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more, partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them, partly out of hope to overwhelm them, then ill successe to the publique Consultations; and therefore its no marvell if with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations.

XI. The hope of overcomming is also to be numbred among other seditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you wil, infected with opinions repugnant to Peace, and civill Government; let there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torne with affronts, and calumnies, by them who are in Authority; yet if there be no hope of having

the better of them, or it appear not sufficient, there will no sedition follow; every man will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen, then hazard an heavier weight. There are four things necessarily requisite to this hope: Numbers, Instruments, mutuall trust, and Commanders. To resist publique Magistrates without a great number, is not Sedition, but Desperation. By Instruments of war I mean all manner of armes, munition, and other necessary provision, without which Number can doe nothing, nor Arms neither without mutuall trust; Nor all these without union under some Commander, whom of their own accord, they are content to, obey. not as being engaged by their submission to his command (for we have already in this very Chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand, being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes) but for some opinion they have of his vertue, or military skill, or resemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved with the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions by their own judgements, there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the Realme, but one to stirre up and quicken them.

XII. Salust his Character of Catiline, (then whom there never was a greater Artist in raising seditions) is this, That he had great eloquence, and little wisdome. he separates wisdome from eloquence, attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions, adjudging that as an instructresse of Peace, and quietnesse. Now, eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant, and cleare expression of the conceptions of the mind, and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, partly from an understanding of words taken in their own proper, and definite signification; the other is a commotion of the Passions of the minde (such as are hope, fear, anger, pitty) and derives from a metaphoricall use of words fitted to the Passions: That forms a speech from true Principles, this from opinions already received, what nature soever they are of. The art of that is Logick, of this

Rhetorick; the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use, that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never disjoyned from wisdome, but this almost ever. But that this kind of powerfull eloquence, separated from the true knowledge of things, that is to say, from wisdome, is the true character of them who sollicite, and stirre up the people to innovations, may easily be gathered out of the work it selfe which they have to doe; for they could not poyson the people with those absurd opinions contrary to Peace and civill society, unlesse they held them themselves, which sure is an ignorance greater then can well befall any wise man. For he that knows not whence the Lawes derive their power, which are the Rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evill; what makes and preserves Peace among men, what destroyes it; what is his, and what anothers; Lastly, what he would have done to himselfe (that he may doe the like to others) is surely to be accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their Auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected seem worse, to them who are well-affected seem evil; that they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving their mindes, makes all things to appear to bee such as they in their mindes prepared before, had already conceived them.

XIII. Many men who are themselves very well affected to civill society, doe through want of knowledge, cooperate to the disposing of subjects mindes to sedition, whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their Schooles, and all the people in their Pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this disposition into Act, place their whole endeavour in this, First, that they may joyn the ill affected together into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction: They gather them into faction, while they make themselves

the relators, and interpretors of the counsels and actions of single men, and nominate the Persons and Places, to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction, The faction must be kept in a faction, that is to say, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of them shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest, and most popular men of the faction to their side: And thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing of affaires; and thus they sometimes oppresse the Commonwealth, namely where there is no other faction to oppose them, but for the most part they rend it, and introduce a civill warre. For folly and eloquence concurre in the subversion of government in the same manner (as the fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias King of Thessaly, conspired with Medea against their father; They going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again, by the counsell of Medea, they cut him into peeces, and set him in the fire to boyle, in vain expecting when he would live again; So the common people through their folly (like the daughters of Pelias) desiring to renew the ancient government, being drawne away by the eloquence of ambitious men, as it were by the witchcraft of Medea, divided into faction, they consume it rather by those flames, then they reforme it.

Chapter XIII: Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule

I. BY WHAT hath hitherto been said, the duties of Citizens and in any kind of government whatsoever, and the Power of the supreme Ruler over them are apparent; but we have as yet said nothing of the duties of Rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their Subjects; We must then distinguish between the Right, and the exercise of supreme authority, for they can be divided; as for example, when he who hath the Right, either cannot, or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affaires: For Kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affaires, sometimes also though they can doe it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choyce of their Officers and Counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where the Right and exercise are severed, there the government of the Commonweale, is like the ordinary government of the world, in which God, the mover of all things, produceth naturall effects by the means of secondary causes; but where he, to whom the Right of ruling doth belong, is himselfe present in all judicatures, consultations, and publique actions, there the administration is such, as if God beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all matters. We will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties who exercise authority, whether by their own or others Right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things, which being divers from others, some Princes may doe, for this is to be left to the Politicall Practices of each Common weale.

II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence, The safety of the people is the supreme Law; for although they who among men obtain the chiefest Dominion, cannot be subject to Lawes properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yeeld obedience unto right reason, which is the naturall, morall, and divine Law. But because dominions were constituted for Peaces sake, and Peace was sought after for safeties sake, he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise then to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of Peace, that is to say, against the Lawes of nature; Now as the safety of the People dictates a Law by which Princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the Citizens, is the power of the City, that is to say, his that bears the chief Rule in any state.

III. By the people in this place we understand, not one civill Person, namely the City it selfe which governs, but the multitude of subjects which are governed; for the City was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects sake; and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man; for the Ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people, then by his Lawes, which are universall; and therefore he hath fully discharged himselfe, if he have throughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions, to establish the welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own default, Or by some chance which could not be prevented; but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men doe suffer.

IV. But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation. of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happines. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves, and institute a government, that they might, as much as their humane condition would afford, live delightfully. They

therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kinde of government, would sinne against the Law of nature (because against their trust who had committed that power unto them) if they should not study, as much as by good Laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired Dominion by arms, doe all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve them the better; wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.

V. And first of all, Princes doe beleeve that it mainly concerns eternall salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what manner of worship he is to be adored with; which being supposed, it may be demanded, whether chief Rulers, and whosoever they be, whether one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the Law of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine, and worship, to be taught and practised (or permit a contrary to be taught and practised) as they beleeve necessarily conduceth to the eternall salvation of their subjects? It is manifest that they act against their conscience, and that they will, as much as in them lies, the eternall perdition of their subjects; for if they willed it not, I see no reason why they should suffer, (when being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this difficulty in suspence.

VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only, may be distributed into foure kindes. 1. That they be defended against forraign enemies. 2. That Peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique security. 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse liberty; For supreme Commanders can conferre no more to their civill happinesse, then

that being preserved from forraign and civill warres, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own industry.

VII. There are two things necessary for the Peoples defence; To be warned, and to be forearmed; for the state of Common-wealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile; neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called Peace, but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values his security not according to the Pacts, but the forces and counsels of his adversary; And this by naturall Right, as hath been shewed in the second Chapter, 10. Artic. from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene; It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City, First, that there be some who may as near as may be, search into, and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For discoverers to Ministers of State, are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule, and we may more truly say in vision politicall, then naturall, that the sensible, and intelligible Species of outward things, not well considered by others, are by the ayre transported to the soule, (that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority) and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State, then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man; or if they be compared to Spiders webs, which extended on all sides by the finest threds, doe warn them, keeping in their small holds, of all outward motions; They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their Subjects without Spies, then those Spiders can when they shall goe forth, and whether they shall repair, without the motion of those threds.

VIII. Farthermore, its necessarily requisite to the peoples defence, that they be fore-armed. Now to be fore-armed is to be furnisht with Souldiers, Armes, Ships, Forts and Monies, before the danger be instant; for the listing of Souldiers, and taking up of Armes after a blow is given, is too late, at

least if not impossible. In like manner, not to raise Forts, and appoint Garrisons in convenient places, before the Frontiers are invaded, is to be like those Country Swains (as Demosthenes said) who ignorant of the art of Fencing, with their Bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise Monies for the maintenance of Souldiers, and other Charges of War, when the danger begins to shew it self, they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close-fisted men so vast a proportion of Monies; for almost all men, what they once reckon in the number of their goods, doe judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to imploy but the least part of it for the publique good. Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the Country with Armes, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of Imposts, and Customes; we must therefore, for fear of War, in time of Peace hoord up good summs, if we intend the safety of the Common-weal. Since therefore it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover the Enemies Counsell, to keep Garrisons, and to have Money in continuall readinesse, and that Princes are by the Law of Nature bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their Subjects, it followes, that its not onely lawfull for them to send out Spies, to maintain Souldiers, to build Forts, and to require Monies for these purposes, but also, not to doe thus, is unlawfull. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lesning of the power of forraigners whom they suspect, whether by sleight, or force. For Rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect, lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence.

IX. But many things are required to the conservation of inward Peace, because many things concur (as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter) to its perturbation. We have there shewed, that some things there are which

dispose the minds of men to sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certaine perverse doctrines. Its therefore the duty of those who have the chief Authority; to root those out of the mindes of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terrour of penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons; the Lawes whereby this evill may be withstood are not to be made against the Persons erring, but against the Errours themselves. Those errours which in the foregoing Chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the Common-weal, have crept into the mindes of ignorant men, partly from the Pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who by reason of little employment, otherwise, doe finde leasure enough to study; and they got into these mens mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique schooles. Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce sound Doctrine, he must begin from the Academies: There, the true, and truly demonstrated foundations of civill Doctrine are to be laid, wherewith young men being once endued, they may afterward both in private and publique instruct the vulgar. And this they will doe so much the more cheerfully, and powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess, and teach; for seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no more intelligible, then if a man should joyne together a company of termes drawn by chance out of an urne, by reason of the frequent use of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines suitable to their own understandings, and the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of Supreme Officers to cause the true elements of civill Doctrine to be written, and to command them to be taught in all the Colledges of their severall Dominions.

X. In the next place we shewed that grief of mind arising from want did dispose the Subjects to Sedition, which want, although deriv'd from their

own luxury, and sloth, yet they impute it to those who govern the Realm, as though they were drained and opprest by publique Pensions. Notwithstanding it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just, namely, when the burthens of the Realm are unequally imposed on the Subjects; For that which to all together is but a light weight, if many withdraw themselves, it wil be very heavy, nay, even intollerable to the rest: Neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen it self, as at the inequality. With much earnestnes therefore men strive to be freed from taxes, & in this conflict the lesse happy, as being overcome, do envy the more fortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, its the interest of the publique quiet, and by consequence it concernes the duty of the Magistrate, to see that the publique burthens be equally born. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to publick use, is nothing else but the price of their bought Peace, its reason good, that they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an equall part either by contributing their Monies, or their labours to the Common-weal. Now it is the Law of Nature (by the 15. Article of the 3. Chapter) that every man in distributing right to others, doe carry himself equall to all; wherefore Rulers are by the naturall Law obliged to lay the burthens of the Common-weal equally on their Subjects.

XI. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of Money, but of Burthen, that is to say, an equality of reason between the Burthens, and the Benefits. For although all equally enjoy Peace, yet the benefits springing from thence, are not equall to all; for some get greater possessions, others lesse; and againe, some consume lesse, others more. It may therefore be demanded whether Subjects ought to contribute to the publique, according to the rate of what they gain, or of what they spend, that is to say, whether the persons must be taxt, so as to pay contribution according to their wealth, or the goods themselves, that every man contribute according to what he spends. But if we consider, where Monies are raised according to wealth,

there they who have made equall gain, have not equall possessions, because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of Peace, they doe not equally sustaine the Burthens of the Common-weal: and on the other side, where the goods themselves are taxt, there every man, while he spends his private goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably payes part due to the Common-weal, according to, not what he hath, but what by the benefit of the Realm he hath had. It is no more to be doubted, but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and therefore against the duty of Rulers, the latter is agreeable to reason, and the exercise of their authority.

XII. In the third place, we said that that trouble of minde which riseth from ambition was offensive to publique Peace. For there are some who seeming to themselves to be wiser then others, and more sufficient for the managing of affaires then they who at present doe govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their vertue would prove to the Common-weale, they shew it, by harming it; but because ambition and greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men, its not the duty of Rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of rewards, and punishments, they may so order it, that men may know that the way to honour is, not by contempt of the present government, nor by factions, and the popular ayre, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the Decrees, the Lawes and Rights of their Fathers; if with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punisht, and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more ambition to obey, then withstand. Notwithstanding it so happens sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fiercenesse, so a stiffe-neckt subject must be flatter’d for fear of his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this, when the Commander is in danger of falling. But we speak

here of those, whose authority and power is intire. Their duty (I say) it is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depresse the factious all they can; nor can the publique power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects quiet without it.

XIII. But if it be the duty of Princes to restrain the factious, much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves. Now I call a faction, a multitude of subjects gathered together, either by mutuall contracts among themselves, or by the power of some one, without his or their authority who bear the supreme Rule: A faction therefore is as it were a City in a City; for as by an Union of men in the state of nature a City receives its being, so by a new union of subjects, there ariseth a faction. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any forreign Prince, or Subject, or have made any Pacts, or Leagues of mutuall defence between themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the City, is a faction. Also favour with the vulgar if it be so great, that by it an Army may be rais'd, except publique caution be given, either by hostages, or some other pledges, contains faction in it; The same may be said of private wealth, if it exceed, because all things obey mony. Forasmuch therefore as it is true, that the state of Cities among themselves is naturall, and hostile, those Princes who permit factions, doe as much as if they received an enemy within their walls, which is Contrary to the subjects safety, and therefore also against the Law of nature.

XIV. There are two things necessary to the enriching of Subjects, Labour and thrift; there is also a third which helps, to wit the naturall increase of the earth and water; and there is a fourth too, namely the Militia, which sometimes augments, but more frequently lessens the subjects stock. The two first are only necessary. For a City constituted in an Island of the Sea, no greater then will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing, or

fishing, by merchandize, and handicrafts only; but there is no doubt if they have a territory, but they may be richer with the same number, or equally rich, being a greater number. But the fourth, namely the Militia, was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining Arts, under the notion of Booting or taking Prey; and it was by mankind, (disperst by families) before the constitution of civill societies, accounted just and honourable; for preying, is nothing else but a warre waged with small forces; And great Common-weales, namely that of Rome, and Athens, by the spoyles of warre, forraigne tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their armes, have sometimes so improved the Common-wealth, that they have not onely not required any publique monies from the poorer sort of subjects, but have also divided to each of them both monies and lands. But this kind of increase of riches, is not to be brought into rule and fashion: For the Militia in order to profit, is like a Dye wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since therefore there are three things only, the fruits of the earth and water, Labour and Thrift, which are expedient for the enriching of subjects, the duty of Commanders in chief, shall be conversant onely about those three. For the first, those lawes will be usefull which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth, and water, such as are husbandry, and fishing. For the second, all Lawes against idlenesse, and such as quicken industry, are profitable; the art of Navigation (by help whereof the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only, are brought into one City) and the Mechanicks, (under which I comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen) and the Mathematicall sciences, the fountains of navigatory and mechanick employments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third, those lawes are usefull, whereby all inordinate expence, as well in meats, as in clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with usage, is forbidden. Now because such

lawes are beneficiall to the ends above specified, it belongs also to the Office of supreme Magistrates, to establish them.

XV. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the Lawes of the City, or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what Laws they have a mind to; but because all the motions and actions of subjects, are never circumscribed by Lawes, nor can be, by reason of their variety, it is necessary that there be infinite cases, which are neither commanded, nor prohibited, but every man may either doe, or not doe them, as he lists himselfe. In these, each man is said to enjoy his liberty, and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place, namely, for that part of naturall Right, which is granted and left to Subjects by the civill Lawes. As water inclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having no bounds, it spreds too largely, and the more passages it findes, the more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might doe nothing without the commands of the Law would grow dull, and unwildly, if all, they would be disperst, and the more is left undetermined by the Lawes, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes are faulty, for Lawes were not invented to take away, but to direct mens actions, even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but to guide the course of the streame. The measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects, and the Cities good. Wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of those who command, and have the authority of making lawes, that there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the Magistrate, and his Subjects; for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do, or not to do, by naturall reason, rather then any knowledge of the Lawes, where there are more Lawes then can easily be remembred, and whereby such things are forbidden, as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity, they must through ignorance, without the least evill intention, fall within the compasse of Lawes, as gins laid to entrap

their harmelesse liberty, which supreme Commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the Lawes of nature.

XVI. It is a great part of that liberty which is harmlesse to civill government, and necessary for each subject to live happily, that there be no penalties dreaded, but what they may both foresee, and look for. and this is done, where there are either no punishments at all defined by the Lawes, or greater not required then are defined. Where there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the Law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment, and his feare is supposed boundlesse, because it relates to an unbounded evill; now the Law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civill Lawes, (by what we have said in the third Chapter, Artic. 11.) and therefore supreme Commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing, they must not so much regard the past evill, as the future good, and they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment, then the publique benefit. But where the punishment is defined, either by a Law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words, that he that shall doe thus, or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the penalty, (not by any Law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning) is afterward determined by the punishment of the first. delinquent (for naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by the Law, is against the Law of nature. For the end of punishment is not to compell the will of man, but to fashion it, & make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniencies, and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us. If therefore the Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime, then will make our feare more considerable with us, then our lust; that excesse of lust above the feare of punishment, whereby sinne is committed, is to be

attributed to the Legislator (that is to say) to the supreme; and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment, then himselfe hath determined in his Lawes, he punisheth that in another, in which he sinned himselfe.

XVII. It pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary liberty of subjects, that every man may without feare, enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the Lawes; for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht by the Lawes from anothers, if by wrong judgement; robbery, theft, they may bee again confounded. But it falls out so, that these doe happen where Judges are corrupted; for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evill, ariseth not from hence, namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed; for we esteeme the future by what is past, seldome expecting what seldome happens. If therefore Judges corrupted either by Gifts, Favour, or even by pitty it self, do often forbear the execution of the Penalties due by the Law, and by that meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht: honest Subjects encompast with murtherers, theeves and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other, nor scarce to stirre abroad without hazard; nay, the City it self is dissolved, and every mans right of protecting himself at his own will returnes to him. The Law of Nature therefore gives this precept to Supreme Commanders, that they not onely doe righteousnesse themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the Judges, by them appointed, to doe the same; that is to say, that they hearken to the complaints of their Subjects; and as oft as need requires, make choice of some extraordinary Judges, who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.

Chapter XIV: Of Lawes and Trespasses

I. HEY WHO lesse seriously consider the force of words, doe sometimes confound Law with Counsell, sometimes with Covenant, sometimes with Right. They confound Law with Counsell, who think, that it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their Counsellours, but also to obey them, as though it were in vaine to take Counsell, unlesse it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between Counsell, and Law, from the difference between Counsell, and Command. Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it, is taken from the thing it self which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander. For it is not properly said, Thus I will, and thus I Command, except the will stand for a Reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes, not for the thing it self, but by reason of the advisers will, the Law is not a Counsell, but a Command, and is defined thus, LAW is the command of that Person (whether Man, or Court) whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience; as the Precepts of God in regard of Men, of Magistrates in respect of their Subjects, and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their Lawes. Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways; Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth, Counsell to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by Law, is duty, what by Counsell, is free-will. Counsell is directed to his end that receives it, Law, to his that gives it. Counsell is given to none but the willing, Law even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the Counsellour is made void by the

will of him to whom he gives Counsell, the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed.

II. They confound Law, and Covenant, who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain omologemata or forms of living, determined by the common consent of men: Amongst whom is Aristotle, who defines Law on this manner, Nomos esti logos orismenos kath omologian koinen poleos, minuon pos dei prattein ekasta, that is to say, Law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the City, declaring every thing that we ought to doe. Which definition is not simply of Law, but of the Civill Law; for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the Lawes of Nature; for if they had their originall from the consent of men, they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed that's no right definition of a Civill Law; for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person, having one will, or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those words, common consent, are ill placed here, for one person hath no common consent; neither ought he to have said, (declaring what was needfull to be done) but commanding; for what the City declares, it commands its Subjects. He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes) some certain formes of living; but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man (and therefore are no Lawes) before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell, have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Lawes therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else, but naked, and weak contracts, which then at length, when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power, shall either become Lawes, or no Lawes, at his will and pleasure: Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes, which he ought not to have done; for Contract is a promise,

Law a command. In Contracts we say, I will do this; In Lawes, Doe this. Contracts oblige us, Lawes tie us fast, being obliged. A Contract obligeth of it self, The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience; Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done, before we are obliged to doe it; But in Law we are first obliged to performe, and what is to be done, is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus, A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City, commanding every thing behoofefull to be done, which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art. 9. to wit, that the civill lawes are the command of him (whether man, or Court of men) who is endued with supreme Power in the city, concerning the future actions of his Subjects.

Contracts oblige us. To be obliged, and to be tyed being obliged, seems to some men to be one, and the same thing, and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More cleerly therefore, I say thus, That a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to performe for his promise sake; but that the Law tyes him being obliged, that is to say, it compells him to make good his promise, for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law.

III. They confound Lawes with Right, who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right, notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law: That which is prohibited by the divine Law, cannot bee permitted by the civill, neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law, be prohibited by the civill. Notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right, that is to say, that which may be done by divine Right, doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes; for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour, although they cannot enlarge them. Now naturall liberty is a Right not constituted, but allowed by the Lawes. For the Lawes being removed, our liberty is

absolute; This is first restrained by the naturall, and divine Lawes, the residue is bounded by the civill Law, and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns, and Societies. There is great difference therefore between Law, and Right; For Law is a fetter, Right is freedome, and they differ like contraries.

IV. All Law may be divided, first according to the diversity of its Authors into Divine and humane. The Divine, according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold, naturall (or morall) and positive; naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them, to wit, their naturall Reason; and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold. Positive is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie, wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man: Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government, and divine worship, and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes, because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes, his peculiar people. Again, the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men, which alone hath obtained the title of the Law of nature, and that of Cities, which may be called that of Nations, but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations. The precepts of both are alike, but because Cities once instituted doe put on the personall proprieties of men, that Law, which speaking of the duty of single men, we call naturall, being applyed to whole Cities, and Nations, is called the Right of Nations. And the same Elements of naturall law, and Right, which have hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole Cities and Nations, may be taken for the Elements of the lawes, and Right of Nations.

V. All humane law is civill. For the state of men considered out of civill society, is hostile, in which, because one is not subject to another, there are no other Lawes, beside the dictates of naturall reason, which is the divine Law. But in civill government the City onely, that is to say, that man, or

Court, to whom the supreme power of the City is committed, is the Legislator, and the Lawes of the City are civill. The civill Lawes may be divided according to the diversity of their subject matter, into sacred, or secular; sacred are those which pertain to Religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies, and worship of God (to wit what Persons, things, places, are to be consecrated, and in what fashion, what opinions concerning the Deity are to be taught publiquely, and with what words, and in what order supplications are to be made, and the like) and are not determined by any divine positive Law. For the civill sacred Lawes are the humane Lawes (which are also called Ecclesiasticall) concerning things sacred; but the secular under a generall notion, are usually called the civill Lawes.

VI. Again, the civill Law (according to the two offices of the. Legislator, whereof one is to judge; the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his judgements) hath two parts; the one distributive, the other vindicative, or penall. By the distributive it is, that every man hath his proper Right, that is to say, it sets forth Rules for all things, whereby we may know what is properly ours, what another mans; so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own; and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs; and what is lawfull for every man to doe or omit, and what is not lawfull. Vindicative is that whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the Law.

VII. Now distributive, and vindicative, are not two severall Species of the Lawes, but two parts of the same Law. For if the Law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you take with your net in the Sea, be it yours, its in vain; For although another should take that away from you which you have caught, it hinders not, but that it still remains yours; for in the state of nature where all things are common to all, yours, and others, are all one, insomuch as what the Law defines to be yours, was yours even before the Law, and after the Law ceases not to bee yours, although in

another mans possession. Wherefore the Law doth nothing, unlesse it bee understood to bee so yours, as all other men be forbidden to interrupt your free use, and secure enjoyment of it at all times, according to your own will, and pleasure. For this is that which is required to a propriety of goods, not that a man may be able to use them, but to use them alone, which is done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain doe they also prohibit any men, who doe not withall strike a fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore is the Law, unlesse it contain both parts, that which forbids injuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of them which is called distributive, is Prohibitory, and speaks to all; the second which is styled vindicative, or paenary, is mandatory, and onely speaks to publique Ministers.

VIII. From hence also we may understand, that every civill Law hath a penalty annexed to it, either explicitly, or implicitly; For where the penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example of any one who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed Law there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary, namely, to depend on the will of the Legislator, that is to say, of the supreme Commander. For in vain is that Law which may be broken without punishment.

IX. Now because it comes from the civill Lawes, both that every man have his proper Right, and distinguisht from anothers, and also that he is forbidden to invade anothers Rights, it followes, that these Precepts (Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defin'd by the Lawes unto thy Parents: Thou shalt not kill the man whom the Lawes forbid thee to kill: Thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden by the Laws: Thou shalt not take away anothers goods against the Lords will: Thou shalt not frustrate the Laws and Judgements by false testimony) are Civill Lawes. The naturall Lawes command the same things but implicitly. for the law of nature (as hath been said in the 3. Chap. Art. 2.) commands us to keep contracts, and therefore

also to performe obedience when we have covenanted obedience, and to abstaine from anothers goods when it is determin'd by the civill Law what belongs to another. But all Subjects (by the 13. Art. of the 6. Chap.) do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme power, that is to say the civill Lawes, in the very constitution of government, even before it is possible to break them. For the Law of nature did oblige in the state of nature, where first (because nature hath given all things to all men) nothing did properly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to invade anothers right; next, where all things were common, and therefore all carnall copulations lawfull; Thirdly, where was the state of Warre, and therefore lawfull to kill; Fourthly, where all things were determined by every mans own judgement, and therefore paternall respects also: Lastly, where there were no publique judgements, and therefore no use of bearing witnesse, either true, or false.

X. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those Laws, is more ancient then the promulgation of the Laws themselves, as being contained in the very constitution of the City, by the vertue of the naturall Law which forbids breach of Covenant, the Law of nature commands us to keep all the civill Laws; for where we are tyed to obedience, before we know what will be commanded us, there we are universally tyed to obey in all things. Whence it followes, that no civil Law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Deity (in respect of whom, Cities themselves have no right of their own, and cannot be said to make Lawes) can possibly be against the Law of nature; for though the Law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c. yet if the civill Law command us to invade any thing, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c. For when the Lacedemonians of old permitted their youths by a certaine Law, to take away other mens goods, they commanded that these goods should not bee accounted other mens, but their own who took them;

and therefore such surreptions were no thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen Sexes, according to their Lawes, were lawfull marriages.

XI. Its necessary to the essence of a Law, that the Subjects be acquainted with two things, First, what man or Court hath the supreme power, that is to say, the Right of making Lawes. Secondly, what the Law it self sayes; for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tyed to, cannot obey, and by consequence is in such a condition, as if he were not tyed at all. I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a Law, that either one, or the other be perpetually known, but onely that it be once knowne; and if the Subject afterward forget either the Right he hath who made the Law, or the Law it self, that makes him no lesse tyed to obey, since he might have remembred it, had he had a will to obey.

XII. The knowledge of the Legislator depends on the Subject himselfe; for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without his owne consent, and covenant, either exprest, or suppos'd; exprest, when from the beginning the Citizens doe themselves constitute a forme of governing the City, or when by promise they submit themselves to the Dominion of any one; or suppos'd at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the Realme, and Lawes, for their protection and conservation against others. For to whose Dominion we require our fellow Subjects to yeeld obedience for our good, his Dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request. And therefore ignorance of the power of making Lawes, can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knowes what he hath done himselfe.

XIII. The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Legislator, who must publish them, for otherwise they are not Lawes; for Law is the command of the Law-maker, and his command is the Declaration of his Will; it is not therefore a Law, except the will of the Law-maker be declar'd, which is done by promulgation. Now in promulgation two things must be manifest,

whereof one is, that he or they who publish a Law, either have a right themselves to make Lawes, or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him or them who have it; the other is the sense of the Law it selfe. Now, that the first, namely publisht Lawes proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from the mouth of the Commander; the rest beleeve, but the reasons of their beliefe are so many, that it is scarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a Democratical City where every one may be present at the making of Laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must beleeve those that were present; but in monarchies and Aristocraties, because its granted but to few to be present, and openly to heare the commands of the monarch or the Nobles, it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest. And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts and Decrees of Princes, which are propounded to us for such, either by the writings, or voices of them, whose office it is to publish them. But yet when we have these causes of beliefe, that we have seen the Prince, or supreme Councell constantly use such Counsellors, Secretaries, publishers, and seales, and the like arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any authority from them; that they have bin punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the Law; not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and Decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd, but he that not believing, shall not yield obedience, is punisht. For the constant permission of these things is a manifest signe enough, and evident declaration of the Commanders will; provided there be nothing contain'd in the Law, Edict or Decree, derogatory from his supreme power: For it is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by any of his Officers as long as he retaines a will to governe. Now the sense of the law, when there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme

authority hath committed the knowledge of causes, or Judgements; for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation to apply the lawes to particular cases. Now we may know who they are that have this Office granted them, in the same manner, as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws.

XIV. Againe the civill law according to its two fold manner of publishing, is of two sorts, written & unwritten; By written, I understand that which wants a voice, or some other signe of the will of the Legislator that it may become. a Law. For all kind of Laws are of the same age with mankinde, both in nature, and time, and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters, and the Art of writing. Wherefore not a writing, but a voice is necessary for a written law. this alone is requisite to the being, that to the Remembrance of a Law; for we reade, that before letters were found out for the help of memory, that Lawes contracted into Meetre, were wont to be sung. The unwritten is that which wants no other publishing then the voice of nature, or naturall reason; such are the lawes of nature. For the naturall Law although it be distinguisht from the civill, for as much as it commands the Will, yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill; for example, this same, Thou shalt not covet, which onely appertaines to the minde, is a naturall Law, onely. but this, Thou shalt not invade, is both naturall and civill. For seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universall Rules, whereby all future contentions which perhaps are infinite, may be determined, its to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written lawes, the law of naturall equity is to be followed, which commands us to distribute equally to equals; and this by the vertue of the civill law, which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature.

XV. These things being understood, it appeares first, That the Lawes of Nature, although they were describ’d in the Books of some Philosophers,

are not for that reason to be termed Written lawes: and that the Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes, were no Lawes, for want of the Supreme Authority; nor yet those orations of the Wise, (that is to say) Judges, but so farre forth as by the consent of the Supreme power they part into custome; and that then they are to be received among the Written lawes, not for the Customes sake (which by its own force doth not constitute a Law) but for the Will of the Supreme Commander, which appeares in this, that he hath suffer'd his Sentence, whether equall, or unequall, to passe into custome.

XVI. Sinne, in its largest signification, comprehends every deed, word and thought, against right reason. For every man by reasoning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe. If therefore he reason right (that is to say, beginning from most evident principles, he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary,) he will proceede in a most direct way; otherwise hee'l goe astray, that is to say, he will either doe, say, or endeavour, somewhat against his proper end: which when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred, but in action and will to have sinned; for sin followes errour, just as the Will doth the understanding: And this is the most generall acception of the word, under which is contain'd every imprudent action, whether against the Law, as to overthrow another mans house, or not against the Law, as to build his owne upon the Sand.

XVII. But when we speak of the Lawes, the word Sinne is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason, but that onely which is blameable, and therefore is call'd malum culpae, the evill of fault; but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne, or fault, but onely if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evill which he eschewes; and therefore through the diversity of our affections, it

happens that one counts that good, which another counts evill; and the same man what now he esteem'd for good, he immediately looks on as evill; and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe, he tearmes evill in another. For we all measure good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equalls, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seeme and are irkesome, and therefore evill to all; and men use to repute those evill, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive evill; its impossible to be determined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blam'd. They may agree indeed in some certaine generall things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sinnes, as if they should say that all men account those things evill to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense; but we demand not whether theft be a Sinne, but what is to be term'd theft, and so concerning other in like manner. For as much therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable, is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man more then another, because of the equality of humane nature, and there are no other reasons in being, but onely those of particular men, and that of the City, it followes, that the City is to determine what with reason is culpable: So as a fault, that is to say, a SINNE, is that, which a man do's, omits, sayes, or wills, against the reason of the City, that is, contrary to the Lawes.

XVIII. But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through humane infirmity, although he desire to fulfill them, and yet his action as being against the Lawes, is rightly blam'd, and call'd a Sinne. But there are some, who neglect the Lawes, and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only the deeds, but even the mindes of these

men are against the Lawes. They who sinne onely through infirmity, are good men even when they sinne; but these even when they doe not sin, are wicked. For though both the action, and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes, yet those repugnancies are distinguisht by different appellations, for the irregularity of the action is called adikema, unjust deed; that of the mind adikia, and kakia, injustice, and malice; that is, the infirmity of a disturbed soule, this the pravity of a sober mind.

XIX. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law, and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sinne, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he will say, that he never submitted his will to Gods will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech seems so farre forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be refer'd to sins of imprudence*; but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the Atheist is punisht either immediately by God himselfe, or by Kings constituted under God; not as a Subject is punished by a King, because he keeps not the Lawes, but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the Lawes; that is to say, by the Right of warre, as the Giants warring against God: For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.

- [Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence] Many find fault that I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared my

selfe an enemy bitter enough against Atheists: They object farther, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be knowne there is a God, by naturall reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the Law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to Atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some Law whereby I might condemne them of injustice; but when I found none, I enquired next what name God himselfe did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the Atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. therefore I placed their sinne in that rank which God himselfe referres to; next, I shew them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, then that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirme that they may under that notion be justly punisht both by God, and supreme Magistrates, and therefore by no meanes excuse or extenuate this sinne. Now that I have said that it might be known by naturall reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this, except they think that because Archimedes by naturall reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it followes thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be knowne to some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures, or seeking of riches and honour, also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to doe it, lastly, fools, in which number are Atheists, cannot know this.

XX. Seeing that from the vertue of the Covenant whereby each Subject is tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall obedience (such as is defined above Cha. art. 13.) to the City, that is to say, to the Soveraign power, whether that be one man or Councel, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civill Lawes, so that that Covenant contains in it self all the Laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the generall Covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the Lawes. Which trespasse is so much worse then any other one sinne, by how much to sinne alwayes, is worse then to sinne once. And this is that sin which is called TREASON; and it is a word or deed whereby the Citizen, or Subject, declares that he will no longer obey that man or Court to whom the supreme power of the City is entrusted. And the Subject declares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth, or endeavours to do violence to the Soveraigns Person, or to them who execute his commands; of which sort are Traytors, Regicides, and such as take up armes against the City, or during a warre, flye to the enemies side. And they shew the same will in word, who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that wee must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God intire) simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should say, that he had no Right to wage warre at his own will, to make Peace, list souldiers, levie monies, electing Magistrates, and publique Ministers, enacting Lawes, deciding controversies, setting penalties, or doing ought else, without which the State cannot stand. And these and the like words and deeds are Treason by the naturall, not the civill Law. But it may so happen, that some action which before the civill Law was made, was not Treason, yet will become such, if it be done afterwards. As if it be declared by the Law, that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing publique obedience (that is to say for Treason) if any man shall coyn monies, or forge the Privie Seale, he that

after that Declaration shall doe this, will be no lesse guilty of Treason then the other. Yet he sinnes lesse, because he breakes not all the Laws at once, but one Law only; for the Law by calling that Treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by Right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons, but it makes not the sinne it selfe more grievous.

XXI. But that sinne which by the Law of nature is Treason, is a Transgression of the naturall, not the civill Law. For since our obligation to civill obedience, by vertue whereof the civill Lawes are valid, is before all civill Law, and the sin of Treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it followes that by the sin of Treason, that Law is broken which preceded the civill Law, to wit, the naturall, which forbids us to violate Covenants, and betrothed faith. But if some Soveraign Prince should set forth a Law on this manner, Thou shalt not rebell, he would effect just nothing: For except Subjects were before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to rebell, all Law is of no force; now the obligation which obligeth to what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.

XXII. Hence it followes, that Rebels, Traytors, and all others convicted of Treason, are punisht not by civill, but naturall Right; that is to say, not as civill Subjects, but as Enemies to the Government, not by the Right of Soveraignty, and Dominion, but by the Right of Warre.

XXIII. There are some who think that those acts which are done against the Law, when the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe, are expiated, if the punished willingly undergoe the punishment; and that they are not guilty before God of breaking the naturall Law (although by breaking the civill Lawes, we break the naturall too, which command us to keep the civill) who have suffered the punishment which the Law required; as if by the Law, the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price, whereby a licence might be bought of doing what the

Law forbids. By the same reason they might inferre too, that no transgression of the Law were a sin, but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill. But we must know that the words of the Law may be understood in a twofold sense, the one as containing two parts (as hath been declared above in the seventh Art.) namely that of absolutely prohibiting, as, Thou shalt not doe this; and revenging, as, he that doth this, shall be punisht; The other, as containing a condition, for example, Thou shalt not doe this thing, unlesse thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus, the Law forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth it, sins, because he doth what the Law forbids to be done; if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to doe what is forbidden him, that performs the condition; For in the first sense, all men are forbidden to doe it; in the second, they only who keep themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative part of the Law obligeth not the guilty, but the Magistrate to require punishment; in the second, he himselfe that owes the punishment is obliged to exact it, to the payment whereof, if it be capitall, or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what sense the Law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath the Soveraignty. When there is therefore any doubt of the meaning of the Law, since we are sure they sinne not who doe it not, it will be sin if we doe it, howsoever the Law may afterward be explained; for so to doe that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he hath freedome to forbear it, is a contempt of the Lawes, and therefore by the 28. Art. of the third Chapter, a sin against the Law of nature. Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into Active and Passive, as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees, which is a sinne against the Law of nature, which is the Law of God; or as though they sinned not, who sinne at their own perill.

Chapter XV: Of the Kingdome of God, by Nature

I. WEE HAVE already in the foregoing Chapters, proved both by reason, and testimonies of holy Writ, that the estate of nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, who neither govern, nor are governed, is an Anarchy, or hostile state; that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state, are the Lawes of nature; that there can be no civill government without a Soveraigne; and that they who have gotten this Soveraigne command must be obey'd simply, that is to say, in all things which repugne not the Commandments of God: There is this one thing only wanting to the complete understanding of all civill duty, & that is, to know which are the Laws and Commandments of God. For else we cannot tell whether that which the civill power commands us, be against the Lawes of God, or not; whence it must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the civill authority, we become stubborne against the divine Majesty; or for feare of sinning against God, we runne into disobedience against the civill power: To avoid both these rocks, its necessary to know the Divine Lawes. now because the knowledge of the Lawes, depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome, we must in what followes, speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God.

II. The Lord is King, the earth may be glad there of saith the Psalmist, Psal: 97 v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist, Psal. 99. v. 1. The Lord is King, be the People never so unpatient; he sitteth betweene the Cherubins, be the Earth never so unquiet; to wit, whether men will, or not, God is THE King over all the Earth, nor is he mov'd from his Throne, if there be any who deny either his existence, or his providence. Now although God

governe all men so by his power, that none can doe any thing which he would not have done, yet this, to speake properly, and accurately, is not to reigne; for he is sayed to reigne, who rules not by acting, but speaking, that is to say, by precepts and threatnings. And therefore we account not inanimate, nor irrationall bodies, for Subjects in the Kingdome of God, although they be subordinate to the Divine power; because they understand not the commands, and threats of God; nor yet the Atheists, because they beleeve not that there is a God; nor yet those who beleeving there is a God, doe not yet beleeve that he rules these Inferiour things; for even these, although they be govern'd by the power of God, yet doe they not acknowledge any of his Commands, nor stand in awe of his threats. Those onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome, who acknowledge him to be the Governour of all things, and that he hath given his Commands to men, and appointed punishments for the transgressours; The rest, we must not call Subjects, but Enemies of God.

III. But none are said to governe by commands, but they who openly declare them to those who are govern'd by them; for the Commands of the Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd. But lawes they are not, if not perspicuously publisht, in so much as all excuse of Ignorance may be taken away. Men indeed publish their Lawes by word or voice, neither can they make their will universally knowne any other way; But Gods lawes are declar'd after a threefold manner: first, by the tacit dictates of Right reason: next, by immediate revelation, which is suppos'd to be done either by a supernaturall voice, or by a vision or dreame, or divine inspiration: Thirdly, by the voice of one man whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy of beliefe, by the working of true miracles. Now he whose voice God thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others, is called a PROPHET. These three manners may be term'd the threefold word of God, to wit the Rationall word, the sensible word, and the word of Prophecy: To which

answer, the three manners whereby we are said to heare God, Right reasoning, sense, and faith. Gods sensible word hath come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except particularly to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have any Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people.

IV. And according to the difference which is between the Rationall word and the word of Prophecy, we attribute a twofold Kingdome unto God: Naturall, in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason, and which is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power, by reason of that rationall nature which is common to all; and Propheticall, in which he rules also by the word of Prophecy, which is peculiar, because he hath not given positive Lawes to all men, but to his peculiar people, and some certaine men elected by him.

V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule, and to punish those who break his Lawes, from his sole irresistable power. For all Right over others is either from nature, or from Contract. How the Right of governing springs from Contract, we have already shewed in the 6. Chapter. And the same Right is derived from nature, in this very thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For when by nature all men had a Right over all things, every man had a Right of ruling over all as ancient as nature it selfe; but the reason why this was abolisht among men, was no other but mutuall fear; as hath been declared above in the second Chapter, the 3. art; reason namely dictating that they must foregoe that Right for the preservation of mankinde, because the equality of men among themselves according to their strength and naturall powers was necessarily accompanied with warre, and with warre joynes the destruction of mankinde. Now if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joyned forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that Right which nature had given him; The Right therefore of Dominion over

all the rest, would have remained with him, by reason of that excesse of power whereby he could have preserved both himselfe and them. They therefore whose power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty, derives his Right of Soveraignty from the Power it selfe. And as oft as God punisheth, or slayes a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned, yet may we not say that he could not justly have punisht or killed him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing, may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the Right of afflicting, and killing, depends not on divine Power, but on mens sins.

VI. That question made famous by the disputations of the Antients, why evill things befell the good, and good things the evill, is the same with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth good and evill things unto men. And with its difficulty, it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine providence, but also of Philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psal. 73. v. 1, 2, 3. Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart. but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well nigh slipt. And why? I was grieved at the wicked, I doe also see the ungodly in such prosperity. And how bitterly did Job expostulate with God, that being just, he should yet be afflicted with so many calamities? God himselfe with open voyce resolved this difficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his Right by arguments drawn not from Jobs sinne, but from his own power. For Job and his friends had argued so among themselves, that they would needs make him guilty, because he was punisht; and he would reprove their accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence: But God when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation, not by condemning him of injustice, or any sin, but by declaring his own power, Job. 38. v. 4. Where wast thou (sayes he) when I laid the foundation of the earth, &c. And for his friends, God pronounces

himself angry against them, Job. 42. v. 7. Because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant Job. Agreeable to this is that speech of our Saviours in the mans case who was born blind, when, his Disciples asking him whether he or his Parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, John 9. v. 3. neither hath this man sinned, nor his Parents, but that the works of God should be manifest in him. For though it be said, Rom. 5. 12. That death entred into the world by sinne, it followes not, but that God by his Right might have made men subject to diseases, and death, although they had never sinned, even as he hath made the other animalls mortall, and sickly, although they cannot sinne.

VII. Now if God have the Right of Soveraignty from his power, it is manifest, that the obligation of yeelding him obedience lyes on men by reason of their weaknesse*; for that obligation which rises from Contract, of which we have spoken in the second Chapter, can have no place here, where the Right of Ruling (no Covenant passing between) rises only from nature. But there are two Species of naturall obligation, one when liberty is taken away by corporall impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe obey the common Lawes of their Creation: The other when it is taken away by hope, or fear, according to which the weaker despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinde of obligation, that is to say from fear, or conscience of our own weaknesse (in respect of the divine power) it comes to passe, that we are obliged to obey God in his naturall Kingdome; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the divine power and providence, that there is no kicking against the pricks.

- [By reason of their weaknesse] If this shall seem hard to any man, I desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there were two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey; I beleeve he will confesse that neither is bound: if this be true, then it is

also true what I have set down, that men are subject unto God because they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour admonishing Paul (who at that time was an enemy to the Church) that he should not kick against the pricks, seems to require obedience from him for this cause, because he had not Power enough to resist.

VIII. Because the word of God ruling by nature onely, is supposed to be nothing else but right reason, and the Laws of Kings can be known by their word only, its manifest that the Laws of God ruling by nature alone, are onely the naturall Lawes; namely those which we have set down in the second and third Chapters, and deduced from the dictates of reason, Humility, Equity, Justice, Mercy, and other Morall vertues befriending Peace, which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men one toward the other, and those which right reason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those Naturall Laws, or Morall vertues are; but we must see what honours, and what divine worship, that is to say, what sacred Lawes, the same naturall reason doth dictate.

IX. Honour, to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of anothers Power joyned with goodnesse; and to honour a man, is the same with highly esteeming him, and so honour is not in the Party honoured, but in the honourer. Now three Passions do necessarily follow honour thus placed in opinion; Love, which referres to goodnesse; hope, and feare, which regard Power. And from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerfull are appeased, and become Propitious, and which are the effects, and therefore also the naturall signes of honour it selfe. But the word honour is transferred also to those outward effects of honour, in which sense, we are said to honour him, of whose power we testifie our selves, either in word, or deed, to have a very great respect; insomuch as honour is the same with

worship. Now WORSHIP is an outward act, the sign of inward honour. and whom we endeavour by our homage to appease, if they be, angry or howsoever to make them favourable to us, we are said to worship.

X. All signes of the mind are either words or deeds, and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds. Now both the one and the other are referred to three kindes; whereof the first is Praise, or publique declaration of goodnesse; The second, a publique declaration of Present Power, which is to magnify megalunois; The third, is a publique declaration of happinesse, or of Power, secure also for the future, which is called, makariomos. I say, that all kindes of honour may be discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then praise, and celebrate in words, when we doe it by way of Proposition, or Dogmatically, that is to say by Attributes, or Titles, which may be termed praysing, and celebrating, categorically, and plainly, as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberall, strong, wise; And then, in deeds, when it is done by consequence, or by hypothesis, or supposition, as by Thanksgiving, which supposeth goodnesse; or by Obedience, which supposeth Power. or by Congratulation, which supposeth happinesse;

XI. Now whether we desire to praise a man in words, or deeds, we shall find some things which signify honour with all men, such as among attributes, are the generall words of vertues and powers, which cannot be taken in ill sense, As Good, Faire, Strong, Just, and the like; and among actions, Obedience, Thanksgiving, Prayers, and others of that kinde, by which an acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever understood: Others, which signify honour, but with some, and scorne with others, or else neither; such as in Attributes, are those words which according to the diversity of opinions, are diversly referred to vertues or vices, to honest or dishonest things; As that a man slew his enemy, that he fled, that he is a Philosopher, or an Orator, and the like, which with some are had in honour,

with others in contempt. In deeds, such as depend on the custome of the place, or prescriptions of civill Lawes, as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the shoes, to bend the body. to petition for any thing, and the like. Now standing, prostrate, kneeling, forms of ceremony, that worship which is alwayes, and by all men accounted honourable, may be called Naturall; the other, which followes places, and customes, Arbitrary.

XII. Furthermore, worship may be enjoyned, to wit by the command of him that is worshiped, and it may bee voluntary, namely such as seems good to the worshipper: If it be enjoyned, the actions expressing it, do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as they are enjoyned: for they signify obedience immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship enjoyned consists in obedience. Voluntary is honourable onely in the nature of the actions, which if they doe signify honour to the beholders, it is worship, if not, it is Reproach. Again worship may be either publique or private. But publique, respecting each single worshipper, may not be voluntary; respecting the City it may. For seeing that which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the Doer, there would not one worship be given, but as many worships as worshippers, except the will of all men were united by the command, of one. But Private worship may be voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is done openly is restrained, either by Lawes, or through modesty, which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action.

XIII. Now that we may know what the scope and end of worshipping others is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship: And we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere, that Joy consists in this, that a man contemplate vertue, strength, science, beauty, friends, or any Power whatsoever, as being, or as though it were his own; and it is nothing else but a Glory, or Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured, that is to say, lov’d and fear’d, that is to say, having the services and assistances of men in readinesse. Now because men beleeve him to be powerfull whom they see

honoured (that is to say) esteemed powerfull by others, it falls out that honour is increased by worship; and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired. His end therefore who either commands, or suffers himself to be worshipt, is, that by this means he may acquire as many as he can, either through love, or fear, to be obedient unto him.

XIV. But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God naturall reason doth assigne us, let us begin from his Attributes: where, first it is manifest, that existence is to be allowed him; for there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no being. Next, those Philosophers who said, that God was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that is to say, a part of it) spake unworthily of God, for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being. For by the word God we understand the Worlds cause; but in saying that the World is God, they say, that it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like manner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but eternall; because there can be no cause of an eternall thing, In denying the world to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a God. They also have a wretched apprehension of God, who imputing idlenesse to him, doe take from him the Government of the world, and of mankind. For say they should acknowledge him omnipotent, yet if he minde not these inferiour things, that same thred-bare Sentence will take place with them, Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos; What is above us, doth not concern us. And seeing there is nothing for which they should either love, or fear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all. Moreover in Attributes which signifie Greatnesse, or Power, those which signifie some finite, or limited thing, are not signes at all of an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily if we ascribe lesse Power, or greatnesse to him then possibly we can; but every finite thing is lesse then we can, for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more to a finite thing; No shape therefore must be assigned to God, for all shape is finite; nor must he be said to be

conceived, or comprehended by imagination, or any other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is finite: And although this word Infinite signifie a conception of the mind, yet it followes not, that we have any conception of an infinite thing: For when we say that a thing is infinite, we signifie nothing really, but the impotency in our owne mind, as if we should say we know not whether, or where it is limited: Neither speak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an Idea of him in our mind; for an Idea is our conception, but conception we have none, except of a finite thing: Nor they, who say that he hath Parts, or that he is some certaine intire thing; which are also attributes of finite things: Nor that he is in any place; for nothing can be said to be in a place, but what hath bounds and limits of its greatnesse on all sides: Nor that he is moved, or is at rest; for either of them suppose a being in some place: Nor that there are more Gods; because not more infinites. Farthermore concerning attributes of happinesse, those are unworthy of God which signify sorrow (unlesse they be taken not for any Passion, but by a Metonomy for the effect) such as Repentance, anger, Pity: Or Want, as Appetite, Hope, Concupiscence, and that love which is also called lust, for they are signes of Poverty, since it cannot be understood, that a man should desire, hope, and wish for ought, but what he wants and stands in need. of. Or any Passive faculty; for suffering belongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we therefore attribute a will to God, it is not to be conceived like unto ours, which is called a rationall desire; for if God desires, he wants, which for any man to say, is a contumelie; but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive. In like manner when wee attribute sight and other acts of the senses to him, or knowledge, or understanding, which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the minde raised from outward objects pressing the Organes, wee must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity; for it is a signe of power depending upon some other, which is not

the most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe any other titles to God, then what reason commands, must use such as are either Negative, as infinite, eternall, incomprehensible, &c. or superlative, as most good, most great, most powerfull, &c. or Indefinite, as good, just, strong, Creatour, King, and the like; in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is (which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our phantasie), but to confesse our own admiration, and obedience, which is the property of humility, and of a minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe. For Reason dictates one name alone, which doth signify the nature of God (i.e.) Existent, or simply, that he is; and one in order to, and in relation to us, namely God, under which is contained both King, and Lord, and Father.

XV. Concerning the Outward actions wherewith God is to be worshipped (as also concerning his Titles) its a most generall command of Reason, that they be signes of a mind yeelding honour; under which are contained in the first place, Prayers;

Qui fingit sacros auro, vel marmore vultus,

Non facit ille Deos, qui rogat, ille facit.

For Prayers are the signes of hope, and hope is an acknowledgement of the divine Power, or goodnesse.

In the second place, Thanksgiving; which is a signe of the same affection, but that prayers goe before the benefit, and thanks follow it.

In the third, Guifts, that is to say oblations and sacrifices, for these are thanksgivings.

In the fourth, not to sweare by any other. For a mans Oath is an, Imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knowes whether he doe, or not, and can punish him if he doe, though he be never so powerfull; which only belongs to God: for if there were any man from whom his subjects malice could not lye hid, and whom no humane power

could resist, plighted faith would suffice without swearing, which, broken, might be punisht by that Man; and for this very reason there would be no need of an Oath.

In the fifth place, To speak warily of God; for that is a sign of fear, and feare is an acknowledgement of Power. It followes from this precept: That we may not take the name of God in vain, or use it rashly; for either are inconsiderate. That wee must not swear where there is no need; for that is in vain; but need there is none, unlesse it be between Cities to avoyd or take away contention by force, which necessarily must arise, where there is no faith kept in promises, or in a City, for the better certainty of Judicature. Also, That we must not dispute of the Divine nature: For it is supposed that all things in the naturall Kingdom of God are enquired into by reason only, that is to say, out of the Principles of naturall Science; but we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as reach to the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies, or of any other Creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty, according to the small measure of our conceptions. It followes also (which belongs to the Right of Gods Kingdome) that their speech is inconsiderate, and rash, who say, That this, or that, doth not stand with divine justice; for even men count it an affront that their children should dispute their Right, or measure their justice otherwise then by the rule of their Commands.

In the sixth. Whatsoever is offered up in Prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices, must in its kind be the best, and most betokening honour; namely, Prayers must not be rash, or light, or vulgar, but beautifull, and well composed. For though it were absurd in the Heathen to worship God in animage, yet was it not against reason to use Poetry, and Musick, in their Churches. Also Oblations must be clean, and Presents sumptuous, and such

as are significative either of submission, or gratitude, or commemorative of benefits received; for all these proceed from a desire of honouring.

In the seventh. That God must be worshipt not privately onely, but openly, and publiquely in the sight of all men; because that worship is so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour, and esteem in others (as hath been declared before in the 13. art.). Unlesse others therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship, vanisheth.

In the last place. That we use our best endeavour to keep the Lawes of Nature. For the undervaluing of our Masters command, exceeds all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, Obedience is more acceptable then all other sacrifices. And these are principally the naturall Lawes concerning the worship of God, those I mean which Reason dictates to every Man; but to whole Cities, every one whereof is one Person, the same naturall Reason farther commands an uniformity of publique worship. For the actions done by particular Persons, according to their private Reasons, are not the Cities actions, and therefore not the Cities worship; but what is done by the City, is understood to be done by the command of him, or them who have the Soveraignty, wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects, that is to say, Uniformly.

XVI. The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article concerning the divine worship, only command the giving of naturall signes of honour; but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes, the one naturall, the other done upon agreement, or by expresse, or tacite composition. Now because in every language, the use of words, and names, come by appointment, it may also by appointment be altered; for that which depends on, and derives its force from the will of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again, or abolisht. Such names therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken away; now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the

City may doe; The City therefore by Right (that is to say, they who have the power of the whole City) shall judge what names or appellations are more, what lesse honourable for God, that is to say, what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God, and his operations. Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment, but naturally, even as the effects are signes of their causes; whereof some are alwayes signes of Scorn to them before whom they are committed, as those, whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect; Others are alwayes signes of honour, as to draw near, and discourse decently and humbly, to give way, or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit: In these actions the City can alter nothing. But there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour, or reproach, are indifferent; now these, by the institution of the City, may both be made signes of honour, and being made so, doe in very deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to say, for Worship; provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour, because that is a sign of honour, which by the Cities command is us'd for such.

XVII. We have already declared which were the Laws of God, as wel sacred as secular, in his government by the way of Nature onely. Now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that it so falls out, that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions, it may be demanded farther, whom God would have to be the Interpreter of right Reason, that is to say, of his Lawes. And as for the Secular Lawes, I mean those which concern justice, and the carriage of men towards men; by what hath been said before of the constitution of a City, we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason, that all Judicature belongs to the City, and that Judicature is nothing else but an Interpretation of the Laws, and by consequence, that everywhere Cities, that is to say, those who

have the Soveraign power, are the Interpreters of the Lawes. As for the Sacred Lawes, we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth Chap. the 13. art. that every Subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him, or them, who had the supreme authority, but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured, and therefore also he hath done it; That he could, it appeares hence, that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht from every mans private Reason; but every man can subject his private Reason to the Reason of the whole. City Moreover, if each Man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so great a diversity of worshippers, one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem to the other to honour God: Even that therefore which were most consonant to reason, would not be a worship, because that the nature of worship consists in this, that it be the sign of inward honour; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others, and therefore is there no sign of honour but what seems so to others. Again, that's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the City, becomes a sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God, declared by the way of reason onely, to give him such signs of honour as the City shall command. Wherefore Subjects can transferre their Right of judging the manner of Gods worship on him or them who have the Soveraign power. Nay, they must doe it, for else all manner of absurd opinions, concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any Nations, will bee seen at once in the same, City. whence it will fall out, that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe offer God an affront; so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships God; for no man worships God, that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby hee

appeares to others for to honour him. It may therefore bee concluded, that the Interpretation of all Lawes, as well Sacred, as Secular, (God ruling by the way of nature only) depends on the authority of the City, that is to say, that man, or councell, to whom the Soveraign power is committed; and that whatsoever God commands, he commands by his voyce. And on the other side, that whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of honouring God, and concerning secular affaires, is commanded by God himselfe.

XVIII. Against this, some Man may demand, first, Whether it doth not follow, that the City must be obeyed if it command us directly to affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow, neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all, cannot by any Man be understood for a manner of worshipping; neither also had any one, before the constitution of a City, of those who acknowledge God to rule, a Right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him; nor could he therefore transfer a Right on the City of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether the City must be obeyed if it command somewhat to be said, or done, which is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences may be derived: as for example, if it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who account that honourable? Truly it is to be done*. For Worship is instituted in signe of Honour; but to Worship him thus, is a signe of honour, and increaseth Gods Honour among those who do so account of it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name which we know not what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word, God? That also must be done; for what we do for Honours sake, (and we know no better), if it be taken for a signe of Honour, it is a signe of Honour; and therefore if we refuse to doe it, we refuse the enlarging of Gods Honour. The same judgement must be had of all the Attributes and Actions about the meerly rationall Worship of God which

may be controverted, and disputed; for though these kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore sins in them who command them, yet are they not against right reason, nor sins in Subjects, whose right reason in points of Controversie is that, which submits its selfe to the reason of the City. Lastly, if that Man, or Councell, who hath the Supreme Power, command himselfe to be Worshipt with the same Attributes, and Actions, wherewith God is to be Worshipt, the question is, whether we must obey? There are many things which may be commonly attributed both to God, and Men; for even Men may be Praised, and Magnified; and there are many actions whereby God, and Men, may be Worshipt. But the significations of the Attributes, and Actions, are onely to be regarded: Those Attributes therefore, whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a Soveraignty independent from God, or that he is immortall, or of infinite power, and the like, though commanded by Princes, yet must they be abstained from. As also from those Actions signifying the same, as Prayer to the absent; to aske those things which God alone can give, as Rain, and Fair weather; to offer him what God can onely accept, as Oblations, Holocausts; or to give a Worship, then which a greater cannot be given, as Sacrifice. For these things seeme to tend to this end, that God may not be thought to rule, contrary to what was supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civill Worship. for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the civill power onely. For Divine Worship is distinguisht from civill, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the Body, but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we doe Worship; as if we cast down our selves before any man, with intention of declaring by that Signe that we esteeme him as God, it is Divine Worship; if we doe the same thing as a Signe of our acknowledgment of the civill Power, it is civill Worship. Neither is the

Divine Worship distinguished from Civill by any action usually understood by the words latreia and douleia, whereof the former marking out the Duty of Servants, the latter their Destiny, they are words of the same action in degree.

- [Truly it is to be done] We said in the 14. Article of this Chapter, That they who attributed limits to God, transgrest the naturall Law concerning Gods Worship. Now they who worship him in an Image, assigne him limits; wherefore they doe that which they ought not to doe, and this place seemes to contradict the former. We must therefore know first, that they who are constrained by Authority, doe not set God any bounds, but they who command them; for they who worship unwillingly, doe worship in very deed, but they either stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawfull Soveraign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all times, and every where, but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping God beside the dictates of humane reason; for then the will of the City stands for Reason. But in the Kingdome of God by way of Covenant, whether old, or new, where idolatry is expressely forbid, though the City commands us to worship thus, yet must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some repugnancy between this, and the 14. Article, will surely cease to think so any longer.

XIX. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by the way of naturall reason onely, Subjects doe sinne, First, if they break the morall Laws, which are unfolded in the second and third Chapters. Secondly, if they break the Lawes, or commands of the City in those things which pertain to Justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God, kata ta nomika.

Fourthly, if they confesse not before men, both in words, and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme King of the World, and of all worldly Kings; that is to say, if they doe not worship God. This fourth sinne in the naturall Kingdome of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, in the second Article, is the sinne of Treason against the Divine Majesty; for it is a denying of the Divine Power, or Atheisme. For sinnes proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the Soveraign King, who being himselfe absent, should rule by his Vice-Roy; against whom sure they would transgresse who should not obey his Vice-Roy in all things, except he usurpt the Kingdome to himself, or would give it to some other; but they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be said to be guilty of Treason.

Chapter XVI: Of the Kingdome of God under the Old Covenant

I. MANKIND, FROM conscience of its own weaknesse, and admiration of naturall events, hath this, that most men beleeve God to be the invisible Maker of all visible things, whom they also fear, conceiving that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves; but the imperfect use they had of their Reason, the violence of their Passions did so clowd them, that they could not rightly worship him. Now the fear of invisible things, when it is sever'd from right reason is superstition. It was therefore almost impossible for men without the speciall assistance of God to avoyd both Rocks of Atheisme and Superstition: for this proceeds from fear without right reason, that, from an opinion of right reason, without feare. Idolatry therefore did easily fasten upon the greatest part of men, and almost all nations did worship God in Images, and resemblances of finite things; and they worshipt spirits, or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them Devills. But it pleased the Divine Majesty (as we read it written in the sacred history) out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him, and to reveal himselfe supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous Covenant with him and his seed, which is called the old Covenant, or Testament. He therefore is the head of true Religion; he was the first that after the Deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creatour of the Universe; And from him the Kingdome of God by way of Covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. Antiq. Jewes. lib. I. ca.

II. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not onely naturally, but also by way of Covenant, over Adam, and Eve; so as it seems he would

have no obedience yeelded to him, beside that which naturall Reason should dictate, but by the way of Covenant, that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this Covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the originall of Gods Kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way, that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evill (whether the judicature of good and evill, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden) God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good, or evill, which was commanded; for the fruit of the tree, if the Command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evill, that is to say, a sinne.

III. Now the Covenant between God and Abraham, was made in this manner. Gen. 17. v. 7, 8. I will establish my Covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations,for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the Land wherein thou art a stranger, all the Land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession, and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign whereby Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this Covenant; wherefore Circumcision was added to the Covenant, but yet as a sign onely. vers 10: This is my Covenant which yee shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token of the Covenant between me and you. It is therefore Covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God, and the God of his seed; that is to say, that he shall submit himselfe to be governed by him, and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that Land wherein he then dwelt, but as a Pilgrim, and that Abraham for

a memoriall sign of this Covenant, should take care to see himselfe, and his male seed circumcised.

IV. But seeing that Abraham even before the Covenant acknowledged God to be the Creatour and King of the world, (for he never doubted either of the being, or the Providence of God) how comes it not to be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price, and by contract, an obedience which was due to him by nature; namely by promising Abraham the Land of Canaan, upon condition that he would receive him for his God, when by the Right of nature he was already so? By those words therefore, To be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee, wee understand not that Abraham satisfied this Covenant by a bare acknowledgement of the power, and Dominion which God had naturally over men, that is to say, by acknowledging God indefinitely, which belongs to naturall reason; but he must definitely acknowledge him, who said unto him, Gen. 12. v. 1. Get thee out of thy Country, &c. Gen. 13. v. 14. Lift up thine eyes. &c. who appear'd unto him, Gen. 18. v. 1. in the shape of three celestiall men, and Gen. 15. v. 1. In a vision; and vers. 13. In a dream, which is matter of faith. In what shape God appeared unto Abraham, by what kinde of sound he spake to him, is not exprest, yet it is plain that Abraham beleeved that voyce to be the voyce of God, and a true Revelation; and would have all his to worship him, who had so spoken unto him, for God the Creatour of the world; and that his faith was grounded on this, not that he beleeved God to have a being, or that he was true in his promises, that which all men beleeve, but that he doubted not him to be God, whose voice, and promises he had heard; and that the God of Abraham signified not simply God, but that God which appeared unto him, even as the worship which Abraham owed unto God in that notion, was not the worship of reason, but of Religion, and Faith, and that, which not reason, but God had supernaturally revealed.

V. But we read of no Lawes given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to his family, either then, or after, secular, or sacred (excepting the Commandement of Circumcision, which is contained in the Covenant it selfe); whence it is manifest, that there were no other Lawes, or worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the Lawes of nature, rationall worship, and circumcision.

VI. Now Abraham was the Interpreter of all Lawes, as well sacred as secular, among those that belonged to him, not meerly naturally, as using the Lawes of nature onely, but even by the form of the Covenant it selfe, in which obedience is promised by Abraham not for himselfe onely, but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except his children had been tyed to obey his Commands: And how can that be understood, which God sayes Gen. 18. vers. 18. 19. (All the Nations of the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he will command his children, and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to doe justice, and judgement) unlesse his children and his houshold were supposed to be obliged to yeeld obedience unto his Commands.

VII. Hence it followes, that Abrahams subjects could not sinne in obeying him, provided that Abraham commanded them not, to deny Gods Existence, or Providence, or to doe somewhat expresly contrary to the honour of God. In all other things, the word of God was to be fetcht from his lips only, as being the Interpreter of all the Lawes, and words of God. For Abraham alone could teach them who was the God of Abraham, and in what manner he was to be worshipped. And they who after Abrahams death were subject to the Soveraignty of Isaac or Iacob, did by the same reason obey them in all things without sin, as long as they acknowledged, and profest the God of Abraham to be their God. For they had submitted themselves to God simply, before they did it to Abraham; and to Abraham before they did it to the God of Abraham; againe, to the God of Abraham

before they did it to Isaac. In Abrahams subjects therefore, To deny God was the only Treason against the Divine Majesty; but in their posterity it was also Treason to deny t he God of Abraham, that is to say, to worship God otherwise then was instituted by Abraham, to wit, in Images made with hands, as other Nations did, which for that reason were called Idolators. And hitherto subjects might easily enough discern what was to be observed, what avoyded in the Commands of their Princes. In Images made with hands In the 15. Cha. Article, There wee have shewed such a kinde of worship to be irrationall; but if it be done by the command of a City to whom the written word of God is not known, nor received, we have then shewed this worship in the 15. Chap. art. 18. to be rationall. But where God reigns by way of Covenant, in which it is expresly warned not to worship thus, as in the Covenant made with Abraham, there, whether it be with, or without the Command of the City, it is ill done.

VIII. To goe on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture, The same Covenant was renewed, Gen. 26. vers. 3, 4. with Isaac, and Gen. 28. vers. 14. with Iacob, where God stiles himselfe not simply God, whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the God of Abraham and Isaac; afterward being about to renew the same Covenant, by Moyses, with the whole People of Israel, Exod. 3. v. 6. I am saith he the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Afterward when that People, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to humane subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their AEgyptian bondage, abode in the wildernesse near mount Sinai, that antient Covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner, Exod. 19. ver. 5. Therefore if yee will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, (to wit, that Covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob) then shall yee be a peculiar Treasure unto me, above all People; for all the earth is mine, and yee shall be to me a Kingdome of Priests, and an holy Nation.

And all the People answered together, and said, All that the Lord hath spoken, will we doe, vers. 8.

IX. In this Covenant, among other things, we must consider well the appellation of Kingdom not used before. For although God both by nature & by Covenant made with Abraham, was their King, yet owed they him an obedience and worship only naturall, as being his subjects; & religious such as Abraham instituted, as being the Subjects of Abraham, Isaac, & Iacob, their naturall Princes; For they had received no word of God beside the naturall word of right reason, neither had any Covenant past between God and them, otherwise then as their wils were included in the will of Abraham, as their Prince. But now by the Covenant made at mount Sinai, the consent of each man being had, there becomes an institutive Kingdome of God over them. That Kingdom of God so renowned in Scriptures and writings of Divines, took its beginning from this time, and hither tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites asked a King, 1. Sam. 8. 7. They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them; and that which Samuel told the Israelites, 1. Sam. 12. 12. Yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King; and that which is said, Jer. 31. vers. 31. I will make a new Covenant, &c. Although I was an Husband unto them; And the doctrine also of Judas Galilaeus, where mention is made in Ioseph. Antiq. of the Iewes, 18. Book, 2. Chap. in these words: But Judas Galilaeus was the first authour of this fourth way of those who followed the study of wisdome. These agree in all the rest with the Pharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of liberty, beleeving God alone to be held for their Lord and Prince, and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments, together with their kinsfolks, and dearest friends, then call any mortall man their Lord.

X. The Right of the Kingdome being thus constituted by way of Covenant, let us see in the next place, what lawes God propounded to them; now those are knowne to all, to wit, the Decalogue, and those other, as well judiciall as ceremoniall lawes, which we find from the 20. Chap. of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomie, and the death of Moyses. Now of those lawes deliver'd in generall by the hand of Moyses, some there are which oblige naturally, being made by God, as the God of nature, and had their force even before Abrahams time; others there are which oblige by vertue of the Covenant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of Abraham, which had their force even before Moyses his time, by reason of the former Covenant; but there are others which oblige by vertue of that Covenant onely which was made last with the people themselves, being made by God, as being the Peculiar King of the Israelites. Of the first sort are all the Precepts of the Decalogue which pertaine unto manners, such as, Honour thy Parents, thou shalt not Kill, thou shalt not commit Adultery, thou shalt not Steale, thou shalt not beare false witnesse, thou shalt not Covet; For they are the Lawes of nature; Also the precept of not taking Gods name in vaine, for it is a part of naturall worship, as hath beene declar'd in the foregoing Chap. Art. 15. In like manner the second Commandement of not worshipping by way of any Image made by themselves; for this also is a part of naturall Religion, as hath beene shewed in the same Article. Of the second sort is the first Commandment of the Decalogue, of not having any other Gods; for in that consists the essence of the Covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires nothing else, but that he should be his God, and the God of his seede: Also the Precept of keeping holy the Sabbath; for the Sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memoriall of the six dayes Creation, as appeares out of these words, Exod. 31. ver. 16, 17. It is a perpetuall Covenant, (meaning the Sabbath) and a signe betweene me, and the Children of Israel for ever, for in sixe dayes the Lord made

Heaven, and Earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed. Of the third kind are the Politique, judiciall and Ceremoniall lawes, which onely belong'd to the Jewes. The lawes of the first and second sort written in Tables of stone, to wit the Decalogue, was kept in the Ark it selfe. The rest written in the volume of the whole Law, were laid up in the side of the Arke. Deut. 31. ver. 26. For these retaining the faith of Abraham might be chang'd, those could not.

XI. All Gods Lawes are Gods Word; but all Gods Word is not his Law. I am the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the Land of AEgypt, is the word of God, it is no Law: Neither is all that which for the better declaring of Gods Word is pronounc't, or written together with it, instantly to be taken for Gods Word: For, Thus saith the Lord, is not the voice of God, but of the Preacher or Prophet. All that, and onely that, is the word of God which a true Prophet hath declar'd God to have spoken. Now the writings of the Prophets comprehending as well those things which God, as which the Prophet himselfe speaks, are therefore called the word of God, because they containe the word of God. Now because all that, and that alone, is the Word of God which is recommended to us for such, by a true Prophet, it cannot be knowne what Gods Word is, before we know who is the true Prophet; nor can we beleeve Gods Word, before we beleeve the Prophet. Moyses was beleev'd by the People of Israel for two things, His Miracles, and his Faith; for how great, and most evident Miracles soever he had wrought, yet would they not have trusted him, at least he was not to have beene trusted, if he had call'd them out of AEgypt to any other worship then the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their Fathers. For it had beene contrary to the Covenant made by themselves with God. In like manner two things there are, to wit, supernaturall Prediction of things to come, which is a mighty miracle; and Faith in the God of Abraham their deliverer out of AEgypt, which God propos'd to all the Jews to be kept for marks of a true

Prophet. He that wants either of these is no Prophet, nor is it to be receiv'd for Gods word which he obtrudes for such. If Faith be wanting, he is rejected in these words, Deut. 13. ver. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If there arise among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a signe, or a wonder, and the signe or the wonder come to Passe, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us goe after other Gods, & c. That Prophet, or that dreamer of dreames shall be put to death. If Praediction of events be wanting, he is condemn'd by these, Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. And if thou say in thine heart, how shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken? When a Prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to Passe, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath spoken it presumptuously. Now, that that is the word of God which is publisht for such by a true Prophet, and that he was held to be a true Prophet among the Jewes, whose faith was true, and to whose praedictions the events answer'd, is without controversie. But what it is to follow other Gods, and whether the events which are affirm'd to answer their praedictions, doe truly answer them, or not, may admit many controversies, specially in praedictions which obscurely, & aenigmatically foretell the Event, such as the praedictions of almost all the Prophets are, as who saw not God apparently like unto Moyses, but in darke speeches, and in figures. Numb. 12. ver. 8. But of these we cannot judge otherwise then by the way of naturall reason; because that Judgment depends on the Prophets interpretation, and on its proportion with the Event.

XII. The Jewes did hold the booke of the whole Law which was called Deuteronomie, for the written word of God, and that onely, (forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history) untill the Captivity; for this booke was deliver'd by Moyses himselfe to the Priests to be kept, and layd up in the side of the Ark of the Covenant, and to be copyed out by the Kings; and the same a long time after by the authority of King Josiah acknowledg'd

againe for the Word of God. Kings 23. ver. 2. But it is not manifest when the rest of the books of the Old Testament were first receiv'd into Canon. But what concernes the Prophets, Isaiah and the rest, since they foretold no other things then what were to come to passe, either in or after the Captivity, their writings could not at that time be held for Prophetique, by reason of the Law cited above. Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. Whereby the Israelites were commanded not to account any man for a true Prophet but him whose Prophecies were answer'd by the events; And hence peradventure it is that the Jews esteem'd the writings of those whom they slew when they Prophesied, for Prophetique afterward, that is to say, for the word of God.

XIII. It being known what Lawes there were under the old Covenant, and that Word of God receiv'd from the beginning; we must farthermore consider with whom the authority of judging, whether the writings of the Prophets arising afterward, were to be receiv'd for the Word of God, that is to say, whether the Events did answer their praedictions or not, and with whom also the authority of interpreting the Lawes already receiv'd, and the written Word of God, did reside; which thing is to be trac't through all the times, and severall changes of the Commonwealth of Israel. But it is manifest that this power during the life of Moyses, was intirely in himselfe; for if he had not been the Interpreter of the Lawes and Word, that office must have belong'd either to every private Person, or to a congregation, or Synagogue of many, or to the High-Priest, or to other Prophets. First, that that office belong'd not to private men, or any Congregation made of them, appeares hence, that they were not admitted, nay they were prohibited, with most heavy threats, to heare God speake, otherwise then by the means of Moyses; for it is written, Let not the Priests and the people break through to come up unto the Lord, lest he break forth upon them. So Moyses went downe unto the people, and spake unto them. Exod. 19. 24, 25. It is farther manifestly, and expresly declar'd, upon occasion given by the Rebellion of

Core, Dathan and Abiram, and the two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly, that neither private men, nor the Congregation should pretend that God had spoken by them, and by Consequence that they had the right of interpreting Gods Word; for they contending, that God spake no lesse by them then by Moyses, argue thus, Yee take too much upon you, seeing all the Congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among them; wherefore then lift yee up your selves above the Congregation of the Lord? Numb. 16. ver. 3. But how God determin'd this controversie is easily understood by the 33. and 35. verses of the same Chapter, where Corah, Dathan, and Abiram went downe alive into the Pit, and there came out fire from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred and fifty men that offer'd Incense: Secondly, that Aaron the high Priest had not this authority, is manifest by the like controversie betweene him (together with his Sister Miriam) and Moyses; For the question was, whether God spake by Moyses only, or by them also, that is to say, whether Moyses alone, or whether they also were interpreters of the Word of God. For thus they said, Hath the Lord indeed spoken onely by Moyses? Hath he not also spoken by us? Numb. 12. ver. 2. But God reprov'd them, and made a distinction betweene Moyses and other Prophets, saying, If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my selfe knowne unto him in a vision, and will speake unto him in a dreame: My Servant Moyses is not so, &c. For with him will I speake mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in darke speeches, and the Similitude of the Lord shall he behold; wherefore then were yee not afraid to speake against my Servant Moyses? Ibid. ver. 6, 7, 8. Lastly, that the interpretation of the Word of God as long as Moses liv'd, belong'd not to any other Prophets whatsoever, is collected out of that place which we now cited concerning his eminency above all others, and out of naturall reason, for as much as it belongs to the same Prophet who brings the Commands of God to unfold them too; but there was then no other Word of God, beside

that which was declar'd by Moyses. And out of this also, that there was no other Prophet extant at that time, who Prophesied to the people, excepting the 70. Elders who Prophesied by the Spirit of Moyses; and even that Joshuah, who was then Moyses his Servant, his successour afterward, beleev'd to be injuriously done, till he knew it was by Moyses his Consent; which thing is manifest by Text of Scripture, And the Lord came downe in a clowd, & c. and tooke of the spirit that was upon Moyses, and gave it unto the 70. Elders. Numb. 11. ver. 25. Now after it was told that they Prophesied, Joshuah said unto Moyses, Forbid them my Lord. But Moyses answered, Why enviest thou for my sake? Seeing therefore Moyses alone was the Messenger of Gods Word, and that the authority of interpreting it pertain'd neither to private men, nor to the Synagogue, nor to the High Priest, nor to other Prophets; it remaines, that Moyses alone was the Interpreter of Gods Word, who also had the supreme power in civill matters; And that the conventions of Corah with the rest of his complices against Moses and Aaron; and of Aaron with his Sister against Moyses, were rais'd, not for the salvation of their soules, but by reason of their ambition, and desire of Dominion over the People.

XIV. In Joshuahs time the interpretation of the Lawes, and of the Word of God, belong'd to Eleazar the High Priest, who was also under God, their absolute King. Which is collected first of all out of the Covenant it selfe, in which the Common-wealth of Israel is called a Priestly Kingdome, or as it is recited in the 1 Pet. 2. 9. A Royall Priesthood; which could in no wise be sayd, unlesse by the institution and Covenant of the People, the regall power were understood to belong to the High Priest. Neither doth this repugne what hath beene said before, where Moyses, and not Aaron, had the Kingdome under God; since it is necessary that when one man institutes the forme of a future Common-wealth, that one should governe the Kingdome which he institutes, during his life, (whether it be Monarchie,

Aristocraty, or Democraty) and have all that power for the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future. Now, that Eleazar the Priest, had not onely the Priesthood, but also the Soveraignty, is expressely set downe in Joshuahs call to the administration; for thus it is written. Take thee Joshuah the Son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit, and lay thine hand upon him, and set him before Eleazer the Priest, and before all the Congregation, and give him a charge in their sight, and thou shalt put some of thine honour uPon him, that all the Congregation of the Children of Israel may be obedient, and he shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall aske Counsell for him after the judgment of Urim, before the Lord: at his word shall they goe out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the Children of Israel with him, even all the Congregation. Num. 27. ver. 18, 19, 20, 21. where to aske Counsell of God for whatsoever is to be done, (that is) to interpret Gods word, and in the name of God to Command in all matters, belongs to Eleazar; and to goe out, and, to come in at his word, that is to say, to obey, belongs both to Joshuah, and to all the People. Its to be observ'd also, that that speech, Part of thy glory; clearely denotes that Joshuah had not a power equall with that which Moyses had. In the meane time it is manifest, that even in Ioshuahs time, the Supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were both in one Person.

XV. After Ioshuahs death follow the times of the Iudges untill King Saul, in which it is manifest that the right of the Kingdome instituted by God, remained with the High Priest. For the Kingdome was by Covenant Priestly, that is to say, Gods government by Priests; and such ought it to have been untill that form with Gods consent were changed by the people themselves: which was not done, before that requiring a King God consented unto them, and said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voyce of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them. 1. Sam. 8. 7. The supreme civill power was

therefore Rightly due by Gods own institution to the High-Priest; but actually that power was in the Prophets, to whom (being raysed by God in an extraordinary manner) the Israelites (a people greedy of the Prophets) submitted themselves to be protected, and judged, by reason of the great esteem they had of Prophecies. The Reason of this thing, was, because that though penalties were set, and Judges appointed in the institution of Gods priestly Kingdome, yet, the Right of inflicting punishment, depended wholly on private judgement; and it belonged to a dissolute multitude, and each single Person, to punish or not to punish according as their private zeale should stirre them up. And therefore Moyses by his own command punisht no man with death; but when any man was to be put to death, one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them, by divine authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord. Now this was conformable to the nature of Gods peculiar Kingdome. For there God reignes indeed where his Lawes are obeyed, not for fear of men, but for fear of himselfe. And truly, if men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state of civill government; but as men are, there is a coercive power (in which I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them. And therefore also God from the beginning prescribed Lawes by Moyses for the future Kings. Deut. 17. vers. 14. and Moyses foretold this in bis last words to the people, saying, I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt your selves, and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you, &c. Deut. 31. 29. When therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel, the children of Israel did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served Balaam, Iud. 2. 10, 11. to wit, they cast off Gods government, that is to say, that of the Priest, by whom God ruled, and afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies, and opprest with bondage, they looked for Gods will, not at the hands of the Priest any more, but of the Prophets.

These therefore actually judged Israel, but their obedience was rightly due to the High Priest; Although therefore the Priestly Kingdome after the death of Moyses, & Ioshuah, was without power, yet was it not without Right. Now that the interpretation of Gods word did belong to the same High Priest, is manifest by this, That God, after the Tabernacle, & the Ark of the Covenant was consecrated, spake no more in mount Sinai, but in the Tabernacle of the Covenant, from the propitiatory which was between the Cherubims, whether it was not lawfull for any to aproach except the High Priest. If therefore regard be had to the Right of the Kingdome, the supreme civill Power, and the authority of interpreting Gods word, were joyned in the High Priest; If we consider the fact, they were united in the Prophets who judged Israel. For as Iudges, they bad the civill authority, as Prophets, they interpreted Gods word, and thus every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable.

XVI. Kings being once constituted, its no doubt but the civill authority belonged to them, for the Kingdome of God by the way of Priesthood, (God consenting to the request of the Israelites) was ended; which Hierom also marks speaking of the books of Samuel: Samuel (sayes he) Eli being dead, and Saul slain, declares the old Law abolisht; Furthermore the Oaths of the new Priesthood, and new Soveraignty in Zadok, and David, do testifie, that the Right whereby the Kings did rule, was founded in the very concession of the People. The Priest could rightfully do only what God had commanded, but the King had by right whatsoever power over every man that each man by right had over himself; for the Israelites granted him a Right to judge of all things, and to wage warre for all men; in which two are contained all Right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man. Our King (say they) shall judge us, and goe out before us, and fight our battails, 1. Sam. 8. 20. Iudicature therefore belonged to the Kings; but to judge is nothing else then by interpreting to apply the facts to the Lawes; to them

therefore belonged the interpretation of Lawes too. And because there was no other written word of God acknowledged beside the Law of Moyses, untill the Captivity, the authority of interpreting Gods word, did also belong to the Kings; Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken for a Law, if there had been another written word beside the Mosaicall Law, seeing the interpretation of Lawes belonged to the Kings, the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them. When the book of Deuteronomie (in which the whole Mosaicall Law was contained) being a long time lost, was found again, the Priests indeed asked Counsell of God concerning that book; but not by their own authority, but by the Commandement of Iosiah, and not immediately neither, but by the meanes of Holda the Prophetesse. Whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of God, belonged not to the Priest; neither yet followes it that that authority belonged to the Prophetesse, because others did judge of the Prophets whether they were to be held for true, or not. For to what end did God give signes, and tokens to all the People, whereby the true Prophets might be discerned from the false, namely, the event of predictions, and conformity with the Religion establisht by Moyses, if they might not use those marks? The authority therefore of admitting books for the word of God belonged to the King, & thus that book of the Law was approved, and received again by the authority of King Iosiah, as appears by the fourth book of the Kings, 22. 23. Chap. where it is reported that he gathered together all the severall degrees of his Kingdome, the Elders, Priests, Prophets, and all the people, and he read in their eares all the words of the Covenant, that is to say, he caused that Covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaicall Covenant, that is to say, for the word of God, and to be again received, and confirmed by the Israelites. The civill power therefore, and the power of discerning Gods word from the word of men, and of interpreting Gods word even in the dayes of the Kings was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent

not with authority, but in the form, and by the Right of Proclaimers, and Preachers, of whom the hearers did judge; and if perhaps these were punisht who did not listen to them plainly, teaching easie things, it doth not thence follow, that the Kings were obliged to follow all things which they in Gods name did declare, were to be followed. For though Iosiah the good King of Iudah were slain because he obeyed not the word of the Lord from the mouth of Necho King of AEgypt, that is to say, because he rejected good Counsell though it seemed to come from an enemy, yet no man I hope will say that Iosiah was by any bond either of divine, or humane Lawes obliged to beleeve Pharoah Necho King of AEgypt, because he said that God had spoken to him. But what some man may object against Kings, that for want of learning, they are seldome able enough to interpret those books of antiquity in the which Gods word is contained, and that for this cause it is not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority, he may object as much against the Priests, and all mortall men, for they may erre; and although Priests were better instructed in nature, and arts then other men, yet Kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters under them; and so, though Kings did not themselves interpret the word of God, yet the office of interpreting them might depend on their authority; and they who therefore refuse to yeeld up this authority to Kings, because they cannot practise the office it selfe, doe as much as if they should say that the authority of teaching Geometry must not depend upon Kings, except they themselves were Geometricians. We read that Kings have prayed for the People, that they have blest the people, that they have consecrated the Temple, that they have commanded the Priests, that they have removed Priests from their office, that they have constituted others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered, for that was hereditary to Aaron, and his sonnes; but it is manifest, as in Moyses his life time, so throughout all ages from King

Saul to the captivity of Babylon, that the Priesthood was not a Maistry, but a Ministry.

XVII. After their returne from Babylonian bondage, the Covenant being renewed, and sign'd, the Priestly Kingdome was restor'd to the same manner it was in from the death of Ioshuah to the beginning of the Kings; excepting that it is not expresly set downe that the return'd Jewes did give up the Right of Soveraignty either to Esdras (by whose directions they ordred their State) or to any other, beside God himselfe. That reformation seemes rather to be nothing else then the bare promises, and vowes of every man to observe those things which were written in the booke of the Law. Notwithstanding, (perhaps not by the Peoples intention) by virtue of the Covenant which they then renewed, (for the Covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai) that same state was a Priestly Kingdome, that is to say, the supreme civill authority, and the sacred were united in the Priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the Priesthood, and by the interposition of forraigne Princes, it was so troubled till our Saviour Iesus Christs time, that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times, where that authority resided; yet it's plaine, that in those times, the power of interpreting Gods Word was not severed from the supreme civill power.

XVIII. Out of all this, we may easily know how the Iewes in all times from Abraham unto Christ were to behave themselves in the Commands of their Princes. For as in Kingdomes meerly humane men must obey a subordinate Magistrate in all things, excepting when his Commands containe in them some Treason; so in the Kingdome of God, the Iewes were bound to obey their Princes, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moyses, the Priest, the King, every one during their time in all things, except when their commands did containe some treason against the Divine Majesty. Now treason against the Divine Majesty was, first, the deniall of his divine providence, for this

was to deny God to be a King by nature; next, Idolatry, or the worship not of other (for there is but one God) but of strange Gods, that is to say, a worship though of one God, yet under other Titles, Attributes, and Rites, then what were establisht by Abraham, and Moyses. For this was to deny the God of Abraham to be their King by Covenant made with Abraham, and themselves. In all other things they were to obey; and if a King or Priest having the Soveraign authority, had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the Lawes, that had been his sinne, and not his subjects, whose duty it is, not to dispute, but to obey the Commands of his superiours.

Chapter XVII: Of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant

I. THERE ARE many cleare prophesies extant in the old Testament concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the Kingdome of God by a new Covenant, partly foretelling his regall Dignity, partly his Humility and Passion. Among others concerning his Dignity, these; God blessing Abraham, makes him a promise of his sonne Isaac, and addes, And Kings of People shall be of him, Gen. 17. vers. 16. Jacob blessing his sonne Judah, The Scepter (quoth he) shall not depart from Judah, Gen. 49. vers. 10. God to Moyses, A Prophet (saith he) will I raise them up from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him, and it shall come to Passe, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him, Deut. 18. vers. 18. Isaias, The Lord himselfe shall give thee a signe, Behold a Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Sonne, and shall call his name Emanuel, Isai 7. v. 14. The same Prophet, Unto us a child is born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, Isai 9. vers. 6. And again, There shall come forth a Rod out of the stemme of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, &c. he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reProve after the hearing of his eares, but with righteousnesse shall he judge the Poor, &c. and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked, Isay 11. vers.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Furthermore in the 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62. Ch. of the same Isay, there is almost nothing else contained but a description of the coming, and the works of Christ. Jeremias, Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah, Jerem. 31. 31. And Baruch, This is our God. &c. Afterward did he shew himselfe upon earth, and conversed with men; Baruch 3. vers. 35, 37. Ezekiel, I will set up one Shepheard over them, and he shall feed them, even my Servant David, And I will make with them a Covenant of Peace, &c. Ezek. 34. vers. 23, 25. Daniel, I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Sonne of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the antient of dayes, and they brought him near before him, and there was given him Dominion, and Glory, and a Kingdome, that all People, Nations, and Languages should serve him, his Dominion is an everlasting Dominion, &c. Dan. 7. vers. 13, 14. Hagga, Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the Heaven, and the Earth, and the Sea, and the drye Land, and I will shake all Nations, and the desire of all Nations shall come, Hagga 2. v. 8. Zachariah, Under the type of Joshuah the High Priest: I will bring forth my servant the Branch, &c. Zach. 3. v. 8. And again, Behold the man whose name is the Branch, Zach. 6. v. 12. And again, Rejoyce greatly O Daughter of Sion, Shout O Daughter of Jerusalem, behold thy King cometh to thee, he is just, having salvation, Zach. 9. v. 9. The Jewes moved by these, and other Prophesies, expected Christ their King to be sent from God, who should redeem them, and furthermore bear rule over all Nations. Yea this Prophesie had spread over the whole Roman Empire (which Vespasian too, though falsly, interpreted in favour of his own enterprises) That out of Judea should come he that should have dominion.

II. Now the Prophesies of Christs Humility and Passion, amongst others are these. Isa 53. v. 4 He hath born our griefes, and carried our sorrowes; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, & afflicted, and by and by,

He was oPpressed, he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; He is brought as a Lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her Shearer is dumb, so opened he not his mouth, &c. vers. 7. And again, He was cut out of the Land of the living,for the transgression of my People was he stricken, &c. vers. 8. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoyle with the strong, because he hath poured out his soule unto death, and he was numbred with the transgressours, and he bare the sinne of many, and made intercession for the transgressours, vers. 12. And that of Zachary, He is lowly, riding upon an Asse, and upon a Colt the foale of an Asse. Zach. 9. vers. 9.

III. In the reign of Tiberius Cesar, JESUS our Saviour a Galilaean began to preach, the sonne (as was supposed) of Joseph, declaring to the people of the Jewes, that the Kingdome of God expected by them, was now come; and that himselfe was a King, that is to say, THE CHRIST: Explaining the Law; choosing twelve Apostles, and seventy Disciples, after the number of the Princes of the Tribes, and seventy Elders (according to the pattern of Moyses) to the Ministry; teaching the way of salvation by himselfe and them; purging the Temple; doing great signes, and fulfilling all those things which the Prophets had foretold of Christ to come. That this man, hated of the Pharisees, (whose false doctrine and hypocriticall sanctity he had reproved) and by their means, of the People accused of unlawfull seeking for the Kingdome, and crucified, was the true CHRIST, and King promised by God, and sent from his father to renew the new Covenant between them and God, both the Evangelists doe shew (describing his Genealogie, nativity, life, doctrine, death, and resurrection) and by comparing the things which he did, with those which were foretold of him, all Christians doe consent to.

IV. Now from this, That CHRIST was sent from God his Father to make a Covenant between him and the people, it is manifest, that though Christ

were equall to his Father according to his nature, yet was he inferior according to the Right of the Kingdom; for this office to speak properly, was not that of a King, but of a Vice-roy, such as Moyses his Government was. For the Kingdom was not his, but his Fathers; which CHRIST himselfe signified when he was baptized as a subject, and openly profest, when he taught his Disciples to pray, Our Father, Thy Kingdome come, &c. And when he said, I will not drink of the blood of the grape, untill that day when I shall drink it new with you in the Kingdome of my Father, Mat. 26. vers. 29. And Saint Paul. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; but every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, who beleeved in his coming; Then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom to God even his Father, &c. 1. Cor. 15. vers. 22, 23, 24. The same notwithstanding is also called the Kingdome of Christ: for both the Mother of the sonnes of Zebedie petitioned Christ, saying, Grant that these my two sonnes may sit, the one on thy right hand, the other on thy left, in thy Kingdome, Mat. 20. vers. 21. And the Theef on the Cross, Lord remember me when thou comest into thy Kingdom, Luke 23. vers. 42. And Saint Paul, For this know yee, that no whormonger, &c. shall enter into the Kingdome of God, and of Christ, Ephes. 5. ver. 5. And elsewhere, I charge thee before God, and the Lord Iesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his Kingdome, & c. 2 Tim. 4. ver. 1. And the Lord shall deliver me from every evill worke, and will Preserve me unto his heavenly Kingdome, ver. 18. Nor is it to be marvelled at, that the same Kingdome is attributed to them both, since both the Father, and the Son, are the same God; and the new Covenant concerning Gods Kingdome, is not propounded in the Name of the FATHER, but in the name of the FATHER, of the SON, and of the HOLY-GHOST, as of one God.

V. But the Kingdome of God, for restitution whereof CHRIST was sent from God his Father, takes not its beginning before his second comming, to

wit, from the day of Judgement, when he shall come in Majesty accompanied with his Angels: For it is promis'd the Apostles, that in the Kingdome of God, they shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Ye which have followed me in the regeneration, when the Sonne of man shall sit in the Throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve Thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel, Mat. 19. ver. 28. which is not to be done till the day of judgement; CHRIST therefore is not yet in the throne of his Majesty, nor is that time when CHRIST was conversant here in the world call'd a Kingdome, but a regeneration, that is to say a renovation, or restitution of the Kingdome of God, and a calling of them who were hereafter to be receiv'd into his Kingdome; And where it is said, When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy Angels with him, then shall he sit uPon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all Nations, and he shall seParate them one from another, as a Shepheard divideth his Sheep from the Goates, Mat. 25. ver. 31. we may manifestly gather, that there will be no Locall separation of Gods Subjects from his Enemies, but that they shall live mixt together untill CHRISTS second comming. Which is also confirm'd by the comparison of the Kingdome of heaven, with wheat mingled with Darnell; and with a net containing all sorts of fish. But a multitude of men, Enemies and Subjects, living promiscuously together, cannot properly be term'd a Kingdome. Besides, the Apostles, when they askt our Saviour, Whether he would at that time when he ascended into heaven, restore the Kingdome unto Israel? did openly testifie, that they then, when CHRIST ascended, thought the Kingdome of God not to be yet come. Farthermore, the words of CHRIST, My Kingdome is not of this world; And, I will not drinke, &c. till the Kingdome of God come: And, God hath not sent his Son into the World, to judge the World, but that the World through him might be sav'd. And, If any man heare not my words, and keepe them, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the World, but to

save the World. And, Man, who made me a judge or divider betweene you? And the very Appellation of the Kingdome of Heaven testifies as much. The same thing is gathered out of the words of the Prophet Jeremiah, speaking of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant, They shall teach no more every man his Neighbour, saying, Know the Lord, for they shall all know me from the least of them, to the greatest of them, saith the Lord, Jer. 31. v. 34. which cannot be understood of a Kingdome in this World. The Kingdome of God therefore, for the restoring whereof CHRIST came into the world, of which the Prophets did Prophesie, and of which praying wee say, Thy Kingdome come, (if it must have Subjects locally separated from Enemies, if judicature, if Majesty, according as hath beene foretold,) shall begin from that time, wherein God shall separate the Sheep from the Goats; wherein the Apostles shall judge the twelve Tribes of Israel; wherein CHRIST shall come in Majesty, and glory; wherein Lastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall not need to be taught, that is to say, at CHRIST his second comming, or the day of Judgement. But if the Kingdome of God were now already restor'd, no reason could be rendered why CHRIST having compleated the work for which he was sent, should come againe, or why we should pray, Thy Kingdome come.

VI. Now, although the Kingdome of God by CHRIST to be establisht with a new Covenant, were Heavenly, we must not therefore thinke, that they, who beleeving in CHRIST would make that Covenant, were not so to be govern'd here on the Earth too, as that they should persevere in their faith, and obedience promis'd by that Covenant. For in vaine had the Kingdome of heaven beene promis'd, if we were not to have been led into it. But none can be led, but those who are directed in the way. Moyses, when he had instituted the Priestly Kingdome, himselfe though he were no Priest, yet rul'd, and conducted the People all the time of their Peregrination untill their entrance into the promis'd Land. In the same manner is it our

Saviours office (whom God in this thing would have like unto Moyses) as he was sent from his Father, so to governe the future Subjects of his heavenly Kingdome in this life, that they might attaine to, and enter into that, although the Kingdome were not properly his, but his Fathers. But the government whereby CHRIST rules the faithfull ones in this life, is not properly a Kingdome, or Dominion, but a Pastorall charge, or the Right of teaching, that is to say, God the father gave him not a power to judge of Meum and Tuum as he doth to the Kings of the Earth; nor a Coercive power; nor legislative; but of shewing to the world, and teaching them the way, and knowledge of Salvation, that is to say, of Preaching, and declaring what they were to doe, who would enter into the Kingdome of Heaven. That CHRIST had receiv'd no power from his father to judge in questions of Meum and Tuum, that is to say, in all questions of Right among those who beleev'd not; those words above cited doe sufficiently declare: Man, who made me a judge, or divider betweene you? And it is confirm'd by reason; for seeing CHRIST was sent to make a Covenant between God and men, and no man is oblig'd to performe obedience before the Contract be made, if he should have judg'd of questions of Right, no man had been tyed to obey his sentence. But that the discerning of Right was not committed to CHRIST in this world, neither among the faithfull, nor among infidels, is apparent in this, that that Right without all controversie belongs to Princes as long as it is not by, But it is not derogated God himselfe derogated from their authority; before the day of Judgement, as appeares by the words of Saint Paul, speaking of the day of Judgement, Then commeth the end when He shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God even the Father, when He shall have put downe all rule, and all authority, and Power, 1 Cor. 15. ver. 24. Secondly, the words of our Saviour reproving James, and Iohn, when they had said, Wilt thou that we call for Fyer from Heaven, that it may consume them (namely the Samaritans, who had denyed to receive him

going up to Jerusalem) and replying, The Son of Man is not come to destroy soules, but to save them; And those words, Behold I send you as Sheep among Wolves; Shake off the dust of your Feet, and the like; And those words, God sent not his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world through him might be sav'd; and those, If any man heare my words, and keep them not, I judge him not, for I came not to judge the world, & c. doe all shew, that he had no power given him, to condemne or punish any man. We reade indeed that the Father judgeth no Man, but hath committed all judgement to the Son, but since that both may, and must be understood of the day of future judgement, it doth not at all repugne what hath beene sayed before. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new Lawes, and that therefore by his Office, and mission, he was no Legislatour properly so called, nor Moyses neither, but a bringer and Publisher of his Fathers Lawes, (for God only, and neither Moyses, nor CHRIST, was a King by Covenant) is collected hence, that he sayed, I came not to destroy (to wit the Lawes before given from God by Moyses, which he presently interprets) but to fulfill; And, He that shall break one of the least of these Commandements, and shall teach men so, He shall be called least in the Kingdome of Heaven. CHRIST therefore had not a Royall, or Soveraigne power committed to him from his Father in this world, but consiliary, and doctrinall onely; which himselfe signifies, as well then when he call his Apostles, not Hunters, but Fishers of men; as when he compares the Kingdome of God to a graine of mustard seed, and to a little Leaven hid in meale.

VII. God promis'd unto Abraham first, a numerous seed, the possession of the Land of Canaan, and a blessing upon all Nations in his seed, on this Condition, that he, and his seed should serve him; next unto the seed of Abraham according to the flesh, a Priestly Kingdome, a Government most free, in which they were to be Subject to no humane power, on this

Condition, that they should serve the God of Abraham on that fashion which Moyses should teach. Lastly, both to them, and to all Nations, a heavenly, and eternall Kingdome, on Condition that they should serve the God of Abraham, on that manner which Christ should teach. For by the new, that is to say, the Christian Covenant, it's covenanted on mens part, to serve the God of Abraham, on that manner which JESUS should teach: On Gods part, to pardon their sinnes, and bring them into his caelestiall Kingdome. We have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly Kingdome above in the 5. Article; but it is usually call'd, sometimes the Kingdome of Heaven, sometimes the Kingdome of Glory, sometimes the life Eternall. What's required on mens part, namely to serve God as CHRIST should teach, containes two things, Obedience to be performed to God, (for this is to serve God) and Faith in JESUS, to wit, That we beleeve JESUS TO BE THAT CHRIST who was promis'd by God: for that only is the cause why his Doctrine is to be followed, rather then any others. Now in holy Scriptures, Repentance is often put in stead of Obedience, because Christ teacheth every where, that with God the Will is taken for the deed; but Repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind. These things being understood, it will most evidently appear out of many places of sacred Scripture, that those are the Conditions of the Christian Covenant which we have nam'd, to wit, giving remission of sins, and eternall life on Gods part; and Repenting, and Beleeving in JESUS CHRIST, on Mens part. First, the words, The Kingdom of God is at hand. Repent yee and beleeve the Gospell, Mark 1. 15. contain the whole Covenant: In like manner those, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repentance, and remission of sinnes should be preached in his Name among all Nations, begining at Jerusalem, Luke 24. vers. 46, 47. And those, Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come, &c. Acts 3. vers. 19.

And sometimes one part is expresly propounded, and the other understood, as here, He that beleeveth in the Sonne, hath everlasting life; He that beleeveth not the Sonne, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him, Iohn 3. vers. 36, Where Faith is exprest, Repentance not mentioned. And in CHRISTS preaching, Repent, for the Kingdome of heaven is at hand, Mat. 4. 17. Where Repentance is exprest, Faith is understood. But the parts of this new Contract are most manifestly, and formally set down there, where a certain Ruler bargaining as it were for the Kingdom of God, asketh our Saviour, Good Waster, what shall I doe to inherit eternall life, Luke 18. v. 18. But CHRIST first propounds one part of the price, namely observation of the Commandements, or obedience, which when he answered that he had kept, he adjoynes the other, saying, Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that thou hast, and distribute to the Poor, and thou shalt have Treasure in Heaven, and come, follow me, v. 22. This was matter of Faith. He therefore not giving sufficient credit to CHRIST, and his heavenly Treasures, went away sorrowfull. The same Covenant is contained in these words: Hee that beleeveth, and is baptized, shall be saved, he that beleeveth not, shall be damned, Mark 16. vers. 15, 16. Where Faith is exprest, Repentance is supposed in those that are baptized; and in these words, Except a man be born again of water, and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven, Iohn 3. vers. 5. Where to be born of water, is the same with regeneration, that is to say, Conversion to CHRIST. Now that Baptisme is required in the two places cited just before, and in divers others, we must understand, that what Circumcision was to the old Covenant, that Baptisme is to the new: Seeing therefore, that was not of the Essence, but served for a memoriall of the old Covenant, as a Ceremony or signe (and was omitted in the wildernesse) in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the Essence, but in memory, and for a signe of the New Covenant which wee make with God; and provided the will be not wanting,

the Act through necessity may be omitted; but Repentance and Faith, which are of the Essence of the Covenant, are alwayes required.

VIII. In the Kingdome of God after this life there will be no, Lawes. partly because there is no roome for Lawes, where there is none for sinne; partly because Laws were given us from God, not to direct us in Heaven, but unto Heaven. Let us now therefore enquire what Laws CHRIST (establisht not himselfe, for he would not take upon him any Legislative authority, as hath been declared above in the sixth Article, but) propounded to us for his Fathers. Wee have a place in Scripture, where he contracts all the Lawes of God publisht till that time, into two Preceps, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy minde: this is the greatest, and first Commandement. And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy selfe. On these two Commandements hangs all the Law, and the Prophets, Mat. 22. vers. 37, 38, 39, 40. The first of these was given before by Moyses in the same words, Deut. 6. vers. 5. And the second even before Moyses; for it is the naturall Law, having its begining with rationall nature it selfe. And both together is the summe of all Lawes: for all the Lawes of divine naturall worship, are contained in these words, Thou shalt love God; and all the Lawes of divine worship due by the old Covenant, in these words, Thou shalt love thy God, that is to say, God as being the peculiar King of Abraham, and his seed; and all the Lawes naturall, and civill, in these words, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy selfe. For he that loves God and his neighbour, hath a minde to obey all Lawes, both divine, and humane. But God requires no more then a minde to obey. Wee have another place, where CHRIST interprets the Lawes, namely, the fifth, sixth, and seventh entire Chapters of Saint Matthewes Gospell. But all those Lawes are set down, either in the Decalogue, or in the morall Law, or are contained in the faith of Abraham; as that Law of not putting away a wife is contained in the faith of Abraham:

for that same, Two shall be one flesh, was not delivered either by CHRIST first, or by Moyses, but by Abraham, who first publisht the Creation of the world. The Lawes therefore which CHRIST contracts in one place, and explaines in another, are no other then those to which all mortall men are obliged, who acknowledge the God of Abraham. Beside these, we read not of any Law given by CHRIST, beside the institution of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Eucharist.

IX. What may be said then of these kinde of Precepts: Repent, Be Baptized, Keep the Commandements, Beleeve the Gospell, Come unto me, Sell all that thou hast, give to the Poor, follow me, and the like? We must say that they are not Lawes, but a calling of us to the faith, such as is that of Isa. Come, buy wine, and milk without monie, and without Price, Isai 55. vers. 1. Neither if they come not, doe they therefore sinne against any Law, but against prudence onely; neither shall their infidelity be punisht, but their former sinnes. Wherefore Saint John saith of the unbeleever, The wrath of God abideth on him; he saith not, The wrath of God shall come upon him; And, He that beleeveth not, is already judged; he saith not, shall be judged, but is already judged. Nay it cannot be well conceived, that remission of sinnes should be a benefit arising from faith, unlesse we understand also on the other side, that the punishment of sinnes is an hurt proceeding from infidelity.

X. From hence, that our Saviour hath prescribed no distributive Lawes, to the Subjects of Princes, and Citizens of Cities, that is to say, hath given no rules whereby a Subject may know, and discerne what is his owne, what another mans, not by what forms, words, or circumstances, a thing must be given, delivered, invaded, possest, that it may be known by Right to belong to the Receiver, Invader, or Possessour, we must necessarily understand that each single subject (not only with unbeleevers, among whom CHRIST himselfe denyed himselfe to be a judge and distributer, but even with

Christians) must take those rules from his City, that is to say, from that Man, or Councell, which hath the supreme power It. followes therefore, that by those Lawes, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steale, Honour thy Father and Mother, nothing else was commanded, but that Subjects, and Citizens, should absolutely obey their Princes in all questions concerning Meum & Tuum, their own and others Right. For by that Precept, Thou shalt not kill, all slaughter is not prohibited; for he that said, Thou shalt not kill, said also, Whosoever doth work uPon the Sabbath, shall be put to death, Exod 35. vers. 2. No, nor yet all slaughter the cause not being heard; for he said, Slay every man his Brother, and every man his Companion, and every man his Neighbour, Exo. 32. v. 27. And there fell of the People about three thousand men, v. 28. Nor yet all slaughter of an innocent Person; for Iephte vowed, Whosoever cometh forth, &c. I will offer him up for a burnt offering unto the Lord, Jud. 11. vers. 31. and his vow was accepted of God. What then is forbidden? Onely this: that no man kill another, who hath not a Right to kill him, that is to say, that no man kill, unlesse it belong to him to doe so. The Law of CHRIST therefore concerning killing, and consequently all manner of hurt done to any man, and what penalties are to be set, commands us to obey the City only. In like manner, by that Precept, Thou shalt not commit adultery, all manner of Copulation is not forbidden, but only that of lying with another mans wife; but the judgment which is another mans wife, belongs to the City, and is to be determined by the rules which the City prescribes: This precept therefore commands both male and female to keep that faith intire which they have mutually given, according to the statutes of the City. So also by the precept, Thou shalt not steal, all manner of invasion, or secret surreption is not forbidden, but of another mans. only. The subject therefore is commanded this only, that he invade not, nor take away ought which the City prohibits to be invaded or taken away; and universally not to

call any thing murder, adultery, or t heft, but what is done contrary to the civill Lawes. Lastly, seeing CHRIST hath commanded us to honour our Parents, and hath not prescribed, with what Rites, what appellations, and what manner of obedience they are to be honoured, it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the will indeed, and inwardly, as Kings and Lords over their Children, but outwardly, not beyond the Cities permission, which shall assign to every man (as all things else, so also) his honour. But since the nature of justice consists in this, that every Man have his own given him, its manifest, that it also belongs to a Christian City to determin what is justice, what injustice, or a sinne against justice; Now what belongs to a City, that must be judg'd to belong to him or them who have the Soveraigne power of the City.

XI. Moreover, because our Saviour hath not shewed Subjects any other Lawes for the government of a City beside those of nature, that is to say, beside the Command of obedience, no Subject can privately determine who is a publique friend, who an enemy, when Warre, when Peace, when Truce is to be made; nor yet what Subjects, what authority, and of what men, are commodious, or prejudiciall to the safety of the Common-weale. These, and all like matters therefore are to be learned, if need be, from the City, that is to say, from the Soveraign powers.

XII. Furthermore, all these things, to build Castles, Houses, Temples; to move, carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely over Seas; to contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses; to be well acquainted with the face of the whole world, the Courses of the Starres, the seasons of the yeare, the accounts of the times, and the nature of all things; to understand perfectly all naturall and civill Rights; and all manner of Sciences, which (comprehended under the Title of Philosophy) are necessary partly to live, partly to live well; I say, the understanding of these (because CHRIST hath not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning, that is to say by making

necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from experience. But mens reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and consequently that which is concluded, and held for a truth, is sometimes truth, sometimes errour. Now, errours even about these Philosophicall points doe sometimes publique hurt, and give occasions of great seditions, and injuries: It is needfull therefore, as oft as any controversie ariseth in these matters contrary to publique good, and common Peace, that there be some body to judge of the reasoning, that is to say, whether that which is inferred, be rightly inferred or not, that so the controversie may be ended. But there are no rules given by CHRIST to this purpose; neither came he into the world to teach Logick. It remaines therefore that the Iudges of such controversies be the same with those whom God by nature had instituted before, namely those who in each City are constituted by the Soveraign. Moreover, if a controversie be raised of the accurate and proper signification (i.e.) the definition of those names or appellations which are commonly us'd, in so much as it is needfull for the peace of the City, or the distribution of right, to be determin'd, the determination will belong to the City; for men by reasoning doe search out such kind of definitions in their observation of diverse conceptions, for the signification whereof, those appellations were us'd at divers times, and for divers causes. But the decision of the question whether a man doe reason rightly, belongs to the City. For Example. If a woman bring forth a Child of an unwonted shape, and the Law forbid to kill a man, the question is, whether the Childe be a man. It is demanded therefore what a man is. No man doubts, but the City shall judge it, and that without taking an account of Aristotles definition, that man is a rationall Creature. And these things (namely Right, Politie, and naturall Sciences) are Subjects concerning which CHRIST denies that it belongs to his Office to give any Praecepts, or teach any thing, beside this onely, that in all Controversies about them, every single Subject should

obey the Lawes, and determinations of his City. Yet must we remember this, that the same Christ as God could not onely have taught, but also commanded what he would.

XIII. The summe of our Saviours Office was to teach the way, and all the meanes of Salvation, and aeternall life; but Iustice and civill obedience, and observation of all the naturall Lawes is one of the meanes to Salvation. Now these may be taught two wayes; one, as Theorems by the way of naturall reason, by drawing Right and the natural Lawes from humane Principles, and contracts; and this Doctrine thus deliver'd is subject to the censure of civill powers: The other, as Lawes, by divine authority, in shewing the will of God to be such; and thus to teach, belongs onely to him to whom the Will of God is supernaturally knowne, that is to say, to Christ. Secondly, it belong'd to the Office of Christ to forgive sinnes to the Penitent, for that was necessary for the Salvation of men who had already sinn'd; neither could it be done by any other; for remission of sinnes followes not Repentance naturally, (as a Debt) but it depends (as a free gift) on the will of God supernaturally to be reveal'd. Thirdly, it belongs to the Office of Christ to teach all those Commandements of God, whether concerning his worship, or those points of faith which cannot be understood by naturall reason, but onely by revelation; of which nature are those that he was the Christ; that his Kingdome was not terrestriall, but celestiall; that there are rewards, and punishments after this life; that the soule is immortall; that there should be such, and so many Sacraments, and the like.

XIV. From what hath beene sayed in the foregoing Chapter, it is not hard to distinguish betweene things Spirituall, and Temporall. For since by Spirituall, those things are understood which have their foundation on the authority, and Office of CHRIST, and unlesse CHRIST had taught them, could not have beene known; and all other things are temporall; it followes, that the definition, and determination of whats just, and unjust, the

cognizance of all controversies about the meanes of Peace, and publique defence, and the Examination of doctrines, and books in all manner of rationall science, depends upon the temporall Right. But those which are mysteries of faith, depending on CHRIST his word, and authority onely, their judgements belong to spirituall Right. But it is reasons inquisition, and pertaines to temporall Right to define what is spirituall, and what temporall, because our Saviour hath not made that distinction; For although Saint Paul in many places distinguish betweene spirituall things, and carnall things, and calls those things spirituall, which are of the spirit, to wit, the word of wisdome, the word of knowledge, faith, the gift of healing, the working of miracles, Prophesie, divers kindes of tongues, interpretation of tongues, Rom. 8. 5. 1 Cor. 12. 8, 9. All supernaturally inspired by the Holy Ghost, and such as the carnall man understands not, but he only who hath known the mind of CHRIST, 2. Cor. 2. 14, 15, 16. And those things carnall which belong to worldly wealth, Rom. 15. 27. And the men carnall men, 1 Cor. 3. vers. 1, 2, 3. yet hath he not defined, nor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from naturall reason, what from supernaturall inspiration.

XV. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour hath committed to, or rather not taken away from Princes, and those who in each City have obtained the Soveraignty, the supreme authority of judging & determineing al manner of controversies about temporall matters, we must see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in matters spirituall. Which because it cannot bee known, except it be out of the word of God, and the Tradition of the Church, we must enquire in the next place what the word of God is, what to interpret it, what a Church is, and what the will and command of the Church. To omit that the word of God is in Scripture taken sometimes for the Sonne of God, it is used, three manner of wayes; First, most properly for that which God hath spoken; Thus whatsoever God spake unto Abraham,

the Patriarchs, Moses, and the Prophets, our Saviour to his Disciples, or any others, is the word of God. Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion, or by Command of the Holy Ghost; in which sense we acknowledge the Scriptures to be the word of God. Thirdly, in the New Testament indeed the word of God most frequently signifies the Doctrine of the Gospell, or the word concerning God, or the word of the Kingdome of God by CHRIST: as where it is said that CHRIST preach't the Gospell of the Kingdome, Mat. 4. vers. 23. Where the Apostles are said to preach the word of God, Acts 13. vers. 46. Where the word of God is called the word of life, Acts 5. vers. 20. The word of the Gospell, Acts 15. vers. 7. The word of faith, Rom. 10. vers. 8. The word of truth, that is to say, (adding an interpretation) The Gospel of salvation, Eph. 1. 13. And where it is called the word of the Apostles; For Saint Paul sayes, If any man obey not our word, &c. 2. Thess. 3. vers. 14. which places cannot be otherwise meant then of the doctrine Evangelicall. In like manner where the word of God is said to be sowen, to encrease, and to be multiplied, Acts 12. vers. 24. and Cha. vers. 49. it is very hard to conceive this to be spoken of the voyce of God, or of his Apostles; but of their doctrine, easie. And in this third acception is all that doctrine of the Christian faith which at this day is preacht in Pulpits, and contained in the books of divines, the word of God.

XVI. Now the sacred Scripture is intirely the word of God in this second acception, as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired from God. And innumerable places of it, in the first. And seeing the greatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the Kingdome of Heaven, or in prefigurations before the incarnation of CHRIST, or in Evangelization, and explication after, The sacred Scripture is also the word of God, and therefore the Canon and Rule of all Evangelicall Doctrine, in this third signification, where the word of God is taken for the word concerning God, that is to say, for the Gospel. But because in the same Scriptures we read

many things Politicall, Historicall, Morall, Physicall, and others which nothing at all concern the Mysteries of our faith, those places although they contain true doctrine, and are the Canon of such kind of doctrines, yet can they not be the Canon of the Mysteries of Christian Religion.

XVII. And truly it is not the dead voyce, or letter of the word of God, which is the Canon of Christian doctrine, but a true and genuine determination; For the minde is not governed by Scriptures, unlesse they be understood. There is need therefore of an Interpreter to make the Scriptures Canon. And hence followes one of these two things, that either the word of the Interpreter is the word of God, or that the Canon of Christian doctrin is not the word of God. The last of these must necessarily be false; for the rule of that doctrine which cannot be knowne by any humane reason, but by divine revelation only, cannot be lesse then divine; for whom we acknowledge not to be able to discern whether some doctrin be true or not, its impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same doctrine. The first therefore is true, That the word of an Interpreter of Scriptures, is the word of God.

XVIII. Now that Interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be held for the word of God, is not every one that translates the Scriptures out of the Hebrew, and Greek tongue, to his Latine Auditors in Latine, to his French, in French, and to other Nations in their mother tongue; for this is not to interpret. For such is the nature of speech in generall, that although it deserve the chiefe place among those signes whereby we declare our conceptions to others, yet cannot it perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances; For the living voice hath its interpreters present, to wit, time, place, countenance, gesture, the Counsell of the Speaker, and himselfe unfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is. To recall these aids of interpretation, so much desired in the writings of old time, is neither the part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the

quaintest, without great learning, and very much skill in antiquity. It sufficeth not therefore for interpretation of Scriptures, that a man understand the language wherein they speak. Neither is every one an authentique Interpreter of Scriptures, who writes Comments upon them: For men may erre, they may also either bend them to serve their own ambition, or even resisting, draw them into bondage by their forestallings; whence it will follow that an erroneous sentence must be held for the word of God. But although this could not happen, yet as soon as these Commentators are departed, their Commentaries will need explications, and in processe of time, those explications, expositions; those expositions new Commentaries without any end: so as there cannot in any written Interpretation whatsoever be a Canon, or Rule of Christian doctrine, whereby the Controversies of Religion may be determined. It remains, that there must bee some Canonicall Interpreter whose legitimate Office it is to end Controversies begun, by explaining the word of God in the judgements themselves; and whose authority therefore must be no lesse obeyed, then theirs who first recommended the Scripture it selfe to us for a Canon of faith; and that one, and the same Person be an Interpreter of Scripture, and a supreme Judge of all manner of doctrines.

XIX. What concerns the word Ecclesia, or Church: originally it signifies the same thing that Concio, or a congregation does in Latin; even as Ecclesiastes, or Church man, the same that concionator, or Preacher, that is to say, He who speaks to the Congregation. In which sense wee read in the Acts of the Apostles, of a Church confused, and of a Lawfull Church, Acts 19. vers. 32, 39. that, taken for a Concourse of people meeting in way of tumult; this, for a convocated Assembly. But in holy writ by a Church of Christians, is sometimes understood the Assembly, and sometimes the Christians themselves, although not actually assembled, if they be permitted to enter into the Congregation, and to communicate with them. For

example. Tell it to the Church, Mat. 18. vers. 17. is meant of a Church assembled; for otherwise it is impossible to tell any thing to the Church: But, Hee laid waste the Church, Acts 8. vers. 3. is understood of a Church not assembled. Sometimes a Church is taken for those who are baptized, or for the professors of the Christian faith, whether they be Christians inwardly, or feignedly, as when we reade of somewhat said or written to the Church, or said or decreed, or done by the Church; sometimes for the Elect onely, as when it is called holy, and without blemish, Ephes. 5. vers. 27. But the Elect, as they are militant, are not properly called a Church; for they know not how to assemble, but they are a future Church, namely in that day when sever'd from the reprobate, they shall bee triumphant. Againe a Church may bee sometimes taken (for all Christians collectively,) as when Christ is called the head of his Church, and the head of his body the Church, Eph. 5. vers. 23. Colos. 1. vers. 18. sometimes for its parts, as the Church of Ephesus, The Church which is in his house, the seven Churches, & c. Lastly, a Church as it is taken for a Company actually assembled, according to the divers ends of their meeting, signifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate, and judge, in which sense it is also called a Councell, & a Synod; sometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship God, in which signification it is taken in the 1 Cor. 14. vers. 4, 5. 23. 28. &c.

XX. Now a Church which hath personall Rights, and proper actions attributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be understood, Tell it to the church, and, he that obeys not the church, and all such like formes of speech, is to be defin'd so, as by that word may be understood, A Multitude of men who have made a new Covenant with God in Christ, (that is to say, a multitude of them who have taken upon them the Sacrament of Baptisme) which multitude, may both lawfully be call'd together by some one into one place, and he so calling them, are bound to be present either in

Person, or by others. For a multitude of men, if they cannot meet in assembly, when need requires, is not to be call'd a Person; For a Church can neither speak, nor discerne, nor heare, but as it is a congregation. Whatsoever is spoken by particular men, (to wit, as many opinions almost as heads) that's the speech of one man, not of the Church; farthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be unlawfull, it shall be considered as null. Not any one of these therefore who are present in a tumult shall be tyed to the decree of the rest, but specially if he dissent; and therefore neither can such a Church make any decree; for then a multitude is sayd to decree somewhat, when every man is oblig'd by the decree of the major part. We must therefore grant to the definition of a Church (to which we attribute things belonging to a Person) not onely a possibility of assembling, but also of doing it lawfully. Besides, although there be some one who may lawfully call the rest together, yet if they who are called may lawfully not appeare (which may happen among men who are not subject one to another) that same Church is not one Person. For by what Right they, who being call'd to a certaine time, and place, doe meet together, are one Church; by the same, others flocking to another place appointed by them, are another Church. And every number of men of one opinion is a Church, and by Consequence there will be as many Churches as there are divers opinions, that is to say, the same multitude of men will at once prove to be one, and many Churches. Wherefore a Church is not one, except there be a certaine, and known, that is to say, a lawfull power, by meanes whereof every man may be oblig'd to be present in the Congregation, either himselfe in person, or by Proxie. And that becomes One, and is capable of personall functions, by the union of a lawfull power of convocating Synods, and assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of Doctrine: and otherwise, it is a multitude, and Persons in the plurall, howsoever agreeing in opinions.

XXI. It followes what hath beene already said by necessary connexion, that a City of Christian men, and a Church, is altogether the same thing, of the same men, term'd by two names, for two causes: For the matter of a City & a Church is one, to wit the same Christian men. And the forme which consists in a Lawfull power of assembling them is the same too; for 'tis manifest that every Subject is oblig'd to come thither, whither he is summon'd by his City. Now that which is call'd a City, as it is made up of men, the same, as it consists of Christians, is styled a Church.

XXII. This too is very cohaerent with the same points, If there be many Christian Cities, they are not altogether personally one church. They may indeed by mutuall consent become one Church, but no otherwise, then as they must also become one City; For they cannot assemble but at some certaine time, and to some place appointed. But Persons, places, and times, belong to civill Right; neither can any Subject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place, but by the permission of the City, which is Lord of the place. But the things which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the City, those, if they be lawfully done, are done by the Cities authority. The Universall church is indeed one mysticall body, whereof CHRIST is the head, but in the same manner, that all men together acknowledging God for the Ruler of the world, are one Kingdome, and one City, which notwithstanding is neither one Person, nor hath it one common action, or determination. Farthermore where it is said that CHRIST is the head of his body the Church, it manifestly appeares, that that was spoken by the Apostle of the Elect, who as long as they are in this world, are a Church onely in potentia, but shall not actually be so before they be separated from the reprobate, and gather'd together among themselves, in the day of Judgement. The Church of Rome of old was very great, but she went not beyond the bounds of her Empire; and therefore neither was she Universall, unlesse it were in that sense, wherein it was also said of the City of Rome,

Orbem jam totum victor Romanus habebat, when as yet he had not the twentieth part of it. But after that the civill Empire was divided into parts, the single Cities thence arising were so many Churches; and that power which the Church of Rome had over them, might perhaps wholy depend on the authority of those Churches, who having cast off the Emperours were yet content to admit the Doctours of Rome.

XXIII. They may be called Church-men who exercise a publique office in the Church. But of offices there was one a Ministery, another a Maistery; The office of the Ministers was to serve Tables, to take care of the temporall goods of the Church, and to distribute (at that time when all propriety of riches being abolisht, they were fed in common) to each man his portion; The Maisters according to their order, were called some Apostles, some Bishops, some Presbyters, that is to say Elders; yet not so, as that by the name of Presbyter, the age, but the office might be distinguisht; For Timothy was a Presbyter although a young man; but because for the most part the Elders were receiv'd into the Maistership, the word, denoting age, was us'd to signifie the office. The same Maisters, according to the diversity of their employments were called some of them Apostles, some Prophets, some Evangelists, some Pastors or Teachers. And the Apostolicall worke indeed was universall; the Propheticall to declare their owne revelations in the Church; the Evangelicall to preach, or to be publishers of the Gospell among the infidels; that of the Pastors to teach, confirme, and rule the minds of those who already beleev'd.

XXIV. In the Election of Church-men two things are to be considered, the Election of the Persons, and their consecration, or institution, which also is called ordination. The first twelve Apostles CHRIST himselfe both elected, and ordain'd. After CHRISTS ascension Matthias was elected in the roome of Judas the Traitour, the Church (which at that time consisted of a Congregation of about one hundred and twenty men) choosing two men:

And they appointed two, Joseph and Matthias; but God himselfe by lot approving of Mathias. And Saint Paul calls these twelve the first, and great Apostles, also the Apostles of the Circumcision. Afterward were added two other Apostles, Paul, and Barnabas; ordain'd indeed by the Doctours, and Prophets of the Church of Antioch, (which was a particular Church) by the imposition of hands, but elected by the command of the Holy Ghost. That they were both Apostles is manifest in the 13. of the Acts v. 2, 3. That they receiv'd their Apostleship from hence, namely because they were separated by command of the spirit for the work of God, from the rest of the Prophets, and Doctours of the Church of Antioch, Saint Paul himselfe shewes, who calls himselfe for distinctions sake an Apostle separated unto the Gospell of God, Rom. 1. ver. 1. But if it be demanded further; by what authority it came to passe that that was receiv'd for the command of the Holy Ghost, which those Prophets and Doctours did say proceeded from him, it must necessarily be answer'd; by the Authority of the church of Antioch. For the Prophets & Doctours must be examined by the Church before they be admitted; For Saint John saith, Beleeve not every Spirit, but try the Spirits, whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world; but by what Church, but that to which that Epistle was written? In like manner Saint Paul reprooves the Churches of Galatia, because they Judaized, Gal. 2. v. 14. although they seemed to doe so by the Authority of Peter; for when he had told them that he had, reprehended Peter himselfe with these words, If thou being a Iew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as doe the Iewes, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as doe the Iewes? Not long after he questions them, saying, This onely would I learne of you: Received ye the Spirit by the works of the Law, or by the hearing of faith? Gal. 3. ver. 2. Where it is evident, that it was Judaisme which he reprehended the Galathians for, notwithstanding that the Apostle Peter compelled them to Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the

Church, and not to Peter, and therefore also not to any man, to determine what Doctors they should follow, it also pertained to the authority of the Church of Antioch to elect their Prophets and Doctors. Now because the Holy Ghost separated to himself the Apostles Paul & Barnabas, by the imposition of hands from Doctors thus elected; its manifest, that imposition of hands, & consecration, of the prime Doctors in each Church, belongs to the Doctors of the same Church. But Bishops, who were also called Presbyters, although all Presbyters were not Bishops, were ordain'd somtimes by Apostles (for Paul & Barnabas when they had taught in Derbe, Lystra, and Iconium, ordained Elders in every Church, Acts 14. v. 23.) sometimes by other Bishops, for Titus was by Paul left in Crete, that he should ordain Elders in every City, Tit. 1. v. 5. And Timothy was advised not to neglect the gift that was in him, which was given him by Prophesy with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, 1. Tim. 4. v. 14. And he had rules given him concerning the Election of Presbyters. But that cannot be understood otherwise, then of the ordination of those who were elected by the Church; for no man could constitute a Doctor in the Church, but by the Churches permission. For the duty of the Apostles themselves was not to command, but to teach; and although they who were recommended by the Apostles, or Presbyters, were not rejected, for the esteem that was had of the recommenders, yet seeing they could not be elected without the will of the Church, they were also suppos'd elected by the authority of the Church. In like manner Ministers, who are called Deacons, were ordained by the Apostles; yet elected by the Church. For when the seven Deacons were to bee elected, and ordained, the Apostles elected them not, but look yee out, (say they) among you Brethren seven men of honest report, &c. And they chose Stephen, &c. And they set them before the Apostles, Acts 6. vers. 3. 6. It is apparent therefore by the custome of the Primitive Church under the Apostles, that the ordination, or consecration of all Church-men,

which is done by Prayer, and imposition of hands, belonged to the Apostles, and Doctors; but the Election of those who were to be consecrated, to the Church.

XXV. Concerning the power of binding, and loosing, that is to say of remitting, and retaining of sinnes, there is no doubt, but it was given by Christ to the Pastors then yet for to come, in the same manner as it was to the present Apostles. Now the Apostles had all the power of remitting of sins given them, which Christ himselfe had; As the Father hath sent me (sayes Christ) so send I you, John 20. vers. 21. and he addes, Whose soever sins yee remit, they are remitted, and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained. vers. 23. But what binding and loosing, or remitting and retaining of sinnes, is, admits of some scruple. For first, to retain his sinnes who being baptized into remission of sins, is truly penitent, seems to be against the very Covenant it selfe of the new Testament, and therefore could not be done by Christ himselfe, much lesse by his Pastors. And to remit the impenitent, seems to be against the will of God the Father, from whom Christ was sent to convert the world, and to reduce men unto obedience. Furthermore, if each Pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sinnes in this manner, all awe of Princes, and civill Magistrates, together with all kind of civill Government would be utterly destroyed. For Christ hath said it, nay even nature it selfe dictates, that we should not feare them who slay the body, but cannot kill the soule; but rather feare him who can cast both soule and body into hell, Mat. 10. vers. 28. Neither is any man so mad as not to choose to yeeld obedience rather to them who can remit, and retain their sinnes, then to the powerfullest Kings. Nor yet on the other side, it is to be imagined, that remission of sinnes is nothing else but an exemption from Ecclesiasticall punishments; for what evill hath excommunication in it, beside the eternall pains which are consequent to it? or what benefit is it to be received into the Church if there were salvation

out of it? We must therefore hold, That Pastors have Power, truly, and absolutely to forgive sinnes, but, to the penitent; and to retain them, but, of the impenitent. But while men think that to Repent, is nothing else but that every one condemn his Actions, and change those Counsels which to himselfe seem sinfull, and blameable, there is an opinion risen, that there may be repentance before any Confession of sinnes to men, and that repentance is not an effect, but a cause of Confession; and thence, the difficulty of those who say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven in Baptisme, and theirs who repent not, cannot be forgiven at al, is against Scripture, and contrary to the words of Christ, Whose soever sins ye remit, &c. We must therefore to resolve this difficulty know in the first place, that a true acknowledgement of sin is Repentance; for he that knows he hath sinned, knows he hath erred, but to will an errour is impossible; therefore he that knowes he hath sinned, wishes he had not done it, which is to repent. Farther, where it may be doubtfull, whether that which is done be a sin or not, we must consider, that repentance doth not precede confession of sins, but is subsequent to it: for there is no repentance but of sinnes acknowledged. The penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact, and know it to be a sinne, that is to say, against the Law. If a man therefore think, that what he hath done, is not against the Law; its impossible he should repent of it. Before repentance therefore, its necessary there be an application of the facts unto the Law. But its in vain to apply the facts unto the Law without an Interpreter. for not the words of the Law, but the sentence of the Law-giver is the rule of mens actions; but surely either one man, or some men are the Interpreters of the Law, for every man is not judge of his own fact whether it be a sin or not; wherefore the fact of which we doubt whether it be a sinne or not, must be unfolded before some man or men, and the doing of this is confession. Now when the Interpreter of the Law hath judged the fact to bee a sinne, if the sinner submit to his

judgement, and resolve with himselfe not to do so any more, tis repentance; and thus, either it is not true repentance, or else it is not antecedent, but subsequent to confession. These things being thus explained, it is not hard to understand what kinde of power that of binding and loosing is. For seeing in remission of sinnes there are two things considerable, one the Judgement or Condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a sinne; the other, (when the Party condemned does acquiesce, and obey the sentence, that is to say, Repents) the remission of the sinne, or, (if he repent not) the Retention: The first of these, that is to say, the Judging whether it be a sinne or not, belongs to the Interpreter of the Law, that is, the Soveraign Judge; the second, namely Remission, or retention of the sinne, to the Pastor, and it is that concerning which the power of binding and loosing is conversant. And that this was the true meaning of our Saviour Christ in the institution of the same power, is apparent in the 18 of Mat. vers. 15, 16, 17, 18. thus, He there speaking to his Disciples, sayes, If thy Brother sinne against thee, goe, and tell him his fault betweene thee and him alone, (where we must observe by the way, that if thy Brother sinne against thee, is the same with, if he doe thee injury; and therefore Christ spake of those matters which belonged to the civill Tribunall) he addes, if he heare thee not (that is to say, if he deny that he hath done it, or if having confest the fact, he denies it to be unjustly done) take with thee yet one or two, and if he refuse to heare them, tell it the Church. But why to the Church, except that she might judge whether it were a sinne or not? But if he refuses to hear the Church, that is, if he doe not submit to the Churches sentence, but shall maintain that to be no sin, which She Judges to be a sinne, that is to say, if he repent not (for certain it is that no man repents himselfe of that action which She conceives not to be a sinne) he saith not, Tell it to the Apostles, that we might know that the definitive sentence in the question, whether it were a sin or not, was not left unto them, but to the Church; but let him be unto thee (sayes he) as an

Heathen, or Publican, that is, as one out of the Church, as one that is not baptized, that is to say, as one whose sinnes are retained. For all Christians were baptized into remission of sinnes. But because it might have been demanded who it was that had so great a power, as that of withholding the benefit of Baptisme from the impenitent, Christ shewes that the same Persons to whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the remission of sinns, and to make them of heathen men, Christians, had also authority to retain their sins who by the Church should be adjudged to be impenitent, and to make them of Christian men Heathens; and therefore presently subjoynes, Verily I say unto you, Whose soever sinnes yee shall binde upon Earth, they shall bee bound also in Heaven, and whose soever sins yee shall loose upon Earth, they shall be loosed also in Heaven. Whence we may understand, that the power of binding, and loosing, or of remitting, and retaining of sinnes, which is called in another place, the power of the keyes, is not different from the power given in another place in these words, Goe, and teach all Nations, Baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Sonne, and of the Holy Ghost, Mat. 28. ver. 19. And even as the Pastours cannot refuse to Baptize him whom the Church judges worthy, so neither can they retaine his sinnes whom the Church holds fitting to be absolv'd, nor yet remit his sinnes whom the Church pronounceth disobedient. And it is the Churches part to judge of the sinne, the Pastours, to cast out, or to receive into the Church those that are judg'd. Thus Saint Paul to the Church of Corinth, Do not ye judge, saith he, of those that are within? Yet he himself pronounc't the sentence of Excommunication against the incestuous Person, I indeed (saith he) as absent in body, but present in Spirit, &c.

XXVI. The act of retaining sinnes is that which is called by the Church Excommunication, and by Saint Paul, delivering over to Satan. The word Excommunication, sounding the same with aposunagogon poiein, casting

out of the Synagogue, seems to be borrowed from the Mosaicall Law, wherein they who were by the Priest adjudged leprous, were commanded to be kept apart out of the Camp, untill by the judgement of the Priest they were againe pronounc't cleane, and by certaine rights (among which the washing of the body was one) were purified, Levit. 13. ver. 46. From hence in processe of time it became a custome of the Jewes, not to receive those who passed from Gentilisme to Judaisme, (supposing them to be uncleane) unlesse they were first washed; and those who dissented from the Doctrine of the Synagogue, they cast out of the Synagogue. By resemblance of this custome, those that came to Christianity, (whether they were Jewes, or Gentiles) were not receiv'd into the Church without Baptisme; and those that dissented from the Church were depriv'd of the Churches Communion. Now, they were therefore said to be deliver'd over to Satan, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended within his Kingdome. The end of this kind of Discipline was, that being destitute for a time of the grace and spirituall priviledges of the Church, they might be humbled to salvation. But the effect in regard to secular matters, that being excommunicated, they should not onely be prohibited all Congregations, or Churches, and the participation of the mysteries, but as being contagious they should be avoided by all other Christians, even more then Heathen: for the Apostle allowed to accompany with Heathen, but with these not so much as to eate, 1 Cor. 5. ver. 10, II. Seeing then the effect of Excommunication is such, it is manifest in the first place, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated. For a Christian City is a Christian Church, as hath been declar'd above in the 21. Art. and of the same extension. But a Church cannot be excommunicated; For either she must excommunicate her selfe, which is impossible; or she must be excommunicated by some other Church, and this, either universall, or particular. But seeing an Universall Church is no Person, (as hath been prov'd in the 22. Artic.) and therefore neither acts, nor

does any thing, it cannot excommunicate any man. And a particular church by excommunicating another Church doth nothing; for where there is not one common Congregation, there cannot be any Excommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of Jerusalem) should have excommunicated an other (suppose that of Rome) would it any more have excommunicated this, then her selfe: for he that deprives another of his Communion, deprives himselfe also of the Communion of that other. Secondly, No man can excommunicate the subjects of any absolute government all at once, or forbid them the use of their Temples, or their publique worship of God. For they cannot be excommunicated by a Church which themselves doe constitute; for if they could, there would not onely not remain a Church, but not so much as a common-weale, and they would be dissolved of themselves; and this were not to be excommunicated, or prohibited. But if they be excommunicated by some other Church, that church is to esteem them as Heathen. But no christian Church by the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the Heathen to gather together, and Communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good to their Cities, especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it be done in a singular custome, and manner: therefore also not the excommunicated, who are to be dealt with as Heathen. Thirdly, a Prince who hath the Soveraign Power, cannot be excommunicated. For by the doctrine of Christ, neither one, nor many subjects together can interdict their Prince any publique, or private places, or deny him entrance into any Assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of what hee will within his own jurisdiction. For it is Treason among all Cities, for any one, or many subjects joyntly to arrogate to themselves any authority over the whole City; but they who arrogate to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the City, doe arrogate the same authority over the City it selfe. Besides, a Soveraign Prince, if he be a Christian, hath this farther advantage, that the City whose

Will is contained in His, is that very thing which we call a Church; the Church therefore excommunicates no man, but whom it excommunicates by the authority of the Prince: but the Prince excommunicates not himselfe, his subjects therefore cannot doe it. It may be indeed that an Assembly of rebellious Citizens or Traytors, may pronounce the sentence of excommunication against their Prince, but not by Right. Much lesse can one Prince be excommunicated by another, for this would prove not an excommunication, but a provocation to Warre by the way of affront. For since that is not one church which is made up of Citizens belonging to two absolute Cities, for want of power of lawfully assembling them, (as hath been declar'd before in the 22. Art.) they who are of one Church are not bound to obey an other, and therefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience. Now, what some may say, that Princes, being they are members of the Universall church, may also by the authority of the Universall church be excommunicated, signifies nothing: because the Universall church (as hath beene shewed in the 22. Art.) is not one Person, of whom it may be said that shee acted, decreed, determin'd, excommunicated, absolv'd, and the like personall attributes; neither hath she any Governour upon Earth at whose command she may assemble, and deliberate: For to be guide of the Universall church, and to have the power of assembling her, is the same thing as to be Governour, and Lord over all the Christians in the world, which is granted to none, but God onely.

XXVII. It hath beene shewed above in the 18. Art. that the authority of interpreting the Holy Scriptures consisted not in this, that the interpreter might without punishment, expound, and explicate his sentence & opinion taken thence, unto others, either by writing, or by his owne voice; but, that others have not a Right to doe, or teach ought contrary to his sentence; insomuch as the interpretation we speak of is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred

Scriptures. Now we must shew that that power belongs to each Church, and depends on his, or their authority who have the Supreme command, provided that they be Christians. For if it depend not on the civill authority, it must either depend on the opinion of each private Subject, or some forraigne authority. But among other reasons, the inconveniencies that must follow private opinions cannot suffer its dependance on them; of which this is the chiefe, that not onely all civill obedience would be taken away (contrary to Christ his praecept) but all humane society and peace would be dissolved (contrary to the Lawes of nature;) for seeing every man is his owne interpreter of Scripture, that is to say, since every man makes himselfe judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto God, they cannot obey their Princes before that they have judg'd whether their commands be conformable to the Word of God, or not. And thus either they obey not, or they obey for their owne opinions sake, that is to say, they obey themselves, not their Soveraigne; civill obedience therefore is lost. Againe, when every man followes his owne opinion, it's necessary that the controversies which rise among them will become innumerable, and indeterminable; whence there will breed among men (who by their own naturall inclinations doe account all dissention an affront) first hatred, then brawles and warres, and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish. We have farthermore for an example, that which God under the old Law required to be observed concerning the book of the Law, namely, that it should be transcrib'd, and publiquely us'd, and he would have it to be the Canon of Divine doctrine: but the controversies about it not to be determined by private Persons, but onely by the Priests. Lastly, it is our Saviours Precept, that if there be any matter of offence between private Persons, they should hear the Church. Wherefore it is the Churches duty to define controversies; it therefore belongs not to private men, but to the Church, to interpret Scriptures. But that we may know that the authority of interpreting Gods Word, that is to

say, of determining all questions concerning God, and Religion, belongs not to any forraign Person whatsoever, we must consider first what esteem such a power carries in the mindes of the subjects, and their civill actions. For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men by a naturall necessity, doe follow those opinions which they have concerning good, and evill, Reward, and Punishment; whence it happens that necessarily they would chuse rather to obey those by whose judgement they beleeve that they shall be eternally happy, or miserable. Now, by whose judgement it is appointed what Doctrines are necessary to salvation, by their judgement doe men expect their eternall blisse, or perdition; they will therefore yeeld them obedience in all things. Which being thus, most manifest it is, that those subjects who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a forraign authority in those Doctrines which are necessary to salvation, doe not per se constitute a City, but are the subjects of that forraign power. Nor therefore although some Soveraign Prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other, yet so, as he would be understood to have retained the civill power in his own hands, shall such a Writing be valid, or transferre ought necessary for the retaining, or good administration of his command. For by the 2. Cha. artic. no man is said to transferre his Right, unlesse he give some proper sign, declaring his Will to transferre it; but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his Soveraignty, cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it. This kinde of Writing therefore will not be a sign of Will, but of Ignorance in the contractors. We must consider next how absurd it is for a City, or Soveraign, to commit the ruling of his Subjects consciences to an enemy. For they are, as hath been shewed above in the 5. Cha. artic. in an hostile state, whosoever have not joyn’d themselves into the unity of one Person. Nor contradicts it this truth that they doe not alwayes fight: (for truces are made between enemies) it is sufficient for an hostile minde, that there is

suspition, that the Frontiers of Cities, Kingdomes, Empires, strengthned with Garisons, doe with a fighting posture and countenance, though they strike not, yet as enemies mutually behold each other. Lastly, how unequall is it to demand that, which by the very reason of your demand, you confesse belongs to anothers Right? I am the Interpreter of Scriptures to you who are the Subject of anothers Realme: Why? By what Covenants past between you and me? By Divine authority. Whence knowne? Out of holy Scripture. Behold the Book, read it. In vain, unlesse I may also interpret the same for my self; That interpretation therefore doth by Right belong to me, and the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny. It remains therefore that in all christian Churches, that is to say, in all christian Cities, the interpretation of sacred Scripture depend on, and derive from the authority of that man, or Councell, which hath the Soveraign power of the City.

XXVIII. Now because there are two kindes of controversies, the one about spirituall matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth whereof cannot be searcht into by naturall reason; such are the questions concerning the nature, and office of Christ, of rewards and punishments to come, of the Sacraments, of outward worship, and the like: the other, about questions of humane science, whose truth is sought out by naturall reason, and Syllogismes, drawne from the Covenants of men, and definitions (that is to say, significations received by use, and common consent of words) such as are all questions of Right, and Philosophy. For example, when in matter of Right its questioned whether there be a Promise, and Covenant, or not? that is nothing else, but to demand, whether such words spoken in such a manner be by common use, and consent of the Subjects, a Promise or Covenant; which if they be so called, then it is true that a Contract is made, if not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the compacts, and consents of men. In like manner when it is demanded in Philosophy whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once; the

determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men about the signification of the word entire: for if men when they say a thing is entirely somewhere doe signifie by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere, it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once: that truth therefore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason in all other questions concerning Right, and Philosophy. And they who doe judge that any thing can be determin'd, (contrary to this common consent of men concerning the appellations of things) out of obscure places of Scripture, doe also judge that the use of speech, and at once all humane society, is to be taken away; for he who hath sold an whole field, will say, he meant one whole ridge, and will retaine the rest as unsold; nay, they take away reason it selfe, which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent. These kinde of questions therefore need not be determin'd by the City by way of interpretation of Scriptures; for they belong not to Gods Word, in that sense wherein the Word of God is taken for the Word concerning God, that is to say, for the Doctrine of the Gospell; neither is he who hath the Soveraigne Power in the Church, oblig'd to employ any Ecclesiastical Doctours for the judging of any such kind of matters as these. But for the deciding of questions of Faith, that is to say, concerning God, which transcend humane capacity, we stand in need of a divine blessing (that we may not be deceiv'd at least in necessary points) to be deriv'd from CHRIST himselfe by the imposition of hands. For, seeing to the end we may attaine to aeternal Salvation, we are oblig'd to a supernatural Doctrine, & which therefore it is impossible for us to understand; to be left so destitute, as that we can be deceiv'd in necessary points, is repugnant to aequity. This infallibility our Saviour Christ promis'd (in those things which are necessary to Salvation) to his Apostles untill the day of judgement; that is to say, to the Apostles, and Pastors succeeding the Apostles who were to be consecrated by the

imposition of hands. He therefore who hath the Soveraigne power in the City, is oblig'd as a Christian, where there is any question concerning the Mysteries of Faith, to interpret the Holy Scriptures by Clergy-men lawfully ordain'd. And thus in Christian Cities the judgement both of spirituall and temporall matters belongs unto the civill authority. And that man, or councell who hath the Supreme power, is head both of the City, and of the Church; for a Church, and a Christian City is but one thing.

Chapter XVIII: Concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven

I. IT WAS ever granted that all authority in secular matters deriv'd from him who had the Soveraigne power, whether he were one Man, or an Assembly of Men. That the same in spirituall matters depended on the authority of the Church, is manifest by the next foregoing proofs; and besides this, that all Christian Cities are Churches endued with this kind of authority From whence a man though but dull of apprehension may collect, that in a Christian City, (that is to say, in a City whose Soveraignty belongs to a Christian Prince, or Councell) all Power, as well spiritual, as secular, is united under Christ; and therefore it is to be obey'd in all things. But on the other side, because we must rather obey God then Wen, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely be yeelded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which CHRIST hath prohibited. The reason of this difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speakes to us by CHRIST, and his Prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by divers men are diversly understood, they know indeed what Princes, and a congregated Church doe command; but whether that which they doe command be contrary to the word of God, or not, this they know not, but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporall, and spirituall death, as it were sailing betweene Scilla and Carybdis, they often run themselves upon both. But they who rightly distinguish betweene the things necessary to Salvation, and those which are not necessary, can have none of this kind of doubt. For if the command of the Prince, or City be such, that he can obey it without hazard of his

aeternall Salvation, it is unjust not to obey them, and the Apostles praecepts take place: Servants in all things obey your Wasters according to the flesh. Children obey your Parents in all things. Col. 3. v. 20, 22. And the command of CHRIST, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses chair, all things therefore whatsoever they command you, that observe, and doe. Mat. 23. v. 2. On the contrary, if they command us to doe those things which are punisht with aeternall death, it were madnesse not rather to chuse to dye a naturall death, then by obeying, to dye eternally; and then comes in that which CHRIST sayes, Feare not them who kill the body, but cannot kill the Soule. Mat. 10. v. 28. We must see therefore what all those things are, which are necessary to Salvation.

II. Now all things necessary to Salvation are comprehended in two vertues, Faith, and Obedience. The latter of these if it could be perfect would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but because we have all of us beene long since guilty of disobedience against God in Adam, and besides we our selves have since actually sinned, Obedience is not sufficient without remission of sinnes. But this, together with our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven is the reward of Faith. Nothing else is requisite to Salvation; for the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, those who have not perform'd due Obedience to the Lawes; and not to those neither, if they beleeve the necessary articles of the Christian Faith. Now, if we shall know in what points Obedience doth consist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian Faith, it will at once be manifest what we must doe, and what abstaine from, at the commands of Cities, and of Princes.

III. But by Obedience in this place is signified not the fact, but the Will and desire wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much as we can to obey for the future: in which sense the word Obedience is aequivalent to Repentance. For the vertue of repentance consists not in the sorrow which

accompanies the remembrance of sinne; but in our conversion to the way, and full purpose to sinne no more, without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a Penitent but a desperate person. But because they who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine Law, and they who love their Neighbours cannot but desire to obey the morall Law, which consists as hath beene shewed above in the 3. Chapter, in the prohibition of Pride, ingratitude, contumely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby our Neighbours are prejudic't, therefore also Love or charity are aequivalent to Obedience. Justice also (which is a constant will of giving to every man his due) is aequivalent with it. But that Faith and Repentance are sufficient for Salvation, is manifest by the Covenant it selfe of Baptisme; for they who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him what they should do? He answered, Repent, and be Baptiz'd every one of you in the name of Jesus for the remission of your Sins. Act. 2. v. 38. There was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of Baptisme, that is to say, for to enter into the Kingdome of God, but to Repent, and beleeve in the Name of JESUS. For the Kingdome of Heaven is promis'd by the Covenant which is made in Baptisme; farthermore, by the words of CHRIST answering the Lawyer who askt him what he should doe to inherit eternall life, Thou knowest the Commandements, Thou shalt not Kill, Thou shalt not commit Adultery, &c. which refer to Obedience; and, Sell all that thou hast, and come, and follow me, which relates to faith, Luke 18. ver. 20. Mar. 10. ver. 18. And by that which is said, The just shall live by Faith, (not every man, but the just) for justice is the same disposition of Will which Repentance and Obedience are; And by the words of Saint Mark, The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdome of God is at hand, Repent yee, and beleeve the Gospell, by which words is not obscurely signified that there is no need of other Vertues, for our entrance into the Kingdome of God, excepting those of Repentance and Faith. The Obedience therefore which is

necessarily requir'd to Salvation is nothing else but the Will, or endeavour to obey, that is to say, of doing according to the Lawes of God, that is the morall Lawes, which are the same to all men; and the civill Lawes, that is to say, the commands of Soveraignes in temporall matters, and the Ecclesiasticall Lawes in spirituall; which two kinds of Lawes are divers in divers Cities, and Churches, and are knowne by their promulgation, and publique sentences.

IV. That we may understand what the Christian Faith is, we must define Faith in generall, and distinguish it from those other acts of the minde wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of Faith universally taken, namely for that which is beleev'd, is evermore a proposition, (that is to say a speech affirmative, or negative) which we grant to be true. But because Propositions are granted for divers causes, it falls out, that these kind of concessions are diversly called: But we grant Propositions sometimes which notwithstanding we receive not into our mindes; and this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of the consequencies, we have well examin'd the truth of them, which we call supposing; or also simply, as through feare of the Lawes, which is to professe, or confesse by outward tokens; or for a voluntary compliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they respect, and for love of Peace to others, which is absolute yeelding. Now the Propositions which we receive for truth, we alwaies grant for some reasons of our owne, and these are deriv'd either from the Proposition it selfe, or from the Person propounding. They are deriv'd from the Proposition it selfe, by calling to minde what things those words which make up the Proposition doe by common consent usually signifie: if so, then the assent which we give is called knowledge, or Science. But if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but sometimes one thing, sometimes another seeme to be apprehended by us, then we are said to thinke. For example, if it be

propounded that two and three makes five; and by calling to minde the order of those numerall words, that it is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us, (as it were by a certaine contract necessary for humane society) that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contain'd in two and three taken together, a man assents, that this is therefore true because two and three together, are the same with five. This assent shall be called knowledge, and to know this truth is nothing else but to acknowledge that it is made by our selves; For by whose will and rules of speaking the number... is called two,... is called three, &c... is called five, by their will also it comes to passe, that this Proposition is true, Two and three taken together makes five. In like manner if we remember what it is that is called theft, and what injury, we shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that theft is an injury, or not. Truth is the same with a true Proposition; but the Proposition is true in which the word consequent, which by Logicians is called the praedicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude, which they call the Subject; and to know truth is the same thing as to remember that it was made by our selves in the common use of words. Neither was it rashly, or unadvisedly said by Plato of old, that knowledge was memory. But it happens sometimes that words although they have a certaine, and defin'd signification by constitution, yet by vulgar use either to adorne, or deceive, they are so wrested from their owne significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they were first impos'd on things is very hard, and not to be maistered but by a sharpe judgement, and very great diligence. It happens too, that there are many words which have no proper, determin'd, and every where the same signification; and are understood not by their owne, but by vertue of other signes us'd together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable; of those things therefore whereof they are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vaine doe we

seeke for the truth of those Propositions, which they make out of the words themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the hope we have of finding it, we thinke it sometimes true, and sometimes false; either of which apart is called thinking, and also beleeving; both together, doubting. But when our reasons for which we assent to some Proposition, derive not from the Proposition it selfe, but from the Person Propounding, whom we esteeme so learned that he is not deceiv'd, and we see no reason why he should deceive us; our assent, because it growes not from any confidence of our owne, but from another mans knowledge, is called Faith: And by the confidence of whom, we doe beleeve, we are said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what hath been said, the difference appeares first betweene Faith, and Profession; for that is alwaies joyn'd with inward assent, this not alwayes; That is an inward perswasion of the minde, this an outward obedience. Next, betweene Faith, and Opinion; for this depends on our owne reason, that on the good esteeme we have of another. Lastly betweene Faith and Knowledge; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken, and chewed; that swallowes downe whole and entire. The explication of words, whereby the matter enquir'd after is propounded, is conducible to knowledge; nay, the onely way to know, is by definition. But this is prejudiciall to Faith; for those things which exceede humane capacity, and are propounded to be beleev'd, are never more evident by explication, but on the contrary more obscure, and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man who endeavours to demonstrate the mysteries of Faith by naturall reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholsome, but bitter Pills; whence it comes to passe, that he presently brings them up againe, which perhaps would otherwise, if he had taken them well downe, have prov'd his remedy.

V. We have seene therefore what it is to beleeve. But what is it to beleeve in CHRIST? Or what Proposition is that which is the object of our Faith in CHRIST? For when we say, I beleeve in CHRIST, we signifie indeed Whom, but not What we beleeve. Now, to beleeve in CHRIST is nothing else but to beleeve that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, namely Hee, who according to the Prophesies of Moyses, and the Prophets of Israel, was to come into this world to institute the Kingdome of God. And this sufficiently appeares out of the words of CHRIST himselfe to Martha: I am (saith he) the Resurrection and the life, HE THAT BELEEVETH IN ME, though he were dead, yet he shall live, and WHOSOEVER LIVETH, AND BELEEVETH IN ME, shall never dye. Beleevest thou this? She saith unto him, Yea Lord, I beleeve that THOU ART THE CHRIST the Son of God, which should come into the world. John 11. ver. 25, 26, 27. In which words we see that the question BELEEVEST THOU. IN ME? is expounded by the answer, THOU ART THE CHRIST. To beleeve in CHRIST therefore is nothing else but to beleeve JESUS HIMSELFE saying that he is THE CHRIST.

VI. Faith and Obedience both necessarily concurring to Salvation, what kinde of Obedience that same is, and to whom due, hath beene shewed above in the 3. Article. But now we must enquire what articles of Faith are requisite: And I say, that to a Christian* there is no other article of Faith requisite as necessary to Salvation, but only this, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST. But we must distinguish (as we have already done before in the 4. Article) betweene Faith, and Profession. A Profession therefore of more articles (if they be commanded) may be necessary. for it is a part of our obedience due to the Lawes; but we enquire not now what Obedience, but what Faith is necessary to salvation. And this is prov'd first out of the scope of the Evangelists which was by the description of our Saviours life to establish this one Article. And we shall know that such was the scope, and

counsell of the Evangelists, if we observe but the History it selfe. Saint Matthew beginning at his Genealogy shewes that JESUS was of the linage of David, borne of a Virgin, Cha. that He was adored by the Wise men as King of the Jewes; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him, Cha. That his Kingdome was Preacht both by john the Baptist, and Himselfe, Cha, 4. That He taught the Lawes, not as the Scribes, but as one having authority, Cha, 6, 7. That he cur'd diseases miraculously, Cha, 9. That He sent his Apostles the Preachers of his Kingdome throughout all the parts of judea, to proclame his Kingdome, Cha. That He commanded the Messengers sent from john to enquire whether he were the CHRIST or not, to tell him what they had seene, namely the miracles which were onely competible with CHRIST, Cha. That he prov'd and declar'd his Kingdome to the Pharisees, and others by arguments, parables and signes, Chap: 12. and the following Chapters to the 21. That He maintain'd himselfe to be the Christ against the Pharisees, That He was saluted with the title of King, when he entred into Jerusalem, Cha. That he forewarn'd others of false Christs, and That He shewed in Parables what manner of Kingdome his should be, Cha, 23, 24, 25. That He was taken, and accused for this reason, because He said He was a King; and that a Title was written on his Crosse, THIS IS JESUS, THE KING OF THE JEWES, Cha, 27. Lastly, that after his resurrection, He told his Apostles that all power was given unto Him both in Heaven, and in Earth, Cha. All which tends to this end, That we should beleeve Jesus to be the Christ. Such therefore was the Scope of Saint Matthew in describing his Gospell; but such as his was, such also was the rest of the Evangelists; which Saint Iohn sets down expresly in the end of his Gospel, These things (saith He) are written, that ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Sonne of the living God. Iohn 20. vers. 31.

[I say, that to a Christian] Although I conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my

labour to make a more ample explication of it, because I perceive that being somewhat new, it may possibly be distastfull to many Divines. First therefore when I say this Article, That Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to salvation; I say not that Faith onely is necessary, but I require justice also, or that Obedience which is due to the Lawes of God, that is to say, a Will to live righteously. Secondly, I deny not but the profession of many Articles, (provided that that profession be commanded by the Church) is also necessary to salvation; but seeing Faith is internall, Profession externall, I say that the former onely is properly Faith; the latter a part of Obedience; insomuch as that Article alone sufficeth for inward beleefe, but is not sufficient for the outward profession of a Christian. Lastly, even as if I had said that true and inward Repentance of sinnes was onely necessary to salvation, yet were it not to be held for a Paradox, because we suppose justice, Obedience, and a mind reformed in all manner of vertues to be contained in it: so when I say that the Faith of one Article is sufficient to salvation, it may well be lesse wondred at, seeing that in it so many other Articles are contained. For these words, Jesus is the Christ, do signifie that Jesus was that Person whom God had promised by his Prophets should come into the world to establish his Kingdom, that is to say, that Jesus is the Sonne of God, the Creatour of Heaven and Earth, born of a Virgin, dying for the sinnes of them who should beleeve in Him; that Hee was Christ, that is to say a King; that He reviv'd (for else He were not like to reign) to judge the world, and to reward every one according to his works, for otherwise he cannot be a King; also that men shall rise again, for otherwise they are not like to come to judgement. The whole Symbol of the Apostles is therefore contained in this one Article; which notwithstanding I thought reasonable to contract thus, because I found that many men for this alone, without the rest, were admitted into the Kingdome of God, both by Christ, and his Apostles; as the Thief on the Crosse, the Eunuch baptized by Philip, the two

thousand men converted to the Church at once by Saint Peter. But if any man be displeased that I doe not judge all those eternally damned, who doe not inwardly assent to every Article defined by the Church (and yet doe not contradict, but if they be commanded, doe submit) I know not what I shall say to them; for the most evident Testimonies of Holy Writ which doe follow, doe withhold me from altering my opinion.

VII. Secondly, this is proved by the preaching of the Apostles. For they were the Proclamers of his Kingdome, neither did Christ send them to preach ought but the Kingdome of God, Luke 9. vers. 2. Act. 15. vers. 6. And what they did after Christ his Ascension may be understood by the accusation which was brought against them, They drew Jason (saith Saint Luke) and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These are the men that have turned the world upside down, and are come hither also, whom Jason hath received; and these all do contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another King, one Jesus. Acts 17. vers. 6, 7. It appears also what the subject of the Apostles Sermons was, out of these words: Opening, and alleadging out of the Scriptures (to wit, of the old Testament) that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that THIS JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Acts 17. vers. 2, 3.

VIII. Thirdly, By the places in which the easinesse of those things which are required by Christ to the attaining of salvation, is declared. For if an internall assent of the minde were necessarily required to the truth of all and each Proposition which this day is controverted about the Christian Faith, or by divers Churches is diversly defined, there would be nothing more difficult then the Christian Religion. And how then would that be true, My yoke is easie, and my burthen light? Mat. 11. vers. 30. and that litle ones doe beleeve in Him? Mat. 18. vers. 6. and that it pleased God by the foolishnesse of Preaching, to save those that beleeve? 1 Cor. 1. vers. 21. or how was the thiefe hanging on the Crosse sufficiently instructed to

salvation, the confession of whose Faith was contained in these words, Lord remember me when thou comest into thy Kingdome; or how could Saint Paul himselfe, from an enemy, so soon become a Doctor of Christians?

IX. Fourthly, by this, that that Article is the foundation of Faith, neither rests it on any other foundation. If any man shall say unto you, Loe here is Christ, or He is there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes, and wonders, &c. Mat. 24. vers. 23. Whence it followes, that for the Faiths sake which we have in this Article, we must not beleeve any signes, and wonders. Although we, or an Angell from Heaven (saith the Apostle) should preach to you any other Gospel, then what we have preacht, let him be accursed. Gal. 1. 8. By reason of this Article therefore we might not trust the very Apostles, and Angels themselves (and therefore I conceive not the Church neither) if they should teach the contrary. Beloved, beleeve not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world, hereby know yee the spirit of God, every spirit that confesseth Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God, &c. 1 John 4. vers. 1, 2. That Article therefore is the measure of the Spirits whereby the authority of the Doctors, is either received, or rejected. It cannot be denied indeed, but that all who at this day are Christians, did learn from the Doctors, that it was Jesus who did all those things whereby he might be acknowledged to be the Christ; yet it followes not that the same Persons beleeved that Article for the Doctors, or the Churches, but for Jesus his own sake. For that Article was before the Christian Church, although all the rest were after it, and the Church was founded upon it, not it upon the Church. Mat. 16. vers. 18. Besides, this Article, that Jesus is the Christ, is so fundamentall, that all the rest are by Saint Paul said to be built upon it, For other foundation can no man lay, then that which is layd, which is Jesus Christ (that is to say, that Jesus is the Christ). Now if any man build uPon this foundation, gold,

silver, precious stone, wood, hay, stubble; every mans work shall be made manifest: If any mans work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward; if any mans work shall be burnt, he shall suffer losse, but he himselfe shall be saved. 1 Cor. 3. vers. 11, 12, 13. &c. From whence it plainly appears, that by foundation is understood this Article, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST. For gold, and silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble (whereby the Doctrines are signified) are not built upon the Person of Christ; and also, that false Doctrines may be raised upon this foundation, vet not so, as they must necessarily be damned who teach them.

X. Lastly, that this Article alone is needfull to be inwardly beleeved, may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy Scriptures, let who will be the Interpreter: Search the Scriptures, for in them yee think yee have eternall life; and they are they which testify of me. John 5. 39. But Christ meant the Scriptures of the old Testament only: for the new was then not yet written. Now, there is no other testimony concerning Christ in the old Testament, but that an eternall King was to come in such a place, that He was to be born of such Parents, that He was to teach, and doe such things; whereby, as by certain signes, he was to be knowne: All which testify this one thing, that JESUS who was so born, and did teach, and doe such things, was THE CHRIST. Other Faith then was not required to attain eternall life, besides this Article. Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in me, shall never dye. John 11. vers. 25. But to beleeve in Jesus (as is there exprest) is the same with beleeving that JESUS WAS THE CHRIST. He therefore that beleeves that, shall never dye, and by consequence, that Article alone is necessary to salvation. These are written that yee might beleeve that JESUS IS THE CHRIST the Sonne of God, and that beleeving yee might have life through his name. Jo. 20. vers. 31. Wherefore he that beleeves thus, shall have eternall life, and therefore needs no other Faith. Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. 1 Jo. 4. v. 2. And,

Whosoever beleeveth that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, is born of God. 1 Jo. 5. vers. 1. And, Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that beleeveth that IESUS is the Son of God? 1 Jo. 5. v. 5. If therefore there be no need to beleeve any thing else, to the end a man may be of God, born of God, and overcome the world, then that IESUS IS THE CHRIST. that one Article then is sufficient to salvation. See, here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest with all thine heart, thou maist. And he answered and said, I beleeve that IESUS CHRIST is the Sonne of God. Acts 8. vers. 36, 37. If then this Article being beleeved with the whole heart, (that is to say, with inward Faith) was sufficient for Baptisme, it is also sufficient for salvation. Besides these places there are innumerable others which doe clearly, and expresly affirm the same thing. Nay, wheresoever wee read that our Saviour commended the Faith of any one, or that he said, Thy Faith hath saved thee, or that he healed any one for his Faiths sake, there the Proposition beleeved was no other but this, IESUS IS THE CHRIST, either directly, or consequently.

XI. But because no man can beleeve IESUS TO BE THE CHRIST, who, when he knowes that by Christ is understood that same King who was promised from God by Moyses, and the Prophets, for to be the King, and Saviour of the world, doth not also beleeve Moyses, and the Prophets, neither can he beleeve these, who beleeves not that God is, and that he governs the world; it is necessary that the Faith of God, and of the old Testament be contained in this Faith of the new. Seeing therefore that Atheisme, and the deniall of the Divine Providence, were the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the Kingdome of God by Nature; but Idolatry also in the Kingdome of God by the Old Covenant; now in this Kingdome wherein God rules by way of a new Covenant, apostasie is also added, or the renunciation of this article once receiv'd, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Truly other Doctrines, provided they have their determination from a

lawfull Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sinne of disobedience; but it hath been fully declar'd before that they are not needfull to be beleev'd with an inward Faith.

XII. Faith and Obedience have divers parts in accomplishing the salvation of a Christian; for this contributes the power, or capacity; that the Act. And either is said to justifie in its kinde. For Christ forgives not the sins of all men, but of the Penitent, or the Obedient, that is to say the just, I say not the guiltlesse, but the just; for justice is a Will of obeying the Lawes, and may be consistent with a sinner, and with Christ the Will to obey is Obedience; for not every man, but the just shall live by Faith. Obedience therefore justifies because it maketh just in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate, Prudence Prudent, Chastity chaste, namely essentially; and puts a man in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon. Againe, Christ hath not promis'd forgivenesse of sinnes to all just men, but only those of them who beleeve Him to be the Christ. Faith therefore justifies in such a sense as a judge may be said to justifie who absolves; namely by the sentence which actually saves a man. And in this acception of justification (for it is an aequivocall terme) Faith alone justifies, but in the other, Obedience onely: but neither Obedience alone nor Faith alone doe save us, but both together.

XIII. By what hath been said hitherto, it will be easy to discerne what the duty of Christian Subjects is towards their Soveraignes, who as long as they professe themselves Christians cannot command their Subjects to deny Christ, or to offer him any contumely; for if they should command this, they would professe themselves to be no Christians. For seeing we have shewed both by naturall reason, and out of holy Scriptures, that Subjects ought in all things to obey their Princes and Governours, excepting those which are contrary to the command of God; and that the commands of God in a Christian City concerning temporall affairs, (that is to say, those which are

to be discust by humane reason) are the Lawes and sentence of the City deliver'd from those who have receiv'd authority from the City to make Laws, and judge of controversies; but concerning spirituall matters; (that is to, say those which are to be defin'd by the holy Scripture) are the Lawes, and sentences of the City, that is to say the Church (for a Christian City, and a Church, as hath beene shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 20. Art. are the same thing) deliv'rd by Pastors lawfully ordain'd, and who have to that end authority given them by the City; it manifestly followes, that in a Christian Common weale, Obedience is due to the Soveraign in all things, as well Spirituall, as Temporall. And that the same obedience even from a Christian subject is due in all temporall matters to those Princes who are no Christians, is without any controversie; but in matters spirituall, that is to say, those things which concern Gods worship, some christian Church is to be followed. For it is an hypothesis of the Christian Faith, that God speaks not in things supernaturall, but by the way of Christian Interpreters of holy Scriptures. But what? Must we resist Princes when we cannot obey them? Truly no; for this is contrary to our civill Covenant. What must we doe then? Goe to Christ by Martyrdome. Which if it seem to any man to be an hard saying, most certain it is that he beleeves not with his whole heart THAT IESUS IS THE CHRIST the Sonne of the living God, (for he would then desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ) but he would by a feigned Christian Faith elude that obedience which he hath contracted to yeeld up unto the City.

XIV. But some men perhaps will wonder, if, (excepting this one Article, that IESUS IS THE CHRIST, which only is necessary to salvation in relation to internall faith) all the rest belong to obedience, which may be performed, although a man doe not inwardly beleeve, (so he doe but desire to beleeve, and make an outward profession, as oft as need requires, of whatsoever is propounded by the Church); how it comes about that there are

so many Tenets which are all held so to concern our Faith, that except a man doe inwardly beleeve them, He cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven. But if he consider that in most controversies the contention is about humane Soveraignty; in some, matter of gain, and profit; in others, the glory of Wits; he will surely wonder the lesse. The question about the propriety of the Church, is a question about the Right of Soveraignty; for, it being known what a Church is, it is known at once to whom the Rule over Christians doth belong. For if every Christian City be that Church which Christ himselfe hath commanded every Christian subject to that city, to hear, then every subject is bound to obey his City, that is to say, Him, or them who have the supreme power, not only in temporall but also in spirituall matters. But if every Christian City be not that Church, then is there some other Church more universall, which must be obeyed. All Christians therefore must obey that Church just as they would obey Christ if He came upon Earth. She will therfore rule either by the way of Monarchy, or by some Assembly: This question then concerns the Right of ruling. To the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility; for whosoever were truly, and internally beleeved by all mankinde, that he could not erre, would be sure of all Dominion, as well temporall as spirituall, over all mankinde, unlesse himselfe would refuse it; for if he say that he must be obeyed in temporalls, because it is supposed he cannot erre, that Right of Dominion is immediately granted him. Hither also tends the priviledge of interpreting Scriptures. For he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of Scriptures, hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine all manner of controversies whatsoever. but he who hath this, hath also the command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of God. To this end drive all the disputes about the Power of remitting, and retaining sinnes; or the authority of excommunication. For every man, if he be in his wits, will

in all things yeeld that man an absolute obedience, by vertue of whose sentence he beleeves himselfe to be either saved, or damned. Hither also tends the power of instituting societies; for they depend on him by whom they subsist, who hath as many subjects as Monks, although living in an Enemies City. To this end also refers the question concerning the Iudge of lawfull Matrimony; for he to whom that judicature belongs, to him also pertains the knowledge of all those cases which concern the inheritance, and succession to all the goods, and Rights, not of private men onely, but also of Soveraign Princes. And hither also in some respect tends the Virgin-life of Ecclesiasticall Persons; for unmarried men have lesse coherence then others with civill society: and besides, it is an inconvenience not to be slighted, that Princes must either necessarily forgoe the Priesthood (which is a great bond of civill obedience) or have no hereditary Kingdome. To this end also tends the canonization of Saints which the Heathen called Apotheosis; for he that can allure forraign subjects with so great a reward, may bring those who are greedy of such glory to dare, and doe any thing. For what was it but an honourable Name with posterity? which the Decii and other Romans sought after, and a thousand others who cast themselves upon incredible perils? The controversies about Purgatory, and indulgencies, are matter of gain. The questions of Free-will, Iustification, and the manner of receiving Christ in the Sacrament, are Philosophicall. There are also questions concerning some Rites not introduced, but left in the Church not sufficiently purged from gentilisme; but we need reckon no more. All the world knows that such is the nature of men, that dissenting in questions which concern their Power, or profit, or preeminence of Wit, they slander, and curse each other. It is not therefore to be wondred at, if almost all tenets (after men grew hot with disputings) are held forth by some or other to be necessary to salvation, and for our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven; insomuch as they who hold them not, are not only condemned as guilty of disobedience

(which in truth they are after the Church hath once defined them) but of Infidelity, which I have declared above to be wrong out of many evident places of Scripture; to which I adde this one of Saint Pauls, Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath received him. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind, Rom. 14. v. 3, 5.

Leviathan

OR THE MATTER, FORME, AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL

First published in 1651, Hobbes' masterpiece concerns the structure of society and legitimate government. The text is regarded as one of the earliest and most influential examples of social contract theory. Written during the English Civil War (1642-1651), it argues for a social contract and rule by an absolute sovereign. Hobbes argues that civil war and the brute situation of a state of nature (the war of all against all) could only be avoided by strong, undivided government. The book's name derives from the biblical Leviathan mentioned in the Book of Job. Unlike the more informative titles usually given to works of early modern political philosophy, such as John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* or Hobbes' own earlier work *The Elements of Law*, he selected a more poetic name for this challenging treatise. Lexicographers in the early modern period believed that the term "leviathan" was associated with the Hebrew words lavah, meaning "to couple, connect, or join", and thannin, meaning "a serpent or dragon".

The treatise opens with an account of human nature, presenting an image of man as matter in motion, attempting to show through example how everything about humanity can be explained materialistically, without recourse to an incorporeal, immaterial soul or a faculty for understanding ideas that are external to the human mind. The author defines terms clearly and unsentimentally. Good and evil are nothing more than terms used to denote an individual's appetites and desires, which are a tendency to move toward or away from an object. Hope, Hobbes explains, is nothing more

than an appetite for a thing combined with an opinion that it can be had. He suggests that the dominant political theology of the time, Scholasticism, thrives on confused definitions of everyday words, which is a contradiction in terms.

Hobbes goes on to describe human psychology without any reference to the *summum bonum* (greatest good), as previous thought had done. Not only is the concept of a *summum bonum* superfluous, but given the variability of human desires, there could be no such thing. Therefore, any political community that sought to provide the greatest good to its members would find itself driven by competing conceptions of that good with no way to decide among them. The result would be civil war.

Later on, Hobbes explains that in the state of nature nothing can be considered just or unjust, and every man must be considered to have a right to all things. The second law of nature is that one ought to be willing to renounce one's right to all things when others are willing to do the same, to quit the state of nature, and to erect a commonwealth with the authority to command them in all things. Hobbes concludes the first part by articulating an additional seventeen laws of nature that make the performance of the first two possible, explaining what it would mean for a sovereign to represent the people even when they disagree with the sovereign.

Leviathan does not significantly depart from previous views outlined in *De Cive,* concerning the relation between protection and obedience. However, it devotes much more attention to the civil obligations of Christians and the proper and improper roles of a church within a state. Hobbes propounds that believers do not endanger their prospects of salvation by obeying a sovereign's decrees to the letter and he maintains that churches have no authority that is not granted by the civil sovereign. Hobbes' book famously compares the State to a monster (leviathan) composed of men, created under pressure of human needs and dissolved by

civil strife due to human passions. The work closes with a general “Review and Conclusion”, in response to the war, which answers the question: “Does a subject have the right to change allegiance when a former sovereign’s power to protect is irrevocably lost?”



LEVIATHAN,

OR

The Matter, Forme, & Power

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH

ECCLESIASTICALL

AND

CIVILL.

By THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury.

LONDON,

Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon in St. *Pauls* Church-yard. 1651.

The first edition's title page

CONTENTS

THE FIRST EDITION TEXT
THE MOLESWORTH 1839 TEXT

The original frontispiece

THE FIRST EDITION TEXT

CONTENTS

TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN OF GODOLPHIN

THE INTRODUCTION

PART 1 OF MAN

CHAPTER I. OF SENSE
CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION
CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS
CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH
CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS
CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE
CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION
CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,
CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS
CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION
CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,
CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL
CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS
CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER
CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL
CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES
CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS
CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS
CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE
CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,
CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN
CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD, OF
CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS
CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE
CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,
CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH
CHAPTER XL
CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR
CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL
CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MANS RECEPTION INTO THE
CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE
CHAPTER XLV. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF THE
CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS
CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH DARKNESSE, AND TO WHOM IT ACCREWETH
A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION

TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN OF GODOLPHIN

HONOR'D SIR.

Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there) offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose

than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes.

Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.

THE INTRODUCTION

NATURE (THE ART whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the Peoples Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this

Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.

Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth and Dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth, when he does Think, Opine, Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c; not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions, which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and

confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himselfe a good or evill man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind; which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.

PART 1 OF MAN

CHAPTER I. OF SENSE

CONCERNING THE THOUGHTS of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that

causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action, For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition, or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen; which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must

let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION

THAT WHEN A thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as

proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

Memory

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that the distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose(for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before; But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is

fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily

to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness

shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.

Apparitions Or Visions

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Phillipi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as

make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and

that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS

BY CONSEQUENCE, OR Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated

The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire, and designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean;

and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause, sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to

mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things To Come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come.

From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

Signes

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past

As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But his conjecture, has the

same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.

CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH

Originall Of Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be

gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The Use Of Speech

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others

that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common Universall

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter, John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man,

Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing

in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now, to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is

True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those

men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject To Names

Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested,

and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living, Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall, Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches.

Use Of Names Positive

And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names With Their Uses

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words Insignificant

All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or (which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round, the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be

false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

Understanding

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

Inconstant Names

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of Inconstant

signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.

CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.

Reason What It Is

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Reason Defined

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

Right Reason Where

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but

their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use Of Reason

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

Of Error And Absurdity

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is

most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

Causes Of Absurditie

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition; A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither, The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Science

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory

are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

Signes Of Science

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS

COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.

Motion Vitall And Animal

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion, otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is

moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst; Aversion

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;)

and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

Good Evill

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the

objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant Unprofitable

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Delight Displeasure

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the

Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure Offence

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others

arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.

Hope — For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire — The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare — Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Courage — The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Anger — Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Confidence — Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Diffidence — Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Indignation — Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence — Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse — Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Ambition — Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity — Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity — Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Valour — Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality — Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Miserablenesse — Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse — Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust — Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.

Luxury — Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love; Jealousie — Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse — Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity — Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion — Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour — Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration — Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory — Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection — Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory Laughter — Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some

deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping — On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame Blushing — Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

Impudence — The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty — Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Cruelty — Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation Envy — Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Deliberation — When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee

retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.

The Will

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary Actions.

Formes Of Speech, In Passion

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts. And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It, When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of the Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

Good And Evill Apparent

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Felicity

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.

Praise Magnification

The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.

CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

OF ALL DISCOURSE, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have

said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

Science Opinion Conscience

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in

love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

Beliefe Faith

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all

for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;

AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS

Intellectuall Vertue Defined

Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called

DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without

Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly

professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And ’tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

Prudence

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie,

or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.

Craft

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.

Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

Giddinesse Madnesse

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing,

GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.

Rage

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Melancholy

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and

he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that

is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For

neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled with the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some

said, “He hath a Divell, and is mad;” whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, “These are not the words of one that hath a Divell.” So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, “What came that mad-man for?” So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an

unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

Insignificant Speech

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning

of these words. “The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?” They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

THERE ARE OF KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact: the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that, If The Figure Showne Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through The Centre Shall Divide It Into Two Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following Table.

I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY

A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY

1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall; which are Quantity, and Motion.

a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate; which, being the Principles or first foundation of Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined

a) By Figure, By Number

1] Mathematiques,

GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE

2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in Speciall

a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,

1] Cosmography

ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and Figures of Body,

1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight

Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION

2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities

a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

METEOROLOGY

b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent

1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres

a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the

Science of

SCIOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,

ASTROLOGY

2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that fill the space between the Starres; such as are the Ayre, or substance aetherial.

3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are without Sense,

1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as Stones, Metals, &c

2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals

1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in Generall

a] Consequences from Vision,

OPTIQUES

b] Consequences from Sounds,

MUSIQUE

c] Consequences from the rest of the senses

2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall

a] Consequences from Passions of Men,

ETHIQUES

b] Consequences from Speech,

i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.

POETRY

ii) In Persuading,

RHETORIQUE

iii) In Reasoning,

LOGIQUE

iv) In Contracting,

The Science of

JUST and UNJUST

B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY

1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of the Subjects.

CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS

Power

The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.

Worth

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.

Dignity

The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.

To Honour and Dishonour

To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because ’tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare then he expects, is to Dishonour; for ’tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclayming, “Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour.” And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour; such as are Magistracy,

Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the

Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt

thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.

Titles of Honour

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to

Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

Worthinesse Fitnesse

WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

What Is Here Meant By Manners

By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

Love Of Contention From Competition

Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.

From Feare Of Death Or Wounds

Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

And From Love Of Arts

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though they

now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour,

which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others

Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.

Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two

former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

And From Want Of Understanding

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of

Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are

grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Naturall Religion, From The Same

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that

cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able

to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION

Religion, In Man Onely

Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.

From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.

The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The Prudent Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And

therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.

And Suppose Them Incorporeall

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed; they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts;

as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and then Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.

But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call Causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the

Pompeian faction for their warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.

But Honour Them As They Honour Men

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like

encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Made Different By Culture

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.

The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi,

and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an

effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique: Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as

Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the antient Romans, men were

not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Gomes, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. God is

King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.

The Causes Of Change In Religion

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.

Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall reason.

Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others

Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40 dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up (Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be

exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.

CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,

AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY

NATURE HATH MADE men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves:

For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From Equality Proceeds Diffidence

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

From Diffidence Warre

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of

conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out Of Civil States,

There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a

warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

The Incommodites Of Such A War

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a

journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they

uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions That Incline Men To Peace

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.

CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS

Right Of Nature What

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty What

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A Law Of Nature What

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that

speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.

The Fundamental Law Of Nature

And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, “That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.” The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, “To seek Peace, and follow it.” The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, “By all means we can, to defend our selves.”

The Second Law Of Nature

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.” For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; “Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.” And that Law of all men, “Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris.”

What it is to lay down a Right

To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.

Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation Duty Justice

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.

Not All Rights Are Alienable

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To Himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

Contract What

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying

and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Covenant What

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.

Free-gift

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.

Signes Of Contract Expresse

Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words are

either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have Given, I Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future; as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which words of the future, are called Promise.

Signes Of Contract By Inference

Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.

Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, “I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow,” then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo; that is between “I will that this be thine to morrow,” and, “I will give it to thee to morrow:” For the word I Will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the

former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.

Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, A Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.

Merit What

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not

determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In Contract, I merit at The Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.

Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set over them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that

performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the Covenant Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

No Covenant With Beasts

To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.

Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the

unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no man can be obliged.

Covenants How Made Voyd

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide

Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it; And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,) and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, “Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;” he cannot Covenant thus “Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me.” For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.

No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe

A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is

no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, his not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.

The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society.

The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast." So is our Forme, "I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God." And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater.

No Oath, But By God

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.

CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE

The Third Law Of Nature, Justice

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.

Justice And Injustice What

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance

of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own." And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

Justice Not Contrary To Reason

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which

dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen,

and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason,

by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.

Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.

Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What

The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse; and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of Guilty.

Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say

Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when The Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice Commutative, And Distributive

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the

distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.

The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, “That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will.” For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own

Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.

The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest." For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called

SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

The Sixth, Facility To Pardon

A sixth Law of Nature is this, “That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it.” For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good

A seventh is, “ That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow.” Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

The Eighth, Against Contumely

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this Precept, “That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another.” The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

The Ninth, Against Pride

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put

this, “That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature.” The breach of this Precept is Pride.

The Tenth Against Arrogance

On this law, dependeth another, “That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest.” As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.

The Eleventh Equity

Also “If a man be trusted to judge between man and man,” it is a precept of the Law of Nature, “that he deale Equally between them.” For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the

use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons, Prosopolepsia.

The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common

And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right." For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.

The Thirteenth, Of Lot

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, "That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot." For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

The Fifteenth, Of Mediators

It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct." For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.

The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."

The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of Partiality

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular

men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;” which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,

But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the

ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.

The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

And Yet Easie

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But

yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

A Person What

A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction."

Person Naturall, And Artificiall

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

The Word Person, Whence

The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth

another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Actor, Author; Authority

Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is.

Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Cha) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also

when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

But Not The Actor

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.

The Authority Is To Be Shewne

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Things Personated, Inanimate

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.

Irrational

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

False Gods

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be

Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

The True God

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

A Multitude Of Men, How One Person

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.

Every One Is Author

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.

An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable

And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation

of executing presently, or deferring till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

Negative Voyce

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength

and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

And That Continually

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.

Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,

Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The Generation Of A Common-wealth

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing

my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner." This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.

The Definition Of A Common-wealth

And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."

Soveraigne, And Subject, What

And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives

on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

The Consequences To Such Institution, Are

I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and

Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully

make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of

him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such

conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he

to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.

6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary

to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.

8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision

of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War. For seeing the

Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all

Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, “A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:” For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men

in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been.

And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as

one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.

Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce

sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,

AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER

The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.

Subordinate Representatives Dangerous

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute

Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth committed to them.

Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most

closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience,

proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their

Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the

Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are

governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of The Right Of Succession

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as

Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by other tacite signes sufficient.

Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.

Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.

To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,

Not Unlawfull

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were

wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.

CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL

A COMMON-WEALTH BY Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.

Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he

unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.

The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.

Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the

Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.

Or Education;

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the

Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.

Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.

The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of Possession

The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Despoticall Dominion, How Attained

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.

Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each

particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.

The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) “Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye.” This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) “This shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants.” This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, “you shall be his servants.” Againe, when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) “We will be as all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our wars.” Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) “Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and Evill.” It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would have done it, David forbad

them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9) “God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God.” For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) “Servants obey your masters in All things,” and, (Verse. 22) “Children obey your Parents in All things.” There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3) “The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do.” There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) “Warn them that they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them.” This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed, where he sayes, “Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;” and payed such taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat. 21. 2,3) “Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go.” They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) “You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill.” and verse 11. “Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?” For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon

having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith, “Hast thou eaten, &c.” as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A FREE-MAN, is “he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to.” But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to

Impediment: And therefore, when ’tis said (for example) The way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers had Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from their

will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the

Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;

Not Of Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in

reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques, (lib.6.cap.2) “In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for ’tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government.” And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,

Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when he commands me. "'Tis one thing to say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;' another thing to say, 'I will kill my selfe, or my fellow.'" It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon

taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law

As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of

his Power, is done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in

it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.

In Case Of Captivity

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe. The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And Heyrs

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

In Case Of Banishment

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE

The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative,

consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.

In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative Is Limited

In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited: And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects; and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.

By Letters Patents

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.

And The Lawes

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely

In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he does

according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That Assented Onely

But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration. It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are not involved in their Votes.

When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It, By Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the

Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be none) out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable That Have Assented

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged.

If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body Onely Is Obliged

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having

liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.

Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique

Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject is the Author.

Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province, Colony, Or Town

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour; For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose

rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they

set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.

A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The Soveraign

These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique, representing every Subject of that Dominion;

but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.

A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly, (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power

established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.

Secret Cabals

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men, part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

Feuds Of Private Families

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-

wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.

Factions For Government

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians;” which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words,(Acts 19. 40) “If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of People.” Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.

CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER

IN THE LAST Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Common-wealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique Ministers.

Publique Minister Who

A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.

Ministers For The Generall Administration

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall.

For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy

Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers:

Ministers, because they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

For Instruction Of The People

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign. The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia & Regis; or Dei Providentia & Voluntate Regis.

They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant

are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall, These publique persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.

For Execution

Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.

Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To Advise

Are Not Publique Ministers

Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint

Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.

CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

THE NOURISHMENT OF A Common-wealth Consisteth In The Commodities

Of Sea And Land

The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by

importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.

And The Right Of Distribution Of Them

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, “Let the Civill Law,” saith he, “be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children.” And again; “Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans.” Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to

say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.

All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally

From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign

In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a People comming into possession of a land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.

Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign,

But Onely Of Another Subject

From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.

The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted

In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free

from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and War, assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common-wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.

The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As Their Distribution,

On The Soveraign

As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.

The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Soveraign

Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.

Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure for the value of all things else between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with provision. But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws,

and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.

The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use

The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.

The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they went was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require

of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised them to Plant.

CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL

Counsell What

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words “Doe this,” are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.

Differences Between Command And Counsell

COMMAND is, where a man saith, “Doe this,” or “Doe this not,” without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own

Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, “Doe” or “Doe not this,” and deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth

Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.

Exhortation And Dehortation What

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own

occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. “Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale not,” &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, “Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me,” are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have “Treasure in Heaven.” These words, “Go into the village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me,” are a

Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, “Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus,” are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.

Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours

As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour,

That His Ends, And Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour, But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In, But Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but every one of the

particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary To Be Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From Thence, And With All The Records Of Treaties, And Other Transactions Of State Between Them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the

heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does

next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.

CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES

Civill Law what

By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth; And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.

And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner. “CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.”

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The Soveraign Is Legislator

1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And Not Subject To Civill Law

2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.

Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of The Soveraigns Consent

3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember. And our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished; But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.

The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other

4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: for it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall. But the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such

manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.

Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome, But By The Soveraign Power

5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a people that have lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth, For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes. And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called the Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such Customes have their Force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.

Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning The Making Of Lawes

6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority, and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of

the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges. As for example, “That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but the Parlament;” which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not Parlamentum, but Rex In Parlamento. And where a Parlament is Soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are Force, and Justice; The First Whereof Is In The King; The Other Deposited In The Hands Of The Parlament. As if a Common-wealth could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to command and govern.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not the Letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet (as Sr. Ed, Coke makes it (Sir Edward Coke, upon Littleton Lib.2. Ch.6 fol 97.b),) an Artificiall Perfection of Reason, Gotten By Long Study, Observation, And Experience, (as his was.) For it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they

build, the greater is the ruine; and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris Prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law

8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath

taken away the means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other formes of government.

Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of Nature

And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, "Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe."

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall. For example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according

to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in al things not conteined in his written Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique and private. All which Instructions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall Justice.

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason. And in antient time, before letters were in common use, the Lawes were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements (Prov. 7. 3) upon his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, (Deut. 11. 19) he biddeth them to teach it their Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; and (Deut. 31. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to heare it read.

Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be Known

Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign. For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified.

Difference Between Verifying And Authorising

Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the law; which consisteth in the Command of the Soveraign only.

The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge

If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individuall case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice; tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.

By The Publique Registers

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.

By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale

If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen his Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future actions.

The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth On The Soveraign Power

The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law my be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.

All Lawes Need Interpretation

All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation. The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality, and passion,

make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters. The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two; if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.

The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not That Of Writers

The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth, dependeth not on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.

The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving Sentence Viva Voce

In Every Particular Case

The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique; not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.

The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or Another Judge

To Give Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After

But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in

Lawes immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one Judge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of God. Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own naturall reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Nature, To Punish The Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the powers and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth away for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England. "If a man," saith he, "that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be

found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight." Here you see, An Innocent Man, Judicially Acquitted, Notwithstanding His Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, Upon A Presumption In Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall: if the presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law. For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the some manner, as

they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements. For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Soveraigne.

The Difference Between The Letter And Sentence Of The Law

In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the Literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained. It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another;

and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himselfe Witnesse. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

The Abilities Required In A Judge

The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the Statutes, and Constitutions of the Soveraign, alledged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parlament in England were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving Sentence.

In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward. The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first A Right Understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity; which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt Of Unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To Be Able In Judgement To Devest Himselfe Of All Feare, Anger, Hatred, Love, And Compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience To Heare; Diligent Attention In Hearing; And Memory To Retain, Digest And Apply What He Hath Heard.

Divisions Of Law

The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the

Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Civill Lawes.

1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles Of The Prince, that is, of the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.

2. The Decrees Of The Whole People Of Rome (comprehending the Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Lawes, at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. For all Lawes that bind, are understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them. Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. The Decrees Of The Common People (excluding the Senate,) when they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.

4. Senatus Consulta, the Orders Of The Senate; because when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate in stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of Counsell.

5. The Edicts Of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.

6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law, and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperour to observe; And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to observe

them. For the Judges of the Common Law of England, are not properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.

7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.

Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Naturall are those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are called not onely Naturall, but also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been for Eternity; but have been made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.

Another Division Of Law

Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine; And of Humane positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive are those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the

Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written together with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all Lawes are generall judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.

Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law

Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority of man to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver Lawes to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How Can A Man Without Supernaturall Revelation Be Assured Of The Revelation Received By The Declarer? and How Can He Be Bound To Obey Them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: for though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of Gods extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidence of speciall Revelation. Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous

to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the Lawes Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer, by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernaturall Manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) “This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee.” Abrahams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over their children, and servants. Againe, where God saith to Abraham, “In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe Righteousnesse and Judgement,” it is manifest, the obedience of his Family, who had no

Revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, “Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye?” By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the Commandements of the Common-wealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are declared for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

Another Division Of Lawes

There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and Not Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws in that manner.

A Fundamentall Law What

For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common-wealth cannot stand, such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique good. Not Fundamentall is that the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes Concerning Controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Lawes.

Difference Between Law And Right

I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength,

and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention; but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Lawe may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.

And Between A Law And A Charter

Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command, and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I Have Given, I Have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS

SINNE WHAT

A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once. And therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to transgresse. For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that sayth, "Thou shalt not covet:" nor is the pleasure a man my have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of a man, and every other living creature, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes. But I confesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other.

A Crime What

A Crime, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime. To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be Crime; which distinction the Greeks observed in the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which is translated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation. In like manner the Latines by Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law; but by crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as my be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.

Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime

From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law, may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth. But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants, Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. When therefore his

Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.

Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No Man

The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding; or some errour in Reasoning, or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again, ignorance is of three sort; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there.

But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.

Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes

In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.

Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not

Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not

Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man: For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does Injury,

without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is thereby violated.

Punishments Declared Before The Fact, Excuse From Greater Punishments After It

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves; and therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same Crime; it the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By A Law Made After The Fact

No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediatly before alledged.

False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of Crime

From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles; as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning, “That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again;” and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.

False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of Nature Secondly, by false

Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.

And False Inferences From True Principles, By Teachers

Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.

By Their Passions;

Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.

Presumption Of Riches

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.

And Friends

And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.

Wisedome

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own Wisdome. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes,

redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not as wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,) are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.

Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of Crime

As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him; The former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which

sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.

Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The Danger Is Neither Present, Nor Corporeall

Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. This is a Crime; For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall,

and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.

Crimes Not Equall

From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime,

that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.

Totall Excuses

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law Naturall.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to

abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, “If I doe it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained;” Nature therefore compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before alledged.

Excuses Against The Author

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the law, bothe the Author, and Actor are Criminalls. From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the

Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,) upon complaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.

Evill Teachers, Extenuate

Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall.

Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as a greater Crime, than if there have been may precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

Praemeditation, Aggravateth

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law,

on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Soveraign Power.

Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates

Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part, he that refuseth Duell, is

subject to contempt and scorne, without remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher; which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.

Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his

counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.

Laesae Majestas

Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth, are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men; For the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina Laesae Majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.

Bribery And False Testimony

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.

Depeculation

Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues, is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.

Counterfeiting Authority

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many.

Crimes Against Private Men Compared

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury, life preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods.

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own Vertue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally by Nature. And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other Crime proposed.

Publique Crimes What

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when

the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.

CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS

The Definition Of Punishment

“A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”

Right To Punish Whence Derived

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do

whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour.

Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments

From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.

Nor Denyall Of Preferment

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but

of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.

Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of Transgressing, Is Not Punishment

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law, A Greater Hurt Is Not Punishment, But Hostility

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law, No Punishment

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.

The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.

Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not By Way Of Punishment

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may

lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.

Punishments Corporall

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.

Capitall

And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death

follow not in the Intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not be bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it. As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and

therefore the losse of them is not Punishment. But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment

Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the Later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the generall name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.

Exile

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but

rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.

But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.

Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of

requitall. For though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt.

Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards

The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by feare, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

Salaries Certain And Casuall

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases

hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud. “There is nothing,” saith he, “on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride.” But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.

CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

DISSOLUTION OF COMMON-WEALTHS Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution

Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.

Want Of Absolute Power

Of which, this is one, “That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.” From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs. And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French. Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the

warres between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.

Private Judgement Of Good and Evill

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, “That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common-wealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Erroneous Conscience

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that “Whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne;” and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

Pretence Of Inspiration

It hath been also commonly taught, “That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion,” which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not

Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.

Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, "That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes." It is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is, “That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign.” Every man has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.

Dividing Of The Soveraign Power

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and ’tis this, “That the Soveraign Power may be divided.” For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.

Imitation Of Neighbour Nations

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the

forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations; So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.

Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of their popular form of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy. From the reading, I

say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.

As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill Power, and

the Power of the Common-wealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should

have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Mixt Government

Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the

person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Want Of Mony

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as

we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.

Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Popular Men

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are

drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.

Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power

To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a

burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.

Dissolution Of The Common-wealth

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.

CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

The Procuration Of The Good Of The People

The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

By Instruction & Lawes

And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right

of Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.

Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For Absolute Soveraignty

As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar

But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in

their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.

Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.

And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when ’tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end

had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.

And To Honour Their Parents

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they

were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.

And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:

Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.

And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all to this one

Commandement of mutuall Charity, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:” as the summe of the first Table is reduced to “the love of God;” whom they had then newly received as their King.

The Use Of Universities

As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their knowledge

from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and ’tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that concern

the Common-wealth onely, may without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.

Equall Taxes

To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the Impositions that are layd on the

People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.

Publique Charity

And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.

Prevention Of Idlenesse

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.

Good Lawes What

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall Perspicuous.

Such As Are Necessary

For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the People.

Such As Are Perspicuous

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their

circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.

Punishments

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which

may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.

Rewards

In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and

not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Counsellours

Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is

first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own

wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.

Commanders

A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of

receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE

The Scope Of The Following Chapters

That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill duty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.

Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God

“God is King, let the Earth rejoice,” saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1). And again, “God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved.” (Psal. 98. 1). Whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.

A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy

To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known; for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By Revelation, and by the Voyce of some Man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he

procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.

A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and Prophetique, there may be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to speak in this Chapter.

The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one to reigne over all the rest. But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to

his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.

Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction

This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer Adversity," has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with this of ours, "By what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and Adversities of this life;" and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. "How Good," saith David, "is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity." And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such as this "Where was thou when I layd the foundations of the earth," and the like,

both approved Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made manifest in him." And though it be said "That Death entred into the world by sinne," (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.

Divine Lawes

Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign. The first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues. It remaineth therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour And Worship What

Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People, and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.

Severall Signes Of Honour

From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodnesse, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are significant both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we

thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.

Worship Naturall And Arbitrary

There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship.

Worship Commanded And Free

And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.

Worship Publique And Private

Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.

The End Of Worship

The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth another worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them.

Attributes Of Divine Honour

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence:

For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.

Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is Finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:

Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely of things Finite:

Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite:

Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to him (unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy: or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood, as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he

effecteth every thing.

Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.

Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite, Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, Most Great, and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour

Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall Precept of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as are, First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.

Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship, no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be of the best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.

Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour: for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengence on the perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to no purpose; unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order of the Common-wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre. And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of the Principles of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For in the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pious Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.

Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgivings, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor Plebeian; but beautifull and well composed; For else we do not God as

much honour as we can. And therefore the Heathens did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable. Also that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.

Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that, (that which in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to honour him, is lost.

Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private men.

Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity

But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.

All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill

And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes are to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill. And because a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power; it followeth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.

Not All Actions

But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of Gods Worship, are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, “It is better to obey God than men,” hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.

Naturall Punishments

Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme that Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.

The Conclusion Of The Second Part

And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and the Common-wealth of Plato; For

he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES

THE WORD OF God Delivered By Prophets Is The Main Principle Of Christian Politiques

I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of Subjects hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as Experience has found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and from Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning) universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of the Will of God; the ground of my Discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word of God, but also the Propheticall.

Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicate Faith, but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion, For though there be many things in Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.

Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words; and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such

mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of naturall science. For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

What It Is To Captivate The Understanding

But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them. We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the words spoken.

How God Speaketh To Men

When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and

immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it. It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation. To say he hath seen a Vision, or heard a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions, Voice, and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre, and (which is more) may lie.

By What Marks Prophets Are Known

How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet? (1 Kings 22) Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one.(1 Kings 13) The Prophet that was sent to prophecy against the Altar set up by Jeroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than that which is already established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is sufficient. (Deut. 13 v. 1,2,3,4,5) “If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord your God.” In which words two things are to be observed, First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him that governeth by the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance. For these words, “revolt from the Lord your God,” are in this place equivalent

to “revolt from your King.” For they had made God their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods Commandements to the people. In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say, for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for their King, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. “There shall arise,” (saith he) “false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect.” (Mat. 24. 24) By which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St. Paul says further to the Galatians, that “if himself, or an Angell from heaven preach another Gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed.” (Gal. 1. 8) That Gospel was, that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the King received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.

The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law, Miracles, And Doctrine

Conformable To The Law

And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God hath established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of Miracles, is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. For if a man that teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet without shewing any Miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18. v. 21, 22. “If thou say in thy heart, How shall we

know that the Word (of the Prophet) is not that which the Lord hath spoken. When the Prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to passe, that's the word which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not." But a man may here again ask, When the Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not? For he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer then the time of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one time or other: in which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr'd event. So that it is manifest, that the teaching of the Religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true Prophet, that is to say immediate Revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith.

Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease, The Scripture Supplies Their Place

Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour, supply the want of all other Prophecy; and from which, by wise and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme, or supernaturall Inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of which I am to take the Principles of my Discourse, concerning the Rights of those that are the Supream Govenors on earth, of Christian Common-wealths; and of the duty of

Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, or the Books, Writers, Scope and Authority of the Bible.

CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,

AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURES

Of The Books Of Holy Scripture

By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be the Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all Rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of what is Law throughout all Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws every Christian King shall constitute in his own Dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that Soveraigns in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators; those Books only are Canonicall, that is, Law, in every nation, which are established for such by the Soveraign Authority. It is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly Potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of When, and What God hath said; which to Subjects that have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason, which guided them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to obey the authority of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull Soveraigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other Books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the Church

of England. What Books these are, is sufficiently known, without a Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdome of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and second of Maccabees, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of the Canonicall, Josephus a learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth Twenty Two, making the number agree with the Hebrew Alphabet. St. Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For Josephus numbers Five Books of Moses, Thirteen of Prophets, that writ the History of their own times (which how it agrees with the Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee shall see hereafter), and Four of Hymnes and Morall Precepts. But St. Jerome reckons Five Books of Moses, Eight of Prophets, and Nine of other Holy writ, which he calls of Hagiographa. The Septuagint, who were 70. learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy King of Egypt, to translate the Jewish Law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in the Church of England.

As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all sects of Christians, that admit any Books at all for Canonicall.

Their Antiquity

Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture, has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History, (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of naturall Reason; for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact, but) of

consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the Bookes themselves: And this light, though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time, wherein they were written.

The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses

And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no more than these titles, The Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, The Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of Books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. The History Of Livy, denotes the Writer; but the History Of Scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject. We read in the last Chapter of Deuteronomie, Ver. 6. concerning the sepulcher of Moses, “that no man knoweth of his sepulcher to this day,” that is, to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was not found to that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alledged, that the last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, but the rest not: Let us therefore consider that which we find in the Book of Genesis, Cha. Ver. 6 “And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the land;” which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who dyed before he came into it. Likewise Numbers 21. Ver. 14. the Writer citeth another more ancient Book,

Entituled, The Book of the Warres of the Lord, wherein were registred the Acts of Moses, at the Red-sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.

But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seemeth in the 11 of Deuteronomie, and the following Chapters to the 27. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. (Deut. 31. 9) And this did Moses himself write, and deliver to the Priests and Elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of Tabernacles. And this is that Law which God commanded, that their Kings (when they should have established that form of Government) should take a copy of from the Priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Arke; (Deut. 31. 26) and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to King Josias, who causing it to be read to the People, renewed the Covenant between God and them. (2 King. 22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3)

The Book of Joshua Written After His Time

That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the Book it self. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the middest of Jordan, for a monument of their passage; (Josh 4. 9) of which the Writer saith thus, “They are there unto this day;” (Josh 5. 9) for “unto this day”, is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off from the people the Reproach of Egypt, the Writer saith, “The

place is called Gilgal unto this day;" which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the Camp, (Josh. 7. 26) the Writer saith, "remaineth unto this day;" which must needs bee therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other; as Josh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63.

The Booke Of Judges And Ruth Written Long After The Captivity

The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, cha. 21,26 6.24 10.4 15.19 17.6 and Ruth 1. 1. but especially Judg. 18. 30. where it is said, that Jonathan "and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of Dan, untill the day of the captivity of the land."

The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel

That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, 1 Sam. 5.5. 7.13,15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after David had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the Ammunition, with them that fought, the Writer saith, "He made it a Statute and an Ordinance to Israel to this day." (2. Sam. 6.4.) Again, when David (displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out his hand to sustain the Ark,) called the place Perez-Uzzah, the Writer saith, it is called so "to this day": the time therefore of the writing of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of David.

The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles

As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are 1 Kings 9.13. 9.21. 10. 12. 12.19. 2 Kings 2.22. 8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1 Chron. 4.41. 5.26. It is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon, that the History of them is continued till that time. For the Facts Registred are alwaies more ancient than such Books as make mention of, and quote the Register; as these Books doe in divers places, referring the Reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Juda, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the Books of the Prophet Samuel, or the Prophet Nathan, of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the Books of the Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.

Ezra And Nehemiah

The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the Covenant, and ordination of their policy are therein contained.

Esther

The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and therefore the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.

Job

The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and though it appear sufficiently (Exekiel 14.14, and James 5.11.) that he was no fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be a History, but a Treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, “why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted;” and it is the most probably, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies) in prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in Hexameter Verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a Preface in the beginning, and an Epilogue in the end. But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in Philosophy, especially morall Philosophy, in ancient time frequent.

The Psalter

The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use of the Quire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and some of them after the return from the Captivity; as the 137. and the 126. whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.

The Proverbs

The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh; and partly of the Mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon, rather then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemues; and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one Book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all.

Ecclesiastes And The Canticles

The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For “The Words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem;” and, “the Song of Songs, which is Solomon’s,” seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the Law; to the end, that not the Doctrine only, but the Authors also might be extant.

The Prophets

Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah, and Azariah, otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonas is not properly a Register of his Prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words, “Fourty dayes and Ninivy shall be destroyed,”) but a History or Narration of his frowardenesse and disputing Gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be the Author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the Book of Amos is his Prophecy.

Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of Josiah.

Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.

When Joel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings. But considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is manifest enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused it to bee translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that purpose. And if the Books of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for profitable Books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the Scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14. verse 21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, “Thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou has done, or the works that are to begin. But if I have found Grace before thee, send down the holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy Law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the later days, may live.” And verse 45. “And it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, ‘The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people.’” And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes of the Old Testament.

The New Testament

The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age after Christs Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his Disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the Books of the New Testament were received, and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing, is not altogether so ancient. For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are derived to us, from no higher time then that of Esdras, who by the direction of Gods Spirit retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the Governours of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of those Apostles and Disciples; under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement the first (after St. Peter) Bishop of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell of Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles: and this Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ. At which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church, as no more to esteem Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of the people, but for Sheep; and Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to passe their Doctrine, not for Counsell, and Information, as Preachers; but for Laws, as absolute Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious; yet I am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the Scriptures, though the copies of the Books of the New Testament, were in the hands only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more

favorable to their power over Christian Princes, and Civill Soveraignty, than they are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy Interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the Writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall.

Their Scope

And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the Rights of the Kingdome of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the Book of Genesis, deriveth the Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the World, to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of Moses, contain the Election of God for their King, and the Laws which hee prescribed for their Government: The Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods people, till the time they cast off Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the manner of their neighbour nations; The rest of the History of the Old Testament, derives the succession of the line of David, to the Captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdome of God, even our blessed Saviour God the Son, whose

coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets, after whom the Evangelists writt his life, and actions, and his claim to the Kingdome, whilst he lived one earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the Authority he left with them, and their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old Testament, and the Gospels, and Epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; 1. in Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3. in the Apostles and the successors to Apostolicall power. For these three at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day.

The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures Stated.

It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, From Whence The Scriptures Derive Their Authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How Wee Know Them To Be The Word Of God, or, Why We Beleeve Them To Be So: and the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched. For it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the

question is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, By What Authority They Are Made Law.

Their Authority And Interpretation

As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt, but they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other Authority, then that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws, not Made, but Eternall.

If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of written Law, which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he know not they were his.

He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only has the Legislative power. Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority of the Common-wealth, that giveth them the force of Laws, it must bee some other Authority derived from God, either private, or publique: if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveale it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance, take their own

Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,) it were impossible that any Divine Law should be acknowledged. If publique, it is the Authority of the Common-wealth, or of the Church. But the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a Common-wealth of Christians; called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person, their Soveraign; and a Church, because it consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian Soveraign. But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will, Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall. Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws, by the Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all Christian Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne of all Christendome. So that the question of the Authority of the Scriptures is reduced to this, "Whether Christian Kings, and the Soveraigne Assemblies in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted over the Universall Church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good."

Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular consideration of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to judge of the Authority of Interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.

CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN

THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture

Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; It is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT, which in the language of the Schools are termed, Substances, Corporeall, and Incorporeall.

The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, Subject, to various accidents, as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still; and

to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another. And this diversity of Seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies, on the organs of our sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, & call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word, Substance and Body, signifie the same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall Body.

But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, Aire, and Aeriall Substances, use not to be taken for Bodies, but (as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called Wind, or Breath, or (because the some are called in the Latine Spiritus) Spirits; as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any living creature, gives it life and motion, Vitall and Animall Spirits. But for those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain waking, they are (as the Apostle saith generally of all Idols) nothing; Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense. And men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes, know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper signification of Spirit in common speech, is

either a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination. But for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for sometimes it is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, A Spirit Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean Spirit; for Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb Spirit, and for Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit of God: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of Wisdome; and Mad Men are said to be Possessed With A Spirit.

Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under humane Understanding; and our Faith therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but in our Submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God himselfe. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of What He Is, but only That He Is; and therefore the Attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, What He Is, Nor to signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.

Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture Sometimes For A Wind, Or Breath

Gen. 1. 2. “The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters.” Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion attributed to God, and consequently Place, which are intelligible only of Bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not

dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is Body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, Gen. 8. 1. Where when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth like words, “I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall be diminished:” in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind, (that is an Aire or Spirit Moved,) which might be called (as in the former place) the Spirit of God, because it was Gods Work.

Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The Understanding

Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God. For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, “Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?” and Exod. 28.3. “Thou shalt speak (saith God) to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the Spirit of Wisdome, to make Aaron Garments, to consecrate him.” Where extraordinary Understanding, though but in making Garments, as being the Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. 31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31. And Isaiah 11.2,3. where the Prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, “The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the Spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Where manifestly is meant, not so many Ghosts, but so many eminent Graces that God would give him.

Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections

In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the defence of Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited Othoniel, Gideon, Jeptha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude, Judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29. 13.25. 14.6,19. And of Saul, upon the newes of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabeth Gilead, it is said (1 Sam.11.6.) that "The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his Anger (or, as it is in the Latine, His Fury) was kindled greatly." Where it is not probable was meant a Ghost, but an extraordinary Zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came upon Saul, when hee was amongst the Prophets that praised God in Songs, and Musick (1 Sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an unexpected and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotions.

Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction By Dreams And Visions

The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22.24.) "Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?" Which cannot be understood of a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before the Kings of Israel and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a Vision, and not as from a Spirit, speaking in him.

In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that though they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say, by a speciall grace of Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a Ghost within them, but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.

Fiftly, For Life

Gen. 2.7. It is said, “God made man of the dust of the Earth, and breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul.” There the Breath of Life inspired by God, signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (Job 27.3.) “as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils;” is no more then to say, “as long as I live.” So in Ezek. 1.20. “the Spirit of life was in the wheels,” is equivalent to, “the wheels were alive.” And (Ezek. 2.30.) “the spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet,” that is, “I recovered my vitall strength;” not that any Ghost, or incorporeal substance entred into, and possessed his body.

Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority

In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. “I will take (saith God) of the Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee;” that is, upon the seventy Elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses would not doe. Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had received authority so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a Spirit, or Authority subordinate to his own.

In the like sense we read (Deut. 34.9.) that “Joshua was full of the Spirit of wisdome,” because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is, because he was Ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but prevented by death, could not finish.

In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8.9.) “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his:” not meaning thereby the Ghost of Christ, but a Submission to his Doctrine. As also (1 John 4.2.) “Hereby you shall know

the Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God;" by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity, or Submission to that main Article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.

Likewise these words (Luke 4.1.) "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost" (that is, as it is exprest, Mat. 4.1. and Mar. 1.12. "of the Holy Spirit",) may be understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee was sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that God himselfe (for so our Saviour was,) was filled with God; which is very unproper, and unsignificant. How we came to translate Spirits, by the word Ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word Spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a reall Substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary Ability of Affection of the Mind, or of the Body.

Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies

The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14.26. and Marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an Aeriall Body, and not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only. In like manner, where he was taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles (Luke 24.3,7.): So also (Acts 12.15) when St. Peter was delivered out of Prison, it would not be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said it was his Angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say, the Disciples themselves did

follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and such as needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews called Spirits, and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same by the name of Daemons. And some such apparitions may be reall, and substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernaturall manner. But when hee hath so formed them they are Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not Ghosts Incorporeall, that is to say, Ghosts that are in No Place; that is to say, that are No Where; that is to say, that seeming to be Somewhat, are Nothing. But if corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by our externall Senses; then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary, but Reall; namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser Bodies.

Angel What

By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger; and most often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or Vision.

Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall,

and Animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall Substances, but accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels.

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of Daemons, Good and Evill; which because they seemed to subsist really, they called Substances; and because they could not feel them with their hands, Incorporeall: so also the Jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadduces,) that those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those they thought would hurt them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill Spirits; such as was the Spirit of Python, and the Spirits of Mad-men, of Lunatiques, and Epileptiques: For they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, Daemoniaques.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word Angel, but some image raised (supernaturally) in the fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.

For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an Angel, but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, “I will multiply thy seed exceedingly;” that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this apparition a Fancy

figured, but a Voice. By which it is manifest, that Angel signifieth there, nothing but God himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice supernaturall, testifying Gods speciall presence there. Why therefore may not the Angels that appeared to Lot, and are called Gen. 19.13. Men; and to whom, though they were but two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, "Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord") be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to stay his hand (Gen. 22.11.) from slaying Isaac, there was no Apparition, but a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a Messenger, or Angel of God, because it declared Gods will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts. The Angels which Jacob saw on the Ladder of Heaven (Gen. 28.12.) were a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream; yet being supernaturall, and signs of Gods Speciall presence, those apparitions are not improperly called Angels. The same is to be understood (Gen.31.11.) where Jacob saith thus, "The Angel of the Lord appeared to mee in my sleep." For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a Dreame, whether such Dreame be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which there Jacob calleth an Angel, was God himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse 13.) "I am the God of Bethel."

Also (Exod.14.9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself; and he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day) of a Pillar Of Cloud and (by night) in form of a Pillar Of Fire; and yet this Pillar was all the apparition, and Angel promised to Moses (Exod. 14.9.) for the Armies guide: For this cloudy pillar, is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.

There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of Gods presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of a Man, or Child of never so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the shape; but their use, that makes them Angels. But their use is to be significations of Gods presence in supernaturall operations; As when Moses (Exod. 33.14.) had desired God to goe along with the Campe, (as he had done alwaies before the making of the Golden Calfe,) God did not answer, "I will goe," nor "I will send an Angel in my stead;" but thus, "my presence shall goe with thee."

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of England holdeth for Canonicall, from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit or Angel,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking Body for that, which is some what, or some where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of Angel, for Messenger; as John Baptist is called an Angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same Analogy) the Dove, and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes of Gods speciall presence, might also be called Angels. Though we find in Daniel two names of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet is cleer out of the text it selfe, (Dan. 12.1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an Angel, but as a Prince: and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that

two Saints being in talke, one of them said to the other, “Gabriel, let us make this man understand his Vision:” For God needeth not, to distinguish his Celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to the short memories of Mortalls. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels (except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. That they are permanent, may bee gathered from the words of our Saviour himselfe, (Mat. 25.41.) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, “Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels:” which place is manifest for the permanence of Evill Angels, (unlesse wee might think the name of Devill and his Angels may be understood of the Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their Immateriality; because Everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things Incorporeall. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be Incorporeall. In like manner where St. Paul sayes (1 Cor. 6.3.) “Knew ye not that wee shall judge the Angels?” And (2 Pet. 2.4.) “For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell.” And (Jude 1,6.) “And the Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the Judgement of the last day;” though it prove the Permanence of Angelicall nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (Mat. 22.30.) In the resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven:” but in the resurrection men shall be Permanent, and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.

There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words, Substance, and Incorporeall; as Incorporeall is taken not for subtile body,

but for Not Body, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an Angel, or Spirit is (in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in effect, there is no Angel nor Spirit at all. Considering therefore the signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgement, and beleef, that there be also Angels substantiall, and permanent. But to beleeve they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced.

Inspiration What

On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of the word INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if Spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat. That word therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2.7.) where it is said, that God Inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall motion. For we are not to think that God made

first a living breath, and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (Acts 17.25.) “that he gave him life and breath;” that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Tim. 3.16.) “all Scripture is given by Inspiration from God,” speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined the spirit or mind of those Writers, to write that which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter (2 Pet. 1.21.) saith, that “Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,” by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision supernaturall, which is not Inspiration; Nor when our Saviour breathing on his Disciples, said, “Receive the Holy Spirit,” was that Breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them. And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood for Infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God sayes (Joel 2.28.) “I will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and your Daughters shall prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your Young men shall see Visions,” wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion, or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them Propheticall Dreams, and Visions. For the proper use of the word Infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into men, as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill Spirits into

those that became Phrenetique, Lunatique, or Epileptique, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts 2.2.) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity it self; but for an Externall sign of Gods speciall working on their hearts, to effect in them the internall graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for the performance of their Apostleship.

CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD, OF

HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines Metaphorically But In The Scriptures

Properly

The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in Sermons, and Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall Felicity, after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) Sanctification, which they terme the Kingdome of Grace, but never for the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of Kingdome.

To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places of Scripture, a Kingdome Properly So Named, constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for Dominion Over Sinne; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.

From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men Naturally by his might; but also had Peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by a Voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he Reigned over Adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill, not by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created him: And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge; And in these eight did consist the then Kingdome Of God.

The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17.7,8.) to make a Covenant with him in these words, “I will establish my Covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession.” And for a memoriall, and a token of this Covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the Sacrament of Circumcision. This is it which is called the Old Covenant, or Testament; and containeth a Contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law Morall he was obliged before, as by an Oath of Allegiance. And though the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an Institution by pact, of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over the seed

of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressely called a peculiar Kingdome of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4.11.) that he is the "Father of the Faithfull," that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not violate their Allegiance sworn to God, then by Circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant by Baptisme.

That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly His Civill Soveraignty Over A Peculiar People By Pact

This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod. 19.5.) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine; and yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." For a "Peculiar people" the vulgar Latine hath, Peculium De Cunctis Populis: the English translation made in the beginning of the Reign of King James, hath, a "Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations;" and the Geneva French, "the most precious Jewel of all Nations." But the truest Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (Tit. 2.14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour "gave himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is, an extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the Greek periousios, which is opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and as this signifieth Ordinary, Quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) Of Daily Use; so the other signifieth that which is Overplus, and Stored Up, and Enjoyed In A Speciall Manner; which the Latines call Peculium; and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, "For all the

Earth is mine," as if he should say, "All the Nations of the world are mine;" but it is not so that you are mine, but in a Speciall Manner: For they are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you shall be mine, by your own Consent, and Covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.

The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same Text, "Yee shall be to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." The Vulgar Latine hath it, Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth the Translation of that place (1 Pet. 2.9.) Sacerdotium Regale, A Regal Priesthood; as also the Institution it self, by which no man might enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire Gods will immediately of God himselfe, but onely the High Priest. The English Translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, "a Kingdome of Priests;" which is either meant of the succession of one High Priest after another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the High Priesthood; For there was never any but the High Priest onely, that was to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever allowed to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.

Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right. All the Earth (as is said in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth is not called Holy, but that onely which is set apart for his especiall service, as was the Nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the Kingdome of God, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.

But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1 Sam. 8.7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of the Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him, “Hearken unto the voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them.” Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their King; and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time to time appointed him.

Again, (1 Sam. 12.12.) where Samuel saith to the People, “When yee saw that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King:” It is manifest that God was their King, and governed the Civill State of their Common-wealth.

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his restitution; as (Isaiah 24.23.) “Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the Sun ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem;” where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and Jerusalem; that is, on Earth. And (Micah 4.7.) “And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion:” This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the Earth. And (Ezek. 20.33.) “As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil rule over you; and (verse 37.) I will cause you to passe under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the Covenant;” that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another King.

And in the New testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke 1.32,33) “He shall be great, and be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David; and he shall reign over

the house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome there shall be no end." This is also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse, was, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews; hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of Thornes; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples (Acts 17.7.) "That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Jesus. The Kingdome therefore of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so taken, not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say, "For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory," it is to be understood of Gods Kingdome, by force of our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, "Thy Kingdome come," unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that Kingdome of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, "The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand," or to pray, "Thy Kingdome come," if it had still continued.

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiastical Government. This they have observed, that in stead of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, translate, a Kingdome of Priests: for they may as well translate a Royall Priesthood, (as it is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood of Kings. And whereas, for a Peculiar People, they put a Pretious Jewel, or Treasure, a man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.

In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted, first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the High Priest of the time being, should deliver to them from before the Cherubins

in the Sanctum Sanctorum; and which kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul, the Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the Lords Prayer, "Thy Kingdome come;" and the Right whereof we acknowledge, when we adde, "For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, for ever and ever, Amen;" and the Proclaiming whereof, was the Preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the Teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to Gods government) is, to bee in the Kingdome of Grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to bee the subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome of Glory. If the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne) were not a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenant, or Vicars, who deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth; there would not have been so much contention, and warre, about who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many Priests have troubled themselves with Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied it them.

Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth also the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes use to call Publique, or the Kings.

The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative of all his own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was the Holy One of Israel. The Nation which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the Nation of that Soveraign, that is, of the Publique Person. So the Jews, who were Gods Nation, were called (Exod. 19.6.) "a Holy Nation." For by Holy, is alwaies understood, either God himselfe, or that which is Gods in propriety;

as by Publique is alwaies meant, either the Person of the Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the Common-wealths, as no private person can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy Day; the Temple, (Gods house) a Holy House; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) Holy Duties; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, under Christ (Gods ministers) Holy Men; The Coelestiall ministring Spirits (Gods Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of Propriety, gotten by consent. In saying "Hallowed be thy name," we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandement, of "having no other Gods but Him." Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a Holy Nation. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant.

Sacred What

And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper, in the Kingdome of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also are called Holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designes, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made Holy by Gods appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be Sanctified by God, as the Seventh day in the fourth Commandement; and as the Elect in the New Testament were said to bee Sanctified, when they were endued with the Spirit of godlinesse. And that which is made Holy by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called also SACRED, and said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other Houses of Publique Prayer, and their

Utensils, Priests, and Ministers, Victimes, Offerings, and the externall matter of Sacraments.

Degrees of Sanctity

Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer and more especial service. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a people Holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a Holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy; and amongst the Priests, the High Priest was the most Holy. So the Land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped, was more Holy; and again, the Temples more Holy than the City; and the Sanctum Sanctorum more Holy than the rest of the Temple.

Sacrament

A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either of our admission into the Kingdome of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a Commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the sign of Admission was Circumcision; in the New Testament, Baptisme. The Commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the Eating (at a certain time, which was Anniversary) of the Paschall Lamb; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lords Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our Blessed

Saviours death upon the crosse. The Sacraments of Admission, are but once to be used, because there needs but one Admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance, and of our Allegeance, The Sacraments of Commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principall Sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our Alleageance. There be also other Consecrations, that may be called Sacraments, as the word implyeth onely Consecration to Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of Alleageance to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but Circumcision, and the Passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament, but Baptisme, and the Lords Supper.

CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS

Word What

When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it significative; but a perfect Speech or Discourse, whereby the speaker Affirmeth, Denieth, Commandeth, Promiseth, Threateneth, Wisheth, or Interrogateth. In which sense it is not Vocabulum, that signifies a Word; but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is some Speech, Discourse, or Saying.

The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God, Both Are Called Gods Word

In Scripture

Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood sometimes of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that a Man hath spoken): In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the Writer of it: and sometimes of the Subject: In which sense, when we read in the Bible, “The words of the days of the Kings of Israel, or Judah,” ’tis meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the Subject of those Words; And in the Greek, which (in the Scripture) retaineth many Hebraismes, by the Word of God is oftentimes

meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God, and his government; that is to say, the Doctrine of Religion: Insomuch, as it is all one, to say Logos Theou, and Theologia; which is, that Doctrine which wee usually call Divinity, as is manifest by the places following (Acts 13.46.) “Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles.” That which is here called the Word of god, was the Doctrine of Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before. And (Acts 5.20.) where it is said to the Apostles by an Angel, “Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life;” by the Words of this life, is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same Chap. “Daily in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus:” In which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the subject of this Word of Life; or (which is all one) the subject of the Words of this Life Eternall, that our saviour offered them. So (Acts 15.7.) the Word of God, is called the Word of the Gospel, because it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and the same Word (Rom. 10.8,9.) is called the Word of Faith; that is, as is there expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also (Mat. 13. 19.) “When any one heareth the Word of the Kingdome;” that is, the Doctrine of the Kingdome taught by Christ. Again, the same Word, is said (Acts 12. 24.) “to grow and to be multiplied;” which to understand of the Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, or Speech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense the Doctrine of Devils, signifieth not the Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine of Heathen men concerning Daemons, and those Phantasms which they worshipped as Gods. (1 Tim. 4.1.)

Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for the Doctrine of the Christian Religion,) that the whole scripture is the Word of God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these words, “I am the Lord thy God, &c.” to the end of the Ten Commandements, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the Preface, “God spake these words and said,” is to be understood for the Words of him that wrote the holy History. The Word of God, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes Properly, sometimes Metaphorically. Properly, as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets; Metaphorically, for his Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making the world; in which sense, those Fiats, “Let there be light,” “Let there be a firmament,” “Let us make man,” &c. (Gen. 1.) are the Word of God. And in the same sense it is said (John 1.3.) “All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made; And (Heb. 1.3.) “He upholdeth all things by the word of his Power;” that is, by the Power of his Word; that is, by his Power; and (Heb. 11.3.) “The worlds were framed by the Word of God;” and many other places to the same sense: As also amongst the Latines, the name of Fate, which signifieth properly The Word Spoken, is taken in the same sense.

Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word

Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it self, which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned, or Promised; as (Psalm 105.19.) where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, “till his Word was come;” that is, till that was come to passe which he had (Gen. 40.13.) foretold to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being restored to his office: for there by His Word Was Come, is meant, the thing it self was

come to passe. So also (1 King. 18.36.) Elijah saith to God, “I have done all these thy Words,” in stead of “I have done all these things at thy Word,” or commandement: and (Jer. 17.15.) “Where is the Word of the Lord,” is put for, “Where is the Evill he threatened:” And (Ezek. 12.28.) “There shall none of my Words be prolonged any more:” by “Words” are understood those Things, which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (Mat. 24.35.) “heaven and earth shal pass away, but my Words shall not pass away;” that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall not come to passe. And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John onely calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh “the Word of God (as Joh. 1.14.) the Word was made Flesh;” that is to say, the Word, or Promise that Christ should come into the world, “who in the beginning was with God;” that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of Eternall life, but it was not till then put in execution, and actually incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called “the Word,” not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by Nown, so also by Verbe, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this Word which St. John in his Gospel saith was with God, is (in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.) called “the Word of Life;” and (verse 2.) “The eternall life, which was with the Father:” so that he can be in no other sense called the Word, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall life; that is, “he that hath procured us Eternall life,” by his comming in the flesh. So also (Apocalypse 19.13.) the Apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud,

saith; his name is “the Word of God;” which is to be understood, as if he had said his name had been, “He that was come according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his Word and promises delivered by the Prophets.” So that there is nothing here of the Incarnation of a Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son, therefore called the Word, because his Incarnation was the Performance of the Promise; In like manner as the Holy Ghost is called The Promise. (Acts 1.4. Luke 24.49.)

Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity

There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God, is signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an Idolator; yet his Words to the good King Josiah, in which he advised him by Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against Carchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not hearkning to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 Chron. 35. vers. 21,22,23. It is true, that as the same History is related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But wee are to give credit to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.

The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason, and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written in mans heart; as Psalm 36.31. Jerem. 31.33. Deut.30.11, 14. and many other like places.

Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet

The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God: And sometimes Praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come; And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the People. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were Prophets. And in this sense the High Priest was a Prophet, for he only went into the Sanctum Sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John saith (cha.51.) that "He spake not this of himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied that one man should dye for the nation." Also they that in Christian Congregations taught the people, (1 Cor. 14.3.) are said to Prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses (Exod. 4.16.) concerning Aaron, "He shall be thy Spokes-man to the People; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him in stead of God;" that which here is Spokesman, is (chap.7.1.) interpreted Prophet; "See (saith God) I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet." In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a Prophet (Genes. 20.7.) where God in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, "Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall pray for thee;" whereby may be also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be given, not unproperly to them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say publique prayers for the Congregation. In the same sense, the Prophets that came down from the High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a Pipe, and a Harp (1 Sam. 10.5,6.) and (vers. 10.) Saul amongst them, are said to Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely. In the like sense, is Miriam (Exod. 15.20.) called a Prophetesse. So is it also to be taken (1 Cor. 11.4,5.) where St. Paul saith, "Every man that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c.

and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered: For Prophecy in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes, and Holy Songs; which women might doe in the Church, though it were not lawfull for them to speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it is, that the Poets of the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in the honor of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough known by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles, and as is evident (Tit. 1.12.) where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars; not that St. Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of God in Verse

Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies Prophecy

When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future Contingents; not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen, and foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but also all those Imposters, that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come: of which (as I have declared already in the 12. chapter of this Discourse) there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation of Prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is not an art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary Employment from God, most often of Good men, but sometimes also of the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death,

was not therefore a Prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means of Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by which he fell. And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of Prophecy, because the Prophets of their Oracles, intoxicated with a spirit, or vapour from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of Materia prima. In the Scripture I find it also so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10.) in these words, "And the Evill spirit came upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house."

The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The Prophets

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom God speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The Prophet David argueth thus, "Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?" But this may be spoken, not (as usually) to signifie Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. For to See, and Hear, are Honorable Attributes, and may be given to God, to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all parts of

mans body, that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand his will: And the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the Holy Scripture: where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood, how he spake to many of the rest.

To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old Testament He Spake

By Dreams, Or Visions

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (Gen. 12.7.) God is said to have Appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God made his presence manifest; that is, by an Apparition, or Vision. And again, (Gen. 15.1.) The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods Messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Gen. 18. 1.) by an apparition of three Angels; and to Abimelech (Gen. 20. 3.) in a dream: To Lot (Gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of Two Angels: And to Hagar (Gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one Angel: And to Abraham again (Gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: And (Gen. 26. 24.) to Isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream): And to Jacob (Gen. 18. 12.) in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text) “Jacob dreamed that he

saw a ladder, &c." And (Gen. 32. 1.) in a Vision of Angels: And to Moses (Exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament, is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the Prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and in the Tabernacle; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle, and in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, and degree in Gods favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to other Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these (Numb. 12. 6,7,8.) "If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my self known to him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold." And (Exod. 33. 11.) "The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend." And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely, Acts 7. ver. 35. and 53. and Gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a Vision, though a more cleer Vision than was given to other Prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut. 13. 1.) "If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams," the later word is but the interpretation of the former. And (Joel 2. 28.) "Your sons and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams, and your young men shall see Visions:" where again, the word Prophecy is expounded by Dream, and Vision. And in the same

manner it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor; for the text saith, (1 Kings 3. 15.) “And Solomon awoak, and behold it was a Dream:” So that generally the Prophets extraordinary in the old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from their Dreams, or Visions, that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie; which imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.

The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit; as (Zach. 7. 12.) where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith, “They made their hearths hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former Prophets.” By which it is manifest, that speaking by the Spirit, or Inspiration, was not a particular manner of Gods speaking, different from Vision, when they that were said to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a particular Commission, or (which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, And Supreme, God Spake In The Old Testament From The Mercy Seat, In A Manner Not Expressed In The Scripture. Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old Testament, some were Supreme, and some Subordinate: Supreme were first Moses; and after him the High Priest, every one for his time, as long as the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews, had rejected God, that he should no more reign over them, those Kings which submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his chief Prophets; and the High Priests office became Ministeriall. And when God was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as the King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the King thought fit. For King Saul (1 Sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt offering to be

brought, and (1 Sam. 14. 18.) he commands the Priest to bring the Ark neer him; and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsell of God. In like manner King David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the Kingdome, is said to "enquire of the Lord" (1 Sam. 23. 2.) whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10.) David commandeth the Priest to bring him the Ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah, or not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2. 27.) took the Priesthood from Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35.) to Zadoc. Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the pious Kings, who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all Soveraign Prophets. But in what manner God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other Prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses, and other Prophets, Numb. 12. 6,7,8. To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility. To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh Col. 2.9.) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall. For God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by severall occasions, naturall, and ordinary.

And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses, at Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking to the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat. Therefore in what manner God spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it

was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament, there was no Soveraign Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and the Prophet to whom he spake.

To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, But Subordinate, God Spake By The Spirit. To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef, to Righteousnesse, and to other vertues all other Christian Men. Which way, though it consist in Constitution, Instruction, Education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit (which we in our language call the Holy Ghost): For there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not alwaies supernaturall. When therefore a Prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks according to Gods will, declared by the supreme Prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word Spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition.

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that Prophecyed in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to them, is declared in the 11 of Numbers, verse 25. “The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy Elders. And it came to passe, when the Spirit rested upon them, they Prophecyed, and did not cease,” By which it is manifest, first, that their Prophecying to the people, was subservient, and subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the Spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed as Moses would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at all. For there was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to Moses; and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to Joshua,

Bee not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that place, signifieth nothing but the Mind and Disposition to obey, and assist Moses in the administration of the Government. For if it were meant they had the substantial Spirit of God; that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no lesse manner than Christ himself, in whom onely the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the Gift and Grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses; from whom their Spirit was derived. And it appeareth (verse 16.) that, they were such as Moses himself should appoint for Elders and Officers of the People: For the words are, "Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people:" where, "thou knowest," is the same with "thou appointest," or "hast appointed to be such." For we are told before (Exod. 18.) that Moses following the counsell of Jethro his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the Kingdome: and in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Sam. 16. 13, 14.) presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from him, he rejected. So that by the Spirit is meant Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.

God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots

God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were ordered by such as he had put in Authority over his people. So wee read that God manifested by the Lots which Saul caused to be drawn (1 Sam. 14. 43.) the fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the

oath taken by the people. And (Josh. 18. 10.) God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelite, by the “lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh.” In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered (Joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are the wayes whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.

All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a Vision of an Angel: To Joseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way to Damascus in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision of a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean, beasts; and in prison, by Vision of an Angel: And to all the Apostles, and Writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot) by lot.

Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability Of A Pretended Prophets Calling

Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two, when they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God, so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of Reason and Judgement to discern between naturall, and supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to

happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized. And if this examination of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, by which every man might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (Deut. 13. 1,&c.) to know a Prophet by; and (1 John 4.1.&C) to know a Spirit by: and seeing there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill. And first, that there were many more false than true Prophets, appears by this, that when Ahab (1 Kings 12.) consulted four hundred Prophets, they were all false Imposters, but onely one Michaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars. “The Prophets” (saith the Lord by Jerem. cha. 14. verse 14.) “prophecy Lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart.” In so much as God commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet Jeremiah (cha. 16.) not to obey them. “Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.”

All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet Is To Be Examined

By Every Subject

Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah, and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the Lye to one another, (as in Jerem. 14.14.) and such controversies in the New Testament at this day, amongst the Spirituall Prophets: Every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses the Soveraign Prophet had taught them; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to passe, as I have already shown out of Deut. 13. 1. &c. and in the New Testament there was but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine, That Jesus Is The Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a false Prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true Prophet. For St. John (1 Epist, 4. 2, &c) speaking expressely of the means to examine Spirits, whether they be of God, or not; after he hath told them that there would arise false Prophets, saith thus, “Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God;” that is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a Prophet avowed. For God sometimes speaketh by Prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam; and as he foretold Saul of his death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, “Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the

Flesh, is not of Christ. And this is the Spirit of Antichrist." So that the rule is perfect on both sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come, and looketh for him in some future Imposter, that shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is Gods Viceregent on earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name of God, hee commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracles, or without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that Rule, to doe as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some that Prophecyed in the Campe, whose Authority so to doe they doubted of; and leave to the Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the Spirit of their Soveraigne. For when Christian men, take not their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they must either take their owne Dreams, for the prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and Impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.

CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE

A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration

By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore they are also called Wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly in Holy Scripture, called Signes, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latines, Ostenta, and Portenta, from shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to passe.

And Must Therefore Be Rare, Whereof There Is No Naturall Cause Known

To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of God. But when wee see some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.

Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because both the thing is strange, & the Naturall cause difficult to imagin: So also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because ’tis usuall, it is no Miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of God, the one is brought to passe, than the other.

The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall destruction of the world by Water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works produced by the Art of man: yet when we know they are done; because thereby wee know also the means how they are done, we count them not for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but by mediation of humane Industry.

That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man, May Seem Otherwise To Another

Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to another. And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men make great

Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,) admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people; when neverthelesse, there were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive: Or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems to him a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such Miracles as those, cannot easily be done.

The End Of Miracles

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets, that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universall deluge, were admirable works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any Prophet, or other Minister of God, they use not to be called Miracles. For how admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were properly Miracles; because they were done with intention to make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest, but as sent from God. Therefore after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage,

when he said (Exod 4.1. &c.) “They will not beleeve me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me,” God gave him power, to turn the Rod he had in his hand into a Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod; and by putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous; and again by pulling it out to make it whole, to make the Children of Israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the God of their Fathers had appeared unto him; And if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud. And when hee had done these Miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41.) that “they beleeved him.” Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites beleeve in Moses, and were properly Miracles. In like manner if we consider all the Miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the Prophets, till the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles afterward; we shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm beleefe, that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. Wee may further observe in Scripture, that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to say, is such as God had determined should become his Subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the conversion of Pharaoh; For God had told Moses before, that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And when he let them goe at last, not the Miracles perswaded him, but the plagues forced him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13. 58.) that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in Marke 6.5.) in stead of, “he wrought not many,” it is, “he could work none.” It was not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of Miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the Miracles of Moses, of Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his Apostles was to adde men to

the Church; but it was, because the end of their Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour sent from his Father, hee could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of St. Marke, say, that his word, "Hee could not," is put for, "He would not," do it without example in the Greek tongue, (where Would Not, is put sometimes for Could Not, in things inanimate, that have no will; but Could Not, for Would Not, never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no Miracles, but amongst the credulous.

The Definition Of A Miracle

From that which I have here set down, of the nature, and use of a Miracle, we may define it thus, "A MIRACLE, is a work of God, (besides his operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation."

And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done it, without using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.

Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can do a Miracle. For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or by Incantation, that is, vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all men deny: and if they doe it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no Miracle.

There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being cast on the ground became a Serpent, (Exod. 7. 11.) “the Magicians of Egypt did the like by their Enchantments;” and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water into blood, (Exod. 7. 22.) “the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their Enchantments;” and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, (Exod. 8. 7.) “the Magicians also did so with their Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt;” will not a man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of Words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and other such places? and yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what on Enchantment is. If therefore Enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words; but Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from supernaturall, as the Impostors need not the study so much as of naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick, Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight they seem to bear.

That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False Miracles

For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a Rod seemeth a

Serpent, or the Water Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth done by Enchantment; if it be not to the edification of Gods people, not the Rod, nor the Water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the Words, but the Spectator. So that all the Miracle consisteth in this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man; which is no Miracle, but a very easie matter to doe.

For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a Science of the course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned? A juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in antient time were called Ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of Speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of being Conjurers. But it is too long a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts of those men, which the Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by Confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to bee beleeved. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him

with a charme, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.

Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles

In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended Miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before in the precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end of the 18. of Deuteronomy; That wee take not any for Prophets, that teach any other Religion, then that which Gods Lieutenant, (which at that time was Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same Religion,) whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe. Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, and the Soveraign Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the Head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or Prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our private judgments. For Example; if a man pretend, that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a God, or a man, or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done; nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his Vicar, or

Lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18. 22.) “he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him.” If he say ’tis done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but onely hear tell of a Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful Head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian Soveraigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall: and the question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a Miracle; whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the Act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye. In which question we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique Reason, that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,

HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION

THE MAINTENANCE OF Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments than Death. Now seeing Eternall Life is a greater reward, than the Life Present; and Eternall Torment a greater punishment than the Death of Nature; It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in Holy Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what offences, against whom committed, men are to be Eternally Tormented; and for what actions, they are to obtain Eternall Life.

Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned, The Terrestrial Paradise

And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden Everlastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of

Good an Evill; which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, “lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever.” (Gen. 3. 22.) By which it seemeth to me, (with submission neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if he had not sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin. Not that actuall Death then entred; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed. But where it is said, “In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,” it must needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternall life was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense it is, that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth (Rom. 5.18, 19.) “As by the offence of one, Judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon all men to Justification of Life.” Which is again (1 Cor. 15.21,22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, “For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”

Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall For Beleevers

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make

it on Earth. For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth; even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, (Psal. 133.3.) “Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even Life for evermore;” for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as also that of S. Joh. (Rev. 2.7.) “To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God.” This was the tree of Adams Eternall life; but his life was to have been on Earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. Joh. (Rev. 21.2.) where he saith, “I John saw the Holy City, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a Bride adorned for her husband:” and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ, should come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe up to it from Earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were looking upon Christ ascending (Acts 1.11.) “This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into Heaven.” Which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down to govern them under his Father, Eternally here; and not take them up to govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration of the Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a Political government of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (Mat. 22.30.) “that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven,” is a description of an Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of Marriage. For seeing Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on Earth Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not continually have procreated their kind. For if Immortals should have generated, as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a

small time, would not have been able to afford them a place to stand on. The Jews that asked our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is Marriage, or generation among the Angels. The comparison between that Eternall life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered; holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by Christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from the Condemnation of Adam, not from the Execution; so life is reckoned from the Absolution, not from the Resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.

Ascension Into Heaven

That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the world, which are the most remote from Earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another Higher Heaven, called Caelum Empyreum, (whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the Kingdome of the King that dwelleth in Heaven; and his Kingdome was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets his Lieutenants, first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign Priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their King, after the manner of other Nations. And when our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his Ministers, shall have perswaded the Jews to return, and

called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new Kingdome of Heaven, because our King shall then be God, whose Throne is Heaven; without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than Gods Footstool the Earth. On the contrary, we find written (Joh. 3.13.) that "no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven." Where I observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not in Heaven, but upon the Earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2.34.) where St. Peter, to prove the Ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist, (Psal. 16.10.) "Thou wilt not leave my soule in Hell, nor suffer thine Holy one to see corruption," saith, they were spoken (not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this Reason, "For David is not ascended into Heaven." But to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of Judgment, yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our Saviour (Luke 20.37,38.) who proving the Resurrection out of the word of Moses, saith thus, "That the dead are raised, even Moses shewed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for they all live to him." But if these words be to be understood only of the Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man. Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall Life upon the faithfull. And though at that time the Patriarchs and many other faithfull men were Dead, yet as it is in the text, they Lived To God; that is,

they were written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to Life eternall at the Resurrection. That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and a living Creature independent on the Body; or that any meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except Enos and Elias,) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole 14. Chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the Immortality at the Resurrection. "There is hope of a tree," (saith hee verse 7.) "if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughes like a Plant. But man dyeth, and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the Ghost, and where is he?" and (verse 12.) "man lyeth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more." But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us, that it is at the generall Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle, 3. Chapter, and 7. verse, he saith, that "the Heavens and the Earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of Judgment, and perdition of ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking for, and hasting to the comming of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat. Neverthelesse, we according to the promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse." Therefore where Job saith, man riseth not till the Heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and day of Judgment; and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation; but the Promise. For St. Peter saies not, "Wee look for new heavens, and a new earth, (from Nature) but from Promise."

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a Civil

Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue first of the Old, and since of the New Covenant, wherein he reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the comming again of our Saviour in his Majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and Eternally; the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth. But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome (of) God, have so great influence on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have the Soveraign Power.

The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were Never In The Kingdome Of God, Or Having Been In, Are Cast Out

As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place on Earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is usually called in Scripture, by words that signifie Under Ground; which the Latines read generally Infernus, and Inferni, and the Greeks Hades; that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the Grave, as any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned after the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament, by any note of

situation; but onely by the company: as that it shall bee, where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary, and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth: As for Example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomelesse pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were swallowed up alive into the earth. Not that the Writers of the Scripture would have us beleeve, there could be in the globe of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the height of the Stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottome; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their Daemonologie (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,) and after them, the Romans called Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,

Bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:

for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear: but that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.

The Congregation Of Giants

Again, because those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in the time of Noah, before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes, and the Scripture Giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of God, with the children of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the Damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased Giants; as Proverbs 21.16. “The man that wandreth out of the way of understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the Giants,” and Job 26.5. “Behold the Giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them.” Here the place of the Damned,

is under the water. And Isaiah 14.9. “Hell is troubled how to meet thee,” (that is, the King of Babylon) “and will displace the Giants for thee:” and here again the place of the Damned, (if the sense be literall,) is to be under water.

Lake Of Fire

Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse with Fire and Brimstone, and together with them the countrey about made a stinking bituminous Lake; the place of the Damned is sometimes expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the Apocalypse ch.21.8. “But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and Murderers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolators, and all Lyars, shall have their part in the Lake that burneth with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the second Death.” So that it is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed by Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind, or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for Destruction, as it is in the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is said, that “Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire;” that is to say, were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment, there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is, no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is the same with no more Dying.

Utter Darknesse

Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (Exod. 10.23.) “They saw not one another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the Children of Israel had light in their dwellings;” the place of the wicked after Judgment, is called Utter Darknesse, or (as it is in the originall) Darknesse Without. And so it is expressed (Mat. 22.13.) where the King commandeth his Servants, “to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his Wedding garment, and to cast him out,” Eis To Skotos To Exoteron, Externall Darknesse, or Darknesse Without: which though translated Utter Darknesse, does not signifie How Great, but Where that darknesse is to be; namely, Without The Habitation of Gods Elect.

Gehenna, And Tophet

Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the Valley of the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children to the Idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch upon their own Altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of Kings cha. the place served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither, out of the City; and there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon. And this Gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of Everlasting, and Unquenchable Fire.

Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture Concerning Hell

Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or under water; or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more see one another; nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning Hell Fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words) both of the Place of Hell, and the nature of Hellish Torment, and Tormenters.

Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives

And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties, exactly and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan; The Accuser, or Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abbadon. Which significant names, Satan, Devill, Abbadon, set not forth to us any Individuall person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.

And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant, the Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore if the Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, (as in the former Chapter I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,) The Enemy, and

his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.

Torments Of Hell

The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by “weeping, and gnashing of teeth,” as Mat. 8.12. Sometimes, by “the worm of Conscience;” as Isa.66.24. and Mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes, by Fire, as in the place now quoted, “where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched,” and many places beside: sometimes by “Shame, and contempt,” as Dan. 12.2. “And many of them that sleep in the dust of the Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt.” All which places design metaphorically a grief, and discontent of mind, from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily paines, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under evill and cruell Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second Death. For though the Scripture bee clear for an universall Resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is promised an Eternall life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15.42, 43.) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that “the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it is raised in power;” Glory and

Power cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of Second Death, bee applyed to those that can never die but once: And although in Metaphoricall speech, a Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an Everlasting Death yet it cannot well be understood of a Second Death. The fire prepared for the wicked, is an Everlasting Fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the Resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred, that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die. And though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire, and Torments (into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever;) yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but on the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death: (Apoc. 20. 13,14.) “For after Death, and the Grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be cast into the Lake of Fire. This is the Second Death.” Whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no more.

The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation The Same Thing,

Salvation From Sin, And From Misery, All One

The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of SALVATION, or Being Saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely against all Evill,

comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. And because man was created in a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happinesse by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be Saved From Sin, is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us. And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man sick of the Palsey, by saying, (Mat. 9.2.) "Son be of good cheer, thy Sins be forgiven thee;" and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them (v.5.) "whether it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk;" signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy Sins are forgiven," and "Arise and walk;" and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had power to forgive Sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.

Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14.39. "as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," that is, from their temporary enemies, and 2 Sam. 22.4. "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence;" and 2 Kings 13.5. "God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians," and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.

The Place Of Eternall Salvation

But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. On one side, by Kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this Salvation should be on Earth. For by Salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But how good soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture. The state of Salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33. ver. 20,21,22,23,24.

"Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities, thine eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken.

But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall gallant ship passe thereby.

For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King, he will save us.

Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey.

And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity."

In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed, "Jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the Eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall not be taken down," &c. The Saviour of it, "the Lord, their Judge, their Lawgiver, their King, he will save us;" the Salvation, "the Lord shall be to

them as a broad mote of swift waters," &c. the condition of their Enemies, "their tacklings are loose, their masts weake, the lame shal take the spoil of them." The condition of the Saved, "The Inhabitants shall not say, I am sick:" And lastly, all this is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, "The people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." By which it is evident, that Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign, (at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the Salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into Gods Kingdome; as is also more expressely declared by the same Prophet, Cha.20, 21. "And they," (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the House of the Lord. And I will also take of them for Priests and for Levites, saith the Lord:" Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of Gods Kingdome (which is the Place, from whence the Salvation of us that were Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem; And the same is also confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place of Gods worship; to whom he saith, John 4.22. that the Samaritans worshipped they know not what, but the Jews worship what they knew, "For Salvation is of the Jews (Ex Judais, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him again, "We know the Messias shall come." So that which our saviour saith, "Salvation is from the Jews," is the same that Paul sayes (Rom. 1.16,17.) "The Gospel is the power of God to Salvation to every one that beleeveth; To the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousnesse of God revealed from faith to faith;" from the faith of

the Jew, to the faith of the Gentile. In the like sense the Prophet Joel describing the day of Judgment, (cha.30,31.) that God would “shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud, and fire, and pillars of smoak. The Sun should be turned to darknesse, and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come,” he addeth verse 32. “and it shall come to passe, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. For in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem shall be Salvation.” And Obadiah verse 17 saith the same, “Upon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be holinesse, and the house of Jacob shall possesse their possessions,” that is, the possessions of the Heathen, which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the Mount of Esau, the Land of the Philistines, the Fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the Cities of the South, and concludes with these words, “the Kingdom shall be the Lords.” All these places are for Salvation, and the Kingdome of God (after the day of Judgement) upon Earth. On the other side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any Coelum Empyreum, or other aetheriall Region; saving that it is called the Kingdome of Heaven; which name it may have, because God, that was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by Angels from Heaven, to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men, from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his Footstoole. But that the Subjects of God should have any place as high as his throne, or higher than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a King, nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.

From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation, it is not hard to interpret, what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World, the Present World,

and the World to Come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 2.5.) “If God spared not the Old World, but saved Noah the eighth person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly,” &c. So the First World, was from Adam to the generall Flood. Of the present World, our Saviour speaks (John 18.36.) “My Kingdome is not of this World.” For he came onely to teach men the way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine. Of the World to come, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 3. 13.) “Neverthelesse we according to his promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth.” This is that WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth, and thence forth reign over them, (under his Father) Everlastingly.

Redemption

Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that is once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of the same; and must pay (or some other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such Ransome is to be paid before Salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require. By this Ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the Offence, which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another; The dammage a man does to another, he may make amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either Gratis, or upon such penalty, as God is

pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To forgive sin is not an act of Injustice, though the punishment have been threatned. Even amongst men, though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises, of Evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind God, who is infinitely more mercifull then men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to Redeem us, did not in that sense satisfie for the Sins of men, as that his Death, of its own vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall death; but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the Salvation at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in him. And though this act of our Redemption, be not alwaies in Scripture called a Sacrifice, and Oblation, but sometimes a Price, yet by Price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father, but that Price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.

CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH

Church The Lords House

The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture divers things. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House, that is to say, for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely; as, 1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. “Let your women keep silence in the Churches:” but this is Metaphorically put, for the Congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the Edifice it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians, and Idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was Gods House, and the House of Prayer; and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christs House: and therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, The Lords House; and thence, in our language it came to be called Kyrke, and Church.

Ecclesia Properly What

Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation, or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak unto them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called Concio, as he that spake was called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator. And when they were called forth by lawfull Authority, (Acts 19.39.) it was Ecclesia Legitima, a Lawfull Church, Ennomos Ecclesia. But when they were excited by

tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused Church, Ecclesia Sugkechumene.

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (Act. 8.3.) where it is said, that “Saul made havock of the Church:” And in this sense is Christ said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (Col. 4.15.) “Salute the Church that is in his house.” Sometimes also for the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5.27.) “A Glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;” which is meant of the Church Triumphant, or, Church To Come. Sometimes, for a Congregation assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether their profession be true, or counterfeit, as it is understood, Mat. 18.17. where it is said, “Tell it to the Church, and if hee neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican.”

In What Sense The Church Is One Person Church Defined

And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other action whatsoever; For without authority from a lawfull Congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse that act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a CHURCH to be, “A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign; at

whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble." And because in all Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the Civil Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull Assembly.

A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All One

It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth, to which all other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians, in the Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them is subject to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person. And therefore a Church, such as one as is capable to Command, to Judge, Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the Resurrection shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall; but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. There is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the Church and State; between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the

Sword Of Justice, and the Shield Of Faith; and (which is more) in every Christian mans own brest, between the Christian, and the Man. The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill Soveraignes: But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign; And to whom the Scripture hath assigned that Office, we shall see in the Chapters following.

CHAPTER XL

OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, HIGH PRIESTS,

AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham

The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by Covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the Covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God; not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as Morall Laws,) by the light of Nature; but also such, as God should in speciall manner deliver to him by Dreams and Visions. For as to the Morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withall, by promise of the Land of Canaan. Nor was there any Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: And therefore the Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream, or Vision, and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.

Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering The Religion Of His Own People

In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points of important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at the making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills (which make the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto (Gen 18.18, 19.) God saith, “All the Nations of the Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.” From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandements of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign. And Consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own Soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of Religion. As for the inward Thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.

No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against The Religion Of Abraham

From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or Spirit,

or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed, or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in the Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.

Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What God Spake

There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian Common-wealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God. For God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: And therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Common-wealth, are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.

The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded

The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, cha.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was Moses, for his owne time; and the succession to that office was setled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to God a Sacerdotall Kingdome for ever.

By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity of his Miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in Gods name. We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandement of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses Himself; And our Saviour saith of himself, (John 5. 31.) “If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true,” much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him. And so it was: for “the people” (Exod. 20.18.) “when they saw the Thunderings, and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, and the mountaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die.” Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the Commandement of God.

Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews, All His Own Time,

Though Aaron Had The Priesthood

And notwithstanding the Covenant constituted a Sacerdotall Kingdome, that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession, after Moses should bee dead. For whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the Policy, as first founder of a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy) must needs have Soveraign Power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron but to him. Secondly, (Exod. 24.1, 2.) "And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him." By which it is plain, that Moses who was alone called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders, nor the People who were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the Person of God; that is to say, was their sole Soveraign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verse 9.) "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire stone," &c. yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words which God had said to him. He onely went for the businesse of the people; the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see God and live. "God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from him to the people. Again, it is every where said, "The Lord spake unto Moses," as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the ordering of the

Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldome. The Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams mutiny against Moses, was (Numbers 12.) judged by God himself for Moses. So also in the question between Moses, and the People, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly "gathered themselves together" (Numbers 16. 3) "against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, 'Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are Holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the Lord?'" God caused the Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with their wives and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty Princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People, but Moses alone had next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion; For Moses onely spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the Mountain where God talked with Moses. "Thou shalt set bounds" (saith the Lord, Exod 19. 12.) "to the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death." and again (verse 21.) "Get down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze." Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall Soveraigns. For the Scriptures since God now speaketh

in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To look upon them and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgresse the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.

All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of Moses

There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were in his time but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy by the Spirit of God, and these were of all Moses his election; concerning whom God saith to Moses (Numb. 11.16.) “Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the Elders of the People.” To these God imparted his Spirit; but it was not a different Spirit from that of Moses; for it is said (verse 25.) “God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders.” But as I have shewn before (cha.) by Spirit, is understood the Mind; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might Prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such manner, as to set forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but Ministers; and when two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same Chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his

Spirit that they Prophecyed. By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.

After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High Priest

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being a Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him (next under himself) for Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the Generall of their Army. For thus God saith expressely (Numb. 27.21.) concerning Joshua; “He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall ask counsell for him, before the Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the Children of Israel with him:” Therefore the Supreme Power of making War and Peace, was in the Priest. The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to the High Priest: For the Book of the Law was in their keeping; and the Priests and Levites onely were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill, as appears in Deut. 17.8, 9, 10. And for the manner of Gods worship, there was never doubt made, but that the High Priest till the time of Saul, had the Supreme Authority. Therefore the Civill and Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in one and the same person, the High Priest; and ought to bee so, in whosoever governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from God.

Of The Soveraign Power Between The Time Of Joshua And Of Saul

After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in the Book of Judges, “that there was in those dayes no King in Israel;” and sometimes with this addition, that “every man did that which was right in his own eyes.” By which is to bee understood, that where it is said, “there was no King,” is meant, “there was no Soveraign Power” in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the Act, and Exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua, & Eleazar, “there arose another generation” (Judges 2.10.) “that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim.” And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, “to look for a sign,” not onely before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas Signs, and Miracles had for End to procure Faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of Nature. But if we consider not the Exercise, but the Right of governing, the Soveraign power was still in the High Priest. Therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges, (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the Right the High Priest had to the Soveraign Power, in all matters, both of Policy and Religion. And neither the Judges, nor Samuel himselfe had an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the Government; and were obeyed by the Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore the Right of Regulating both the Policy, and the Religion, were inseparable.

Of The Rights Of The Kings Of Israel

To the Judges, succeeded Kings; And whereas before, all authority, both in Religion, and Policy, was in the High Priest; so now it was all in the King. For the Soveraignty over the people, which was before, not onely by vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in God, and next under him, in the High Priest, as his Viceregent on earth, was cast off by the People, with the consent of God himselfe. For when they said to Samuel (1 Sam. 8.5.) "make us a King to judge us, like all the Nations," they signified that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the Priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in deposing the High Priest of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar Government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7.) "Hearken unto the voice of the People, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee, that I should not reign over them." Having therefore rejected God, in whose Right the Priests governed, there was no authority left to the Priests, but such as the King was pleased to allow them; which was more, or lesse, according as the Kings were good, or evill. And for the Government of Civill affaires, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the King. For in the same Chapter, verse 20. They say they will be like all the Nations; that their King shall be their Judge, and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in Peace and War. In which is contained also the ordering of Religion; for there was no other Word of God in that time, by which to regulate Religion, but the Law of Moses, which was their Civill Law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2.27.) that Solomon "thrust out Abiathar from being Priest before the Lord:" He had therefore authority over the High Priest, as over any other Subject; which is a great mark of Supremacy in Religion. And we read also (1 Kings 8.) that hee dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the People; and

that he himselfe in person made that excellent prayer, used in the Consecrations of all Churches, and houses of Prayer; which is another great mark of Supremacy in Religion. Again, we read (2 Kings 22.) that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by the High Priest, but Josiah sent both him, and others to enquire concerning it, of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark of the Supremacy in Religion. Lastly, wee read (1 Chro. 26.30.) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, Officers of Israel among them Westward, "in all businesse of the Lord, and in the service of the King." Likewise (verse 32.) that hee made other Hebronites, "rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the halfe tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the King." Is not this full Power, both Temporall and Spirituall, as they call it, that would divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of Gods Kingdome, to the Captivity, the Supremacy of Religion, was in the same hand with that of the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the election of Saul, was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.

The Practice Of Supremacy In Religion, Was Not In The Time Of The Kings,

According To The Right Thereof

Notwithstanding the government both in Policy and Religion, were joined, first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings, so far forth as concerned the Right; yet it appeareth by the same Holy History, that the people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or

(which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests; they took occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them, by blaming sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change the Government, or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure: And from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities of the Nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the Covenant of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, regarded no more the Commandement of the Priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in Civill affairs, such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour Nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God (as they ought to doe,) but with such men, or women, as they guessed to bee Prophets by their Praedictions of things to come; and thought they had an Idol in their Chappel, yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain, they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.

And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would have a King to judg them in Civill actions; but not that they would allow their King to change the Religion which they thought was recommended to them by Moses. So that they alwaies kept in store a pretext, either of Justice, or Religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile. Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a King, (for God was their King already, and Samuel had but an authority under him); yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsell,

in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint another King, namely David, to take the succession from his heirs. Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought him an Oppressor; that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to Jeroboam an Idolater. And generally through the whole History of the Kings, as well of Judah, as of Israel, there were Prophets that alwaies controlled the Kings, for transgressing the Religion; and sometimes also for Errours of State; (2 Chro. 19. 2.) as Jehosaphat was reproved by the Prophet Jehu, for aiding the King of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for shewing his treasures to the Ambassadors of Babylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of State and Religion were in the Kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own naturall abilities, or felicities. So that from the practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the right of Supremacy in Religion was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the Prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church; or because Josiah consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the High Priest, but Hulda the Prophetesse had the Supreme authority in matter of Religion; which I thinke is not the opinion of any Doctor.

After The Captivity The Jews Had No Setled Common-wealth

During the Captivity, the Jews had no Common-wealth at all

And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other; And presently after they became subjects to the Greeks (from whose

Customes, and Daemonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their Religion became much corrupted): In such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in State and Religion, concerning the Supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his Son Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his Everlasting Kingdome, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the Chapter following.

CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR

Three Parts Of The Office Of Christ

We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the Office of the Messiah: the first of a Redeemer, or Saviour: The second of a Pastor, Counsellour, or Teacher, that is, of a Prophet sent from God, to convert such as God hath elected to Salvation; The third of a King, and Eternall King, but under his Father, as Moses and the High Priests were in their severall times. And to these three parts are corespondent three times. For our Redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the Sacrifice, wherein he offered up himself for our sinnes upon the Crosse: our conversion he wrought partly then in his own Person; and partly worketh now by his Ministers; and will continue to work till his coming again. And after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious Reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

His Office As A Redeemer

To the Office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the Ransome of Sin, (which Ransome is Death,) it appertaineth, that he was Sacrificed, and thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed away from us our iniquities, in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though without sinne, can satisfie for the offences of all men, in the rigour of Justice, but in the Mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old Law (as we may read,

Leviticus the 16.) the Lord required, that there should every year once, bee made an Atonement for the Sins of all Israel, both Priests, and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was to receive from them two young Goates, of which he was to Sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was the Scape Goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the Goat to be led into the wildernesse, and there to Escape, and carry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the Sacrifice of the one Goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah, is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem to be here figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat, and the Scape Goat; “Hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted (Isa. 53.7.); he opened not his mouth; he brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth:” Here he is the Sacrificed Goat. “He hath born our Griefs, (ver.4.) and carried our sorrows;” And again, (ver. 6.) “the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all:” And so he is the Scape Goat. “He was cut off from the land of the living (ver. 8.) for the transgression of my People:” There again he is the Sacrificed Goat. And again (ver. 11.) “he shall bear their sins:” Hee is the Scape Goat. Thus is the Lamb of God equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, in that he dyed; and escaping, in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his Ascension.

Christs Kingdome Not Of This World

For as much therefore, as he that Redeemeth, hath no title to the Thing Redeemed, before the Redemption, and Ransome paid; and this Ransome was the Death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour (as man) was not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is, during that time hee conversed bodily on the Earth. I say, he was not then King in present, by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make with him in Baptisme; Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with God in Baptisme, they were obliged to obey him for King, (under his Father) whensoever he should be pleased to take the Kingdome upon him. According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressely saith, (John 18.36.) "My Kingdome is not of this world." Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of Judgment, (which is therefore also called, The Last Day;) and that which shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth; the Kingdome of Christ is not to begin till the general Resurrection. And that is it which our Saviour saith, (Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works." To reward every man according to his works, is to execute the Office of a King; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father, with his Angells. When our Saviour saith, (Mat. 23.2.) "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses seat; All therefore whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe and doe;" hee declareth plainly, that hee ascribeth Kingly Power, for that time, not to himselfe, but to them. And so hee hath also, where he saith, (Luke 12.14.) "Who made mee a Judge, or Divider over you?" And (John 12.47.) "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." And yet our Saviour came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge in the world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the High Priests that

succeeded Moses, and in the Kings that succeeded the Priests. And St. John saies expressely (cha. ver. 22.) “The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son.” And this is not repugnant to that other place, “I came not to judge the world:” for this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at the second coming of Christ, (Mat. 19. 28.) “Yee that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his Glory, yee shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.”

The End Of Christs Comming Was To Renew The Covenant Of The Kingdome

Of God, And To Perswade The Elect To Imbrace It, Which Was The Second

Part Of His Office

If then Christ while hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this World, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new Covenant, the Kingdome, which being his by the Old Covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the King promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are two parts of our Saviours Office during his aboad upon the Earth; One to Proclaim himself the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty, to take

possession of his Fathers Kingdome. And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is often by himself called the Regeneration; which is not properly a Kingdome, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates that then were, (for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in Moses chaire, and to pay tribute to Caesar;) but onely an earnest of the Kingdome of God that was to come, to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him; For which cause the Godly are said to bee already in the Kingdome of Grace, as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.

The Preaching Of Christ Not Contrary To The Then Law Of The Jews,

Nor Of Caesar

Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ, that tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes, or of Caesar. For as touching the Common-wealth which then was amongst the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, that they that were governed, did all expect the Messiah, and Kingdome of God; which they could not have done if their Laws had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, and declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by Preaching, and Miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah, hee did therein nothing against their laws. The Kingdome hee claimed was to bee in another world; He taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate in Moses seat: he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute, and refused to take upon himselfe to be a Judg. How then could his words, or actions bee seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then Civill Government? But God having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction of his elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of their

malice, and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though Pilate himself (to gratifie the Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him: And put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, “that he pretended to be King;” but simply, “That hee was King of the Jews;” and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, “What I have written, I have written.”

The Third Part Of His Office Was To Be King (Under His Father)

Of The Elect

As for the third part of his Office, which was to be King, I have already shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till the Resurrection. But then he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their Baptisme. And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (Mat. 19.28.) that his Apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, “When the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory;” whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature; and (Mat. 16.27.) “The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works.” The same we may read, Marke 13..26. and 14.26. and more expressely for the time, Luke 22.29, 30. “I appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” By which it is manifest that the Kingdome of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in Glory, and make his Apostles Judges of the

twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the Kingdome of Heaven, whether men shall then eat, and drink; what eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour (John 6.27.) where he saith, “Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give you.” So that by eating at Christs table, is meant the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoying of Immortality, in the Kingdome of the Son of Man. By which places, and many more, it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to bee exercised by him in his humane nature.

Christs Authority In The Kingdome Of God Subordinate To His Father

Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than as subordinate, or Viceregent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as the High Priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the Kings were after it. For it is one of the Prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be like (in Office) to Moses; “I will raise them up a Prophet (saith the Lord, Deut. 18.18.) from amongst their Brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth,” and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilest he was conversant on Earth. For as Moses chose twelve Princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel; And as Moses authorized Seventy Elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to Prophecy to the people, that is, (as I have said before,) to speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy Disciples, to preach his Kingdome, and Salvation to all Nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of the Seventy that prophecyed in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as

being subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man that cast out Devills in his name, justified him therein, saying, (Luke 9.50.) “Forbid him not, for hee that is not against us, is on our part.”

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of Sacraments, both of Admission into the Kingdome of God, and of Commemoration of his deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition. As the Children of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception into the Kingdome of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of Circumcision, which rite having been omitted in the Wildernesse, was again restored as soon as they came into the land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of Baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those that being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament to be taken by all that beleeved in him. From what cause the rite of Baptisme first proceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning Leprousie; wherein the Leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the Priest to be clean, hee was admitted into the campe after a solemne Washing. And this may therefore bee a type of the Washing in Baptisme; wherein such men as are cleansed of the Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received into the Church with the solemnity of Baptisme. There is another conjecture drawn from the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens; and that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would doe to converse with a Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into the number of men, by Washing, as Children new born were washed from

the uncleannesse of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was under the Dominion of Alexander, and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept into the Religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a Heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the Legall Ceremony of Washing after Leprosie. And for the other Sacraments, of eating the Paschall Lambe, it is manifestly imitated in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; in which the Breaking of the Bread, and the pouring out of the Wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the Misery of Sin, by Christs Passion, as the eating of the Paschall Lambe, kept in memory the deliverance of the Jewes out of the Bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. The same is more expressely signified, by that that hee teacheth us to pray, "Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come;" and, "For thine is the Kingdome, the power and the Glory;" and by that it is said, that "Hee shall come in the Glory of his Father;" and by that which St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. 15.24.) "then commeth the end, when hee shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God, even the Father;" and by many other most expresse places.

One And The Same God Is The Person Represented By Moses, And By Christ

Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as Moses Did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward, but not before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same substance, is one Person as represented by Moses, and another Person as represented by

his Sonne the Christ. For Person being a relative to a Representer, it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there bee a plurality of Persons, though of one and the same Substance.

CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICALL

FOR THE UNDERSTANDING of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our Saviour, into two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men endued with Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion. For it was long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.

Of The Holy Spirit That Fel On The Apostles

And for the time between, it is manifest, that the Power Ecclesiasticall, was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained to Preach the Gospell, and to convert men to Christianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of Salvation; and after these the Power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by Imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained Ministers of God, to advance his Kingdome. So that Imposition of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of their Commission to Preach Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his Minister Joshua, as wee read Deuteronomy 34. ver. 9. “And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdome; for Moses had laid his hands upon him.” Our Saviour therefore between his Resurrection, and Ascension,

gave his Spirit to the Apostles; first, by “Breathing on them, and saying,” (John 20.22.) “Receive yee the Holy Spirit;” and after his Ascension (Acts 2.2, 3.) by sending down upon them, a “mighty wind, and Cloven tongues of fire;” and not by Imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands on Moses; and his Apostles afterward, transmitted the same Spirit by Imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby, in whom the Power Ecclesiasticall continually remained, in those first times, where there was not any Christian Common-wealth; namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands.

Of The Trinity

Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses, and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office of Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before, [chapt. 16.].) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is Represented; and therefore God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons; though neither the word Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John indeed (1 Epist. 5.7.) saith, “There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One:” But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another. For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person, and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority

from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare witnesse. St. John therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that “God hath given us eternall life in his Son.” Again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God; and either prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the character of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth expressely (Acts 1. ver. 21,22.) where St Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, “Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the Baptisme of John, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection:” which words interpret the Bearing of Witnesse, mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in Earth. For (ver. 8.) he saith, “there are three that bear Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one:” that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of which Testimony he saith (verse 10.) “He that beleeveth on the Son of man hath the Witnesse in himselfe.” In this Trinity on Earth the Unity is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the persons of one and the same God, though Represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can

be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this; that God who is alwaies One and the same, was the Person Represented by Moses; the Person Represented by his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles. As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake, is God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man), the Son is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From whence we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament: For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from Representing; which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods Person in ruling, or in directing under him.

Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour to the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth an Assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a Comforter. Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and over whom.

The Power Ecclesiasticall Is But The Power To Teach

Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled a great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of the Pope of Rome; and begins with this, Whether it ought to be Monarchicall, Aristocraticall, or Democraticall. All which sorts of Power, are Soveraign, and Coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no Coercive Power left them by our Saviour; but onely a Power to proclaim the Kingdom of Christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by precepts and good

counsell, to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the Apostles, and other Ministers of the Gospel, are our Schoolemasters, and not our Commanders, and their Precepts not Laws, but wholesome Counsells then were all that dispute in vain.

An Argument Thereof, The Power Of Christ Himself

I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they be Kings,) require obedience in his name. For if the Supreme King, have not his Regall Power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his Officers? As my Father sent me, (so saith our Saviour) I send you. But our Saviour was sent to perswade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father, and not to reign in Majesty, no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant, till the day of Judgment.

From The Name Of Regeneration

The time between the Ascension, and the generall Resurrection, is called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of Judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, Mat. 19.28. “You that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve Thrones;” And of St. Paul (Ephes. 6.15.) “Having your feet shod with the Preparation of the Gospell of Peace.”

From The Comparison Of It, With Fishing, Leaven, Seed

And is compared by our Saviour, to Fishing; that is, to winning men to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion: and therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them so many Nimrods, Hunters Of Men; But Fishers Of Men. It is compared also to Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of a grain of Mustard-seed; by all which Compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual Reigning. The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of Christ, and a preparation for his second comming; as the Evangelization of John Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.

From The Nature Of Faith:

Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, is to make men Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason, or from something men beleeve already. Therefore the Ministers of Christ in this world, have no Power by that title, to Punish any man for not Beleeving, or for Contradicting what they say; they have I say no Power by that title of Christs Ministers, to Punish such: but if they have Soveraign Civill Power, by politick institution, then they may indeed lawfully Punish any Contradiction to their laws whatsoever: And St. Paul, of himselfe and other then Preachers of the Gospell saith in expresse words, (2 Cor. 1.24.) “Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are Helpers of your Joy.”

From The Authority Christ Hath Left To Civill Princes

Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority which Christ hath left to all Princes, as well Christians, as Infidels. St. Paul saith (Col. 3.20.) “Children obey your Parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord.” And ver. 22. “Servants obey in all things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the Lord;” This is spoken to them whose Masters were Infidells; and yet they are bidden to obey them In All Things. And again, concerning obedience to Princes. (Rom. 13. the first 6. verses) exhorting to “be subject to the Higher Powers,” he saith, “that all Power is ordained of God;” and “that we ought to be subject to them, not onely for” fear of incurring their “wrath, but also for conscience sake.” And St. Peter, (1 Epist. chae ver. 13, 14, 15.) “Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King, as Supreme, or unto Governours, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of God.” And again St. Paul (Tit. 3.1.) “Put men in mind to be subject to Principalities, and Powers, and to obey Magistrates.” These Princes, and Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all Infidels; much more therefore we are to obey those Christians, whom God hath ordained to have Soveraign Power over us. How then can wee be obliged to doe any thing contrary to the Command of the King, or other Soveraign Representant of the Common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with Civill Authority, any authority to Command other men.

What Christians May Do To Avoid Persecution

But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this I answer, that such forbidding is of no effect, because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow mens Commands. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? Profession with the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding firmely in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 Kings 5.17.) “Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other Gods but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing.” This the Prophet approved, and bid him “Goe in peace.” Here Naaman beleeved in his heart; but by bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviours saying, “Whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in Heaven?” This we may say, that whatsoever a Subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns; nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governour, and the law of his

countrey. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign Command him to bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mamometan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawful Prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their Religion, true, or false; if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, "Whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you, that doe yee unto them;" and contrary to the Law of Nature, (which is the indubitable everlasting Law of God) "Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee."

Of Martyrs

But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in the History of the Church, that they have needlessely cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause put to death; whereof some have received a Calling to preach, and professe the Kingdome of Christ openly; others have had no such Calling, nor more has been required of them than their owne faith. The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true Martyrs; For a Martyr is, (to give the true definition of the word) a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: For a Witnesse must have seen what he testifieth, or else

his testimony is not good. And that none but such, can properly be called Martyrs of Christ, is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, Act. 1.21, 22. “Wherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the Baptisme of John unto that same day hee was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a Martyr (that is a Witnesse) with us of his Resurrection:” Where we may observe, that he which is to bee a Witnesse of the truth of the Resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamentall article of Christian Religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and after his Resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall Disciples: whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but Witnesses of other mens testimony; and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs of Christs Witnesses.

He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the History of our Saviours life, and of the Acts, or Epistles of the Apostles; or which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man, wil oppose the Laws and Authority of the Civill State, is very far from being a Martyr of Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs. ’Tis one Article onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name; and that Article is this, that Jesus Is The Christ; that is to say, He that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternall life in his glorious Kingdome. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth Witnesse, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a Witnesse, and consequently a Martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his

Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a Martyr, neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as are sent to the conversion of Infidels. For no man is a Witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs no Witnesse; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his Apostles, and his Seventy Disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: And he sent them to unbeleevers; "I send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves;" not as sheep to other sheep.

Argument From The Points Of Their Commission

Lastly the points of their Commission, as they are expressely set down in the Gospel, contain none of them any authority over the Congregation.

To Preach

We have first (Mat. 10.) that the twelve Apostles were sent "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to Preach, "that the Kingdome of God was at hand." Now Preaching in the originall, is that act, which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to doe publiquely in Proclaiming of a King. But a Crier hath not right to Command any man. And (Luke 10.2.) the seventy Disciples are sent out, "as Labourers, not as Lords of the Harvest;" and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, "The Kingdome of God is come nigh unto you;" and by Kingdome here is meant, not the

Kingdome of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are bidden to denounce it (ver. 11.) to those Cities which shall not receive them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodome, than for such a City. And (Mat. 20.28.) our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that sought Priority of place, their Office was to minister, even as the Son of man came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: “Bee not called Masters, (saith our Saviour, Mat. 23.10) for one is your Master, even Christ.”

And Teach

Another point of their Commission, is, to Teach All Nations; as it is in Mat. 28.19. or as in St. Mark 16.15 “Goe into all the world, and Preach the Gospel to every creature.” Teaching therefore, and Preaching is the same thing. For they that Proclaim the comming of a King, must withall make known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: As St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when “three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alledging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ.” But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, (that is to say, King,) and risen from the dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws, and commands of their Soveraigns; but that they shall doe wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in Patience, and Faith, with Obedience to their present Magistrates.

To Baptize;

Another point of their Commission, is to Baptize, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” What is Baptisme? Dipping into water. But what is it to Dip a man into the water in the name of any thing? The meaning of these words of Baptisme is this. He that is Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming a new man, and a loyall subject to that God, whose Person was represented in old time by Moses, and the High Priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his humane nature Represent his Fathers Person in his eternall Kingdome after the Resurrection; and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the Apostles, who assisted by the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto. This, being our promise in Baptisme; and the Authority of Earthly Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of Judgment; (for that is expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23, 24. where he saith, “As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. But every man in his owne order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, at his comming; Then Commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the Kingdome of God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all Rule, and all Authority and Power”) it is manifest, that we do not in Baptisme constitute over us another authority, by which our externall actions are to be governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the way to life eternall.

And To Forgive, And Retain Sinnes

The Power of Remission, And Retention Of Sinnes, called also the Power of Loosing, and Binding, and sometimes the Keyes Of The Kingdome Of

Heaven, is a consequence of the Authority to Baptize, or refuse to Baptize. For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance, of them that are to be received into the Kingdome of God; that is to say, into Eternall life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin: For as Eternall life was lost by the Committing, so it is recovered by the Remitting of mens Sins. The end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they that were converted by his Sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what they were to doe, advised them to "repent, and be Baptized in the name of Jesus, for the Remission of Sins." And therefore seeing to Baptize is to declare the Reception of men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to Baptize is to declare their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power to declare them Cast out, or Retained in it, was given to the same Apostles, and their Substitutes, and Successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them, saying, (John 20.22.) "Receive the Holy Ghost," hee addeth in the next verse, "Whose soever Sins ye Remit, they are Remitted unto them; and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are Retained." By which words, is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or Retain Sins, simply and absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them, who knoweth the Heart of man, and truth of his Penitence and Conversion; but conditionally, to the Penitent: And this Forgivenesse, or Absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned Repentance, is thereby without other act, or sentence of the Absolvent, made void, and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the contrary, to the Aggravation of his Sin. Therefore the Apostles, and their Successors, are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which appearing, they have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare not, they have no authority to Absolve. The same also is to be observed in Baptisme: for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the Apostles had not the Power to deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans Repentance, further than by externall

marks, taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to hypocrisie; another question will arise, Who it is that is constituted Judge of those marks. And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; (Mat. 18. 15, 16, 17.) “If thy Brother (saith he) shall trespasse against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee, and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one, or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church, let him be unto thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican.” By which it is manifest, that the Judgment concerning the truth of Repentance, belonged not to any one Man, but to the Church, that is, to the Assembly of the Faithfull, or to them that have authority to bee their Representant. But besides the Judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of Sentence: And this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or some Pastor of the Church, as Prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18 verse, “Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.” And comformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul (1 Cor. 5.3, 4, & 5.) where he saith, “For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, To deliver such a one to Satan;” that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose Sins are not Forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the Sentence; but the Assembly was first to hear the Cause, (for St. Paul was absent;) and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.) the Judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to the Assembly: “But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a Brother be a Fornicator, &c. with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to judg them that are without? Do not ye judg them that are within?” The Sentence therefore

by which a man was put out of the Church, was pronounced by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the Judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, (as the times were before the conversion of Kings, and men that had Soveraign Authority in the Common-wealth,) the Assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same City; as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the Christians of Corinth.

Of Excommunication

This part of the Power of the Keyes, by which men were thrust out from the Kingdome of God, is that which is called Excommunication; and to excommunicate, is in the Originall, Aposunagogon Poiein, To Cast Out Of The Synagogue; that is, out of the place of Divine service; a word drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their Synagogues, such as they thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as Lepers were by the Law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time as they should be by the Priest pronounced clean.

The Use Of Excommunication Without Civill Power.

The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they, who were not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been Christians; for with such they might eate, and drink; which with Excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (1 Cor. 5. ver. 9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to

“company with Fornicators;” but (because that could not bee without going out of the world,) he restraineth it to such Fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren; “with such a one” (he saith) they ought not to keep company, “no, not to eat.” And this is no more than our Saviour saith (Mat. 18.17.) “Let him be to thee as a Heathen, and as a Publican.” For Publicans (which signifieth Farmers, and Receivers of the revenue of the Common-wealth) were so hated, and detested by the Jews that were to pay for it, as that Publican and Sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing: Insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus a Publican; though it were to Convert him, yet it was objected to him as a Crime. And therefore, when our Saviour, to Heathen, added Publican, he did forbid them to eat with a man Excommunicate.

As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly, they had no Power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he were Christian, or Heathen. And because all places are by right, in the Dominion of the Common-wealth; as well hee that was Excommunicated, as hee that never was Baptized, might enter into them by Commission from the Civill Magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entred into their Synagogues at Damascus, (Acts 9.2.) to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by Commission from the High Priest.

Of No Effect Upon An Apostate

By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not assist the Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothing in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their unbeleef; nor of

dammage, because they returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved. The dammage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice.

But Upon The Faithfull Only

Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his Kingdom, to those whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those that were Excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is that St. Paul calleth Excommunication, a delivery of the Excommunicate person to Satan. For without the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment, are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan. This is it that the faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not Forgiven. Whereby wee may understand, that Excommunication in the time that Christian Religion was not authorized by the Civill Power, was used onely for a correction of manners, not of errours in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so beleeved, needed no other opinion, but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved.

For What Fault Lyeth Excommunication

There Lyeth Excommunication for Injustice; as (Mat. 18.) If thy Brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he obey not, “Let him be to thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican.” And there lyeth Excommunication for a Scandalous Life, as (1 Cor. 5. 11.) “If any man that is called a Brother, be a Fornicator, or Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard, or an Extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat.” But to Excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that Jesus Was The Christ, for difference of opinion in other points, by which that Foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (Titus 3.10.) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary. “A man that is an Haeretique, after the first and second admonition, reject.” For an Haeretique, is he, that being a member of the Church, teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion, which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, S. Paul adviseth Titus, after the first, and second admonition, to Reject. But to Reject (in this place) is not to Excommunicate the Man; But to Give Over Admonishing Him, To Let Him Alone, To Set By Disputing With Him, as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe. The same Apostle saith (2 Tim. 2.23.) “Foolish and unlearned questions avoid;” The word Avoid in this place, and Reject in the former, is the same in the Originall, paraitou: but Foolish questions may bee set by without Excommunication. And again, (Tit. 3.93) “Avoid Foolish questions,” where the Originall, periistaso, (set them by) is equivalent to the former word Reject. There is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance the Casting out of the Church faithfull men, such as beleeved the foundation, onely for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good & pious conscience. But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a Lesson to Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of

Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed well. S. Peter and S. Paul, though their controversie were great, (as we may read in Gal. 2.11.) yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. Neverthelesse, during the Apostles time, there were other Pastors that observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 John 9. &c.) who cast out of the Church, such as S. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in Praeeminence; so early it was, that Vainglory, and Ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.

Of Persons Liable To Excommunication

That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as First, that he be a member of some Commonalty, that is to say, of some lawfull Assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee Excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can bee no Excommunication; nor where there is no power to Judge, can there bee any power to give Sentence. From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be Excommunicated by another: For either they have equall power to Excommunicate each other, in which case Excommunication is not Discipline, nor an act of Authority, but Schisme, and Dissolution of charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part Excommunicated, is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individuall persons.

And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth an advice, not to keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is Excommunicate, if

a Soveraign Prince, or Assembly bee Excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. For all Subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by the law of Nature; nor can they lawfully either expell him from any place of his own Dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out of his Dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them to that honour,) refuse to eat with him. And as to other Princes and States, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the State Excommunicate: for the very Institution, as it uniteth many men into one Community; so it dissociateth one Community from another: so that Excommunication is not needfull for keeping Kings and States asunder; nor has any further effect then is in the nature of Policy it selfe; unlesse it be to instigate Princes to warre upon one another.

Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen, of any effect. For if he beleeve that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God" (1 Joh. 4.1.) "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God," (1 Joh. 4.15.) But hee that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God; hee in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication of men. Therefore, he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all the dangers threatned to persons Excommunicate. He that beleeveth it not, is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to Excommunication; Nor he also that is a professed Christian, till his Hypocrisy appear in his Manners, that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners, and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of Manners but by externall Actions, which Actions can never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the Law of the Common-wealth.

If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, yet are not the Children forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them; for that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey their Parents, and Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.

In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation in the world to come. And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: For to a Teacher that shall so complain, may be applyed the Answer of God to Samuel in the like place, (1 Sam. 8.) “They have not rejected thee, but mee.” Excommunication therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the Civill Power, as it doth, when a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate by a forain Authority, is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour. The name of Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, the Thunderbolt Of Excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the Heathen made Jupiter King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems, and Pictures, a Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants, that should dare to deny his power: Which imagination was grounded on two errours; one, that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviours owne words, “My Kingdome is not of this world;” the other, that hee is Christs Vicar, not onely over his

owne Subjects, but over all the Christians of the World; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place.

Of The Interpreter Of The Scriptures Before Civill Soveraigns Became Christians

St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews, (Acts 17.2, 3.) "As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ." The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the Word of God. Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and (as it is in the 5. ver.) some beleeved not. What was the reason, when they all beleeved the Scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the Interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one Interpreted them to himself? It was this; S. Paul came to them without any Legall Commission, and in the manner of one that would not Command, but Perswade; which he must needs do, either by Miracles, as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in Gods works; or by Reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word. But whosoever perswadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom hee speaketh Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scripture? If S. Paul, what needed he to quote

any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ. The Interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might beleeve, or not beleeve, according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged. And generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by expresse words (Deut. 17.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from the Priests and Judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to bee understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.

For the Conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging the Scriptures, which they beleeved not. The Apostles therefore laboured by Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done, to perswade them to the faith of Christ, by their testimony of his Life, and Resurrection. So that there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority to Interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to follow any mans Interpretation of any Scripture, except his Soveraigns Interpretation of the Laws of his countrey.

Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see what there was therein, that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to no other thing then to the Beleef of that which the Apostles preached: And the Apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the dead, and gone up into Heaven, and should come again one day to judg the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that himselfe, or any other

Apostle was such an Interpreter of the Scripture, as all that became Christians, ought to take their Interpretation for Law. For to Interpret the Laws, is part of the Administration of a present Kingdome; which the Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other Pastors ever since, “Let thy Kingdome come;” and exhorted their Converts to obey their then Ethnique Princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one Body. Every of the Evangelists was Interpreter of his own Gospel; and every Apostle of his own Epistle; And of the Old Testament, our Saviour himselfe saith to the Jews (John 5. 39.) “Search the Scriptures; for in them yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me.” If hee had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ; he would either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests.

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and Elders of the Church assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached, and taught, and how they should Interpret the Scriptures to the People; but took not from the People the liberty to read, and Interpret them to themselves. The Apostles sent divers Letters to the Churches, and other Writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them to Interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in the Apostles time, it must be till such time as there should be Pastors, that could authorise an Interpreter, whose Interpretation should generally be stood to: But that could not be till Kings were Pastors, or Pastors Kings.

Of The Power To Make Scripture Law

There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall; for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Counsellor to his friend, without power to Compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse Canons; because they are Rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely Rules, but Laws: The question therefore here, is of the Power to make the Scriptures (which are the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.

Of The Ten Commandements

That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten Commandements, written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by God himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no written Law of God, who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar Kingdome, had given no Law to men, but the Law of Nature, that is to say, the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart. Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of Soveraignty; 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other Nations, in these words, “Non habebis Deos alienos coram me,” that is, “Thou shalt not have for Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship; but onely me:” whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor, as their King and Governour, any other God, than him that spake unto them then by Moses, and afterwards by the High Priest. 2. That they “should not make any Image to represent him;” that is to say, they were not to choose to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any Representative of their own fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office.

3. That “they should not take the Name of God in vain;” that is, they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his Right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his Lieutenants. 4. That “they should every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour,” and employ that time in doing him Publique Honor. The second Table containeth the Duty of one man towards another, as “To honor Parents; Not to kill; Not to Commit Adultery; Not to steale; Not to corrupt Judgment by false witnesse;” and finally, “Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury one to another.” The question now is, Who it was that gave to these written Tables the obligatory force of Lawes. There is no doubt but that they were made Laws by God himselfe: But because a Law obliges not, nor is Law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the Soveraign, how could the people of Israel that were forbidden to approach the Mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them? Some of them were indeed the Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first Table, the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exod. 20.19.) “Speak them thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die.” It was therefore onely Moses then, and after him the High Priest, whom (by Moses) God declared should administer this his peculiar Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns. Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, or making of the Scripture Law, belonged to the Civill Soveraigne.

Of The Judicial, And Leviticall Law

The Judiciall Law, that is to say, the Laws that God prescribed to the Magistrates of Israel, for the rule of their administration of Justice, and of the Sentences, or Judgments they should pronounce, in Pleas between man and man; and the Leviticall Law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the Rites and Ceremonies of the Priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses onely; and therefore also became Lawes, by vertue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the People by Moses (after his forty dayes being with God in the Mount) by word of mouth, is not expressed in the Text; but they were all positive Laws, and equivalent to holy Scripture, and made Canonicall by Moses the Civill Soveraign.

The Second Law

After the Israelites were come into the Plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of Promise, Moses to the former Laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy: that is, Second Laws. And are (as it is written, Deut. 29.1.) “The words of a Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the Children of Israel, besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb.” For having explained those former Laws, in the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12. Cha. and continue to the end of the 26. of the same Book. This Law (Deut. 27.1.) they were commanded to write upon great stones playstered over, at their passing over Jordan: This Law also was written by Moses himself in a Book; and delivered into the hands of the “Priests, and to the Elders of Israel,” (Deut. 31.9.) and commanded (ve. 26.) “to be put in the side of the Arke;” for in

the Ark it selfe was nothing but the Ten Commandements. This was the Law, which Moses (Deuteronomy 17.18.) commanded the Kings of Israel should keep a copie of: And this is the Law, which having been long time lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received for the Law of God. But both Moses at the writing, and Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the Civill Soveraignty. Hitherto therefore the Power of making Scripture Canonicall, was in the Civill Soveraign.

Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other Book, from the time of Moses, till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the Law of God. For the Prophets (except a few) lived in the time of the Captivity it selfe; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from having their Prophecies generally received for Laws, as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false Prophets, and partly by the Kings which were seduced by them. And this Book it self, which was confirmed by Josiah for the Law of God, and with it all the History of the Works of God, was lost in the Captivity, and sack of the City of Jerusalem, as appears by that of 2 Esdras 14.21. “Thy Law is burnt; therefor no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, of the works that shall begin.” And before the Captivity, between the time when the Law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when Shishak King of Egypt took the spoils of the Temple,(1 Kings 14.26.)) and the time of Josiah, when it was found againe, they had no written Word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such, as each of them esteemed Prophets.

The Old Testament, When Made Canonicall

From whence we may inferre, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not Canonicall, nor a Law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their Covenant with God at their return from the Captivity, and restauration of their Common-wealth under Esdras. But from that time forward they were accounted the Law of the Jews, and for such translated into Greek by Seventy Elders of Judaea, and put into the Library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the Word of God. Now seeing Esdras was the High Priest, and the High Priest was their Civill Soveraigne, it is manifest, that the Scriptures were never made Laws, but by the Soveraign Civill Power.

The New Testament Began To Be Canonicall Under Christian Soveraigns By the Writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that Christian Religion was received, and authorised by Constantine the Emperour, we may find, that the Books wee now have of the New Testament, were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholique Church, and others Haeretiques) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost; and consequently for the Canon, or Rule of Faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of their Teachers; as generally the reverence that the Disciples bear to their first Masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when S. Paul wrote to the Churches he had converted; or any other Apostle, or Disciple of Christ, to those which had then embraced Christ, they received those their Writings for the true Christian Doctrine. But in that time, when not the Power and Authority of the Teacher, but the Faith of the Hearer caused them to receive it, it was not the Apostles that made their own Writings Canonicall, but every Convert made them so to himself.

But the question here, is not what any Christian made a Law, or Canon to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right he received it;) but

what was so made a Canon to them, as without injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be Canonicall, that is to say, a Law in any place where the Law of the Common-wealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a Law. For a Law, (as hath been already shewn) is the Commandement of that Man, or Assembly, to whom we have given Soveraign Authority, to make such Rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit; and to punish us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other Rules, which the Soveraign Ruler hath not prescribed, they are but Counsell, and Advice; which, whether good, or bad, hee that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to observe, and when contrary to the Laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say, he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men; though he may without blame beleeve the his private Teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely received for Law. For internall faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civil obedience, are injustice both before God and Man. Seeing then our Saviour hath denyed his Kingdome to be in this world, seeing he hath said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other Laws than those of the Common-wealth; that is, the Jews to the Law of Moses, (which he saith (Mat. 5.) he came not to destroy, but to fulfill,) and other Nations to the Laws of their severall Soveraigns, and all men to the Laws of Nature; the observing whereof, both he himselfe, and his Apostles have in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternall Kingdome, wherein shall be Protection, and Life everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour, and his Apostles, left not new Laws to oblige us in

this world, but new Doctrine to prepare us for the next; the Books of the New Testament, which containe that Doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded, by them that God hath given power to on earth to be Legislators, were not obligatory Canons, that is, Laws, but onely good, and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take, and refuse at his owne perill, without injustice.

Again, our Saviour Christs Commission to his Apostles, and Disciples, was to Proclaim his Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and to Teach all Nations; and to Baptize them that should beleeve; and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them; and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compell them to obedience by the Sword. In all which there is nothing of Power, but of Perswasion. He sent them out as Sheep unto Wolves, not as Kings to their Subjects. They had not in Commission to make Laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to Laws made; and consequently they could not make their Writings obligatory Canons, without the help of the Soveraign Civill Power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only Law, where the lawfull Civill Power hath made it so. And there also the King, or Soveraign, maketh it a Law to himself; by which he subjecteth himselfe, not to the Doctor, or Apostle, that converted him, but to God himself, and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the Apostles themselves.

Of The Power Of Councells To Make The Scripture Law

That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that have embraced Christian Doctrine, the force of Laws, in the times, and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their

Synods. For we read (Acts 15.28.) the stile of the Councell of the Apostles, the Elders, and the whole Church, in this manner, “It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things, &C.” which is a stile that signifieth a Power to lay a burthen on them that had received their Doctrine. Now “to lay a burthen on another,” seemeth the same that “to oblige;” and therefore the Acts of that Councell were Laws to the then Christians. Neverthelesse, they were no more Laws than are these other Precepts, “Repent, Be Baptized; Keep the Commandements; Beleeve the Gospel; Come unto me; Sell all that thou hast; Give it to the poor;” and “Follow me;” which are not Commands, but Invitations, and Callings of men to Christianity, like that of Esay 55.1. “Ho, every man that thirsteth, come yee to the waters, come, and buy wine and milke without money.” For first, the Apostles power was no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the Kingdome of God; which they themselves acknowledged for a Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and they that have no Kingdome, can make no Laws. And secondly, if their Acts of Councell, were Laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we read not any where, that they who received not the Doctrine of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the Laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned. And those Laws were the Laws of Nature, and the Civill Laws of the State, whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore by the Burthen, which the Apostles might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be understood Laws, but Conditions, proposed to those that sought Salvation; which they might accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being condemned, and excluded out of the Kingdome of God for their sins past. And therefore of Infidels, S. John saith not, the wrath of God shall “come” upon them, but “the wrath of God remaineth upon them;” and not that they shall be condemned; but that “they

are condemned already."(John 3.36, 3.18) Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of Faith, "is Remission of sins" unlesse we conceive withall, that the dammage of Infidelity, is "the Retention of the same sins."

But to what end is it (may some man aske), that the Apostles, and other Pastors of the Church, after their time, should meet together, to agree upon what Doctrine should be taught, both for Faith and Manners, if no man were obliged to observe their Decrees? To this may be answered, that the Apostles, and Elders of that Councell, were obliged even by their entrance into it, to teach the Doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught, so far forth, as no precedent Law, to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe, what they taught. For though they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their Assembly had had a Legislative Power; which none could have but Civill Soveraigns. For though God be the Soveraign of all the world, we are not bound to take for his Law, whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor any thing contrary to the Civill Law, which God hath expressely commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the Acts of Councell of the Apostles, were then no Laws, but Councells; much lesse are Laws the Acts of any other Doctors, or Councells since, if assembled without the Authority of the Civill Soveraign. And consequently, the Books of the New Testament, though most perfect Rules of Christian Doctrine, could not be made Laws by any other authority then that of Kings, or Soveraign Assemblies.

The first Councell, that made the Scriptures we now have, Canon, is not extant: For that Collection the first Bishop of Rome after S. Peter, is subject to question: For though the Canonicall books bee there reckoned up; yet these words, "Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libris venerandi, &c." containe a distinction of Clergy, and Laity, that was not in use so neer St.

Peters time. The first Councell for setling the Canonicall Scripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, Can. 59. which forbids the reading of other Books then those in the Churches; which is a Mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those onely that had authority to read any publiquely in the Church; that is, to Ecclesiastiques onely.

Of The Right Of Constituting Ecclesiasticall Officers In The Time Of The Apostles

Of Ecclesiastical Officers in the time of the Apostles, some were Magisteriall, some Ministeriall. Magisteriall were the Offices of preaching of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to Infidels; of administring the Sacraments, and Divine Service; and of teaching the Rules of Faith and Manners to those that were converted. Ministeriall was the Office of Deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the Church, at such time as they lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithfull.

Amongst the Officers Magisteriall, the first, and principall were the Apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himselfe; and their Office was not onely to Preach, Teach, and Baptize, but also to be Martyrs, (Witnesses of our Saviours Resurrection.) This Testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall mark; whereby the Apostleship was distinguished from other Magistracy Ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an Apostle, either to have seen our Saviour after his Resurrection, or to have conversed with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his Divinity, whereby they might be taken for sufficient Witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new Apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, S. Peter saith (Acts 1.21,22.) “Of

these men that have companyed with us, all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptisme of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection:" where, by this word Must, is implyed a necessary property of an Apostle, to have companyed with the first and prime Apostles in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.

Matthias Made Apostle By The Congregation.

The first Apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the time he was upon the Earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner: There were assembled together in Jerusalem about 120 Christians (Acts 1.15.) These appointed two, Joseph the Just, and Matthias (ver. 23.) and caused lots to be drawn; "and (ver. 26.) the Lot fell on Matthias and he was numbred with the Apostles." So that here we see the ordination of this Apostle, was the act of the Congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, otherwise then as Members of the Assembly.

Paul And Barnabas Made Apostles By The Church Of Antioch

After him there was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and Barnabas, which was done (as we read Acts 13.1,2,3.) in this manner. "There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certaine Prophets, and Teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministred unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said,

‘Separate mee Barnabas, and Saul for the worke whereunto I have called them.’ And when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away.”

By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost, their Calling was declared unto them, and their Mission authorized by the particular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the Apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (Acts 14.14.) Apostles: And that it was by vertue of this act of the Church of Antioch, that they were Apostles, S. Paul declareth plainly (Rom. 1.1.) in that hee useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling: For he stileth himself, “An Apostle separated unto the Gospel of God;” alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, “Separate me Barnabas and Saul, &c.” But seeing the work of an Apostle, was to be a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Christ, and man may here aske, how S. Paul that conversed not with our Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen. To which it is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to Damascus, from Heaven, after his Ascension; “and chose him for a vessell to bear his name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and Children of Israel;” and consequently (having seen the Lord after his passion) was a competent Witnesse of his Resurrection: And as for Barnabas, he was a Disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul, and Barnabas were Apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized (not by the first Apostles alone, but) by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was chosen, and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.

What Offices In The Church Are Magisteriall

Bishop, a word formed in our language, out of the Greek Episcopus, signifieth an overseer, or Superintendent of any businesse, and particularly a Pastor or Shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst the Jews that were originally Shepherds, but also amongst the Heathen, to signifie the Office of a King, or any other Ruler, or Guide of People, whether he ruled by Laws, or Doctrine. And so the Apostles were the first Christian Bishops, instituted by Christ himselfe: in which sense the Apostleship of Judas is called (Acts 1.20.) his Bishoprick. And afterwards, when there were constituted Elders in the Christian Churches, with charge to guide Christs flock by their doctrine, and advice; these Elders were also called Bishops. Timothy was an Elder (which word Elder, in the New Testament is a name of Office, as well as of Age;) yet he was also a Bishop. And Bishops were then content with the Title of Elders. Nay S. John himselfe, the Apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth his Second Epistle with these words, "The Elder to the Elect Lady." By which it is evident, that Bishop, Pastor, Elder, Doctor, that is to say, Teacher, were but so many divers names of the same Office in the time of the Apostles. For there was then no government by Coercion, but only by Doctrine, and Perswading. The Kingdome of God was yet to come, in a new world; so that there could be no authority to compell in any Church, till the Common-wealth had embraced the Christian Faith; and consequently no diversity of Authority, though there were diversity of Employments.

Besides these Magisteriall employments in the Church, namely Apostles, Bishops, Elders, Pastors, and Doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews, and Infidels, and to direct, and teach those that beleeved we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of Evangelists and Prophets, is not signified any Office, but severall Gifts, by which severall men were profitable to the Church: as Evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour; such as were S. Matthew and S. John Apostles, and S.

Marke and S. Luke Disciples, and whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as S. Thomas, and S. Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church have not received the Books that have gone under their names:) and as Prophets, by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall Revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of Languages, nor the gift of Casting out Devils, or of Curing other diseases, nor any thing else did make an Officer in the Church, save onely the due calling and election to the charge of Teaching.

Ordination Of Teachers

As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the Assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and Paul, and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the Presbyters, and Pastors in other Cities, elected by the Churches of those Cities. For proof whereof, let us consider, first, how S. Paul proceeded in the Ordination of Presbyters, in the Cities where he had converted men to the Christian Faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their Apostleship. We read (Acts 14.23.) that "they ordained Elders in every Church;" which at first sight may be taken for an Argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority: But if we consider the Originall text, it will be manifest, that they were authorized, and chosen by the Assembly of the Christians of each City. For the words there are, "cheirotonesantes autoispresbuterous kat ekklesian," that is, "When they had Ordained them Elders by the Holding up of Hands in every Congregation." Now it is well enough known, that in all those Cities, the manner of choosing Magistrates, and Officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and (because the ordinary way

of distinguishing the Affirmative Votes from the Negatives, was by Holding up of Hands) to ordain an Officer in any of the Cities, was no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of Votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessell marked for the Affirmative, or Negative; for divers Cities had divers customes in that point. It was therefore the Assembly that elected their own Elders: the Apostles were onely Presidents of the Assembly to call them together for such Election, and to pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called Consecration. And for this cause they that were Presidents of the Assemblies, as (in the absence of the Apostles) the Elders were, were called proestotes, and in Latin Antistities; which words signifie the Principall Person of the Assembly, whose office was to number the Votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the Votes were equall, to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the Office of a President in Councell. And (because all the Churches had their Presbyters ordained in the same manner,) where the word is Constitute, (as Titus 1.5.) “ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous,” “For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute Elders in every City,” we are to understand the same thing; namely, that hee should call the faithfull together, and ordain them Presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had been a strange thing, if in a Town, where men perhaps had never seen any Magistrate otherwise chosen then by an Assembly, those of the Town becomming Christians, should so much as have thought on any other way of Election of their Teachers, and Guides, that is to say, of their Presbyters, (otherwise called Bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages, intimated by S. Paul (Acts 14.23.) in the word Cheirotonesantes: Nor was there ever any choosing of Bishops, (before the Emperors found it

necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them,) but by the Assemblies of the Christians in every severall Town.

The same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day, in the Election of the Bishops of Rome. For if the Bishop of any place, had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the Pastorall Office, in any City, at such time as he went from thence, to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the Right, to appoint his successour in that place, in which he last resided and dyed: And we find not, that ever any Bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen by the People, as we may see by the sedition raised about the Election, between Damascus, and Ursinicus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great, that Juventius the Praefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to goe out of the City; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the Church it self. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole Clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the Cardinalls; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their successors, I think I may reasonably conclude, they had no right to appoint the new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to Teach, but to Command the Church; which none could doe, but the Civill Soveraign.

Ministers Of The Church What

The word Minister in the Originall Diakonos signifieth one that voluntarily doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from a Servant onely in this, that Servants are obliged by their condition, to what is commanded them; whereas Ministers are obliged onely by their undertaking, and bound

therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: So that both they that teach the Word of God, and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both Ministers, but they are Ministers of different Persons. For the Pastors of the Church, called (Acts 6.4.) “The Ministers of the Word,” are Ministers of Christ, whose Word it is: But the Ministery of a Deacon, which is called (verse 2. of the same Chapter) “Serving of Tables,” is a service done to the Church, or Congregation: So that neither any one man, nor the whole Church, could ever of their Pastor say, he was their Minister; but of a Deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each City on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the House of Prayer, or of the Revenue, or other worldly businesse of the Church, the whole Congregation might properly call him their Minister.

For their employment, as Deacons, was to serve the Congregation; though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the Gospel, and maintain the Doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as S. Steven did; and both to Preach, and Baptize, as Philip did: For that Philip, which (Act. 8. 5.) Preached the Gospel at Samaria, and (verse 38.) Baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For it is manifest (verse 1.) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem, and (verse 14.) “When they heard that Samaria had received the Word of God, sent Peter and John to them;” by imposition of whose hands, they that were Baptized (verse 15.) received (which before by the Baptisme of Philip they had not received) the Holy Ghost. For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that their Baptisme should be administred, or confirmed by a Minister of the Word, not by a Minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the Baptisme of those that Philip the Deacon had Baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter, and John; who conferred on them that before were but Baptized, those

graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true Beleevers; which what they were may be understood by that which S. Marke saith (cha.17.) “These signs follow them that beleeve in my Name; they shall cast out Devills; they shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up Serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; They shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.” This to doe, was it that Philip could not give; but the Apostles could, and (as appears by this place) effectually did to every man that truly beleeved, and was by a Minister of Christ himself Baptized: which power either Christs Ministers in this age cannot conferre, or else there are very few true Beleevers, or Christ hath very few Ministers.

And How Chosen What

That the first Deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by a Congregation of the Disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of Acts 6. where we read that the Twelve, after the number of Disciples was multiplyed, called them together, and having told them, that it was not fit that the Apostles should leave the Word of God, and serve tables, said unto them (verse 3.) “Brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdome, whom we may appoint over this businesse.” Here it is manifest, that though the Apostles declared them elected; yet the Congregation chose them; which also, (verse the fift) is more expressely said, where it is written, that “the saying pleased the multitude, and they chose seven, &c.”

Of Ecclesiasticall Revenue, Under The Law Of Moses

Under the Old Testament, the Tribe of Levi were onely capable of the Priesthood, and other inferiour Offices of the Church. The land was divided amongst the other Tribes (Levi excepted,) which by the subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph, into Ephraim and Manasses, were still twelve. To the Tribe of Levi were assigned certain Cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattell: but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their Brethren. Again, the Priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations, and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron (Numb. 18. 20.) “Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them, I am thy part, and thine inheritance amongst the Children of Israel.” For God being then King, and having constituted the Tribe of Levi to be his Publique Ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance, the Publique revenue, that is to say, the part that God had reserved to himself; which were Tythes, and Offerings: and that it is which is meant, where God saith, I am thine inheritance. And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of Clergy from Kleros, which signifieth Lot, or Inheritance; not that they were heirs of the Kingdome of God, more than other; but that Gods inheritance, was their maintenance. Now seeing in this time God himself was their King, and Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were his Lieutenants; it is manifest, that the Right of Tythes, and Offerings was constituted by the Civill Power.

After their rejection of God in the demand of a King, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the Right thereof was derived from that, that the Kings did never take it from them: for the Publique Revenue was at the disposing of him that was the Publique Person; and that (till the Captivity) was the King. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their Tythes as before to the Priest. Hitherto therefore Church Livings were determined by the Civill Soveraign.

In Our Saviours Time, And After

Of the maintenance of our Saviour, and his Apostles, we read onely they had a Purse, (which was carried by Judas Iscariot;) and, that of the Apostles, such as were Fisher-men, did sometimes use their trade; and that when our Saviour sent the Twelve Apostles to Preach, he forbad them “to carry Gold, and Silver, and Brasse in their purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire:” (Mat. 10. 9,10.) By which it is probable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was (ver. 8.) “freely to give, because they had freely received;” and their maintenance was the Free Gift of those that beleeved the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may adde, that which was contributed out of gratitude, by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned “Certain women (Luke 8. 2,3.) which had been healed of evill spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven Devills; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herods Steward; and Susanna, and many others, which ministred unto him of their substance.

After our Saviours Ascension, the Christians of every City lived in Common, (Acts 4. 34.) upon the mony which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty; for “whilest the Land remained (saith S. Peter to Ananias Acts 5.4.) was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?” which sheweth he needed not to have saved his land, nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, unlesse he had pleased. And as in the time of the Apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we shall find, that the maintenance of the Bishops, and Pastors of the Christian Church, was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their Doctrine. There was yet no

mention of Tythes: but such was in the time of Constantine, and his Sons, the affection of Christians to their Pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith (describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinicus about the Bishopricke,) that it was worth their contention, in that the Bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of Matrons, lived splendidly, were carryed in Coaches, and sumptuous in their fare and apparell.

The Ministers Of The Gospel Lived On The Benevolence Of Their Flocks But here may some ask, whether the Pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon almes, "For who (saith S. Paul 1 Cor. 9. 7.) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eatheth not of the milke of the flock?" And again, (1 Cor. 9. 13.) "Doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the Temple; and they which wait at the Altar, partake with the Altar;" that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the Altar for their maintenance? And then he concludeth, "Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel. From which place may be inferred indeed, that the Pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the Pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own Carvers. Their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude, and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole Congregation. By the whole Congregation it could not be, because their Acts were then no Laws: Therefore the maintenance of Pastors, before Emperours and Civill Soveraigns had made Laws to settle it, was nothing but Benevolence. They that served at the Altar lived on what was offered. In what court should they sue for it, who had no Tribunalls? Or if they had Arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their Judgments, when they had no power to arme their Officers? It remaineth therefore, that there could be no certaine maintenance assigned to any Pastors of the Church, but

by the whole Congregation; and then onely, when their Decrees should have the force (not onely of Canons, but also) of Laws; which Laws could not be made, but by Emperours, Kings, or other Civill Soveraignes. The Right of Tythes in Moses Law, could not be applyed to the then Ministers of the Gospell; because Moses and the High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns of the people under God, whose Kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdome of God by Christ is yet to come.

Hitherto hath been shewn what the Pastors of the Church are; what are the points of their Commission (as that they were to Preach, to Teach, to Baptize, to be Presidents in their severall Congregations;) what is Ecclesiasticall Censure, viz. Excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the Civill Laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the Excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the Civill Law commanded, a putting the Excommunicate out of the Congregations of Christians; who elected the Pastors and Ministers of the Church, (that it was, the Congregation); who consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the Pastor); what was their due revenue, (that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout and gratefull Christians). We are to consider now, what Office those persons have, who being Civill Soveraignes, have embraced also the Christian Faith.

The Civill Soveraign Being A Christian Hath The Right Of Appointing Pastors

And first, we are to remember, that the Right of Judging what Doctrines are fit for Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is in all Common-wealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved cha. 18.) to the Soveraign

Power Civill, whether it be in one Man, or in one Assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the Good, or Evill, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the Soveraign Power, will bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the Laws, and thereby overthrow the Common-wealth, and introduce confusion, and Civill war; for the avoiding whereof, all Civill Government was ordained. And therefore in all Common-wealths of the Heathen, the Soveraigns have had the name of Pastors of the People, because there was no Subject that could lawfully Teach the people, but by their permission and authority.

This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who never ordained, that Kings for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or (which is all one) be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of Peace amongst their Subjects, and for their defence against foraign Enemies. And therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what Pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the People committed to their charge.

Again, let the right of choosing them be (as before the conversion of Kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles themselves (as hath been shewn already in this chapter); even so also the Right will be in the Civill Soveraign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allowes the Teaching; and in that he is the Soveraign (which is as much as to say, the Church by Representation,) the Teachers hee elects, are elected by the Church. And when an Assembly of Christians choose their Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, it is the Soveraign that electeth him, because tis done by his Authority; In the same manner, as when a Town choose their Maior, it is the act of him that hath the Soveraign Power: For every act

done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of History, concerning the Election of Pastors, by the People, or by the Clergy, they are no arguments against the Right of any Civill Soveraign, because they that elected them did it by his Authority.

Seeing then in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civill Soveraign is the Supreme Pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his Subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority, that all other Pastors are made, and have power to teach, and performe all other Pastorall offices; it followeth also, that it is from the Civill Soveraign, that all other Pastors derive their right of Teaching, Preaching, and other functions pertaining to that Office; and that they are but his Ministers; in the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, Judges in Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies, are all but Ministers of him that is the Magistrate of the whole Common-wealth, Judge of all Causes, and Commander of the whole Militia, which is alwayes the Civill Soveraign. And the reason hereof, is not because they that Teach, but because they that are to Learn, are his Subjects. For let it be supposed, that a Christian King commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions to another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power to the Pope;) he doth not thereby constitute a Pastor over himself, nor a Soveraign Pastor over his People; for that were to deprive himself of the Civill Power; which depending on the opinion men have of their Duty to him, and the fear they have of Punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill, and loyalty of Doctors, who are no lesse subject, not only to Ambition, but also to Ignorance, than any other sort of men. So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the

recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.

The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only Is De Jure Divino, That Of Other Pastors Is Jure Civili

If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office, as the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21.23.) asked our Saviour, “By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority:” he can make no other just Answer, but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by the King, or Assembly that representeth it. All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Jure Civili. But the King, and every other Soveraign executeth his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, In Gods Right, or Jure Divino. And therefore none but Kings can put into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely) Dei Gratia Rex, &c. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, “By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse;” or as Civill Ministers, “In his Majesties Name.” For in saying, Divina Providentia, which is the same with Dei Gratia, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.

Christian Kings Have Power To Execute All Manner Of Pastoral Function

But if every Christian Soveraign be the Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the Authority, not only to Preach (which perhaps no man will deny;) but also to Baptize, and to Administer the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; and to Consecrate both Temples, and Pastors to Gods service; which most men deny; partly because they use not to do it; and partly because the Administration of Sacraments, and Consecration of Persons, and Places to holy uses, requireth the Imposition of such mens hands, as by the like Imposition successively from the time of the Apostles have been ordained to the like Ministery. For proof therefore that Christian Kings have power to Baptize, and to Consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use not to doe it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of Imposition of hands, they are made capable of doing it, when they will.

There is no doubt but any King, in case he were skilfull in the Sciences, might by the same Right of his Office, read Lectures of them himself, by which he authorizeth others to read them in the Universities. Neverthelesse, because the care of the summe of the businesse of the Common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to apply himself in Person to that particular. A King may also if he please, sit in Judgment, to hear and determine all manner of Causes, as well as give others authority to doe it in his name; but that the charge that lyeth upon him of Command and Government, constrain him to bee continually at the Helm, and to commit the Ministeriall Offices to others under him. In the like manner our Saviour (who surely had power to Baptize) Baptized none himselfe, but sent his Apostles and Disciples to Baptize. (John 4.2.) So also S. Paul, by the necessity of Preaching in divers and far distant places, Baptized few: Amongst all the Corinthians he Baptized only Crispus, Cajus, and Stephanus; (1 Cor.1.14,16.) and the reason was, because his principall

Charge was to Preach. (1 Cor. 1.17.) Whereby it is manifest, that the greater Charge, (such as is the Government of the Church,) is a dispensation for the lesse. The reason therefore why Christian Kings use not to Baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at this day there are few Baptized by Bishops, and by the Pope fewer.

And as concerning Imposition of Hands, whether it be needfull, for the authorizing of a King to Baptize, and Consecrate, we may consider thus.

Imposition of Hands, was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob in blessing the children of Joseph (Gen. 48.14.) "Laid his right Hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left Hand on Manasseh the first born;" and this he did Wittingly (though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the Burnt offering, Aaron is commanded (Exod. 29.10.) "to Lay his Hands on the head of the bullock;" and (ver. 15.) "to Lay his Hand on the head of the ramme." The same is also said again, Levit. 1.4. & 8.14. Likewise Moses when he ordained Joshua to be Captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to Gods service, (Numb. 27.23.) "Laid his hands upon him, and gave him his Charge," designing and rendring certain, who it was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites (Numb. 8.10.) God commanded that "the Children of Israel should Put their Hands upon the Levites." And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord (Levit. 24.14.) God commanded that "all that heard him should Lay their Hands on his head, and that all the Congregation should stone him." And why should they only that heard him, Lay their Hands upon him, and not rather a Priest, Levite, or other Minister of Justice, but that none else were able to design, and demonstrate to the eyes of the

Congregation, who it was that had blasphemed, and ought to die? And to design a man, or any other thing, by the Hand to the Eye is lesse subject to mistake, than when it is done to the Eare by a Name.

And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole Congregation at once, which cannot be done by Laying on of Hands, yet "Aaron (Levit. 9.22.) did lift up his Hand towards the people when he blessed them." And we read also of the like ceremony of Consecration of Temples amongst the Heathen, as that the Priest laid his Hands on some post of the Temple, all the while he was uttering the words of Consecration. So naturall it is to design any individuall thing, rather by the Hand, to assure the Eyes, than by Words to inform the Eare in matters of Gods Publique service.

This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviours time. For Jairus (Mark 5.23.) whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour (not to heal her, but) "to Lay his Hands upon her, that shee might bee healed." And (Matth. 19.13.) "they brought unto him little children, that hee should Put his Hands on them, and Pray."

According to this ancient Rite, the Apostles, and Presbyters, and the Presbytery it self, Laid Hands on them whom they ordained Pastors, and withall prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall, and religious designation of the person, ordained either to the Pastorall Charge in general, or to a particular Mission: so (Act. 6.6.) "The Apostles Prayed, and Laid their Hands" on the seven Deacons; which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before thy were chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3.) but to design them to that Office. And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (Act. 8.17.)" and laid their Hands on them, and they

received the Holy Ghost." And not only an Apostle, but a Presbyter had this power: For S. Paul adviseth Timothy (1 Tim. 5.22.) "Lay Hands suddenly on no man;" that is, designe no man rashly to the Office of a Pastor. The whole Presbytery Laid their Hands on Timothy, as we read 1 Tim. 4.14. but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the Presbytery, and most likely their Proestos, or Prolocutor, which it may be was St. Paul himself. For in his 2 Epist. to Tim. ver. 6. he saith to him, "Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by the Laying on of my Hands:" where note by the way, that by the Holy ghost, is not meant the third Person in the Trinity, but the Gifts necessary to the Pastorall Office. We read also, that St. Paul had Imposition of Hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus (Acts 9.17,18.) at the time of his Baptisme; and again (Acts 13.3.) at Antioch, when he was first sent out to Preach. The use then of this ceremony considered in the Ordination of Pastors, was to design the Person to whom they gave such Power. But if there had been then any Christian, that had had the Power of Teaching before; the Baptizing of him, that is the making of him a Christian, had given him no new Power, but had onely caused him to preach true Doctrine, that is, to use his Power aright; and therefore the Imposition of Hands had been unnecessary; Baptisme it selfe had been sufficient. But every Soveraign, before Christianity, had the power of Teaching, and Ordaining Teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new Right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and consequently they needed no Imposition of Hands (besides that which is done in Baptisme) to authorize them to exercise any part of the Pastorall Function, as namely, to Baptize, and Consecrate. And in the Old Testament, though the Priest only had right to Consecrate, during the time that the Soveraignty was in the High Priest; yet it was not so when the Soveraignty was in the King: For we read (1 Kings 8.) That Solomon Blessed the People, Consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that Publique Prayer,

which is the pattern now for Consecration of all Christian Churches, and Chappels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of Ecclesiasticall Government; but also of exercising Ecclesiasticall Functions.

The Civill Soveraigne If A Christian, Is Head Of The Church In His Own Dominions

From this consolidation of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique in Christian Soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of Power over their Subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of mens externall actions, both in Policy, and Religion; and may make such Laws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own Subjects, both as they are the Common-wealth, and as they are the Church: for both State, and Church are the same men.

If they please therefore, they may (as many Christian Kings now doe) commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them, and exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion Jure Civili, in the Right of the Civill Soveraign; not Jure Divino, in Gods Right; and may therefore be discharged of that Office, when the Soveraign for the good of his Subjects shall think it necessary. They may also if they please, commit the care of Religion to one Supreme Pastor, or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests, or Presbyters, they will; and make such Laws for their maintenance, either by Tithes, or otherwise, as they please, so they doe it out of a sincere conscience, of which God onely is the Judge. It is the Civill Soveraign, that is to appoint Judges, and Interpreters of the Canonicall Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them Laws.

It is he also that giveth strength to Excommunications; which but for such Laws and Punishments, as may humble obstinate Libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would bee contemned. In summe, he hath the Supreme Power in all causes, as well Ecclesiasticall, as Civill, as far as concerneth actions, and words, for these onely are known, and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no Judg at all, but God, that knoweth the heart. And these Rights are incident to all Soveraigns, whether Monarchs, or Assemblies: for they that are the Representants of a Christian People, are Representants of the Church: for a Church, and a Common-wealth of Christian People, are the same thing.

Cardinal Bellarmines Books De Summo Pontifice Considered

Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this Book, seem cleer enough for the asserting of the Supreme Ecclesiasticall Power to Christian Soveraigns; yet because the Pope of Romes challenge to that Power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as is possible, by Cardinall Bellarmine, in his Controversie De Summo Pontifice; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds, and strength of his Discourse.

The First Book

Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three Questions: One, Which is simply the best government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixt of all there: Another, which of these is the best

Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should most participate of Monarchy: the third, whether in this mixt Monarchy, St. Peter had the place of Monarch. Concerning his first Conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute. In Monarchy there is but One Man Supreme; and all other men that have any kind of Power in the State, have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme Assembly, with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to the Monarch, which is not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the Divine positive Law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he have the Civill Soveraignty,) what kind of Government is the best; because their Calling is not to govern men by Commandement, but to teach them, and perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught. For Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of Masters of Families, not three sorts of Schoolmasters for their children.

And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power without his own Dominions: For in all other Common-wealths his Power (if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.

For the third Conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was Monarch of the Church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of S. Matth. (cha.18,

19.) “Thou art Peter, And upon this rock I will build my Church, &c. And I will give thee the keyes of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven.” Which place well considered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one onely Article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all the Apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited; which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing but this Article of Faith, “that he was the Christ;” all other Articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that. John began first, (Mat. 3.2.) preaching only this, “The Kingdome of God is at hand.” Then our Saviour himself (Mat. 4.17.) preached the same: And to his Twelve Apostles, when he gave them their Commission (Mat. 10.7.) there is no mention of preaching any other Article but that. This was the fundamentall Article, that is the Foundation of the Churches Faith. Afterwards the Apostles being returned to him, he asketh them all, (Mat. 16.13) not Peter onely, “Who men said he was;” and they answered, that “some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the Prophets:” Then (ver. 15.) he asked them all again, (not Peter onely) “Whom say yee that I am?” Therefore Peter answered (for them all) “Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God;” which I said is the Foundation of the Faith of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying, “Upon this stone I will build my Church;” By which it is manifest, that by the Foundation-Stone of the Church, was meant the Fundamentall Article of the Churches Faith. But why then (will some object) doth our Saviour interpose these words, “Thou art Peter”? If the originall of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared: We are therefore to consider, that the Apostle Simon, was surnamed Stone, (which is the signification of the Syriacke word Cephas,

and of the Greek word Petrus). Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that Fundamentall Article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, Thou art "Stone," and upon this Stone I will build my Church: which is as much as to say, this Article, that "I am the Christ," is the Foundation of all the Faith I require in those that are to bee members of my Church: Neither is this allusion to a name, an unusuall thing in common speech: But it had been a strange, and obscure speech, if our Saviour intending to build his Church on the Person of St. Peter, had said, "thou art a Stone, and upon this Stone I will build my Church," when it was so obvious without ambiguity to have said, "I will build my Church on thee; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name.

And for the following words, "I will give thee the Keyes of Heaven, &c." it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his Disciples (Matth. 18.18.) "Whatsoever yee shall bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven. And whatsoever ye shall loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven." But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the Power here granted belongs to all Supreme Pastors; such as are all Christian Civill Soveraignes in their own Dominions. In so much, as if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him, and to acknowledge his Kingdome; yet because his Kingdome is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else hee must have deprived him of the Soveraignty, to which the Right of Teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in refutation of his first Book, wherein hee would prove St. Peter to have been the Monarch Universall of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.

The Second Book

The second Book hath two Conclusions: One, that S. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and there dyed: The other, that the Popes of Rome are his Successors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them to be true; yet if by Bishop of Rome bee understood either the Monarch of the Church, or the Supreme Pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine (who was the first Christian Emperour) was that Bishop; and as Constantine, so all other Christian Emperors were of Right supreme Bishops of the Roman Empire; I say of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendome: For other Christian Soveraigns had the same Right in their severall Territories, as to an Office essentially adhaerent to their Soveraignty. Which shall serve for answer to his second Book.

The Third Book

In the third Book, he handleth the question whether the Pope be Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense that Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist, to contradict the Authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised in the Dominions of any other Prince, or State.

It is evident that the Prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the time of Samuel, when they required a King after the manner of other Nations. This expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious to the Imposture of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the Kingdome, and the art to deceive the People by counterfeit miracles, by hypocriticall life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles forewarned men of False Prophets, and of False Christs. False Christs, are

such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and are called properly Antichrists, in such sense, as when there happeneth a Schisme in the Church by the election of two Popes, the one calleth the other Antipapa, or the false Pope. And therefore Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essentiall marks; One, that he denyeth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee Christ. The first Mark is set down by S. John in his 1 Epist. 4. ch. 3. ver. “Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; And this is the Spirit of Antichrist.” The other Mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour, (Mat. 24.5.) “Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ;” and again, “If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, there is Christ beleeve it not.” And therefore Antichrist must be a False Christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ. And out of these two Marks, “to deny Jesus to be the Christ,” and to “affirm himselfe to be the Christ,” it followeth, that he must also be an “Adversary of the true Christ,” which is another usuall signification of the word Antichrist. But of these many Antichrists, there is one speciall one, O Antichristos, The Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certaine person; not indefinitely An Antichrist. Now seeing the Pope of Rome, neither pretendeth himself, nor denyeth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to be His Lieutenant, or Vicar Generall, but to be Hee. There is also some Mark of the time of this speciall Antichrist, as (Mat. 24.15.) when that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel, (Dan. 9. 27.) shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, (ver. 22.) “no flesh could be saved; but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened” (made fewer). But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the Sun and Moon, a

falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour, in the cloudes. And therefore The Antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many Popes are both come and gone. It is true, the Pope in taking upon him to give Laws to all Christian Kings, and Nations, usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not As Christ, but as For Christ, wherein there is nothing of the Antichrist.

The Fourth Book

In the fourth Book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme Judg in all questions of Faith and Manners, (which is as much as to be the absolute Monarch of all Christians in the world,) be bringeth three Propositions: The first, that his Judgments are Infallible: The second, that he can make very Laws, and punish those that observe them not: The third, that our Saviour conferred all Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall on the Pope of Rome.

Texts For The Infallibility Of The Popes Judgement In Points Of Faith

For the Infallibility of his Judgments, he alledgeth the Scriptures: and first, that of Luke 22.31. “Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that hee may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith faile not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy Brethren.” This, according to Bellarmines exposition, is, that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two priviledges: one, that neither his Faith should fail, neither he, nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning Faith, or Manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope: Which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that with attention readeth that chapter,

shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture, that maketh more against the Popes Authority, than this very place. The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passeover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the Passeover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his Apostles, which he said, till the Kingdome of God was come hee would doe no more; and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him: Hereupon they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall (seeing the next Passeover their Master would celebrate should be when he was King) entred into a contention, who should then be the greater man. Our Saviour therefore told them, that the Kings of the Nations had Dominion over their Subjects, and are called by a name (in Hebrew) that signifies Bountifull; but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one another; I ordain you a Kingdome, but it is such as my Father hath ordained mee; a Kingdome that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse till my second coming; then yee shall eat and drink at my Table, and sit on Thrones, judging the twelve Tribes of Israel: And then addressing himself to St. Peter, he saith, Simon, Simon, Satan seeks by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; Thou therefore (Note this,) being converted, and understanding my Kingdome as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy Brethren: To which S. Peter answered (as one that no more expected any authority in this world) “Lord I am ready to goe with thee, not onely to Prison, but to Death.” Whereby it is manifest, S. Peter had not onely no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the other Apostles, that they also should have none. And for the Infallibility of St. Peters sentence definitive in matter of Faith, there is no more to be attributed to it out of this Text, than that Peter should continue in the beleef of this point, namely, that Christ should come again, and possesse the Kingdome at the day of Judgement; which was not given

by the Text to all his Successors; for wee see they claim it in the World that now is.

The second place is that of Matth. 16. “Thou art Peter, and upon this rocke I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it.” By which (as I have already shewn in this chapter) is proved no more, than that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely this, That Jesus Is Christ The Sonne Of God.

The third text is John 21. ver. 16,17. “Feed my sheep;” which contains no more but a Commission of Teaching: And if we grant the rest of the Apostles to be contained in that name of Sheep; then it is the supreme Power of Teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were no Christian Soveraigns already possessed of that Supremacy. But I have already proved, that Christian Soveraignes are in their owne Dominions the supreme Pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue of their being Baptized, though without other Imposition of Hands. For such imposition being a Ceremony of designing the person, is needlesse, when hee is already designed to the Power of Teaching what Doctrine he will, by his institution to an Absolute Power over his Subjects. For as I have proved before, Soveraigns are supreme Teachers (in generall) by their Office and therefore oblige themselves (by their Baptisme) to teach the Doctrine of Christ: And when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it at the perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the Heads of Families that God will require the account of the instruction of his Children and Servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith (Gen. 18.19) “I know him that he will command his Children, and his houshold after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgement.

The fourth place is that of Exod. 28.30. “Thou shalt put in the Breastplate of Judgment, the Urim and the Thummin:” which hee saith is

interpreted by the Septuagint, delosin kai aletheian, that is, Evidence and Truth: And thence concludeth, God had given Evidence, and Truth, (which is almost infallibility,) to the High Priest. But be it Evidence and Truth it selfe that was given; or be it but Admonition to the Priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the High Priest, it was given to the Civill Soveraign: For next under God was the High Priest in the Common-wealth of Israel; and is an argument for Evidence and Truth, that is, for the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy of Civill Soveraigns over their own Subjects, against the pretended Power of the Pope. These are all the Texts hee bringeth for the Infallibility of the Judgement of the Pope, in point of Faith.

Texts For The Same In Point Of Manners

For the Infallibility of his Judgment concerning Manners, hee bringeth one Text, which is that of John 16.13. “When the Spirit of truth is come, hee will lead you into all truth” where (saith he) by All Truth, is meant, at least, All Truth Necessary To Salvation. But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more Infallibility to the Pope, than to any man that professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned: For if any man erre in any point, wherein not to erre is necessary to Salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that onely is necessary to Salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these are, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the Chapter following. In this place I say no more, but that though it were granted, the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any Jurisdiction in the Dominions of another Prince, unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions

the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another.

Besides the Text, he argueth from Reason, thus, If the Pope could erre in necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Churches Salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Popes directions. But this Reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when, and where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope: Nay granting whatsoever was given to S. Peter was given to the Pope; yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St. Peter, no man can bee just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to those of his lawfull Soveraign.

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himselfe, that he is the Civill Soveraign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his Jurisdiction in point of Manners. For the Civill Soveraignty, and supreme Judicature in controversies of Manners, are the same thing: And the Makers of Civill Laws, are not onely Declarers, but also Makers of the justice, and injustice of actions; there being nothing in mens Manners that makes them righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity with the Law of the Soveraign. And therefore when the Pope challengeth Supremacy in controversies of Manners, hee teacheth men to disobey the Civill Soveraign; which is an erroneous Doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Saviour and his Apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.

To prove the Pope has Power to make Laws, he alledgeth many places; as first, Deut. 17.12. “The man that will doe presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the Priest, (that standeth to Minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the Judge,) even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from Israel.” For answer whereunto, we are to remember that the High Priest (next and immediately under God) was the Civill Soveraign;

and all Judges were to be constituted by him. The words alledged sound therefore thus. “The man that will presume to disobey the Civill Soveraign for the time being, or any of his Officers in the execution of their places, that man shall die, &c.” which is cleerly for the Civill Soveraignty, against the Universall power of the Pope.

Secondly, he alledgeth that of Matth. 16. “Whatsoever yee shall bind, &c.” and interpreteth it for such Binding as is attributed (Matth. 23.4.) to the Scribes and Pharisees, “They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be born, and lay them on mens shoulders;” by which is meant (he sayes) Making of Laws; and concludes thence, the Pope can make Laws. But this also maketh onely for the Legislative power of Civill Soveraigns: For the Scribes, and Pharisees sat in Moses Chaire, but Moses next under God was Soveraign of the People of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say, but not all that they should do. That is, to obey their Laws, but not follow their Example.

The third place, is John 21.16. “Feed my sheep;” which is not a Power to make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.

The fourth place John 20.21. is against him. The words are, “As my Father sent me, so send I you.” But our Saviour was sent to Redeem (by his Death) such as should Beleeve; and by his own, and his Apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his Kingdome; which he himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though hee refused (Acts 1.6,7.) to tell his Apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles shall sit on twelve Thrones (every one perhaps as high as that of St. Peter) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the Father sent not our Saviour to make Laws in this present world, wee may conclude from the Text, that

neither did our Saviour send S. Peter to make Laws here, but to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith; and in the mean time, if Subjects, to obey their Princes; and if Princes, both to beleeve it themselves, and to do their best to make their Subjects doe the same; which is the Office of a Bishop. Therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy to the Civill Soveraignty, contrary to that which Cardinall Bellarmine alledgeth it for.

The fift place is Acts 15.28. “It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things, that yee abstaine from meats offered to Idols, and from bloud, and from things strangled, and from fornication.” Here hee notes the word Laying Of Burdens for the Legislative Power. But who is there, that reading this Text, can say, this stile of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving Counsell, as in making Laws? The stile of a Law is, We Command: But, We Think Good, is the ordinary stile of them, that but give Advice; and they lay a Burthen that give Advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: And such is the Burthen, of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute, but in case they will not erre. I have shewn before (cha.) that Law, is distinguished from Counsell, in this, that the reason of a Law, is taken from the designe, and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a Counsell, from the designe, and benefit of him, to whom the Counsell is given. But here, the Apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their Salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or not. And therefore the Acts of this Councell, were not Laws, but Counsells.

The sixt place is that of Rom. 13. “Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God;” which is meant, he saith not onely of Secular, but also of Ecclesiasticall Princes. To which I answer,

first, that there are no Ecclesiasticall Princes but those that are also Civill Soveraignes; and their Principalities exceed not the compasse of their Civill Soveraignty; without those bounds though they may be received for Doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for Princes. For if the Apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own Princes, and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, “to serve two Masters.” And though the Apostle say in another place, “I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpnesse, according to the Power which the Lord hath given me;” it is not, that he challenged a Power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are Punishments; but onely to Excommunicate, which (without the Civill Power) is no more but a leaving of their company, and having no more to doe with them, than with a Heathen man, or a Publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the Excommunicant, than to the Excommunicate.

The seventh place is 1 Cor. 4.21. “Shall I come unto you with a Rod, or in love, and the spirit of lenity?” But here again, it is not the Power of a Magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a Rod; but onely the Power of Excommunication, which is not in its owne nature a Punishment, but onely a Denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of his Kingdome, at the day of Judgment. Nor then also shall it bee properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject that hath broken the Law; but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth the Right of our Saviour to the Kingdome: And therefore this proveth not the Legislative Power of any Bishop, that has not also the Civill Power.

The eighth place is, Timothy 3.2. “A Bishop must be the husband but of one wife, vigilant, sober, &c.” which he saith was a Law. I thought that none could make a Law in the Church, but the Monarch of the Church, St. Peter. But suppose this Precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see

no reason why to call it a Law, rather than an Advice, seeing Timothy was not a Subject, but a Disciple of St. Paul; nor the flock under the charge of Timothy, his Subjects in the Kingdome, but his Scholars in the Schoole of Christ: If all the Precepts he giveth Timothy, be Laws, why is not this also a Law, “Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy healths sake”? And why are not also the Precepts of good Physitians, so many Laws? but that it is not the Imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute Subjection to a Person, that maketh his Precept Laws.

In like manner, the ninth place, 1 Tim. 5. 19. “Against an Elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three Witnesses,” is a wise Precept, but not a Law.

The tenth place is, Luke 10.16. “He that heareth you, heareth mee; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me.” And there is no doubt, but he that despiseth the Counsell of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the Counsell of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by Christ, but such as are ordained Pastors by lawfull Authority? and who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the Soveraign Pastor? and who is ordained by the Soveraign Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not ordained by the authority of the Soveraign thereof? Out of this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his Soveraign being a Christian, heareth Christ; and hee that despiseth the Doctrine which his King being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the Doctrine of Christ (which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary). But all this is nothing to a Law. Nay more, a Christian King, as a Pastor, and Teacher of his Subjects, makes not thereby his Doctrines Laws. He cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as a Civill Soveraign he may make Laws suitable to his Doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are Laws; and the

externall actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the Soveraign, and not of the Subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his owne at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.

The eleventh, is every place, where the Apostle for Counsell, putteth some word, by which men use to signifie Command; or calleth the following of his Counsell, by the name of Obedience. And therefore they are alledged out of 1 Cor. 11.2. “I commend you for keeping my Precepts as I delivered them to you.” The Greek is, “I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them.” Which is far from signifying that they were Laws, or any thing else, but good Counsell. And that of 1 Thess. 4.2. “You know what commandements we gave you:” where the Greek word is paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to paredokamen, what wee delivered to you, as in the place next before alledged, which does not prove the Traditions of the Apostles, to be any more than Counsells; though as is said in the 8th verse, “he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but God”: For our Saviour himself came not to Judge, that is, to be King in this world; but to Sacrifice himself for Sinners, and leave Doctors in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the Law produceth,) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of Laws, but of Counsell, and Doctrine.

And that of 2 Thess. 3.14. “If any man Obey not our word by this Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee ashamed”: where from the word Obey, he would inferre, that this Epistle was a Law to the Thessalonians. The Epistles of the Emperours were indeed Laws. If therefore the Epistle of S. Paul were also a Law, they were to obey two Masters. But the word Obey, as it is in the Greek upakouei, signifieth Hearkening To, or Putting In Practice, not onely that which is Commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is delivered in a way of

Counsell for our good; and therefore St. Paul does not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which Legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may bee ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the Empire of an Apostle, but his Reputation amongst the Faithfull, which the Christians stood in awe of.

The last place is that of Heb. 13.17. “Obey your Leaders, and submit your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account:” And here also is intended by Obedience, a following of their Counsell: For the reason of our Obedience, is not drawn from the will and command of our Pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the Salvation of our Souls they watch for, and not for the Exaltation of their own Power, and Authority. If it were meant here, that all they teach were Laws, then not onely the Pope, but every Pastor in his Parish should have Legislative Power. Again, they that are bound to obey, their Pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall wee say to St. John who bids us (1 Epist. cha. ver. 1.) “Not to beleeve every Spirit, but to try the Spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world”? It is therefore manifest, that wee may dispute the Doctrine of our Pastors; but no man can dispute a Law. The Commands of Civill Soveraigns are on all sides granted to be Laws: if any else can make a Law besides himselfe, all Common-wealth, and consequently all Peace, and Justice must cease; which is contrary to all Laws, both Divine and Humane. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places of Scripture, to prove the Decrees of the Pope, where he has not also the Civill Soveraignty, to be Laws.

The Question Of Superiority Between The Pope And Other Bishops The last point hee would prove, is this, “That our Saviour Christ has committed Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope.” Wherein he handleth not the Question of Supremacy between the Pope and Christian

Kings, but between the Pope and other Bishops. And first, he sayes it is agreed, that the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is at least in the generall De Jure Divino, that is, in the Right of God; for which he alledges S. Paul, Ephes. 4.11. where hee sayes, that Christ after his Ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men, some Apostles, some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors, and some Teachers:" And thence inferres, they have indeed their Jurisdiction in Gods Right; but will not grant they have it immediately from God, but derived through the Pope. But if a man may be said to have his Jurisdiction De Jure Divino, and yet not immediately; what lawfull Jurisdiction, though but Civill, is there in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not also De Jure Divino? For Christian Kings have their Civill Power from God immediately; and the Magistrates under him exercise their severall charges in vertue of his Commission; wherein that which they doe, is no lesse De Jure Divino Mediato, than that which the Bishops doe, in vertue of the Popes Ordination. All lawfull Power is of God, immediately in the Supreme Governour, and mediately in those that have Authority under him: So that either hee must grant every Constable in the State, to hold his Office in the Right of God; or he must not hold that any Bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himselfe.

But this whole Dispute, whether Christ left the Jurisdiction to the Pope onely, or to other Bishops also, if considered out of these places where the Pope has the Civill Soveraignty, is a contention De Lana Caprina: For none of them (where they are not Soveraigns) has any Jurisdiction at all. For Jurisdiction is the Power of hearing and determining Causes between man and man; and can belong to none, but him that hath the Power to prescribe the Rules of Right and Wrong; that is, to make Laws; and with the Sword of Justice to compell men to obey his Decisions, pronounced either by himself, or by the Judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully do, but the Civill Soveraign.

Therefore when he alledgeth out of the 6 of Luke, that our Saviour called his Disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he named Apostles, he proveth that he Elected them (all, except Matthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them Power and Command to Preach, but not to Judge of Causes between man and man: for that is a Power which he refused to take upon himselfe, saying, “Who made me a Judge, or a Divider, amongst you?” and in another place, “My Kingdome is not of this world.” But hee that hath not the Power to hear, and determine Causes between man and man, cannot be said to have any Jurisdiction at all. And yet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them Power to Preach and Baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawfull Soveraign forbidden: For to our own Soveraigns Christ himself, and his Apostles have in sundry places expressely commanded us in all things to be obedient.

The arguments by which he would prove, that Bishops receive their Jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the Dominions of other Princes hath no Jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all Bishops receive Jurisdiction when they have it from their Civill Soveraigns, I will not omit the recitall of them.

The first, is from Numbers 11. where Moses not being able alone to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the People of Israel, God commanded him to choose Seventy Elders, and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those Seventy Elders: by which it is understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority from him; wherein he doth truly, and ingenuously interpret that place. But seeing Moses had the entire Soveraignty in the Common-wealth of the Jews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their Authority from the Civill Soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that Bishops in every Christian Common-wealth have their Authority from the Civill Soveraign;

and from the Pope in his own Territories only, and not in the Territories of any other State.

The second argument, is from the nature of Monarchy; wherein all Authority is in one Man, and in others by derivation from him: But the Government of the Church, he says, is Monarchicall. This also makes for Christian Monarchs. For they are really Monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people;) whereas the Power of the Pope, though hee were S. Peter, is neither Monarchy, nor hath any thing of Archicall, nor Craticall, but onely of Didacticall; For God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience.

The third, is, from that the Sea of S. Peter is called by S. Cyprian, the Head, the Source, the Roote, the Sun, from whence the Authority of Bishops is derived. But by the Law of Nature (which is a better Principle of Right and Wrong, than the word of any Doctor that is but a man) the Civill Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the Head, the Source, the Root, and the Sun, from which all Jurisdiction is derived. And therefore, the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is derived from the Civill Soveraign.

The fourth, is taken from the Inequality of their Jurisdictions: For if God (saith he) had given it them immediately, he had given aswell Equality of Jurisdiction, as of Order: But wee see, some are Bishops but of own Town, some of a hundred Towns, and some of many whole Provinces; which differences were not determined by the command of God; their Jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of Man; and one has a greater, another a lesse, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument, if he had proved before, that the Pope had had an Universall Jurisdiction over all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large Jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the Emperours of Rome, (for the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being Bishop of the Capitall

City of the Empire, and Seat of the Emperour, claimed to be equal to him,) it followeth, that all other Bishops have their Jurisdiction from the Soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the same: And as for that cause they have not their Authority De Jure Divino; so neither hath the Pope his De Jure Divino, except onely where hee is also the Civill Soveraign.

His fift argument is this, “If Bishops have their Jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can doe nothing contrary to Gods ordination;” And this consequence is good, and well proved. “But, (saith he) the Pope can do this, and has done it.” This also is granted, so he doe it in his own Dominions, or in the Dominions of any other Prince that hath given him that Power; but not universally, in Right of the Popedome: For that power belongeth to every Christian Soveraign, within the bounds of his owne Empire, and is inseparable from the Soveraignty. Before the People of Israel had (by the commandment of God to Samuel) set over themselves a King, after the manner of other Nations, the High Priest had the Civill Government; and none but he could make, nor depose an inferiour Priest: But that Power was afterwards in the King, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine; For if the Priest (be he the High Priest or any other) had his Jurisdiction immediately from God, then the King could not take it from him; “for he could do nothing contrary to Gods ordinance: But it is certain, that King Solomon (1 Kings 2.26.) deprived Abiathar the High Priest of his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35.) in his room. Kings therefore may in the like manner Ordaine, and Deprive Bishops, as they shall thinke fit, for the well governing of their Subjects.

His sixth argument is this, If Bishops have their Jurisdiction De Jure Divino (that is, immediately from God,) they that maintaine it, should bring some Word of God to prove it: But they can bring none. The argument is

good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no lesse good, to prove the Pope himself to have no Jurisdiction in the Dominion of any other Prince.

Lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two Popes, Innocent, and Leo; and I doubt not but hee might have alledged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since S. Peter: For considering the love of Power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Neverthelesse, they should therein but doe, as Innocent, and Leo did, bear witnesse of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.

Of The Popes Temporall Power

In the fift Book he hath four Conclusions. The first is, “That the Pope in not Lord of all the world:” the second, “that the Pope is not Lord of all the Christian world:” The third, “That the Pope (without his owne Territory) has not any Temporall Jurisdiction DIRECTLY:” These three Conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, “That the Pope has (in the Dominions of other Princes) the Supreme Temporall Power INDIRECTLY:” which is denyed; unlesse he mean by Indirectly, that he has gotten it by Indirect means; then is that also granted. But I understand, that when he saith he hath it Indirectly, he means, that such Temporall Jurisdiction belongeth to him of Right, but that this Right is but a Consequence of his Pastorall Authority, the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with it: And therefore to the Pastorall Power (which he calls Spirituall) the Supreme Power Civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby hee hath a Right to change Kingdomes, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the Salvation of Souls.

Before I come to consider the Arguments by which hee would prove this doctrine, it will not bee amisse to lay open the Consequences of it; that Princes, and States, that have the Civill Soveraignty in their severall Common-wealths, may bethink themselves, whether it bee convenient for them, and conducing to the good of their Subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the day of Judgment, to admit the same.

When it is said, the Pope hath not (in the Territories of other States) the Supreme Civill Power Directly; we are to understand, he doth not challenge it, as other Civill Soveraigns doe, from the originall submission thereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this Treatise demonstrated, that the Right of all Soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to bee governed; whether they that choose him, doe it for their common defence against an Enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a Man, or an Assembly of men to protect them; or whether they doe it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering Enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the Supreme Civill Power over other States Directly, denyeth no more, but that his Right cometh to him by that way; He ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another way; and that is, (without the consent of them that are to be governed) by a Right given him by God, (which hee calleth Indirectly,) in his Assumption to the Papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the Power is the same; and he may (if it bee granted to be his Right) depose Princes and States, as often as it is for the Salvation of Soules, that is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the Sole Power to Judge, whether it be to the salvation of mens Souls, or not. And this is the Doctrine, not onely that Bellarmine here, and many other Doctors teach in their Sermons and Books, but also that some Councells have decreed, and the Popes have decreed, and the Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practise. For the fourth Councell of Lateran held

under Pope Innocent the third, (in the third Chap. De Haereticis,) hath this Canon. “If a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeretiques, and being Excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their Obedience.” And the practise hereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the Deposing of Chilperique, King of France; in the Translation of the Roman Empire to Charlemaine; in the Oppression of John King of England; in Transferring the Kingdome of Navarre; and of late years, in the League against Henry the third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few Princes that consider not this as Injust, and Inconvenient; but I wish they would all resolve to be Kings, or Subjects. Men cannot serve two Masters: They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the Reins of Government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another Indirect Power, as with a Direct one. But to come now to his Arguments.

The first is this, “The Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall: Therefore he that hath the Supreme Power Spirituall, hath right to command Temporall Princes, and dispose of their Temporalls in order to the Spirituall. As for the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the Temporall, or Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall. There be but two ways that those words can be made sense. For when wee say, one Power is subject to another Power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath the other; or that the one Power is to the other, as the means to the end. For wee cannot understand, that one Power hath Power over another Power; and that one Power can have Right or Command over another: For Subjection,

Command, Right, and Power are accidents, not of Powers, but of Persons: One Power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a Sadler, to the art of a Rider. If then it be granted, that the Civill Government be ordained as a means to bring us to a Spirituall felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a King have the Civill Power, and the Pope the Spirituall, that therefore the King is bound to obey the Pope, more then every Sadler is bound to obey every Rider. Therefore as from Subordination of an Art, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Professor; so from the Subordination of a Government, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Governor. When therefore he saith, the Civill Power is Subject to the Spirituall, his meaning is, that the Civill Soveraign, is Subject to the Spirituall Soveraign. And the Argument stands thus, "The Civil Soveraign, is subject to the Spirituall; Therefore the Spirituall Prince may command Temporall Princes." Where the conclusion is the same, with the Antecedent he should have proved. But to prove it, he alledgeth first, this reason, "Kings and Popes, Clergy and Laity make but one Common-wealth; that is to say, but one Church: And in all Bodies the Members depend one upon another: But things Spirituall depend not of things Temporall: Therefore, Temporall depend on Spirituall. And therefore are Subject to them." In which Argumentation there be two grosse errours: one is, that all Christian Kings, Popes, Clergy, and all other Christian men, make but one Common-wealth: For it is evident that France is one Common-wealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c. And these consist of Christians; and therefore also are severall Bodies of Christians; that is to say, severall Churches: And their severall Soveraigns Represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man; which no Generall or Universall Church is, till it have a Representant; which it hath not on Earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendome were one Common-wealth, whose Soveraign were that Representant, both in things Spirituall and Temporall:

And the Pope, to make himself this Representant, wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to Command, and to Judge, and to Punish, otherwise than (by Excommunication) to run from those that will not Learn of him: For though the Pope were Christs onely Vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our Saviours second coming: And then also it is not the Pope, but St. Peter himselfe, with the other Apostles, that are to be Judges of the world.

The other errour in this his first Argument is, that he sayes, the Members of every Common-wealth, as of a naturall Body, depend one of another: It is true, they cohaere together; but they depend onely on the Soveraign, which is the Soul of the Common-wealth; which failing, the Common-wealth is dissolved into a Civill war, no one man so much as cohaering to another, for want of a common Dependance on a known Soveraign; Just as the Members of the naturall Body dissolve into Earth, for want of a Soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude, from whence to inferre a dependance of the Laity on the Clergy, or of the Temporall Officers on the Spirituall; but of both on the Civill Soveraign; which ought indeed to direct his Civill commands to the Salvation of Souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himselfe. And thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first Argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the Subordination of Actions in the way to the End; and the Subjection of Persons one to another in the administration of the Means. For to every End, the Means are determined by Nature, or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men use the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given) to the Civill Soveraign.

His second Argument is this, “Every Common-wealth, (because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in it self,) may command any other Common-wealth, not subject to it, and force it to change the administration

of the Government, nay depose the Prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them: much more may a Spirituall Common-wealth command a Temporall one to change the administration of their Government, and may depose Princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the Spirituall Good."

That a Common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true, that there is now in this world a Spirituall Common-wealth, distinct from a Civill Common-wealth, then might the Prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repaire, and secure himself by Warre; which is in summe, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of Hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no lesse lawfull for a Civill Soveraign, upon the like injuries done, or feared, to make warre upon the Spirituall Soveraign; which I beleeve is more than Cardinall Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.

But Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which he himselfe saith, is not of this world; but shall be in the next world, at the Resurrection, when they that have lived justly, and beleeved that he was the Christ, shall (though they died Naturall bodies) rise Spirituall bodies; and then it is, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his Adversaries, and make a Spirituall Common-wealth. In the mean time, seeing there are no men on earth, whose bodies are Spirituall; there can be no Spirituall Common-wealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unlesse wee call Preachers, that have Commission to Teach, and prepare men for their reception into the

Kingdome of Christ at the Resurrection, a Common-wealth; which I have proved to bee none.

The third Argument is this; “It is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case he endeavour to draw them to his Haeresie, or Infidelity. But to judge whether a King draw his subjects to Haeresie, or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope Right, to determine whether the Prince be to be deposed, or not deposed.”

To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians, (or men of what Religion soever,) if they tolerate not their King, whatsoever law hee maketh, though it bee concerning Religion, doe violate their faith, contrary to the Divine Law, both Naturall and Positive: Nor is there any Judge of Haeresie amongst Subjects, but their own Civill Soveraign; for “Haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion which the Publique Person (that is to say, the Representant of the Common-wealth) hath commanded to bee taught.” By which it is manifest, that an opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught, cannot be Haeresie; nor the Soveraign Princes that authorize them, Haeretiques. For Haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly defend some Doctrine, prohibited by their lawful Soveraigns.

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate Infidell, or Haereticall Kings, he alledgeth a place in Deut. 17. where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a King over themselves, to choose a stranger; And from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull for a Christian, to choose a King, that is not a Christian. And ’tis true, that he that is a Christian, that is, hee that hath already obliged himself to receive our Saviour when he shall come, for his King, shal tempt God too much in choosing for King in this world, one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and perswasion to make him violate his faith. But, it is (saith hee) the same danger, to choose one that is not a Christian, for King, and not to depose him, when hee is chosen. To

this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the Justice of deposing him. To choose him, may in some cases bee unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case Just. For it is alwaies violation of faith, and consequently against the Law of Nature, which is the eternal Law of God. Nor doe wee read, that any such Doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the Apostles; nor in the time of the Romane Emperours, till the Popes had the Civill Soveraignty of Rome. But to this he hath replyed, that the Christians of old, deposed not Nero, nor Diocletian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arrian, for this cause onely, that they wanted Temporall forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve Legions of immortall, invulnerable Angels to assist him, want forces to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to bee crucified? Or if the Apostles wanted Temporall forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them in their Epistles to the new made Christians, to teach them, (as they did) to obey the Powers constituted over them, (whereof Nero in that time was one,) and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? Shall we say they did not onely obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their Heathen Princes, or Princes (for I cannot call any one whose Doctrine is the Publique Doctrine, an Haeretique) that authorize the teaching of an Errour. And whereas for the Temporall Power of the Pope, he alledgeth further, that St. Paul (1 Cor. 6.) appointed Judges under the Heathen Princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those Princes; it is not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their Brethren to compound their differences, as Arbitrators, rather than to goe to law one with another before the Heathen Judges; which is a wholsome Precept, and full of Charity, fit to bee practised also in the Best Christian Common-wealths.

And for the danger that may arise to Religion, by the Subjects tolerating of an Heathen, or an Erring Prince, it is a point, of which a Subject is no competent Judge; or if hee bee, the Popes Temporall Subjects may judge also of the Popes Doctrine. For every Christian Prince, as I have formerly proved, is no lesse Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, than the Pope of his.

The fourth Argument, is taken from the Baptisme of Kings; wherein, that they may be made Christians they submit their Scepters to Christ; and promise to keep, and defend the Christian Faith. This is true; for Christian Kings are no more but Christs Subjects: but they may, for all that, bee the Popes Fellowes; for they are Supreme Pastors of their own Subjects; and the Pope is no more but King, and Pastor, even in Rome it selfe.

The fifth Argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, Feed My Sheep; by which was give all Power necessary for a Pastor; as the Power to chase away Wolves, such as are Haeretiques; the Power to shut up Rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other Sheep with their Hornes, such as are Evill (though Christian) Kings; and Power to give the Flock convenient food: From whence hee inferreth, that St. Peter had these three Powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of these Powers, is no more than the Power, or rather Command to Teach. For the first, which is to chase away Wolves, that is, Haeretiques, the place hee quoteth is (Matth. 7.15.) “Beware of false Prophets which come to you in Sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening Wolves.” But neither are Haeretiques false Prophets, or at all Prophets: nor (admitting Haeretiques for the Wolves there meant,) were the Apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were Kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that hee gave this Counsell, to Beware of false Prophets: which

therefore if it conferre a Power of chasing away Kings, was given, not onely to private men; but to men that were not at all Christians. And as to the Power of Separating, and Shutting up of furious Rammes, (by which hee meaneth Christian Kings that refuse to submit themselves to the Roman Pastor,) our Saviour refused to take upon him that Power in this world himself, but advised to let the Corn and Tares grow up together till the day of Judgment: much lesse did hee give it to St. Peter, or can S. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all other Pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, (that disobey the Christian Soveraigne) as Heathen men, and as Publicans. Seeing then men challenge to the Pope no authority over Heathen Princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to bee esteemed as Heathen.

But from the Power to Teach onely, hee inferreth also a Coercive Power in the Pope, over Kings. The Pastor (saith he) must give his flock convenient food: Therefore the Pope may, and ought to compell Kings to doe their duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as Pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings: which all Christian Kings ought indeed either to Confesse, or else they ought to take upon themselves the Supreme Pastorall Charge, every one in his own Dominion.

His sixth, and last Argument, is from Examples. To which I answer, first, that Examples prove nothing; Secondly, that the Examples he alledgeth make not so much as a probability of Right. The fact of Jehoiada, in Killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11.) was either by the Authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible Crime in the High Priest, which (ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere Subject. The fact of St. Ambrose, in Excommunicating Theodosius the Emperour, (if it were true hee did so,) was a Capitall Crime. And for the Popes, Gregory 1. Greg. 2. Zachary, and Leo 3. their Judgments are void, as given in their own Cause; and the Acts done by them conformably to this Doctrine, are the greatest Crimes (especially that of

Zachary) that are incident to Humane Nature. And thus much of Power Ecclesiasticall; wherein I had been more briefe, forbearing to examine these Arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his, as a Private man, and not as the Champion of the Papacy, against all other Christian Princes, and States.

CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MANS RECEPTION INTO THE

KINGDOME OF HEAVEN.

The Difficulty Of Obeying God And Man Both At Once

The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandements are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his Father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own. For as there ware in the Church of the Jews, many false Prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams, and Visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false Teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false Doctrines; and by such reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,) to govern them for their private benefit.

Is None To Them That Distinguish Between What Is, And What Is Not Necessary To Salvation

But this difficulty of obeying both God, and the Civill Soveraign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is Necessary, and what is not Necessary for their Reception into the Kingdome of God, is of no moment. For if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such, as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall; not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the Apostle takes place; “Servants obey your Masters in all things;” and, “Children obey your Parents in all things;” and the precept of our Saviour, “The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chaire, All therefore they shall say, that observe, and doe.” But if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to Eternall Death, then it were madnesse to obey it, and the Counsell of our Saviour takes place, (Mat. 10. 28.) “Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule.” All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly Soveraign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not Necessary to Eternall Salvation.

All That Is Necessary To Salvation Is Contained In Faith And Obedience

All that is NECESSARY to Salvation, is contained in two Vertues, Faith in Christ, and Obedience to Laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because wee are all guilty of disobedience to Gods Law,

not onely originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not onely Obedience for the rest of our time, but also a Remission of sins for the time past; which Remission is the reward of our Faith in Christ. That nothing else is Necessarily required to Salvation, is manifest from this, that the Kingdome of Heaven, is shut to none but to Sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the Law; nor to them, in case they Repent, and Beleeve all the Articles of Christian Faith, Necessary to Salvation.

What Obedience Is Necessary;

The Obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the Will for the Deed, is a serious Endeavour to Obey him; and is called also by all such names as signifie that Endeavour. And therefore Obedience, is sometimes called by the names of Charity, and Love, because they imply a Will to Obey; and our Saviour himself maketh our Love to God, and to one another, a Fulfilling of the whole Law: and sometimes by the name of Righteousnesse; for Righteousnesse is but the will to give to every one his owne, that is to say, the will to obey the Laws: and sometimes by the name of Repentance; because to Repent, implyeth a turning away from sinne, which is the same, with the return of the will to Obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the Commandements of God, or repenteth him truely of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, hath all the Obedience Necessary to his Reception into the Kingdome of God: For if God should require perfect Innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

And To What Laws

But what Commandements are those that God hath given us? Are all those Laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the Commandements of God? If they bee, why are not Christians taught to obey them? If they be not, what others are so, besides the Law of Nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws, but Counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall Soveraigns: Nor did he make any new Law to the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but onely expounded the Laws of Moses, to which they were subject before. The Laws of God therefore are none but the Laws of Nature, whereof the principall is, that we should not violate our Faith, that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns, which wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another. And this Law of God, that commandeth Obedience to the Law Civill, commandeth by consequence Obedience to all the Precepts of the Bible, which (as I have proved in the precedent Chapter) is there onely Law, where the Civill Soveraign hath made it so; and in other places but Counsell; which a man at his own perill, may without injustice refuse to obey.

In The Faith Of A Christian, Who Is The Person Beleeved

Knowing now what is the Obedience Necessary to Salvation, and to whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning Faith, whom, and why we beleeve; and what are the Articles, or Points necessarily to be beleeved by them that shall be saved. And first, for the Person whom we beleeve, because it is impossible to beleeve any Person, before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that wee have heard speak. The Person therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and the Prophets beleeved,

was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: And the Person, whom the Apostles and Disciples that conversed with Christ beleeved, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the Father, nor our Saviour ever spake, it cannot be said, that the Person whom they beleeved, was God. They beleeved the Apostles, and after them the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith the History of the Old and New Testament: so that the Faith of Christians ever since our Saviours time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their Pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the Rule of Faith; which none could do but Christian Soveraignes; who are therefore the Supreme Pastors, and the onely Persons, whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as God speaketh to, in these days supernaturally. But because there be many false Prophets "gone out into the world," other men are to examine such Spirits (as St. John advised us, 1 Epistle, Cha. ver.1.) "whether they be of God, or not." And therefore, seeing the Examination of Doctrines belongeth to the Supreme Pastor, the Person which all they that have no speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every Common-wealth) the Supreme Pastor, that is to say, the Civill Soveraigne.

The Causes Of Christian Faith

The causes why men beleeve any Christian Doctrine, are various; For Faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each severall man, by such wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate cause of our beleef, concerning any point of Christian Faith, is, that wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God. But why wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well

stated. For they make not the question to be, “Why we Beleeve it,” but “How wee Know it;” as if Beleeving and Knowing were all one. And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the Infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of the Private Spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a man know the Infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the Infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Arguments of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church; and least of all, the Infallibility of any particular man.

Faith Comes By Hearing

It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men doe not know, but onely beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making them beleeve which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of Nature, that is to say, from their Teachers. It is the Doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian Faith in generall, (Rom. 10.17.) “Faith cometh by Hearing,” that is, by Hearing our lawfull Pastors. He saith also (ver. 14,15. of the same Chapter) “How shall they beleeve in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a Preacher? and how shall they Preach, except they be sent?” Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of beleeving that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is the same with the cause of the beleeving of all other Articles of our Faith, namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches: Which also is

made more manifest by experience. For what other cause can there bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either beleeve, or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God, and in other Common-wealths scarce any; but that in Christian Common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise?

But if Teaching be the cause of Faith, why doe not all beleeve? It is certain therefore that Faith is the gift of God, and hee giveth it to whom he will. Neverthelesse, because of them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of Teachers, the immediate cause of Faith is Hearing. In a School where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the Master; yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God. All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them, say they are Inspired; for that implies a gift supernaturall, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a Prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.

But whether men Know, or Beleeve, or Grant the Scriptures to be the Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary, and onely necessary for Salvation, those men must needs Know, Beleeve, or Grant the same.

The Onely Necessary Article Of Christian Faith, The (Unum Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply Necessary to Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. By the name of Christ, is understood the King, which God had before promised by the Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) under himself eternally; and to give them that eternall life, which was lost by the sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further shew when, and in what sense some other Articles may bee also called Necessary.

Proved From The Scope Of The Evangelists

For Proof that the Beleef of this Article, Jesus Is The Christ, is all the Faith required to Salvation, my first Argument shall bee from the Scope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our Saviour, to establish that one Article, Jesus Is The Christ. The summe of St. Matthews Gospell is this, That Jesus was of the stock of David; Born of a Virgin; which are the Marks of the true Christ: That the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews: That Herod for the same cause sought to kill him: That John Baptist proclaimed him: That he preached by himselfe, and his Apostles that he was that King; That he taught the Law, not as a Scribe, but as a man of Authority: That he cured diseases by his Word onely, and did many other Miracles, which were foretold the Christ should doe: That he was saluted King when he entered into Jerusalem: That he fore-warned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ: That he was taken, accused, and put to death, for saying, hee was King: That the cause of his condemnation written on the Crosse, was JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWES. All which tend to no other end than this, that men should beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ. Such therefore was the Scope of St. Matthews Gospel. But the Scope of all the Evangelists (as may appear by reading them) was the same. Therefore the Scope of the whole Gospell, was the establishing of that onely Article. And St. John expressely makes it his conclusion, John 20. 31. “These things are written, that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.”

From The Sermons Of The Apostles:

My second Argument is taken from the Subject of the Sermons of the Apostles, both whilest our Saviour lived on earth, and after his Ascension. The Apostles in our Saviours time were sent, Luke 9.2. to Preach the Kingdome of God: For neither there, nor Mat. 10.7. giveth he any Commission to them, other than this, “As ye go, Preach, saying, the Kingdome of Heaven is at hand;” that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King which was to come. That their Preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of Acts 17.6. “They drew (saith St. Luke) Jason and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received. And these all do contrary to the Decrees of Caesar, saying, that there is another King, one Jesus:” And out of the 2.&3. verses of the same Chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul “as his manner was, went in unto them; and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures; opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen againe from the dead, and that this Jesus (whom he preached) is Christ.”

From The Easinesse Of The Doctrine:

The third Argument is, from those places of Scripture, by which all the Faith required to Salvation is declared to be Easie. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the Doctrines concerning Christian Faith now taught, (whereof the greatest part are disputed,) were necessary to Salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard, as to be a Christian. The Thief upon the Crosse though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, “Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome;” by which he testified no beleefe of any other Article, but this, That Jesus Was The King.

Nor could it bee said (as it is Mat. 11. 30.) that “Christs yoke is Easy, and his burthen Light:” Nor that “Little Children beleeve in him,” as it is Matth. 18.6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Cor. 1. 21.) “It pleased God by the Foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve:” Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved, much lesse have been so great a Doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of Transsubstantiation, nor Purgatory, nor many other Articles now obtruded.

From Formall And Cleer Texts

The fourth Argument is taken from places expresse, and such as receive no controversie of Interpretation; as first, John 5. 39. “Search the Scriptures, for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life; and they are they that testifie of mee.” Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures onely of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the Markes by which men might know him when hee came; as that he should descend from David, be born at Bethlehem, and of a Virgin; doe great Miracles, and the like. Therefore to beleeve that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternall life: but more than sufficient is not Necessary; and consequently no other Article is required. Again, (John 11. 26.) “Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee, shall not die eternally,” Therefore to beleeve in Christ, is faith sufficient to eternall life; and consequently no more faith than that is Necessary, But to beleeve in Jesus, and to beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following. For when our Saviour (verse 26.) had said to Martha, “Beleevest thou this?” she answereth (verse 27.) “Yea Lord, I beleeve that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the

world;" Therefore this Article alone is faith sufficient to life eternall; and more than sufficient is not Necessary. Thirdly, John 20. 31. "These things are written that yee might beleeve, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that beleeving yee might have life through his name." There, to beleeve that Jesus Is The Christ, is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other Article is Necessary. Fourthly, 1 John 4. 2. "Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God." And 1 Joh. 5. 1. "whosoever beleeveth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." And verse 5. "Who is hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Jesus is the Son of God?" Fiftly, Act. 8. ver. 36, 37. "See (saith the Eunuch) here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst. And hee answered and said, I beleeve that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Therefore this Article beleeved, Jesus Is The Christ, is sufficient to Baptisme, that is to say, to our Reception into the Kingdome of God, and by consequence, onely Necessary. And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, "Thy faith hath saved thee," the cause he saith it, is some Confession, which directly, or by consequence, implyeth a beleef, that Jesus Is The Christ.

From That It Is The Foundation Of All Other Articles

The last Argument is from the places, where this Article is made the Foundation of Faith: For he that holdeth the Foundation shall bee saved. Which places are first, Mat. 24.23. "If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes and wonders, &c." Here wee see, this Article Jesus Is The Christ, must bee held, though hee that shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles. The second place is Gal. 1. 8.

“Though we, or an Angell from Heaven preach any other Gospell unto you, than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed.” But the Gospell which Paul, and the other Apostles, preached, was onely this Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; Therefore for the Beleef of this Article, we are to reject the Authority of an Angell from heaven; much more of any mortall man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the Fundamentall Article of Christian Faith. A third place is, 1 Joh. 4.1. “Beloved, beleeve not every spirit. Hereby yee shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God.” By which it is evident, that this Article, is the measure, and rule, by which to estimate, and examine all other Articles; and is therefore onely Fundamentall. A fourth is, Matt. 16.18. where after St. Peter had professed this Article, saying to our Saviour, “Thou art Christ the Son of the living God,” Our Saviour answered, “Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church:” from whence I inferre, that this Article is that, on which all other Doctrines of the Church are built, as on their Foundation. A fift is (1 Cor. 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.) “Other Foundation can no man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build upon this Foundation, Gold, Silver, pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; Every mans work shall be made manifest; For the Day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every mans work, of what sort it is. If any mans work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward: If any mans work shall bee burnt, he shall suffer losse; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” Which words, being partly plain and easie to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult; out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that Pastors that teach this Foundation, that Jesus Is The Christ, though they draw from it false consequences, (which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may neverthelesse bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who being no Pastors, but Hearers, beleeve that which is by their lawfull

Pastors taught them. Therefore the beleef of this Article is sufficient; and by consequence there is no other Article of Faith Necessarily required to Salvation.

Now for the part which is Allegoricall, as “That the fire shall try every mans work,” and that “They shall be saved, but so as by fire,” or “through fire,” (for the originall is dia puros,) it maketh nothing against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that are plain. Neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken, to prove the fire of Purgatory, I will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall of Doctrines, and saving of men as by Fire. The Apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the Prophet Zachary, Ch. 13. 8,9. who speaking of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God, saith thus, “Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them.” The day of Judgment, is the day of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God; and at that day it is, that St. Peter tells us (2 Pet. 3. v.7, 10, 12.) shall be the Conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save, shall passe through that Fire, unhurt, and be therein (as Silver and Gold are refined by the fire from their drosse) tryed, and refined from their Idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true God. Alluding whereto St. Paul here saith, that The Day (that is, the Day of Judgment, the Great Day of our Saviours comming to restore the Kingdome of God in Israel) shall try every mans doctrine, by Judging, which are Gold, Silver, Pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; And then they that have built false Consequences on the true Foundation, shall see their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved, and passe unhurt through this universall Fire, and live eternally, to call upon the

name of the true and onely God. In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of Purgatory.

In What Sense Other Articles May Be Called Necessary

But a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to Salvation, to beleeve, that God is Omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as to beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ. To which I answer, they are; and so are many more Articles: but they are such, as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more, or lesse difficulty. For who is there that does not see, that they who beleeve Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, doe therein also beleeve, that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man beleeve, that Jesus is the King that shall reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the Office of a King. In summe, he that holdeth this Foundation, Jesus Is The Christ, holdeth Expressely all that hee seeth rightly deduced from it, and Implicitely all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence. And therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one Article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the Penitent, and consequently to bring them into the Kingdome of Heaven.

That Faith, And Obedience Are Both Of Them Necessary To Salvation

Now that I have shewn, that all the Obedience required to Salvation, consisteth in the will to obey the Law of God, that is to say, in Repentance; and all the Faith required to the same, is comprehended in the beleef of this Article, Jesus Is The Christ; I will further alledge those places of the Gospell, that prove, that all that is Necessary to Salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the Ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the Apostles, saying, (Act. 2.37.) “Men and Brethren what shall we doe?” to whom St. Peter answered (in the next verse) “Repent, and be Baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore Repentance, and Baptisme, that is, beleeving that Jesus Is The Christ, is all that is Necessary to Salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain Ruler, (Luke 18.18.) “What shall I doe to inherit eternall life?” Answered (verse 20) “Thou knowest the Commandements, Doe not commit Adultery, Doe not Kill, Doe not Steal, Doe not bear false witnesse, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother;” which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, “Sell all thou hast, give it to the Poor, and come and follow me:” which was as much as to say, Relye on me that am the King: Therefore to fulfill the Law, and to beleeve that Jesus is the King, is all that is required to bring a man to eternall life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (Rom. 1.17.) “The Just shall live by Faith;” not every one, but the Just; therefore Faith and Justice (that is, the Will To Be Just, or Repentance) are all that is Necessary to life eternall. And (Mark 1.15.) our Saviour preached, saying, “The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand, Repent and Beleeve the Evangile,” that is, the Good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to Repent, and to Beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to Salvation.

What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto

Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed in the word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question by which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed. Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the Law of God. And therefore when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. And in this sense onely it is, that a man is called Just, or Unjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders him capable of Living By His Faith, which before he was not. So that Justice Justifies in that that sense, in which to Justifie, is the same that to Denominate A Man Just; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.

But a man is then also said to be Justified, when his Plea, though in it selfe unsufficient, is accepted; as when we Plead our Will, our Endeavour to fulfill the Law, and Repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the Performance it selfe: And because God accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but onely in the Faithfull; it is therefore Faith that makes good our Plea; and in this sense it is, that Faith onely Justifies: So that Faith and Obedience are both Necessary to Salvation; yet in severall senses each of them is said to Justifie.

Obedience To God And To The Civill Soveraign Not Inconsistent

Whether Christian, Having thus shewn what is Necessary to Salvation; it is not hard to reconcile our Obedience to the Civill Soveraign; who is either Christian, or Infidel. If he bee a Christian, he alloweth the beleefe of this Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; and of all the Articles that are contained in, or are evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the Faith Necessary to Salvation. And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth Obedience to all his owne, that is, to all the Civill Laws; in which also are contained all the Laws of Nature, that is, all the Laws of God: for besides the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of the Church, which are part of the Civill Law, (for the Church that can make Laws is the Common-wealth,) there bee no other Laws Divine. Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian Soveraign, is not thereby hindred, neither from beleeving, nor from obeying God. But suppose that a Christian King should from this Foundation, Jesus Is The Christ, draw some false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of Hay, or Stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says, he shal be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull Teacher. And in case a Subject be forbidden by the Civill Soveraign to professe some of those his opinions, upon what grounds can he disobey? Christian Kings may erre in deducing a Consequence, but who shall Judge? Shall a private man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience? or shall any man Judg but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the Civill Soveraign that representeth it? or if the Pope, or an Apostle Judge, may he not erre in deducing of a consequence? did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the Laws of a Christian Common-wealth.

And when the Civill Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God (for such as are the Laws of Nature,) and rejecteth the counsell of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and all Children and Servants to obey they Parents, and Masters, in all things. And for their Faith, it is internall, and invisible; They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in Heaven, and not complain of their Lawfull Soveraign; much lesse make warre upon him. For he that is not glad of any just occasion of Martyrdome, has not the faith be professeth, but pretends it onely, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, that waiteth for the second comming of Christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of beleeving that Jesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a Subject?

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the Kingdome of God, and Policy Ecclesiasticall. Wherein I pretend not to advance any Position of my own, but onely to shew what are the Consequences that seem to me deducible from the Principles of Christian Politiques, (which are the holy Scriptures,) in confirmation of the Power of Civill Soveraigns, and the Duty of their Subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such Texts as are of obscure, or controverted Interpretation; and to alledge none, but is such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was written for the re-establishment of the Kingdome of God in Christ. For it is not the bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which any

writing is to bee interpreted; and they that insist upon single Texts, without considering the main Designe, can derive no thing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of Scripture, as dust before mens eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.

CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUALL DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

The Kingdome Of Darknesse What

Besides these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another Power, namely, (Eph. 6. 12.), that of "the Rulers of the Darknesse of this world," (Mat. 12. 26.), "the Kingdome of Satan," and, (Mat. 9. 34.), "the Principality of Beelzebub over Daemons," that is to say, over Phantasmes that appear in the Air: For which cause Satan is also called (Eph. 2. 2.) "the Prince of the Power of the Air;" and (because he ruleth in the darknesse of this world) (Joh. 16. 11.) "The Prince of this world;" And in consequence hereunto, they who are under his Dominion, in opposition to the faithfull (who are the Children Of The Light) are called the Children Of Darknesse. For seeing Beelzebub is Prince of Phantasmes, Inhabitants of his Dominion of Air and Darknesse, the Children of Darknesse, and these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, signifie allegorically the same thing. This considered, the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a "Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the Kingdome of God to come."

The Church Not Yet Fully Freed Of Darknesse

As men that are utterly deprived from their Nativity, of the light of the bodily Eye, have no Idea at all, of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time, or other perceived by his outward Senses: so also is it of the light of the Gospel, and of the light of the Understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto. And from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the un-forseen mischances, that befall them in their ways; The Darkest part of the Kingdome of Satan, is that which is without the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that beleeve not in Jesus Christ. But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth (as the land of Goshen) all the light, which to the performance of the work enjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence comes it, that in Christendome there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by forraign, and Civill war? such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, Felicity, if it be not Night amongst us, or at least a Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.

Four Causes Of Spirituall Darknesse

The Enemy has been here in the Night of our naturall Ignorance, and sown the tares of Spirituall Errors; and that, First, by abusing, and putting out the light of the Scriptures: For we erre, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing the Daemonology of the Heathen Poets, that is to say, their fabulous Doctrine concerning Daemons, which are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane

fancy; such as are dead mens Ghosts, and Fairies, and other matter of old Wives tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers reliques of the Religion, and much of the vain and erroneous Philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false, or uncertain Traditions, and fained, or uncertain History. And so we come to erre, by "giving heed to seducing Spirits," and the Daemonology of such "as speak lies in Hypocrisie," (or as it is in the Originall, 1 Tim. 4.1,2. "of those that play the part of lyars") "with a seared conscience," that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the first of these, which is the Seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this Chapter.

Errors From Misinterpreting The Scriptures, Concerning The Kingdome Of God

The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the Kingdome of God was first instituted by the Ministery of Moses, over the Jews onely; who were therefore called his Peculiar People; and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded a King after the manner of the nations; which God himself consented unto, as I have more at large proved before, in the 35. Chapter. After that time, there was no other Kingdome of God in the world, by any Pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be King, of all men, and of all creatures, as governing according to his Will, by his infinite Power. Neverthelesse, he promised by

his Prophets to restore this his Government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it shall bee fully come, and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, and amendment of life; and not onely so, but he invited also the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happinesse of his Reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and hee promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his Doctrine, to receive him at his second coming: Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact, but our Civill Soveraigns; saving onely, that Christian men are already in the Kingdome of Grace, in as much as they have already the Promise of being received at his comming againe.

As That The Kingdome Of God Is The Present Church

Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christs Kingdome, there ought to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour (now in heaven) speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person to all Christians, or divers Men, or divers Assemblies that doe the same to divers parts of Christendome. This power Regal under Christ, being challenged, universally by that Pope, and in particular Common-wealths by Assemblies of the Pastors of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to none but to Civill Soveraigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth so great a Darknesse in mens understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.

And That The Pope Is His Vicar Generall

Consequent to this claim of the Pope to Vicar Generall of Christ in the present Church, (supposed to be that Kingdom of his, to which we are addressed in the Gospel,) is the Doctrine, that it is necessary for a Christian King, to receive his Crown by a Bishop; as if it were from that Ceremony, that he derives the clause of Dei Gratia in his title; and that then onely he is made King by the favour of God, when he is crowned by the authority of Gods universall Viceregent on earth; and that every Bishop whosoever be his Soveraign, taketh at his Consecration an oath of absolute Obedience to the Pope, Consequent to the same, is the Doctrine of the fourth Councell of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the third, (Cha. De Haereticis.) “That if a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeresies, and being excommunicate for the same, doe not give satisfaction within a year, his Subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience.” Where, by Haeresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained. And by this means, as often as there is any repugnancy between the Politicall designes of the Pope, and other Christian Princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a Mist amongst their Subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull Prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this Darknesse of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another mans ambition.

And That The Pastors Are The Clergy

From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdome of God, it proceeds that Pastours, Deacons, and all other Ministers of the Church, take

the name to themselves of the Clergy, giving to other Christians the name of Laity, that is, simply People. For Clergy signifies those, whose maintenance is that Revenue, which God having reserved to himselfe during his Reigne over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi (who were to be his publique Ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance. The Pope therefore, (pretending the present Church to be, as the Realme of Israel, the Kingdome of God) challenging to himselfe and his subordinate Ministers, the like revenue, as the Inheritance of God, the name of Clergy was sutable to that claime. And thence it is, that Tithes, or other tributes paid to the Levites, as Gods Right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by Ecclesiastiques, Jure Divino, that is, in Gods Right. By which meanes, the people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the State, another to the Clergy; whereof, that to the Clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a King of Athens (and esteemed a Tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all publique charges: For he demanded no more but the twentieth part; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the Commonwealth. And in the Kingdome of the Jewes, during the Sacerdotall Reigne of God, the Tithes and Offerings were the whole Publique Revenue.

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God, came in the distinction betweene the Civill and the Canon Laws: The civil Law being the acts of Soveraigns in their own Dominions, and the Canon Law being the Acts of the Pope in the same Dominions. Which Canons, though they were but Canons, that is, Rules Propounded, and but voluntarily received by Christian Princes, till the translation of the Empire to Charlemain; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope encreased, became Rules Commanded, and the Emperours themselves (to avoyd greater

mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into) were forced to let them passe for Laws.

From hence it is, that in all Dominions, where the Popes Ecclesiasticall power is entirely received, Jewes, Turkes, and Gentiles, are in the Roman Church tolerated in their Religion, as farre forth, as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civill power: whereas in a Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman Religion, is Capitall; because the Pope pretendeth that all Christians are his Subjects. For otherwise it were as much against the law of Nations, to persecute a Christian stranger, for professing the Religion of his owne country, as an Infidell; or rather more, in as much as they that are not against Christ, are with him.

From the same it is, that in every Christian State there are certaine men, that are exempt, by Ecclesiasticall liberty, from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the Civil State; for so are the secular Clergy, besides Monks and Friars, which in many places, bear so great a proportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an Army, sufficient for any warre the Church militant should imploy them in, against their owne, or other Princes.

Error From Mistaking Consecration For Conjuration

A second generall abuse of Scripture, is the turning of Consecration into Conjuration, or Enchantment. To Consecrate, is in Scripture, to Offer, Give, or Dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to Sanctifie, or make it Gods, and to be used only by those, whom God hath appointed to be his Publike Ministers, (as I have already proved at large in

the 35. Chapter;) and thereby to change, not the thing Consecrated, but onely the use of it, from being Profane and common, to be Holy, and peculiar to Gods service. But when by such words, the nature of qualitie of the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it is not Consecration, but either an extraordinary worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuration. But seeing (for the frequency of pretending the change of Nature in their Consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a Conjuration or Incantation, whereby they would have men to beleeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of mans Sight, and of all the rest of his Senses. As for example, when the Priest, in stead of Consecrating Bread and Wine to Gods peculiar service in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common use, to signifie, that is, to put men in mind of their Redemption, by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the Crosse for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our Saviour, “This is my Body,” and “This is my Blood,” the nature of Bread is no more there, but his very Body; notwithstanding there appeared not to the Sight, or other Sense of the Receiver, any thing that appeareth not before the Consecration. The Egyptian Conjurers, that are said to have turned their Rods to Serpents, and the Water into Bloud, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the Spectators by a false shew of things, yet are esteemed Enchanters: But what should wee have thought of them, if there had appeared in their Rods nothing like a Serpent, and in the Water enchanted, nothing like Bloud, nor like any thing else but Water, but that they had faced down the King, that they were Serpents that looked like Rods, and that it was Bloud that seemed Water? That had been both Enchantment, and Lying. And yet in this daily act of the Priest, they doe the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a Charme, which produceth nothing now to the Sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the Bread into a Man; nay more, into a

God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself present God and Man, and thereby to commit most grosse Idolatry. For if it bee enough to excuse it of Idolatry, to say it is no more Bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say, the Leeks, and Onyons they worshipped, were not very Leeks, and Onyons, but a Divinity under their Species, or likenesse. The words, "This is my Body," are aequivalent to these, "This signifies, or represents my Body;" and it is an ordinary figure of Speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can it extend any further, than to the Bread which Christ himself with his own hands Consecrated. For hee never said, that of what Bread soever, any Priest whatsoever, should say, "This is my Body," or, "This is Christs Body," the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this Transubstantiation, till the time of Innocent the third; which was not above 500. years agoe, when the Power of Popes was at the Highest, and the Darknesse of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the Bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the Crosse, as if they would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated, not onely into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of his Crosse, and that they did eat both together in the Sacrament.

Incantation In The Ceremonies Of Baptisme

The like incantation, in stead of Consecration, is used also in the Sacrament of Baptisme: Where the abuse of Gods name in each severall Person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the Crosse at each name, maketh up the Charm: As first, when they make the Holy water, the Priest saith, "I Conjure thee, thou Creature of Water, in the name of God the Father

Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his onely Son our Lord, and in vertue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become Conjured water, to drive away all the Powers of the Enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant the Enemy, &c." And the same in the Benediction of the Salt to be mingled with it; "That thou become Conjured Salt, that all Phantasmes, and Knavery of the Devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean Spirit bee Conjured by Him that shall come to judge the quicke and the dead." The same in the Benediction of the Oyle. "That all the Power of the Enemy, all the Host of the Devill, all Assaults and Phantasmes of Satan, may be driven away by this Creature of Oyle." And for the Infant that is to be Baptized, he is subject to many Charms; First, at the Church dore the Priest blows thrice in the Childs face, and sayes, "Goe out of him unclean Spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter." As if all Children, till blown on by the Priest were Daemoniaques: Again, before his entrance into the Church, he saith as before, "I Conjure thee, &c. to goe out, and depart from this Servant of God:" And again the same Exorcisme is repeated once more before he be Baptized. These, and some other Incantations, and Consecrations, in administration of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Lords Supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy men (except the unhallowed Spittle of the Priest) hath some set form of Exorcisme.

In Marriage, In Visitation Of The Sick, And In Consecration Of Places

Nor are the other rites, as of Marriage, of Extreme Unction, of Visitation of the Sick, of Consecrating Churches, and Church-yards, and the like, exempt from Charms; in as much as there is in them the use of Enchanted Oyle, and Water, with the abuse of the Crosse, and of the holy word of David,

“Asperges me Domine Hyssopo,” as things of efficacy to drive away Phantasmes, and Imaginery Spirits.

Errors From Mistaking Eternall Life, And Everlasting Death

Another generall Error, is from the Misinterpretation of the words Eternall Life, Everlasting Death, and the Second Death. For though we read plainly in Holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of Living for Ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his Commandement; which was not essentiall to Humane Nature, but consequent to the vertue of the Tree of Life; whereof hee had liberty to eat, as long as hee had not sinned; and that hee was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest hee should eate thereof, and live for ever; and that Christs Passion is a Discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him; and by consequence, a restitution of Eternall Life, to all the Faithfull, and to them onely: yet the Doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath Eternity of Life by Nature, in as much as his Soul is Immortall: So that the flaming Sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the Tree of Life, hinders him not from the Immortality which God took from him for his Sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the recovering of the same; and consequently, not onely the faithfull and righteous, but also the wicked, and the Heathen, shall enjoy Eternall Life, without any Death at all; much lesse a Second, and Everlasting Death. To salve this, it is said, that by Second, and Everlasting Death, is meant a Second, and Everlasting Life, but in Torments; a Figure never used, but in this very Case.

All which Doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of the New Testament; which neverthelesse, the whole scope of the Scripture

considered, are cleer enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to the Christian Faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carkasse; cannot God that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his Word, as easily raise a dead carkasse to life again, and continue him alive for Ever, or make him die again, by another Word? The Soule in Scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the Life, or the Living Creature; and the Body and Soule jointly, the Body Alive. In the fift day of the Creation, God said, Let the water produce Reptile Animae Viventis, the creeping thing that hath in it a Living Soule; the English translate it, "that hath Life:" And again, God created Whales, "& omnem animam viventem;" which in the English is, "every living Creature:" And likewise of Man, God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of Life, "& factus est Homo in animam viventem," that is, "and Man was made a Living Creature;" And after Noah came out of the Arke, God saith, hee will no more smite "omnem animam viventem," that is "every Living Creature;" And Deut. 12.23. "Eate not the Bloud, for the Bloud is the Soule;" that is "the Life." From which places, if by Soule were meant a Substance Incorporeall, with an existence separated from the Body, it might as well be inferred of any other living Creature, as of Man. But that the Souls of the Faithfull, are not of their own Nature, but by Gods speciall Grace, to remaine in their bodies, from the Resurrection to all Eternity, I have already I think sufficiently proved out of the Scriptures, in the 38. Chapter. And for the places of the New Testament, where it is said that any man shall be cast Body and Soul into Hell fire, it is no more than Body and Life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into the perpetuall fire of Gehenna.

This window it is, that gives entrance to the Dark Doctrine, first, of Eternall Torments; and afterwards of Purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places Consecrated, Solitary, or Dark, of the Ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of Exorcisme and Conjuration of Phantasmes; as also of Invocation of men dead; and to the Doctrine of Indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever, from the fire of Purgatory, wherein these Incorporeall Substances are pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for Heaven. For men being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by contagion of the Daemonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the Souls of men were substances distinct from their Bodies, and therefore that when the Body was dead, the Soule of every man, whether godly, or wicked, must subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any supernaturall gift of Gods; the Doctors of the Church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be re-united to their Bodies in the Resurrection; supposing for a while, they lay under the Altars: but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable, to build for them this place of Purgatory; which by some other Churches in this later age, has been demolished.

The Texts Alledged For The Doctrines Aforementioned Have Been Answered

Before

Let us now consider, what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three generall Errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinall Bellarmine hath alledged, for the present Kingdome of God administred by the Pope, (than which there are none that make a better show of proof,) I

have already answered them; and made it evident, that the Kingdome of God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul: After which time the Priest of his own authority never deposed any King. That which the High Priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in the right of the young King Joash her Son: But Solomon in his own right deposed the High Priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all those than can be brought, to prove the Kingdome of God by Christ is already in this world, is alledged, not by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza; that will have it to begin from the Resurrection of Christ. But whether hee intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the Supreme Power Ecclesiasticall in the Common-wealth of Geneva, (and consequently to every Presbytery in every other Common-wealth,) or to Princes, and other Civill Soveraignes, I doe not know. For the Presbytery hath challenged the power to Excommunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators in Religion, in the places where they have that form of Church government, no lesse then the Pope challengeth it universally.

Answer To The Text On Which Beza Infereth

That The Kingdome Of Christ Began At The Resurrection The words are (Marke 9.1.) “Verily, I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not tast of death, till they have seene the Kingdome of God come with power.” Which words, if taken grammatically, make it certaine, that either some of those men that stood by Christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the Kingdome of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more difficult: For when the Apostles after our Saviours Resurrection, and immediately before his

Ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (Acts.1.6.) “Wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdome to Israel,” he answered them, “It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power; But ye shall receive power by the comming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and yee shall be my (Martyrs) witnesses both in Jerusalem, & in all Judaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the Earth:” Which is as much as to say, My Kingdome is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come, for it shall come as a theefe in the night; But I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to beare witnesse to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the workes I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may beleeve in me, and expect eternall life, at my comming againe: How does this agree with the comming of Christs Kingdome at the Resurrection? And that which St. Paul saies (1 Thessal. 1.9, 10.) “That they turned from Idols, to serve the living and true God, and to waite for his Sonne from Heaven:” Where to waite for his Sonne from Heaven, is to wait for his comming to be King in power; which were not necessary, if this Kingdome had beene then present. Againe, if the Kingdome of God began (as Beza on that place (Mark 9.1.) would have it) at the Resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, “Let thy Kingdome Come”? It is therefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are not so to be interpreted. There be some of them that stand here (saith our Saviour) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the Kingdome of God come in power. If then this Kingdome were to come at the Resurrection of Christ, why is it said, “some of them” rather than all? For they all lived till after Christ was risen.

Explication Of The Place In Mark 9.1

But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter concerning St. John, (cha.22.) “If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?” upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye: Neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Marke. And if it be lawfull to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately followes, both here, and in St. Luke, where the same is againe repeated, it is not unprobable, to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following; where it is said, that “After six dayes Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John (not all, but some of his Disciples) and leadeth them up into an high mountaine apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. And his rayment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no Fuller on earth can white them. And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus, &c.” So that they saw Christ in Glory and Majestie, as he is to come; insomuch as “They were sore afraid.” And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of Vision: For it was a Vision, as may probably bee inferred out of St. Luke, that reciteth the same story (ch. 9. ve. 28.) and saith, that Peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep; But most certainly out of Matth. 17.9. (where the same is again related;) for our Saviour charged them, saying, “Tell no man the Vision untill the Son of man be Risen from the dead.” Howsoever it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument, to prove that the Kingdome of God taketh beginning till the day of Judgement.

Abuse Of Some Other Texts In Defence Of The Power Of The Pope

As for some other texts, to prove the Popes Power over civill Soveraignes (besides those of Bellarmine;) as that the two Swords that Christ and his Apostles had amongst them, were the Spirituall and the Temporall Sword, which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ: And, that of the two Luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the lesser the King; One might as well inferre out of the first verse of the Bible, that by Heaven is meant the Pope, and by Earth the King: Which is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over Princes, that came in fashion after the time the Popes were growne so secure of their greatnesse, as to contemne all Christian Kings; and Treading on the necks of Emperours, to mocke both them, and the Scripture, in the words of the 91. Psalm, “Thou shalt Tread upon the Lion and the Adder, the young Lion and the Dragon thou shalt Trample under thy feet.”

The Manner Of Consecrations In The Scripture, Was Without Exorcisms

As for the rites of Consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgement of the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction, as the nature of the action it selfe requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures, be both decent, and significant, or at least conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the Tabernacle, the Altar, and the Vessels belonging to them (Exod. 40.) he anointed them with the Oyle which God had commanded to bee made for that purpose; and they were holy; There was nothing Exorcised, to drive away Phantasmes. The same Moses (the civill Soveraigne of Israel) when he consecrated Aaron (the High Priest,) and his Sons, did wash them with Water, (not Exorcised water,) put their Garments upon them, and anointed them with Oyle; and they were

sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the Priests office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before hee presented them to God, to be his servants. When King Solomon, (the civill Soveraigne of Israel) consecrated the Temple hee had built, (2 Kings 8.) he stood before all the Congregation of Israel; and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God, for putting into the heart of his father, to build it; and for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that House, though it were not sutable to his infinite Greatnesse; and to hear the prayers of his Servants that should pray therein, or (if they were absent) towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of Peace-offering, and the House was dedicated. Here was no Procession; the King stood still in his first place; no Exorcised Water; no Asperges Me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion; but a decent, and rationall speech, and such as in making to God a present of his new built House, was most conformable to the occasion. We read not that St. John did Exorcise the Water of Jordan; nor Philip the Water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any Pastor in the time of the Apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the nose of the person to be Baptized, and say, “In odorem suavitatis,” that is, “for a sweet savour unto the Lord;” wherein neither the Ceremony of Spittle, for the uncleannesse; nor the application of that Scripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.

The Immortality Of Mans Soule, Not Proved By Scripture To Be Of Nature, But Of Grace

To prove that the Soule separated from the Body liveth eternally, not onely the Soules of the Elect, by especiall grace, and restauration of the Eternall

Life which Adam lost by Sinne, and our Saviour restored by the Sacrifice of himself, to the Faithfull, but also the Soules of Reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: but such, as when I compare them with that which I have before (Chapter 38.) alledged out of the 14 of Job, seem to mee much more subject to a divers interpretation, than the words of Job.

And first there are the words of Solomon (Ecclesiastes 12.7.) “Then shall the Dust return to Dust, as it was, and the Spirit shall return to God that gave it.” Which may bear well enough (if there be no other text directly against it) this interpretation, that God onely knows, (but Man not,) what becomes of a mans spirit, when he expireth; and the same Solomon, in the same Book, (Cha. ver. 20,21.) delivereth in the same sentence in the sense I have given it: His words are, “All goe, (man and beast) to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of Man goeth upward, and the spirit of the Beast goeth downward to the earth?” That is, none knows but God; Nor is it an unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not, “God knows what,” and “God knows where.” That of Gen. 5.24. “Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him;” which is expounded Heb. 13.5. “He was translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because God had translated him. For before his Translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God,” making as much for the Immortality of the Body, as of the Soule, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; not common to them with the wicked; and depending on Grace, not on Nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides the literall sense of the words of Solomon (Eccles. 3.19.) “That which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dyeth, so doth the other;

yea, they have all one breath (one spirit;) so that a Man hath no praeeminence above a Beast, for all is vanity." By the literall sense, here is no Naturall Immortality of the Soule; nor yet any repugnancy with the Life Eternall, which the Elect shall enjoy by Grace. And (cha. ver.3.) "Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they;" that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the Soule of all them that have lived, were Immortall, were a hard saying; for then to have an Immortall Soule, were worse than to have no Soule at all. And againe,(Chapt. 9.5.) "The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing;" that is, Naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.

Another place which seems to make for a Naturall Immortality of the Soule, is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a Life then actuall; and in the same sense that God said to Adam, that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ spake; but are not actually till the Resurrection. And the History of Dives and Lazarus, make nothing against this, if wee take it (as it is) for a Parable.

But there be other places of the New Testament, where an Immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident, that they shall all rise to Judgement. And it is said besides in many places, that they shall goe into "Everlasting fire, Everlasting torments, Everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth;" and all this is comprehended in the word Everlasting Death, which is ordinarily interpreted Everlasting Life In Torments: And yet I can find no where that any man shall live in torments Everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the Father of Mercies, that doth in Heaven and Earth all

that hee will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to doe, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evill, should punish mens transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of Everlasting Fire, and other the like phrases of Scripture.

I have shewed already, that the Kingdome of God by Christ beginneth at the day of Judgment: That in that day, the Faithfull shall rise again, with glorious, and spirituall Bodies, and bee his Subjects in that his Kingdome, which shall be Eternall; That they shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, nor eate and drink, as they did in their naturall bodies; but live for ever in their individuall persons, without the specificall eternity of generation: And that the Reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: As also, that those of the Elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spirituall, and Immortall. But that the bodies of the Reprobate, who make the Kingdome of Satan, shall also be glorious, or spirituall bodies, or that they shall bee as the Angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendring; or that their life shall be Eternall in their individuall persons, as the life of every faithfull man is, or as the life of Adam had been if hee had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save onely these places concerning Eternall Torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.

From whence may be inferred, that as the Elect after the Resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the Reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam, and his posterity were in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the Reprobate.

These things considered, the texts that mention Eternall Fire, Eternal Torments, or the Word That Never Dieth, contradict not the Doctrine of a Second, and Everlasting Death, in the proper and naturall sense of the word Death. The Fire, or Torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any one Eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adams sin, may at the Resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the Resurrection, as they did before: For there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the Resurrection (1 Cor. 15.) understandeth it onely of the Resurrection to Life Eternall; and not the Resurrection to Punishment. And of the first, he saith that the Body is "Sown in Corruption, raised in Incorruption; sown in Dishonour, raised in Honour; sown in Weaknesse, raised in Power; sown a Naturall body, raised a Spirituall body:" There is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them that rise to Punishment. The text is Luke 20. Verses 34,35,36. a fertile text. "The Children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world, and the Resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: Neither can they die any more; for they are equall to the Angells, and are the Children of God, being the Children of the Resurrection:" The Children of this world, that are in the estate which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is corrupt, and generate successively; which is an Immortality of the Kind, but not of the Persons of men: They are not worthy to be counted amongst them that

shall obtain the next world, and an absolute Resurrection from the dead; but onely a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end onely to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The Elect are the onely children of the Resurrection; that is to say the sole heirs of Eternall Life: they only can die no more; it is they that are equall to the Angels, and that are the children of God; and not the Reprobate. To the Reprobate there remaineth after the Resurrection, a Second, and Eternall Death: between which Resurrection, and their Second, and Eternall death, is but a time of Punishment and Torment; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of Man by propagation shall endure, which is Eternally.

Answer Of The Texts Alledged For Purgatory

Upon this Doctrine of the Naturall Eternity of separated Soules, is founded (as I said) the Doctrine of Purgatory. For supposing Eternall Life by Grace onely, there is no Life, but the Life of the Body; and no Immortality till the Resurrection. The texts for Purgatory alledged by Bellarmine out of the Canonicall Scripture of the old Testament, are first, the Fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned (2 Kings, 1. 12.); and againe, (2 Sam. 3. 35.) for the death of Abner. This Fasting of David, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at Gods hands, after their death; because after he had Fasted to procure the recovery of his owne child, assoone as he know it was dead, he called for meate. Seeing then the Soule hath an existence separate from the Body, and nothing can be obtained by mens Fasting for the Soules that are already either in Heaven, or Hell, it followeth that there be some Soules of dead men, what are neither in Heaven, nor in Hell; and therefore they must bee in some third place, which must be Purgatory. And thus with hard straining, hee has wrested those places to the

proofe of a Purgatory; whereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of Mourning, and Fasting, when they are used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable to the Mourners, they are used for honours sake to their persons; and when tis done for the death of them by whose life the Mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular dammage: And so David honoured Saul, and Abner, with his Fasting; and in the death of his owne child, recomforted himselfe, by receiving his ordinary food.

In the other places, which he alledgeth out of the old Testament, there is not so much as any shew, or colour of proofe. He brings in every text wherein there is the word Anger, or Fire, or Burning, or Purging, or Clensing, in case any of the Fathers have but in a Sermon rhetorically applied it to the Doctrine of Purgatory, already beleeved. The first verse of Psalme, 37. “O Lord rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure:” What were this to Purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the Wrath to the fire of Hell, and the Displeasure, to that of Purgatory? And what is it to Purgatory, that of Psalme, 66. 12. “Wee went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place;” and other the like texts, (with which the Doctors of those times entended to adorne, or extend their Sermons, or Commentaries) haled to their purposes by force of wit?

Places Of The New Testament For Purgatory Answered

But he alledgeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easie to be answered: And first that of Matth. 12.32. “Whosoever speaketh a word against the Sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not bee forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come:” Where he will have Purgatory to be the World to come, wherein some sinnes may be forgiven, which in this World were not

forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but three Worlds; one from the Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by Water, and is called in Scripture the Old World; another from the Flood to the day of Judgement, which is the Present World, and shall bee destroyed by Fire; and the third, which shall bee from the day of Judgement forward, everlasting, which is called the World To Come; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no Purgatory; And therefore the World to come, and Purgatory, are inconsistent. But what then can bee the meaning of those our Saviours words? I confesse they are very hardly to bee reconciled with all the Doctrines now unanimously received: Nor is it any shame, to confesse the profoundnesse of the Scripture, to bee too great to be sounded by the shortnesse of humane understanding. Neverthelesse, I may propound such things to the consideration of more learned Divines, as the text it selfe suggesteth. And first, seeing to speake against the Holy Ghost, as being the third Person of the Trinity, is to speake against the Church, in which the Holy Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, betweene the Easinesse of our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while he was on earth, and the Severity of the Pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority, which was from the Holy Ghost: As if he should say, You that deny my Power; nay you that shall crucifie me, shall be pardoned by mee, as often as you turne unto mee by Repentance: But if you deny the Power of them that teach you hereafter, by vertue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this World, and leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unlesse you turn also to them,) to the punishments (as much as lies in them) of the World to come: And so the words may be taken as a Prophecy, or Praediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the Christian Church: Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not peremptory in such difficult places,) perhaps there may be place left after the Resurrection for

the Repentance of some sinners: And there is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15. 29.) “What shall they doe which are Baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they Baptized for the dead?” a man may probably inferre, as some have done, that in St. Pauls time, there was a custome by receiving Baptisme for the dead, (as men that now beleeve, are Sureties and Undertakers for the Faith of Infants, that are not capable of beleeving,) to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our Saviour for their King, at his coming again; and then the forgivenesse of sins in the world to come, has no need of a Purgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox, that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are throughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Onely of thus much, I see evident Scripture, to perswade men, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of Purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the Soule without the Body; neither for the Soule of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the Soules of them which the Romane Church pretend to be tormented now in Purgatory. For God, that could give a life to a peece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten Carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall Body.

Another place is that of 1 Cor. 3. where it is said that they which built Stubble, Hay, &c. on the true Foundation, their work shall perish; but “they themselves shall be saved; but as through Fire:” This Fire, he will have to be the Fire of Purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zach. 13. 9. where he saith, “I will bring the third part through the Fire, and refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed;” Which is spoken of the comming of the Messiah in Power and

Glory; that is, at the day of Judgment, and Conflagration of the present world; wherein the Elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous Doctrines, and Traditions, and have them as it were sindged off; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the Apostle saith of them, that holding this Foundation Jesus Is The Christ, shall build thereon some other Doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall passe through it to Salvation; but so, as to see, and relinquish their former Errours. The Builders, are the Pastors; the Foundation, that Jesus Is The Christ; the Stubble and Hay, False Consequences Drawn From It Through Ignorance, Or Frailty; the Gold, Silver, and pretious Stones, are their True Doctrines; and their Refining or Purging, the Relinquishing Of Their Errors. In all which there is no colour at all for the burning of Incorporeall, that is to say, Impatible Souls.

Baptisme For The Dead, How Understood

A third place is that of 1 Cor. 15. before mentioned, concerning Baptisme for the Dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that Prayers for the Dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a Fire of Purgatory: But neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word Baptisme, he approveth this in the first place, that by Baptisme is meant (metaphorically) a Baptisme of Penance; and that men are in this sense Baptized, when they Fast, and Pray, and give Almes: And so Baptisme for the Dead, and Prayer of the Dead, is the same thing. But this is a Metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture. The word Baptisme is used (Mar. 10. 38. & Luk. 12. 59.) for

being Dipped in ones own bloud, as Christ was upon the Cross, and as most of the Apostles were, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that Prayer, Fasting, and Almes, have any similitude with Dipping. The same is used also Mat. 3. 11. (which seemeth to make somewhat for Purgatory) for a Purging with Fire. But it is evident the Fire and Purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the Prophet Zachary speaketh (cha. v. 9.) “I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will Refine them, &c.” And St. Peter after him (1 Epist. 1. 7.) “That the triall of your Faith, which is much more precious than of Gold that perisheth, though it be tryed with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the Appearing of Jesus Christ;” And St. Paul (1 Cor. 3. 13.) The Fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is.” But St. Peter, and St. Paul speak of the Fire that shall be at the Second Appearing of Christ; and the Prophet Zachary of the Day of Judgment: And therefore this place of S. Mat. may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity of the Fire of Purgatory.

Another interpretation of Baptisme for the Dead, is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability; And thence also he inferreth the utility of Prayer for the Dead. For if after the Resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ, or not beleeved in him, may be received into Christs Kingdome; it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them, till they should be risen. But granting that God, at the prayers of the faithfull, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point, cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for Purgatory, because to rise from Death to Life, is one thing; to rise from Purgatory to Life is another; and being a rising from Life to Life, from a Life in torments to a Life in joy.

A fourth place is that of Mat. 5. 25. “Agree with thine Adversary quickly, whilest thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the Adversary

deliver thee to the Officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou has paid the uttermost farthing." In which Allegory, the Offender is the Sinner; both the Adversary and the Judge is God; the Way is this Life; the Prison is the Grave; the Officer, Death; from which, the sinner shall not rise again to life eternall, but to a second Death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his Passion, which is a full Ransome for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally veniall.

The fift place, is that of Matth. 5. 22. "Whosoever is angry with his Brother without a cause, shall be guilty in Judgment. And whosoever shall say to his Brother, RACHA, shall be guilty in the Councel. But whosoever shall say, Thou Foole, shall be guilty to hell fire." From which words he inferreth three sorts of Sins, and three sorts of Punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there is punishment of lesser sins in Purgatory. Of which inference, there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given to them: Shall there be a distinction after this life of Courts of Justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviours time, to hear, and determine divers sorts of Crimes; as the Judges, and the Councell? Shall not all Judicature appertain to Christ, and his Apostles? To understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this Chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the Grammaticall sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the Legislator. Therefore whereas they thought the Sixth Commandement was not broken, but by Killing a man; nor the Seventh, but when a man lay with a woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them, the inward Anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just

cause, is Homicide: You have heard (saith hee) the Law of Moses, “Thou shalt not Kill,” and that “Whosoever shall Kill, shall be condemned before the Judges,” or before the Session of the Seventy: But I say unto you, to be Angry with ones Brother without cause; or to say unto him Racha, or Foole, is Homicide, and shall be punished at the day of Judgment, and Session of Christ, and his Apostles, with Hell fire: so that those words were not used to distinguish between divers Crimes, and divers Courts of Justice, and divers Punishments; but to taxe the distinction between sin, and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the Will in Obeying God, but from the difference of their Temporall Courts of Justice; and to shew them that he that had the Will to hurt his Brother, though the effect appear but in Reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the Judges, and by the Session, which shall be the same, not different Courts at the day of Judgment. This Considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain Purgatory, I cannot imagine.

The sixth place is Luke 16. 9. “Make yee friends of the unrighteous Mammon, that when yee faile, they may receive you into Everlasting Tabernacles.” This he alledges to prove Invocation of Saints departed. But the sense is plain, That we should make friends with our Riches, of the Poore, and thereby obtain their Prayers whilest they live. “He that giveth to the Poore, lendeth to the Lord. “The seventh is Luke 23. 42. “Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome:” Therefore, saith hee, there is Remission of sins after this life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave him; and at his comming againe in Glory, will remember to raise him againe to Life Eternall.

The Eight is Acts 2. 24. where St. Peter saith of Christ, “that God had raised him up, and loosed the Paines of Death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it;” Which hee interprets to bee a descent of Christ into Purgatory, to loose some Soules there from their torments; whereas it is

manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was hee that could not bee holden of Death, or the Grave; and not the Souls in Purgatory. But if that which Beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed, there is none that will not see, that in stead of Paynes, it should be Bands; and then there is no further cause to seek for Purgatory in this Text.

CHAPTER XLV. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF THE

GENTILES

The Originall Of Daemonology

The impression made on the organs of Sight, by lucide Bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from Opaque, or refracted in the passage through Diaphanous Bodies, produceth in living Creatures, in whom God hath placed such Organs, an Imagination of the Object, from whence the Impression proceedeth; which Imagination is called Sight; and seemeth not to bee a meer Imagination, but the Body it selfe without us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himselfe; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but onely a motion in the interiour organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call Imagination, and Memory, and (in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by Sicknesse, or Violence) a Dream: of which things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third Chapters.

This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Naturall Knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard

for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: Which some (because they vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely Incorporeall, that is to say Immateriall, of Formes without Matter; Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured Body; and that they can put on Aiery bodies (as a garment) to make them Visible when they will to our bodily Eyes; and others say, are Bodies, and living Creatures, but made of Air, or other more subtile and aethereall Matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed. But Both of them agree on one generall appellation of them, DAEMONS. As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed, were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or Hell; not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason, as if one should say, he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-Glasse, or the Ghosts of the Stars in a River; or call the ordinary apparition of the Sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the Daemon, or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world: And by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to doe them good, or harme; and consequently, given occasion to the Governours of the Heathen Common-wealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that DAEMONOLOGY (in which the Poets, as Principal Priests of the Heathen Religion, were specially employed, or reverenced) to the Publique Peace, and to the Obedience of Subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them Good Daemons, and others Evill; the one as a Spurre to the Observance, the other, as Reines to withhold them from Violation of the Laws.

What Were The Daemons Of The Ancients

What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of Daemons, appeareth partly in the Genealogie of their Gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient Poets of the Graecians; and partly in other Histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the 12. Chapter of this discourse.

How That Doctrine Was Spread

The Graecians, by their Colonies and Conquests, communicated their Language and Writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by necessary consequence their Daemonology, or (as St. Paul calles it) “their Doctrines of Devils;” And by that meanes, the contagion was derived also to the Jewes, both of Judaea, and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of Daemon they did not (as the Graecians) attribute to Spirits both Good, and Evill; but to the Evill onely: And to the Good Daemons they gave the name of the Spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be Prophets. In summe, all singularity if Good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and if Evill, to some Daemon, but a kakodaimen, an Evill Daemon, that is, a Devill. And therefore, they called Daemoniaques, that is, possessed by the Devill, such as we call Madmen or Lunatiques; or such as had the Falling Sicknesse; or that spoke any thing, which they for want of understanding, thought absurd: As also of an Unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an Unclean Spirit; of a Dumbe man, that he had a Dumbe Devill; and of John Baptist (Math. 11. 18.) for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a Devill; and of our Saviour, because he said, hee that keepeth his sayings should not see Death In Aeternum, (John 8. 52.) “Now we know thou hast a Devill; Abraham is dead, and the Prophets are dead:” And again, because he

said (John 7. 20.) “They went about to kill him,” the people answered, “Thou hast a Devill, who goeth about to kill thee?” Whereby it is manifest, that the Jewes had the same opinions concerning Phantasmes, namely, that they were not Phantasmes that is, Idols of the braine, but things reall, and independent on the Fancy.

Why Our Saviour Controlled It Not

Which doctrine if it be not true, why (may some say) did not our Saviour contradict it, and teach the Contrary? nay why does he use on diverse occasions, such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I answer, that first, where Christ saith, “A Spirit hath not flesh and bone,” though hee shew that there be Spirits, yet he denies not that they are Bodies: And where St. Paul sais, “We shall rise Spirituall Bodies,” he acknowledgeth the nature of Spirits, but that they are Bodily Spirits; which is not difficult to understand. For Air and many other things are Bodies, though not Flesh and Bone, or any other grosse body, to bee discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour speaketh to the Devill, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the Devill, be meant a Disease, as Phrenesy, or Lunacy, or a corporeal Spirit, is not the speech improper? can Diseases heare? or can there be a corporeall Spirit in a Body of Flesh and Bone, full already of vitall and animall Spirits? Are there not therefore Spirits, that neither have Bodies, nor are meer Imaginations? To the first I answer, that the addressing of our Saviours command to the Madnesse, or Lunacy he cureth, is no more improper, then was his rebuking of the Fever, or of the Wind, and Sea; for neither do these hear: Or than was the command of God, to the Light, to the Firmament, to the Sunne, and Starres, when he commanded them to bee; for they could not heare before they had a beeing. But those speeches are not

improper, because they signifie the power of Gods Word: no more therefore is it improper, to command Madnesse, or Lunacy (under the appellation of Devils, by which they were then commonly understood,) to depart out of a mans body. To the second, concerning their being Incorporeall, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other Corporeal Spirit, but that of his owne, by which his body is naturally moved.

The Scriptures Doe Not Teach That Spirits Are Incorporeall

Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the form of a Dove, is said by St. Matthew (Chapt. 4. 1.) to have been "led up by the Spirit into the Wildernesse;" and the same is recited (Luke 4. 1.) in these words, "Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the Wildernesse;" Whereby it is evident, that by Spirit there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for a Possession: For Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another. And whereas in the verses following, he is said "to have been taken up by the Devill into the Holy City, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple," shall we conclude thence that hee was possessed of the Devill, or carryed thither by violence? And again, "carryed thence by the Devill into an exceeding high mountain, who shewed him them thence all the Kingdomes of the world:" herein, wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed, or forced by the Devill; nor that any Mountaine is high enough, (according to the literall sense,) to shew him one whole Hemisphere. What then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the Wildernesse; and that this carrying of him up and down, from the Wildernesse to the City, and from thence into a Mountain,

was a Vision? Conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that hee was led into the Wildernesse, not By, but In the Spirit: whereas concerning His being Taken up into the Mountaine, and unto the Pinnacle of the Temple, hee speaketh as St. Matthew doth. Which suiteth with the nature of a Vision.

Again, where St. Luke sayes of Judas Iscariot, that "Satan entred into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the Chief Priests, and Captaines, how he might betray Christ unto them:" it may be answered, that by the Entring of Satan (that is the Enemy) into him, is meant, the hostile and traiterous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture understood, the Graces and good Inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so by the Entring of Satan, may bee understood the wicked Cogitations, and Designes of the Adversaries of Christ, and his Disciples. For as it is hard to say, that the Devill was entred into Judas, before he had any such hostile designe; so it is impertinent to say, he was first Christs Enemy in his heart, and that the Devill entred into him afterwards. Therefore the Entring of Satan, and his Wicked Purpose, was one and the same thing.

But if there be no Immateriall Spirit, nor any Possession of mens bodies by any Spirit Corporeall, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his Apostles did not teach the People so; and in such cleer words, as they might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more curious, than necessary for a Christian mans Salvation. Men may as well aske, why Christ that could have given to all men Faith, Piety, and all manner of morall Vertues, gave it to some onely, and not to all: and why he left the search of naturall Causes, and Sciences, to the naturall Reason and Industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally; and many other such questions: Of which neverthelesse there may be alledged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when he brought the Israelites into

the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein, by subduing all the Nations round about them; but left many of them, as thornes in their sides, to awaken from time to time their Piety and Industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly Kingdome, did not destroy all the difficulties of Naturall Questions; but left them to exercise our Industry, and Reason; the Scope of his preaching, being onely to shew us this plain and direct way to Salvation, namely, the beleef of this Article, "that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himselfe for our Sins, and at his comming again, gloriously to reign over his Elect, and to save them from their Enemies eternally:" To which, the opinion of Possession by Spirits, or Phantasmes, are no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own Inventions. If wee require of the Scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of Gods commands; we may as well complaine of Moses for not having set downe the time of the creation of such Spirits, as well as of the Creation of the Earth, and Sea, and of Men, and Beasts. To conclude, I find in Scripture that there be Angels, and Spirits, good and evill; but not that they are Incorporeall, as are the Apparitions men see in the Dark, or in a Dream, or Vision; which the Latines call Spectra, and took for Daemons. And I find that there are Spirits Corporeal, (though subtile and Invisible;) but not that any mans body was possessed, or inhabited by them; And that the Bodies of the Saints shall be such, namely, Spirituall Bodies, as St. Paul calls them.

The Power Of Casting Out Devills, Not The Same It Was In The Primitive Church

Neverthelesse, the contrary Doctrine, namely, that there be Incorporeall Spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of Exorcisme, (that is to say, of ejection of Devills by Conjuration) is thereupon built; and (though rarely and faintly practised) is not yet totally given over. That there were many Daemoniaques in the Primitive Church, and few Mad-men, and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of, and see many Mad-men, and few Daemoniaques, proceeds not from the change of Nature; but of Names. But how it comes to passe, that whereas heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time, the Pastors of the Church, did cure those singular Diseases, which now they are not seen to doe; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true Beleever now, to doe all that the Faithfull did then, that is to say, as we read (Mark 16. 17.) “In Christs name to cast out Devills, to speak with new Tongues, to take up Serpents, to drink deadly Poison without harm taking, and to cure the Sick by the laying on of their hands,” and all this without other words, but “in the Name of Jesus,” is another question. And it is probable, that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity onely in his Kingdome to come; and consequently, that when they sought Authority, and Riches, and trusted to their own Subtilty for a Kingdome of this world, these supernaturall gifts of God were again taken from them.

Another Relique Of Gentilisme, Worshipping Images, Left In The Church

Not Brought Into It

Another relique of Gentilisme, is the Worship of Images, neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them, after they had given their

names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the generall Religion of the Gentiles, to worship for Gods, those Apparences that remain in the Brain from the impression of externall Bodies upon the organs of their Senses, which are commonly called Ideas, Idols, Phantasmes, Conceits, as being Representations of those externall Bodies, which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a Dream: And this is the reason why St. Paul says, "Wee know that an Idol is Nothing:" Not that he thought that an Image of Metall, Stone, or Wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honored, or feared in the Image, and held for a God, was a meer Figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the Brain. And the worship of these with Divine Honour, is that which is in the Scripture called Idolatry, and Rebellion against God. For God being King of the Jews, and his Lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the High Priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to Images, (which are Representations of their own Fancies,) they had had no farther dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude; nor on his prime Ministers, Moses, and the High Priests; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the Common-wealth, and their own destruction for want of Union. And therefore the first Law of God was, "They should not take for Gods, ALIENOS DEOS, that is, the Gods of other nations, but that onely true God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their enemies." And the second was, that "they should not make to themselves any Image to Worship, of their own Invention." For it is the same deposing of a King, to submit to another King, whether he be set up by a neighbour nation, or by our selves.

Answer To Certain Seeming Texts For Images

The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of Images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where God is worshipped, are First, two Examples; one of the Cherubins over the Ark of God; the other of the Brazen Serpent: Secondly, some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain Creatures for their relation to God; as to worship his Footstool: And lastly, some other texts, by which is authorized, a religious honoring of Holy things. But before I examine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I must first explain what is to be understood by Worshipping, and what by Images, and Idols.

What Is Worship

I have already shewn in the 20 Chapter of this Discourse, that to Honor, is to value highly the Power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in Power; we Honor him not but Dishonour him by any Value lesse than Infinite. And thus Honor is properly of its own nature, secret, and internall in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appeare outwardly in their words and actions, are the signes of our Honoring, and these goe by the name of WORSHIP, in Latine, CULTUS. Therefore, to Pray to, to Swear by, to Obey, to bee Diligent, and Officious in Serving: in summe, all words and actions that betoken Fear to Offend, or Desire to Please, is Worship, whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they appear as signes of Honoring, are ordinarily also called Honor.

Distinction Between Divine And Civill Worship

The Worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men, as to Kings, and men in Authority, is Civill Worship: But the worship we exhibite to that which we think to bee God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is Divine Worship. To fall prostrate before a King, in him that thinks him but a Man, is but Civill Worship: And he that but putteth off his hat in the Church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the House of God, worshippeth with Divine Worship. They that seek the distinction of Divine and Civill Worship, not in the intention of the Worshipper, but in the Words douleia, and latreia, deceive themselves. For whereas there be two sorts of Servants; that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their Masters, as Slaves taken in war, and their Issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the Will of their Masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience,) and that are bought and sold as Beasts, were called Douloi, that is properly, Slaves, and their Service, Douleia: The other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their Masters) voluntarily; are called Thetes; that is, Domestique Servants; to whose service the Masters have no further right, than is contained in the Covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of Servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: And the word Latris, is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: So that Latreia signifieth generally all Service; but Douleia the service of Bondmen onely, and the condition of Slavery: And both are used in Scripture (to signifie our Service of God) promiscuously. Douleia, because we are Gods Slaves; Latreia, because wee Serve him: and in all kinds of Service is contained, not onely Obedience, but also Worship, that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signifie Honor.

An Image What Phantasmes

An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the Resemblance of some thing visible: In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of Visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely Images; such as are the Shew of a man, or other thing in the Water, by Reflexion, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct Vision in the Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where thy seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our Imagination, and in our Dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend onely upon the Fancy. And these are the Images which are originally and most properly called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of the Graecians, with whom the word Eido signifieth to See. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language, Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans Nature, is called the Imagination. And from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can bee any Image made of a thing Invisible.

It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And therefore there can bee no Image of God: nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits, but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.

Fictions; Materiall Images

And whereas a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the Poets make their Centaures, Chimaeras, and other Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to those Shapes, and make them in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also called Images, not for the resemblance of any corporeall thing, but for the resemblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of the Maker. But in these Idols, as they are originally in the Brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the Materiall Body made by Art, may be said to be the Image of the Phantasticall Idoll made by Nature.

But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign. And many times in the Idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their Materiall Idoll to the Idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the Image of it. For a Stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their Gods. And at this day we see many Images of the Virgin Mary, and other Saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one mans Fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the Names onely, to represent the Persons mentioned in the History; to which every man applyeth a Mentall Image of his owne making, or none at all. And thus an Image in the largest sense, is either the Resemblance, or the Representation of some thing Visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part.

But the name of Idoll is extended yet further in Scripture, to signifie also the Sunne, or a Starre, or any other Creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for Gods.

Idolatry What

Having shewn what is Worship, and what an Image; I will now put them together, and examine what that IDOLATRY is, which is forbidden in the Second Commandement, and other places of the Scripture.

To worship an Image, is voluntarily to doe those externall acts, which are signes of honoring either the matter of the Image, which is Wood, Stone, or Metall, or some other visible creature; or the Phantasme of the brain, for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and figured; or both together, as one animate Body, composed of the Matter and the Phantasme, as of a Body and Soule.

To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry.

To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us, is Divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compell a man to it by the terrour of Death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not Idolatry: For the Worship which the Soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry. Neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block

before his Brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of the Soveraign.

To worship God, in some peculiar Place, or turning a mans face towards an Image, or determinate Place, is not to worship, or honor the Place, or Image; but to acknowledge it Holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the Image, or the Place to be set apart from common use: for that is the meaning of the word Holy; which implies no new quality in the Place, or Image; but onely a new Relation by Appropriation to God; and therefore is not Idolatry; no more than it was Idolatry to worship God before the Brazen Serpent; or for the Jews when they were out of their owne countrey, to turn their faces (when they prayed) toward the Temple of Jerusalem; or for Moses to put off his Shoes when he was before the Flaming Bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai; which place God had chosen to appear in, and to give his Laws to the People of Israel, and was therefore Holy ground, not by inhaerent sanctity, but by separation to Gods use; or for Christians to worship in the Churches, which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the Authority of the King, or other true Representant of the Church. But to worship God, is inanimating, or inhibiting, such Image, or place; that is to say, an infinite substance in a finite place, is Idolatry: for such finite Gods, are but Idols of the brain, nothing reall; and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of Vanity, and Lyes, and Nothing. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or present in the place, or Image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some works of his, in case the Place, or Image be dedicated, or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our Soveraign Pastors, is Idolatry. For the Commandement is, “Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven image.” God commanded Moses to set up the Brazen

Serpent; hee did not make it to himselfe; it was not therefore against the Commandement. But the making of the Golden Calfe by Aaron, and the People, as being done without authority from God, was Idolatry; not onely because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a Religious use, without warrant either from God their Soveraign, or from Moses, that was his Lieutenant.

The Gentiles worshipped for Gods, Jupiter, and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious Acts; and for the Children of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an Immortall Deity, and a mortall man. This was Idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternall Law of Reason, nor in his positive and revealed Will. But though our Saviour was a man, whom wee also beleeve to bee God Immortall, and the Son of God; yet this is no Idolatry; because wee build not that beleef upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures. And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, "This is my Body," signifie, "that he himselfe, and the seeming bread in his hand; and not onely so, but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by Priests, bee so many Christs bodies, and yet all of them but one body," then is that no Idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text doe not signifie that, (for there is no other that can be alledged for it,) then, because it is a worship of humane institution, it is Idolatry. For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the Bread into Christs Body: For the Gentiles also held God to be Omnipotent; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their Idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, as transubstantiation of their Wood, and Stone into God Almighty.

Whereas there be, that pretend Divine Inspiration, to be a supernaturall entring of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of Gods grace,

by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous Dilemma. For if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so inspired, they fall into Impiety; as not adoring Gods supernaturall Presence. And again, if they worship them, they commit Idolatry; for the Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore the safest way is to beleeve, that by the Descending of the Dove upon the Apostles; and by Christs Breathing on them, when hee gave them the Holy Ghost; and by the giving of it by Imposition of Hands, are understood the signes which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to Preach his Kingdome, and in their Conversation, that it might not be Scandalous, but Edifying to others.

Scandalous Worship Of Images

Besides the Idolatrous Worship of Images, there is also a Scandalous Worship of them; which is also a sin; but not Idolatry. For Idolatry is to worship by signes of an internall, and reall honour: but Scandalous Worship, is but Seeming Worship; and may sometimes bee joined with an inward, and hearty detestation, both of the Image, and of the Phantasticall Daemon, or Idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed onely from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is neverthelesse a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of Religion: Whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling.

If therefore a Pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, doe externall honor to

an Idol for fear; unlesse he make his feare, and unwillingnesse to it, as evident as the worship; he Scandalizeth his Brother, by seeming to approve Idolatry. For his Brother, arguing from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to bee lawfull in it selfe. And this Scandall, is Sin, and a Scandall given. But if one being no Pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian Doctrine, doe the same, and another follow him; this is no Scandall given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of Scandall which hee taketh of himselfe for an excuse before men: For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an idolatrous King, or State, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an Idoll, hee detesteth the Idoll in his heart, hee doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should doe better. But if a Pastor, who as Christs Messenger, has undertaken to teach Christs Doctrine to all nations, should doe the same, it were not onely a sinfull Scandall, in respect of other Christian mens consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.

The summe of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the Worship of Images, is that, that he that worshippeth in an Image, or any Creature, either the Matter thereof, or any Fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it; or both together; or beleeveth that such things hear his Prayers, or see his Devotions, without Ears, or Eyes, committeth Idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such Worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a man whose example hath power amongst his Brethren, committeth a sin: But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an Image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but taken from the commandement of Gods Word, as the Jewes did in worshipping God before the Cherubins, and before the Brazen Serpent for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not Idolatry.

Now for the Worship of Saints, and Images, and Reliques, and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the Word of God, not brought into the Church of Rome, from the Doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the Bishops of Rome.

Answer To The Argument From The Cherubins, And Brazen Serpent

As for the proofs alledged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of Images appointed by God to bee set up; They were not set up for the people, or any man to worship; but that they should worship God himselfe before them: as before the Cherubins over the Ark, and the Brazen Serpent. For we read not, that the Priest, or any other did worship the Cherubins; but contrarily wee read (2 Kings 18.4.) that Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent which Moses had set up, because the People burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put for our Imitation, that we also should set up Images, under pretence of worshipping God before them; because the words of the second Commandement, “Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image, &c.” distinguish between the Images that God commanded to be set up, and those which wee set up to our selves. And therefore from the Cherubins, or Brazen Serpent, to the Images of mans devising; and from the Worship commanded by God, to the Will-Worship of men, the argument is not good. This also is to bee considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should doe so no more; so also Christian Soveraigns ought to break down the Images which their Subjects have been accustomed to worship; that there be no more occasion of such Idolatry. For at this day,

the ignorant People, where Images are worshipped, doe really beleeve there is a Divine Power in the Images; and are told by their Pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done by the Saint, which they think either is the Image it self, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the Calfe, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was Idolatry, because they thought the Calfe either was that God, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the Image to be God, or a Saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the Golden Calfe was made, the people said, (Exod. 32. 2.) “These are thy Gods O Israel;” and where the Images of Laban (Gen. 31.30.) are called his Gods. And wee see daily by experience in all sorts of People, that such men as study nothing but their food and ease, are content to beleeve any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entaile unalienable, except by an expresse and new Law.

Painting Of Fancies No Idolatry: Abusing Them To Religious Worship Is

But they inferre from some other places, that it is lawfull to paint Angels, and also God himselfe: as from Gods walking in the Garden; from Jacobs seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other Visions, and Dreams. But Visions, and Dreams whether naturall, or supernaturall, are but Phantasmes: and he that painteth an Image of any of them, maketh not an Image of God, but of his own Phantasm, which is, making of an Idol. I say not, that to draw a Picture after a fancy, is a Sin; but when it is drawn, to hold it for a Representation of God, is against the second Commandement; and can be of no use, but to worship. And the same may be said of the

Images of Angels, and of men dead; unlesse as Monuments of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: For such use of an Image, is not Worship of the Image; but a civill honoring of the Person, not that is, but that was: But when it is done to the Image which we make of a Saint, for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the honour wee doe him, when dead, and without sense, wee attribute to him more than humane power; and therefore it is Idolatry.

Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the Law of Moses, nor in the Gospel, for the religious Worship of Images, or other Representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the Worship of the Image of any Creature in Heaven, or Earth, or under the Earth: And whereas Christian Kings, who are living Representants of God, are not to be worshipped by their Subjects, by any act, that signifieth a greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortall man is capable of; It cannot be imagined, that the Religious Worship now in use, was brought into the Church, by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the Images themselves, in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.

How Idolatry Was Left In The Church

The cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the workmanship of them, which made the owners (though converted, from worshipping them as they had done Religiously for Daemons) to retain them still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honor of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the Pastors of the Primitive Church; as being easie, by giving them new names, to make that an Image of the Virgin Mary, and of her Sonne our Saviour, which before

perhaps was called the Image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a Jupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like. And as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the Pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new made Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the Images of Christ and his Apostles, grow more and more Idolatrous; save that somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers Emperors, and Bishops, and generall Councells observed, and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof; but too late, or too weakly.

Canonizing Of Saints

The Canonizing of Saints, is another Relique of Gentilisme: It is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custome as ancient as the Common-wealth of Rome it self. The first that ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon the narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the Senate, he spake with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in Heaven, and was there called Quirinius, and would be propitious to the State of their new City: And thereupon the Senate gave Publique Testimony of his Sanctity. Julius Caesar, and other Emperors after him, had the like Testimony; that is, were Canonized for Saints; now defined; and is the same with the Apotheosis of the Heathen.

The Name Of Pontifex

It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the name, and power of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. This was the name of him that in the ancient Common-wealth of Rome, had the Supreme Authority under the Senate and People, of regulating all Ceremonies, and Doctrines concerning their Religion: And when Augustus Caesar changed the State into a Monarchy, he took to himselfe no more but this office, and that of Tribune of the People, (than is to say, the Supreme Power both in State, and Religion;) and the succeeding Emperors enjoyed the same. But when the Emperour Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian Religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause Religion to be regulated (under his authority) by the Bishop of Rome: Though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but rather, that the succeeding Bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the Bishops of the Roman Provinces. For it is not any Priviledge of St. Peter, but the Priviledge of the City of Rome, which the Emperors were alwaies willing to uphold; that gave them such authority over other Bishops; as may be evidently seen by that, that the Bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperour made that City the Seat of the Empire, pretended to bee equall to the Bishop of Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carryed it, and became the Pontifex Maximus; but in right onely of the Emperour; and not without the bounds of the Empire; nor any where, after the Emperour had lost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him. From whence wee may by the way observe, that there is no place for the superiority of the Pope over other Bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the Civill Soveraign; and where the Emperour having Soveraign Power Civill, hath expressely chosen the Pope for the chief Pastor under himselfe, of his Christian Subjects.

Procession Of Images

The carrying about of Images in Procession, is another Relique of the Religion of the Greeks, and Romans: For they also carried their Idols from place to place, in a kind of Chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latines called Thensa, and Vehiculum Deorum; and the Image was placed in a frame, or Shrine, which they called Ferculum: And that which they called Pompa, is the same that now is named Procession: According whereunto, amongst the Divine Honors which were given to Julius Caesar by the Senate, this was one, that in the Pompe (or Procession) at the Circaean games, he should have Thensam & Ferculum, a sacred Chariot, and a Shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a God: Just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers under a Canopie.

Wax Candles, And Torches Lighted

To these Processions also belonged the bearing of burning Torches, and Candles, before the Images of the Gods, both amongst the Greeks, and Romans. For afterwards the Emperors of Rome received the same honor; as we read of Caligula, that at his reception to the Empire, he was carried from Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of People, the wayes beset with Altars, and Beasts for Sacrifice, and burning Torches: And of Caracalla that was received into Alexandria with Incense, and with casting of Flowers, and Dadouchiais, that is, with Torches; for Dadochoi were they that amongst the Greeks carried Torches lighted in the Processions of their Gods: And in processe of time, the devout, but ignorant People, did many times honor their Bishops with the like pompe of Wax Candles, and the Images of our Saviour, and the Saints, constantly, in the Church it self. And

thus came in the use of Wax Candles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councells.

The Heathens had also their Aqua Lustralis, that is to say, Holy Water. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their Holy Dayes. They had their Bacchanalia; and we have our Wakes, answering to them: They their Saturnalia, and we our Carnevalls, and Shrove-tuesdays liberty of Servants: They their Procession of Priapus; wee our fetching in, erection, and dancing about May-poles; and Dancing is one kind of Worship: They had their Procession called Ambarvalia; and we our Procession about the fields in the Rogation Week. Nor do I think that these are all the Ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles: but they are all that I can for the present call to mind; and if a man would wel observe that which is delivered in the Histories, concerning the Religious Rites of the Greeks and Romanes, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty Bottles of Gentilisme, which the Doctors of the Romane Church, either by Negligence, or Ambition, have filled up again with the new Wine of Christianity, that will not faile in time to break them.

CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

What Philosophy Is

By Philosophy is understood “the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such Effects, as humane life requireth.” So the Geometrician, from the Construction of Figures, findeth out many Properties thereof; and from the Properties, new Ways of their Construction, by Reasoning; to the end to be able to measure Land and Water; and for infinite other uses. So the Astronomer, from the Rising, Setting, and Moving of the Sun, and Starres, in divers parts of the Heavens, findeth out the Causes of Day, and Night, and of the different Seasons of the Year; whereby he keepeth an account of Time: And the like of other Sciences.

Prudence No Part Of Philosophy

By which Definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that originall knowledge called Experience, in which consisteth Prudence: Because it is not attained by Reasoning, but found as well in Brute Beasts, as in Man; and is but a Memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the

effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most Prudent: whereas nothing is produced by Reasoning aright, but generall, eternall, and immutable Truth.

No False Doctrine Is Part Of Philosophy

Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false Conclusions: For he that Reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an Error:

No More Is Revelation Supernaturall

Nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall Revelation; because it is not acquired by Reasoning:

Nor Learning Taken Upon Credit Of Authors

Nor that which is gotten by Reasoning from the Authority of Books; because it is not by Reasoning from the Cause to the Effect, nor from the Effect to the Cause; and is not Knowledge, but Faith.

Of The Beginnings And Progresse Of Philosophy

The faculty of Reasoning being consequent to the use of Speech, it was not possible, but that there should have been some generall Truthes found out by Reasoning, as ancient almost as Language it selfe. The Savages of America, are not without some good Morall Sentences; also they have a little Arithmetick, to adde, and divide in Numbers not too great: but they are not therefore Philosophers. For as there were Plants of Corn and Wine in small quantity dispersed in the Fields and Woods, before men knew their

vertue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in Fields, and Vineyards; in which time they fed on Akorns, and drank Water: so also there have been divers true, generall, and profitable Speculations from the beginning; as being the naturall plants of humane Reason: But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon grosse Experience; there was no Method; that is to say, no Sowing, nor Planting of Knowledge by it self, apart from the Weeds, and common Plants of Errour and Conjecture: And the cause of it being the want of leasure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great Common-wealths, it should be otherwise. Leasure is the mother of Philosophy; and Common-wealth, the mother of Peace, and Leasure: Where first were great and flourishing Cities, there was first the study of Philosophy. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldea and Egypt, are counted the most ancient Philosophers; and those Countreys were the most ancient of Kingdomes. Philosophy was not risen to the Graecians, and other people of the West, whose Common-wealths (no greater perhaps then Lucca, or Geneva) had never Peace, but when their fears of one another were equall; nor the Leasure to observe any thing but one another. At length, when Warre had united many of these Graecian lesser Cities, into fewer, and greater; then began Seven Men, of severall parts of Greece, to get the reputation of being Wise; some of them for Morall and Politique Sentences; and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, which was Astronomy, and Geometry. But we hear not yet of any Schools of Philosophy.

Of The Schools Of Philosophy Amongst The Athenians

After the Athenians by the overthrow of the Persian Armies, had gotten the Dominion of the Sea; and thereby, of all the Islands, and Maritime Cities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17.21.) “in telling and hearing news,” or in discoursing of Philosophy publiquely to the youth of the City. Every Master took some place for that purpose. Plato in certaine publique Walks called Academia, from one Academus: Aristotle in the Walk of the Temple of Pan, called Lycaeum: others in the Stoa, or covered Walk, wherein the Merchants Goods were brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their Leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their Opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the City together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades also did at Rome, when he was Ambassadour: which caused Cato to advise the Senate to dispatch him quickly, for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak (as they thought) fine things.

From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called Schola, which in their Tongue signifieth Leasure; and their Disputations, Diatribae, that is to say, Passing of The Time. Also the Philosophers themselves had the name of their Sects, some of them from these their Schools: For they that followed Plato’s Doctrine, were called Academiques; The followers of Aristotle, Peripatetiques, from the Walk hee taught in; and those that Zeno taught, Stoiques, from the Stoa: as if we should denominate men from More-fields, from Pauls-Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter.

Neverthelesse, men were so much taken with this custome, that in time it spread it selfe over all Europe, and the best part of Afrique; so as there were

Schools publiquely erected, and maintained for Lectures, and Disputations, almost in every Common-wealth.

Of The Schools Of The Jews

There were also Schools, anciently, both before, and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the Jews: but they were Schools of their Law. For though they were called Synagogues, that is to say, Congregations of the People; yet in as much as the Law was every Sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name onely from Publique Schools; and were not onely in Jerusalem, but in every City of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a Schoole at Damascus, whereinto Paul entred, to persecute. There were others at Antioch, Iconium and Thessalonica, whereinto he entred, to dispute: And such was the Synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia; that is to say, the Schoole of Libertines, and of Jewes, that were strangers in Jerusalem: And of this Schoole they were that disputed with Saint Steven.

The Schoole Of Graecians Unprofitable

But what has been the Utility of those Schools? what Science is there at this day acquired by their Readings and Disputings? That wee have of Geometry, which is the Mother of all Naturall Science, wee are not indebted for it to the Schools. Plato that was the best Philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his Schoole, to all that were not already in some measure Geometricians. There were many that studied that Science to the

great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their Schools; nor was there any Sect of Geometricians; nor did they then passe under the name of Philosophers. The naturall Philosophy of those Schools, was rather a Dream than Science, and set forth in senselesse and insignificant Language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach Philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in Geometry: For Nature worketh by Motion; the Wayes, and Degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the Proportions and Properties of Lines, and Figures. Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions. For the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature; and in it, the Law Civill; that determineth what is Honest, and Dishonest; what is Just, and Unjust; and generally what is Good, and Evill: whereas they make the Rules of Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking: By which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of Common-wealth. Their Logique which should bee the Method of Reasoning, is nothing else but Captions of Words, and Inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about to pose them. To conclude there is nothing so absurd, that the old Philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained. And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques, nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques.

The Schools Of The Jews Unprofitable

The Schoole of the Jews, was originally a Schoole of the Law of Moses; who commanded (Deut. 31.10.) that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear, and learn it: Therefore the reading of the Law (which was in use after the Captivity) every Sabbath day, ought to have had no other end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandements which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the Prophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the Text of the Law with their false Commentaries, and vain Traditions; and so little understood the Prophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he did; for which the Prophets prophecyed. So that by their Lectures and Disputations in their Synagogues, they turned the Doctrine of their Law into a Phantasticall kind of Philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God, and of Spirits; which they compounded of the Vain Philosophy and Theology of the Graecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most easily bee wrested to their purpose; and from the Fabulous Traditions of their Ancestors.

University What It Is

That which is now called an University, is a Joyning together, and an Incorporation under one Government of many Publique Schools, in one and the same Town or City. In which, the principal Schools were ordained for the three Professions, that is to say, of the Romane Religion, of the Romane Law, and of the Art of Medicine. And for the study of Philosophy it hath no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the Romane Religion: And since the Authority of Aristotle is onely current there, that study is not properly

Philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on Authors,) but Aristotelity. And for Geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigide Truth. And if any man by the ingenuity of his owne nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, hee was commonly thought a Magician, and his Art Diabolicall.

Errors Brought Into Religion From Aristotles Metaphysiques

Now to descend to the particular Tenets of Vain Philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from Blindnesse of understanding; I shall first consider their Principles. There is a certain Philosophia Prima, on which all other Philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations of such Appellations, or Names, as are of all others the most Universall: Which Limitations serve to avoid ambiguity, and aequivocation in Reasoning; and are commonly called Definitions; such as are the Definitions of Body, Time, Place, Matter, Forme, Essence, Subject, Substance, Accident, Power, Act, Finite, Infinite, Quantity, Quality, Motion, Action, Passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a mans Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of Bodies. The Explication (that is, the setling of the meaning) of which, and the like Terms, is commonly in the Schools called Metaphysiques; as being a part of the Philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title: but it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much, as "Books written, or placed after his naturall Philosophy:" But the Schools take them for Books Of Supernaturall Philosophy: for the word Metaphysiques will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood,

and so repugnant to naturall Reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it, must needs think it supernaturall.

Errors Concerning Abstract Essences

From these Metaphysiques, which are mingled with the Scripture to make Schoole Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certaine Essences separated from Bodies, which they call Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes: For the Interpreting of which Jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of Discourse, for applying my selfe to those that are. The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of it Worldly Men, but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently No Where. Nor does it follow from hence, that Spirits are Nothing: for they have dimensions, and are therefore really Bodies; though that name in common Speech be given to such Bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of Opacity: But for Spirits, they call them Incorporeall; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to God himselfe; in whom wee consider not what Attribute expresseth best his Nature, which is Incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour him.

To know now upon what grounds they say there be Essences Abstract, or Substantiall Formes, wee are to consider what those words do properly

signifie. The use of Words, is to register to our selves, and make manifest to others the Thoughts and Conceptions of our Minds. Of which Words, some are the names of the Things conceived; as the names of all sorts of Bodies, that work upon the Senses, and leave an Impression in the Imagination: Others are the names of the Imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those Ideas, or mentall Images we have of all things wee see, or remember: And others againe are names of Names; or of different sorts of Speech: As Universall, Plurall, Singular, Negation, True, False, Syllogisme, Interrogation, Promise, Covenant, are the names of certain Forms of Speech. Others serve to shew the Consequence, or Repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, "A Man is a Body," hee intendeth that the name of Body is necessarily consequent to the name of Man; as being but severall names of the same thing, Man; which Consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word Is. And as wee use the Verbe Is; so the Latines use their Verbe Est, and the Greeks their Esti through all its Declinations. Whether all other Nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it: For the placing of two names in order may serve to signifie their Consequence, if it were the custome, (for Custome is it, that give words their force,) as well as the words Is, or Bee, or Are, and the like.

And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb answerable to Est, or Is, or Bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentially, that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most commonly they are? They are therefore no Names of Things; but Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one name or Attribute to another: as when we say, "a Man, is, a living Body," wee mean not that

the Man is one thing, the Living Body another, and the Is, or Beeing a third: but that the Man, and the Living Body, is the same thing: because the Consequence, “If hee bee a Man, hee is a living Body,” is a true Consequence, signified by that word Is. Therefore, to bee a Body, to Walke, to bee Speaking, to Live, to See, and the like Infinitives; also Corporeity, Walking, Speaking, Life, Sight, and the like, that signifie just the same, are the names of Nothing; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.

But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a Man is dead and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the Figure, and Colour, and Tast of a peece of Bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no Bread: And upon the same ground they say, that Faith, and Wisdome, and other Vertues are sometimes powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven; as if the Vertuous, and their Vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of Subjects on the Soveraign Power of their Countrey. For who will endeavour to obey the Laws, if he expect Obedience to be Powred or Blown into him? Or who will not obey a Priest, that can make God, rather than his Soveraign; nay than God himselfe? Or who, that is in fear of Ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the Holy Water, that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the Errors, which are brought into the Church, from the Entities, and Essences

of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false Philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their Religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.

Being once fallen into this Error of Separated Essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be reall, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them Incorporeall, without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is Corporeall; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscriptive, but Definitive: Which Terms being meer Words, and in this occasion insignificant, passe onely in Latine, that the vanity of them may bee concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but the Determination, or Defining of its Place; and so both the Terms of the Distinction are the same. And in particular, of the Essence of a Man, which (they say) is his Soule, they affirm it, to be All of it in his little Finger, and All of it in every other Part (how small soever) of his Body; and yet no more Soule in the Whole Body, than in any one of those Parts. Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to beleeve, to those that will beleeve the Existence of an Incorporeall Soule, Separated from the Body.

And when they come to give account, how an Incorporeall Substance can be capable of Pain, and be tormented in the fire of Hell, or Purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn Soules.

Again, whereas Motion is change of Place, and Incorporeall Substances are not capable of Place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a Soule can goe hence, without the Body to Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory; and how the Ghosts of men (and I may adde of their clothes which they appear

in) can walk by night in Churches, Church-yards, and other places of Sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unlesse they will say, they walke Definitive, not Circumscriptive, or Spiritually, not Temporally: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever.

Nunc-stans

For the meaning of Eternity, they will not have it to be an Endlesse Succession of Time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how Gods Will, and Praeordaining of things to come, should not be before his Praescience of the same, as the Efficient Cause before the Effect, or Agent before the Action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the Incomprehensible Nature of God. But they will teach us, that Eternity is the Standing still of the Present Time, a Nunc-stans (as the Schools call it;) which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a Hic-stans for an Infinite greatnesse of Place.

One Body In Many Places, And Many Bodies In One Place At Once

And whereas men divide a Body in their thought, by numbring parts of it, and in numbring those parts, number also the parts of the Place it filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, wee make also many places of those parts; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us beleeve, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it

were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power, to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature; whose Attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him, with the best Appellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his Nature, from these Attributes of Honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one Inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the Ceremonies of Court, comming into the presence of a greater Person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling, lets slip his Cloake; to recover his Cloake, lets fall his Hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity.

Absurdities In Naturall Philosophy, As Gravity The Cause Of Heavinesse

Then for Physiques, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate, and secundary causes of naturall events; they render none at all, but empty words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the Earth, and others goe naturally from it; The Schools will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are Heavy; and that this Heavinesse is it that causes them to descend: But if you ask what they mean by Heavinesse, they will define it to bee an endeavour to goe to the center of the Earth: so that the cause why things sink downward, is an Endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they doe. Or they will tell you the center of the Earth is the place of Rest, and Conservation for Heavy things; and

therefore they endeavour to be there: As if Stones, and Metalls had a desire, or could discern the place they would bee at, as Man does; or loved Rest, as Man does not; or that a peece of Glasse were lesse safe in the Window, than falling into the Street.

Quantity Put Into Body Already Made

If we would know why the same Body seems greater (without adding to it) one time, than another; they say, when it seems lesse, it is Condensed; when greater, Rarefied. What is that Condensed, and Rarefied? Condensed, is when there is in the very same Matter, lesse Quantity than before; and Rarefied, when more. As if there could be Matter, that had not some determined Quantity; when Quantity is nothing else but the Determination of Matter; that is to say of Body, by which we say one Body is greater, or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if a Body were made without any Quantity at all, and that afterwards more, or lesse were put into it, according as it is intended the Body should be more, or lesse Dense.

Powring In Of Soules

For the cause of the Soule of Man, they say, Creatur Infundendo, and Creando Infunditur: that is, “It is Created by Powring it in,” and “Powred in by Creation.”

Ubiquity Of Apparition

For the Cause of Sense, an ubiquity of Species; that is, of the Shews or Apparitions of objects; which when they be Apparitions to the Eye, is Sight; when to the Eare, Hearing; to the Palate, Tast; to the Nostrill, Smelling; and to the rest of the Body, Feeling.

Will, The Cause Of Willing

For cause of the Will, to doe any particular action, which is called Volitio, they assign the Faculty, that is to say, the Capacity in generall, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called Voluntas; making the Power the cause of the Act: As if one should assign for cause of the good or evill Acts of men, their Ability to doe them.

Ignorance An Occult Cause

And in many occasions they put for cause of Naturall events, their own Ignorance, but disguised in other words: As when they say, Fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: And as when they attribute many Effects to Occult Qualities; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as they thinke) to no Man else. And to Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, Specificall Qualities, and other like Termes, which signifie neither the Agent that produceth them, nor the Operation by which they are produced.

If such Metaphysiques, and Physiques as this, be not Vain Philosophy, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.

One Makes The Things Incongruent, Another The Incongruity

And for their Morall, and Civill Philosophy, it hath the same, or greater absurdities. If a man doe an action of Injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the Law, God they say is the prime cause of the Law, and also the prime cause of that, and all other Actions; but no cause at all of the Injustice; which is the Inconformity of the Action to the Law. This is Vain Philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man maketh both a streight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their Incongruity. And such is the Philosophy of all men that resolve of their Conclusions, before they know their Premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is Incomprehensible; and of Attributes of Honour to make Attributes of Nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the Doctrine of Free-Will, that is, of a Will of man, not subject to the Will of God.

Private Appetite The Rule Of Publique Good:

Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers define Good, and Evill, by the Appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own Law: For in the condition of men that have no other Law but their own Appetites, there can be no generall Rule of Good, and Evill Actions. But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. And yet is this Doctrine still practised; and men judge the Goodnesse, or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions, and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by their own Passions; and no man calleth Good or Evill, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the Publique Laws; except onely Monks, and Friers, that are bound by Vow to that simple obedience to their Superiour, to which every

Subject ought to think himself bound by the Law of Nature to the Civill Soveraign. And this private measure of Good, is a Doctrine, not onely Vain, but also Pernicious to the Publique State.

And That Lawfull Marriage Is Unchastity

It is also Vain and false Philosophy, to say the work of Marriage is repugnant to Chastity, or Continence, and by consequence to make them Morall Vices; as they doe, that pretend Chastity, and Continence, for the ground of denying Marriage to the Clergy. For they confesse it is no more, but a Constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy Orders that continually attend the Altar, and administration of the Eucharist, a continuall Abstinence from women, under the name of continuall Chastity, Continence, and Purity. Therefore they call the lawfull use of Wives, want of Chastity, and Continence; and so make Marriage a Sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the Altar. If the Law were made because the use of Wives is Incontinence, and contrary to Chastity, then all marriage is vice; If because it is a thing too impure, and unclean for a man consecrated to God; much more should other naturall, necessary, and daily works which all men doe, render men unworthy to bee Priests, because they are more unclean.

But the secret foundation of this prohibition of Marriage of Priests, is not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errours in Morall Philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of Matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdome of St. Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of persecution were Preachers of the Gospel, and forced to fly from one countrey to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the

design of the Popes, and Priests of after times, to make themselves the Clergy, that is to say, sole Heirs of the Kingdome of God in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of Marriage, because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his Kingdome the Children of God shall "neither Marry, nor bee given in Marriage, but shall bee as the Angels in heaven;" that is to say, Spirituall. Seeing then they had taken on them the name of Spirituall, to have allowed themselves (when there was no need) the propriety of Wives, had been an Incongruity.

And That All Government But Popular, Is Tyranny

From Aristotles Civill Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Common-wealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants; and the Aristocracy of the thirty Governours set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued them, the thirty Tyrants: As also to call the condition of the people under the Democracy, Liberty. A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signifie, not onely the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings in Rome, as being a thing naturall to all men, to conceive some great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight, and to a great Enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to expresse their anger in; but call readily the one Anarchy, and the other Oligarchy, or the Tyranny Of A Few. And that which offendeth the People, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as

every one of them would himselfe, but as the Publique Representant, be it one Man, or an Assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by an Arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their Superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force and Power of the Laws.

That Not Men, But Law Governs

And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws. What man, that has his naturall Senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the Law can hurt him; that is, Words, and Paper, without the Hands, and Swords of men? And this is of the number of pernicious Errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their Governours, to adhaere to those that call them Tyrants, and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them: And yet they are many times cherished from the Pulpit, by the Clergy.

Laws Over The Conscience

There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the Heathen,) to extend the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold,

notwithstanding the Conformity of their Speech and Actions: By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a Minister in the charge of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach such, and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment: But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his Actions are not by Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, when the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?

Private Interpretation Of Law

For a Private man, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, that is to say, without permission from the Representant thereof, to Interpret the Law by his own Spirit, is another Error in the Politiques; but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the Heathen Philosophers. For none of them deny, but that in the Power of making Laws, is comprehended also the Power of Explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are Law, made Law by the Authority of the Common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the Civill Law?

Of the same kind it is also, when any but the Soveraign restraineth in any man that power which the Common-wealth hath not restrained: as they do, that impropriate the Preaching of the Gospell to one certain Order of men, where the Laws have left it free. If the State give me leave to preach, or

teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find my selfe amongst the Idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian, though not in Orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received Orders from Rome? or when I have preached, shall not I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is shall I not Teach? But for this may some say, as also for administring to them the Sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient Mission; which is true: But this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no Law that forbids it. Therefore to deny these Functions to those, to whom the Civill Soveraigne hath not denyed them, is a taking away of a lawfull Liberty, which is contrary to the Doctrine of Civill Government.

Language Of Schoole-Divines

More examples of Vain Philosophy, brought into Religion by the Doctors of Schoole-Divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall onely adde this, that the Writings of Schoole-Divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant Traines of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, then in the common use of the Latine tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and Varro, and all the Grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any Schoole-Divine into any of the Modern tongues, as French, English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made Intelligible, is no Intelligible in the Latine. Which Insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false Philosophy; yet it hath a quality,

not onely to hide the Truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.

Errors From Tradition

Lastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain History, what is all the Legend of fictitious Miracles, in the lives of the Saints; and all the Histories of Apparitions, and Ghosts, alledged by the Doctors of the Romane Church, to make good their Doctrines of Hell, and purgatory, the power of Exorcisme, and other Doctrines which have no warrant, neither in Reason, nor Scripture; as also all those Traditions which they call the unwritten Word of God; but old Wives Fables? Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the Writings of the ancient Fathers; yet those Fathers were men, that might too easily beleeve false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they beleeved, hath no other force with them that (according to the Counsell of St. John 1 Epist. cha. verse 1.) examine Spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Romane Church, (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it,) to discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the Fathers were) are commonly the most subject to: For naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope, and S. Bernard have somewhat of Apparitions of Ghosts, that said they were in Purgatory; and so has our Beda: but no where, I beleeve, but by report from others. But if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own Infirmity, or Fraud.

Suppression Of Reason

With the Introduction of False, we may joyn also the suppression of True Philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor sufficient study, are competent Judges of the truth. Our own Navigations make manifest, and all men learned in humane Sciences, now acknowledge there are Antipodes: And every day it appeareth more and more, that Years, and Dayes are determined by Motions of the Earth. Neverthelesse, men that have in their Writings but supposed such Doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by Authority Ecclesiasticall. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true Religion? that cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent Judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the Religion established? Let them be silenced by the Laws of those, to whom the Teachers of them are subject; that is, by the Laws Civill: For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the Laws teach even true Philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in Government, as countenancing Rebellion, or Sedition? then let them be silenced, and the Teachers punished by vertue of his power to whom the care of the Publique quiet is committed; which is the Authority Civill. For whatsoever Power Ecclesiastiques take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the State) in their own Right, though they call it Gods Right, is but Usurpation.

CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH DARKNESSE, AND TO WHOM IT ACCREWETH

He That Receiveth Benefit By A Fact, Is Presumed To Be The Author

Cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe Judge amongst the Romans, for a custome he had, in Criminal causes, (when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the Accusers, Cui Bono; that is to say, what Profit, Honor, or other Contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the Fact. For amongst Praesumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the Author, as doth the BENEFIT of the Action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may be, that have possessed the People so long in this part of Christendome, with these Doctrines, contrary to the Peaceable Societies of Mankind.

That The Church Militant Is The Kingdome Of God, Was First Taught By

The Church Of Rome

And first, to this Error, That The Present Church Now Militant On Earth, Is The Kingdome Of God, (that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the Land of Promise; not the Kingdome of Grace, which is but a Promise of the Land,) are annexed these worldly Benefits, First, that the Pastors, and Teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as Gods Publique Ministers, to a Right of Governing the Church; and consequently (because the Church, and

Common-wealth are the same Persons) to be Rectors, and Governours of the Common-wealth. By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian Princes, to beleeve, that to disobey him, was to disobey Christ himselfe; and in all differences between him and other Princes, (charmed with the word Power Spirituall,) to abandon their lawfull Soveraigns; which is in effect an universall Monarchy over all Christendome. For though they were first invested in the right of being Supreme Teachers of Christian Doctrine, by, and under Christian Emperors, within the limits of the Romane Empire (as is acknowledged by themselves) by the title of Pontifex Maximus, who was an Officer subject to the Civill State; yet after the Empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them, another Title, namely, the Right of St. Peter; not onely to save entire their pretended Power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian Provinces, though no more united in the Empire of Rome. This Benefit of an Universall Monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear Rule) is a sufficient Presumption, that the popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the Authors of the Doctrine, by which it was obtained; namely, that the Church now on Earth, is the Kingdome of Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some Lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his Commandements.

After that certain Churches had renounced this universall Power of the Pope, one would expect in reason, that the Civill Soveraigns in all those Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as (before they had unadvisedly let it goe) was their own Right, and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the Kings administred the Government of Religion, by maintaining their imployment to be in Gods Right, seemed to usurp, if not a Supremacy, yet an Independency on the Civill Power: and they but seemed to usurp it, in as

much as they acknowledged a Right in the King, to deprive them of the Exercise of their Functions at his pleasure.

And Maintained Also By The Presbytery

But in those places where the Presbytery took that Office, though many other Doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this Doctrine, that the Kingdome of Christ is already come, and that it began at the Resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But Cui Bono? What Profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected: to have a Soveraign Power over the People. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful King, but to keep him from all places of Gods publique Service in his own Kingdom? and with force to resist him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it, without Authority from the Civill Soveraign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his Lawfull Liberty, that is, to usurpe an unlawfull Power over their Brethren? The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.

Infallibility

To this head, I referre also all those Doctrines, that serve them to keep the possession of this spirituall Soveraignty after it is gotten. As first, that the Pope In His Publique Capacity Cannot Erre. For who is there, that beleeving this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands?

Subjection Of Bishops

Secondly, that all other Bishops, in what Common-wealth soever, have not their Right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their Civill Soveraigns, but from the Pope, is a Doctrine, by which there comes to be in every Christian Common-wealth many potent men, (for so are Bishops,) that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to him, though he be a forraign Prince; by which means he is able, (as he hath done many times) to raise a Civill War against the State that submits not it self to be governed according to his pleasure and Interest.

Exemptions Of The Clergy

Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other Priests, and of all Monkes, and Fryers, from the Power of the Civill Laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every Common-wealth, that enjoy the benefit of the Laws, and are protected by the Power of the Civill State, which neverthelesse pay no part of the Publique expence; nor are lyable to the penalties, as other Subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him onely, to uphold his universall Monarchy.

The Names Of Sacerdotes, And Sacrifices

Fourthly, the giving to their Priests (which is no more in the New Testament but Presbyters, that is, Elders) the name of Sacerdotes, that is, Sacrificers,

which was the title of the Civill Soveraign, and his publique Ministers, amongst the Jews, whilest God was their King. Also, the making the Lords Supper a Sacrifice, serveth to make the People beleeve the Pope hath the same power over all Christian, that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all power, both Civill and Ecclesiasticall, as the High Priest then had.

The Sacramentation Of Marriage

Fiftly, the teaching that Matrimony is a Sacrament, giveth to the Clergy the Judging of the lawfulnesse of Marriages; and thereby, of what Children are Legitimate; and consequently, of the Right of Succession to haereditary Kingdomes.

The Single Life Of Priests

Sixtly, the Deniall of Marriage to Priests, serveth to assure this Power of the pope over Kings. For if a King be a Priest, he cannot Marry, and transmit his Kingdome to his Posterity; If he be not a Priest then the Pope pretendeth this Authority Ecclesiasticall over him, and over his people.

Auricular Confession

Seventhly, from Auricular Confession, they obtain, for the assurance of their Power, better intelligence of the designs of Princes, and great persons

in the Civill State, than these can have of the designs of the State Ecclesiasticall.

Canonization Of Saints, And Declaring Of Martyrs

Eighthly, by the Canonization of Saints, and declaring who are Martyrs, they assure their Power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the Laws and Commands of their Civill Soveraigns even to death, if by the Popes excommunication, they be declared Heretiques or Enemies to the Church; that is, (as they interpret it,) to the Pope.

Transubstantiation, Penance, Absolution

Ninthly, they assure the same, by the Power they ascribe to every Priest, of making Christ; and by the Power of ordaining Pennance; and of Remitting, and Retaining of sins.

Purgatory, Indulgences, Externall Works

Tenthly, by the Doctrine of Purgatory, of Justification by externall works, and of Indulgences, the Clergy is enriched.

Daemonology And Exorcism

Eleventhly, by their Daemonology, and the use of Exorcisme, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep (or thinke they keep) the People more in awe of their Power.

School-Divinity

Lastly, the Metaphysiques, Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle, the frivolous Distinctions, barbarous Terms, and obscure Language of the Schoolmen, taught in the Universities, (which have been all erected and regulated by the Popes Authority,) serve them to keep these Errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the Ignis Fatuus of Vain Philosophy, for the Light of the Gospell.

The Authors Of Spirituall Darknesse, Who They Be

To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark Doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an unlawfull Power over the lawfull Soveraigns of Christian People; or for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly Riches, Honour, and Authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule, of Cui Bono, we may justly pronounce for the Authors of all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope, and Roman Clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous Doctrine, that the Church now on Earth, is that Kingdome of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament.

But the Emperours, and other Christian Soveraigns, under whose Government these Errours, and the like encroachments of Ecclesiastiques

upon their Office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and of the tranquillity of their Subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the Sequel, and of insight into the designs of their Teachers, may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessories to their own, and the Publique dammage; For without their Authority there could at first no seditious Doctrine have been publiquely preached. I say they might have hindred the same in the beginning: But when the people were once possessed by those spirituall men, there was no humane remedy to be applyed, that any man could invent: And for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the Machinations of men against the Truth, wee are to attend his good pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let goe all, as Peters net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of Fishes; whereas the Impatience of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their Subjects eyes were opened, did but encrease the power they resisted. I doe not therefore blame the Emperour Frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman Pope Adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if hee had not doe it, hee was not likely to have succeeded in the Empire: But I blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such Doctrines to be forged in the Universities of their own Dominions, have holden the Stirrop to all the succeeding Popes, whilest they mounted into the Thrones of all Christian Soveraigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and their people, at their pleasure.

But as the Inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is inverted: The web begins at the first Elements of Power, which are Wisdom, Humility, Sincerity, and other

vertues of the Apostles, whom the people converted, obeyed, out of Reverence, not by Obligation: Their Consciences were free, and their Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power. Afterwards the Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ encreased) assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the Decrees of their Assemblies, made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their Doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called Excommunication,) not as being Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty. And the number of Presbyters encreasing, the Presbyters of the chief City or Province, got themselves an authority over the parochiall Presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of Bishops: And this was a second knot on Christian Liberty. Lastly, the Bishop of Rome, in regard of the Imperiall City, took upon him an Authority (partly by the wills of the Emperours themselves, and by the title of Pontifex Maximus, and at last when the Emperours were grown weak, by the priviledges of St. Peter) over all other Bishops of the Empire: Which was the third and last knot, and the whole Synthesis and Construction of the Pontificall Power.

And therefore the Analysis, or Resolution is by the same way; but beginning with the knot that was last tyed; as wee may see in the dissolution of the praeterpoliticall Church Government in England.

First, the Power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the Bishops, who before exercised their Functions in Right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in Right of the Queen and her Successours; though by retaining the phrase of Jure Divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate Right from God: And so was untyed the first knot. After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of Episcopacy: And so was the second knot dissolved: And almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians:

And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best: First, because there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase: and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile. Nor ought those Teachers to be displeased with this losse of their antient Authority: For there is none should know better then they, that power is preserved by the same Vertues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by Wisdome, Humility, Clearnesse of Doctrine, and sincerity of Conversation; and not by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the Morality of Naturall Reason; nor by obscure Language; nor by Arrogating to themselves more Knowledge than they make appear; nor by Pious Frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the Pastors of Gods Church are not only Faults, but also scandalls, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their Authority.

Comparison Of The Papacy With The Kingdome Of Fayries

But after this Doctrine, “that the Church now Militant, is the Kingdome of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament,” was received in the World; the ambition, and canvasing for the Offices that belong thereunto, and

especially for that great Office of being Christs Lieutenant, and the Pompe of them that obtained therein the principal Publique Charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward Reverence due to the Pastorall Function: in so much as the Wisest men, of them that had any power in the Civill State, needed nothing but the authority of their Princes, to deny them any further Obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for Bishop Universall, by pretence of Succession to St. Peter, their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the Kingdome of Fairies; that is, to the old wives Fables in England, concerning Ghosts and Spirits, and the feats they play in the night. And if a man consider the originall of this great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy, is no other, than the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power.

The Language also, which they use, both in the Churches, and in their Publique Acts, being Latine, which is not commonly used by any Nation now in the world, what is it but the Ghost of the Old Romane Language.

The Fairies in what Nation soever they converse, have but one Universall King, which some Poets of ours call King Oberon; but the Scripture calls Beelzebub, Prince of Daemons. The Ecclesiastiques likewise, in whose Dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one Universall King, the Pope.

The Ecclesiastiques are Spirituall men, and Ghostly Fathers. The Fairies are Spirits, and Ghosts. Fairies and Ghosts inhabite Darknesse, Solitudes, and Graves. The Ecclesiastiques walke in Obscurity of Doctrine, in Monasteries, Churches, and Churchyards.

The Ecclesiastiques have their Cathedral Churches; which, in what Towne soever they be erected, by vertue of Holy Water, and certain

Charmes called Exorcismes, have the power to make those Townes, cities, that is to say, Seats of Empire. The Fairies also have their enchanted Castles, and certain Gigantique Ghosts, that domineer over the Regions round about them.

The fairies are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the Ecclesiastiques vanish away from the Tribunals of Civill Justice.

The Ecclesiastiques take from young men, the use of Reason, by certain Charms compounded of Metaphysiques, and Miracles, and Traditions, and Abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute what they command them. The Fairies likewise are said to take young Children out of their Cradles, and to change them into Naturall Fools, which Common people do therefore call Elves, and are apt to mischief.

In what Shop, or Operatory the Fairies make their Enchantment, the old Wives have not determined. But the Operatories of the Clergy, are well enough known to be the Universities, that received their Discipline from Authority Pontificall.

When the Fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their Elves, to pinch them. The Ecclesiastiques, when they are displeased with any Civill State, make also their Elves, that is, Superstitious, Enchanted Subjects, to pinch their Princes, by preaching Sedition; or one Prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.

The Fairies marry not; but there be amongst them Incubi, that have copulation with flesh and bloud. The Priests also marry not.

The Ecclesiastiques take the Cream of the Land, by Donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by Tythes: So also it is in the Fable of Fairies, that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the Cream, which they skim from the Milk.

What kind of Money is currant in the Kingdome of Fairies, is not recorded in the Story. But the Ecclesiastiques in their Receipts accept of the same Money that we doe; though when they are to make any Payment, it is in Canonizations, Indulgences, and Masses.

To this, and such like resemblances between the Papacy, and the Kingdome of Fairies, may be added this, that as the Fairies have no existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions of old Wives, or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own Civill Dominion) consisteth onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunication; upon hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture.

It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry 8. by his Exorcisme; nor for Qu. Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this Spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by Missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yeeld him little fruit, may not return, or rather an Assembly of Spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabite this clean swept house, and make the End thereof worse than the beginning? For it is not the Romane Clergy onely, that pretends the Kingdome of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinct from that of the Civill State. And this is all I had a designe to say, concerning the Doctrine of the POLITIQUES. Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my Countrey.

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION

FROM THE CONTRARIETY of some of the Naturall Faculties of the Mind, one to another, as also of one Passion to another, and from their reference to Conversation, there has been an argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty. The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censorious, and unapt to pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the other side, Celerity of Fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary, to discern exactly between Right and Wrong. Again, in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable.

And amongst the Passions, Courage, (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace; And Timorousnesse, many times disposeth to the desertion of the Publique Defence. Both these they say cannot stand together in the same person.

And to consider the contrariety of mens Opinions, and Manners in generall, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to converse:

Which Businesse consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for Honor, Riches, and Authority.

To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: For by Education, and Discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather Straw: So also may the Judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration, and the Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy; nor between abstaining from Injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think. I have known cleernesse of Judgment, and largenesse of Fancy; strength of Reason, and gracefull Elocution; a Courage for the Warre, and a Fear for the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre, in the Publique quarrel, by an indiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.

To the Laws of Nature, declared in the 15. Chapter, I would have this added, “That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of Peace.” For he that pretendeth a Right of Nature to preserve his owne body, cannot pretend a Right of Nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: It is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. And though this Law

may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.

And because I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws: Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject of a Conquerour, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have showed before in the end of the 21. Chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his Contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed lawfull; as totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawfull. Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of Protection, and means to live as a Souldier: But when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new Master. And so much

for the Time when he may do it lawfully, if hee will. If therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true Subject: For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.

By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be Conquered; and in what the nature of Conquest, and the Right of a Conquerour consisteth: For this Submission is it implyeth them all. Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is Overcome, but not Conquered; He that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not Conquered, though Overcome; for he is still an Enemy, and may save himself if hee can: But he that upon promise of Obedience, hath his Life and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject; and not before. The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had Pacified such a Province, that is to say, in English, Conquered it; and that the Countrey was Pacified by Victory, when the people of it had promised Imperata Facere, that is, To Doe What The Romane People Commanded Them: this was to be Conquered. But this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: Expresse, by Promise: Tacite, by other signes. As for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse Promise, (because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their Protection openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the Government: But if he live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a Spie, and Enemy of the State. I say not, hee does any Injustice, (for acts of open Hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it. So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples

Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty.

In the 29th Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the Dissolutions of Common-wealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power; for want whereof, the Civill Soveraign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerours require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.

And because the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in general, and another evill seed, not differing much from the former. For to the Justification of the Cause of a Conqueror, the Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the Obligation of the

Conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the Review of the first and second part of this Discourse.

In the 35th Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture, that in the Common-wealth of the Jewes, God himselfe was made the Soveraign, by Pact with the People; who were therefore called his Peculiar People, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their Consent, but by his own Power: And that in this Kingdome Moses was Gods Lieutenant on Earth; and that it was he that told them what Laws God appointed to doe Execution; especially in Capitall Punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as I find it since. Wee know that generally in all Common-wealths, the Execution of Corporeall Punishments, was either put upon the Guards, or other Souldiers of the Soveraign Power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart, concurred, to make them sue for such an Office. But amongst the Israelites it was a Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the Witnesses should cast the first Stone, and after the Witnesses, then the rest of the People. This was a Law that designed who were to be the Executioners; but not that any one should throw a Stone at him before Conviction and Sentence, where the Congregation was Judge. The Witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to Execution, unlesse the Fact were committed in the presence of the Congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull Judges; for then there needed no other Witnesses but the Judges themselves. Neverthelesse, this manner of proceeding being not throughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, is some cases, by a Right of Zeal; as if the Executions done upon Offenders in the Kingdome of God in old time, proceeded not from the Soveraign

Command, but from the Authority of Private Zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.

First, where the Levites fell upon the People, that had made and worshipped the Golden Calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the Commandement of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, Exod. 32.27. And when the Son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give Sentence against him; as appears, Levit. 25.11, 12. Again, (Numbers 25.6, 7.) when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: Their Crime was committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no Witnesse; the Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; and which is the principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly upon a subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this Presumption of a future Ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety [of] a Common-wealth; as in a sudden Rebellion, any man that can suppresse it by his own Power in the Countrey where it begins, may lawfully doe it, and provide to have it Ratified, or Pardoned, whilest it is in doing, or after it is done. Also Numb. 35.30. it is expressely said, “Whosoever shall kill the Murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of Witnesses:” but Witnesses suppose a formall Judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of Jus Zelotarum. The Law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to Idolatry, (that is to say, in the Kingdome of God to a renouncing of his Allegiance) (Deut. 13.8.) forbids to conceal him, and commands the Accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be Condemned. And (Deut. 17. ver.4, 5, 6.) the Processe against Idolatry is exactly set down: For God there speaketh to the People, as Judge, and commandeth them, when a man is Accused of Idolatry, to Enquire diligently of the Fact, and finding it true,

then to Stone him; but still the hand of the Witnesse throweth the first stone. This is not Private Zeal, but Publique Condemnation. In like manner when a Father hath a rebellious Son, the Law is (Deut. 21. 18.) that he shall bring him before the Judges of the Town, and all the people of the Town shall Stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these Laws it was, that St. Steven was Stoned, and not by pretence of Private Zeal: for before hee was carried away to Execution, he had Pleaded his Cause before the High Priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance Executions by Private Zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is against both the Justice and Peace of a Common-wealth.

In the 36th Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses: Not that he spake not to him sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercy-seat, is expressely set down (Numbers 7.89.) in these words, “From that time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the Mercy-Seate, which is over the Arke of the Testimony, from between the Cherubins he spake unto him.” But it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other Prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he also spake by a Voice, (that is, by Vision) Unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the Vision. For Face to Face, and Mouth to Mouth, cannot be literally understood of the Infinitenesse, and Incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.

And as to the whole Doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it are true and proper; and the Ratiocination solid. For I ground the Civill Right of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known

naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the Power Ecclesiasticall of the same Soveraigns, I ground it on such Texts, as are both evident in themselves, and consonant to the Scope of the whole Scripture. And therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that by Writing, or Publique Discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before: Of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many.

In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are some new Doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that bothe may be preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when Novelty can breed no trouble, nor disorder in a State, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of Antiquity, as to preferre Ancient Errors, before New and well proved Truth.

There is nothing I distrust more than my Elocution; which neverthelesse I am confident (excepting the Mischances of the Presse) is not obscure.

That I have neglected the Ornament of quoting ancient Poets, Orators, and Philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether I have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any Writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact, but of Right, wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not intrinsically the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion, when Greek and Latine Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due: For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. If the Antiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that am Writing: But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the Living.

To conclude, there is nothing in this whole Discourse, nor in that I writ before of the same Subject in Latine, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of God, or to good Manners; or to the disturbance of the Publique Tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to

whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the People, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the lesse grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves have the lesse cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of forraign Enemies.

And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the Laws Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of States, there can be no very good Constellation for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new;) yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend. For such Truth, as opposeth no man profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.

FINIS

THE MOLESWORTH 1839 TEXT

CONTENTS

TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN, OF GODOLPHIN.

THE INTRODUCTION.

PART I. OF MAN.

CHAPTER I. OF SENSE.
CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION.
CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS.
CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH.
CHAPTER V. OF REASON AND SCIENCE.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.
CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE.
CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL; AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.
CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND WORTHINESS.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS.
CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION.
CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY.
CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS.

CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.
CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED.

PART II. OF COMMONWEALTH.

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMONWEALTH.
CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION.
CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER.
CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNAL, AND DESPOTICAL.
CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS.
CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, AND PRIVATE.
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN POWER.
CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMONWEALTH.
CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSEL.
CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVIL LAWS.
CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.
CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS.
CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH.
CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN REPRESENTATIVE.
CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.

CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS.
CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.
CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.
CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOM OF GOD, OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT.
CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS.
CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNAL LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION.
CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH.
CHAPTER XL. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH.
CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR.
CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICAL.
CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MAN'S RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.

PART IV. OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.

CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUAL DARKNESS, FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.
CHAPTER XLV. OF DEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELICS OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES.

CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESS FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS.
CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH DARKNESS, AND TO WHOM IT ACCRUETH.

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.

TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN, OF GODOLPHIN.

HONOR'D SIR,

Your most worthy brother, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his country, to civil society, or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, 't is hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. But yet, methinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power, should not be by the civil power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but, in the abstract, of the seat of power, (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there), offending none, I think, but those without, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain texts of Holy Scripture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use

to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also, in order to my subject, necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugn the civil power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say, I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presumed on that, to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am,

Sir, Your most humble, and most obedient Servant,

Thomas Hobbes.

Paris, April 15/25, 1651.

THE INTRODUCTION.

NATURE, THE ART whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members, are the strength; salus populi, the people's safety, its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity, and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.

To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider

First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man.

Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserveth or dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth.

Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books, but of men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; that is, nosce teipsum, read thyself: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, &c; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c: for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men’s actions

we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.

PART I. OF MAN.

CHAPTER I. OF SENSE.

SENSE.

Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

The original of them all, is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.

To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odour; to the tongue and palate, in a savour; and to the rest of the body, in

heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species, in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye, is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an audible species, that is an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say the thing understood, sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the

way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.

CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION.

IMAGINATION.

That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly.

When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one

sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

Memory.

The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voices grow weak, and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean fancy itself, we call imagination, as I said before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; the former, which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense, is simple imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is compounded; as when, from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression made in sense: as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes; which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men's discourse.

Dreams.

The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams. And these also, as all other imaginations, have been before, either totally or by parcels, in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man's body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain, and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the organs of sense being now

benumbed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions, that I do waking; nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts, dreaming, as at other times; and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream I think myself awake.

And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, divers distempers must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal; and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream at another.

Apparitions or visions.

The most difficult discerning of a man’s dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts, and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances

of going to bed or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius Cæsar, and was also his favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Cæsar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision; but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish; and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or any thing but a vision. And this is no very rare accident; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear, to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them

has, I think, been on purpose either taught or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural apparitions; but that he does it so often, as men need to fear such things, more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man, to believe them no farther, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the schools: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For, not knowing what imagination or the senses are, what they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding

The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding; and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and so will

many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS.

BY CONSEQUENCE, OR train of thoughts, I under stand that succession of one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, mental discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Train of thoughts unguided.

This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and

scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not only without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick.

Train of thoughts regulated.

The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and design. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong, and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire, ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out, Respice finem; that is to say, in all

your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance.

The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins called sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call remembrance, or calling to mind: the Latins call it reminiscentia, as it were a re-conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner as one would sweep a room, to find a jewel; or as a spaniel ranges the field, till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the alphabet, to start a rhyme.

Prudence.

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal, recons what he has seen follow on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts, is called foresight, and prudence, or providence; and sometimes wisdom; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most signs to guess by.

Signs.

A sign is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed, before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future time; and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of

natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture of the time past.

As prudence is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past: so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any other state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience.

There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.

Infinite.

Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea, or conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we

signify only, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness, and power are unconceivable; but that we may honour him. Also because, whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident to sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolmen.

CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH.

ORIGINAL OF SPEECH.

The invention of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of Phœnicia. A profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an orator or philosopher has need of: for I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered,

that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words and speech, as general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which are useful; and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other insignificant words of the school.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the Tower of Babel, when, by the hand of God, every man was stricken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need, the mother of all inventions, taught them; and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.

The use of speech.

The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that for two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks, or notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by their connexion and order, one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help

of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses of speech.

To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conception, that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, by words, when they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of names, and the connexion of them.

Names, proper and common. Universal.

Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing, as Peter, John, this man, this tree; and some are common to many things, man, horse, tree; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an universal; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.

One universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

And of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent; the larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent,

comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example: the name body is of larger signification than the word man, and comprehendeth it; and the names man and rational, are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice, that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, one only word; but sometimes, by circumlocution, many words together. For all these words, he that in his actions observeth the laws of his country, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, just.

By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example: a man that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know, without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms, every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered, as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning, of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.

But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five; and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.

When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation, as thus, a man is a living creature; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature; if the latter name, living creature, signify all that the former name man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is true; otherwise false. For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood; error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

Necessity of definitions.

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry, which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men begin

at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs, excellently foolish. For words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they

are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject to names.

Subject to names, is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money rationes, and accounting ratiocinatio; and that which we in bills or books of account call items, they call nomina, that is names; and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, λόγος, for both speech and reason; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: and the act of reasoning they called syllogism, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same thing may enter into account for divers accidents, their names are, to show that diversity, diversly wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads.

Names.

First, a thing may enter into account for matter or body; as living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which names the word matter, or body, is understood; all such being names of matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, &c.; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for living put into the account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These are called names abstract, because severed, not from matter, but from the account of matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction; as when anything is seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy: and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear; and such are names of fancies.

Use of names positive.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to names themselves, and to speeches: for general, universal, special, equivocal, are names of names. And affirmation, interrogation, commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many other such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or words and speech.

Negative names, with their uses.

There be also other names, called negative, which are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words, nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want four, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing, because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used.

Words insignificant.

All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and puzzled philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeal body, or, which

is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words inpoured virtue, inblown virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of parole, but by the name of verbe often; yet verbe and parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

Understanding

When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech and their connexion were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it; understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding; though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.

Inconstant names.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions,

and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.

CHAPTER V. OF REASON AND SCIENCE.

REASON, WHAT IT is.

When a man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing, yet they are the same; for multiplication, is but adding together of things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers; so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures, solid and superficial, angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words; adding together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism; and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together pactions to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do.

Reason defined.

Out of all which we may define, that is to say determine, what that is, which is meant by this word reason, when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men.

Right reason, where.

And, as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves may often, err, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions; not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art: but no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right reason, by the claim they lay to it.

The use of reason.

The use and end of reason, is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations, on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he pays for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountants' skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, which are the significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and does not know anything, but only believeth.

Of error and absurdity.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it; if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called error; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an absurdity, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we

conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call absurd, insignificant, and nonsense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle; or, accidents of bread in cheese; or, immaterial substances; or of a free subject; a free will; or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.

I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called theorems, or aphorisms; that is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or subtracted from another.

But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

Causes of absurdity.

The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter; these considerations being

diversely named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore,

The second cause of absurd assertions, I asscribe to the giving of names of bodies to accidents; or of accidents to bodies; as they do, that say, faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be poured, or breathed into anything, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasms are spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the air, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies to names, or speeches; as they do that say, that there be things universal; that a living creature is genus, or a general thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents to names and speeches; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a man's command is his will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither; the proverb says this or that, whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak; yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the schools, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-now, and the like canting of schoolmen.

To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Science.

By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call science. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable. Science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time; because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech; but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no science, are in better, and nobler condition, with their natural prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.

Prudence and sapience, with their difference

As much experience, is prudence; so, is much science sapience. For though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia; ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or guard: the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter, as prudence to sapience; both useful; but the latter infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills or disgraces him.

Signs of science.

The signs of science are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pertendeth the science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible. But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general sentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence enough for their private affairs: but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit, than the success of another's business.

CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.

MOTION, VITAL AND animal. Endeavour.

There be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, &c. to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavour.

Appetite. Desire. Hunger. Thirst. Aversion.

This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire; the latter, being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion. These words, appetite and aversion, we have from the Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not.

Love. Hate.

That which men desire, they are also said to love: and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt.

Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemn; contempt being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

Good. Evil.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

Pulchrum. Turpe. Delightful. Profitable. Unpleasant. Unprofitable.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly,

base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mien, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

Delight. Displeasure.

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c. so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call delight, or trouble of mind.

Pleasure. Offence.

This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, à juvando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation, or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence.

Pleasures of sense. Pleasures of the mind. Joy. Pain. Grief.

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called pleasure of sense; the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things; whether those things in the sense please or displease. And these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth those consequences, and are generally called joy. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, and called pain; others in the expectation of consequences, and are called grief.

These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.

Hope.

For appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called hope.

Despair.

The same, without such opinion, despair.

Fear.

Aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, fear.

Courage.

The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, courage.

Anger.

Sudden courage, anger.

Confidence.

Constant hope, confidence of ourselves.

Diffidence.

Constant despair, diffidence of ourselves.

Indignation.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, indignation.

Benevolence. Good nature.

Desire of good to another, benevolence, good will, charity. If to man generally, good nature.

Covetousness.

Desire of riches, covetousness; a name used always in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another attaining them; though the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought.

Ambition.

Desire of office, or precedence, ambition: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, pusillanimity.

Magnanimity.

Contempt of little helps and hindrances, magnanimity.

Valour.

Magnanimity, in danger of death or wounds, valour, fortitude.

Liberality.

Magnanimity in the use of riches, liberality.

Miserableness.

Pusillanimity in the same, wretchedness, miserableness, or parsimony; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindness.

Love of persons for society, kindness.

Natural lust.

Love of persons for pleasing the sense only, natural lust.

Luxury.

Love of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of pleasure past, luxury.

The passion of love. Jealousy.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, the passion of love. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, jealousy.

Revengefulness.

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, revengefulness.

Curiosity.

Desire to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure.

Religion. Superstition. True religion.

Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, true religion.

Panic terror.

Fear, without the apprehension of why, or what, panic terror, called so from the fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas, in truth, there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his fellow to know why.

And therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, admiration; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory. Vain-glory.

Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vain-glory: which name is properly given; because a well grounded confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain.

Dejection.

Grief, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories, or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected oftentimes by age, and employment.

Sudden glory. Laughter.

Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper

works is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.

Sudden dejection. Weeping.

On the contrary, sudden dejection, is the passion that causeth weeping; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps external, such as are women, and children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter, and weeping, are sudden motions; custom taking them both away. For no man laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.

Shame. Blushing.

Grief, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of the love of good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

Impudence.

The contempt of good reputation is called impudence.

Pity.

Grief, for the calamity of another, is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity, those hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Cruelty.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call cruelty; proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that any man

should take pleasure in other men's great harms; without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation. Envy.

Grief, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant, or hinder a competitor, envy.

Deliberation.

When in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call deliberation.

Therefore of things past, there is no deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion.

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also deliberate.

Every deliberation is then said to end, when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or aversion.

The will.

In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act, not the faculty, of willing. And beasts that have deliberation, must necessarily also have will. The definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. For if the intervenient appetites, make any action voluntary; then by the same reason all intervenient aversions, should make the same action involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both voluntary and involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.

Forms of speech, in passion.

The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts. And first, generally all passions may be expressed indicatively; as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed subjunctively; which is a

speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, if this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words; but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is imperative; as do this, forbear that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is command; otherwise prayer; or else counsel. The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness, optative: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called interrogative; as, what is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the passions I find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

Good and evil apparent.

And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent, or seeming evil: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Felicity.

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felicity; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men beatifical vision is unintelligible.

Praise. Magnification. Μακαρ˛ισμός.

The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of any thing, is praise. That whereby they signify the power and greatness of any thing, is magnifying. And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity, is by the Greeks called μακαρ˛ισμός, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the passions.

CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE.

OF ALL DISCOURSE, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.

Judgment, or sentence final. Doubt.

If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or, it has been, or, has not been. All which is opinion. And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of past, and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation, is called the will; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the judgment, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good, or bad, is called deliberation; so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called doubt.

No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that

not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

Science. Opinion. Conscious.

And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions; or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion, is again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to speak against his conscience: or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.

Belief. Faith.

When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called belief, and faith: faith, in the man; belief, both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To have faith in, or trust to, or believe a man, signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to believe what is said, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, I believe in; as also the Latin, credo in; and the Greek, πιςέυω ἐις, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, I believe him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin, credo illi: fido illi: and in Greek, πιςέυω αὐτω: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.

But by believing in, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.

From whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority, and good opinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him only. And consequently, when we believe

that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Cæsar; I do not think the ghost of Alexander, or Cæsar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.

CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL; AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE DEFINED.

Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. And by virtues intellectual, are always understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good wit; though the same word wit, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Wit, natural, or acquired. Natural wit.

These virtues are of two sorts; natural, and acquired. By natural, I mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean, that wit, which is gotten by use only, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This natural wit, consisteth principally in two things; celerity of imagining, that is, swift succession of one thought to another; and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called dullness, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good wit, or fancy. Good judgment. Discretion.

And this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore

some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a good wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a good fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called distinguishing, and discerning, and judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good judgment: and particularly in matter of conversation and business; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this virtue is called discretion. The former, that is, fancy, without the help of judgment, is not commended as a virtue: but the latter which is judgment, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this virtue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not only by illustrations of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a

trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good poem, whether it be epic, or dramatic; as also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required: but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion.

In a good history, the judgment must be eminent; because the goodness consisteth, in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the style.

In orations of praise, and in invectives, the fancy is predominant; because the design is not truth, but to honour or dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The judgment does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serveth best to the design in hand; so is the judgment, or the fancy most required.

In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. But for metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit; to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the judgment shall approve of the time, place, and

persons. An anatomist, or a physician may speak, or write his judgment of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before good company. And it is the want of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and equivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary fancy: but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence; there is no gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. Judgment therefore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgment, not.

Prudence.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what design they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, this wit of his is called prudence; and depends on much experience, and memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men; as there is in their fancies and judgment; because the experience of men equal in age, is not much unequal, as to the quantity; but lies in different occasions; every one having his private designs. To govern well a family, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence; but different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house, than a privy-councillor in the affairs of another man.

Craft.

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear, or want; you have that crooked wisdom, which is called craft; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call versutia, translated into English, shifting, and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter-sighted craft, called versutia, from versura, which signifies taking money at usury for the present payment of interest.

Acquired wit.

As for acquired wit, I mean acquired by method and instruction, there is none but reason; which is grounded on the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences. But of reason and science I have already spoken, in the fifth and sixth chapters.

The causes of this difference of wits, are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceedeth, partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies and discretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions; which are different, not only from the difference of mens' complexions; but also from their difference of customs, and education.

The passions that most of all cause the difference of wit, are principally, the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, and honour, are but several sorts of power.

Giddiness. Madness.

And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things; but is, as men term it, indifferent; though he may be so far a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires, as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired: all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence: for as to have no desire, is to be dead: so to have weak passions, is dullness; and to have passions indifferently for everything, giddiness, and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call madness.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature.

The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness, is either great vain-glory; which is commonly called pride, and self-conceit; or great dejection of mind.

Rage.

Pride, subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof, is the madness called rage and fury. And thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage: that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage: excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness: the same, joined with envy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by others, rage.

Madness. Melancholy.

Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears; which is a madness, commonly called melancholy; apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing, some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the general name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains, might enrol a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same.

For example, though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such passion; yet, when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea, as any other part of the same quantity; so also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet we may be well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madness; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness.

This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an error generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on) they presently admire themselves, as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that madness is nothing else, but too much appearing passion, may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of madmen: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering passions: for the effect of the wine, does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. For, I believe, the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen; which is a confession, that passions unguided, are for the most part mere madness.

The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of madness, have been two. Some deriving them from the passions; some, from demons, or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner, as madmen use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, madmen: but the latter, called them sometimes demoniacs, that is, possessed with spirits; sometimes enurgumeni, that is, agitated or moved with spirits; and now in Italy they are called, not only pazzi, madmen; but also spiritati, men possessed.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extreme hot day;

whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambics, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of winter; and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian city, which seized only the young maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Devil. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing that they did not contemn also their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates, to strip such as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. This, the story says, cured that madness. But on the other side, the same Grecians, did often ascribe madness to the operation of Eumenides, or Furies; and sometimes of Ceres, Phœbus, and other gods; so much did men attribute to phantasms, as to think them aëreal living bodies; and generally to call them spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews; for they called madmen prophets, or, according as they thought the spirits good or bad, demoniacs: and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs, madmen; and some called the same man both demoniac, and madman. But for the Gentiles it is no wonder, because diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as demons. So that a man was to understand by demon, as well, sometimes an ague, as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended to prophecy by possession of a spirit; but from the voice of God; or by a vision or dream: nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught, there was any such enthusiasm, or any possession. When God is said, (Numb. xi. 25) to to take from the spirit that was in Moses, and give

to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures, by the Spirit of God in man, mean a man's spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is said, (Exod. xxiii. 8) "whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit, and so other spirits, though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled, is extraordinary, and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of the old Testament pretend enthusiasm; or, that God spake in them; but to them, by voice, vision, or dream; and the burthen of the Lord was not possession, but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes: and their placing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusual ability, or defect, in a man's mind; unless they see withal, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it supernatural; and then what can it be, but that either God or the Devil is in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour (Mark iii. 21) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils; as if the greater madman had awed the lesser: and that (John x. 20) some said, he hath a devil, and is mad; whereas others holding him for a prophet, said, these are not the words of one that hath a devil. So in the old Testament he that came to anoint Jehu, (2 Kings ix. 11) was a prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, what came that madman for? So that in sum, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner, was thought by the

Jews to be possessed either with a good, or evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, which is very near to direct atheism; and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to term such men demoniacs, rather than madmen.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possessed; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God, and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their natural reason. Whether the earth's, or sun's motion make the day, and night; or whether the exorbitant actions of men, proceed from passion, or from the devil, so we worship him not, it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said (Matt. viii. 26) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luke iv. 39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever is a devil. And whereas many of the devils are said to confess Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those madmen confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Matt. xii. 43) speaketh of an unclean spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himself; it is manifestly a parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the

Scripture, that requireth a belief, that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen.

Insignificant speech.

There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the School-men; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a School-man in his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; transubstantiation; free-will, &c. into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar. What is the meaning of these words, The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work? They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez' first book, Of the concourse, motion, and help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken; they that say, the whiteness, roundness, magnitude, quality, corruptibility, all which are incorporeal, &c. go out of the wafer, into the body of our blessed

Saviour, do they not make those nesses, tudes, and ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits, they mean always things, that being incorporeal, are nevertheless moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of madness; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but lucid intervals. And thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual.

CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE.

KNOWLEDGE.

There are of knowledge two kinds; whereof one is knowledge of fact: the other knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another. The former is nothing else, but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done: and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called science; and is conditional; as when we know, that, if the figure shown be a circle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into two equal parts. And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning.

The register of knowledge of fact is called history. Whereof there be two sorts: one called natural history; which is the history of such facts, or effects of nature, as have no dependence on man's will; such as are the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. The other, is civil history; which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.

The registers of science, are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation, to another; and are commonly called books of philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table.


SCIENCE, that is, knowledge of consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents of bodies natural; which is called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the accidents common to all bodies natural; which are *quantity*, and *motion*
PHYSICS or consequences from *qualities*.
Consequences from the qualities of bodies *transient*, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish, *Meteorology*.
Consequences from the qualities of bodies *permanent*.
Consequences from the qualities of the *stars*.
Consequences of the qualities from *liquid* bodies, that fill the space between the stars; such as are the *air*, or substances ethereal.
Consequences from the qualities of *bodies terrestrial*.
Consequences from the accidents of *politic* bodies; which is called POLITICS, and CIVIL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Of consequences from the *institution* of COMMONWEALTHS, to the *rights*, and *duties* of the *body politic* or *sovereign*.
2. Of consequences from the same, to the *duty* and *right* of the *subjects*.


Consequences from quantity, and motion *indeterminate*; which being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is called *Philosophia Prima*.
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA.
Consequences from motion and quantity *determined*.
Consequences from quantity, and motion determined.
By Figure
By Number
Mathematics.
GEOMETRY.
ARITHMETIC.
Consequences from the motion, and quantity of bodies in *special*.
Consequences from the motion and quantity of the greater parts of the world, as the *earth* and *stars*.
Cosmography.
ASTRONOMY.
GEOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the motions of special kinds, and figures of body.
Mechanics. Doctrine of *weight*.
Science of ENGINEERS.
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION.
METEOROLOGY
Consequences from the *light* of the stars. Out of this, and the motion of the sun, is made the science of
SCIOGRAPHY.
Consequences from the *influences* of the stars
ASTROLOGY
Consequences from the parts of the earth, that are *without* sense.
Consequences from the qualities of *minerals*, as *stones*, *metals*, &c.
Consequences from the qualities of *vegetables*.
Consequences from the qualities of *animals*.
Consequences from the qualities of *animals in general*.
Consequences from *vision*
OPTICS.
Consequences from *sounds*
MUSIC.
Consequences from the rest of the *senses*.
Consequences from the qualities of *men in special*.
Consequences from the *passions* of men
ETHICS.
Consequences from *speech*.
In *magnifying*, *vilifying*, &c.
POETRY.
In *persuading*,
RHETORIC.
In *reasoning*,
LOGIC.
In *contracting*,
The *Science* of JUST and UNJUST.

CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND WORTHINESS.

POWER.

The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means; to obtain some future apparent good; and is either original or instrumental.

Natural power, is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste.

The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for they are strengths united.

Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth friends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.

Reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called popularity, for the same reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom, or good fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is increase of power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths, where it has privileges: for in such privileges, consisteth their power.

Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.

Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The sciences, are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war; because they confer to defence, and victory, are power: and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother, as his issue.

Worth.

The value, or worth of a man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called honouring, and dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate, is to honour him; at a low rate, is to dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.

Dignity.

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which men commonly call dignity. And this value of him by the commonwealth, is understood, by offices of command, judicature, public employment; or by names and titles, introduced for distinction of such value.

To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is to honour; because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour.

To honour and dishonour.

To obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to honour him; because it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts, is to dishonour;

because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting another's good; also to flatter, is to honour; as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect, is to dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to honour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to dishonour.

To show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to honour; for both to love, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear, than he expects, is to dishonour; for it is undervaluing.

To praise, magnify, or call happy, is to honour; because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity, is to dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to dishonour.

To hearken to a man's counsel, or discourse of what kind soever is to honour; as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signs of honour, or which the law or custom makes so, is to honour; because in approving the honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to honour; as being a sign of approving his judgment, and wisdom. To dissent, is dishonour, and an upbraiding of error; and, if the dissent be in many things, of folly.

To imitate, is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate one's enemy, is to dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to honour him; as a sign of approbation of his judgment. To honour his enemies, is to dishonour him.

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour; as a sign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonour.

All these ways of honouring, are natural; and as well within, as without commonwealths. But in commonwealths, where he, or they that have the supreme authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signs of honour, there be other honours.

A sovereign doth honour a subject, with whatsoever title, or office, or employment, or action, that he himself will have taken for a sign of his will to honour him.

The king of Persia, honoured Mordecai, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the king's garment, upon one of the king's horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him, proclaiming, thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour. And yet another king of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to wear one of the king's robes, gave him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should wear it as the king's fool; and then it was dishonour. So that of civil honour, the fountain is in the person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on the will of the sovereign; and is therefore temporary, and called civil honour; such as magistracy, offices, titles; and in some places coats and scutcheons painted: and men honour such as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the commonwealth; which favour is power.

Honourable.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and sign of power.

Dishonourable.

And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many, is honourable; as arguments of power. To be honoured of few or none, dishonourable.

Dominion, and victory is honourable; because acquired by power; and servitude, for need, or fear, is dishonourable.

Good fortune, if lasting, honourable; as a sign of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, dishonourable. Riches, are honourable; for they are power. Poverty, dishonourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonourable.

Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And irresolution, dishonourable; as a sign of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.

Honourable & Dishonourable.

All actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honourable; for all these are powers. Actions, or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly, dishonourable.

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honourable; because employment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandize; but of the latter, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand, and other trash.

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable; as a sign of the power for

which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity, is dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous parents, is honourable; because they the more easily attain the aids, and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage, is dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable; as signs of magnanimity: for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable.

Covetousness of great riches, and ambition of great honours, are honourable; as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and ambition, of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power, be just or unjust: for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: insomuch as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his frauds, and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of Apollo, from his herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great commonwealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate, or a highway thief; but rather a lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other nations; as is manifest by the histories of ancient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage; and the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they be effects

of rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonour, in one, or both the combatants; who engaged by rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.

Coats of arms.

Scutcheons, and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any eminent privileges, are honourable; otherwise not: for their power consisteth either in such privileges, or in riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called gentry, hath been derived from the ancient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with such devices as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a sign of poverty, and of a common soldier; but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families: but they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custom; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans, or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.

For Germany, being anciently, as all other countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars one with another; those masters, or lords, principally to the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their armour, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture of some beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament both of the arms, and crest, descended by inheritance to their children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some

note of diversity, such as the old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish scutcheons, was made a private office apart. And the issue of these lords, is the great and ancient gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisadoes, and other notes of war; nothing being then in honour, but virtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, but popular commonwealths, gave divers manners of scutcheons, to such as went forth to the war, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompense to their service. All which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories, Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German nation and manners, in their times.

Titles of honour.

Titles of honour, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth: which titles, were in old time titles of office, and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French: dukes, in Latin duces, being generals in war: counts, comites, such as bear the general company out of friendship, and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: marquises, marchiones, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the empire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German militia. But baron, seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man; such as were the king's, or prince's men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from vir, to ber, and bar, that signified the same in the language of the Gauls, that vir in Latin; and thence to bero, and baro: so that such men were called berones, and after barones; and, in Spanish, varones. But he that would know more particularly the original of titles of honour,

may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Selden's most excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the commonwealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other titles also, were devised to the same end.

Worthiness. Fitness.

Worthiness, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert, and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named fitness, or aptitude.

For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that nevertheless, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts.

CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS.

WHAT IS HERE meant by manners.

By manners, I mean not here, decency of behaviour; as how one should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals; but those qualities of mankind, that concern their living together in peace, and unity. To which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

A restless desire of power in all men.

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be

content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

Love of contention from competition.

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Civil obedience from love of ease. From fear of death, or wounds.

Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common power: because by such desires, a man doth abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry, and labour. Fear of death, and wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour military but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

And from love of arts.

Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power: for such desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently protection from some other power than their own.

Love of virtue from love of praise.

Desire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgment they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure to the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, from difficulty of requiting great benefits.

To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom; which is to one's equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, which men call gratitude, is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and service mutual; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And from conscience of deserving to be hated.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgiveness; both which are hateful.

Promptness to hurt, from fear.

Fear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

And from distrust of their own wit.

Men that distrust their own subtlety, are, in tumult and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other, fearing to be circumvented, to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the precincts of battle, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit.

Vain undertaking from vain-glory.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are inclined only to ostentation; but not to attempt: because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of government, are disposed to ambition. Because without public employment

in council or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.

Irresolution, from too great valuing of small matters.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign, the difference of motives, the one way and the other, are not great: therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.

Frugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: for it weakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigour by reward.

Confidence in others, from ignorance of the marks of wisdom and kindness.

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming wisdom, the latter seeming kindness. Add to them military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former having given them caution against danger from him; the latter gives them caution against danger from others.

And from ignorance of natural causes.

Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advice, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

And from want of understanding.

Ignorance of the signification of words, which is want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust: for neither error nor nonsense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: as they that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has only a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between one action of all the senators of Rome in killing Cataline, and the many actions of a number of senators in killing Cæsar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.

Adherence to custom, from ignorance of the nature of right and wrong.

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that unjust which it hath been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but the correction they receive from their parents and masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas, men are not so; because grown old, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: which is the cause, that the

doctrine of right and wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines, and figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle, should be equal to two angles of a square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.

Adherence to private men, from ignorance of the causes of peace.

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and instrumental: for these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the public, discharge their anger upon the publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other officers of the public revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the public government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for fear of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity, from ignorance of nature.

Ignorance of natural causes, disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men like to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance itself without malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Curiosity to know, from care of future time.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Natural religion from the same.

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also by the visible things in this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form

it into laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be best able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.

CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION.

RELIGION IN MAN only.

Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of religion, but in man only; there it no cause to doubt, but that the seed of religion, is also only in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in any other living creatures.

First, from his desire of knowing causes.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.

From the consideration of the beginning of things.

Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

From his observation of the sequel of things.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; man observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy

suggesteth; or trusteth the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The natural cause of religion, the anxiety of the time to come.

The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in a state like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, which interpreted, is, the prudent man, was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired in the night: so that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which makes them fear the power of invisible things.

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which spoken of the gods, that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes;

shall at last come to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feign them.

And suppose them incorporeal.

And for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancied; they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real, and external substances; and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines, and umbræ; and thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit, and incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.

But know not the way how they effect anything.

Then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing, that is, almost all men, have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connexion at all: and therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as charming and conjuring, the liturgy of witches; insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing into any thing.

But honour them as they honour men.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing, that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

And attribute to them all extraordinary events.

Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men

are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Four things, natural seeds of religion.

And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Made different by culture.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other have done it, by God's commandment, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort, is a part of human politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics; and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of common-wealths, and the law-givers of the Gentiles: of the latter sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.

The absurd opinion of Gentilism.

And for that part of religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has

not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a god, or devil; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the world, was a god, by the name of Chaos.

The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were so many gods.

Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek, were deified. Besides that, they filled almost all places, with spirits called demons: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyrs; the woods, with Fawns, and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every river, and fountain, with a ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house with its Lares, or familiars; every man with his Genius; hell with ghosts, and spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with larvæ, lemures, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built temples to meer accidents, and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that good, or evil, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own lusts by the name of Cupid; their own rage, by the name of Furies; their own privy members, by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubæ: insomuch as there was nothing, which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem, which they did not make either a god, or a devil.

The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for religion, which is men’s ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no

dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial gods; ascribing the cause of fecundity, to Venus; the cause of arts, to Apollo; of subtlety and craft, to Mercury; of tempests and storms, to *Æ*olus; and of other effects, to other gods; insomuch as there was amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods, as of business.

And to the worship, which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their gods, namely, oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images, both in picture, and sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, that is to say, the most part or generality of the people, thinking the gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them: and endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their idols; as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands; and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters; but also the faculties, and passions of men and beasts: as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, and this not only by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrel gods, and but inmates of heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others; besides anger, revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power, or a cause of pleasure; and all such vices, as amongst men are taken to be against law, rather than against honour.

Lastly, to the prognostics of time to come; which are naturally, but conjectures upon experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine revelation; the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly upon

pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious ways of divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by design, to own the event both ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous caverns: sometimes in the leaves of the Sybils; of whose prophecies, like those perhaps of Nostradamus (for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times), there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic: sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen, supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted theomancy, or prophecy: sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their nativity; which was called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology: sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumomancy, or presage: sometimes in the prediction of witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: sometimes in the casual flight, or feeding of birds; called augury: sometimes in the entrails of a sacrificed beast; which was aruspicina: sometimes in dreams: sometimes in croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds: sometimes in the lineaments of the face; which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casual words, called omina: sometimes in monsters, or unusual accidents; as eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they called portenta, and ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshow some great calamity to come; sometimes, in mere lottery, as cross and pile; counting holes in a sieve; dipping of verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are

men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

The designs of the authors of the religion of the heathen.

And therefore the first founders, and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received: so Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria: and the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun; and Mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery, came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this life: which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to their end, which was the peace of the commonwealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their governors; and being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their civil government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.

The true religion and the laws of God's kingdom the same.

But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion; there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom: and gave laws, not only of behaviour towards himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and spiritual domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place (chapter XXXV).

The causes of change in religion.

From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible, and supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; it followeth necessarily, when they that have the government of religion, shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or when they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation; that the religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and, without the fear of the civil sword, contradicted and rejected.

Enjoining belief of impossibilities.

That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom, in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.

Doing contrary to the religion they establish.

That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity, is the doing or saying of such things, as appear to be signs, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make

men to fall in the way of religion; as injustice, cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these roots, believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the belief they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Want of the testimony of miracles.

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling, can be no other, than the operation of miracles; or true prophecy, which also is a miracle; or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, to those points of religion, which have been received from them that did such miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their calling by some miracle, obtain no greater belief, than what the custom and laws of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in natural things, men of judgment require natural signs, and arguments; so in supernatural things, they require signs supernatural, which are miracles, before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of men's faith, do manifestly appear in the examples following. First, we have the example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his calling to them by miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but forty days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up (Exod. xxxiii. 1, 2) a golden calf for their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen

the great works of God in Israel, (Judges ii. 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that miracles failing, faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam. viii. 3) being constituted by their father judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their king, in other manner than he was king of other people; and therefore cried out to Samuel, to chose them a king after the manner of the nations. So that justice failing, faith also failed: insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian religion, the oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that success, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between princes. Also the religion of the church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendom; insomuch, as the failing of virtue in the pastors, maketh faith fail in the people: and partly from bringing of the philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into religion, by the Schoolmen; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance, and of fraudulent intention; and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own princes, as in France and Holland; or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those princes, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all foreign authority, as easily as it has been

excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a king hath not his authority from Christ, unless a bishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? That whether a prince be born in lawful marriage, or not, must be judged by authority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance, if by the court of Rome, the king be judged an heretic? That a king, as Chilperic of France, may be deposed by a pope, as Pope Zachary, for no cause; and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the fees of private masses, and vales of purgatory; with other signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, as I said, the civil magistrate, and custom did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing priests; and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that church that hath presumed most of reformation.

CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY.

MEN BY NATURE equal.

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more

learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From equality proceeds diffidence.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

From diffidence war.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such

augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against every one.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For war, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition

thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

The incommodities of such a war.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mánkind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man’s nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know:

nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

In such a war nothing is unjust.

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that

there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace.

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS.

RIGHT OF NATURE what.

The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty what.

By liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.

A law of nature what. Difference of right and law.

A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law: yet they ought to be distinguished; because right, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Naturally every man has right to every thing. The fundamental law of nature.

And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

The second law of nature.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the

Gospel; whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.

What it is to lay down a right.

To lay down a man's right to any thing, is to divest himself of the liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature: but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another man's defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Renouncing a right, what it is. Transferring right what. Obligation. Duty. Injustice.

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By transferring; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is injustice, and injury, as being sine jure; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that injury, or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth, or transferreth his right, is a

declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce, or transfer; or hath so renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and actions. And the same are the bonds, by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word, but from fear of some evil conseuence upon the rupture.

Not all rights are alienable.

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

Contract what.

The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call contract.

There is difference between transferring of right to the thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is delivery of the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right; as in buying and selling with ready-money; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Convenant what.

Again, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the contract on his part, is called pact, or covenant: or both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith; and the failing of performance, if it be voluntary, violation of faith.

Free-gift.

When the transferring of right, is not mutual: but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but gift, free-gift, grace: which words signify one and the same thing.

Signs of contract express. Promise.

Signs of contract, are either express, or by inference. Express, are words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are either of the time present, or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant: which words of the future are called promise.

Signs of contract by inference.

Signs by inference, are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a sign by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor.

Free gift passeth by words of the present or past.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free-gift, and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as to-morrow I will give, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. But if the words be of the time present, or past, as, I have given, or, do give to be delivered to-morrow, then is my to-morrow's right given away to day; and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, volo hoc tuum esse cras, and cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine to-morrow, and, I will give it thee to-morrow: for the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of the will to transfer a right, besides words; then, though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by words of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words be of the future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them run.

Signs of contract are words both of the past, present, and future.

In contracts, the right passeth, not only where the words are of the time present, or past, but also where they are of the future: because all contract is

mutual translation, or change of right; and therefore he that promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right should pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant; and therefore obligatory.

Merit what.

He that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as due. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth; or money is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free gift; yet so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the money; though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of merit, this difference, that in contract, I merit by virtue of my own power, and the contractor's need; but in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver: in contract, I merit at the contractor's hand that he should depart with his right; in this case of gift, I merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than another's. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schools, between meritum congrui, and meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men, hoodwinked with carnal desires, that can walk through this world according to the precepts, and limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit Paradise ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God only; they say, no man

can merit Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirm any thing of their meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due.

Covenants of mutual trust, when invalid.

If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy; contrary to the right, he can never abandon, of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

Right to the end, containeth right to the means.

He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land, is understood to transfer the herbage, and whatsoever grows upon it: nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty, are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.

No covenant with beasts.

To make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant.

Nor with God without special revelation.

To make covenant with God, is impossible, but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural, or by his lieutenants that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that vow anything contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them.

No covenant, but of possible and future.

The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say, an act, and the last act of deliberation; and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, though not to the thing

itself, yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.

Covenants how made void.

Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being forgiven. For performance, is the natural end of obligation; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants extorted by fear are valid.

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it: for it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a weaker prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless, as hath been said before, there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

The former covenant to one, makes void the later to another.

A former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man to-day, hath it not to pass to-morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.

A man’s covenant not to defend himself is void.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For, as I have showed before, no man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right; and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.

No man obliged to accuse himself.

A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: and in the civil state, the accusation is followed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it. Also accusations upon torture, are not to be reputed as testimonies. For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured; not to the informing of the torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by true, or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life.

The end of an oath. The form of an oath.

The force of words, being, as I have formerly noted, too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants; there are in man's nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word; or a glory, or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon, is fear; whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man, his own religion: which hath place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle. So that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that invisible power, which they every one worship as God; and fear as a revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: which swearing, or oath, is a form of speech, added to a promise; by which he that promiseth, signifieth, that unless he perform, he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself. Such was the heathen form, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast. So is our form, I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God. And this, with the rites and ceremonies, which every one useth in his own religion, that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater.

No oath but by God.

By this it appears, that an oath taken according to any other form, or rite, than his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no oath: and that there is no swearing by any thing which the swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings, for fear, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them divine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

An oath adds nothing to the obligation.

It appears also, that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an oath.

CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.

THE THIRD LAW of nature, justice.

From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

Justice and injustice what.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of injustice, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

Justice and propriety begin with the constitution of commonwealth

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part, as hath been said in the former chapter, are invalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right

they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for they say, that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no own, that is no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins.

Justice not contrary to reason.

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice: but he questioneth, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, may not sometimes stand with that reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against reason, it is not against justice; or

else justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue: and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice: somewhat like to a piece of law in Coke's Commentaries on Littleton; where he says, if the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason; yet the crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the attainder be void: from which instances a man will be very prone to infer; that when the heir apparent of a kingdom, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no civil power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no covenants: but either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a power to make him perform; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man who can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the

help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant.

And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a law of nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the law of nature, to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against,

the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent. But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith; but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature.

Covenants not discharged by the vice of the person to whom they are made.

Others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others: and this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it.

Justice of men and justice of actions what.

The names of just, and injust, when they are attributed to men, signify one thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of manners, to reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they signify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of manners, or manner of life, but of particular actions. A just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his actions may be all just: and an unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our language styled by the names of righteous, and unrighteous; than just, and unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a righteous man, does not lose that title, by one, or a few unjust actions, that proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things, or persons: nor does an unrighteous man, lose his character, for such actions, as he does, or forbears to do, for fear: because his will is not framed by the

justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to human actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This justice of the manners, is that which is meant, where justice is called a virtue; and injustice a vice.

But the justice of actions donominates men, not just, but guiltless: and the injustice of the same, which is also called injury, gives them but the name of guilty.

Justice of manners, and justice of actions.

Again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do injury; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is to say injury, supposeth an individual person injured; namely him, to whom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation; and therefore could not injure him. And so also in commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence, are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.

Nothing done to a man by his own consent can be injury.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. And if he have;

then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.

Justice commutative and distributive.

Justice of actions, is by writers divided into commutative, and distributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And merit, besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive, is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the justice, of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying, and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing; exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.

And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is just. Wherein, being trusted by them that make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed just distribution, and may be called, though improperly, distributive justice; but more properly equity; which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.

The fourth law of nature, gratitude.

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free gift: and is the fourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this form, that a man which receiveth

benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war; which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law, is called ingratitude; and hath the same relation to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.

The fifth mutual accommodation, or complaisance.

A fifth law of nature, is complaisance; that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in men's aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others, than itself fills; and for the hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; he that shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature, which commandeth to seek

peace. The observers of this law, may be called sociable, the Latins call them commodi; the contrary, stubborn, insociable, froward, intractable.

The sixth, facility to pardon.

A sixth law of nature, is this, that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it. For pardon, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

The seventh, that in revenges, men respect only the future good.

A seventh is, that in revenges, that is, retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; for the end is always somewhat to come; and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason, and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of war; which is against the law of nature; and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty.

The eighth, against contumely.

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept, that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred, or contempt of another. The breach of which law, is commonly called contumely.

The ninth, against pride.

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where, as has been shewn before, all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy; others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he; as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others: nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged: or if nature have made men unequal; yet because men that think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this, that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride.

The tenth, against arrogance.

On this law, dependeth another, that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list: so is it necessary for man's life, to retain some; as right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else, without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do

contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of natural equality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of this law, are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law πλεονεξία; that is, a desire of more than their share.

The eleventh, equity.

Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature, that he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He therefore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deter men from the use of judges, and arbitrators; and consequently, against the fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war.

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called equity, and, as I have said before, distributive justice: the violation, acception of persons, προσωπολημψία.

The twelfth, equal use of things common.

And from this followeth another law, that such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and contrary to equity.

The thirteenth, of lot.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth, that the entire right; or else, making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot. For equal distribution, is of the law of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.

The fourteenth, of primogeniture, and first seizing.

Of lots there be two sorts, arbitrary, and natural. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the competitors: natural, is either primogeniture, which the Greek calls κληρονομία, which signifies, given by lot; or first seizure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and in some cases to the first born, as acquired by lot.

The fifteenth, of mediators.

It is also a law of nature, that all men that mediate peace, be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commandeth peace, as the end, commandeth intercession, as the means; and to intercession the means is safe conduct.

The sixteenth, of submission to arbitrement.

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action; first, whether it were done, or not done; secondly, if done, whether against the law, or not against the law; the former whereof, is called a question of fact; the latter a question of right, therefore unless the parties to the question, covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other to whose sentence they submit is called an arbitrator. And therefore it is of the law of nature, that they that are at controversy, submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator.

The seventeenth, no man is his own judge.

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause; and if he were never so fit; yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also; and so the controversy, that is, the cause of war, remains, against the law of nature.

The eighteenth, no man to be judge, that has in him a natural cause of partiality.

For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken, though an unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy, and the condition of war remaineth, contrary to the law of nature.

The nineteenth of witnesses.

And in a controversy of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: for else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the law of nature.

These are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

A rule, by which the laws of nature may easily be examined.

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself; which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and self-

love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The laws of nature oblige in conscience always, but in effect then only when there is security.

The laws of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation. And again, he that having sufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war; and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence.

And whatsoever laws bind in foro interno, may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his action in this case, be according to the law; yet his purpose was against the law; which, where the obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.

The laws of nature are eternal.

The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.

And yet easy.

The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.

The science of these laws, is the true moral philosophy.

And the science of them, is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different; and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which, as I have shewed before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say; moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness; nor that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift, made liberality.

These dictates of reason, men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But

yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED.

A PERSON WHAT.

A person, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.

Person natural, and artificial.

When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.

The word person, whence.

The word person is Latin: instead whereof the Greeks have πρ¸όσωπον, which signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard: and from the stage, hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres. So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et judicis: I bear three persons; my own, my adversary's, and the judge's; and is called in divers occasions, diversly; as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.

Actor. Author. Authority.

Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the author: in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an owner, and in Latin dominus, in Greek κύριος speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, is called authority. So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission, or licence from him whose right it is.

Covenants by authority, bind the author.

From hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. XIV) of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no further.

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.

But not the actor.

When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature; for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.

The authority is to be shown.

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself.

Things personated, inanimate.

There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners, or governors of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be personated, before there be some state of civil government.

Irrational.

Likewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason, may be personated by guardians, or curators; but can be no authors, during that time, of any action done by them, longer than, when they shall recover the use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because before such estate, there is no dominion of persons.

False gods.

An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated; as were the gods of the heathen: which by such officers as the state appointed, were

personated, and held possessions, and other goods, and rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be authors: for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded from the state: and therefore before introduction of civil government, the gods of the heathen could not be personated.

The true God.

The true God may be personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the Israelites, that were not his, but God's people, not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moses; but in God's name, with hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the Son of man, his own Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews, and induce all nations into the kingdom of his father; not as of himself, but as sent from his father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himself; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

A multitude of men, how one person.

A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person: and unity, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.

Every one is author.

And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many; they cannot be understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their representative saith, or doth in their name; every man giving their common representer, authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint: otherwise,

when they limit him in what, and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him commission to act.

An actor may be many men made one by plurality of voices.

And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives; and thereby the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath.

Representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable.

And a representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in some cases contradictory voices equal in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve not. For when a cause is heard; not to condemn, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time: for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing execution, is a decree of dilation.

Negative voice.

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies; whereof every one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative; because by the diversity of opinions, and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war.

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors conditional, are generally called sureties, in Latin, fidejussores, and sponsores; and particularly for debt, prædes; and for appearance before a judge, or magistrate, vades.

PART II. OF COMMONWEALTH.

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMONWEALTH.

THE END OF commonwealth, particular security:

The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter XIII, to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

Which is not to be had from the law of nature:

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature, that the greater spoils they gained,

the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms which are but greater families, for their own security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.

Nor from the conjunction of a few men or families:

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.

Nor from a great multitude, unless directed by one judgment:

And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of

nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any civil government, or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection.

And that continually.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment, for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power.

It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

The generation of a commonwealth. The definition of a commonwealth.

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will:

which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas. This is the generation of that great leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.

Sovereign, and subject, what.

And he that carrieth this person, is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject.

The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One, by natural force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or

by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution; and the former, a commonwealth by acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a commonwealth by institution.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION.

THE ACT OF instituting a commonwealth, what.

A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

The consequences to such institution, are.

From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

1. The subjects cannot change the form of government.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for they are bound,

every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and because it is injustice for a man to do anything, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

2. Sovereign power cannot be forfeited.

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants

after he hath the sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof,is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution; and others, or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No man can without injustice protest against the institution of the sovereign declared by the major part.

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is,

becontented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

4. The sovereign's actions cannot be justly accused by the subject.

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth: and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification.

5. Whatsoever the sovereign doth is unpunishable by the subject.

Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign; he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself.

6. The sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defence of his subjects.

And because the end of this institution, is the peace and defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means; it belongeth of right, to whatsoever man, or assembly that hath the sovereignty, to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad; and, when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

And judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them.

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace, and concord. And though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true, that in a commonwealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfulness of governors, and teachers, false doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden, and rough bursting in of a new truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another; and they live, as it were, in the

precincts of battle continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the sovereign power, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war.

7. The right of making rules; whereby the subjects may every man know what is so his own, as no other subject can without injustice take it from him.

Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and this is it men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety, or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each commonwealth in particular; though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law.

8. To him also belongeth the right of judicature and decision of controversy.

Eightly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies, which may arise concerning law, either civil, or natural; or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject, against the injuries of another; the laws concerning meum and tuum are in vain; and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation,

the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.

9. And of making war, and peace, as he shall think best.

Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of making war and peace with other nations, and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end; and to levy money upon the subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their armies; and the strength of an army, in the union of their strength under one command; which command the sovereign instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the militia, without other institution, maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.

10. And of choosing all counsellors and ministers, both of peace & war.

Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the choosing of all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace, and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defence, he is understood to have power to use such means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

11. And of rewarding and punishing, and that (where no former law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrarily.

Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches, or honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath formerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.

12. And of honour and order.

Lastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a common enemy; it is necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those laws in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not only the whole militia, or forces of the commonwealth; but also the judicature of all controversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of honour; and to appoint what order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signs of respect, in public or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These rights are indivisible.

These are the rights, which make the essence of sovereignty; and which are the marks, whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs; to have præemption in markets; and all other statute prerogatives, may be transferred by the sovereign; and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he transfer the militia, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of the laws: or if he grant away the power of raising money; the militia is in vain; or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect, in the conservation of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths are instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in

itself cannot stand: for unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil war; first between those that disagreed in politics; and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right, that there be few now in England that do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been.

And can by no grant pass away without direct renouncing of the sovereign power.

And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them, the grant is void: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

The power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of the power sovereign.

This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of sovereign kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater power than every one of their subjects, yet they be universis minores, of less power than them all together. For if by all together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by all together, they understand them as one person, which person the sovereign bears, then the power of all together, is

the same with the sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough, when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.

Sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting readily to a less.

But a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth; whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same: not considering that the state of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage or weakening of their

subjects, in whose vigour, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.

CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER.

THE DIFFERENT FORMS of commonwealths but three.

The difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a monarchy: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular commonwealth: when an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be indivisible, entire.

Tyranny and oligarchy, but different names of monarchy, and aristocracy

There be other names of government, in the histories, and books of policy; as tyranny, and oligarchy: but they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy, call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want of government, is

any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the governors.

Subordinate representatives dangerous.

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch, as absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative of the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace, is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a monarchy, he that had the sovereignty from a descent of six hundred years, was alone called sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their representative; the name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that

office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.

Comparison of monarchy, with sovereign assemblies.

The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not in the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.

Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But

when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it. For the understanding is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude.

Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other inconstancy, than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence of a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm, which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments, or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to-day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a civil war.

Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another's flatterers, serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites of monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own kindred; the favourites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much more numerous, than of any monarch. Besides, there is no favourite of a monarch, which cannot as well

succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires less eloquence, such is man's nature, than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by his right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person, and authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the sovereign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is to say that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion, and civil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the custom in that case received: and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of the subjects; which in all kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed in their duty, and the rights of sovereignty, is the same. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such tuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or damage, is not tuition, but treachery. So

that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrel, about the government under a child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace, it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition of subjects, and ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no great commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly, which is not, as to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws, in the same condition, as if the government were in a child. For as a child wants the judgment to dissent from counsel given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is committed: so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority: so also, in great commonwealths, the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of custodes libertatis; that is of dictators, or protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs, to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their power; and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof, than infant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.

Definition of monarchy, and other forms.

Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that is to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or democracy, where the general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms, arising from these mingled together. As for example, elective kingdoms; where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or kingdoms, wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments, are nevertheless by most writers called

monarchy. Likewise if a popular, or aristocratical commonwealth, subdue an enemy's country, and govern the same, by a president, procurator, or other magistrate; this may seem perhaps at first sight, to be a democratical, or aristocratical government. But it is not so. For elective kings, are not sovereigns, but ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings, sovereigns, but ministers of them that have the sovereign power: nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracy, or aristrocracy of another commonwealth, democratically or aristocratically governed, but monarchically.

Definition of monarchy, &c.

And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to certain years or months, as the dictator's power amongst the Romans; if he have right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary. But if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect anew, or else the commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of war. If it be known who have the power to give the sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sovereignty was in them before: for none have right to give that which they have not right to possess, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the sovereignty, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war. And consequently he was, when elected, a sovereign absolute.

Secondly, that king whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is not supreme; that is to say not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was always

in that assembly which had the right to limit him; and by consequence the government not monarchy, but either democracy, or aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the kings had a privilege to lead their armies; but the sovereignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea, for example, by a president; yet was not Judea therefore a democracy; because they were not governed by any assembly, into the which, any of them, had right to enter; nor an aristocracy; because they were not governed by any assembly, into which, any man could enter by their election: but they were governed by one person, which, though as to the people of Rome, was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a monarch. For though where the people are governed by an assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a democracy, or aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an assembly, not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy; not of one man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of the right of succession.

Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not only monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an artificial man, so there be order also taken, for an artificial eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an assembly, should return into the condition of war in every age; and they that are governed by one man, as soon as their governor dieth. This artificial eternity, is that which men call the right of succession.

There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign. For if it be in any other particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by

the sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the right is in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choice; then is the commonwealth dissolved; and the right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the commonwealth, for their perpetual, and not temporary security.

In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless the multitude that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right of succession, have in that form of government no place at all.

In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the assembly, as the sovereign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth, as author. And though the sovereign assembly may give power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their court; yet it is still by their authority, that the election is made; and by the same it may, when the public shall require it, be recalled.

The present monarch hath right to dispose of the succession.

The greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch that hath the sovereign authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of inheritance, (for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death of him that hath the sovereign power in propriety, leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all; that is, without any representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all:

and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch; every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a return to confusion, and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution. Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of monarchy, the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor.

And for the question, which may arise sometimes, who it is that the monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his express words, and testament; or by other tacit signs sufficient.

Succession passeth by express words;

By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his lifetime, viva voce, or by writing; as the first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. For the word heir does not of itself imply the children, or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. If therefore a monarch declare expressly, that such a man shall be his heir, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his predecessor, invested in the right of being monarch.

Or, by not controlling a custom;

But where testament, and express words are wanting, other natural signs of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And therefore where the custom is, that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that, if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life-time. And likewise where the custom is, that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same reason. And so it is if the

custom were to advance the female. For whatsoever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand.

Or, by presumption of natural affection.

But where neither custom, nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, first, that a monarch's will is, that the government remain monarchical; because he hath approved that government in himself. Secondly, that a child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a male than a female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own issue faileth, rather a brother than a stranger; and so still the nearer in blood, rather than the more remote; because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred.

To dispose of the succession, though to a king of another nation, not unlawful.

But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers, that is, men not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language, do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government, but from the unskilfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules of politics. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving

sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes to principal men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges, but also the name of Romans; and took many of them into the senate, and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it our most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeavouring the union of his two realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the civil wars, which make both those kingdoms, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulness of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.

CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNAL, AND DESPOTICAL.

A COMMONWEALTH BY acquisition.

A commonwealth by acquisition, is that, where the sovereign power is acquired by force; and it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.

Wherein different from a commonwealth by institution.

And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution, only in this, that men who choose their sovereign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such covenants, as proceed from fear of death or violence, void: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of commonwealth, could be obliged to obedience. It is true, that in a commonwealth once instituted, or acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence, are no covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the laws; but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully perform, and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant, that absolveth him, but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: but when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he

is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such absolution.

The rights of sovereignty the same in both.

But the rights, and consequences of sovereignty, are the same in both. His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of injury: he cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace; and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and peace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers, and ministers; and to determine of rewards, and punishments, honour, and order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter, for the same rights, and consequences of sovereignty by institution.

Dominion paternal how attained. Not by generation, but by contract;

Dominion is acquired two ways; by generation, and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation, is that, which the parent hath over his children; and is called paternal. And is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from the child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be always two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore over the child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters. And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths, this controversy is decided by the civil law; and for the most part, but not always, the sentence is in favour of the father; because for the most part commonwealths have been erected

by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere nature; where there are supposed no laws of matrimony; no laws for the education of children; but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the females was in the mother.

Or education;

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father, unless it be declared by the mother: and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.

Or precedent subjection of one of the parents to the other.

If the mother be the father’s subject, the child, is in the father’s power: and if the father be the mother’s subject, as when a sovereign queen

marrieth one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother; because the father also is her subject.

If a man and woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion also over the children of the child; and over their children's children. For he that hath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all that is his; without which, dominion were but a title, without the effect.

The right of succession followeth the rules of the right of possession.

The right of succession to paternal dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the right of succession of monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Despotical dominion attained.

Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call despotical, from Δεσπότης, which signifieth a lord, or master; and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before: for by the word servant, whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute, is not meant a captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: for such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their

bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly: but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

Not by the victory, but by the consent of the vanquished.

It is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think fit.

And that which men do, when they demand, as it is now called, quarter, which the Greeks called Ζωγρ῾ία, taking alive, is to evade the present fury of the victor, by submission, and to compound for their life, with ransom, or service: and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not a yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his life in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in prisons; or fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.

The master of the servant, is master also of all he hath: and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution; and

for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, whereof he hath, in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds; to demand of one nation more than of the other, from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty; for the sovereign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no sovereignty at all; and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

Difference between a family and a kingdom.

By this it appears; that a great family, if it be not part of some commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little monarchy: whether that family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a family is not properly a commonwealth; unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. for where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice, concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of sovereign rights, from the nature, need, and designs of men, in erecting of commonwealths, and putting themselves under monarchs, or assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.

The rights of monarchy from Scripture.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses, the children of Israel say thus: Speak thou to us, and we will hear

thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die. (Exod. xx. 19.) This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. viii. 11, 12, &c.) This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks, and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your flocks; and you shall be his servants. This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants. Again, when the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (verse 10) we will be as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars. Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the militia, and to all judicature; in which is contained as absolute power, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of king Solomon to God, was this (1 Kings, iii. 9): Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil. It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil: which rules are laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6) God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of God. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith; (Col. iii. 22) Servants obey your masters in all things; and, (Col. iii. 20) children obey your parents in all things. There is simple obedience

in those that are subject to paternal, or despotical dominion. Again, (Matt. xxiii. 2, 3) The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair, and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do. There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (Titus iii. 2) Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himself acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed, where he says, give to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's; and paid such taxes himself. And that the king's word, is sufficient to take anything from any subject, when there is need; and that the king is judge of that need: for he himself, as king of the Jews, commanded his disciples to take the ass, and ass's colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Matth. xxi. 2, 3) Go into the village over against you, and you shall find a she ass tied, and her colt with her, untie them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them: and they will let them go. They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (iii. 5) Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. And (verse 11) Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing good and evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw

not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakedness, wherein it was God's will to create them, to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitly censure God himself. And thereupon God saith; Hast thou eaten, &c. as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified, that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

Sovereign power ought in all commonwealths to be absolute.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the practice; when men ask, where, and when, such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war. In those nations, whose commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument from the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of commonwealths, and suffer daily those

miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis-play, on practice only: which rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS.

LIBERTY WHAT.

Liberty, or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say; it wants the liberty; but the power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.

What it is to be free.

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words free, and liberty, are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely,

it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word free-will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

Fear and liberty are consistent.

Fear and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: it is therefore the action of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men do in commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.

Liberty and necessity consistent.

Liberty, and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes, proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions, would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, and no more, nor less. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to anything, of which appetite God's will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that

on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural liberty, which only is properly called liberty.

Artificial bonds, or covenants.

But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so also have they made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty of subjects consisteth in liberty from covenants.

In relation to these bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the liberty of subjects. For seeing there is no commonwealth in the world, wherein there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men; as being a thing impossible: it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions by the laws prætermitted, men have the liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in the proper sense, for corporal liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains and prison; it were very absurd for men to clamour as they do, for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty, for an exemption from laws, it is it no less absurd, for men to demand as they do, that liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the

sovereign hath prætermitted: such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.

Liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of the sovereign.

Nevertheless we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the sovereign power of life and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shown, that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to anything, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in commonwealths, that a subject may be put to death, by the command of the sovereign power; and yet neither do the other wrong: as when Jephtha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince, that putteth to death an innocent subject. For though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity, as was the killing of Uriah, by David; yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself: and yet to God, because David was God's subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature: which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their commonwealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would do: nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not

whom; and every citizen bringing his oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actually accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of justice; and sometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the liberty to jest, or to be just.

The liberty which writers praise, is the liberty of sovereigns; not of private men.

The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention, in the histories, and philosophy of the ancient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men; but the liberty of the commonwealth: which is the same with that which every man then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romans were free; that is, free commonwealths: not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative; but that their representative had the liberty to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great characters at this day, the word libertas; yet no man can thence infer, that a particular man has more

liberty, or immunity from the service of the commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth be monarchical, or popular, the freedom is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of liberty; and for want of judgment to distinguish, mistake that for their private inheritance, and birth-right, which is the right of the public only. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings on this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of government. In these western parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution, and rights of commonwealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans, that living under popular states, derived those rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the practice of their own commonwealths, which were popular; as the grammarians describe the rules of language, out of the practice of the time; or the rules of poetry, out of the poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, to keep them from desire of changing their government, that they were freemen, and all that lived under monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politics, (lib. 6. cap. ii.) In democracy, liberty is to be supposed: for it is commonly held, that no man is free in any other government. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other writers have grounded their civil doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome; and afterwards by their successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latin authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false show of liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those controllers; with the effusion of so much blood, as I think I may truly say, there was never any

thing so dearly bought, as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.

Liberty of subjects how to be measured.

To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless, without injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what rights we pass away, when we make a commonwealth; or, which is all one, what liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the actions, without exception, of the man, or assembly we make our sovereign. For in the act of our submission, consisteth both our obligation, and our liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the express words, I authorize all his actions, or from the intention of him that submitteth himself to his power, which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth; the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is to be derived, either from those words, or others equivalent; or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.

Subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them.

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by covenant of every one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest, that every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14th chapter, that covenants, not to defend a man's own body, are void. Therefore,

Are not bound to hurt themselves.

If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound, without assurance of pardon, to confess it; because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.

Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power, is contained in these words, I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill myself, or my fellow. It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself, or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission; but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor to warfare, unless they voluntarily undertake it.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth. And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness; not only to women, of whom no such dangerous duty is expected, but also to men of feminine courage. When

armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle, is not injustice, but cowardice. But he that inrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh imprest money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it, without his captain's leave. And when the defence of the commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty, takes away from the sovereign, the means of protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful.

The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law.

As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in some times more, in other

times less, according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in aftertimes, that liberty of forcible entry, was taken away by a statute made, by the king, in parliament. And in some places of the world, men have the liberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed.

If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent law; he hath the same liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a subject; and before such judges, as are appointed by the sovereign. For seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former law, and not by virtue of his power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that law. The suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign; and consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause; and sentence, according to that law. But if he demand, or take anything by pretence of his power; there lieth, in that case, no action of law; for all that is done by him in virtue of his power, is done by the authority of every subject, and consequently he that brings an action against the sovereign, brings it against himself.

If a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to all, or any of his subjects, which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the grant is void; unless he directly renounce, or transfer the sovereignty to another. For in that he might openly, if it had been his will, and in plain terms, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the sovereign power; and therefore the sovereignty is still retained; and consequently all those powers, which

are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the power of war, and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers, and councillors, of levying money, and the rest named in the 18th chapter.

In what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to their sovereign.

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by foreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord.

In case of captivity.

If a subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporal liberty given him, on condition to be subject to the victor, he hath liberty to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same, if he be detained on the same terms, in a foreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

In case the sovereign cast off the government from himself and his heirs.

If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself, and his heirs; his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature; because, though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of his kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the precedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he will have no heir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The case is the same, if he die without known kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For then there can no heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due.

In case of banishment.

If the sovereign banish his subject; during the banishment, he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is still subject; but it is, by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another's dominion, is subject to all the laws thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special licence.

In case the sovereign render himself subject to another.

If a monarch subdued by war, render himself subject to the victor; his subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own body; he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his right remaining, the question is only of the administration; that is to say, of the magistrates and officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, AND PRIVATE.

THE DIVERS SORTS of systems of people.

Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles of a body natural. By systems, I understand any numbers of men joined in one interest, or one business. Of which, some are regular, and some irregular. Regular are those, where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All other are irregular.

Of regular, some are absolute, and independent, subject to none but their own representative: such are only commonwealths; of which I have spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are dependent; that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one, as also their representative is subject.

Of systems subordinate, some are political, and some private. Political, otherwise called bodies politic, and persons in law, are those, which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no authority derived from foreign power, within the dominion of another, is public there, but private.

And of private systems, some are lawful; some unlawful. Lawful, are those which are allowed by the commonwealth: all other are unlawful. Irregular systems, are those which having no representative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor

made on evil design, such as are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end, are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable), unknown, they are unlawful.

In all bodies politic the power of the representative is limited.

In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power sovereign. For power unlimited, is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave. And to give leave to a body politic of subjects, to have an absolute representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence; which the sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words, are not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the contrary; but rather signs of error, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that power, which is given to the representative of a body politic, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign: the other is the law of the commonwealth.

By letters patent:

For though in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth, which is independent, there needs no writing, because the power of the representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembered without letters, nor taken notice of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be read to them, and withal sealed, or testified, with the seals, or other permanent signs of the authority sovereign.

And the laws.

And because such limitation is not always easy, or perhaps possible to be described in writing; the ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must determine what the representative may lawfully do, in all cases, where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore,

When the representative is one man, his unwarranted acts are his own only.

In a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the person of the body, which is not warranted in his letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other member thereof besides himself: because further than his letters, or the laws limit, he representeth no man's person, but his own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: for of the act of the sovereign every one is author, because he is their representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the sovereign, is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of the body is author of it.

When it is an assembly, it is the act of them that assented only.

But if the representative be an assembly; whatsoever that assembly shall decree, not warranted by their letters, or the laws, is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by procuration. It is the act of the assembly, because voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which is to such artificial, and fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politic. But they that gave not their vote, are therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent

any man in things unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved in their votes.

When the representative is one man, if he borrow money, or owe it, by contract, he is liable only, the members not.

If the person of the body politic being in one man, borrow money of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body, (for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending), the debt is the representative's. For if he should have authority from his letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the sovereignty of them; and therefore the grant were either void, as proceeding from error, commonly incident to human nature, and an insufficient sign of the will of the granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and falleth not under the present question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himself: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those only for his debtors, that are engaged: and seeing the representer can engage himself, and none else, has him only for debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock, if there be any, or, if there be none, out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same.

When it is an assembly, they only are liable that have assented.

But when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and only they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment: for he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt; though when paid by any one, he be discharged.

If the debt be to one of the assembly, the body only is obliged.

But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock, if they have any: for having liberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he votes it shall be paid; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former vote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common treasure only; which failing he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himself, that being privy to the acts of the assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly lend his money.

Protestation against the decrees of bodies politic sometimes lawful, but against sovereign power never.

It is manifest by this, that in bodies politic subordinate, and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the representative assembly, and cause their dissent to be registered, or to take witness of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men. But in a sovereign assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their sovereignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the subject, though not so always in the sight of God, justified by the command; for of such command every subject is the author.

Bodies politic for government of a province, colony, or town

The variety of bodies politic, is almost infinite: for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affairs, some are

ordained for government; as first, the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part; and then this assembly is a body politic, and their power limited by commission. This word province signifies a charge, or care of business, which he whose business it is, committeth to another man, to be administered for, and under him; and therefore when in one commonwealth there be divers countries, that have their laws distinct one from another, or are far distant in place, the administration of the government being committed to divers persons, those countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs by commission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province, by an assembly residing in the province itself, there be few examples. The Romans who had the sovereignty of many provinces; yet governed them always by presidents, and prætors; and not by assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome, and territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were colonies sent from England, to plant Virginia, and Sommer-islands; though the governments of them here, were committed to assemblies in London, yet did those assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation send one governor. For though every man, where he can be present by nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by nature also inclined, to commit the government of their common interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular form of government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering the business that belongs to them, chuse rather to trust one servant, than an assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province, or colony committed to an assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted; or

whatsoever unlawful act is decreed, is the act only of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alleged. Also that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the colony, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself, as having no jurisdiction, nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy, which the law of the place alloweth them. And though the assembly have right, to impose a mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the laws they make; yet out of the colony itself, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the rights of an assembly, for the government of a province, or a colony, is appliable also to an assembly for the government of a town, an university, or a college, or a church, or for any other government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular member conceive himself injured by the body itself, the cognizance of his cause belongeth to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath ordained for judges in such causes, or shall ordain for that particular cause; and not to the body itself. For the whole body is in this case his fellow-subject, which in a sovereign assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the sovereign be not judge, though in his own cause, there can be no judge at all.

Bodies politic for ordering of trade.

In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his money, may be present at all the deliberations, and resolutions of the body, if they will themselves. For roo f whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their merchandize, according to their own discretions, do nevertheless bind themselves up in

one corporation. It is true, there be few merchants, that with the merchandize they buy at home, can freight a ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to join together in one society; where every man may either participate of the gain, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being no common representative to oblige them to any other law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The end of their incorporating, is to make their gain the greater; which is done two ways; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to grant them a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a company incorporate for any particular foreign country, they only export the commodities vendible in that country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainful to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of foreign merchandize, and but one that sells them at home; both which again are gainful to the adventurers.

Of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all foreign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the foreigner: for where but one selleth, the merchandize is the dearer; and where but one

buyeth, the cheaper. Such corporations therefore are no other than monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a commonwealth, if being bound up into one body in foreign markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.

The end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to the whole body, which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of ships, but the particular gain of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly, where every member of the body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a body politic of merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly, every member is liable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private laws, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: but if the debt be to one of the company, the creditor is debtor for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood to be laid upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.

If a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they only are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the

body; which if a crime, because the body was ordained by the authority of the commonwealth, is not his.

If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body; but only by authority of the commonwealth: for if they can do it by their own authority, they can by their own authority give judgment that the debt is due; which is as much as to be judge in their own cause.

A body politic for counsel to be given to the sovereign.

Those bodies made for the government of men, or of traffic, be either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business. For example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other several parts of their territory, to send to him their deputies, to inform him of the condition, and necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good laws, or for any other cause, as with one person representing the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politic, representing every subject of that dominion; but it is only for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly, that by the sovereign authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute representatives of the people, then were it the sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their peace. And therefore where there is once a sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people, but by it. And forthe limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for. For the people

cannot choose their deputies to other intent, than is in the writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed.

A regular private body, lawful as a family.

Private bodies regular, and lawful, are those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to all other subjects. And because they be united in one person representative, they are held for regular; such as are all families, in which the father, or master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth his children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers, and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father and master, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute sovereigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more of their authority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh from them.

Private bodies regular, but unlawful.

Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves into one person representative, without any public authority at all; such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of men, that by authority from any foreign person, unite themselves in another's dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party, against the power of the commonwealth.

Systems irregular, such as are private leagues.

Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere concourse of people, without union to any particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the lawfulness,

or unlawfulness of every particular man's design therein: and his design is to be understood by the occasion.

The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for mutual defence, are in a commonwealth, which is no more than a league of all the subjects together, for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawful design; and are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the name of factions, or conspiracies. For a league being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly, as in the condition of mere nature, to compel them to performance, is so long only valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is no human power established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and, in case the design of them be evil or unknown to the commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed.

Secret cabals.

If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the guidance of the rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no injustice; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men's manners are, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

Feuds of private families.

In all commonwealths, if private men entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous families have lived in continual hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else they had no commonwealth.

Factions for government.

And as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of state, as patricians, and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and democraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the sovereign.

Concourse of people.

Concourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness, or unlawfulness, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the concourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a public show, in usual numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawful, and tumultuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men, to join to a petition to be delivered to a judge, or magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but such a number, as the present officers are not able to suppress, and bring to justice.

When an unusual number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the assembly is an unlawful tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius and a great number of other men, brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate, saying with one voice, Great is Diana of the Ephesians; which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their religion, and trade. The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just; yet was their assembly judged unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it in these words (Acts xix. 38-40.) If Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any man, of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this day's sedition; because there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse of people. Where he calleth an assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning systems, and assemblies of people, which may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body; such as be lawful, to the muscles; such as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours.

CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN POWER.

IN THE LAST chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a commonwealth: in this I shall speak of the parts organical, which are public ministers.

Public minister who.

A public minister, is he, that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in that employment, the person of the commonwealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that hath sovereignty, representeth two persons, or, as the more common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural, and another politic: as a monarch, hath the person not only of the commonwealth, but also of a man; and a sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the commonwealth, but also of the assembly: they that be servants to them in their natural capacity, are not public ministers; but those only that serve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that wait on the assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an aristocracy, or democracy; nor stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the household of a monarch, are public ministers in a monarchy.

Ministers for the general administration.

Of public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of the whole dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a protector, or regent, may be committed by the predecessor of an infant king, during his minority, the whole administration of his

kingdom. In which case, every subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the king's name, and not inconsistent with his sovereign power. Of a part, or province; as when either a monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall give the general charge thereof to a governor, lieutenant, præfect, or viceroy: and in this case also, every one of that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the sovereign, and that not incompatible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors, have no other right, but what depends on the sovereign's will; and no commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the sovereignty, without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of public ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that move the several limbs of a body natural.

For special administration, as for economy.

Others have special administration; that is to say, charges of some special business, either at home, or abroad: as at home, first, for the economy of a commonwealth, they that have authority concerning the treasure, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts thereof, are public ministers: ministers, because they serve the person representative, and can do nothing against his command, nor without his authority: public, because they serve him in his political capacity.

Secondly, they that have authority concerning the militia; to have the custody of arms, forts, ports; to levy, pay, or conduct soldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or sea, are public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he fight for the commonwealth, does not therefore represent the person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

For instruction of the people.

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the public enemy, are public ministers: ministers, in that they do it not by their own authority, but by another's; and public, because they do it, or should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch, or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the sovereign, receiveth his power Dei gratiâ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: all other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their sovereigns; as in a monarchy Dei gratiâ et regis; or Dei providentiâ et voluntate regis.

For judicature.

They also to whom jurisdiction is given, are public ministers. For in their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign; and their sentence, is his sentence: for, as hath been before declared, all judicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty; and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of fact, and of law; so are judgments, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in the same controversy, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversy between the party judged, and the judge; which because they be both subjects to the sovereign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is already agreed on for judge by them both, and is therefore either to hear the cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers

ways; as first, if the defendant be allowed to except against such of his judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the complainant, he hath already chosen his own judge), those which he excepteth not against, are judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal no further; for his appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the sovereign himself, and he by himself, or by delegates which the parties shall agree on, give sentence; that sentence is final: for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rational judicature considered, I cannot forbear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice, established both for Common, and also for Public Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, I mean those, where both the complainant and defendant are subjects: and by public, which are also called Pleas of the Crown, those where the complainant is the sovereign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; the Lords had this privilege, to have for judges in all capital crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a privilege of favour, their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every subject, (as also in civil controversies the Lords), had for judges, men of the country where the matter in controversy lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were judged by those twelve. So that having his own judges, there could be nothing alleged by the party, why the sentence should not be final. These public persons, with authority from the sovereign power, either to instruct, or judge the people, are such members of the commonwealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body natural.

For execution.

Public ministers are also all those, that have authority from the sovereign, to procure the execution of judgments given; to publish the sovereign's commands; to suppress tumults; to apprehend, and imprison malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. For every act they do by such authority, is the act of the commonwealth; and their service, answerable to that of the hands, in a body natural.

Public ministers abroad, are those that represent the person of their own sovereign, to foreign states. Such are ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by public authority, and on public business.

But such as are sent by authority only of some private party of a troubled state, though they be received, are neither public, nor private ministers of the commonwealth; because none of their actions have the commonwealth for author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity; though the authority be public; yet because the business is private, and belonging to him in his natural capacity; is a private person. Also if a man be sent into another country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the authority, and the business be public; yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him, but his own; he is but a private minister; but yet a minister of the commonwealth; and may be compared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are as it were the public ear, are public ministers, and represent their sovereign in that office.

Councillors without other employment than to advise are not public ministers.

Neither a councillor, nor a council of state, if we consider it with no authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose

person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a body of councillors, are never without some other authority, either of judicature, or of immediate administration: as in a monarchy, they represent the monarch, in delivering his commands to the public ministers: in a democracy, the council, or senate propounds the result of their deliberations to the people, as a council; but when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give audience to ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people: and in an aristocracy, the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself; and gives counsel to none but themselves.

CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMONWEALTH.

THE NOURISHMENT OF a commonwealth consisteth in the commodities of sea and land.

The nutrition of a commonwealth consisteth, in the plenty, and distribution of materials conducing to life: in concoction, or preparation; and, when concocted, in the conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the public use.

As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature, to those commodities, which from the two breasts of our common mother, land and sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind.

For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, merely on the labour and industry of men.

This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native, and partly foreign: native, that which is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth: foreign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth, except it be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for the maintenance, and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not some thing more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour.

For a man's labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: and there have been commonwealths that having no more territory, than hath served them for habitation, have nevertheless, not only maintained, but also encreased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the manufactures whereof the materials were brought in from other places.

And the right distribution of them.

The distribution of the materials of this nourishment, is the constitution of mine, and thine, and his; that is to say, in one word propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth to the sovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth, there is, as hath been already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; and therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community; but uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty, in a public pleading, attributeth all propriety to the law civil. Let the civil law, saith he, be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor, or leave to his children. And again; Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another man's. Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And this they well knew of old, who called that Νόμος, that is to say, distribution, which we call law; and defined justice, by distributing to every man his own.

All private estates of land proceed originally from the arbitrary distribution of the sovereign.

In this distribution, the first law, is for division of the land itself: wherein the sovereign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not

according as any subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to equity, and the common good. The children of Israel, were a commonwealth in the wilderness; but wanted the commodities of the earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General, who, when there were twelve tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of Joseph, made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land; and ordained for the tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore arbitrary. And though a people coming into possession of a land by war, do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave to many, or most, or all of them their estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the victors' distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.

Propriety of subject excludes not the dominion of the sovereign, but only of another subject

From whence we may collect, that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their sovereign, be it an assembly, or a monarch. For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth, whose person he representeth, is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed void. It is true, that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature; but this is

not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way to speak evil of their sovereign; because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.

The public is not to be dieted.

In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself, may be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain the whole expense to the common peace, and defence necessarily required. Which were very true, if there could be any representative conceived free from human passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of public land, or of any certain revenue for the commonwealth, is in vain; and tendeth to the dissolution of government, and to the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as ever the sovereign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in engaging the public stock into a long or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no diet: for seeing their expense is not limited by their own appetite, but by external accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the public riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conqueror, divers lands reserved to his own use, besides forests and chases, either for his recreation, or preservation of woods, and divers services reserved on the land he gave his subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his public, but in his natural capacity. For he, and his successors did for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects' land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those public lands, and services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth, it

was contrary to the scope of the institution; being, as it appeared by those ensuing taxes, insufficient, and, as it appears by the late small revenue of the crown, subject to alienation and diminution. It is therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the commonwealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell and give it away, when it is done by their representative.

The places and matter of traffic depend, as their distribution, on the sovereign.

As the distribution of lands at home; so also to assign in what places, and for what commodities, the subject shall traffic abroad, belongeth to the sovereign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing men's appetites, be nevertheless noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign only, to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of foreign traffic.

The laws of transferring propriety belong also to the sovereign.

Further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a commonwealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of land, or in some few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutual contract. And therefore it belongeth to the commonwealth, that is to say, to the sovereign, to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects, as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire, are to be made; and by what words and signs they shall be understood for valid. And for the matter, and distribution of the nourishment, to the several members of the

commonwealth, thus much, considering the model of the whole work, is sufficient.

Money the blood of a commonwealth.

By concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to something of equal value, and withal so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but gold, and silver, and money. For gold and silver, being, as it happens, almost in all countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between nations; and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the subjects of that commonwealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, moveable and immoveable, are made to accompany a man to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from man to man, within the commonwealth; and goes round about, nourishing, as it passeth, every part thereof; in so much as this concoction, is as it were the sanguification of the commonwealth: for natural blood is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way every member of the body of man.

And because silver and gold have their value from the matter itself; they have first this privilege, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few commonwealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base money, may easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the privilege to make commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need is, into foreign countries: and supply, not only private subjects that travel, but also whole armies with provision. But that coin, which is not considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of

the place, being unable to endure change of air, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.

The conduits and way of money to the public use.

The conduits, and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use, are of two sorts: one, that conveyeth it to the public coffers; the other, that issueth the same out again for public payments. Of the first sort, are collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second, are the treasurers again, and the officers appointed for payment of several public or private ministers. And in this also, the artificial man maintains his resemblance with the natural; whose veins receiving the blood from the several parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where being made vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the members of the same.

The children of a commonwealth colonies

The procreation or children of a commonwealth, are those we call plantations, or colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth, under a conductor, or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war. And when a colony is settled, they are either a commonwealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them, as hath been done by many commonwealths, of ancient time, in which case the commonwealth from which they went, was called their metropolis or mother, and requires no more of them, than fathers require of the children, whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic government, which is honour, and friendship; or else they remain united to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of the commonwealth that sent them. So that the right of colonies, saving honour

and league witht heir metropolis, dependeth wholly on their licence or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant.

CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSEL.

COUNSEL WHAT.

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of counsels, and commands, arising from the imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words do this, are the words not only of him that commandeth; but also of him that giveth counsel; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not that these are very different things, or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in men's writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellors, for the precepts of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would infer, or the actions they approve. To avoid which mistakes, and render to those terms of commanding, counselling and exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.

Differences between command and counsel.

Command is, where a man saith, do this, or do not this, without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will only, and the proper object of every man's will, is some good to himself.

Counsel, is where a man saith, do, or do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth counsel, pretendeth only, whatsoever he intendeth, the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between counsel and command, one great difference is, that command is directed to a man's own benefit; and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself: but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will to know his designs, or to gain some other good to himself: which, as I said before, is of every man's will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: for to ask counsel of another, is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign, whether a monarch, or an assembly, when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. For if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further counsel; for the sense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another, to do anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention, or

from ignorance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.

Exhortation and dehortation what.

Exhortation and dehortation is counsel, accompanied with signs in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed: or to say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he counselleth to action: as he that dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And, therefore, they have in their speeches, a regard to the common passions and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to persuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following their advice.

From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by the definition of counsel, ought to regard not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a man is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute, and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.

Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to give counsel, are corrupt counsellors, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good counsellor, than he that giveth a just sentence for a reward, is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully command, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations, are not only lawful, but also necessary, and laudable. But then they are no more counsels, but commands; which when they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and always humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel, rather than in harsher language of command.

Examples of the difference between command and counsel, we may take from the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. Have no other Gods but me; make to thyself no graven image; take not God's name in vain; sanctify the sabbath; honour thy parents; kill not; steal not, &c. are commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our king, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me, are counsel; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have treasure in Heaven. These words, Go into the village over against you, and you shall find an ass tied, and her colt; loose her, and bring her to me, are a command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus, are counsel; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever we rebel; but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.

Differences of fit and unfit counsellors.

As the difference of counsel from command, hath been now deduced from the nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt and inept counsellors be derived from the same. For experience, being but memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the virtues, and defects of counsel, are the same with the virtues, and defects intellectual: and to the person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of memory, and mental discourse. But with this resemblance of the commonwealth, to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience, from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth, may have, and have often their particular ends and passions, that render their counsels always suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counsellor, that his ends, and interests, be not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth.

Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash and unevident inferences, such as are fetched only from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion; obscure, confused, and ambiguous

expressions, also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the office of a counsellor.

Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary to be known, no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such business, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered. For seeing the business of a commonwealth is this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own country, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (chap. VIII.) is judgment. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be infallible rules, as in engines and edifices, the rules of geometry, all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel, that has learnt, or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business, has therein the best judgment, and is the best counsellor.

Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business that hath reference to another commonwealth, it is necessary to be

acquainted with the intelligences, and letters that come from thence, and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state between them; which none can do, but such as the representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to counsel, can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with aye, or no, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow one another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine, when there is need, the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly, where, in every difficult question, a man is rather astonied, and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of their motley orations,

made of the divers coloured threds, or shreads of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own judgment only; as he that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a wheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eyes see more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors; but then only, when the final resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their

private benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; and therefore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them; or by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal factions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for very little commonwealths, be they popular, or monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours.

CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVIL LAWS.

CIVIL LAW WHAT.

By civil laws, I understand the laws, that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not of this, or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws belongeth to them, that profess the study of the laws of their several countries; but the knowledge of civil law in general, to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which signifies a commonwealth: and those countries, which having been under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is law here, and there; but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law.

And first it is manifest, that law in general, is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the commonwealth.

Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. Civil law, is to every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule.

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that some laws are addressed to all the subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to particular vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore laws, to every of those to whom the command is directed, and to none else. As also, that laws are the rules of just, and unjust; nothing being reputed unjust, that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that none can make laws but the commonwealth; because our subjection is to the commonwealth only: and that commands, are to be signified by sufficient signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The sovereign is legislator.

The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sovereign, be he one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy, or aristocracy. For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the commonwealth only prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything, but by the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a law made, but the sovereign; because a law is not abrogated, but by another law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And not subject to civil law.

The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make, and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for

any person to be bound to himself; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only, is not bound.

Use, a law not by virtue of time, but of the sovereign's consent.

When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of consent; and it is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made; the length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right; but the question shall be judged by equity. For many unjust actions, and unjust sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember. And our lawyers account no customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that evil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly, or monarch.

The law of nature, and the civil law contain each other.

The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature, as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth chapter, are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the

world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth, hath convenanted to obey the civil law; either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one, when subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life; and therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of nature. Civil, and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law; whereof one part being written, is called civil, the other unwritten, natural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making laws, is no other, but such restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.

Provincial laws are not made by custom, but by the sovereign power.

If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue a people that have lived under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws, by which they were governed before; yet those laws are the civil laws of the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be divers provinces, within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have their force, only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of their sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an unwritten law, in all the provinces of a

dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no other but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind.

Some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of laws.

Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force, from the will of the commonwealth; that is to say, from the will of the representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other commonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in several commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As for example, that the common law, hath no controller but the parliament; which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not parliamentum, but rex in parliamento. And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power. Item, that the two arms of a commonwealth, are force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other deposited in the hands of the parliament. As if a commonwealth could consist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the authority to command and govern.

Sir Edw. Coke upon Littleton, lib. 2, ch. 6, fol. 97, b.

That law can never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed; and that not the letter, that is every construction of it, but that which is according to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And it is true: but the doubt is of

whose reason it is, that shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws, as there is in the Schools; nor yet, as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, as his was. For it is possible long study may increase, and confirm erroneous sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin: and of those that study, and observe with equal time and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges; but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command, that maketh law: and the commonwealth being in their representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws; and when there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign, which is the person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth: the subordinate judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his sovereign to make such law, that his sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his sovereign's sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

Law made, if not also made known, is no law.

From this, that the law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or madmen, there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a commonwealth. And as those from whom nature or accident

hath taken away the notice of all laws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not: and to speak properly, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signs be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of the sovereign, as well in monarchies, as in other forms of government.

Unwritten laws are all of them laws of nature.

And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men's words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no law can be, but the law of nature. The laws of nature therefore need not any publishing, nor proclamation; as being contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thyself.

Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a law of nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other subjects. For whatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a law not only civil, but natural. For example, if the sovereign employ a public minister, without written instructions what to do; he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge is to take notice, that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign, which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law of nature: or if an ambassador, he is, in all things not contained in

his written instructions, to take for instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his sovereign's interest; and so of all other ministers of the sovereignty, public and private. All which instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name of fidelity; which is a branch of natural justice.

The law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other laws, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the commonwealth, is to be supposed always consonant to equity and reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon (Prov. vii. 3) adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandments upon his ten fingers. And for the law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the covenant (Deut. xi. 19), he biddeth them to teach it their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and doors of their houses; and (Deut. xxxi. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.

Nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known. Difference between verifying & authorizing.

Nor is it enough the law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign. For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for laws what they please, without, or against the legislative authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient

signs of the author and authority. The author, or legislator is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who having been constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their commonwealth is worn out, they do not consider, by whose power they used to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is sovereign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evil men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority derived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the public registers, public counsels, public ministers, and public seals; by which all laws are sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not authorized: for the verification, is but the testimony and record, not the authority of the law; which consisteth in the command of the sovereign only.

The law verified by the subordinate judge.

If therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of nature; that is to say, on common equity; the sentence of the judge, that by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes, is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law, be useful for the avoiding of contention; yet it is but advice: it is the judge must tell men what is law, upon the hearing of the controversy.

By the public registers.

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law; every man by recourse to the registers, by himself or others, may, if he will, be sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime, whether it be an injury, or not: nay he ought to do so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or unjust; and may inform himself, if he will; the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written law, which he may, by himself or others, see and consider; if he complain before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.

By letters patent and public seal.

If the question be of obedience to a public officer; to have seen his commission, with the public seal, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification of his authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to inform himself of all written laws, that may concern his own future actions.

The interpretation of the law dependeth on the sovereign power.

The legislator known; and the laws, either by writing, or by the light of nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the letter, but the intendment, or meaning, that is to say, the authentic interpretation of the law (which is the sense of the legislator), in which the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation of all laws dependeth on the authority sovereign; and the interpreters can be none but those, which the sovereign, to whom only the subject oweth obedience, shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense, contrary to that of the sovereign: by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator.

All laws need interpretation.

All laws, written, and unwritten, have need of interpretation. The unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality and passion, make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or some other passion; it is now become of all laws the most obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The written laws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the divers significations of many words: insomuch as no written law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the final causes, for which the law was made; the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To him therefore there cannot be any knot in the law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends he will, as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot, by the legislative power; which no other interpreter can do.

The authentical interpretation of law is not that of writers.

The interpretation of the laws of nature, in a commonwealth, dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this treatise, concerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore presently law; but because in all commonwealths in the world, it is part of the civil law. For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the sovereign power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great error, to call the laws of nature unwritten law; whereof we see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.

The interpreter of the law is the judge giving sentence viva voce in every particular case.

The interpretation of the law of nature, is the sentence of the judge constituted by the sovereign authority, to hear and determine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case. For in the act of judicature, the judge doth no more but consider, whether the demand of the party, be consonant to natural reason, and equity; and the sentence he giveth, is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature; which interpretation is authentic; not because it is his private sentence; but because he giveth it by authority of the sovereign, whereby it becomes the sovereign's sentence; which is law for that time, to the parties pleading.

The sentence of a judge does not bind him, or another judge to give like sentence in like cases ever after. The sentence of a judge does not bind him, &c.

But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in a judgment of equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man's error becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither, for the same reason, becomes it a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by authority of the sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of nature, they are no laws to the same or other judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth, another cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of the law of nature shall pass; for it is the eternal law of God. Therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been, cannot altogether make a law contrary to natural equity: nor any examples

of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity, in the case he is to judge, from the principles of his own natural reason. For example sake, it is against the law of nature, to punish the innocent; and innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially, and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runneth away for fear of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legal trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to succeeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: but that flying for fear of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime judicially, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which hath no place after judgment given. Yet this is set down by a great lawyer for the common law of England. If a man, saith he, that is innocent, be accused of felony, and for fear flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himself of the felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the felony, he shall notwithstanding his innocency, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law, grounded upon his flight. Here you see, an innocent man judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency, when no written law forbad him to fly, after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the

fact, which was capital, the sentence ought to have been capital: if the presumption were not of the fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law, but upon the presumption of the judges. It is also against law, to say that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law. For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear proof, refuse to do justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the judges that condemn without hearing the proofs offered, are unjust judges; and their presumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice, whatsoever precedent judgments, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein men's judgments have been perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this is enough to show, that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to the party pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall succeed him in that office.

In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is not the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon them. For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil, than the text; and therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such interpretation. And therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and their sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for laws in that particular case; but not to bind other judges, in like cases to give like judgments. For a judge may err in the interpretation even of written laws; but no error of a subordinate judge, can change the law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign.

The difference between the letter and sentence of the law.

In written laws, men use to make a difference between the letter, and the sentence of the law: and when by the letter, is meant whatsoever can be

gathered from the bare words, it is well distinguished. For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the letter, be meant the literal sense, then the letter, and the sentence or intention of the law, is all one. For the literal sense is that, which the legislator intended, should by the letter of the law be signified. Now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity: for it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought therefore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature; or if the case be difficult, to respite judgment till he have received more ample authority. For example, a written law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: it happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no special law ordained. It is evident that this case is contained in the same law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator. Again, the word of the law commandeth to judge according to the evidence: a man is accused falsely of a fact, which the judge himself saw done by another, and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses; because the letter of the law is to the contrary: but procure of the sovereign that another be made judge, and himself witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant a sentence against the law. For every judge of right, and wrong, is not judge of what is commodious, or incommodious to the commonwealth.

The abilities required in a judge.

The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say, in a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate; namely the study of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact, from none but the witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the law from nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the sovereign, alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the sovereign power to declare them; and need not take care beforehand, what he shall judge; for it shall be given him what he shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he shall say in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of parliament in England were judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people, are the judges, and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right; and pronounce simply for the complainant, or for the defendant; that is to say, are judges, not only of the fact, but also of the right: and in a question of crime, not only determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be murder, homicide, felony, assault, and the like, which are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to inform them of it, in the particular case they are to judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unless it be made appear, that they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.

The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the laws, are, first, a right understanding of that principal law of nature called equity; which depending not on the reading of other men’s writings, but on the

goodness of a man's own natural reason, and meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, contempt of unnecessary riches, and preferments. Thirdly, to be able in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.

Divisions of law.

The difference and division of the laws, has been made in divers manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on nature, but on the scope of the writer; and is subservient to every man's proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil laws:

The edicts, constitutions, and epistles of the prince, that is, of the emperor; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the proclamations of the kings of England.

The decrees of the whole people of Rome, comprehending the senate, when they were put to the question by the senate. These were laws, at first, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and such of them as by the emperors were not abrogated, remained laws, by the authority imperial. For all laws that bind, are understood to be laws by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to these laws, are the acts of parliament in England.

The decrees of the common people, excluding the senate, when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by the authority imperial. Like to these, were the orders of the House of Commons in England.

Senatus consulta, the orders of the senate; because when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the emperor, that men should consult the senate, instead of the people; and these have some resemblance with the acts of council.

The edicts of prætors, and in some cases of ædiles: such as are the chief justices in the courts of England.

Responsa prudentum; which were the sentences, and opinion of those lawyers, to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law, and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice; which answers, the judges in giving judgment were obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe: and should be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them. For the judges of the common law of England, are not properly judges, but juris consulti; of whom the judges, who are either the lords, or twelve men of the country, are in point of law to ask advice.

Also, unwritten customs, which in their own nature are an imitation of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be not contrary to the law of nature, are very laws.

Another division of law.

Another division of laws, is into natural and positive. Natural are those which have been laws from all eternity; and are called not only natural, but also moral laws; consisting in the moral virtues, as justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace, and charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been from eternity; but have been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the will of their legislator.

Again, of positive laws some are human, some divine; and of human positive laws, some are distributive, some penal. Distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; nevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent, who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself, but to public ministers appointed to see the penalty executed. And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the laws distributive; and are sometimes called judgments. For all laws are general judgments, or sentences of the legislator; as also every particular judgment, is a law to him, whose case is judged.

Divine positive law how made known to be law.

Divine positive laws (for natural laws being eternal, and universal, are all divine), are those, which being the commandments of God, not from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a certain people, or to certain persons, are declared for such, by those whom God hath authorized to declare them. But this authority of man to declare what be these positive laws of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, how can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently

impossible. For though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the miracles they see him do, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all which are marks of God's extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation. Miracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by natural, and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of God's will; but only a belief; every one, as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser, a firmer or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how can he be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the law declared, be not against the law of nature, which is undoubtedly God's law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men's belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of supernatural law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws; but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham, in a supernatural manner, was thus, (Gen. xvii. 10) This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee. Abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law; which they could not be, but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who, if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham, have

sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed; for I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgment, it is manifest, the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet they were bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for God's law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such, the command of the commonwealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for God's commandments, their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is God's commandment; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the commandments of the commonwealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law, that is to say, to the law of nature, all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is declared to be so, by the laws of the commonwealth. Which also is evident to any man's reason; for whatsoever is not against the law of nature, may be made law in the name of them that have the sovereign power; and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it, when it is propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God, than are declared for such by the commonwealth. Christian states punish those that revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the

commonwealth, it is equity, which is the law of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God, that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

Another division of laws.

There is also another distinction of laws, into fundamental and not fundamental; but I could never see in any author, what a fundamental law signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that manner.

A fundamental law, what.

For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that, which being taken away, the commonwealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that, by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the sovereign, whether a monarch, or a sovereign assembly, without which the commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war and peace, of judicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the commonwealth; such as are the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the division of laws.

Difference between law and right.

I find the words lex civilis, and jus civile, that is to say law and right civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned authors; which nevertheless ought not to be so. For right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but civil law is an obligation, and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure himself by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention: but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as lex and jus, are as different as obligation and liberty.

And between a law and a charter.

Likewise laws and charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet charters are donations of the sovereign; and not laws, but exemptions from law. The phrase of a law is, jubeo, injungo, I command and enjoin: the phrase of a charter is, dedi, concessi, I have given, I have granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a law. A law may be made to bind all the subjects of a commonwealth: a liberty, or charter is only to one man, or some one part of the people. For to say all the people of a commonwealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever, is to say, that in such case, there hath been no law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.

SIN, WHAT.

A sin, is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt, is a breach of all his laws at once. And therefore may consist, not only in the commission of a fact, or in speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the omission of what the law commandeth, but also in the intention, or purpose to transgress. For the purpose to break the law, is some degree of contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the imagination only, of being possessed of another man's goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the law, that saith, Thou shalt not covet: nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a sin; but the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man, and every other living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that hand, than on the other.

A crime, what.

A crime, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath commanded. So

that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To intend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which distinction the Greeks observed, in the word ἁμάρ῾τημα, and ἔγκλημα, or ἀιτία; whereof the former, which is translated sin, signifieth any swerving from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are translated crime, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by peccatum, which is sin, signify all manner of deviation from the law; but by crimen, which word they derive from cerno, which signifies to perceive, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear before a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.

Where no civil law is, there is no crime.

From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may be inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue, can never cease to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every man being his own judge, and accused only by his own conscience, and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. When therefore his intention is right, his fact is no sin: if otherwise, his fact is sin; but not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the institution of sovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this is

to be understood only of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them; for that was a crime from the beginning.

Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man.

The source of every crime, is some defect of the understanding; or some error in reasoning; or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the understanding, is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. Again, ignorance is of three sorts; of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country, though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law, shall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no civil law is binding.

Ignorance of the civil law excuseth sometimes.

In the like manner, if the civil law of a man's own country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action against the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other cases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth not.

Ignorance of the sovereign excuseth not.

Ignorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a man's ordinary residence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the power,

by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the penalty excuseth not.

Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man: for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not, then he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his will whose law is thereby violated.

Punishments declared before the fact, excuse from greater punishments after it.

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same crime; it is the law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

Nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact.

No law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime: because if the fact be against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a positive law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made before the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is liable to the penalty ordained after, in

case no lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediately before alleged.

False principles of right & wrong causes of crime.

From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men are prone to violate the laws, three ways. First, by presumption of false principles: as when men, from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorized, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the only criminals; have thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, that justice is but a vain word: that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry, and hazard, is his own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust: that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be virtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar, the same laws standing, turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth.

False teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature.

Secondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws, such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject.

And false inferences from true principles, by teachers.

Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of

their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but only common experience, and a good natural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may extenuate, a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private business; much less in them that undertake a public charge; because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse.

By their passions.

Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is vain glory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality, not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the vulgar.

Presumption of riches,

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatness of their wealth, adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money, or other rewards.

And friends.

And that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate the laws, from a hope of oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.

Wisdom.

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own wisdom, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime, but what their own designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their neighbours; because they think their designs are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of commonwealth, which can never happen without a civil war, very few are left alive long enough, to see their new designs established: so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden, being nothing else but their own blindness; and are no wiser than children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are subject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger.

Hatred, lust, ambition, covetousness, causes of crime

As for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man’s experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered, but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continual, and unavoidable molestation; whereby either a man’s patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the

power of that which molesteth him. The former is difficult; the latter is many times impossible, without some violation of the law. Ambition, and covetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy, or uncertain punishments.

Fear sometimes cause of crime, as when the danger is neither present nor corporeal.

Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is fear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing, when there is apparence of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.

For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only of corporeal hurt, which we call bodily fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him: if he wound him to death, this is no crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a commonwealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbs, where the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the sovereign power, is a crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace or some little injuries, for which they that made the laws, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason, to take notice of, and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoid this, breaks the law, and protects himself for the future, by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime: for the

hurt is not corporeal, but phantastical, and, though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men, so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which nevertheless, to do, or omit, is contrary to the laws; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by this fear; but is a crime. For, as I have shown before in the second chapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own, or another's dream, or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits, than is permitted by the commonwealth, leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private man's brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream, say true, or lie; which if every private man should have leave to do, as they must by the law of nature, if any one have it, there could no law be made to hold, and so all commonwealth would be dissolved.

Crimes not equal.

From these different sources of crimes, it appears already, that all crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, of the same allay. There is place, not only for excuse, by which that which seemed a crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for extenuation, by which the crime, that seemed great, is made less. For though all crimes do equally deserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight line is equally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed: yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally

unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoics not observing, held it as great a crime, to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill one's father.

Total excuses.

That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of a crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if he that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a crime.

The want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. For the law whereof a man has no means to inform himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to inquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children, and madmen are excused from offences against the law natural.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so), if it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or die; and consequently such obedience is no crime: for no man is obliged, when the protection of the law faileth, not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I do it not, I die presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained; nature therefore compels him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way, but by some fact against the law; as

if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another man's sword; he is totally excused, for the reason next before alleged.

Excuses against the author.

Again, facts done against the law by the authority of another, are by that authority excused against the author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the law, both the author and actor are criminals. From hence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he ought not to condemn it himself, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be done against his own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law.

If that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, disclaim any right essential to the sovereignty, whereby there accrueth to the subject, any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power, that is to say, with the very being of a commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse to obey the command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty, because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey, but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a crime; because he might have been righted, without any breach of the peace, upon complaint.

The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by the malignity of the source, or cause; secondly, by the contagion of the example; thirdly, by the mischief of the effect; and fourthly, by the concurrence of times, places, and persons.

Presumption of power aggravateth.

The same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the law, is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by force, is a root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all laws; whereas in the latter case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. A crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful; for he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by error, after the error is shewn him, is conformable to the law.

Evil teachers extenuate.

He, whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized, is not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and reasoning: for what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority, the commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same authority controlleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment, ought, according to the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand or fall.

Examples of impunity extenuate.

The same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a greater crime, than if there have been many precedent examples of impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the sovereign himself: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

Premeditation aggravateth.

A crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation: for in the former case there is a place for extenuation, in the common infirmity of human nature: but he that doth it with premeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye on the law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to human society; all which, in committing the crime, he hath contemned and postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of passion sufficient for a total excuse: for all the time between the first knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the law, to rectify the irregularity of his passions.

Where the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people read and interpreted, a fact done against it, is a greater crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but, in the former, there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.

Tacit approbation of the sovereign extenuates.

Those facts which the law expressly condemneth, but the law-maker by other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth, are less crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the law and law-maker. For seeing the will of the law-maker is a law, there appear in this case two contradictory laws;

which would totally excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the sovereign's approbation, by other arguments than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not only to the transgression of his law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. For example, the law condemneth duels; the punishment is made capital: on the contrary part, he that refuseth duel, is subject to contempt and scorn, without remedy; and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in war. If thereupon he accept duel, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in governors, not to countenance anything obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the laws themselves. And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernatural grace to follow that precept.

Comparison of crimes from their effects.

Again, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects; first, the same fact, when it redounds to the damage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not only in the present, but also, by example, in the future, it is a greater crime, than if it hurt only in the present: for the former, is a fertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the latter is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the commonwealth, is a greater fault, in an authorized preacher, than in a private person: so also is it, to live profanely,

incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a professor of the law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the sovereign power, is a greater crime, than in another man: also in a man that hath such reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, is a greater crime, than the same fact in another: for such men not only commit crime, but teach it for law to all other men. And generally all crimes are the greater, by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other man carry before them.

Læsa Majestas

Also facts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth, are greater crimes, than the same acts done to private men: for the damage extends itself to all: such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all attempts upon the representative of the commonwealth, be it a monarch, or an assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed, to diminish the authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which crimes the Latins understand by crimina læsæ majestatis, and consist in design, or act, contrary to a fundamental law.

Bribery and false testimony

Likewise those crimes, which render judgments of no effect, are greater crimes, than injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive money to give false judgment, or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater sum; because not only he has wrong, that falls by such judgments; but all judgments are rendered useless, and occasion ministered to force, and private revenges.

Depeculation.

Also robbery, and depeculation of the public treasure, or revenues, is a greater crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a private man; because to rob the public, is to rob many at once.

Counterfeiting authority.

Also the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry, the counterfeiting of public seals or public coin, than counterfeiting of a private man's person, or his seal; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage of many.

Crimes against private men compared.

Of facts against the law, done to private men, the greater crime, is that, where the damage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore

To kill against the law, is a greater crime, than any other injury, life preserved.

And to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a man of his goods.

And the spoiling a man of his goods, by terror of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued: though some men are more, and some less sensible of the same offence. But the law regardeth not the particular, but the general inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harm, than the present grief of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks, Romans, and other both ancient and modern commonwealths; supposing the true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, which takes no hold upon men

conscious of their own virtue, but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill one's parent, is a greater crime, than to kill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign, though he surrendered his power to the civil law; because he had it originally by nature. And to rob a poor man, is a greater crime, than to rob a rich man; because it is to the poor a more sensible damage.

And a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law.

Many other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might be added: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other crime proposed.

Public crimes what.

Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only to some private men, but also to the commonwealth; the same crime, when the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, is called public crime: and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the pleas according thereunto called public, judicia publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser be a private man, the plea is a Private Plea; if the accuser be the sovereign, the plea is a Public Plea.

CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS.

THE DEFINITION OF punishment.

A punishment, is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.

Right to punish whence derived

Before I infer any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right or authority of punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not. But to covenant to assist the sovereign, in doing hurt to another, unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give him a right to punish. It is manifest therefore that the right which the commonwealth, that is, he, or they that represent it, hath to punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the subjects. But I have also showed formerly, that before the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did

not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as entire, as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.

Private injuries & revenges no punishments.

From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled punishment; because they proceed not from public authority.

Nor denial of preferment;

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the public favour, is not a punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Nor pain inflicted without public hearing;

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought first to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the law.

Nor pain inflicted by usurped power;

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of public authority.

Nor pain inflicted without respect to the future good.

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the delinquent, or, by his example, other men, to obey the laws, is not punishment; but an act of hostility: because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Natural evil consequences no punishments.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by nature, divers hurtful consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himself slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some unlawful act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a punishment divine; yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.

Hurt inflicted, if less than the benefit of transgressing, is not punishment.

Seventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the price, or redemption, than the punishment of a crime: because it is of the nature of punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the law; which end, if it be less than the benefit of the transgression, it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Where the punishment is annexed to the law, a greater hurt is not punishment, but hostility.

Eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime committed, there be a greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aim of punishment is not a revenge, but terror; and the terror of a great punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where there is no punishment at all determined by the law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment.

Hurt inflicted for a fact done before the law, no punishment.

Ninthly, harm inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that forbade it, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: for before the law,

there is no transgression of the law: but punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the law; therefore harm inflicted before the law made, is not punishment, but an act of hostility.

The representative of the commonwealth unpunishable.

Tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: because it is of the nature of punishment, to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the representative itself.

Hurt to revolted subjects is done by right of war, not by way of punishment.

Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, falls not under the name of punishment: because seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them, must be taken as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberately deny the authority of the representative of the commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will. For in denying subjection, he denies such punishment as by the law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the commonwealth; that is, according to the will of the representative. For the punishments set down in the law, are to subjects, not to enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own acts subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.

The first, and most general distribution of punishments, is into divine, and human. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.

Human, are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of man; and are either corporal, or pecuniary, or ignominy, or imprisonment, or exile, or mixed of these.

Punishments corporal.

Corporal punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.

Capital.

And of these, some be capital, some less than capital. Capital, is the infliction of death; and that either simply, or with torment. Less than capital, are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain, not in its own nature mortal. For if upon the infliction of a punishment death follow not in the intention of the inflictor, the punishment is not to be esteemed capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a sum of money, but also of lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for money. And in case the law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather money, from such as shall transgress the same, it is not properly a punishment, but the price of privilege and exemption from the law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the money: except where the law is natural, or part of religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it. As where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vain, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable. In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be paid, to him that has been injured; this is but a satisfaction

for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy.

Ignominy, is the infliction of such evil, as is made dishonourable; or the deprivation of such good, as is made honourable by the commonwealth. For there be some things honourable by nature; as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind: others made honourable by the commonwealth; as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereign's favour. The former, though they may fail by nature, or accident, cannot be taken away by a law; and therefore the loss of them is not punishment. But the latter, may be taken away by the public authority that made them honourable, and are properly punishments: such are degrading men condemned, of their badges, titles, and offices; or declaring them incapable of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment.

Imprisonment, is when a man is by public authority deprived of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of pain on a man condemned. The former is not punishment; because no man is supposed to be punished, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment, because evil, and inflicted by public authority, for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. Under this word imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to

work, as in old time men have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to galleys; or be it a chain, or any other such impediment.

Exile.

Exile (banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of the dominion of the commonwealth, or out of a certain part thereof: and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punishment; but rather an escape, or a public commandment to avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says, there was never any such punishment ordained in the city of Rome; but calls it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his goods, and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment, nor does it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth, for which all punishments are ordained, that is to say, to the forming of men's wills to the observation of the law; but many times to the damage of the commonwealth. For a banished man, is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished him; as being no more a member of the same. But if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment lieth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned amongst punishments pecuniary.

The punishment of innocent subjects is contrary to the law of nature.

All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature; for punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a violation, first, of that law of nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some future good: for there can arrive no good to the commonwealth, by punishing the innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing all sovereign power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should as

long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the innocent is not observed.

But the harm done to innocents in war not so. Nor that which is done to declared rebels.

But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants. But against enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent, and innocent, as to the time past nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own people. And upon this ground it is, that also in subjects, who deliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relpase into the condition of war, commonly called rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. For rebellion, is but war renewed.

Reward is either salary or grace.

Reward, is either of gift, or by contract. When by contract, it is called salary, and wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of gift, it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appointeth a salary to any public office, he

that receiveth it, is bound in justice to perform his office; otherwise, he is bound only in honour, to acknowledgment, and an endeavour of requital. For though men have no lawful remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private business, to serve the public, without reward or salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the commonwealth, unless the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the sovereign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common soldier, may demand the wages of his warfare, as a debt.

Benefits bestowed for fear are not rewards.

The benefit which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some power and ability he hath to do hurt to the commonwealth, are not properly rewards; for they are not salaries; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the commonwealth disservice: nor are they graces; because they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the sovereign power: but are rather sacrifices, which the sovereign, considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the commonwealth, makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

Salaries certain and casual.

And whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the public treasure; and others uncertain, and casual, proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained; the latter is in some cases hurtful to the commonwealth; as in the case of judicature. For where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice ariseth from the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognizance, there must needs follow two inconveniences: one, is the nourishing of suits; for the more suits, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction; each court drawing to itself, as many causes as it can. But in

offices of execution there are not those inconveniences; because their employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward; which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons, that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government: together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one-and-fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him king of the proud. There is nothing, saith he, on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride. But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases, and the causes of his mortality; and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey.

CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH.

DISSOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTHS proceedeth from their imperfect institution.

Though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at least from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live, as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the matter; but as they are the makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice: so for want, both of the art of making fit laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled into any other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the infirmities therefore of a commonwealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous procreation.

Want of absolute power.

Of which, this is one, that a man to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes content with less power, than to the peace, and defence of the commonwealth is necessarily required. From whence it cometh to pass, that when the exercise of the power laid by, is for the public safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men, when occasion is presented, to rebel; in the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabs. And when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always, though sometimes, out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure. Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by foreign commonwealths; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their neighbours. So was Thomas Becket, archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of ecclesiastics to the commonwealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an oath, not to infringe the liberty of the church. And so were the barons, whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself, increased to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, maintained in their rebellion against king John, by the French.

Nor does this happen in monarchy only. For whereas the style of the ancient Roman commonwealth, was, the senate and people of Rome; neither senate, nor people pretended to the whole power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the wars between the senate and the people, under

Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Cæsar, to the extinction of their democracy, and the setting up of monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the war for the island of Salamis; and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a madman, and in verse, propounded it to the people that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates of their city; such damage, or shifts, are all commonwealths forced to, that have their power never so little limited.

Private judgment of good and evil.

In the second place, I observe the diseases of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the commonwealth is distracted and weakened.

Erroneous conscience.

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man’s conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to

follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

Pretence of inspiration.

It hath been also commonly taught, that faith and sanctity, are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or infusion. Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again in the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect, unobservable. Faith and sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such times as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned divines, who joining the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that sanctity and natural reason, cannot stand together.

Subjecting the sovereign power to civil laws.

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this, that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true, that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature; because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man, or commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which the commonwealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws, is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is to the sovereign representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him; which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion, and dissolution of the commonwealth.

Attributing of absolute propriety to subjects.

A fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the dissolution of a commonwealth, is, that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such, as excludeth the right of the sovereign. Every man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other subject: and he has it only from the sovereign power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equal right to the same. But if the right of the sovereign also be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from foreign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a commonwealth.

And if the propriety of subjects, exclude not the right of the sovereign representative to their goods; much less to their offices of judicature, or execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.

Dividing of the sovereign power.

There is a sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a commonwealth; and it is this, that the sovereign power may be divided. For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for

powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power.

Imitation of neighbour nations.

And as false doctrine, so also oftentimes the example of different government in a neighbouring nation, disposeth men to alteration of the form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the prophet Samuel, for a king after the manner of the nations: so also the lesser cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the aristocratical, and democratical factions; one part of almost every commonwealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the form of their government. For the constitution of man's nature, is of itself subject to desire novelty. When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicit them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot bloods, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nails, till they can endure the smart no longer.

Imitation of the Greeks and Romans.

And as to rebellion in particular against monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and histories of the ancient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong, and delightful impression, of the great exploits of war, achieved by the conductors of their armies, receive withal a pleasing idea, of all they have

done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government: not considering the frequent seditions, and civil wars, produced by the imperfection of their policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For they say not regicide, that is, killing a king, but tyrannicide, that is, killing of a tyrant is lawful. From the same books, they that live under a monarch conceive an opinion, that the subjects in a popular commonwealth enjoy liberty; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves. I say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a popular government: for they find no such matter. In sum, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudicial to a monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of discreet masters, as are fit to take away their venom: which venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dog, which is a disease the physicians call hydrophobia, or fear of water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog: so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democratical writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.

The opinion that there be more sovereigns than one in the commonwealth.

As there have been doctors, that hold there be three souls in a man; so there be also that think there may be more souls, that is, more sovereigns, than one, in a commonwealth; and set up a supremacy against the

sovereignty; canons against laws; and a ghostly authority against the civil; working on men's minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray by their obscurity; that there walketh, as some think, invisibly another kingdom, as it were a kingdom of fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the civil power, and the power of the commonwealth is the same thing; and that supremacy, and the power of making canons, and granting faculties, implieth a commonwealth; it followeth, that where one is sovereign, another supreme; where one can make laws, and another make canons; there must needs be two commonwealths, of one and the same subjects; which is a kingdom divided in itself, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of temporal, and ghostly, they are still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to two masters. For seeing the ghostly power challengeth the right to declare what is sin, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is law, sin being nothing but the transgression of the law; and again, the civil power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey two masters, who both will have their commands be observed as law; which is impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either the civil, which is the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the ghostly, and then there is no sovereignty but the ghostly; or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporal, and then there is no supremacy but the temporal. When therefore these two powers oppose one another, the commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution. For the civil authority being more visible, and standing in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: and the spiritual, though it stand in the darkness of School distinctions, and hard words, yet because the fear of darkness and ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to destroy a commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfitly may be compared to

the epilepsy, or falling sickness, which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by spirits, in the body natural. For as in this disease, there is an unnatural spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the soul in the brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions, which men call convulsions, in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the body politic, when the spiritual power, moveth the members of a commonwealth, by the terror of punishments, and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it, otherwise than by the civil power, which is the soul of the commonwealth, they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby distract the people, and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civil war.

Mixed government.

Sometimes also in the merely civil government, there be more than one soul; as when the power of levying money, which is the nutritive faculty, has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and command, which is the motive faculty, on one man; and the power of making laws, which is the rational faculty, on the accidental consent, not only of those two, but also of a third; this endangereth the commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good laws: but most often for want of such nourishment, as is necessary to life, and motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent commonwealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but three. In the kingdom of God, there may be three persons independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth; but

where men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the king bear the person of the people, and the general assembly bear also the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign, but three persons, and three sovereigns.

To what disease in the natural body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and stomach, of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Want of money.

Hitherto I have named such diseases of a commonwealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other not so great; which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising money, for the necessary uses of the commonwealth; especially in the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every subject hath a propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the sovereign's right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass, that the sovereign power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the public treasury obstructed, by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend itself, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth itself as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by stratagems of law, to obtain little sums, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the commonwealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed, the veins which by their natural course empty

themselves into the heart, are not, as they ought to be, supplied from the arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbs; and afterward a hot, and strong endeavour of the heart, to force a passage for the blood; and before it can do that, contenteth itself with the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat; or, if nature be too weak, the patient dieth.

Monopolies, and abuses of publicans.

Again, there is sometimes in a commonwealth, a disease, which resembleth the pleurisy; and that is, when the treasure of the commonwealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by monopolies, or by farms of the public revenues; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation, accompanied with a fever, and painful stitches.

Popular men.

Also the popularity of a potent subject, unless the commonwealth have very good caution of his fidelity, is a dangerous disease; because the people, which should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign, by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man are drawn away from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man, of whose virtues, and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a popular government, than in a monarchy; because an army is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the people. By this means it was, that Julius Cæsar, who was set up by the people against the senate, having won to himself the affections of his army, made himself master both of senate and people. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft.

Excessive greatness of a town, multitude of corporations. Liberty of disputing against sovereign power.

Another infirmity of a commonwealth, is the immoderate greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number, and expense of a great army: as also the great number of corporations; which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To which may be added, the liberty of disputing against absolute power, by pretenders to political prudence; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet animated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the molestation of the commonwealth; like the little worms, which physicians call ascarides.

We may further add, the insatiable appetite, or βουλιμια, of enlarging dominion; with the incurable wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; and the wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with less danger lost, than kept; as also the lethargy of ease, and consumption of riot and vain expense.

Dissolution of the commonwealth.

Lastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final victory; so as, the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer, there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty; then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no more, than the carcase of a man, by his departed, though immortal, soul. For though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged, without fraudulent pretence of

having submitted himself out of fear, to protect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an assembly is once suppressed, the right of the same perisheth utterly; because the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the sovereignty to re-enter.

CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PROCURATION OF the good of the people.

The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.

By instruction and laws. Against the the duty of a sovereign to relinquish any essential right of sovereignty.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals, further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of doctrine, and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases.

Or not to see the people taught the grounds of them.

And because, if the essential rights of sovreignty, specified before in the eighteenth chapter, be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life; it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to another, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that deserteth the means, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth

the means, that being the sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws; and renounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making war, or peace by his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers, and ministers both of war and peace; or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defence, peace, and good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the commonwealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law, that shall forbid rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of the sovereignty), is not, as a civil law, any obligation, but by virtue only of the law of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for an act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoid.

Objection of those that say there are no principles of reason for absolute sovereignty.

As I have heard some say, that justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himself, not only in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth, is his own, which I have already showed to be false: so there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those essential rights, which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto

been any commonwealth, where those rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or principles of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which whether they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interests, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles from authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.

Objection from the incapacity of the vulgar.

But they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those that are accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, any thing that discovereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their authority: whereas the common people’s minds,

unless they be tainted with dependance on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are above reason, and millions of men be made believe, that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the law, to make that received, which is so consonant to reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power entire, but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the commonwealth; and consequently, it is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.

Subjects are to be taught not to affect change of government.

And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocratical, or democratical assembly, cometh not from aristocracy, nor from democracy, but from the obedience, and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state, the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to

do no more than reform the commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable; which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepid father, did by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of God's commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations; and in another place concerning kings, that they are Gods.

Nor adhere, against the sovereign, to popular men.

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow-subjects, how high soever he stand, or how conspicuously soever he shine in the commonwealth; nor of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as to defer to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the sovereign only, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them from the sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought, that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage with them in facie ecclesiæ by preachers, and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten commandments.

Nor to dispute the sovereign power.

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a fault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign representative, whether one man, or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power; or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of the commonwealth

consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third commandment by resemblance pointeth to.

And to have days set apart to learn their duty.

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when it is taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and praises given to God, the sovereign of sovereigns, hear those their duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws. To this end had the Jews every seventh day, a sabbath, in which the law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their king was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their king, which redeemed them from their servile, and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful recreation. So that the first table of the commandments, is spent all in setting down the sum of God's absolute power; not only as God, but as king by pact, in peculiar, of the Jews; and may therefore give light, to those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.

And to honour their parents.

And because the first instruction of children, dependeth on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also afterwards, as gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by external signs of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally

the father of every man was also his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the fathers of families, when by instituting a commonwealth, they resigned that absolute power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth commandment.

And to avoid doing of injury.

Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which, consisting in taking from no man what is his, is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or fraud, of any thing which by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern conjugal affection; and after them, riches and means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one another's person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugal honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one another's goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be showed the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.

And to do all this sincerely from the heart.

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, though by accident hindered, are injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth commandment,

and the sum of the second table; which is reduced all to this one commandment of mutual charity, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: as the sum of the first table is reduced to the love of God; whom they had then newly received as their king.

The use of universities.

As for the means, and conduits, by which the people may receive this instruction, we are to search, by what means so many opinions, contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own consciences; that is to say, by their own private judgments: that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth, unless they themselves have first judged them to be lawful: that their propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the dominion, which the commonwealth hath over the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such, as they call tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the people by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensual pleasures; which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of mankind; being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of their duty, chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and conscience, than themselves. And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books, which by men, eminent in those schools and universities,

have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not, may some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to do that? or is it you, will undertake to teach the universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the latter end of Henry the Eighth, the power of the Pope, was always upheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers, against the sovereign power of the king, and by so many lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civil authority. But to the latter question, it is not fit, nor needful for me to say either aye, or no: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or them that have the sovereign power, that justice be equally administered to all degrees of people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence, dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his people. All breaches of the law, are offences against the commonwealth: but there be some, that are also against private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth only, may without breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himself, according to his own

discretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign, that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their subjects, in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons, is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the commonwealth.

Equal taxes.

To equal justice, appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the impositions, that are laid on the people by the sovereign power, are nothing else but the wages, due to them that hold the public sword, to defend private men in the exercise of their several trades, and callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man

oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idly, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the commonwealth, than the other? But when the impositions, are laid upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth: nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.

Public charity.

And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons; but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities of nature require, by the laws of the commonwealth. For as it is uncharitableness in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the sovereign of a commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity.

Prevention of idleness.

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such laws, as may encourage all manner of arts; as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still increasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited: where nevertheless, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little plot with art and labour, to give them

their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by victory, or death.

Good laws, what.

To the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the laws of a commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. A good law is that, which is needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous.

Such as are necessary.

For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in their way. And therefore a law that is not needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not necessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and people, cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign, that has weak subjects; and a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but traps for money: which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend the people.

Such as are perspicuous.

The perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself, as in a declaration of the causes, and motives for which it was made. That is it,

that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning of the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law, is multiplication of ambiguity: besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compass of the law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how short were the laws of ancient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; methinks I see a contention between the penners, and pleaders of the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the latter; and the latter to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the victory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as is in all commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man, or an assembly), to make the reason perspicuous, why the law was made; and the body of the law itself, as short, but in as proper, and significant terms, as may be.

Punishments.

It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign, to make a right application of punishments, and rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes, that are of most danger to the public; such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem authorized, as when they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites of men in authority. For indignation carrieth men, not only against the actors, and authors of injustice; but against all power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the insolent act of one of his sons, he was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself dissolved. But crimes of infirmity; such

as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, when there is such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of the leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example. To be severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was, that they were no better instructed.

Rewards.

In like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the sovereign, to apply his rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the commonwealth; wherein consisteth their use, and end; and is then done, when they that have well served the commonwealth, are with as little expense of the common treasure, as is possible, so well recompensed, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with money, or preferment, from a popular ambitious subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man, is overcome with reward, there arise many more, by the example, that do the same mischief, in hope of like benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war, may be deferred by such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin more

assured. It is therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Counsellors.

Another business of the sovereign, is to choose good counsellors; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth. For this word counsel, consilium, corrupted from considium, is of a large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in the first sense only: and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel, neither in a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors therefore is proper to monarchy; in which, the sovereign that endeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able counsellors, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil counsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace, and defence of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the public affairs, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deal the less. For to know, who knows the rules almost of any art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art, are, much conversing in it, and

constant good effects of it. Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble, in matter of state, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in the study of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the politics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, to have place in the highest council of state by inheritance; it is derived from the conquests of the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords joining together to conquer other nations, would not enter into the confederacy, without such privileges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their posterity, and the posterity of their subjects; which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the favour of the sovereign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of their counsel is greater, when they give every one his advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly, by way of orations; and when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction, through envy, emulation, or other passions arising from the difference of opinion.

The best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy, by laws that look only inward, is to be taken from the general informations, and complaints of the people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essential rights of

sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those essential rights, as I have often before said, the commonwealth cannot at all subsist.

Commanders.

A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently, cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be industrious, valiant, affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his soldiers. This is popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the general in punishing, when need is, the mutinous, or negligent soldiers. But this love of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander's fidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power; especially when it is in the hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.

But when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and beloved of his people, there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their captain though they love him, against their sovereign, when they love not only his person, but also his cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been always put to the trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people from the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to sovereign power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most active part of mankind, has never hitherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the law of nations, I need not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same right, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law, that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in the conscience only; where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the author of nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of kings, are laws. But of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as King also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.

THE SCOPE OF the following chapters.

That the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are sovereigns, nor subjects, is anarchy, and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are guided to avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a commonwealth, without sovereign power, is but a word without substance, and cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns, simple obedience, in all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are those laws of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the civil power, whether it be contrary to the law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civil obedience, offends the Divine Majesty; or through fear of offending God, transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of all law, dependeth on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in that which followeth, of the Kingdom of God.

Who are subjects in the kingdom of God.

God is king, let the earth rejoice, saith the psalmist. (xcvii. 1). And again, (Psalm xcix. 1) God is king, though the nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the cherubims, though the earth be moved. Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine power. By denying the existence, or providence of God, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. But

to call this power of God, which extendeth itself not only to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and bodies inanimate, by the name of kingdom, is but a metaphorical use of the word. For he only is properly said to reign, that governs his subjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to those that obey it, and by threatening them with punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the kingdom of God, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrational; because they understand no precepts as his: nor atheists, nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threatenings. They therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and propounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are God's subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as enemies.

A threefold word of God, reason, revelation, prophecy.

To rule by words, requires that such words be manifestly made known; for else they are no laws: for to the nature of laws belongeth a sufficient, and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance; which in the laws of men is but of one only kind, and that is, proclamation, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God declareth his laws three ways; by the dictates of natural reason, by revelation, and by the voice of some man, to whom by the operation of miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple word of God, rational, sensible, and prophetic: to which correspondeth a triple hearing; right reason, sense supernatural, and faith. As for sense supernatural, which consisteth in revelation or inspiration, there have not been any universal laws so given, because God speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.

A twofold kingdom of God, natural and prophetic.

From the difference between the other two kinds of God's word, rational, and prophetic, there may be attributed to God, a twofold kingdom, natural, and prophetic: natural, wherein he governeth as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural dictates of right reason; and prophetic, wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation, the Jews, for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not only by natural reason, but by positive laws, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy prophets. Of the natural kingdom of God I intend to speak in this chapter.

The right of God's sovereignty is derived from his omnipotence.

The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his irresistible power. I have formerly shown, how the sovereign right ariseth from pact: to show how the same right may arise from nature, requires no more, but to show in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every one to reign over all the rest. But because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that right, to set up men, with sovereign authority, by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible, there had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both himself, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power, that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. And though punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood affliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting, is not always derived from men's sin, but from God's power.

Sin not the cause of all affliction.

This question, why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer adversity, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with this of ours, by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. How good, saith David, (Psalm lxxiii. 1, 2, 3) is the God of Israel to those that are upright in heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in such prosperity. And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his righteousness? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God himself, not by arguments derived from Job's sin, but his own power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sin, and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, God himself taketh up the matter, and having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power, such as this, (Job xxxviii. 4) Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth? and the like, both approved Job's innocence, and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, in these words, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made manifest in him. And though it be said, that death entered into the world by sin, (by which is meant, that if Adam had never sinned, he had never died, that is, never suffered any separation of his soul from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have afflicted him, though he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sin.

Divine laws.

Having spoken of the right of God's sovereignty, as grounded only on nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine laws, or dictates of natural reason; which laws concern either the natural duties of one man to another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The first are the same laws of nature, of which I have spoken already in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of this treatise; namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remaineth therefore that we consider, what precepts are dictated to men, by their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour and worship, what.

Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the power, and goodness of another; and therefore to honour God, is to think as highly of his power and goodness, as is possible. And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the words and actions of men, are called worship; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word cultus. For cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on anything, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yield, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a natural effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the earth, is called culture; and the education of children, a culture of their minds. In the second sense, where men's wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by complaisance, it signifieth as much as courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a worshipper of the people; and cultus Dei, for the worship of God.

Several signs of honour.

From internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness, arise three passions; love, which hath reference to goodness; and hope, and fear, that relate to power: and three parts of external worship; praise, magnifying, and blessing: the subject of praise, being goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing, being power, and the effect thereof felicity. Praise, and magnifying are signified both by words, and actions: by words, when we say a man is good, or great: by actions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. The opinion of the happiness of another, can only be expressed by words.

Worship natural and arbitrary.

There be some signs of honour, both in attributes and actions, that be naturally so; as amongst attributes, good, just, liberal, and the like; and amongst actions, prayers, thanks, and obedience. Others are so by institution, or custom of men; and in some times and places are honourable; in others, dishonourable; in others, indifferent: such as are the gestures in salutation, prayer, and thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is natural; the latter arbitrary worship.

Worship commanded and free.

And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences: for sometimes it is a commanded, sometimes voluntary worship: commanded, when it is such as he requireth, who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words, or gesture, but the obedience is the worship. But when free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely, they are no worship, because no signs of honour; and no signs of honour, because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made, that is, to the spectator.

Worship public and private.

Again, there is a public, and a private worship. Public, is the worship that a commonwealth performeth, as one person. Private, is that which a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole commonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men, it is not so. Private, is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some restraint, either from the laws, or from the opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty.

The end of worship.

The end of worship amongst men, is power. For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater. But God has no ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of honour, that reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.

Attributes of divine honour.

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of nature, I will begin with his attributes. Where, first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him existence. For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any being.

Secondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or the soul of the world was God, spake unworthily of him; and denied his existence. For by God, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, seeing that which is eternal has no cause, is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who attributing, as they think, ease to God, take from him the care of mankind; take from him his honour: for it takes away men’s love, and fear of him; which is the root of honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness, and power; to say he is finite, is not to honour him: for it is not a sign of the will to honour God, to attribute to him less than we can; and finite, is less than we can; because to finite, it is easy to add more.

Therefore to attribute figure to him, is not honour; for all figure is finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is finite:

Nor to attribute to him parts, or totality; which are the attributes only of things finite:

Nor to say he is in this, or that place: for whatsoever is in place, is bounded, and finite:

Nor that he is moved, or resteth: for both these attributes ascribe to him place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all finite: for there cannot be more than one infinite:

Nor to ascribe to him, (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion but the effect,) passions that partake of grief; as repentance, anger, mercy: or of want; as appetite, hope, desire; or of any passive faculty: for passion, is power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a will, it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a rational appetite; but as the power, by which he effecteth every thing.

Likewise when we attribute to him sight, and other acts of sense; as also knowledge, and understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical parts of man's body: for there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to him.

He that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by natural reason, must either use such negative attributes, as infinite, eternal,

incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy,) but how much we admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honour him as much as we can. For there is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that is, I am: and but one name of his relation to us, and that is, God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Actions that are signs of divine honour.

Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason, that they be signs of the intention to honour God; such as are, first, prayers. For not the carvers, when they made images, were thought to make them gods; but the people that prayed to them.

Secondly, thanksgiving; which differeth from prayer in divine worship, no otherwise, than that prayers precede, and thanks succeed the benefit; the end, both of the one and the other, being to acknowledge God, for author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, gifts, that is to say, sacrifices and oblations, if they be of the best, are signs of honour: for they are thanksgivings.

Fourthly, not to swear by any but God, is naturally a sign of honour: for it is a confession that God only knoweth the heart; and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak considerately of God; for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a confession of his power. Hence followeth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in vain: and it is to no purpose, unless it be by way of oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make judgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war. And that disputing of God's nature is contrary to his honour: for it is supposed, that in this natural kingdom of

God, there is no other way to know anything, but by natural reason, that is, from the principles of natural science; which are so far from teaching us any thing of God's nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of the principles of natural reason, dispute of the attributes of God, they but dishonour him: for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth; but the signification of pious intention, to do him the greatest honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the nature of God, that tend not to his honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain abuses of his sacred name.

Sixthly, in prayers, thanksgivings, offerings, and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most significant of honour. As for example, that prayers and thanksgiving, be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian; but beautiful, and well composed. For else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly, to worship images for gods: but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.

Seventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in secret; but also, and especially, in public, and in the sight of men. For without that, that which in honour is most acceptable, the procuring others to honour him, is lost.

Lastly, obedience to his laws, that is, in this case to the laws of nature, is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than

sacrifice; so also to set light by his commandments, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship, which natural reason dictateth to private men.

Public worship consisteth in uniformity.

But seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to God but one worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men, publicly. And this is public worship; the property whereof, is to be uniform: for those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a public worship. And therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any public worship, nor that the commonwealth is of any religion at all.

All attributes depend on the laws civil.

And because words, and consequently the attributes of God, have their signification by agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are to be held significative of honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth, by laws civil. And because a commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws, but those that are made by the will of him, or them that have the sovereign power; it followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth, in the worship of God, for signs of honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their public worship.

Not all actions.

But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are naturally signs of honour, others of contumely; these latter, which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence, cannot be made by human power a part of Divine worship; nor the former, such as are decent, modest, humble behaviour, ever be separated from it. But whereas

there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an indifferent nature; such of them as the commonwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in use, as signs of honour, and part of God's worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than man, hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature.

Natural punishments.

Having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God, and his natural laws, I will add only to this chapter a short declaration of his natural punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences, as no human providence is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this chain, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the painsannexed to it; and these pains, are the natural punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes to pass, that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression: negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. For seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws; natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature; and therefore follow them as their natural, not arbitrary effects.

The conclusion of the second part. Conclusion.

And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is, from the practice of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western parts, that have received their moral learning from Rome and Athens; and how

much depth of moral philosophy is required, in them that have the administration of the sovereign power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as useless, as the commonwealth of Plato. For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider again, that the science of natural justice, is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, farther than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.

CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS.

THE WORD OF God delivered by prophets is the main principle of Christian politics.

I have derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects, hitherto from the principles of nature only; such as experience has found true, or consent concerning the use of words has made so; that is to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions of such words as are essential to all political reasoning, universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the nature and rights of a Christian Commonwealth, whereof there dependeth much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God; the ground of my discourse must be, not only the natural word of God, but also the prophetical.

Yet is not natural reason to be renounced.

Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor, that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word above reason; that it is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.

Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words;

and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick; which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

What it is to captivate the understanding.

But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but always, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken.

How God speaketh to men.

When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it. It is true, that if he be my sovereign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I believe him not; but not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if

one that hath not such authority over me, should pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either belief, or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the prophets, or of the apostles, or of the church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man's own godliness, or other virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion, of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration; yet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends it; who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie.

By what marks prophets are known.

How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his will immediately, saving by the way of natural reason, know when he is to obey, or not to obey his word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet? Of four hundred prophets, of whom the king of Israel asked counsel, concerning the war he made against Ramoth Gilead, (1 Kings, xxii.) only Micaiah was a true one. The prophet that was sent to prophecy against the altar set up by Jeroboam, (1 Kings, xiii.) though a true prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence, appears to be a prophet sent from God, was yet

deceived by another old prophet, that persuaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other religion than that which is already established. Asunder, I say, neither of these is sufficient. If a prophet rise amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to pass; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God. (Deut. xiii. 1-5.) In which words two things are to be observed; first, that God will not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the prophet's calling; but, as it is in the third verse, for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the king's authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, revolt from the Lord your God, are in this place equivalent to revolt from your king. For they had made God their king by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared God's commandments to the people. In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say, for God's anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. There shall arise, saith he, false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great wonders and

miracles, even to the seducing, if it were possible, of the very elect. (Matt. xxiv. 24.) By which it appears, that false prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are we not to take their doctrine for God's word. St. Paul says farther to the Galatians, (Gal. i. 8.) that if himself, or an angel from heaven preach another gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed. That gospel was, that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the king received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.

The marks of a prophet in the old law, miracles, and doctrine comformable to the law.

And as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God hath established; so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of miracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man that teacheth not false doctrine, should pretend to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is never the more to be regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deut. xviii. v. 21, 22, If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the word (of the prophet) is not that which the Lord hath spoken? when the prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to pass, that is the word which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not. But a man may here again ask, when the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it will come to pass or not? For he may foretell it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer than the time of man's life; or indefinitely, that it will come to pass one time or other: in which case this mark of a prophet is unuseful; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to believe a prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferred event. So that it is manifest, that the teaching of the religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together,

were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith.

Miracles ceasing, prophets cease, and the Scripture supplies their place

Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of which I am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the rights of those that are the supreme governors on earth of Christian commonwealths; and of the duty of Christian subjects towards their sovereigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next chapter, of the books, writers, scope and authority of the Bible.

CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

OF THE BOOKS of HolyScripture.

By the Books of Holy Scripture, are understood those, which ought to be the canon, that is to say, the rules of Christian life.

And because all rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of what is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For though it be not determined in Scripture, what laws every Christian king shall constitute in his own dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators; those books only are canonical, that is, law, in every nation, which are established for such by the sovereign authority. It is true, that God is the sovereign of all sovereigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of when and what God hath said; which to subjects that have no supernatural revelation, cannot be known, but by that natural reason, which guideth them, for the obtaining of peace and justice, to obey the authority of their several commonwealths, that is to say, of their lawful sovereigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the authority of the Church of England. What books these are, is sufficiently known, without a

catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and the second of Maccabees, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew,) and the third and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of the canonical, Josephus, a learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the emperor Domitian, reckoneth twenty-two, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet. St. Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For Josephus numbers five Books of Moses, thirteen of Prophets that writ the history of their own times, (which how it agrees with the prophets' writings contained in the Bible we shall see hereafter,) and four of hymns and moral precepts. But St. Jerome reckons five books of Moses, eight of Prophets, and nine of other Holy Writ, which he calls of ἁγιόγρ,αφα. The Septuagint, who were seventy learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the Jewish law out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for Holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in the Church of England.

As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians, that admit any books at all for canonical.

Their antiquity

Who were the original writers of the several Books of Holy Scripture, has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history, which is the only proof of matter of fact; nor can be, by any arguments of natural reason: for reason serves only to convince the truth, not of fact, but, of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the books themselves: and this light, though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unuseful to give us knowledge of the time, wherein they were written.

The Pentateuch not written by Moses.

And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no more than these titles, the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. The history of Livy, denotes the writer; but the history of Scanderberg, is denominated from the subject. We read in the last chapter of Deuteronomy, verse 6th, concerning the sepulchre of Moses, that no man knoweth of his sepulchre to this day, that is, to to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his interment. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses spake of his own sepulchre, though by prophecy, that it was not found to that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alleged, that the last chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, but the rest not. Let us therefore consider that which we find in the book of Genesis, (xii. 6.) And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the land; which must needs be the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who died before he came into it. Likewise Numbers, xxi. 14, the writer citeth another more ancient book, entitled, The Book of the Wars of the Lord, wherein were registered the acts of Moses, at the Red Sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.

But though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which he is there said to have written: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seemeth, in the xith. of Deuteronomy, and the following chapters to the xxviith. which

was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. And this also did Moses himself write, (Deut. xxxi. 9, 10) and delivered to the priests and elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the Feast of Tabernacles. And this is that law which God commanded, that their kings, when they should have established that form of government, should take a copy of from the priests and Levites: and which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark, (Deut. xxxi. 26); and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to king Josias (2 Kings xxii. 8) who causing it to be read to the people, (2 Kings xxiii. 1, 2, 3) renewed the covenant between God and them.

The book of Joshua written after his time.

That the book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their passage; of which the writer saith thus, They are there unto this day (Josh. iv. 9); for unto this day, is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off from the people the reproach of Egypt, the writer saith, The place is called Gilgal unto this day (Josh. v. 9); which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So also the name of the valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the camp, the writer saith, remaineth unto this day (Josh. vii. 26); which must needs be therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other; as Josh. viii. 29, xiii. 13, xiv. 14, xv. 63.

The books of Judges and Ruth written long after the captivity.

The same is manifest by like arguments of the book of Judges, chap. i. 21, 26, vi. 24, x. 4, xv. 19, xvii. 6, and Ruth i. 1; but especially Judg. xviii.

30, where it is said, that Jonathan and his sons were priests to the tribe of Dan, until the day of the captivity of the land.

The like of the books of Samuel.

That the books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, 1 Sam. v. 5, vii. 13, 15; xxvii, 6, and xxx. 25, where, after David had adjudged equal part of the spoils, to them that guarded the ammunition, with them that fought, the writer saith, He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this day. Again, when David, displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out his hand to sustain the ark, called the place Perez-Uzzah, the writer saith, (2 Sam. vi. 8) it is called so to this day: the time therefore of the writing of that book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of David.

The books of the Kings, and the Chronicles.

As for the two books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are 1 Kings ix. 13, ix. 21, x. 12, xii. 19. 2 Kings ii. 22, viii. 22, x. 27, xiv. 7, xvi. 6, xvii. 23, xvii. 34, xvii. 41, and 1 Chron. iv. 41, v. 26: it is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon, that the history of them is continued till that time. For the facts registered are always more ancient than the register; and much more ancient than such books as make mention of, and quote the register; as these books do in divers places, referring the reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the Books of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the books of the prophet Serveiah, and of the prophet Addo.

Ezra and Nehemiah.

The books of Ezra and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and

houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and ordination of their policy, are therein contained.

Esther.

The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it.

Job.

The book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written; and though it appear sufficiently (Ezekiel xiv. 14, and James v. 11) that he was no feigned person; yet the book itself seemeth not to be a history, but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted; and this is the more probable, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is, as St. Jerome testifies, in prose; and from thence to the sixth verse of the last chapter, in hexameter verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a preface in the beginning, and an epilogue in the end. But verse is no usual style of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in philosophy, especially moral philosophy, in ancient time frequent.

The Psalter.

The Psalms were written the most part by David, for the use of the quire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and some of them after the return from the captivity, as the 137th and the 126th, whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.

The Proverbs.

The Proverbs, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur, the son of Jakeh, and partly of the mother of king

Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon, rather than by Agur, or the mother of Lemuel; and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all.

Ecclesiastes and the Canticles.

The books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not Solomon's, except it be the titles, or inscriptions. For The Words of the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem; and, The Song of Songs, which is Solomon's, seem to have been made for distinction's sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the law; to the end, that not the doctrine only, but the authors also might be extant.

The Prophets.

Of the prophets, the most ancient, are Zephaniah, Jonah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Michah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and Azariah, otherwise Ozias, kings of Judah. But the book of Jonah is not properly a register of his prophecy; for that is contained in these few words, Forty days and Niniveh shall be destroyed; but a history or narration of his frowardness and disputing God's commandments; so that there is small probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the book of Amos is his prophecy.

Jeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecied in the time of Josiah.

Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah, in the captivity.

When Joel and Malachi prophecied, is not evident by their writings. But considering the inscriptions, or titles of their books, it is manifest enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolomæus Philadelphus, that caused it to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that

purpose. And if the books of Apocrypha, which are recommended to us by the church, though not for canonical, yet for profitable books for our instruction, may in this point be credited, the Scripture was set forth in the form we have it in, by Esdras: as may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, (chapter xiv. verse 21, 22, &c.) where speaking to God, he saith thus, Thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the works that are to begin. But if I have found grace before thee, send down the holy spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the latter day, may live. And verse 45: And it came to pass when the forty days were fulfilled, that the highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayest deliver them only to such as be wise among the people. And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the books of the Old Testament.

The New Testament. Their scope.

The writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after Christ's ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the apostles. But the time wherein the books of the New Testament were received, and acknowledged by the church to be of their writing, is not altogether so ancient. For, as the books of the Old Testament are derived to us, from no other time than that of Esdras, who by the direction of God's spirit retrieved them, when they were lost: those of the New Testament, of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private man's hand, cannot be derived from a higher time, than that wherein the governors of the church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of those apostles

and disciples, under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the books, both of the Old and New Testament, is in the canons of the apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement, the first (after St. Peter) bishop of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Council of Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then Christian churches, for the writings of the prophets and apostles: and this Council was held in the 364th year after Christ. At which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the church, as no more to esteem emperors, though Christian, for the shepherds of the people, but for sheep; and emperors not Christian, for wolves; and endeavoured to pass their doctrine, not for counsel and information, as preachers; but for laws, as absolute governors; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian doctrine, to be pious; yet I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the Scriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament, were in the hands only of the ecclesiastics; because if they had had an intention so to do, they would surely have made them more favourable to their power over Christian princes, and civil sovereignty, than they are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things, which were done and said by the prophets and apostles. And so perhaps are some of those books which are called apocrypha, and left out of the canon, not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the writer, but the authority of the church, that maketh the book canonical. And although these books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the

writers were all indued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is setting forth of the rights of the kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the book of Genesis, deriveth the genealogy of God's people, from the creation of the world, to the going into Egypt: the other four books of Moses contain the election of God for their king, and the laws which he prescribed for their government: the books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of God's people, till the time they cast off God's yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of their neighbour nations. The rest of the history of the Old Testament derives the succession of the line of David, to the captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdom of God, even our blessed Saviour God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets, after whom the Evangelists write his life, and actions, and his claim to the kingdom, whilst he lived on earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the coming of God the Holy Ghost, and the authority he left with them and their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In sum, the histories and the prophecies of the Old Testament, and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; I., in Moses, and the Priests; II., in the man Christ; and III., in the Apostles and the successors to apostolical power. For these three at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost, when the Holy Ghost descended on them, to this day.

The question of the authority of the Scriptures stated.

It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian religion, from whence the Scriptures derive their authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, how we know them to be

the word of God, or, why we believe them to be so: and the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the improperness of the words wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on all hands, that the first and original author of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are God's word, (though all true Christians believe it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our belief; because some are moved to believe for one, and others for other reasons; there can be rendered no one general answer for them all. The question truly stated is, by what authority they are made law.

Their authority and interpretation.

As far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt, but they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of natural reason: but this is no other authority, than that of all other moral doctrine consonant to reason; the dictates whereof are laws, not made, but eternal.

If they be made law by God himself, they are of the nature of written law, which are laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he knew not they were his.

He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to obey them, by any authority, but his, whose commands have already the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority, than that of the commonwealth, residing in the sovereign, who only has the legislative power. Again, if it be not the legislative authority of the commonwealth, that giveth them the force of laws, it must be some other authority derived from God, either private, or public: if private, it obliges only him, to whom

in particular God hath been pleased to reveal it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for God's law, what particular men, on pretence of private inspiration, or revelation, should obtrude upon him, in such a number of men, that out of pride and ignorance, take their own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madness, for testimonies of God's spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences, it were impossible that any divine law should be acknowledged. If public, it is the authority of the commonwealth, or of the church. But the church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a commonwealth of Christians; called a commonwealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a church, because it consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian sovereign. But if the church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all: it can neither command, nor do any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to anything: nor has any will, reason nor voice; for all these qualities are personal. Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there an universal church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made laws, by the universal church: or if it be one commonwealth, then all Christian monarchs and states are private persons, and subject to be judged, deposed, and punished by an universal sovereign of all Christendom. So that the question of the authority of the Scriptures, is reduced to this, whether Christian kings, and the sovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths, be absolute in their own territories, immediately under God; or subject to one vicar of Christ, constituted of the universal church; to be judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as he shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good.

Which question cannot be resolved, without a more particular consideration of the Kingdom of God; from whence also, we are to judge of

the authority of interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawful power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.

CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

BODY AND SPIRIT how taken in the Scripture.

Seeing the foundation of all true ratiocination, is the constant signification of words; which in the doctrine following, dependeth not, as in natural science, on the will of the writer, nor, as in common conversation, on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; it is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to infer upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words body and spirit, which in the language of the Schools are termed, substances, corporeal, and incorporeal.

The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe. For the universe, being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body; nor any thing properly a body, that is not also part of that aggregate of all bodies, the universe. The same also, because bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is called substance, that is to say, subject to various accidents: as sometimes to be moved; sometimes to stand still; and to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one colour, smell, taste, or sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies on the organs of our

sense, we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, and call them accidents of those bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word, substance and body signify the same thing; and therefore substance incorporeal are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an incorporeal body.

But in the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, air, and aerial substances, use not to be taken for bodies, but (as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called wind, or breath, or (because the same are called in the Latin spiritus) spirits; as when they call that aerial substance, which in the body of any living creature gives it life and motion, vital and animal spirits. But for those idols of the brain, which represent bodies to us, where they are not, as in a looking-glass, in a dream, or to a distempered brain waking, they are, as the apostle saith generally of all idols, nothing; nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain itself, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our sense. And men, that are otherwise employed, than to search into their causes, know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be persuaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them bodies, and think them made of air compacted by a power supernatural, because the sight judges them corporeal; and some to call them spirits, because the sense of touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers: so that the proper signification of spirit in common speech, is either a subtle, fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination. But for metaphorical significations, there be many: for sometimes it is taken for disposition or inclination of the mind; as when for

the disposition to controul the sayings of other men, we say, a spirit of contradiction; for a disposition to uncleanness, an unclean spirit; for perverseness, a froward spirit; for sullenness, a dumb spirit; and for inclination to godliness and God's service, the Spirit of God: sometimes for any eminent ability or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when great wisdom is called the spirit of wisdom; and madmen are said to be possessed with a spirit.

Other signification of spirit I find nowhere any; and where none of these can satisfy the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under human understanding; and our faith therein consisteth not in our opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God himself. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and therefore the attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, what he is, nor to signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honour him with such names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves.

The spirit of God taken in the Scripture sometimes for a wind, or breath.

Gen. i. 2. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is motion attributed to God, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies, and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, (Gen. viii. 1.) where when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth the like words, I will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished: in which place, by Spirit is understood a wind, that is an air or spirit moved, which

might be called, as in the former place, the Spirit of God, because it was God's work.

Secondly, for extraordinary gifts of the understanding.

Gen. xli. 38, Pharoah calleth the Wisdom of Joseph, the Spirit of God. For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God? And Exod. xxviii. 3, Thou shalt speak, saith God, to all the wise hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him: where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments, as being the gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. xxxi. 3, 4, 5, 6, and xxxv. 31. And Isaiah xi. 2, 3, where the prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, the Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord. Where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many eminent graces that God would give him.

Thirdly, for extraordinary affections.

In the book of Judges, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the defence of God's people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Sampson to deliver them from servitude, Judges, iii. 10, vi. 34, xi. 29, xiii. 25, xiv. 6, 19. And of Saul, upon the news of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabesh Gilead, it is said, (1 Sam. xi. 6) that the Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his anger, (or, as it is in the Latin, his fury), was kindled greatly. Where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but an extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came upon Saul, when he was amongst the prophets that praised God in songs and music, (1 Sam. xix. 23), is to be understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden zeal to join with them in their devotion.

Fourthly, for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions.

The false prophet Zedekiah saith to Micaiah (1 Kings xxii. 24), which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee? Which can not be understood of a ghost; for Micaiah declared before the kings of Israel and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a vision, and not as from a spirit speaking in him.

In the same manner it appeareth in the books of the Prophets, that though they spake by the spirit of God, that is to say, by a special grace of prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a ghost within them, but by some supernatural dream or vision.

Fifthly, for life.

Gen. ii. 7, it is said, God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils (spiraculum vitæ) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul. There the breath of life inpired by God, signifies no more, but that God gave him life; and (Job xxvii. 3) as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils, is no more than to say, as long as I live. So in Ezek. i. 20, the spirit of life was in the wheels, is equivalent to, the wheels were alive. And, (Ezek. ii. 2) the Spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet, that is, I recovered my vital strength; not that any ghost or incorporeal substance entered into, and possessed his body.

Sixthly, for a subordination to authority.

In the xith chap. of Numbers, v. 17, I will take, saith God, of the Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee; that is, upon the seventy elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the camp; of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses would not do. Whereby it appears, that Joshua knew not that they had received authority so to do, and prophecied according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a spirit, or authority subordinate to his own.

In the like sense we read, (Deut. xxxiv. 9) that Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is because he was ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work he had himself begun, namely the bringing of God's people into the promised land, but prevented by death, could not finish.

In the like sense it is said, (Rom. viii. 9) If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his: not meaning thereby the ghost of Christ, but a submission to his doctrine. As also, (1 John iv. 2) Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; by which is meant the spirit of unfeigned Christianity, or submission to that main article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be interpreted of a ghost.

Likewise these words, (Luke iv.1) And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost, (that is, as it is expressed, Matt. iv. 1, and Mark i. 12, of the Holy Spirit,) may be understood, for zeal to do the work for which he was sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a ghost, is to say, that God himself, for so our Saviour was, was filled with God; which is very improper and insignificant. How we came to translate spirits, by the word ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the imaginary inhabitants of man's brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a real substance, or metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or affection of the mind, or of the body.

Seventhly, for aerial bodies.

The disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Matt .xiv. 26, and Mark vi. 49) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an aerial body, and not a phantasm; for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of fancies,) but of bodies only. In like manner, where he was taken for a spirit,

by the same apostles, (Luke xxiv. 37): so also (Acts xii. 15) when St. Peter was delivered out of prison, it would not be believed; but when the maid said he was at the door, they said it was his angel; by which must be meant a corporeal substance, or we must say, the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not imaginary, but real, and such as needed not the fancy of man for their existence. These the Jews called spirits, and angels, good or bad; as the Greeks called the same by the name of demons. And some such apparitions may be real, and substantial; that is to say, subtle bodies, which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of ministers, and messengers, that is to say, angels, to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernatural manner. But when he hath so formed them, they are substances, endued with dimensions, and take up room, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies; and therefore are not ghosts incorporeal, that is to say, ghosts that are in no place; that is to say, that are no where; that is to say, that seeming to be somewhat, are nothing. But if corporeal be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our external senses; then is substance incorporeal, a thing not imaginary, but real; namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser bodies.

Angel, what.

By the name of angel, is signified generally, a messenger; and most often, a messenger of God; and by a messenger of God, is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream or vision.

Concerning the creation of angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures. That they are spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews and Gentiles,

sometimes thin bodies: as the air, the wind, the spirits vital and animal of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams and visions; which are not real substances, nor last any longer than the dream, or vision they appear in; which apparitions, though no real substances, but accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signify his will, they are not improperly termed God's messengers, that is to say, his angels.

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of demons, good and evil; which because they seemed to subsist really, they called substances; and, because they could not feel them with their hands, incorporeal: so also the Jews, upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, except the sect of the Sadducees, that those apparitions, which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his angels, were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the angels of God, and those they thought would hurt them, they called evil angels, or evil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of madmen, of lunatics and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, demoniacs.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word angel, but some image raised, supernaturally, in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the execution of some supernatural work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not expressed, it may be understood in the same manner.

For we read, (Gen. xvi.) that the same apparition is called, not only an angel, but God; where that which (verse 7) is called the angel of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, I will multiply thy seed exceedingly; that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this apparition a fancy figured, but a voice. By which it is manifest, that angel signifieth there, nothing but God himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven; or rather, nothing else but a voice supernatural, testifying God's special presence there. Why therefore may not the angels that appeared to Lot, and are called (Gen. xix. 12) men; and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh (verse 18) as but to one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord), be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the fancy; as well as before by angel was understood a fancied voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to stay his hand (Gen. xxii. 11) from slaying Isaac, there was no apparition, but a voice; which nevertheless was called properly enough a messenger or angel of God, because it declared God's will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts. The angels which Jacob saw on the ladder of Heaven, (Gen. xxviii. 12) were a vision of his sleep; therefore only fancy, and a dream; yet being supernatural, and signs of God's special presence, those apparitions are not improperly called angels. The same is to be understood, (Gen. xxxi. 11) where Jacob saith thus, The Angel of the Lord appeared to me in my sleep. For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a dream, whether such dream be natural, or supernatural: and that which there Jacob calleth an angel, was God himself; for the same angel saith, verse 13, I am the God of Bethel.

Also (Exod. xiv. 19) the angel that went before the army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is, (verse 24) the Lord himself; and he appeared, not in the form of a beautiful man, but in form, (Exod. xiii. 21) by

day, of a pillar of cloud, and, by night, in form of a pillar of fire; and yet this pillar was all the apparition and angel promised to Moses, (Exod. xxxiii. 2) for the army's guide: for this cloudy pillar (Exod. xxxiii. 9) is said to have descended, and stood at the door of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.

There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of God's presence; and was no less an angel, than if it had had the form of a man, or child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the shape; but their use that makes them angels. But their use is to be significations of God's presence in supernatural operations; as when Moses (Exod. xxxiii. 14) had desired God to go along with the camp, as he had done always before the making of the golden calf, God did not answer, I will go, nor, I will send an angel in my stead; but thus, My presence shall go with thee.

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of angel is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of England holdeth for canonical, from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing, understood by the name of spirit or angel, that hath not quantity; and that may not be by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may be in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in sum, which is not (taking body for that, which is somewhat or some where,) corporeal; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of angel, for messenger; as John Baptist is called an angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as, according to the same analogy, the dove and the fiery tongues, in that they were signs of God's special presence, might also be called angels. Though we find in Daniel two names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it

is clear out of the text itself, (Dan. xii. 1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince: and that Gabriel, as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep, was nothing but a supernatural phantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two saints being in talk, one of them said to the other, Gabriel, Let us make this man understand his vision: for God needeth not to distinguish his celestial servants by names, which are useful only to the short memories of mortals. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that angels, except when they are put for such men as God hath made the messengers and ministers of his word or works, are things permanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent, may be gathered from the words of our Saviour himself, (Matt. xxv. 41) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels: which place is manifest for the permanence of evil angels, (unless we might think the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the Church's adversaries and their ministers); but then it is repugnant to their immateriality; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, (1 Cor. vi. 3) Know ye not that we shall judge the angels? and 2 Pet. ii. 4, For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell: and (Jude i. 6) And the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the last day: though it prove the permanence of angelical nature, it confirmeth also their materiality. And (Matt. xxii. 30) In the resurrection men do neither marry nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven: but in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so therefore also are the angels.

There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words, substance, and incorporeal; as incorporeal is taken, not for subtle body, but for not body; they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an angel or spirit is in that sense an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect, there is no angel nor spirit at all. Considering therefore the signification of the word angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature; I was inclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviour's own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble reason, an acknowledgment and belief, that there be also angels substantial, and permanent. But to believe they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they, though indirectly, say, that will have them incorporeal, cannot by Scripture be evinced.

Inspiration, what,

On the signification of the word spirit, dependeth that of the word inspiration; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtle air or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasm; which is improper to say, and impossible; for phantasms are not, but only seem to be, somewhat. That word therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically only: as (Gen. ii. 7) where it is said that God inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant, than that God gave unto him vital motion. For we are not to think that God made first a living breath and then

blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were real, or seeming; but only as it is, (Acts xvii. 25) that he gave him life, and breath; that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said, (2 Tim. iii. 16) all Scripture is given by inspiration from God, speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easy metaphor, to signify, that God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers, to write that which should be useful, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter, (2 Pet. i. 21) saith, that Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, by the Holy Spirit is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural, which is not inspiration. Nor, when our Saviour breathing on his disciples, said, Receive the Holy Spirit, was that breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spiritual graces he gave unto them. And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that fulness is not to be understood for infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God says (Joel ii. 28) I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophecy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions, we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them prophetical dreams, and visions. For the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to make them prophecy, or evil spirits into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is not to take the word in

the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts ii. 2) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity itself; but for an external sign of God's special working on their hearts, to effect in them the internal graces, and holy virtues he thought requisite for the performance of their apostleship.

CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOM OF GOD, OF HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT.

THE KINGDOM OF God taken by divines metaphorically, but in the Scriptures properly.

The Kingdom of God in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the kingdom of glory; and sometimes for the earnest of that felicity, sanctification, which they term the kingdom of grace; but never for the monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of kingdom.

To the contrary, I find the kingdom of God to signify, in most places of Scripture, a kingdom properly so named, constituted by the votes of the people of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their king by covenant made with him, upon God's promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for dominion over sin; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a dominion as that, every subject shall have in the kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.

From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally by his might; but also had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he reigned over Adam, and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of good and evil; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to

be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his creator's commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

The original of the kingdom of God.

After this it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. xvii. 7, 8) to make a covenant with him in these words, I will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity, to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him; and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a memorial, and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth (Gen. xvii. 11) the sacrament of circumcision. This is it which is called the old covenant or testament; and containeth a contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of kingdom to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an institution by pact, of God's peculiar sovereignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham, not of Moses, St. Paul saith (Rom. iv. 11) that he is the father of the faithful; that is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptism.

That the kingdom of God is properly his civil sovereignty over a peculiar people by pact.

This covenant, at the foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation. For a peculiar people, the vulgar Latin hath peculium de cunctis populis: the English translation, made in the beginning of the reign of King James, hath a peculiar treasure unto me above all nations; and the Geneva French, the most precious jewel of all nations. But the truest translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (Tit. ii. 14) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour gave himself for us, that he might purify us to himself, a peculiar, that is, an extraordinary, people: for the word is in the Greek περ¸ιούσιος, which is opposed commonly to the word ἐπιούσιος: and as this signifieth ordinary, quotidian, or, as in the Lord's Prayer, of daily use; so the other signifieth that which is overplus, and stored up, and enjoyed in a special manner; which the Latins call peculium: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, For all the earth is mine, as if he should say, All the nations of the world are mine; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a special manner: for they are all mine, by reason of my power; but you shall be mine, by your own consent, and covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.

The same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, Ye shall be to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation. The vulgar Latin hath it, regnum sacerdotale, to which agreeth the translation of that place (1 Pet. ii. 9) Sacerdotium regale, a regal priesthood; as also the institution itself, by which no man might enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, that is to say, no

man might enquire God's will immediately of God himself, but only the high-priest. The English translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, a kingdom of priests; which is either meant of the succession of one high-priest after another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the high-priesthood: for there was never any but the high-priest only, that was to inform the people of God's will; nor any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.

Again, the title of a holy nation confirms the same: for holy signifies, that which is God's by special, not by general right. All the earth, as is said in the text, is God's; but all the earth is not called holy, but that only which is set apart for his especial service, as was the nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the kingdom of God, is properly meant a commonwealth, instituted, by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto, for their civil government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not only towards God their king, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other nations both in peace and war; which properly was a kingdom wherein God was king, and the high-priest was to be, after the death of Moses, his sole viceroy or lieutenant.

But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1 Samuel, viii. 7) when the Elders of Israel, grieved with the corruption of the sons of Samuel, demanded a king, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord, and the Lord answering said unto him, Hearken unto the voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their king; and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time to time appointed him.

Again, (1 Sam. xii. 12) where Samuel saith to the people, When ye saw that Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was your

king. It is manifest that God was their king, and governed the civil state of their commonwealth.

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets did foretell his restitution; as (Isaiah, xxiv. 23) Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem; where he speaketh expressly of his reign in Zion and Jerusalem; that is, on earth. And (Micah, iv. 7) And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion: this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem, upon the earth. And (Ezek. xx. 33) As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you; and (verse 37) I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant; that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.

And in the New Testament, the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke i. 32, 33) He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give unto him the throne of his father David; and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end. This is also a kingdom upon earth; for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Cæsar, he was put to death; the title of his cross, was, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews; he was crowned in scorn with a crown of thorns; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the disciples (Acts xvii. 7) That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying there was another king, one Jesus. The kingdom therefore of God is a real, not a metaphorical kingdom; and so taken, not only in the Old Testament, but in the New; when we say, For thine is the kingdom, the power, and glory, it is to be understood of God's kingdom, by force of our covenant, not by the right of God's power; for such a kingdom God always hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, Thy kingdom come, unless it be meant of

the restoration of that kingdom of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, The kingdom of heaven is at hand; or to pray, Thy kingdom come, if it had still continued.

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much light to Christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical government. This they have observed, that instead of a sacerdotal kingdom, translate, a kingdom of priests; for they may as well translate a royal priesthood, as it is in St. Peter, into a priesthood of kings. And whereas, for a peculiar people, they put a precious jewel, or treasure, a man might as well call the special regiment, or company of a general, the general's precious jewel, or his treasure.

In short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom; which consisted, first, in the obligation of the people of Israel to those laws, which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the high-priest for the time being, should deliver to them from before the cherubims in the sanctum sanctorum; and which kingdom having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the restoration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the Lord's Prayer, Thy kingdom come; and the right whereof we acknowledge, when we add, For thine is the kingdom, the power, and glory, for ever and ever, Amen; and the proclaiming whereof, was the preaching of the apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the teachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, that is to say, to promise obedience to God's government, is to be in the kingdom of grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to be the subjects, that is children, of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his own people, which is called the kingdom of glory. If the kingdom of God, called also the

kingdom of heaven, from the gloriousness and admirable height of that throne, were not a kingdom which God by his lieutenants, or vicars, who deliver his commandments to the people, did exercise on earth; there would not have been so much contention, and war, about who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it them.

Holy, what.

Out of this literal interpretation of the kingdom of God, ariseth also the true interpretation of the word Holy. For it is a word, which in God's kingdom answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call public, or the king's.

The king of any country is the public person, or representative of all his own subjects. And God the king of Israel was the Holy One of Israel. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign, is the nation of that sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God's nation, were called (Exod. xix. 6) a holy nation. For by holy, is always understood either God himself, or that which is God's in propriety; as by public is always meant, either the person of the commonwealth itself, or something that is so the commonwealth's, as no private person can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath, God's day, is a holy day; the temple, God's house, a holy house; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings, God's tribute, holy duties; priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ, God's ministers, holy men; the celestial ministering spirits, God's messengers, holy angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety, gotten by consent. In saying, Hollowed be thy name, we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first commandment, of having no other Gods but him. Mankind is God's nation in propriety: but

the Jews only were a holy nation. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?

Sacred, what.

And the word profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with common; and consequently their contraries, holy and proper, in the kingdom of God, must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also are called holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made holy by God's appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be sanctified by God, as the seventh day in the fourth commandment; and as the elect in the New Testament were said to be sanctified, when they were endued with the spirit of godliness. And that which is made holy by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used only in his public service, is called also sacred, and said to be consecrated, as temples, and other houses of public prayer, and their utensils, priests, and ministers, victims, offerings, and the external matter of sacraments.

Degrees of sanctity.

Of holiness there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God, there may be some set apart again, for a nearer and more especial service. The whole nation of the Israelites were a people holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the priests were yet more holy; and amongst the priests, the high-priest was the most holy. So the land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the holy city wherein God was to be worshipped, was more holy; and again the Temple more holy than the city, and the sanctum sanctorum more holy than the rest of the Temple.

Sacrament:

A sacrament, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a consecration of it to God's service, for a sign either of our admission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the sign of admission was circumcision; in the New Testament, baptism. The commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the eating, at a certain time which was anniversary, of the Paschal Lamb; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lord's Supper; by which, we are put in mind of our deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our blessed Saviour's death upon the cross. The sacraments of admission, are but once to be used, because there needs but one admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance, and of our allegiance, the sacraments of commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal sacraments, and as it were the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance. There be also other consecrations, that may be called sacraments, as the word implieth only consecration to God's service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of allegiance to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but circumcision, and the passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament, but baptism and the Lord's Supper.

CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS.

WORD, WHAT.

When there is mention of the word of God, or of man, it doth not signify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun, or a verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it significative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, threateneth, wisheth, or interrogateth. In which sense it is not vocabulum, that signifies a word; but sermo, (in Greek λόγος) that is, some speech, discourse, or saying.

The words spoken by God, and concerning God, both are called God's word in Scripture.

Again, if we say the word of God, or of man, it may be understood sometimes of the speaker: as the words that God hath spoken, or that a man hath spoken; in which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the writer of it: and sometimes of the subject; in which sense, when we read in the Bible, the words of the days of the kings of Israel, or Judah, it is meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the subject of those words; and in the Greek, which, in the Scripture, retaineth many Hebraisms, by the word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God, and his government; that is to say, the doctrine of religion: insomuch, as it is all one, to say λόγος Θεοῦ, and theologia; which is, that doctrine which we usually call divinity, as is manifest by the places following, (Acts, xiii. 46) Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, it was necessary that the

word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles. That which is here called the word of God, was the doctrine of Christian religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before. And (Acts v. 20) where it is said to the apostles by an angel, Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the words of this life; by the words of this life, is meant, the doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same chapter, Daily in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus: in which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the subject of this word of life; or, which is all one, the subject of the words of this life eternal, that our Saviour offered them. So (Acts xv. 7) the word of God, is called the word of the Gospel, because it containeth the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ; and the same word (Rom. x. 8, 9) is called the word of faith; that is, as is there expressed, the doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also (Matth. xiii. 19) When any one heareth the word of the kingdom; that is, the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same word, is said (Acts xii. 24) to grow and to be multiplied; which to understand of the evangelical doctrine is easy, but of the voice or speech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense (1 Tim. iv. 1) the doctrine of devils signifieth not the words of any devil, but the doctrine of heathen men concerning demons, and those phantasms which they worshipped as gods.

The word of God metaphorically used, first, for the decrees and power of God.

Considering these two significations of the word of God, as it is taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this latter sense, where it is taken for the doctrine of Christian religion, that the whole Scripture is the word of God: but in the former sense, not so. For example, though these words, I am the Lord thy God, &c. to the end of the Ten Commandments, were spoken by God to

Moses; yet the preface, God spake these words and said, is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history. The word of God, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically. Properly, as the words he hath spoken to his prophets: metaphorically, for his wisdom, power, and eternal decree, in making the world; in which sense, those fiats, Let there be light, Let there be a firmament, Let us make man, &c. (Gen. i.) are the word of God. And in the same sense it is said (John i. 3) All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made: and (Heb. i. 3) He upholdeth all things by the word of his power; that is, by the power of his word; that is, by his power: and (Heb. xi. 3) The worlds were framed by the word of God; and many other places to the same sense: as also amongst the Latins, the name of fate, which signifieth properly the word spoken, is taken in the same sense.

Secondly, for the effect of his word.

Secondly, for the effect of his word; that is to say, for the thing itself, which by his word is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or promised; as (Psalm cv. 19) where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, till his word was come; that is, till that was come to pass which he had foretold to Pharaoh's butler (Gen. xl. 13) concerning his being restored to his office: for there, by his word was come, is meant, the thing itself was come to pass. So also (1 Kings xviii. 36) Elijah saith to God, I have done all these thy words, instead of I have done all these things at thy word, or commandment; and (Jer. xvii. 15) Where is the word of the Lord, is put for, Where is the evil he threatened. And (Ezek. xii. 28) There shall none of my words be prolonged any more: by words are understood those things, which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (Matth. xxiv. 35) heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away; that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall not come to pass.

And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John only, calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh the word of God, as (John i. 14) the word was made flesh; that is to say, the word, or promise that Christ should come into the world; who in the beginning was with God; that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of eternal life; but it was not till then put in execution, and actually incarnate. So that our Saviour is there called the word, not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion from this place, do commonly call him the verb of God, do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the noun of God: for as by noun, so also by verb, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeal, or spiritual; and therefore it cannot be said to be either God, or man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this word, which St. John in his gospel saith was with God, is (in his first Epistle, verse 1) called the word of life; and (verse 2) the eternal life, which was with the Father. So that he can be in no other sense called the word, than in that, wherein he is called eternal life; that is, he that hath procured us eternal life, by his coming in the flesh. So also (Apocalypse xix. 13) the apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a garment dipped in blood, saith, his name is the word of God; which is to be understood, as if he had said his name had been, He that was come according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his word and promises delivered by the prophets. So that there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of God the Son, therefore called the word, because his incarnation was the performance of the promise; in like manner as the Holy Ghost is called (Acts i. 4; Luke xxiv. 49) the promise.

Thirdly, for the words of reason and equity.

There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the word of God, is signified such words as are consonant to reason and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh-Necho was an idolater; yet his words to the good king Josiah, in which he advised him by messengers, not to oppose him in his march against Charchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah, not hearkening to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read (2 Chron. xxxv. 21, 22, 23.) It is true, that as the same history is related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah, spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But we are to give credit to the canonical Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.

The word of God, is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to be written in man's heart; as Psalm xxxvii. 31; Jer. xxxi. 33; Deut. xxx. 11, 14, and many other like places.

Divers acceptions of the word prophet.

The name of prophet signifieth in Scripture, sometimes prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from God to man, or from man to God: and sometimes predictor, or a foreteller of things to come: and sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the people. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were prophets. And in this sense the high-priest was a prophet, for he only went into the sanctum sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John saith (chapter xi. 51) that He spake not this of himself, but being high-priest that year, he prophesied that one man should die for the nation. Also they that in Christian congregations taught the people, (1 Cor. xiv. 3) are said to prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses (Exod. iv.

16) concerning Aaron, He shall be thy spokesman to the people; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God: that which here is spokesman, is (Exod. vii. 1) interpreted prophet; See, saith God, I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet. In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a prophet (Gen. xx. 7) where God in a dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee; whereby may be also gathered, that the name of prophet may be given, not unproperly, to them that in Christian churches, have a calling to say public prayers for the congregation. In the same sense, the prophets that came down from the high place, or hill of God, with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe, and a harp (1 Sam. x. 5, 6, and 10), Saul amongst them, are said to prophecy, in that they praised God in that manner publicly. In the like sense, is Miriam (Exod. xv. 20) called a prophetess. So is it also to be taken (1 Cor. xi. 4, 5), where St. Paul saith, Every man that prayeth or prophecieth with his head covered, &c., and every woman that prayeth or prophecieth with her head uncovered: for prophecy, in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God in psalms and holy songs; which women might do in the church, though it were not lawful for them to speak to the congregation. And in this signification it is, that the poets of the heathen, that composed hymns and other sorts of poems in the honour of their gods, were called vates, prophets; as is well enough known by all that are versed in the books of the Gentiles, and as is evident (Tit. i. 12), where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a prophet of their own said, they were liars; not that St. Paul held their poets for prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly used to signify them that celebrated the honour of God in verse.

Prediction of future contingents, not always prophecy.

When by prophecy is meant prediction, or foretelling of future contingents; not only they were prophets, who were God's spokesmen, and foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but also all those impostors, that pretend, by help of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretel the like events in time to come: of which, as I have declared already in the twelfth chapter of this discourse, there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation of prophecy, by one casual event that may be but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is not an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a phantasm of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a prophetess; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise such a phantasm; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of it; but only guided that imposture to be a means of Saul's terror and discouragement, and by consequent, of the discomfiture by which he fell. And for incoherent speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated with a spirit or vapour from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like madmen; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of materia prima. In Scripture I find it also so taken (1 Sam. xviii. 10) in these words, And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophecied in the midst of the house.

The manner how God hath spoken to the prophets.

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom

God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a prophet. Can it, may some say, be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The prophet David argueth thus, (Psalm xciv.9) Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear? But this may be spoken, not as usually, to signify God's nature, but to signify our intention to honour him. For to see, and hear, are honourable attributes, and may be given to God, to declare, as far as our capacity can conceive, his almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other parts of man's body, that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are to interpret God's speaking to men immediately, for that way, whatsoever it be, by which God makes them understand his will. And the ways whereby he doth this, are many, and to be sought only in the Holy Scripture: where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge his presence, and commandment; and by these may be understood, how he spake to many of the rest.

To the extraordinary prophets of the Old, Testament he spake by dreams, or visions.

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (Gen. xii. 7) God is said to have appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God made his presence manifest; that is, by an apparition, or vision. And again,

(Gen. xv. 1) the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God's presence, appeared as God's messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii. 1) by an apparition of three angels; and to Abimelech (Gen. xx. 3) in a dream: to Lot (Gen. xix. 1) by an apparition of two angels: and to Agar (Gen. xxi. 17) by the apparition of one angel: and to Abraham again (Gen. xxii. 11) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: and (Gen. xxvi. 24) to Isaac in the night, that is, in his sleep, or by dream: and to Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12) in a dream; that is to say, as are the words of the text, Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c. and (Gen. xxxii. 1) in a vision of angels: and to Moses (Exod iii. 2) in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush. And after the time of Moses, where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament is expressed, he spake always by a vision, or by a dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

Only to Moses he spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and in the Tabernacle; and to the high-priest in the Tabernacle, and in the sanctum sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the high-priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God's favour; and God himself in express words declareth, that to other prophets he spake in dreams and visions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these (Numb. xii. 6, 7, 8) If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house; with him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold. And (Exod. xxxiii. 11) The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend. And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by

mediation of an angel, or angels, as appears expressly, Acts vii. 35 and 53, and Gal. iii. 19; and was therefore a vision, though a more clear vision than was given to other prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut. xiii. 1) If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, the latter word is but the interpretation of the former. And (Joel, ii. 28) Your sons and your daughters shall prophecy; your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions; where again, the word prophecy is expounded by dream, and vision. And in the same manner it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising him wisdom, riches, and honour; for the text saith, (1 Kings iii. 15) And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a dream; so that generally the prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of the word of God no otherwise than from their dreams, or visions; that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an extasy: which imaginations in every true prophet were supernatural; but in false prophets were either natural or feigned.

The same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the spirit; as (Zech. vii. 12); where the prophet speaking of the Jews, saith, They made their hearts hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former prophets. By which it is manifest, that speaking by the spirit, or inspiration, was not a particular manner of God's speaking, different from vision, when they, that were said to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a peculiar commission, or, which is all one, a new dream, or vision.

To prophets of perpetual calling, and supreme, God spake in the Old Testament from the mercy seat, in a manner not expressed in the Scripture.

Of prophets, that were so by a perpetual calling in the Old Testament, some were supreme, and some subordinate: supreme were first Moses; and after him the high-priests, every one for his time, as long as the priesthood

was royal; and after the people of the Jews had rejected God, that he should no more reign over them, those kings which submitted themselves to God's government, were also his chief prophets; and the highpriest's office became ministerial. And when God was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as the king commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the king thought fit. For king Saul (1 Sam. xiii. 9) commanded the burnt offering to be brought, and (1 Sam. xiv. 18) he commands the priests to bring the ark near him; and (v. 19) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter (v. 37) Saul asketh counsel of God. In like manner king David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to enquire of the Lord (1 Sam. xxiii. 2) whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 9) David commandeth the priest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah, or not. And king Solomon (1 Kings ii. 27) took the priesthood from Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35) to Zadok. Therefore Moses, and the high-priests, and the pious kings, who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what manner God spake unto them is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai, it was a dream or vision, such as other prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses and other prophets (Numb. xii. 6, 7, 8). To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his infiniteness, invisibility, incomprehensibility. To say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equal with Christ, in whom only the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh, Col. ii. 9) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernatural. For God disposeth men to piety,

justice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of virtue, both moral and intellectual, by doctrine, example, and by several occasions, natural and ordinary.

And as these ways cannot be applied to God in his speaking to Moses, at Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applied to him, in his speaking to the high-priests, from the mercy-seat. Therefore in what manner God spake to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament, there was no sovereign prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and the prophet to whom he spake.

To prophets of perpetual calling, but subordinate, God spake by the spirit.

To subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find not any place that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but only in such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and to other virtues all other Christian men. Which way, though it consist in constitution, instruction, education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian virtues; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which we in our language call the Holy Ghost: for there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural. When therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks according to God's will, declared by the supreme prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word spirit, is in the signification of a man's intention, mind, or disposition.

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that prophecied in the camp of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to them, is declared in Numbers, chap. xi. verse 25. The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and

gave it to the seventy elders. And it came to pass, when the spirit rested upon them, they prophecied and did not cease. By which it is manifest, first, that their prophecying to the people was subservient and subordinate to the prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they prophecied as Moses would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to prophecy at all. For there was (verse 27) a complaint made against them to Moses; and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to Joshua, be not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that the spirit of God in that place signifieth nothing but the mind and disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the government. For if it were meant they had the substantial spirit of God; that is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no less manner than Christ himself, in whom only the spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the gift and grace of God, that guided them to cooperate with Moses; from whom their spirit was derived. And it appeareth (Numb. xi. 16) that they were such as Moses himself should appoint for elders and officers of the people: for the words are, Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers of the people: where, thou knowest, is the same with thou appointest, or hast appointed to be such. For we are told before (Exod. xviii. 24) that Moses following the counsel of Jethro, his father-in-law, did appoint judges and officers over the people, such as feared God; and of these were those seventy, whom God, by putting upon them Moses' spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the administration of the kingdom: and in this sense the spirit of God is said (1 Sam. xvi. 13, 14) presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from him he rejected. So that by the spirit is meant inclination to God's service; and not any supernatural revelation.

God sometimes also spake by lots.

God spake also many times by the event of lots; which were ordered by such as he had put in authority over his people. So we read that God manifested by the lots which Saul caused to be drawn (1 Sam. xiv. 43) the fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people. And (Josh. xviii. 10) God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelites, by the lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh. In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered (Joshua vii. 16, &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are the ways whereby God declared his will in the Old Testament.

All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a vision of an angel: to Joseph in a dream: again, to Paul, in the way to Damascus, in a vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh; of clean, and unclean beasts; and in prison, by vision of an angel: and to all the apostles, and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his spirit; and to the apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot, by lot.

Every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended prophet's calling.

Seeing then, all prophecy supposeth vision, or dream, (which two, when they be natural, are the same), or some especial gift of God so rarely observed in mankind as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary dreams and visions, may proceed from God, not only by his supernatural, and immediate, but also by his natural operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of reason and judgment to discern between natural, and supernatural gifts, and between natural, and supernatural visions or dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect and wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey God in that way,

which he in God's name telleth us to be the way to happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined and tried by every man, before he yield them obedience; unless he have yielded it them already, in the institution of a commonwealth; as when the prophet is the civil sovereign, or by the civil sovereign authorized. And if this examination of prophets and spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose to set out the marks, by which every man might be able to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (Deut .xiii. 1, &c.) to know a prophet by; and (1 John iv. 1, &c.) to know a spirit by: and seeing there is so much prophecying in the Old Testament, and so much preaching in the New Testament, against prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets, than of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own peril. And first, that there were many more false than true prophets, appears by this, that when Ahab (1 Kings xxii.) consulted four hundred prophets, they were all false impostors, but only one Micaiah. And a little before the time of the captivity, the prophets were generally liars. The prophets, (saith the Lord, by Jeremiah, chapter xiv. 14) prophecy lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them; they prophecy to you a false vision, a thing of nought, and the deceit of their heart. Insomuch as God commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah (chapter xxiii. 16) not to obey them: Thus saith the Lord of hosts, hearken not unto the words of the prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.

All prophecy but of the sovereign prophet, is to be examined by every subject.

Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrels amongst the visionary prophets, one contesting with another, and asking, when departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Micaiah and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the lie to one another, (as in Jerem. xiv. 14) and such controversies in the New Testament at this day, amongst the spiritual prophets; every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his natural reason, to apply to all prophecy those rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses the sovereign prophet had taught them; and the other, the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to pass, as I have already showed out of Deut. xiii. 1, &c. And in the New Testament there was but one only mark; and that was the preaching of this doctrine, that Jesus is the Christ, that is, king of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denied that article, he was a false prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true prophet. For St. John (1 Epist. iv. 2, &c.) speaking expressly of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of God, or not; after he had told them that there would arise false prophets, saith thus, Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; that is, is approved and allowed as a prophet of God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a prophet avowed. For God sometimes speaketh by prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Balaam; and as he foretold Saul of his death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ; and this is the spirit of Anti-Christ. So that the rule is perfect on

both sides; that he is a true prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denieth him come, and looketh for him in some future impostor, that shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the apostle there properly calleth Anti-Christ. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the sovereign prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is God's vicegerent on earth; and hath next under God, the authority of governing Christian men; and to observe for a rule, that doctrine, which in the name of God, he hath commanded to be taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines, which pretended prophets with miracle, or without, shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that rule, to do as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some that prophecied in the camp, whose authority so to do they doubted of; and leave to the sovereign, as they did to Moses, to uphold, or to forbid them, as he should see cause; and if he disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign. For when Christian men, take not their Christian sovereign, for God's prophet; they must either take their own dreams, for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the tumor of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince; or by some of their fellow-subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine and human, reduce all order, government, and society, to the first chaos of violence and civil war.

CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE.

A MIRACLE IS a work that causeth admiration.

By miracles are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore they are also called wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandment, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private natural reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in holy Scripture, called signs, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latins, ostenta, and portenta, from showing and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.

And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no natural cause known.

To understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: the other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate hand of God. But when we see some possible, natural cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done, or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a miracle.

Therefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle; because both the thing is strange, and the natural cause difficult to imagine. So also were it to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal, engenders his

like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because it is usual, it is no miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a miracle; because strange: but if a piece of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no miracle: and yet we know no more by what operation of God, the one is brought to pass, than the other.

The first rainbow that was seen in the world, was a miracle, because the first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more any universal destruction of the world by water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not miracles, neither to them that know their natural causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works produced by the art of man: yet when we know they are done; because thereby we know also the means how they are done, we count them not for miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but of human industry.

That which seemeth a miracle to one man, may seem otherwise to another.

Furthermore, seeing admiration and wonder are consequent to the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some less; it followeth, that the same thing may be a miracle to one, and not to another. And thence it is, that ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God), admire not at all: as when eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernatural works, by the common people; when nevertheless, there were others, who could from their natural causes have foretold the very hour they should arrive: or, as when a man, by confederacy and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him what he has done in former time; it seems to him a miraculous thing;

but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such miracles as those, cannot easily be done.

The end of miracles.

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to God's messengers, ministers, and prophets, that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universal deluge, were admirable works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any prophet, or other minister of God, they use not to be called miracles. For how admirable soever any work be, the admiration consisteth not in that it could be done; because men naturally believe the Almighty can do all things; but because he does it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were properly miracles; because they were done with intention to make the people of Israel believe, that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his own interest, but as sent from God. Therefore, after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage, when he said (Exod. iv. 1) They will not believe me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me, God gave him power, to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and again to return it into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom, to make it leprous; and again by putting it out, to make it whole; to make the children of Israel believe (as it is verse 5) that the God of their fathers had appeared unto him: and if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into blood. And when he had done these miracles before the people, it is said (verse 31) that they believed him. Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were properly miracles. In like manner if we consider

all the miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the prophets, till the captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his apostles afterwards; we shall find, their end was always to beget or confirm belief, that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. We may farther observe in Scripture, that the end of miracles, was to beget belief, not universally in all men, elect and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to say, in such as God had determined should become his subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for their end, the conversion of Pharaoh; for God had told Moses before, that he would harden the heart of Pharoah, that he should not let the people go: and when he let them go at last, not the miracles persuaded him, but the plagues forced him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written (Matth. xiii. 58), that he wrought not many miracles in his own country, because of their unbelief; and (in Mark vi. 5) instead of, He wrought not many, it is, He could work none. It was not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the miracles of Moses, of the prophets, of our Saviour, and of his apostles was to add men to the church: but it was, because the end of their miracles, was to add to the church, not all men, but such as should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from his Father, he could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of St. Mark, say, that this word, He could not, is put for, He would not, do it without example in the Greek tongue: where would not, is put sometimes for could not, in things inanimate, that have no will; but could not, for would not never: and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could do no miracles, but amongst the credulous.

The definition of a miracle.

From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: a miracle is a work of God, (besides his operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.

And from this definition, we may infer; first, that in all miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done it, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.

Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a miracle. For it must either be by virtue of some natural science, or by incantation, that is, by virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all men deny: and if they do it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle.

There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working wonders, equal to some of those immediate miracles wrought by God himself, to certain arts of magic and incantation. As for example, when we read that after the rod of Moses being cast on the ground became a serpent, (Exod. vii. 11) the magicians of Egypt did the like by their enchantments; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pools of water into blood, (Exod. vii. 22) the magicians did so likewise with their enchantments; and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, (Exod. viii. 7) the magicians also did so with their enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt; will not a man be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and other such places? And yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what an enchantment is. If therefore enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells

and words; but imposture and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from supernatural, as the impostors need not the study so much as of natural causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to do them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of magic, witchcraft, and enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight they seem to bear.

For it is evident enough, that words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signify the intentions or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce hope, fear, or other passions or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a rod seemeth a serpent, or the waters blood, or any other miracle seemeth done by enchantment; if it be not to the edification of God's people, not the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator. So that all the miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which is no miracle, but a very easy matter to do.

That men are apt to be deceived by false miracles.

For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, this hour or day the sun should be darkened? A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil. A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in ancient time were called ventriloqui), and so make the weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from distance of place, is able to

make very many men believe it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being conjurers. But it is too long a business, to reckon up the several sorts of those men, which the Greeks called θαυματουρ‚γοι, that is to say, workers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.

Cautions against the imposture of miracles.

In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in the precedent chapter, in the beginning of the xiiith and end of the xviiith of Deuteronomy; that we take not any for prophets, that teach any other religion, than that which God's lieutenant, which at that time was Moses, hath established; nor any, though he teach the same religion, whose prediction we do not see come to pass. Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign governor of God's people, next under God himself, that is to say, the head of the Church, in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath established, before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not only

so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to God's lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases, we have submitted our private judgments. For example; if a man pretend, after certain words spoken over a piece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his vicar or lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say, not, then followeth that which Moses saith (Deut. xviii. 22) he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him. If he say, it is done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wonderous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason would think supernatural: and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work, and not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lie. In which question we are not every one, to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that is, the reason of God's supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have made him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power, to do all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit can accrue by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to

confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNAL LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION.

THE MAINTENANCE OF civil society depending on justice, and justice on the power of life and death, and other less rewards and punishments, residing in them that have the sovereignty of the commonwealth; it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now seeing eternal life is a greater reward than the life present; and eternal torment a greater punishment than the death of nature; it is a thing worthy to be well considered of all men that desire, by obeying authority, to avoid the calamities of confusion and civil war, what is meant in Holy Scripture, by life eternal, and torment eternal; and for what offences, and against whom committed, men are to be eternally tormented; and for what actions they are to obtain eternal life.

The place of Adam's eternity, if he had not sinned, had been the terrestrial Paradise.

And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the paradise of Eden everlastingly. For there was the tree of life, whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, (Gen. iii.22) lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life and live for ever. By which it seemeth to me, (with submission nevertheless both in this,

and in all questions whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the commonwealth, whose subject I am), that Adam, if he had not sinned, had had an eternal life on earth, and that mortality entered upon himself and his posterity by his first sin. Not that actual death then entered; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he died. But where it is said, (Gen.ii.17) In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, it must needs be meant of his mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then eternal life was lost by Adam's forfeiture in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture, was to recover thereby that life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that believe in him; and therefore recovered to all believers, that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense it is that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth, (Rom. v. 18, 19) As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life; which is again (1 Cor. xv. 21, 22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.

Texts concerning the place of life eternal, for believers.

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternal life which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alleged seem to make it on earth. For if as in Adam all die, that is, have forfeited paradise and eternal life on earth, even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made to live on earth; for else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the psalmist (Psalm. cxxxiii. 3) upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even life for evermore: for Zion is in Jerusalem upon earth: as also that of St. John (Rev. ii. 7) To him that overcometh I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the

paradise of God. This was the tree of Adam's eternal life; but his life was to have been on earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. John (Rev. xxi. 2), where he saith, I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband: and again (verse 10) to the same effect: as if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ, should come down to God's people from heaven, and not they go up to it from earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing, that is the two angels, said to the apostles that were looking upon Christ ascending (Acts i. 11) This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into heaven. Which soundeth as if they had said he should come down to govern them under his Father eternally here, and not take them up to govern them in heaven; and is conformable to the restoration of the kingdom of God instituted under Moses, which was a political government of the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (Matth. xxii. 30), that in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven, is a description of an eternal life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of marriage. For seeing Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on earth eternally in their individual persons; it is manifest, they should not continually have procreated their kind; for if immortals should have generated as mankind doth now, the earth in a small time would not have been able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers should be in the resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of life eternal: and therefore our Saviour puts them in mind of this consequence of immortality; that there shall be no generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage or generation among the angels. The comparison between that eternal life which Adam

lost, and our Saviour by his victory over death hath recovered, holdeth also in this; that as Adam lost eternal life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time, so the faithful Christian hath recovered eternal life by Christ's passion, though he die a natural death, and remain dead for a time, namely, till the resurrection. For as death is reckoned from the condemnation of Adam, not from the execution; so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.

Ascension into heaven.

That the place wherein men are to live eternally, after the resurrection, is the heavens, (meaning by heaven, those parts of the world, which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another higher heaven, called cœlum empyreum, whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason), is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdom of Heaven, is meant the kingdom of the King that dwelleth in heaven; and his kingdom was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the prophets, his lieutenants; first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the sovereign priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortal man for their king, after the manner of other nations. And when our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his ministers, shall have persuaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new kingdom of heaven; because our king shall then be God, whose throne is heaven: without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happiness any higher than God's footstool the earth. On the contrary, we find written (John iii. 13) that no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the son of man, that is in heaven. Where I observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not in heaven, but upon the earth. The like is said of David (Acts ii. 34) where St. Peter, to prove the

ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist (Psalm xvi. 10), Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer thine holy one to see corruption, saith, they were spoken, not of David, but of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this reason, For David is not ascended into heaven. But to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the general day of judgment, yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our Saviour (Luke xx. 37, 38), who proving the resurrection out of the words of Moses, saith thus, That the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for they all live to him. But if these words be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the resurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man. Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those patriarchs were immortal; not by a property consequent to the essence and nature of mankind; but by the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow eternal life upon the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithful men were dead, yet as it is in the text, they lived to God; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved of their sins, and ordained to life eternal at the resurrection. That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a living creature independent on the body, or that any mere man is immortal, otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day, except Enoch and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole of the xivth chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature; and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. There is hope of a tree, saith he, (verse 7) if it be cast down. Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground,

yet when it scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? And (verse 12) Man lieth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more. But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us, that it is at the general resurrection. For in his 2nd Epistle, chap. iii. verse 7, he saith, that the heavens and the earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and (v. 12) looking for, and hasting to the coming of God, wherein the heavens shall be on fire and shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. Nevertheless, we according to the promise look for new heavens, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. Therefore where Job saith, man riseth not till the heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the immortal life, (and soul and life in the Scripture do usually signify the same thing,) beginneth not in man, till the resurrection and day of judgment; and hath for cause, not his specifical nature and generation, but the promise. For St. Peter says, not We look for new heavens and a new earth, from nature, but from promise.

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of Scripture, in chap. XXXV. of this book, that the kingdom of God is a civil commonwealth, where God himself is sovereign, by virtue first of the old, and since of the new covenant, wherein he reigneth by his vicar or lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the coming again of our Saviour in his majesty and glory, to reign actually and eternally, the kingdom of God is to be on earth. But because this doctrine, though proved out of places of Scripture not few nor obscure, will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the authority, not yet amongst my countrymen decided, by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected; and whose

commands, both in speech and writing, whatsoever be the opinions of private men, must by all men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God, have so great influence on the kingdom of man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have the sovereign power.

The place after judgment of those who were never in the kingdom of God, or having been in, are cast out. Tartarus.

As the kingdom of God, and eternal life, so also God's enemies, and their torments after judgment, appear by the Scripture to have their place on earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the resurrection, that were either buried, or swallowed up of the earth, is usually called in Scripture, by words that signify under ground; which the Latins read generally infernus, and inferi, and the Greek ᾅδης, that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the grave, as any any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned after the resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old nor New Testament, by any note of situation; but only by the company: as that it shall be, where such wicked men were, as God in former times, in extraordinary and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the earth: as for example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomless pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abiron, were swallowed up alive into the earth. Not that the writers of the Scripture would have us believe, there could be in the globe of the earth, which is not only finite, but also, compared to the height of the stars, of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottom, that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their demonology, (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning demons), and after them the Romans, called Tartarus; of which Virgil (Æn. VI. 578, 579) says,

Bis patet in præceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras,

Quantus ad ætherium cœli suspectus Olympum:

for that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear: but that we should believe them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.

The congregation of giants. Lake of fire.

Again, because those mighty men of the earth, that lived in the time of Noah, before the flood, (which the Greeks call heroes, and the Scripture giants, and both say were begotten by copulation of the children of God with the children of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the general deluge; the place of the damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased giants; as Proverbs xxi. 16, The man that wandereth out of the way of understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the giants; and Job xxvi. 5, Behold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them. Here the place of the damned is under the water. And Isaiah xiv. 9, Hell is troubled how to meet thee (that is, the King of Babylon) and will displace the giants for thee: and here again the place of the damned, if the sense be literal, is to be under water. Thirdly, because the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickedness with fire and brimstone, and together with them the country about made a stinking bituminous lake: the place of the damned is sometimes expressed by fire, and a fiery lake, as in the Apocalypse, xxi. 8, But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death. So that it is manifest, that hell fire, which is here expressed by metaphor from the real fire of Sodom, signifieth not any certain kind or place of torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for destruction, as it is in Rev. xx. 14, where it is said, that death and hell were cast into the lake of fire; that is to say, were abolished and destroyed; as if after the day of judgment, there shall be no more dying, nor no more going

into hell; that is, no more going to Hades, (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is the same with no more dying.

Utter darkness.

Fourthly, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (Exod. x. 23) They saw not one another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings; the place of the wicked after judgment, is called utter darkness, or, as it is in the original, darkness without. And so it is expressed (Matth. xxii. 13) where the king commanded his servants, to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his wedding garment, and to cast him out, εἰς τὸ σκοτος τὸ ἐξώτερον, into external darkness, or darkness without: which though translated utter darkness, does not signify how great, but where that darkness is to be; namely, without the habitation of God's elect.

Gehenna, and Tophet.

Lastly, whereas there was a place near Jerusalem, called the Valley of the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein Josiah had burned the priests of Moloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in the 2nd of Kings, chap. xxiii. the place served afterwards to receive the filth and garbage which was carried thither out of the city; and there used to be fires made from time to time, to purify the air, and take away the stench of carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon. And this Gehenna, is that word which is usually now translated hell; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of everlasting and unquenchable fire.

Of the literal sense of the Scripture concerning hell.

Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under ground or under water; or that after the resurrection, they shall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another: it followeth, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to be enquired after, (for of all metaphors there is some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words,) both of the place of hell, and the nature of hellish torments, and tormenters.

Satan, Devil, not proper names, but appellatives.

And first for the tormenters, we have their nature and properties, exactly and properly delivered by the names of, the Enemy, or Satan; the Accuser, or Diabolus; the Destroyer, or Abaddon. Which significant names, Satan, Devil, Abaddon, set not forth to us any individual person, as proper names use to do; but only an office, or quality; and are therefore appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are in the Latin and modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to be proper names of demons; and men are the more easily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils; which at that time was the religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of Christ.

And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant the enemy of them that shall be in the kingdom of God; therefore if the kingdom of God after the resurrection, be upon the earth, as in the former chapter I have shown by Scripture it seems to be, the Enemy and his kingdom must be on earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For God's kingdom was in Palestine; and the nations round about, were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any earthly enemy of the Church.

Torments of hell.

The torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by weeping, and gnashing of teeth, as Matth. viii. 12. Sometimes by the worm of conscience; as Isaiah lxvi. 24, and Mark ix. 44, 46, 48: sometimes, by fire, as in the place now quoted, where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched, and many places beside: sometimes by shame and contempt, as Dan. xii. 2, And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt. All which places design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an universal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 42, 43) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that The body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked: nor can the name of second death be applied to those that can never die but once: and although in metaphorical speech, a calamitous life everlasting, may be called an everlasting death, yet it cannot well be understood of a second death.

The fire prepared for the wicked, is an everlasting fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the fire shall be

unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them so as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die. And though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and torments, into which men may be cast successively one after another as long as the world lasts, yet I find none that affirm there shall be an eternal life therein of any individual person; but to the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the second death: (Rev. xx. 13, 14) For after death and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works; death and the grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he shall die no more.

The joys of life eternal, and salvation, the same thing. Salvation from sin, and from misery, all one.

The joys of life eternal, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of salvation, or being saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evils, comprehending want, sickness, and death itself. And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be saved from sin, is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us. And therefore in the holy Scripture, remission of sin, and salvation from death and misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man sick of the palsy, by saying, (Matth. ix. 2) Son be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee; and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive sins, asked them (verse

5) whether it were easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk; signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, Thy sins are forgiven, and Arise and walk; and that he used that form of speech, only to shew he had power to forgive sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since death and misery were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a discharge of death and misery; that is to say, salvation absolute, such as the faithful are to enjoy after the day of judgment, by the power and favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our Saviour.

Concerning particular salvations, such as are understood, (1 Sam. xiv. 39) as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel, that is, from their temporary enemies, and (2 Sam. xxii. 3) Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence; and, (2 Kings xiii. 5) God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians, and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.

The place of eternal salvation.

But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the kingdom of heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the place. On one side, by kingdom, which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual security against enemies and want, it seemeth that this salvation should be on earth. For by salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious reign of our king, by conquest; not a safety by escape: and therefore there where we look for salvation, we must look also for triumph; and before triumph, for victory; and before victory, for battle; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in heaven. But how good soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture. The state of salvation is described at large, Isaiah xxxiii. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24:

Look upon Zion, the city of our solemnities; thine eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken.

But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers and streams; wherein shall go no galley with oars, neither shall gallant ship pass thereby.

For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, the Lord is our king, he will save us.

Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey:

And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity.

In which words we have the place from whence salvation is to proceed, Jerusalem, a quiet habitation; the eternity of it, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down, &c; the Saviour of it, the Lord, their judge, their law-giver, their king, he will save us; the salvation, the Lord shall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters, &c; the condition of their enemies, their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame shall take the spoil of them; the condition of the saved, the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick: and lastly, all this is comprehended in forgiveness of sin, the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity. By which it is evident, that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign, at the coming again of Christ, in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into God's kingdom: as is also more expressly declared by the same prophet, (Isaiah lxvi. 20, 21), And they (that is the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in

litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord. And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord. Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of God's kingdom, which is the place from whence the salvation of us that were Gentiles shall proceed, shall be Jerusalem: and the same is also confirmed by our Saviour in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place of God's worship; to whom he saith (John iv. 22) that the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worshipped what they knew, for salvation is of the Jews (ex Judæis, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he will save you, as we do, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah; a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him again, We know the Messias shall come. So that which our Saviour saith, Salvation is from the Jews, is the same that Paul says (Rom. i. 16, 17) The Gospel is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth: to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith; from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In the like sense the prophet Joel describing the day of Judgment, (chap. ii. 30, 31) that God would shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke; the sun shall be turned to darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come: he addeth, (verse 32) and it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. For in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be salvation. And Obadiah, (verse 17) saith the same, Upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance; and there shall be holiness, and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions, that is the possessions of the heathen, which possessions, he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the mount of Esau, the Land of the Philistines, the

fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the cities of the south, and concludes with these words, the kingdom shall be the Lord's. All these places are for salvation, and the kingdom of God, after the day of judgment, upon earth. On the other side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any cœlum empyreum, or other ætherial region; saving that it is called the kingdom of Heaven: which name it may have, because God, that was king of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by angels from heaven; and after the revolt, sent his Son from heaven to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him thence again to rule both them, and all other faithful men, from the day of judgment, everlastingly: or from that, that the throne of this our great king is in heaven; whereas the earth is but his footstool. But that the subjects of God should have any place as high as his throne, or higher than his footstool, it seemeth not suitable to the dignity of a king, nor can I find any evident text for it in Holy Scripture.

The world to come.

From this that hath been said of the kingdom of God, and of salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the world to come. There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the old world, the present world, and the world to come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. ii. 5) If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly, &c. So the first world, was from Adam to the general flood. Of the present world, our Saviour speaks (John xviii. 36) My kingdom is not of this world. For he came only to teach men the way of salvation, and to renew the kingdom of his Father, by his doctrine. Of the world to come, St. Peter speaks (2 Pet. iii. 13) Nevertheless we according to his promise look for new heavens, and a new earth. This is that world, wherein Christ coming down from heaven in the clouds, with great power, and glory, shall send his angels, and shall

gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the earth, and thenceforth reign over them, under his Father, everlastingly.

Redemption.

Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent redemption; for he that is once guilty of sin, is obnoxious to the penalty of the same; and must pay, or some other for him, such ransom as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such ransom is to be paid before salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require. By this ransom, is not intended a satisfaction for sin, equivalent to the offence; which no sinner for himself, nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another: the damage a man does to another, he may make amends for by restitution or recompense; but sin cannot be taken away by recompense; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. But sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either gratis, or upon such penalty as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, was some sacrifice or oblation. To forgive sin is not an act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatened. Even amongst men, though the promise of good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises of evil, bind them not; much less shall they bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to redeem us, did not in that sense satisfy for the sins of men, as that his death, of its own virtue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice and oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to require for the salvation, at his second coming, of such as in the meantime should repent, and believe in him. And though this act of our redemption, be not always in Scripture called a sacrifice, and oblation, but sometimes a price; yet by price we are not to understand anything, by the value whereof, he

could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father; but that price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.

CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH.

CHURCH THE LORD'S house.

The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the books of Holy Scripture divers things. Sometimes, though not often, it is taken for God's house, that is to say, for a temple, wherein Christians assembled to perform holy duties, publicly, as (1 Cor. xiv. 34) Let your women keep silence in the Churches: but this is metaphorically put for the congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the edifice itself, to distinguish between the temples of Christians and idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was God's house, and the house of prayer; and so is any edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christ's house: and therefore the Greek fathers call it Κυρ˛ιακὴ, the Lord's house: and thence in our language it came to be called kyrke, and church.

Ecclesia, properly what.

Church, when not taken for a house, signifieth the same that ecclesia signified in the Grecian commonwealth, that is to say, a congregation, or an assembly of citizens, called forth to hear the magistrate speak unto them; and which in the commonwealth of Rome was called concio: as he that spake was called ecclesiastes, and concionator. And when they were called forth by lawful authority, (Acts xix. 39) it was Ecclesia legitima, a lawful Church, ἔννομος ἐκκλησία. But when they were excited by tumultuous and seditious clamour, then it was a confused Church, ἐκκλησία συγκεχυμένη.

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the congregation, though not actually assembled, that is to say, for the whole

multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (Acts viii. 3) where it is said, that Saul made havoc of the Church: and in this sense is Christ said to be the head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (Col. iv. 15) Salute the Church that is in his house. Sometimes also for the elect only; as (Eph. v. 27) A glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish; which is meant of the Church triumphant, or Church to come. Sometimes, for a congregation assembled of professors of Christianity, whether their profession be true or counterfeit; as it is understood, (Matth. xviii. 17) where it is said, Tell it to the Church; and if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or publican.

In what sense the church is one person. Church defined.

And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other action whatsoever. For without authority from a lawful congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them all in gross, as of one body; much less the act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a church to be, a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because in all commonwealths, that assembly, which is without warrant from the civil sovereign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful assembly.

A Christian commonwealth and a church all one.

It followeth also, that there is on earth, no such universal Church, as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians, in the dominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that commonwealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil commonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects of it are men: and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporal and spiritual government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross, and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state, nor religion, but temporal; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of the state, and of the religion forbiddeth to be taught. And that governor must be one; or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the commonwealth, between the Church and State; between spiritualists and temporalists; between the sword of justice, and the shield of faith: and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast, between the Christian, and the man. The doctors of the Church, are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines; whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, hath been already shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the Scripture hath assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters following.

CHAPTER XL. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH.

THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT of Abraham.

The father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God; not only such, as he could take notice of, (as moral laws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as God should in special manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal, by promise of the land of Canaan. Nor was there any contract, that could add to, or strengthen the obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: and therefore the covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the commandment of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him in a dream, or vision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.

Abraham had the sole power of ordering the religion of his own people.

In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of important consequence in the government of God's people. First, that at the making of this covenant, God spake only to Abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise than as their wills, which make the essence of all covenants, were before the contract involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawful power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According

whereunto (Gen. xviii. 18, 19) God saith, All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord. From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandments of God, from their sovereign; as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their father, and Lord, and civil sovereign. And consequently in every commonwealth, they who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own sovereign, in the external acts and profession of religion. As for the inward thought, and belief of men, which human governors can take no notice of, (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and of the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.

No pretence of private spirit against the religion of Abraham.

From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawful for Abraham, when any of his subjects should pretend private vision or spirit, or other revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man that shall oppose his private spirit against the laws: for he hath the same place in the commonwealth, that Abraham had in his own family.

Abraham sole judge and interpreter of what God spake.

There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the sovereign in a Christian commonwealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the word of God. For God spake only to Abraham; and it was he only, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore also, they that have the place

of Abraham in a commonwealth, are the only interpreters of what God hath spoken.

The authority of Moses whereon grounded.

The same covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses, (as I have said before, chap. xxxv.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the peculiar kingdom of God; whose lieutenant was Moses, for his own time: and the succession to that office was settled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to be to God a a sacerdotal kingdom for ever.

By this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for God's lieutenant, longer than they believed that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority, notwithstanding the covenant they made with God, depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of his conferences with God, and the verity of his miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take anything for the law of God, which he propounded to them in God's name. We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandment of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself: and our Saviour saith of himself, (John v. 31) If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true; much less if Moses bear witness of himself, especially in a claim of kingly power over God's people, ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people, and their promise to obey him. And so it was: for the people (Exod. xx. 18, 19) when they saw the

thunderings, and the lightenings, and the noise of the trumpets, and the mountain smoking, removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die. Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the commandment of God.

Moses was, under God, sovereign of the Jews all his own time, though Aaron had the priesthood.

And notwithstanding the covenant constituted a sacerdotal kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession after Moses should be dead. For whosoever ordereth and establisheth the policy, as first founder of a commonwealth, be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, must needs have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron, but to him. Secondly, (Exod. xxiv. 1, 2) And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people go up with him. By which it is plain, that Moses, who was alone called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people who were forbidden to come up,) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the person of God, that is to say, was their sole sovereign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verses 9, 10) Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone &c; yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words which God had said to him. He only went for the business

of the people; the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that special grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, as in the verse after appeareth, to see God and live, God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and drink, that is, did live: but did not carry any commandment from him to the people. Again, it is everywhere said, the Lord spake unto Moses, as in all other occasions of government, so also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion, contained in chapters xxv. xxvi. xxvii. xxviii. xxix. xxx. and xxxi. of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriam's mutiny against Moses, was (Numb.xii.) judged by God himself for Moses. So also in the question between Moses and the people, who had the right of governing the people, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly, gathered themselves together (Numb.xvi.3) against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up yourselves above the congregation of the Lord? God caused the earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, with their wives and children, alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but Moses alone had next under God the sovereignty over the Israelites: and that not only in causes of civil policy, but also of religion: for Moses only spake with God, and therefore only could tell the people what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where God talked with Moses. Thou shalt set bounds (saith the Lord, Exod. xix. 12) to the people round about, and say, Take heed to yourselves that you go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount

shall surely be put to death. And again (verse 21) Go down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze. Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole messenger of God, and interpreter of his commandments. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the bounds which are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures, since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent God's person on earth. To look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him, is allowed; but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.

All spirits were subordinate to the spirit of Moses.

There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved and authorized. For there were in his time but seventy men, that are said to prophecy by the spirit of God, and these were all of Moses his election; concerning whom God said to Moses, (Numb. xi. 16) Gather to me seventy of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people. To these God imparted his spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of Moses; for it is said (verse 25) God came down in a cloud, and took of the spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders. But as I have shown before (chap. XXXVI.) by spirit, is understood the mind; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in God's name, in such manner, as to set forward, as ministers of Moses and by his authority, such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For

they were but ministers; and when two of them prophecied in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawful thing; and as it is in verses 27 and 28 of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they prophecied. By which it is manifest, that no subject ought to pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him whom God hath set in the place of Moses.

After Moses the sovereignty was in the high priest.

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a sacerdotal kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant, to Aaron's son Eleazar the high-priest: and God declared him, next under himself, for sovereign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the General of their army. For thus God saith expressly (Numb. xxvii. 21) concerning Joshua: He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him before the Lord; at his word shall they go out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the children of Israel with him. Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace, was in the priest. The supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high-priest: for the book of the law was in their keeping; and the priests and Levites only were the subordinate judges in causes civil, as appears in Deut. xvii. 8, 9, 10. And for the manner of God's worship, there was never doubt made, but that the high-priest till the time of Saul, had the supreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were both joined together in one and the same person, the high-priest; and ought to be so, in whosoever governeth by divine right, that is, by authority immediate from God.

Of the sovereign power between the time of Joshua and of Saul.

After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in the Book of Judges, That there was in those days no king in Israel; and sometimes with this addition, that every man did that which was

right in his own eyes. By which is to be understood, that where it is said, there was no king, is meant, there was no sovereign power in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, there arose another generation (Judges ii. 10, 11) that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim. And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, to look for a sign, not only before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas signs and miracles had for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. But if we consider not the exercise, but the right of governing, the sovereign power was still in the high-priest. Therefore whatsoever obedience was yielded to any of the judges, who were men chosen by God extraordinarily to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy, it cannot be drawn into argument against the right the high-priest had to the sovereign power, in all matters both of policy and religion. And neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary, but an extraordinary calling to the government; and were obeyed by the Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore the right of regulating both the policy, and the religion, were inseparable.

Of the rights of the kings of Israel.

To the judges succeeded kings: and whereas before, all authority, both in religion and policy, was in the high-priest; so now it was all in the king. For the sovereignty over the people, which was before, not only by virtue of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites, in God, and next under him, in the high-priest, as his vicegerent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of God himself. For when they said to Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 5) Make us a king to judge us like all the nations, they signified

that they would no more be governed by the commands that should be laid upon them by the priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in deposing the high-priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (1 Sam. vii. 7) Hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no authority left to the priests, but such as the king was pleased to allow them; which was more or less, according as the kings were good or evil. And for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the king. For in the same chapter, (verse 20), they say they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their judge, and go before them, and fight their battles; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in peace and war. In which is contained also the ordering of religion: for there was no other word of God in that time, by which to regulate religion, but the law of Moses, which was their civil law. Besides, we read (1 Kings ii. 27) that Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord: he had therefore authority over the high-priest, as over any other subject; which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. And we read also, (1 Kings viii.) that he dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the people; and that he himself in person made that excellent prayer, used in the consecration of all churches and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of supremacy in religion. Again, we read (2 Kings xxii.) that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by the high-priest, but Josiah sent both him and others to enquire concerning it, of Huldah, the prophetess; which is another mark of supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read (1 Chron. xxvi. 30) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren,

Hebronites, officers of Israel among them westward, in all their business of the Lord, and in the service of the king. Likewise (verse 32) that he made other Hebronites, rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king. Is not this full power, both temporal and spiritual, as they call it that would divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of God's kingdom, to the captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that of the civil sovereignty; and the priest's office after the election of Saul, was not magisterial, but ministerial.

The practice of supremacy in religion was not, in the time of the kings, according to the right thereof.

Notwithstanding the government both in policy and religion, were joined, first in the high-priests, and afterwards in the kings, so far forth as concerned the right; yet it appeareth by the same holy history, that the people understood it not: but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or, what is equivalent to a miracle, great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their governors, gave sufficient credit either to the fame of Moses or to the colloquies between God and the priests; they took occasion, as oft as their governors displeased them, by blaming sometimes the policy, sometimes the religion, to change the government or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure: and from thence proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotal kingdom, regarded no more the commandment of the priest nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes, and obeyed in civil

affairs such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God, as they ought to do, but with such men or women, as they guessed to be prophets by their predictions of things to come; and though they had an idol in their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.

And afterwards when they demanded a king after the manner of the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God their king; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would have a king to judge them in civil actions; but not that they would allow their king to change the religion which they thought was recommended to them by Moses. So that they always kept in store a pretext, either of justice or religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevail. Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a king; for God was their king already, and Samuel had but an authority under him; yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsel, in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint another king, namely David, to take the succession from his heirs. Rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an oppressor, that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to Jeroboam an idolater. And generally through the whole history of the kings, as well of Judah as of Israel, there were prophets that always controlled the kings, for transgressing the religion; and sometimes also for errors of state; as Jehosaphat was reproved (2 Chron. xix. 2) by the prophet Jehu, for aiding the king of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, (xxxix. 3-7) for shewing his treasures to the ambassadors of Babylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of state and religion were in the kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own natural abilities or felicities. So that from the practise of those times, there can no

argument be drawn, that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings, unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the cherubims, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme head of the church; or because Josiah consulted Huldah the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he nor the high-priest, but Huldah the prophetess, had the supreme authority in matter of religion; which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.

After the captivity, the Jews had no settled commonwealth

During the captivity, the Jews had no commonwealth at all: and after their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: and presently after, they became subjects to the Greeks, from whose customs and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion became much corrupted: in such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of God's external worship, and represented God's person; that is, the person of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his son Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his everlasting kingdom, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the chapter following.

CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR.

THREE PARTS OF the office of Christ.

We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah: the first of a Redeemer or Saviour; the second of a pastor, counsellor, or teacher, that is, of a prophet sent from God to convert such as God hath elected to salvation: the third of a king, and eternal king, but under his Father, as Moses and the high-priests were in their several times. And to these three parts are correspondent three times. For our redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the sacrifice wherein he offered up himself for our sins upon the cross: our conversion he wrought partly then in his own person, and partly worketh now by his ministers, and will continue to work till his coming again. And after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

His office as a Redeemer.

To the office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransom of sin, which ransom is death, it appertaineth, that he was sacrificed, and thereby bare upon his own head and carried away from us our iniquities, in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though without sin, can satisfy for the offences of all men, in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old law (as we may read, Levit. xvi.) the Lord required that there should, every year once, be made an atonement for the sins of all Israel, both priests and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the priests a young bullock; and for the rest

of the people, he was to receive from them two young goats, of which he was to sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was the scape-goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the goat to be led into the wilderness, and there to escape, and carry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient, because an acceptable, price for the ransom of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah, is a sufficient price for the sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our Saviour Christ's sufferings seem to be here figured, as clearly as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament. He was both the sacrificed goat, and the scapegoat; he was oppressed, and he was afflicted (Isaiah liii. 7); he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumb before the shearer, so he opened not his mouth: here he is the sacrificed goat. He hath borne our griefs (verse 4), and carried our sorrows: and again, (verse 6), the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all: and so he is the scape-goat. He was cut off from the land of the living (ver. 8) for the transgression of my people: there again he is the sacrificed goat. And again, (verse 11) he shall bear their sins: he is the scape goat. Thus is the lamb of God equivalent to both those goats; sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his ascension.

Christ's kingdom not of this world.

For as much therefore, as he that redeemeth hath no title to the thing redeemed, before the redemption, and ransom paid; and this ransom was the death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour, as man, was not king of those that he redeemed, before he suffered death; that is, during that time he conversed bodily on the earth. I say, he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact, which the faithful make with him in baptism.

Nevertheless, by the renewing of their pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him for king, under his Father, whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdom upon him. According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressly saith, (John xviii. 36) My kingdom is not of this world. Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain unto the day of judgment, which is therefore also called the last day; and that which shall be after the day of judgment, when there shall be a new heaven, and a new earth: the kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general resurrection. And that is it which our Saviour saith, (Matth.xvi.27) The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works. To reward every man according to his works, is to execute the office of a king; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father, with his angels. When our Saviour saith, (Matth. xxiii. 2, 3) The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you do, that observe and do; he declared plainly, that he ascribed kingly power, for that time, not to himself, but to them. And so he doth also, where he saith (Luke xii. 14) Who made me a judge or divider over you? And (John xii. 47) I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. And yet our Saviour came into this world that he might be a king and a judge in the world to come: for he was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the anointed priest, and the sovereign prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high-priests that succeeded Moses, and in the kings that succeeded the priests. And St. John says expressly (chap. v. verse 22) the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son. And this is not repugnant to that other place, I came not to judge the world: for this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at the second coming of Christ, (Matth. xix. 28) Ye that have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in

the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

The end of Christ's coming was to renew the covenant of the kingdom of God, and to persuade the elect to embrace it, which was the second part of his office.

If then Christ, whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new covenant, the kingdom, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to do, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should believe in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are two parts of our Saviour's office during his abode upon the earth: one to proclaim himself the Christ; and another by teaching, and by working of miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the immortality believers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty to take possession of his Father's kingdom. And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching is often by himself called the regeneration; which is not properly a kingdom, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates that then were; for he commanded to obey those that sat then in Moses' chair, and to pay tribute to Cæsar; but only an earnest of the kingdom of God that was to come, to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to believe in him; for which cause the godly are said to be already in the kingdom of grace, as naturalized in that heavenly kingdom.

The preaching of Christ not contrary to the then law of the Jews, nor of Cæsar.

Hitherto, therefore, there is nothing done or taught by Christ, that tendeth to the diminution of the civil right of the Jews or of Cæsar. For as touching the commonwealth which then was amongst the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, and they that were governed, did all expect the Messiah and kingdom of God; which they could not have done, if their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by preaching and miracles go about to prove himself to be that Messiah, he did therein nothing against their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world: he taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sat in Moses' seat: he allowed them to give Cæsar his tribute, and refused to take upon himself to be a judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then civil government? But God having determined his sacrifice for the reduction of his elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of their malice and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Cæsar. For though Pilate himself, to gratify the Jews, delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him: and put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, that he pretended to be king; but simply, that he was king of the Jews; and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, What I have written, I have written.

The third part of his office was to be king, under his Father, of the elect.

As for the third part of his office, which was to be king, I have already shewn that his kingdom was not to begin till the resurrection. But then he shall be king, not only as God, in which sense he is king already, and ever shall be, of all the earth, in virtue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own elect, by virtue of the pact they make with him in their baptism. And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (Matth. xix. 28) that his apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, When the

Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his glory: whereby he signified that he should reign then in his human nature; and (Matth. xvi. 27) The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works. The same we may read, Mark xiii. 26, and xiv. 62; and more expressly for the time, Luke xxii. 29, 30, I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. By which it is manifest, that the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in glory, and make his apostles judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the kingdom of heaven, whether men shall then eat and drink? What eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour (John vi. 27), where he saith, Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give you. So that by eating at Christ's table, is meant the eating of the tree of life; that is to say, the enjoying of immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which places and many more, it is evident that our Saviour's kingdom is to be exercised by him in his human nature.

Christ's authority in the kingdom of God, subordinate to that of his Father.

Again, he is to be king then, no otherwise than as subordinate or vicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wilderness; and as the high-priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the kings were after it. For it is one of the prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be like, in office, to Moses: I will raise them up a prophet, saith the Lord (Deut. xviii. 18) from amongst their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth; and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilst he was conversant on earth. For as Moses chose

twelve princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And as Moses authorized seventy elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to prophecy to the people, that is, as I have said before, to speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy disciples, to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of the seventy that prophecied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as being subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man that cast out devils in his name, justified him therein, saying, (Luke ix. 50) Forbid him not, for he that is not against us, is on our part.

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the kingdom of God, and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the children of Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of circumcision, which rite having been omitted in the wilderness, was again restored as soon as they came into the Land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of baptizing, that is, of washing with water, all those that being Gentiles embraced the God of Israel. This rite St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached to be already come into the world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that believed in him. From what cause the rite of baptism first proceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning leprosy; wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the priest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing. And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism; wherein such men as are

cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith, are received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture, drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens: and that is, when a man that was thought dead chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would do to converse with a ghost, unless he were received again into the number of men by washing, as children new-born were washed from the uncleanness of their nativity; which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judea was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept into the religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And for the other sacrament of eating the Paschal lamb, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; in which the breaking of the bread, and the pouring out of the wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin, by Christ's passion, as the eating of the Paschal lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of the bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and he but a lieutenant of God; it followeth that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to be like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. The same is more expressly signified, by that that he teacheth us to pray, Our Father, let thy kingdom come; and, For thine is the kingdom, the power and the glory; and by that it is said, that He shall come in the glory of his Father; and by that which St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. xv. 24) then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; and by many other most express places.

One and the same God is the person represented by Moses and Christ.

Our Saviour, therefore, both in teaching and reigning, representeth, as Moses did, the person of God; which God from that time forward, but not before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same substance, is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as represented by his son the Christ. For person being a relative to a representer, it is consequent to plurality of representers, that there be a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.

CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER ECCLESIASTICAL.

FOR THE UNDERSTANDING of power ecclesiastical, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour, into two parts; one before the conversion of kings, and men endued with sovereign civil power; the other after their conversion. For it was long after the ascension, before any king or civil sovereign embraced and publicly allowed the teaching of Christian religion.

Of the holy spirit that fell on the apostles.

And for the time between, it is manifest, that the power ecclesiastical was in the apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Christianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation; and after these, the power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance his kingdom. So that imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ, and teach his doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his minister Joshua, as we read (Deut. xxxiv. 9) And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his hands upon him. Our Saviour therefore, between his resurrection and ascension, gave his spirit to the apostles; first, by breathing on them, and saying, (John xx. 22) Receive ye the Holy Spirit; and after his ascension (Acts ii. 2, 3) by sending down upon them a mighty wind, and cloven

tongues of fire; and not by imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands on Moses: and his apostles afterward transmitted the same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby, in whom the power ecclesiastical continually remained, in those first times where there was not any Christian commonwealth; namely, in them that received the same from the apostles, by successive laying on of hands.

Of the Trinity.

Here we have the person of God born now the third time. For as Moses, and the high-priests, were God's representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himself, as man, during his abode on earth: so the Holy Ghost, that is to say the apostles and their successors, in the office of preaching and teaching, that had received the holy Spirit, have represented him ever since. But a person, as I have shown before, (chap. XIII.) is he that is represented, as often as he is represented; and therefore God, who has been represented, that is personated, thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word Person, nor Trinity, be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John, indeed (1 Epist. v. 7) saith, There be three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are One. But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three persons in the proper signification of persons; which is, that which is represented by another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one person; and as represented by his Son, another person; and as represented by the apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third person; and yet every person here, is the person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bear witness. St. John therefore tells us (verse 11) that they bear witness, that God hath given us eternal life in his Son. Again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the answer is easy; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and

lastly by his apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times represented the person of God, and either prophecied or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the apostles, it was the character of the apostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witness of his resurrection; as appeareth expressly (Acts i. 21, 22), where St. Peter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection: which words interpret the bearing of witness, mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of witnesses in earth. For (1 John v. 8) he saith, there are three that bear witness in earth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood, and these three agree in one: that is to say, the graces of God's spirit, and the two sacraments, baptism, and the Lord's supper, which all agree in one testimony to assure the consciences of believers, of eternal life; of which testimony he saith (verse 10) He that believeth on the Son of man hath the witness in himself. In this Trinity on earth, the unity is not of the thing; for the spirit, the water, and the blood, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: but in the Trinity of heaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same God, though represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the same, was the person represented by Moses; the person represented by his Son incarnate; and the person represented by the apostles. As represented by the apostles, the Holy Spirit, by which they spake, is God; as represented by his Son, that was God and man, the Son is that God; as represented by Moses and the high-priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God. From whence we may

gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament: for they are persons, that is, they have their names from representing; which could not be, till divers men had represented God's person in ruling or in directing under him.

Thus we see how the power ecclesiastical was left by our Saviour to the apostles; and how they were, to the end they might the better exercise that power, endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called sometimes in the New Testament paracletus, which signifieth an assister, or one called to for help, though it be commonly translated a comforter. Let us now consider the power itself, what it was, and over whom.

The power ecclesiastical is but the power to teach.

Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, hath handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the pope of Rome; and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical: all which sorts of power are sovereign and coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no coercive power left them by our Saviour, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of Christ, and to persuade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by precepts and good counsel, to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of God when it comes; and that the apostles, and other ministers of the Gospel, are our schoolmasters, and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws, but wholesome counsels: then were all that dispute in vain.

An argument thereof, the power of Christ himself.

I have shown already, in the last chapter, that the kingdom of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his ministers, unless they be kings, require obedience in his name. For if the supreme king have not his regal power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his

officers? As my Father sent me, so saith our Saviour, (John xx. 21) I send you. But our Saviour was sent to persuade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of his Father, and not to reign in majesty, no not as his Father's lieutenant, till the day of judgment.

From the name of regeneration.

The time between the ascension and the general resurrection, is called, not a reigning, but a regeneration; that is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, (Matth. xix. 28,) You that have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones; and of St. Paul (Ephes. vi. 15) Having your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace.

From the comparison of it, with fishing, leaven, seed.

And is compared by our Saviour, to fishing, that is, to winning men to obedience, not by coercion and punishing, but by persuasion: and therefore he said not to his apostles, he would make them so many Nimrods, hunters of men; but fishers of men. It is compared also to leaven, to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard-seed; by all which compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual reigning. The work of Christ's ministers, is evangelization; that is, a proclamation of Christ, and a preparation for his second coming, as the evangelization of John the Baptist was a preparation to his first coming.

From the nature of faith.

Again, the office of Christ's ministers in this world, is to make men believe and have faith in Christ; but faith hath no relation to, nor dependance at all upon compulsion or commandment; but only upon certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from something men believe already. Therefore the ministers of Christ in this world, have no power, by that title, to punish any man for not believing or for contradicting

what they say; they have I say no power by that title of Christ's ministers, to punish such; but if they have sovereign civil power, by politic institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction to their laws whatsoever: and St. Paul, of himself and other the then preachers of the gospel, saith in express words (2 Cor. i. 24), We have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy.

From the authority Christ hath left to civil princes.

Another argument, that the ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of commanding, may be drawn from the lawful authority which Christ hath left to all princes, as well Christians as infidels. St. Paul saith (Col. iii. 20) Children obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord: and (verse 22) Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as fearing the Lord; this is spoken to them whose masters were infidels; and yet they are bidden to obey them in all things. And again, concerning obedience to princes (Rom. xiii. the first six verses), exhorting to be subject to the higher powers, he saith, that all power is ordained of God; and that we ought to be subject to them, not only for fear of incurring their wrath, but also for conscience sake. And St. Peter (1 Epistle ii. 13, 14, 15), Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for so is the will of God. And again St. Paul (Titus iii. 1), Put men in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, and to obey magistrates. These princes and powers, whereof St. Peter and St. Paul here speak, were all infidels: much more therefore we are to observe those Christians, whom God hath ordained to have sovereign power over us. How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ, if he should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king, or other

sovereign representant of the commonwealth whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not left to his ministers in this world, unless they be also endued with civil authority, any authority to command other men.

What Christians may do to avoid persecution.

But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign person forbid us to believe in Christ? To this I answer, that such forbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow men's commands. Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue, we believe not; must we obey such command? Profession with the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture whereby we signify our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holdi n firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel; for he saith (2 Kings v. 17, 18) Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon: when I bow down myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing. This the prophet approved, and bid him Go in peace. Here Naaman believed in his heart; but by bowing before the idol Rimmon, he denied the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviour's saying, (Matth. x. 33) Whosoever denieth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in heaven. This we may say, that whatsoever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to do in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the

laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign's; nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and the law of his country. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian commonwealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the Mahomedan religion, whether if his sovereign command him to be present at the divine service of the Christian church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahomedan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than obey that command of his lawful prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men to disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false: if he say, he ought to be obedient, then he alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, (Luke vi.31) Whatsoever you would that men should do unto you, that do ye unto them; and contrary to the law of nature, which is the indubitable everlasting law of God, Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should do unto thee.

Of martyrs.

But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the Church, that they have needlessly cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause put to death: whereof some have received a calling to preach, and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others have had no such calling, nor more has been required of them than their own faith. The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witness to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs; for a martyr is, (to give the true definition of the word) a witness of the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: for a witness must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of

Christ, is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, (Acts i. 21, 22) Wherefore of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a martyr (that is a witness) with us of his resurrection: where we may observe, that he which is to be a witness of the truth of the resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental article of Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before and after his resurrection; and consequently must be one of his original disciples: whereas they which were not so, can witness no more but that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but witnesses of other men's testimony; and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ's witnesses.

He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the history of our Saviour's life, and of the Acts or Epistles of the apostles, or which he believeth upon the authority of a private man, will oppose the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from being a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. It is one article only, which to die for, meriteth so honourable a name; and that article is this, that Jesus is the Christ; that is to say, He that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternal life in his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition or profit of the clergy, is not required; nor is it the death of the witness, but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth witness, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a witness, and consequently a martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his apostles, disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because

being not called thereto, it is not required at his hands; nor ought he to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his apostles, and his seventy disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that believed. And he sent them to unbelievers; I send you, saith he, (Matth. x. 16) as sheep amongst wolves; not as sheep to other sheep.

Argument from the points of their commission.

Lastly, the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down in the gospel, contain, none of them, any authority over the congregation.

To preach;

We have first (Matth. x. 6, 7,) that the twelve apostles were sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and commanded to preach that the kingdom of God was at hand. Now preaching, in the original, is that act, which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in proclaiming of a king. But a crier hath not right to command any man. And (Luke x. 2) the seventy disciples are sent out as Labourers, not as Lords of the harvest; and are bidden (verse 9) to say, The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you; and by kingdom here is meant, not the kingdom of grace, but the kingdom of glory; for they are bidden (verse 11, 12) to denounce it to those cities which shall not receive them, as a threatening that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom, than for such a city. And (Matth. xx. 28) our Saviour telleth his disciples, that sought priority of place, their office was to minister, even as the son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not magisterial, but ministerial power: Be not called masters, saith our Saviour, (Matth. xxiii. 10) for one is your master, even Christ.

And teach;

Another point of their commission, is, to Teach all nations; as it is in St. Matth. xxviii. 19, or as in St. Mark, xvi. 15; Go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. Teaching therefore, and preaching, is the same thing. For they that proclaim the coming of a king, must withal make known by what right he cometh, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: as St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when (Acts xvii. 2, 3) three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ. But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, that is to say, king, and risen from the dead, is not to say that men are bound, after they believe it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws and commands of their sovereigns; but that they shall do wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in patience and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.

To baptize;

Another point of their commission, is to baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. What is baptism? Dipping into water. But what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of any thing? The meaning of these words of baptism is this. He that is baptized, is dipped or washed, as a sign of becoming a new man, and a loyal subject to that God, whose person was represented in old time by Moses, and the high-priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ his Son, God and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his human nature represent his Father's person in his eternal kingdom after the resurrection; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles, who, assisted by the spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that kingdom, to be the only and assured way thereunto. This being our promise in baptism; and the authority of earthly sovereigns being not to be put down

till the day of judgment; for that is expressly affirmed by St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22, 23, 24) where he saith, As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming; then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power: it is manifest, that we do not in baptism constitute over us another authority, by which our external actions are to be governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction in the way to life eternal.

And to forgive, and retain sins.

The power of remission and retention of sins, called also the power of loosing and binding, and sometimes the keys of the kingdom of heaven, is a consequence of the authority to baptize, or refuse to baptize. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of them that are to be received into the kingdom of God; that is to say, into eternal life; that is to say, to remission of sin: for as eternal life was lost by the committing, so it is recovered by the remitting of men's sins. The end of baptism is remission of sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they that were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what they were to do, advised them (Acts ii. 38) to repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins. And therefore, seeing to baptize is to declare the reception of men into God's kingdom; and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion; it followeth, that the power to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same apostles, and their substitutes and successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them, saying (John xx. 22) Receive the Holy Ghost, he addeth in the next verse, Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained. By which words, is not granted an authority to forgive or retain sins, simply and absolutely, as God forgiveth or retaineth them, who knoweth the heart of man, and truth of

his penitence and conversion; but conditionally, to the penitent: and this forgiveness, or absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned repentance, is thereby, without other act, or sentence of the absolved, made void, and hath no effect at all to salvation, but on the contrary to the aggravation of his sin. Therefore the apostles, and their successors, are to follow but the outward marks of repentance; which appearing, they have no authority to deny absolution; and if they appear not, they have no authority to absolve. The same also is to be observed in baptism: for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the apostles had not the power to deny baptism; nor to grant it to the unpenitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another man's repentance, further than by external marks, taken from his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy; another question will arise, who it is that is constituted judge of those marks? And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; If thy brother, saith he, (Matth. xviii. 15, 16, 17) shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault, between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. By which it is manifest, that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance, belonged not to any one man, but to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the faithful, or to them that have authority to be their representant. But besides the judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of sentence. And this belonged always to the apostle, or some pastor of the Church, as prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18th verse, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven. And conformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul, (1 Cor. v. 3, 4, 5) where he saith, For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath

so done this deed; in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one to Satan; that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the cause, for St. Paul was absent, and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter (verses 11, 12,) the judgment in such a case is more expressly attributed to the assembly: But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, &c. with such a one, no not to eat. For what have I to do to judge them that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within? The sentence therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was pronounced by the apostle, or pastor; but the judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, as the times were before the conversion of kings, and men that had sovereign authority in the commonwealth, the assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same city: as in Corinth, in the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.

Of excommunication.

This part of the power of the keys, by which men were thrust out from the kingdom of God, is that which is called excommunication; and to excommunicate, is in the original, ἀποσυνάγωγον ποιεῖν, to cast out of the synagogue; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their synagogues such as they thought, in manners or doctrine, contagious, as lepers were by the law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time as they should be by the priest pronounced clean.

The use of excommunication without civil power.

The use and effect of excommunication, whilst it was not yet strengthened with the civil power, was no more than that they, who were not excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not

enough to repute them as heathen, that never had been Christians; for with such they might eat and drink; which with excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (1 Cor. v. 9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to company with fornicators; but, because that could not be without going out of the world, he restraineth it to such fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren; with such a one, he saith, they ought not to keep company, no not to eat. And this is no more than our Saviour saith (Matth. xviii. 17), Let him be to thee as a heathen, and as a publican. For publicans, which signifieth farmers and receivers of the revenue of the commonwealth, were so hated and detested by the Jews that were to pay it, as that publican and sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing: insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchæus a publican; though it were to convert him, yet it was objected to him as a crime. And therefore, when our Saviour to heathen added publican, he did forbid them to eat with a man excommunicate.

As for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they had no power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he were Christian, or heathen. And because all places are by right in the dominion of the commonwealth; as well he that was excommunicated, as he that never was baptized, might enter into them by commission from the civil magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entered into their synagogues at Damascus, (Acts ix. 2) to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the high-priest.

Of no effect upon an apostate;

By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an apostate, in a place where the civil power did persecute, or not assist the Church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of damage in this world, nor of terror: not of terror, because of their unbelief; nor of

damage, because they are returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come were to be in no worse estate, than they which never had believed. The damage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice.

But upon the faithful only.

Excommunication therefore had its effect only upon those, that believed that Jesus Christ was to come again in glory, to reign over and to judge both the quick and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom to those whose sins were retained, that is, to those that were excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is, that St. Paul calleth excommunication, a delivery of the excommunicate person to Satan. For without the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms, after judgment, are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is it that the faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not forgiven. Whereby we may understand, that excommunication, in the time that Christian religion was not authorized by the civil power, was used only for a correction of manners, not of errors in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as believed, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so believed, needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be saved.

For what fault lieth excommunication.

There lieth excommunication for injustice; as (Matth. xviii.), If thy brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he obey not, Let him be to thee as an heathen man and a publican. And there lieth excommunication for a scandalous life, as (1 Cor. v. 11) If any man that is called a brother, be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one ye are not to eat. But to excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that Jesus was the

Christ, for difference of opinion in other points, by which that foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (Titus iii. 10) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary; A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject. For an heretic, is he, that being a member of the Church, teacheth nevertheless some private opinion, which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, St. Paul adviseth Titus, after the first and second admonition, to reject. But to reject, in this place, is not to excommunicate the man; but to give over admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with him, as one that is to be convinced only by himself. The same apostle saith (2 Tim. ii. 23) Foolish and unlearned questions avoid: the word avoid in this place, and reject in the former, is the same in the original, παραιτοῦ: but foolish questions may be set by without excommunication. And again, (Titus iii. 9) Avoid foolish questions, where the original περιΐστασο (set them by) is equivalent to the former word reject. There is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance the casting out of the Church faithful men, such as believed the foundation, only for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious conscience. But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a lesson to pastors, such as Timothy and Titus were, not to make new articles of faith, by determining every small controversy, which oblige men to a needless burthen of conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which lesson the apostles themselves observed well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their controversy were great, as we may read in Gal. ii. 11, yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, during the apostles' times, there were other pastors that observed it not; as Diotrephes (3 John, 9, &c.) who cast out of the Church such as St. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of

a pride he took in preeminence. So early it was, that vain glory and ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.

Of persons liable to excommunication.

That a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as first, that he be a member of some commonalty, that is to say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which he is to be excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no excommunication; nor where there is no power to judge, can there be any power to give sentence.

From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be excommunicated by another: for either they have equal power to excommunicate each other, in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of authority, but schism, and dissolution of charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice; and then they be but one Church; and the part excommunicated is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individual persons.

And because the sentence of excommunication, importeth an advice, not to keep company nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate, if a sovereign prince or assembly be excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. For all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own sovereign, when he requireth it, by the law of nature; nor can they lawfully either expel him from any place of his own dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out of his dominion without his leave; much less, if he call them to that honour, refuse to eat with him. And as to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the state excommunicate: for the very institution, as it uniteth many men into one community, so it dissociateth one community from another: so that excommunication is not needful for keeping kings and states asunder; nor

has any further effect than is in the nature of policy itself, unless it be to instigate princes to war upon one another.

Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own sovereign, whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For if he believe that Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God (1 John v. 1): and God dwelleth in him, and he in God (1 John iv. 15.) But he that hath the spirit of God; he that dwelleth in God; he in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men. Therefore, he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all the dangers threatened to persons excommunicate. He that believeth it not, is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to excommunication: nor he also that is a professed Christian, till his hypocrisy appear in his manners, that is, till his behaviour be contrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and which Christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of manners but by external actions, which actions can never be unlawful, but when they are against the law of the commonwealth.

If a man's father, or mother, or master, be excommunicate, yet are not the children forbidden to keep them company, nor to eat with them: for that were, for the most part, to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of means to get food; and to authorize them to disobey their parents and masters, contrary to the precept of the apostles.

In sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the apostles and pastors of the Church have their commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by command and co-action, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation in the world to come. And as a master in any science may abandon his scholar, when he obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a teacher of

Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they do him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. For to a teacher that shall so complain, may be applied the answer of God to Samuel in the like place, (1 Sam. viii. 7) They have not rejected thee, but me. Excommunication therefore, when it wanteth the assistance of the civil power, as it doth, when a Christian state or prince is excommunicate by a foreign authority, is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terror. The name of Fulmen excommunicationis, that is, the thunderbolt of excommunication, proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was king of kings; as the heathen made Jupiter king of the gods, and assigned him, in their poems, and pictures, a thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue and punish the giants, that should dare to deny his power. Which imagination was grounded on two errors; one, that the kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviour's own words, (John xviii. 36) My kingdom is not of this world; the other, that he is Christ's vicar, not only over his own subjects, but over all the Christians of the world; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall be proved in its due place.

Of the interpreter of the Scriptares, before civil sovereigns became Christians.

St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews, (Acts, xvii. 2, 3) as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ. The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did believe already, that they were the word of God. Hereupon (as it is in verse 4) some of them believed, and (as it is in

verse 5) some believed not. What was the reason, when they all believed the Scripture, that they did not all believe alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one interpreted them to himself? It was this; St. Paul came to them without any legal commission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but persuade; which he must needs do, either by miracles, as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his authority in God's works; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in God's word. But whosoever persuadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom he speaketh judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture? If St. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your laws, of which I am interpreter, as sent by Christ. The interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might believe, or not believe, according as the allegation seemed to himself to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged. And generally in all cases of the world, he that pretendeth any proof, maketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words (Deut. xvii.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.

For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alleging the Scriptures, which they believed not. The apostles therefore laboured by reason to confute their idolatry; and that done, to persuade them to the faith of Christ, by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So that there could

not yet be any controversy concerning the authority to interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged, during his infidelity, to follow any man's interpretation of any Scripture, except his sovereign's interpretation of the laws of his country.

Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was therein that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to no other thing than to the belief of that which the apostles preached: and the apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the king that was to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that he was not dead, but risen again from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and should come again one day to judge the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that himself, or any other apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture, as all that became Christians, ought to take their interpretation for law. For to interpret the laws, is part of the administration of a present kingdom; which the apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other pastors ever since, let thy kingdom come; and exhorted their converts to obey their then ethnic princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one body. Every of the evangelists was interpreter of his own gospel; and every apostle of his own epistle; and of the Old Testament our Saviour himself saith to the Jews (John v. 39) Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think to have eternal life, and they are they that testify of me. If he had not meant they should interpret them, he would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have interpreted them himself, or referred them to the interpretation of the priests.

When a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the Church assembled themselves together, and determined what should be preached and taught, and how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people; but took not

from the people the liberty to read and interpret them to themselves. The apostles sent divers letters to the Churches, and other writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them to interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in the apostles' time, it must be till such time as there should be pastors, that could authorize an interpreter, whose interpretation should generally be stood to: but that could not be till kings were pastors, or pastors kings.

Of the power to make Scripture, law.

There be two senses, wherein a writing may be said to be canonical; for canon, signifieth a rule; and a rule is a precept, by which a man is guided and directed in any action whatsoever. Such precepts, though given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counsellor to his friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless canons; because they are rules. But when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those canons, not only rules, but laws. The question therefore here, is of the power to make the Scriptures, which are the rules of Christian faith, laws.

Of the ten commandments.

That part of the Scripture, which was first law, was the Ten Commandments, written in two tables of stone, and delivered by God himself to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no written law of God, who as yet having not chosen any people to be his peculiar kingdom, had given no law to men, but the law of nature, that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in every man's own heart. Of these two tables, the first containeth the law of sovereignty; 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the gods of other nations, in these words, Non habebis deos alienos coram me, that is, thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other nations worship, but only me: whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honour, as their king and governor, any other God,

than him that spake unto them then by Moses, and afterwards by the high-priest. 2. That they should not make any image to represent him; that is to say, they were not to choose to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any representative of their own fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3. That they should not take the name of God in vain; that is, they should not speak rashly of their king, nor dispute his right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his lieutenants. 4. That they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour, and employ that time in doing him public honour. The second table containeth the duty of one man towards another, as to honour parents; not to kill; not to commit adultery; not to steal; not to corrupt judgment by false witness; and finally, not so much as to design in their heart the doing of any injury one to another. The question now is, who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is no doubt but they were made laws by God himself: but because a law obliges not, nor is law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign; how could the people of Israel, that were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them? Some of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table; and therefore to be acknowledged for God's laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: but of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first table, the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exod. xx. 19), Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die. It was therefore only Moses then, and after him the high-priest, whom, by Moses, God declared should administer this his peculiar kingdom, that had on earth the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to be law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding high-priests, were the

civil sovereigns. Therefore hitherto, the canonizing or making the Scripture law, belonged to the civil sovereign.

Of the judicial and Levitical law.

The judicial law, that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the magistrates of Israel for the rule of their administration of justice, and of the sentences or judgments they should pronounce in pleas between man and man; and the Levitical law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses only; and therefore also became laws, by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the people by Moses, after his being forty days with God in the Mount, by word of mouth, is not expressed in the text; but they were all positive laws, and equivalent to holy Scripture, and made canonical by Moses the civil sovereign.

The second law.

After the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, Moses to the former laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy; that is, second laws. And are, (as it is written Deut. xxix. 1) the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb. For having explained those former laws, in the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the xiith chapter, and continue to the end of the xxvith of the same book. This law (Deut. xxvii. 3) they were commanded to write upon great stones plastered over, at their passing over Jordan: this law also was written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of the priests, and to the elders of Israel (Deut. xxxi. 9), and commanded (verse 26) to be put in the side of the ark; for in the ark itself was nothing but the ten commandments. This was the law, which Moses

(Deut. xvii. 18) commanded the kings of Israel should keep a copy of: and this is the law, which having been long time lost, was found again in the temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received for the law of God. But both Moses at the writing, and Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the civil sovereignty. Hitherto therefore the power of making Scripture canonical, was in the civil sovereign.

Besides this book of the law, there was no other book, from the time of Moses till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the law of God. For the prophets, except a few, lived in the time of the Captivity itself; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from having their prophecies generally received for laws, as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the kings which were seduced by them. And this book itself, which was confirmed by Josiah for the law of God, and with it all the history of the works of God, was lost in the captivity and sack of the city of Jerusalem, as appears by that of 2 Esdras, xiv. 21, thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, or the works that shall begin. And before the captivity, between the time when the law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when (1 Kings xiv. 26) Shishak, king of Egypt, took the spoil of the temple), and the time of Josiah when it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such as each of them esteemed prophets.

The Old Testament when made canonical

From hence we may infer, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not canonical nor a law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their covenant with God at their return from the captivity, and restoration of their commonwealth under Esdras. But from that time forward they were accounted the law of the Jews, and for such translated

into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, and put into the library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the word of God. Now seeing Esdras was the high-priest, and the high-priest was their civil sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws, but by the sovereign civil power.

The New Testament began to be canonical under Christian sovereigns.

By the writings of the fathers that lived in the time before that the Christian religion was received, and authorized by Constantine the emperor, we may find, that the books we now have of the New Testament were held by the Christians of that time, except a few, (in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholic Church, and others heretics), for the dictates of the Holy Ghost, and consequently for the canon or rule of faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of their teachers; as generally the reverence, that the disciples bear to their first masters in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when St. Paul wrote to the Churches he had converted; or any other apostle or disciple of Christ, to those which had then embraced Christ; they received those their writings for the true Christian doctrine. But in that time, when not the power and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer, caused them to receive it, it was not the apostles that made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself.

But the question here, is not what any Christian made a law or canon to himself, which he might again reject by the same right he received it; but what was so made a canon to them, as without injustice they could not do any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be canonical, that is to say a law, in any place where the law of the commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law. For a law, as has been already shown, is the commandment of that man or assembly, to whom we have given sovereign authority to make such rules for the direction of our actions as he shall think fit, and to punish us when

we do any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the sovereign ruler hath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice; which, whether good or bad, he that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to observe; and when contrary to the laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say, he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men; though he may without blame believe his private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice, and that it were publicly received for law. For internal faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human jurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice both before God and man. Seeing then our Saviour hath denied his kingdom to be in this world, seeing he had said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other laws than those of the commonwealth; that is, the Jews to the law of Moses, which he saith (Matth. v. 17) he came not to destroy, but to fulfil; and other nations to the laws of their several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature; the observing whereof, both he himself, and his apostles, have in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternal kingdom, wherein shall be protection, and life everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour, and his apostles, left not new laws to oblige us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next; the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine, until obedience to them was commanded by them that God had given power to on earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is, laws, but only good and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take and refuse at his own peril, without injustice.

Again, our Saviour Christ's commission to his apostles and disciples, was to proclaim his kingdom, not present, but to come; and to teach all nations, and to baptize them that should believe; and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them, and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of persuasion. He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their subjects. They had not in commission to make laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to laws made; and consequently they could not make their writings obligatory canons, without the help of the sovereign civil power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only law, where the lawful civil power hath made it so. And there also the king, or sovereign, maketh it a law to himself; by which he subjecteth himself, not to the doctor or apostle that converted him, but to God himself and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the apostles themselves.

Of the power of councils to make the Scripture law.

That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that have embraced Christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their synod. For we read (Acts xv. 28) the style of the council of the apostles, the elders, and the whole Church, in this manner; It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things, &c; which is a style that signifieth a power to lay a burthen on them that had received their doctrine. Now to lay a burthen on another, seemeth the same as to oblige; and therefore the acts of that council were laws to the then Christians. Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts, Repent; be baptized; keep the commandments; believe the gospel; come unto me; sell all that thou hast; give it to the poor; and, follow me;

which are not commands, but invitations, and callings of men to Christianity, like that of Isaiah lv. 1; Ho, every man that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, come, and buy wine and milk without money. For first, the apostles' power was no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the kingdom of God; which they themselves acknowledged for a kingdom, not present, but to come; and they that have no kingdom, can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts of council were laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we read not any where, that they who received not the doctrine of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned. And those laws were the laws of nature, and the civil laws of the state, whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore by the burthen, which the apostles might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be understood laws, but conditions proposed to those that sought salvation; which they might accept or refuse at their own peril, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being condemned and excluded out of the kingdom of God for their sins past. And therefore of infidels, St. John saith not, the wrath of God shall come upon them, but (John iii. 36) the wrath of God remaineth upon them; and not that they shall be condemned, but that (John iii. 18) they are condemned already. Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of faith is remission of sins, unless we conceive withal, that the damage of infidelity is the retention of the same sins.

But to what end is it, may some man ask, that the apostles, and other pastors of the Church after their time, should meet together to agree upon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no man were obliged to observe their decrees? To this may be answered, that the apostles and elders of that council were obliged even by their entrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded and decreed to be taught, so far forth,

as no precedent law, to which they were obliged to yield obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe what they taught. For though they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had a legislative power; which none could have but civil sovereigns. For though God be the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take for his law whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor anything contrary to the civil law, which God hath expressly commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the acts of council of the apostles, were then no laws, but counsels; much less are laws the acts of any other doctors or council since, if assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And consequently, the Books of the New Testament, though most perfect rules of Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any other authority than that of kings or sovereign assemblies.

The first council, that made the Scriptures we now have canon, is not extant: for that collection of the canons of the apostles, attributed to Clemens, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is subject to question. For though the canonical books be there reckoned up; yet these words, sint vobis omnibus clericis et laicis libri venerandi, etc. contain a distinction of clergy and laity, that was not in use so near St. Peter's time. The first council for settling the canonical Scripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, (Can. lix.) which forbids the reading of other books than those in the churches; which is a mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those only that had authority to read any thing publicly in the church; that is, to ecclesiastics only.

Of the right of constituting ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles.

Of ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were magisterial, some ministerial. Magisterial were the offices of the preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of God to infidels; of administering the sacraments, and divine service; and of teaching the rules of faith and manners to those that were converted. Ministerial was the office of deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the church, at such time as they lived upon a common stock of money, raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithful.

Amongst the officers magisterial, the first and principal were the apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himself; and their office was not only to preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs, witnesses of our Saviour's resurrection. This testimony was the specifical and essential mark, whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other magistracy ecclesiastical; as being necessary for an apostle, either to have seen our Saviour after his resurrection, or to have conversed with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his divinity; whereby they might be taken for sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, St. Peter saith (Acts i. 21, 22) Of these men that have companied with us, all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection: where by this word must, is implied a necessary property of an apostle, to have companied with the first and prime apostles, in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.

Matthias made apostle by the congregation.

The first apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the time he was upon the earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner. There were assembled together in Jerusalem about one hundred and twenty

Christians (Acts i. 15). These (verse 23) appointed two, Joseph the Just and Matthias, and caused lots to be drawn; and (verse 26) the lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles. So that here we see the ordination of this apostle was the act of the congregation, and not of St. Peter nor of the eleven, otherwise than as members of the assembly.

Paul and Barnabas made apostles by the Church of Antioch.

After him there was never any other apostle ordained, but Paul and Barnabas; which was done as we read (Acts xiii. 1, 2, 3) in this manner. There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certain prophets and teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away.

By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost, their calling was declared unto them and their mission authorized by the particular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (Acts xiv. 14) apostles: and that it was by virtue of this act of the Church of Antioch, that they were apostles, St. Paul declareth plainly (Rom. i. 1), in that he useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling: for he styleth himself, An apostle separated unto the gospel of God; alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, Separate me Barnabas and Saul, &c. But seeing the work of an apostle, was to be a witness of the resurrection of Christ, a man may here ask, how St. Paul, that conversed not with our Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen? To which is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to Damascus, from heaven, after his ascension; and chose him for a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles,

and kings, and children of Israel: and consequently, having seen the Lord after his passion, he was a competent witness of his resurrection. And as for Barnabas, he was a disciple before the passion. It is therefore evident that Paul and Barnabas were apostles; and yet chosen and authorized, not by the first apostles alone, but by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was chosen and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.

What offices in the church are magisterial.

Bishop, a word formed in our language out of the Greek Επισκοπος, signifieth an overseer or superintendent of any business, and particularly a pastor or shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst the Jews that were originally shepherds, but also amongst the heathen, to signify the office of a king, or any other rule or guide of people, whether he ruled by laws or doctrine. And so the apostles were the first Christian bishops, instituted by Christ himself: in which sense the apostleship of Judas is called (Acts i. 20) his bishopric. And afterwards, when there were constituted elders in the Christian Churches, with charge to guide Christ's flock by their doctrine and advice; these elders were also called bishops. Timothy was an elder, (which word elder, in the New Testament, is a name of office, as well as of age); yet he was also a bishop. And bishops were then content with the title of elders. Nay St. John himself, the apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth his second Epistle with these words, The elder to the elect lady. By which it is evident, that bishop, pastor, elder, doctor, that is to say, teacher, were but so many divers names of the same office in the time of the apostles; for there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuading. The kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world: so that there could be no authority to compel in any Church, till the commonwealth had embraced the Christian faith: and consequently no diversity of authority, though there were diversity of employments.

Besides these magisterial employments in the Church, namely, apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews and infidels, and to direct and to teach those that believed, we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of evangelists and prophets, is not signified any office, but several gifts, by which several men were profitable to the Church: as evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour, such as were St. Matthew and St. John apos les, and St. Mark and St. Luke disciples, and whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as St. Thomas, and St. Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church have not received the books that have gone under their names): and as prophets, by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of languages, nor the gift of casting out devils, nor of curing other diseases, nor any thing else, did make an officer in the Church, save only the due calling and election to the charge of teaching.

Ordination of teachers.

As the apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and Paul and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the presbyters and pastors in other cities, elected by the Churches of those cities. For proof whereof let us consider, first, how St. Paul proceeded in the ordination of presbyters, in the cities where he had converted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their apostleship. We read (Acts xiv. 23) that they ordained elders in every Church; which at first sight may be taken for an argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority: but if we consider the original text, it will be manifest that they were authorized and chosen by the assembly of the Christians of each city. For the words there are, χειρ῾οτονήσαντες ἀυτοῖς πρ῾εσβυτέρους κατ᾽

ἐκκλησίαν, that is, when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation. Now it is well enough known, that in all those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and, because the ordinary way of distinguishing the affirmative votes from the negatives, was by holding up of hands, to ordain an officer in any of the cities, was no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessel marked for the affirmative or negative; for divers cities had divers customs in that point. It was therefore the assembly that elected their own elders: the apostles were only presidents of the assembly, to call them together for such election, and to pronounce them elected, and to give them the benediction which now is called consecration. And for this cause, they that were presidents of the assemblies, as in the absence of the apostles the elders were, were called προεστῶτες, and in Latin antistites; which words signify the principal person of the assembly, whose office was to number the votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the votes were equal, to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the office of a president in council. And, because all the Churches had their presbyters ordained in the same manner, where the word is constitute, (as Titus i. 5) ἵνα καταστησης κατα πόλιν πρεςβυτέρους, For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute elders in every city, we are to understand the same thing, namely, that he should call the faithful together, and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had been a strange thing, if in a town, where men perhaps had never seen any magistrate otherwise chosen than by an assembly, those of the town becoming Christians should so much as have thought on any other way of election of their teachers and guides, that is to say, of their presbyters, (otherwise called bishops) than this of

plurality of suffrages, intimated by St. Paul (Acts xiv. 23) in the word χειροτονήσαντες. Nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them, in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them, but by the assemblies of the Christians in every several town.

The same is also confirmed by the continual practice, even to this day, in the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the pastoral office, in any city, at such times as he went from thence to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the right to appoint his successors in that place, in which he last resided and died: and we find not that ever any bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the sedition raised about the election between Damasus and Ursicinus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great, that Juventius the præfect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to go out of the city; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the church itself. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the cardinals; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops, without receiving some new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawful authority, not only to teach, but to command the Church; which none could do, but the civil sovereign.

Ministers of the Church, what.

The word minister, in the original Διάκονος, signifieth one that voluntarily doth the business of another man; and differeth from a servant only in this, that servants are obliged by their condition, to do what is

commanded them; whereas ministers are obliged only by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: so that both they that teach the word of God, and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both ministers, but they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church, called (Acts vi. 4) the ministers of the word, are ministers of Christ, whose word it is: but the ministry of a deacon, which is called (verse 2 of the same chapter) serving of tables, is a service done to the Church or congregation: so that neither any one man, nor the whole church, could ever of their pastor say, he was their minister: but of a deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each city on a common stock or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly business of the Church, the whole congregation might properly call him their minister.

For their employment, as deacons, was to serve the congregation; though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the gospel, and maintain the doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as St. Stephen did; and both to preach and baptize, as Philip did. For that Philip, which (Acts viii. 5) preached the gospel at Samaria, and (verse 38) baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the deacon, not Philip the apostle. For it is manifest (verse 1) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the apostles were at Jerusalem, and (verse 14) when they heard that Samaria had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them; by imposition of whose hands, they that were baptized (verse 15), received, which before by the baptism of Philip they had not received, the Holy Ghost. For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that their baptism should be administered or confirmed by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the baptism of those that Philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter and

John; who conferred on them that before were but baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true believers; which what they were may be understood by that which St. Mark saith (chap. xvi. 17), these signs follow them that believe in my name; they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover. This to do, was it that Philip could not give; but the apostles could, and, as appears by this place, effectually did to every man that truly believed and was by a minister of Christ himself baptized: which power either Christ's ministers in this age cannot confer, or else there are very few true believers, or Christ hath very few ministers.

And how chosen.

That the first deacons were chosen, not by the apostles, but by a congregation of the disciples, that is, of Christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of Acts vi, where we read that the Twelve, after the number of disciples was multiplied, called them together, and having told them, that it was not fit that the apostles should leave the word of God and serve tables, said unto them, (verse 3) Brethren, look you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business. Here it is manifest, that though the apostles declared them elected; yet the congregation chose them; which also (verse 5) is more expressly said, where it is written, that the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose seven, &c.

Of ecclesiastical revenue, under the law of Moses.

Under the Old Testament, the tribe of Levi were only capable of the priesthood, and other inferior offices of the Church. The land was divided amongst the other tribes, Levi excepted, which, by the subdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh, were still twelve. To the tribe

of Levi were assigned certain cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattle: but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren. Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron (Numb. xviii. 20) Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land; neither shalt thou have any part amongst them; I am thy part and thine inheritance amongst the children of Israel. For God being then king, and having constituted the tribe of Levi to be his public ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue, that is to say, the part that God had reserved to himself; which were tithes and offerings: and that is it which is meant, where God saith, I am thine inheritance. And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of clergy, from κλῆρ˛ος, which signifieth lot or inheritance; not that they were heirs of the kingdom of God, more than other; but that God's inheritance was their maintenance. Now, seeing in this time God himself was their king, and Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding high-priests, were his lieutenants; it is manifest, that the right of tithes and offerings was constituted by the civil power.

After their rejection of God in the demanding of a king, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the right thereof was derived from that, that the kings did never take it from them: for the public revenue was at the disposing of him that was the public person; and that, till the Captivity, was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their tithes as before to the priest. Hitherto therefore Church livings were determined by the civil sovereign.

In our Saviour's time, and after.

Of the maintenance of our Saviour and his apostles, we read only they had a purse, which was carried by Judas Iscariot; and that of the apostles, such as were fishermen did sometimes use their trade; and that when our

Saviour sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbad them (Matth. x. 9, 10): to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire. By which it is probable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was (verse 8) freely to give, because they had freely received; and their maintenance was the free gift of those that believed the good tiding they carried about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add, that which was contributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned (Luke viii. 2, 3) Certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward, and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of their substance.

After our Saviour's ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common (Acts iv.34,35) upon the money which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the apostles, of good will, not of duty; for, whilst the land remained, saith St. Peter to Ananias (Acts v. 4), was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power? which sheweth he needed not have saved his land nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, unless he had pleased. And as in the time of the apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their doctrine. There was yet no mention of tithes: but such was in the time of Constantine and his sons the affection of Christians to their pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursicinus about the bishopric, that it was worth their contention, in that the bishops of those times, by the liberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly, were carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparel.

The ministers of the Gospel lived on the benevolence of their flocks.

But here may some ask, whether the pastors were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon alms; For who, saith St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 7) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock? And again, (verse 13) Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the temple; and they which wait at the altar, partake with the altar; that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar for their maintenance? And then he concludeth, (verse 14) Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. From which place may be inferred indeed, that the pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance, and be, as it were, their own carvers. Their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole congregation. By the whole congregation it could not be, because their acts were then no laws; therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperors and civil sovereigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. They that served at the altar lived on what was offered. So may the pastors also take what is offered them by their flock; but not exact what is not offered. In what court should they sue for it, who had no tribunals? Or, if they had arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their judgments, when they had no power to arm their officers? It remaineth, therefore, that there could be no certain maintenance assigned to any pastors of the Church, but by the whole congregation; and then only, when their decrees should have the force, not only of canons, but also of laws; which laws could not be made, but by emperors, kings, or other civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in Moses' law, could not be applied to the then ministers of the gospel; because Moses and the high-priests were the civil sovereigns of the people

under God, whose kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the kingdom of God by Christ is yet to come.

Hitherto hath been shewn what the pastors of the Church are; what are the points of their commission, as that they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, to be presidents in their several congregations; what is ecclesiastical censure, viz. excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the civil law commanded, a putting the excommunicate out of the congregations of Christians; who elected the pastors and ministers of the Church, that it was the congregation; who consecrated and blessed them, that it was the pastor; what was their due revenue, that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians. We are to consider now, what office in the Church those persons have, who being civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith.

That the civil sovereign, being a Christian, hath the right of appointing pastors.

And first, we are to remember, that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all commonwealths inseparably annexed, as hath been already proved (chapter XVIII.), to the sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man, or in one assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that men's actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good or evil, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the sovereign power will be more hurtful to them than their disobedience, will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the commonwealth, and introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding whereof, all civil government was ordained. And therefore in

all commonwealths of the heathen, the sovereigns have had the name of pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people, but by their permission and authority.

This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ; who never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or, which is all one, be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of peace amongst their subjects, and for their defence against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed to their charge.

Again, let the right of choosing them be, as before the conversion of kings, in the Church; for so it was in the time of the apostles themselves, as hath been shown already in this chapter; even so also the right will be in the civil sovereign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allows the teaching; and in that he is the sovereign, which is as much as to say, the Church by representation, the teachers he elects are elected by the Church. And when an assembly of Christians choose their pastor in a Christian commonwealth, it is the sovereign that electeth him, because it is done by his authority; in the same manner, as when a town choose their mayor, it is the act of him that hath the sovereign power: for every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of history, concerning the election of pastors by the people, or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil sovereign, because they that elected them did it by his authority.

Seeing then in every Christian commonwealth, the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other pastors are made, and have power to teach, and perform all other pastoral offices; it

followeth also, that it is from the civil sovereign that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and other functions pertaining to that office, and that they are but his ministers; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies, are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil sovereign. And the reason hereof, is not because they that teach, but because they that are to learn, are his subjects. For let it be supposed, that a Christian king commit the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king, as divers Christian kings allow that power to the Pope; he doth not thereby constitute a pastor over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people; for that were to deprive himself of the civil power; which, depending on the opinion men have of their duty to him and the fear they have of punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill and loyalty of doctors, who are no less subject, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance, than any other sort of men. So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint teachers, it is given him by the sovereign in whose dominions he teacheth. Christian doctors are our schoolmasters to Christianity; but kings are fathers of families, and may receive schoolmasters for their subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the public good; the care of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other essential right of the sovereignty.

The pastoral authority of sovereigns only is jure divino; that of other pastors is jure civili.

If a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office, as the chief-priests and elders of the people (Matth. xxi. 23) asked our Saviour,

By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority? he can make no other just answer, but that he doth it by the authority of the commonwealth, given him by the king, or assembly that representeth it. All pastors, except the supreme, execute their charges in the right, that is by the authority of the civil sovereign, that is, jure civili. But the king, and every other sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God, that is to say, in God's right or jure divino. And therefore none but kings can put into their titles a mark of their submission to God only, Dei gratiâ rex, &c. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their mandates, By the favour of the King's Majesty, bishop of such a diocese; or as civil ministers, in His Majesty's name. For in saying, Divinâ providentiâ, which is the same with Dei gratiâ, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the civil state; and slily slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the commonwealth.

Christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral function.

But if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to preach, which perhaps no man will deny, but also to baptize and to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper: and to consecrate both temples and pastors to God's service; which most men deny; partly because they use not to do it, and partly because the administration of sacraments, and consecration of persons and places to holy uses, requireth the imposition of such men's hands, as by the like imposition successively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the like ministry. For proof therefore that Christian kings have power to baptize, and to consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use not to do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of hands, they are made capable of doing it when they will.

There is no doubt but any king, in case he were skilful in the sciences, might by the same right of his office read lectures of them himself, by which he authorizeth others to read them in the universities. Nevertheless, because the care of the sum of the business of the commonwealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular. A king may also, if he please, sit in judgment to hear and determine all manner of causes, as well as give others authority to do it in his name; but that the charge, that lieth upon him of command and government, constrain him to be continually at the helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others under him. In the like manner our Saviour, who surely had power to baptize, baptized none (John iv. 2) himself, but sent his apostles and disciples to baptize. So also St. Paul, by the necessity of preaching in divers and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the Corinthians he baptized only (1 Cor.i. 14, 16,) Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas; and the reason was, (1 Cor. i. 17) because his principal charge was to preach. Whereby it is manifest, that the greater charge, such as is the government of the Church, is a dispensation for the less. The reason therefore why Christian kings use not to baptize, is evident, and the same for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops, and by the Pope fewer.

And as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needful for the authorising of a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider thus:

Imposition of hands, was a most ancient public ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other thing intended in a man's prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob, in blessing the children of Joseph (Gen. xlviii. 14), Laid his right hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left hand on Manasseh the first born; and this he did wittingly (though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his

arms across) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the burnt offering, Aaron is commanded (Exod. xxix. 10) to lay his hands on the head of the bullock: and (verse 15) to lay his hand on the head of the ram. The same is also said again Levit. i. 4, and viii. 14. Likewise Moses, when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to God's service, (Numb. xxvii. 23) Laid his hands upon him, and gave him his charge, designing and rendering certain, who it was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites (Numb. viii. 10), God commanded that the children of Israel should put their hands upon the Levites. And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord (Levit. xxiv. 14), God commanded that all that heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should stone him. And why should they only that heard him, lay their hands upon him, and not rather a priest, Levite, or other minister of justice, but that none else were able to design and to demonstrate to the eyes of the congregation, who it was that had blasphemed and ought to die? And to design a man or any other thing, by the hand to the eye, is less subject to mistake, than when it is done to the ear by a name.

And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, yet Aaron (Levit. ix. 22) did lift up his hands toward the people when he blessed them. And we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of temples amongst the heathen, as that the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple, all the while he was uttering the words of consecration. So natural it is to design any individual thing, rather by the hand, to assure the eyes, than by words to inform the ear, in matters of God's public service.

This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviour's time. For Jairus (Mark v. 23), whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour, not to heal her, but to lay his hands upon her that she might be healed. And (Matthew

xix. 13) they brought unto him little children, that he should put his hands on them, and pray.

According to this ancient rite, the apostles, and presbyters, and the presbytery itself, laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors, and withal prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that not only once, but sometimes oftener, when a new occasion was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a punctual and religious designation of the person, ordained either to the pastoral charge in general, or to a particular mission. So (Acts vi. 6) The apostles prayed, and laid their hands on the seven deacons; which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before they were chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3) but to design them to that office. And after Philip the deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (Acts viii. 17), and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost. And not only an apostle, but a presbyter had this power: for St. Paul adviseth Timothy (1 Tim. v. 22) Lay hands suddenly on no man; that is, design no man rashly to the office of a pastor. The whole presbytery laid their hands on Timothy, as we read 1 Tim. iv. 14: but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery, and most likely their προεστὼς, or prolocutor, which it may be was St. Paul himself. For in his second Epistle to Timothy, (chap. i. 6) he saith to him, Stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the laying on of my hands: where note by the way, that by the Holy Ghost, is not meant the third person in the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the pastoral office. We read also, that St. Paul had imposition of hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus, (Acts ix. 17, 18) at the time of his baptism; and again (Acts xiii. 3) at Antioch, when he was first sent out to preach. The use then of this ceremony, considered in the ordination of pastors, was to design the person to whom they gave such power. But if there had been then any Christian, that had had

the power of teaching before; the baptizing of him, that is, the making him a Christian, had given him no new power, but had only caused him to preach true doctrine, that is, to use his power aright; and therefore the imposition of hands had been unnecessary; baptism itself had been sufficient. But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of teaching, and ordaining teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and consequently they needed no imposition of hands, besides that which is done in baptism, to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral function, as namely, to baptize and consecrate. And in the Old Testament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the time that the sovereignty was in the high-priest; yet it was not so when the sovereignty was in the king. For we read (1 Kings viii.) that Solomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that public prayer which is the pattern now for consecration of all Christian churches and chapels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of ecclesiastical government, but also of exercising ecclesiastical functions.

The civil sovereign, if a Christian, is head of the Church in his own dominions.

From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over their subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of men's external actions, both in policy and religion; and may make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth, and as they are the Church; for both State and Church are the same men.

If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exerciseth that charge in another's dominion jure civili, in the right of the civil sovereign;

not jure divino, in God's right; and may therefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, shall think it necessary. They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honour, as of archbishops, bishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they please, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is the judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them laws. It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but for such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In sum, he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, as far as concerneth actions and words, for those only are known and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all but God, that knoweth the heart. And these rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they that are the representants of a Christian people, are representants of the Church: for a Church, and a commonwealth of Christian people, are the same thing.

Cardinal Bellarmine's books, De Summo Pontifice considered.

Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this book, seem clear enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiastical power to Christian sovereigns; yet because the Pope of Rome's challenge to that power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think, as strongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine, in his controversy De Summo Pontifice; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds and strength of his discourse.

The first book.

Of five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three questions: one, which is simply the best government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixed of all three: another, which of these is the best government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixed, but which should most participate of monarchy: the third, whether in this mixed monarchy, St. Peter had the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (chapter XVIII.) that all governments which men are bound to obey, are simple and absolute. In monarchy there is but one man supreme; and all other men that have any kind of power in the state, have it by his commission, during his pleasure, and execute it in his name: and in aristocracy and democracy, but one supreme assembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch, which is not a mixed, but an absolute sovereignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the law of nature, and the divine positive law, to do anything tending to the subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any pastor, unless he have the civil sovereignty, what kind of government is the best; because their calling is not to govern men by commandment, but to teach them, and persuade them by arguments, and leave it to them to consider whether they shall embrace, or reject the doctrine taught. For monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of sovereigns, not of pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children.

And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Pope’s power without his own dominions. For in all other commonwealths his power, if

he have any at all, is that of the schoolmaster only, and not of the master of the family.

For the third conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was monarch of the Church, he bringeth for his chief argument the place of St. Matthew (chap. xvi. 18, 19) Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, &c. And I will give thee the keys of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven. Which place, well considered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one only article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all the apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited. Which that we may clearly understand, we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by John the Baptist, and by his apostles, nothing but this article of faith, that he was the Christ; all other articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that. John began first, (Matth. iii. 2) preaching only this, the kingdom of God is at hand. Then our Saviour himself (Matth. iv. 17) preached the same: and to his twelve apostles, when he gave them their commission,(Matth.x.7), there is no mention of preaching any other article but that. This was the fundamental article, that is the foundation of the Church's faith. Afterwards the apostles being returned to him, he (Matth. xvi. 13) asketh them all, not Peter only, who men said he was; and they answered, that some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias, and others Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets. Then (verse 15) he asked them all again, not Peter only, whom say ye that I am? Therefore St. Peter answered for them all, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God; which I said is the foundation of the faith of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying, upon this stone I will build my Church: by which it is manifest, that by the foundation-stone of the Church, was meant the fundamental article of the Church's faith. But why then, will some object,

doth our Saviour interpose these words, thou art Peter? If the original of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared. We are therefore to consider, that the apostle Simon was surnamed Stone, which is the signification of the Syriac word Cephas, and of the Greek word Πετρ῾ος. Our Saviour therefore, after the confession of that fundamental article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, Thou art Stone, and upon this Stone I will build my Church: which is as much as to say, this article, that I am the Christ, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those that are to be members of my Church. Neither is this allusion to a name, an unusual thing in common speech. But it had been a strange and obscure speech, if our Saviour, intending to build his Church on the person of St. Peter, had said, thou art a stone, and upon this stone I will build my Church; when it was so obvious, without ambiguity, to have said, I will build my Church on thee; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name.

And for the following words, I will give thee the keys of heaven, &c. it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his disciples, (Matth. xviii. 18), Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven. But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors; such as are all Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions. In so much, as if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself, had converted any of them to believe him, and to acknowledge his kingdom; yet, because his kingdom is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else he must have deprived him of the sovereignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in refutation of his first book, wherein he would prove St. Peter to have been the monarch universal of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.

The second book.

The second book hath two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was bishop of Rome, and there died: the other, that the Popes of Rome are his successors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them true; yet if by Bishop of Rome, be understood either the monarch of the Church, or the supreme pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine, who was the first Christian emperor, was that bishop; and as Constantine, so all other Christian emperors, were of right supreme bishops of the Roman empire: I say, of the Roman empire, not of all Christendom; for other Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as to an office essentially adherent to their sovereignty. Which shall serve for answer to his second book.

The third book.

In the third book he handleth the question, whether the Pope be Antichrist? For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist, to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or state.

It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the time of Samuel, when they required a king after the manner of other nations. This expectation of theirs made them obnoxious to the imposture of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the kingdom, and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by hypocritical life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour therefore, and his apostles, forewarned men of false prophets and of false Christs. False Christs are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and are called properly Antichrists; in such sense, as when there happeneth a schism in the Church,

by the election of two Popes, the one calleth the other Antipapa, or the false Pope. And therefore Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essential marks; one, that he denieth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himself to be Christ. The first mark is set down by St. John in his first Epistle, iv. 3, Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist. The other mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour, (Matth. xxiv. 5) many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and again, (verse 23) If any man shall say unto you, lo! here is Christ, there is Christ, believe it not. And therefore Antichrist must be a false Christ; that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ. And out of these two marks, to deny Jesus to be the Christ, and to affirm himself to be the Christ, it followeth, that he must also be an adversary of Jesus the true Christ, which is another usual signification of the word Antichrist. But of these many Antichrists, there is one special one, ὁ Αντίχριστος, the Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certain person; not indefinitely an Antichrist. Now, seeing the Pope of Rome neither pretendeth himself, nor denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to be his lieutenant or vicar-general, but to be He. There is also some mark of the time of this special Antichrist, as (Matth. xxiv. 15), when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by Daniel (Dan. ix. 27) shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, (Matth. xxiv. 22) no flesh could be saved; but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened, made fewer. But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (verse 29) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a concussion of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds. And therefore the Antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many Popes are both

come and gone. It is true, the Pope, in taking upon him to give laws to all Christian kings and nations, usurpeth a kingdom in this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not as Christ, but as for Christ, wherein there is nothing of the Antichrist.

Fourth book.

In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all questions of faith and manners, which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all Christians in the world, he bringeth three propositions: the first, that his judgments are infallible: the second, that he can make very laws, and punish those that observe them not: the third, that our Saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiastical on the Pope of Rome.

Texts for the infallibility of the Pope's judgment in points of faith.

For the infallibility of his judgments, he allegeth the Scriptures: and first, that of Luke, xxii. 31, 32: Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren. This, according to Bellarmine's exposition, is, that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith should fail, nor the faith of any of his successors: the other, that neither he, nor any of his successors, should ever define any point concerning faith or manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope: which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that with attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture that maketh more against the Pope's authority, than this very place. The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the Passover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his apostles, which he said, till the kingdom of God was come he would do no more; and withal told them, that one of them was to betray him. Hereupon they questioned which of them it should be; and

withal, seeing the next Passover their master would celebrate should be when he was king, entered into a contention, who should then be the greatest man. Our Saviour therefore told them, that the kings of the nations had dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name in Hebrew, that signifies bountiful; but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one another; I ordain you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father hath ordained me; a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possess till my second coming; then ye shall eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And then addressing himself to St. Peter, he saith; Simon, Simon, Satan seeks, by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; thou therefore note this, being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy brethren. To which St. Peter answered, as one that no more expected any authority in this world, Lord, I am ready to go with thee, not only to prison, but to death. Whereby it is manifest, St. Peter had not only no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the other apostles, that they also should have none. And for the infallibility of St. Peter's sentence definitive in matter of faith, there is no more to be attributed to it out of this text, than that Peter should continue in the belief of this point, namely, that Christ should come again and possess the kingdom at the day of judgment; which was not given by this text to all his successors; for we see they claim it in the world that now is.

The second place is that of Matth. xvi. 18, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. By which, as I have already shown in this chapter, is proved no more, than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely this, that Jesus is Christ the Son of God.

The third text is John xxi. 16, 17: Feed my sheep; which contains no more but a commission of teaching. And if we grant the rest of the apostles to be contained in that name of sheep; then it is the supreme power of teaching: but it was only for the time that there were no Christian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. But I have already proved, that Christian sovereigns are in their own dominions the supreme pastors, and instituted thereto, by virtue of their being baptized, though without other imposition of hands. For such imposition, being a ceremony of designing the person, is needless, when he is already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will, by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects. For as I have proved before, sovereigns are supreme teachers, in general, by their office; and therefore oblige themselves, by their baptism, to teach the doctrine of Christ: and when they suffer others to teach their people, they do it at the peril of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of families that God will require the account of the instruction of his children and servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith (Gen. xviii. 19) I know him that he will command his children, and his household after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgment.

The fourth place is that of Exod. xxviii. 30: Thou shalt put in the breast-plate of judgment, the Urim and the Thummim: which he saith is interpreted by the Septuagint δήλωσιν κὰι ἀλήθειαν; that is, evidence and truth: and thence concludeth, God hath given evidence and truth, which is almost infallibility, to the high-priest. But be it evidence and truth itself that was given; or be it but admonition to the priest to endeavour to inform himself clearly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the high-priest, it was given to the civil sovereign; (for such next under God was the high-priest in the commonwealth of Israel); and is an argument for evidence and truth, that is, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil

sovereigns over their own subjects, against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the texts he bringeth for the infallibility of the judgment of the Pope in point of faith.

Texts for the same, in point of manners.

For the infallibility of his judgment concerning manners, he bringeth one text, which is that of John xvi. 13: When the Spirit of truth is come, he will lead you into all truth: where, saith he, by all truth, is meant, at least all truth necessary to salvation. But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the Pope, than to any man that professeth Christianity and is not to be damned. For if any man err in any point, wherein not to err is necessary to salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that only is necessary to salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these are, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the chapter following. In this place I say no more, but that though it were granted, the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince; unless we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another.

Besides the text, he argueth from reason, thus. If the Pope could err in necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Church's salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Pope's directions. But this reason is invalid, unless he shew when and where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope. Nay, granting whatsoever was given to St. Peter, was given to the Pope; yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St. Peter, no man can be just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to those of his lawful sovereign.

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in point of manners. For the civil sovereignty, and supreme judicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing: and the makers of civil laws, are not only declarers, but also makers of the justice and injustice of actions; there being nothing in men's manners that makes them righteous or unrighteous, but their conformity with the law of the sovereign. And therefore, when the Pope challengeth supremacy in controversies of manners, he teacheth men to disobey the civil sovereign; which is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Saviour and his apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.

To prove the Pope has power to make laws, he allegeth many places; as first, (Deut. xvii. 12), The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest, that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die; and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. For answer whereunto, we are to remember that the high-priest, next and immediately under God, was the civil sovereign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. The words alleged sound therefore thus: The man that will presume to disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the execution of their places, that man shall die, &c; which is clearly for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.

Secondly, he allegeth that of Matth.xvi. 19, Whatsoever ye shall bind, &c. and interpreteth it for such binding as is attributed (Matth. xxiii. 4) to the Scribes and Pharisees, They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; by which is meant, he says, making of laws; and concludes thence, that the Pope can make laws. But this also maketh only for the legislative power of civil sovereigns. For the

Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' chair; but Moses next under God was sovereign of the people of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to do all that they should say, but not all that they should do: that is, to obey their laws, but not follow their example.

The third place is John xxi. 16, Feed my sheep; which is not a power to make laws, but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of the family; who by his own discretion chooseth his chaplain, as also a schoolmaster to teach his children.

The fourth place (John xx. 21) is against him. The words are, As my father sent me, so send I you. But our Saviour was sent to redeem by his death such as should believe, and by his own and his apostles' preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom; which he himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though he refused (Acts i. 6, 7) to tell his apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve apostles shall sit on twelve thrones, every one perhaps as high as that of St. Peter, to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the Father sent not our Saviour to make laws in this present world, we may conclude from the text, that neither did our Saviour send St. Peter to make laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with a steadfast faith; and in the mean time, if subjects, to obey their princes; and if princes, both to believe it themselves, and to do their best to make their subjects do the same; which is the office of a bishop. Therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the ecclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to that which Cardinal Bellarmine allegeth it for.

The fifth place is Acts xv. 28, 29, It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen, than these necessary things, that ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication. Here he notes the word laying of burthens

for the legislative power. But who is there, that reading this text, can say, this style of the apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsel, as in making laws? The style of a law is, we command: but, we think good, is the ordinary style of them, that but give advice; and they lay a burthen that give advice, though it be conditional, that is, if they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: and such is the burthen of abstaining from things strangled, and from blood; not absolute, but in case they will not err. I have shown before, (chapter XXV.) that law is distinguished from counsel in this, that the reason of a law is taken from the design and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a counsel, from the design and benefit of him to whom the counsel is given. But here, the apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed or not. And therefore the acts of this council, were not laws, but counsels.

The sixth place is that of Rom. xiii, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God; which is meant, he saith, not only of secular, but also of ecclesiastical princes. To which I answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes but those that are also civil sovereigns; and their principalities exceed not the compass of their civil sovereignty; without those bounds, though they may be received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes. For if the apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own princes, and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, to serve two masters. And though the apostle say in another place, (2 Cor. xiii. 10) I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness, according to the power which the Lord hath given me; it is not, that he challenged a power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are punishments; but only to

excommunicate, which, without the civil power, is no more but a leaving of their company, and having no more to do with them than with a heathen man or a publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the excommunicant, than to the excommunicate.

The seventh place is 1 Cor. iv. 21, Shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love, and the spirit of lenity? But here again, it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a rod; but only the power of excommunication, which is not in its own nature a punishment, but only a denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall inflict when he shall be in possession of his kingdom, at the day of judgment. Nor then also shall it be properly a punishment, as upon a subject that hath broken the law; but a revenge, as upon an enemy or revolter, that denieth the right of our Saviour to the kingdom. And therefore this proveth not the legislative power of any bishop, that has not also the civil power.

The eighth place is 1 Timothy, iii. 2; A bishop must be the husband of but one wife, vigilant, sober, &c. which he saith was a law. I thought that none could make a law in the Church, but the monarch of the Church, St. Peter. But suppose this precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a law, rather than an advice, seeing Timothy was not a subject, but a disciple of St. Paul; nor the flock under the charge of Timothy, his subjects in the kingdom, but his scholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he giveth Timothy be laws, why is not this also a law, (1 Tim. v. 23) Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy health's sake. And why are not also the precepts of good physicians so many laws, but that it is not the imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute subjection to a person, that maketh his precepts laws?

In like manner, the ninth place, 1 Tim. v. 19, Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses, is a wise precept, but not a law.

The tenth place is Luke x. 16, He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me. And there is no doubt, but he that despiseth the counsel of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the counsel of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by Christ, but such as are ordained pastors by lawful authority? And who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the sovereign pastor? And who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in a Christian commonwealth, that is not ordained by the authority of the sovereign thereof? Out of this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his sovereign, being a Christian, heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doctrine which his king, being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the doctrine of Christ: which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary. But all this is nothing to a law. Nay more, a Christian king, as a pastor and teacher of his subjects, makes not thereby his doctrines laws. He cannot oblige men to believe; though as a civil sovereign he may make laws suitable to his doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are laws; and the external actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the sovereign, and not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his own at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.

The eleventh is every place where the apostle for counsel putteth some word, by which men use to signify command; or calleth the following of his counsel by the name of obedience. And therefore they are alleged out of 1 Cor. xi. 2, I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered them to you. The Greek is, I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them. Which is far from signifying that they were laws, or anything else, but good counsel. And that of 1 Thess. iv. 2, You know what commandments we gave you: where the Greek word is παραγγελίας

ἐδώκαμεν, equivalent to παρεδώκαμεν, what we delivered to you, as in the place next before alleged, which does not prove the traditions of the apostles to be any more than counsels; though as is said in the 8th verse, he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but God. For our Saviour himself came not to judge, that is, to be king in this world; but to sacrifice himself for sinners, and leave doctors in his Church to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the law produceth,) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of laws, but of counsel and doctrine.

And that of 2 Thess. iii. 14, If any man obey not our word by this Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed: where from the word obey, he would infer, that this epistle was a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed laws. If therefore the epistle of St. Paul were also a law, they were to obey two masters. But the word obey, as it is in the Greek ὑπακούει, signifieth hearkening to or putting in practice, not only that which is commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is delivered in a way of counsel for our good; and therefore St. Paul does not bid kill him that disobeys; nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may be ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the empire of an apostle, but his reputation amongst the faithful, which the Christians stood in awe of.

The last place is that of Heb. xiii. 17, Obey your leaders, and submit yourselves to them; for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account: and here also is intended by obedience, a following of their counsel. For the reason of our obedience is not drawn from the will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of their own power and authority. If it were meant here, that all they teach were laws, then not only

the Pope, but every pastor in his parish should have legislative power. Again, they that are bound to obey their pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say to St. John, who bids us (1 Epistle iv. 1) Not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world? It is therefore manifest, that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors; but no man can dispute a law. The commands of civil sovereigns are on all sides granted to be laws: if any else can make a law besides himself, all commonwealth, and consequently all peace and justice must cease; which is contrary to all laws both divine and human. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places of Scripture, to prove the decrees of the Pope, where he has not also the civil sovereignty, to be laws.

The question of superiority between the Pope and other bishops.

The last point he would prove, is this, That our Saviour Christ has committed ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope. Wherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the Pope and Christian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he says, it is agreed that the jurisdiction of bishops is at least in the general de jure divino, that is, in the right of God; for which he alleges St. Paul, Eph. iv. 11, where he says, that Christ after his ascension into heaven, gave gifts to men, some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers; and thence infers, they have indeed their jurisdiction in God's right; but will not grant they have it immediately from God, but derived through the Pope. But if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino, and yet not immediately; what lawful jurisdiction, though but civil, is there in a Christian commonwealth, that is not also de juro divino? For Christian kings have their civil power from God immediately; and the magistrates under him exercise their several charges in virtue of his commission; wherein that which they do, is no less de jure divino mediato,

than that which the bishops do in virtue of the Pope's ordination. All lawful power is of God, immediately in the Supreme Governor, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that either he must grant every constable in the state, to hold his office in the right of God; or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himself.

But this whole dispute, whether Christ left the jurisdiction to the Pope only, or to other bishops also, if considered out of those places where the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a contention de lana caprina: for none of them, where they are not sovereigns, has any jurisdiction at all. For jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes between man and man; and can belong to none but him that hath the power to prescribe the rules of right and wrong; that is, to make laws; and with the sword of justice to compel men to obey his decisions, pronounced either by himself, or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully do but the civil sovereign.

Therefore when he allegeth out of chapter vi. of Luke, that our Saviour called his disciples together, and chose twelve of them, which he named apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except Matthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge of causes between man and man: for that is a power which he refused to take upon himself, saying, Who made me a judge, or a divider, amongst you? and in another place, My kingdom is not of this world. But he that hath not the power to hear and determine causes between man and man, cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. And yet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawful sovereign forbidden: for to our own sovereigns Christ himself, and his apostles, have in sundry places expressly commanded us in all things to be obedient.

The arguments by which he would prove, that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the dominions of other princes hath no jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive jurisdiction, when they have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit the recital of them.

The first is from chapter xi. of Numbers, where Moses not being able alone to undergo the whole burthen of administering the affairs of the people of Israel, God commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those seventy elders: by which is understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses; for that had not eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority from him; wherein he doth truly and ingenuously interpret that place. But seeing Moses had the entire sovereignty in the commonwealth of the Jews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their authority from the civil sovereign: and therefore that place proveth that bishops in every Christian commonwealth have their authority from the civil sovereign; and from the Pope in his own territories only, and not in the territories of any other state.

The second argument, is from the nature of monarchy; wherein all authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him. But the government of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This also makes for Christian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church; for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people; whereas the power of the Pope, though he were St. Peter, is neither monarchy, nor hath anything of archical, nor cratical, but only of didactical; for God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience.

The third, is from that the see of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian, the head, the source, the root, the sun, from whence the authority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature, which is a better principle of right and

wrong than the word of any doctor that is but a man, the civil sovereign in every commonwealth, is the head, the source, the root, and the sun, from which all jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops, is derived from the civil sovereign.

The fourth, is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions. For if God, saith he, had given it them immediately, he had given as well equality of jurisdiction, as of order: but we see, some are bishops but of one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces; which differences were not determined by the command of God; their jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of man; and one has a greater, another a less, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument, if he had proved before, that the Pope had an universal jurisdiction over all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the emperors of Rome, (for the patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely of being bishop of the capital city of the empire, and seat of the emperor, claimed to be equal to him), it followeth, that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein they exercise the same. And as for that cause they have not their authority de jure divino; so neither hath the Pope his de jure divino, except only where he is also the civil sovereign.

His fifth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can do nothing contrary to God's ordination; and this consequence is good, and well proved. But, saith he, the Pope can do this, and has done it. This also is granted, so he do it in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power; but not universally, in right of the popedom: for that power belongeth to every Christian sovereign, within the bounds of his own empire, and is inseparable from the sovereignty. Before

the people of Israel had, by the commandment of God to Samuel, set over themselves a king, after the manner of other nations, the high-priest had the civil government; and none but he could make or depose an inferior priest. But that power was afterwards in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine; for if the priest, be he the high-priest or any other, had his jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it from him; for he could do nothing contrary to God's ordinance. But it is certain that king Solomon (1 Kings ii. 26,27) deprived Abiathar the high-priest of his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35) in his room. Kings therefore may in like manner ordain and deprive bishops, as they shall think fit for the well-governing of their subjects.

His sixth argument is this, if bishops have their jurisdiction de jure divino, that is, immediately from God, they that maintain it, should bring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none. The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no less good, to prove the Pope himself to have no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.

Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent and Leo; and I doubt not he might have alleged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the popes almost since St. Peter. For considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, they should therein but do, as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.

Of the Pope's temporal power.

In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is, that the Pope is not lord of all the world: the second, that the Pope is not the lord of all the Christian world: the third, that the Pope, without his own territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction directly. These three conclusions are easily

granted. The fourth is, that the Pope has, in the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power indirectly: which is denied; unless he mean by indirectly, that he has gotten it by indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand, that when he saith he hath it indirectly, he means, that such temporal jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise unless he have the other with it: and therefore to the pastoral power, which he calls spiritual, the supreme power civil is necessarily annexed; and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of souls.

Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open the consequences of it; that princes and states, that have the civil sovereignty in their several commonwealths, may bethink themselves, whether it be convenient for them, and conducing to the good of their subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the day of judgment, to admit the same.

When it is said, the Pope hath not, in the territories of other states, the supreme civil power directly; we are to understand, he doth not challenge it, as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission thereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed; whether they that choose him, do it for their common defence against an enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them; or whether they do it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civil power over other states directly, denieth no more, but that his right cometh to him by that way; he ceaseth not for all that, to claim it another way; and that is, without the consent of them that

are to be governed, by a right given him by God, which he calleth indirectly, in his assumption to the papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the power is the same; and he may, if it be granted to be his right, depose princes and states, as often as it is for the salvation of souls, that is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the sole power to judge whether it be to the salvation of men's souls or not. And this is the doctrine, not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors, teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed, and the Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practice. For the fourth council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the Third, in the third chapter De Hæreticis, hath this canon: If a king, at the Pope's admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heretics, and being excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience. And the practice hereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the deposing of Chilperic, king of France; in the translation of the Roman empire to Charlemagne; in the oppression of John, king of England; in transferring the kingdom of Navarre; and of late years, in the league against Henry the Third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few princes that consider not this as unjust, and inconvenient; but I wish they would all resolve to be kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two masters. They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal and spiritual power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another indirect power, as with a direct one. But to come now to his arguments.

The first is this, The civil power is subject to the spiritual: therefore he that hath the supreme power spiritual, hath right to command temporal

princes, and dispose of their temporals in order to the spiritual. As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the temporal or civil power is subject to the spiritual. There be but two ways that those words can be made sense. For when we say, one power is subject to another power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath the other; or that the one power is to the other, as the means to the end. For we cannot understand, that one power hath power over another power; or that one power can have right or command over another. For subjection, command, right, and power, are accidents, not of powers, but of persons. One power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be granted, that the civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a king have the civil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is bound to obey the Pope, more than every saddler is bound to obey every rider. Therefore as from subordination of an art, cannot be inferred the subjection of the professor; so from the subordination of a government, cannot be inferred the subjection of the governor. When therefore he saith, the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is, that the civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the argument stands thus, The civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual; therefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes. Where the conclusion is the same with the antecedent he should have proved. But to prove it, he allegeth first, this reason: Kings and popes, clergy and laity, make but one commonwealth; that is to say, but one Church: and in all bodies the members depend one upon another: but things spiritual depend not of things temporal: therefore temporal depend on spiritual, and therefore are subject to them. In which argumentation there be two gross errors: one is, that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other Christian men, make but one commonwealth. For it is evident that France is

one commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c. And these consist of Christians; and therefore also are several bodies of Christians; that is to say, several Churches: and their several sovereigns represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man; which no general or universal Church is, till it have a representant; which it hath not on earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendom were one commonwealth, whose sovereign were that representant, both in things spiritual and temporal. And the Pope, to make himself this representant, wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to command, and to judge, and to punish, otherwise than, by excommunication, to run from those that will not learn of him. For though the Pope were Christ's only vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our Saviour's second coming: and then also it is not the Pope, but St. Peter himself with the other apostles, that are to be judges of the world.

The other error in this his first argument is, that he says, the members of every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It is true, they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the soul of the commonwealth; which failing, the commonwealth is dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as cohering to another, for want of a common dependance on a known sovereign; just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude, from whence to infer a dependance of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal officers on the spiritual; but of both on the civil sovereign; which ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himself. And thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the end; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration of the means. For to every end, the means are

determined by nature, or by God himself supernaturally: but the power to make men use the means, is in every nation resigned, by the law of nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their faith given, to the civil sovereign.

His second argument is this; Every commonwealth, because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in itself, may command any other commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of the government; nay, depose the prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the injuries he goes about to do them: much more may a spiritual commonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of their government, and may depose princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good.

That a commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true, that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth, distinct from a civil commonwealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repair and secure himself by war; which is, in sum, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon the like injuries done, or feared, to make war upon the spiritual sovereign; which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.

But spiritual commonwealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the kingdom of Christ, which he himself saith, is not of this world; but shall be in the next world at the resurrection, when they that have lived justly, and believed that he was the Christ, shall, though they died natural bodies, rise spiritual bodies; and then it is, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual commonwealth. In the meantime, seeing there are no men on earth whose

bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unless we call preachers, that have commission to teach, and prepare men for their reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a commonwealth; which I have proved already to be none.

The third argument is this; It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an infidel, or heretical king, in case he endeavour to draw them to his heresy or infidelity. But to judge whether a king draw his subjects to heresy or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope right to determine whether the prince be to be deposed, or not deposed.

To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians, or men of what religion soever, if they tolerate not their king, whatsoever law he maketh, though it be concerning religion, do violate their faith, contrary to the divine law, both natural and positive: nor is there any judge of heresy amongst subjects, but their own civil sovereign. For heresy is nothing else but a private opinion obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion which the public person, that is to say, the representant of the commonwealth, hath commanded to be taught. By which it is manifest, that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught, cannot be heresy; nor the sovereign princes that authorize them, heretics. For heretics are none but private men, that stubbornly defend some doctrine, prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate infidel or heretical kings, he allegeth a place in Deut. xvii. 15, where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a king over themselves, to choose a stranger: and from thence inferreth, that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose a king that is not a Christian. And it is true, that he that is a Christian, that is, he that hath already obliged himself to receive our Saviour, when he shall come, for his king, shall tempt God too much in choosing for king in this world, one that he knoweth will endeavour, both by terror and persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But it is, saith he, the same danger, to choose one that is

not a Christian, for king, and not to depose him when he is chosen. To this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the justice of deposing him. To choose him, may in some cases be unjust; but to depose him when he is chosen, is in no case just. For it is always violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the apostles; nor in the time of the Roman emperors, till the Popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome. But to this he hath replied, that the Christians of old deposed not Nero, nor Dioclesian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arian, for this cause only, that they wanted temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable angels to assist him, want forces to depose Cæsar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to be crucified? Or if the apostles wanted temporal forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them, in their epistles to the new made Christians, to teach them, as they did, to obey the powers constituted over them, whereof Nero in that time was one, and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? Shall we say they did not only obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any one whose doctrine is the public doctrine, an heretic) that authorize the teaching of an error. And whereas for the temporal power of the Pope, he allegeth further, that St. Paul (1 Cor. vi.) appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes; it is not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their brethren to compound their differences as arbitrators, rather than to go to law one with another before the heathen judges; which is a wholesome precept, and full of charity, fit to be practised also in the best

Christian commonwealths. And for the danger that may arise to religion, by the subjects tolerating of a heathen, or an erring prince, it is a point of which a subject is no competent judge; or if he be, the Pope's temporal subjects may judge also of the Pope's doctrine. For every Christian prince, as I have formerly proved, is no less supreme pastor of his own subjects, than the Pope of his.

The fourth argument, is taken from the baptism of kings; wherein, that they may be made Christians, they submit their sceptres to Christ; and promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for Christian kings are no more but Christ's subjects: but they may, for all that, be the Pope's fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects; and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome itself.

The fifth argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, Feed my sheep; by which was given all power necessary for a pastor; as the power to chase away wolves, such as are heretics; the power to shut up rams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such as are evil, though Christian, kings; and power to give the flock convenient food. From whence he inferreth, that St. Peter had these three powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of these powers is no more than the power, or rather command, to teach. For the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the place he quoteth is (Matth. vii. 15) Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves. But neither are heretics false prophets, or at all prophets: nor, admitting heretics for the wolves there meant, were the apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that he gave this counsel, to beware of false prophets: which therefore, if it confer a power of

chasing away kings, was given, not only to private men, but to men that were not at all Christians. And as to the power of separating, and shutting up of furious rams, by which he meaneth Christian kings that refuse to submit themselves to the Roman pastor, our Saviour refused to take upon him that power in this world himself, but advised to let the corn and tares grow up together till the day of judgment: much less did he give it to St. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all other pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, that disobey the Christian sovereign, as heathen men, and as publicans. Seeing then, men challenge to the Pope no authority over heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to be esteemed as heathen.

But from the power to teach only, he inferreth also a coercive power in the Pope over kings. The pastor, saith he, must give his flock convenient food: therefore the Pope may, and ought to compel kings to do their duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as pastor of Christian men, is king of kings: which all Christian kings ought indeed either to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme pastoral charge, every one in his own dominion.

His sixth and last argument, is from examples. To which I answer, first, that examples prove nothing: secondly, that the examples he allegeth make not so much as a probability of right. The fact of Jehoiada, in killing Athaliah, (2 Kings xi.) was either by the authority of king Joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high-priest, which ever after the election of king Saul was a mere subject. The fact of St. Ambrose, in excommunicating Theodosius the emperor, if it were true he did so, was a capital crime. And for the Popes, Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary, and Leo III, their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and the acts done by them conformably to this doctrine, are the greatest crimes, especially that of Zachary, that are incident to human nature. And thus much of Power

Ecclesiastical; wherein I had been more brief, forbearing to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his as a private man, and not as the champion of the Papacy against all other Christian Princes and States.

CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MAN'S RECEPTION INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.

THE DIFFICULTY OF obeying God and man both at once;

The most frequent pretext of sedition, and civil war, in Christian commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man, then when their commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch, or a sovereign assembly), or the command of his father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men, when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth do but abuse God's name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews, many false prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned dreams and visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by fantastical and false doctrines; and by such reputation, (as is the nature of ambition), to govern them for their private benefit.

Is none to them that distinguish between what is, and what is not necessary to salvation.

But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is necessary, and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God, is of no moment. For if the command of the civil sovereign be such, as that it may be obeyed

without the forfeiture of life eternal; not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the apostle takes place: Servants obey your masters in all things; and Children obey your parents in all things; and the precept of our Saviour, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair; all therefore they shall say, that observe and do. But if the command be such as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to eternal death; then it were madness to obey it, and the council of our Saviour takes place, (Matth. x. 28), Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly sovereign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come, for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not necessary to eternal salvation.

All that is necessary to salvation is contained in faith and obedience.

All that is necessary to salvation, is contained in two virtues, faith in Christ, and obedience to laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because we are all guilty of disobedience to God's law, not only originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not only obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past; which remission is the reward of our faith in Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation, is manifest from this, that the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law; nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.

What obedience is necessary;

The obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey him; and is called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. And therefore obedience is sometimes called by the names of charity and love, because

they imply a will to obey; and our Saviour himself maketh our love to God, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole law: and sometimes by the name of righteousness; for righteousness is but the will to give to every one his own; that is to say, the will to obey the laws: and sometimes by the name of repentance; because to repent, implieth a turning away from sin, which is the same with the return of the will to obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the kingdom of God. For if God should require perfect innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

And to what laws.

But what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the commandments of God? If they be, why are not Christians taught to obey them? If they be not, what others are so, besides the law of nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are subject to; that is to say, the laws of nature, and the laws of our several sovereigns: nor did he make any new law to the Jews in his sermon on the Mount, but only expounded the law of Moses, to which they were subject before. The laws of God therefore are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principal is, that we should not violate our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of God, that commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible; which, as I have proved in the precedent chapter, is there only law, where the civil sovereign hath made it so; and in other places, but counsel; which a man at his own peril may without injustice refuse to obey.

In the faith of a Christian, who is the person believed.

Knowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation, and to whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning faith, whom, and why we believe; and what are the articles, or points necessary to be believed by them that shall be saved. And first, for the person whom we believe, because it is impossible to believe any person, before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that we have heard speak. The person, therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets, believed, was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: and the person, whom the apostles and disciples that conversed with Christ believed, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the father, nor our Saviour, ever spake, it cannot be said that the person whom they believed, was God. They believed the apostles, and after them the pastors and doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith the history of the Old and New Testament: so that the faith of Christians ever since our Saviour's time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the rule of faith; which none could do but Christian sovereigns; who are therefore the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally. But because there be many false prophets gone out into the world, other men are to examine such spirits, as St. John adviseth us, (1st Epistle iv. 1) whether they be of God, or not. And therefore, seeing the examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the person, which all they that have no special revelation are to believe, is, in every commonwealth, the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil sovereign.

The causes of Christian faith.

The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine, are various. For faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each several man, by such ways as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate cause of our

belief, concerning any point of Christian faith, is, that we believe the Bible to be the word of God. But why we believe the Bible to be the word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs be, that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, why we believe it, but, how we know it; as if believing and knowing were all one. And thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a man know the infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own private spirit to be other than a belief, grounded upon the authority and arguments of his teachers, or upon a presumption of his own gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the infallibility of the Church; much less, of any particular Church; and least of all, the infallibility of any particular man.

Faith comes by hearing.

It is manifest therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe the Scripture to be the word of God; and that the means of making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It is the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith in general (Rom. x. 17), Faith cometh by hearing, that is, by hearing our lawful pastors. He saith also, (verses 14, 15, of the same chapter), How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent? Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of believing that the Scriptures are the word of God, is the same with the cause of the believing of all other articles of our faith, namely, the hearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us, as our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches. Which also is made more manifest by experience. For what other cause can there be assigned, why in

Christian commonwealths all men either believe, or at least profess the Scripture to be the word of God, and in other commonwealths scarce any; but that in Christian commonwealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise?

But if teaching be the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is certain therefore that faith is the gift of God, and he giveth it to whom he will. Nevertheless, because to them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing. In a school, where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the master; yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God. All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them, say they are inspired; for that implies a gift supernatural, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.

But whether men know, or believe, or grant the Scriptures to be the word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I shall show what articles of faith are necessary, and only necessary for salvation, those men must needs know, believe, or grant the same.

The only necessary article of Christian faith;

The unum necessarium, only article of faith, which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this, that Jesus is the Christ. By the name of Christ is understood the king, which God had before promised by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should believe in him), under himself eternally; and to give them that eternal life, which was lost by the sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other articles may be also called necessary.

Proved from the scope of the Evangelists:

For proof that the belief of this article, Jesus is the Christ, is all the faith required to salvation, my first argument shall be from the scope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our Saviour, to establish that one article, Jesus is the Christ. The sum of St. Matthew's Gospel is this, that Jesus was of the stock of David, born of a Virgin; which are the marks of the true Christ: that the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews: that Herod for the same cause sought to kill him: that John the Baptist proclaimed him: that he preached by himself and his apostles that he was that king: that he taught the law, not as a scribe, but as a man of authority: that he cured diseases by his word only, and did many other miracles, which were foretold the Christ should do: that he was saluted king when he entered into Jerusalem: that he forewarned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ: that he was taken, accused, and put to death, for saying he was king: that the cause of his condemnation written on the cross was, JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWS. All which tend to no other end than this, that men should believe that Jesus is the Christ. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew's Gospel. But the scope of all the evangelists, as may appear by reading them, was the same. Therefore the scope of the whole Gospel was the establishing of that only article. And St. John expressly makes it his conclusion, (John xx. 31), These things are written, that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.

From the sermons of the apostles:

My second argument is taken from the subjects of the sermons of the apostles, both whilst our Saviour lived on earth, and after his ascension. The apostles, in our Saviour's time, were sent, (Luke ix. 2) to preach the kingdom of God. For neither there, nor, Matth. x. 7, giveth he any commission to them other than this, As ye go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand; that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King

which was to come. That their preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of Acts xvii. 6, 7, They drew, saith St. Luke, Jason and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, these that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received: and these all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying, that there is another king, one Jesus. And out of the 2nd and 3rd verses of the same chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them; and three sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures; opening and alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus, whom he preached, is Christ.

From the easiness of the doctrine:

The third argument is from those places of Scripture, by which all the faith required to salvation is declared to be easy. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now taught, whereof the greatest part are disputed, were necessary to salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard as to be a Christian. The thief upon the cross, though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, Lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom; by which he testified no belief of any other article, but this, that Jesus was the king. Nor could it be said (as it is, Matth. xi. 30), that Christ's yoke is easy, and his burthen light: nor that little children believe in him, as it is Matth. xviii. 6. Nor could St. Paul have said, (1 Cor. i. 21), It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe. Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved, much less have been so great a doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation nor purgatory, nor many other articles now obtruded.

From formal and clear texts.

The fourth argument is taken from places express, and such as receive no controversy of interpretation; as first, John v. 39; Search the Scriptures; for

in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they that testify of me. Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures only of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the marks by which men might know him when he came; as that he should descend from David; be born at Bethlehem, and of a Virgin; do great miracles, and the like. Therefore to believe that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternal life: but more than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no other article is required. Again, (John xi. 26) Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall not die eternally. Therefore to believe in Christ, is faith sufficient to eternal life; and consequently no more faith than that is necessary. But to believe in Jesus, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following. For when our Saviour (verse 26) had said to Martha, Believest thou this? she answereth (verse 27), Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world. Therefore this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternal; and more than sufficient is not necessary. Thirdly, John xx. 31: These things are written that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name. There, to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourthly, 1 John iv. 2: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. And 1 John v. 1: Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God. And verse 5, Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God? Fifthly, Acts viii. 36, 37: See, saith the Eunuch, here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, if thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayst. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. Therefore this article believed, Jesus is the Christ, is sufficient to baptism,

that is to say, to our reception into the kingdom of God, and by consequence, only necessary. And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, Thy faith hath saved thee, the cause he saith it, is some confession, which directly, or by consequence, implieth a belief, that Jesus is the Christ.

The last argument is from the places, where this article is made the foundation of faith: for he that holdeth the foundation, shall be saved. Which places are first, Matth. xxiv. 23, 24: If any man shall say unto you, Lo here is Christ, or there, believe it not; for there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders, &c. Here we see this article, Jesus is the Christ, must be held, though he that shall teach the contrary should do great miracles. The second place is, Gal. i. 8: Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you, than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. But the gospel which Paul, and the other apostles, preached, was only this article, that Jesus is the Christ: therefore for the belief of this article, we are to reject the authority of an angel from heaven; much more of any mortal man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the fundamental article of Christian faith. A third place is, 1 John, iv. 1, 2: Beloved, believe not every spirit: hereby ye shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. By which it is evident, that this article, is the measure and rule, by which to estimate and examine all other articles; and is therefore only fundamental. A fourth is Matth. xvi. 16, 18, where after St. Peter had professed this article, saying to our Saviour, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God, our Saviour answered, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; from whence I infer, that this article is that, on which all other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their foundation. A fifth is 1 Cor. iii. 11, 12, &c. Other foundation can no man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build

upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man's work shall be made manifest; for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is. If any man's work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall

From that it is the foundation of all other articles.

receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burnt, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. Which words, being partly plain and easy to understand, and partly allegorical and difficult; out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that pastors that teach this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, though they draw from it false consequences, which all men are sometimes subject to, they may nevertheless be saved; much more that they may be saved, who being no pastors, but hearers, believe that which is by their lawful pastors taught them. Therefore the belief of this article is sufficient; and by consequence, there is no other article of faith necessarily required to salvation.

Now for the part which is allegorical, as that the fire shall try every man's work, and that they shall be saved, but so as by fire, or through fire, (for the original is διὰ πυρὸς,) it maketh nothing against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that are plain. Nevertheless, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken, to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this trial of doctrines, and saving of men as by fire. The apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the prophet Zechariah, (xiii. 8, 9), who speaking of the restoration of the kingdom of God, saith thus; Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them. The day of judgment is the day of the restoration

of the kingdom of God; and at that day it is, that St. Peter tells us (2 Pet. iii. 7, 10, 12) shall be the conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save, shall pass through that fire unhurt, and be therein, (as silver and gold are refined by the fire from their dross,) tried, and refined from their idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true God. Alluding whereto, St. Paul here saith, that the day, that is, the day of judgment, the great day of our Saviour's coming to restore the kingdom of God in Israel, shall try every man's doctrine, by judging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; and then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation, shall see their doctrines condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true and only God. In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.

In what sense other articles may be called necessary.

But a man may here ask, whether it be not as necessary to salvation, to believe, that God is omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as to believe that Jesus is the Christ. To which I answer, they are; and so are many more articles: but they are such, as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more or less difficulty. For who is there that does not see, that they who believe Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, do therein also believe, that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man believe, that Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unless he believe him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. In sum, he that holdeth this foundation, Jesus is the Christ, holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly deduced from

it, and implicitly all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence. And therefore it holdeth still good, that the belief of this one article is sufficient faith to obtain remission of sins to the penitent, and consequently to bring them into the kingdom of heaven.

That faith and obedience are both of them necessary to salvation.

Now that I have shown, that all the obedience required to salvation, consisteth in the will to obey the law of God, that is to say, in repentance; and all the faith required to the same, is comprehended in the belief of this article, Jesus is the Christ; I will further allege those places of the Gospel, that prove, that all that is necessary to salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the apostles, saying, (Acts ii. 37), Men and brethren, what shall we do? To whom St. Peter answered (in the next verse) Repent, and be baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore repentance, and baptism, that is, believing that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain ruler (Luke xviii. 18), What shall I do to inherit eternal life? answered, (verse 20) Thou knowest the commandments, do not commit adultery, do not kill, do not steal, do not bear false witness, honour thy father and thy mother. Which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, (verse 22) Sell all thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me: which was as much as to say, rely on me that am the king. Therefore to fulfil the law, and to believe that Jesus is the king, is all that is required to bring a man to eternal life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (Rom. i. 17), The just shall live by faith; not every one, but the just; therefore faith and justice (that is, the will to be just, or repentance) are all that is necessary to life eternal. And (Mark i. 15) our Saviour preached, saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand, repent and believe the

evangile, that is, the good news that the Christ was come. There fore, to repent, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to salvation.

What each of them contributes thereunto

Seeing then it is necessary that faith and obedience, implied in the word repentance, do both concur to our salvation; the question by which of the two we are justified, is impertinently disputed. Nevertheless, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by righteousness be understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which God doth always accept for the work itself, as well in good, as in evil men. And in this sense only it is, that a man is called just, or unjust; and that his justice justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in God's acceptation, of just; and renders him capable of living by his faith, which before he was not. So that justice justifies in that sense, in which to justify, is the same as that to denominate a man just; and not in the signification of discharging the law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.

But a man is then also said to be justified, when his plea, though in itself insufficient, is accepted; as when we plead our will, our endeavour to fulfil the law, and repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the performance itself. And because God accepteth not the will for the deed, but only in the faithful; it is therefore faith that makes good our plea; and in this sense it is, that faith only justifies. So that faith and obedience are both necessary to salvation; yet in several senses each of them is said to justify.

Obedience to God and to the civil sovereign not inconsistent, whether Christian, or infidel. Obedience to God and to the civil sovereign not

inconsistent, whether Christian,

Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation; it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God, with our obedience to the civil sovereign; who is either Christian, or infidel. If he be a Christian, he alloweth the belief of this article, that Jesus is the Christ; and of all the articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And because he is a sovereign, he requireth obedience to all his own, that is, to all the civil laws; in which also are contained all the laws of nature, that is all the laws of God: for besides the laws of nature, and the laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law, (for the Church that can make laws is the commonwealth), there be no other laws divine. Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian sovereign, is not thereby hindered, neither from believing, nor from obeying God. But suppose that a Christian king should from this foundation Jesus is the Christ, draw some false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of hay or stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says he shall be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but only believes his lawful teacher. And in case a subject be forbidden by the civil sovereign to profess some of those his opinions, upon what just ground can he disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a consequence, but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge, when the question is of his own obedience? Or shall any man judge but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the civil sovereign that representeth it? Or if the pope, or an apostle judge, may he not err in deducing of a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St. Paul, err in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God, and the laws of a Christian commonwealth.

Or infidel.

And when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the laws of God, (for such are the laws of nature), and rejecteth the counsel of the apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things. And for their faith, it is internal, and invisible; they have the license that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful sovereign; much less make war upon him. For he that is not glad of any just occasion of martyrdom, has not the faith he professeth, but pretends it only, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But what infidel king is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a subject, that waiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him, (which is the intent of believing that Jesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to do), to put to death or to persecute such a subject?

Conclusion.

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdom of God, and policy ecclesiastical. Wherein I pretend not to advance any position of my own, but only to show what are the consequences that seem to me deducible from the principles of Christian politics, (which are the holy Scriptures,) in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns, and the duty of their subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure or controverted interpretation; and to allege none, but in such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was written for the re-establishment of the kingdom of God in Christ. For it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist

upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly; but rather by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men's eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.

PART IV. OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.

CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUAL DARKNESS, FROM MISINTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.

THE KINGDOM OF Darkness, what.

Besides these sovereign powers, divine, and human, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another power, namely, (Eph. vi. 12) that of the rulers of the darkness of this world; (Matth. xii. 26) the kingdom of Satan; and (Matth. ix. 34) the principality of Beelzebub over demons, that is to say, over phantasms that appear in the air: for which cause Satan is also called, (Eph. ii.2) the prince of the power of the air; and, because he ruleth in the darkness of this world, (John xvi. 11) the prince of this world: and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his dominion, in opposition to the faithful, (who are the children of the light,) are called the children of darkness. For seeing Beelzebub is prince of phantasms, inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness, the children of darkness, and these demons, phantasms, or spirits of illusion, signify allegorically the same thing. This considered, the kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature, and of the gospel; and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to come.

The Church not yet fully freed of darkness.

As men that are utterly deprived from their nativity, of the light of the bodily eye, have no idea at all of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time or other

perceived by his outward senses: so also is it of the light of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto. And from hence it comes to pass, that men have no other means to acknowledge their own darkness, but only by reasoning from the unforeseen mischances, that befall them in their ways. The darkest part of the kingdom of Satan, is that which is without the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus Christ. But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth, as the land of Goshen, all the light, which to the performance of the work enjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence comes it, that in Christendom there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by foreign and civil war; such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men; and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, felicity, if it be not night amongst us, or at least a mist? We are therefore yet in the dark.

Four causes of spiritual darkness.

The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors; and that, first, by abusing, and putting out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols, or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct from human fancy; such as are dead men's ghosts, and fairies, and other matter of old wives' tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy, of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false, or uncertain traditions, and feigned, or uncertain history. And so we come to err, by giving heed to seducing spirits, and the demonology of such as speak lies in

hypocrisy; or as it is in the original, (1 Tim. iv. 1, 2) of those that play the part of liars, with a seared conscience, that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the first of these, which is the seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.

Errors from misinterpreting the Scriptures, concerning the kingdom of God:

The greatest and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the kingdom of God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only; who were therefore called his peculiar people; and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded a king after the manner of the nations; which God himself consented unto, as I have more at large proved before in chapter xxxv. After that time, there was no other kingdom of God in the world, by any pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be king of all men, and of all creatures, as governing according to his will, by his infinite power. Nevertheless, he promised by his prophets to restore this his government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret counsel appointed for it shall be fully come, and when they shall turn unto him by repentance and amendment of life. And not only so, but he invited the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happiness of his reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and he promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine, to receive him at his second coming. Which second coming not yet being, the kingdom of God is not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact, but our civil sovereigns; saving

only, that Christian men are already in the kingdom of grace, in as much as they have already the promise of being received at his coming again.

As that the kingdom of God is the present Church

Consequent to this error, that the present Church is Christ's kingdom, there ought to be some one man, or assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour, now in heaven, speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person to all Christians; or divers men, or divers assemblies that do the same to divers parts of Christendom. This power regal under Christ, being challenged, universally by the Pope, and in particular commonwealths by assemblies of the pastors of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to none but to civil sovereigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a darkness in men's understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.

And that the Pope is his vicar general:

Consequent to this claim of the Pope to be vicar-general of Christ in the present Church, (supposed to be that kingdom of his to which we are addressed in the gospel,) is the doctrine, that it is necessary for a Christian king to receive his crown by a bishop; as if it were from that ceremony, that he derives the clause of Dei gratia in his title; and that then only he is made king by the favour of God, when he is crowned by the authority of God's universal vicegerent on earth; and that every bishop, whosoever be his sovereign, taketh at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope. Consequent to the same, is the doctrine of the fourth Council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the Third, (chap. III. De Hereticis), that if a king at the Pope's admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heresies, and being excommunicate for the same, do not give satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience. Where, by heresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained. And by this means, as often as there is any

repugnancy between the political designs of the Pope, and other Christian princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a mist amongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawful prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this darkness of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another man's ambition.

And that the pastors are the clergy.

From the same opinion, that the present Church is the kingdom of God, it proceeds that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church, take the name to themselves of the clergy; giving to other Christians the name of laity, that is, simply people. For clergy signifies those, whose maintenance is that revenue, which God having reserved to himself during his reign over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi, (who were to be his public ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren,) to be their inheritance. The Pope therefore, pretending the present Church to be, as the realm of Israel, the kingdom of God, challenging to himself and his subordinate ministers, the like revenue, as the inheritance of God, the name of clergy was suitable to that claim. And thence it is, that tithes, and other tributes paid to the Levites, as God's right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by ecclesiastics, jure divino, that is, in God's right. By which means, the people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the state, another to the clergy; whereof, that to the clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a king of Athens, and esteemed a tyrant, exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all public charges: for he demanded no more but the twentieth part, and yet abundantly maintained therewith the commonwealth. And in the kingdom of the Jews, during the

sacerdotal reign of God, the tithes and offerings were the whole public revenue.

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the kingdom of God, came in the distinction between the civil and the canon laws: the civil law being the acts of sovereigns in their own dominions, and the canon law being the acts of the Pope in the same dominion. Which canons, though they were but canons, that is, rules propounded, and but voluntarily received by Christian princes, till the translation of the empire to Charlemagne; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope increased, became rules commanded, and the emperors themselves, to avoid greater mischiefs, which the people blinded might be led into, were forced to let them pass for laws.

From hence it is, that in all dominions where the Pope's ecclesiastical power is entirely received, Jews, Turks, and Gentiles, are in the Roman Church tolerated in their religion, as far forth, as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civil power: whereas in a Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman religion, is capital; because the Pope pretendeth, that all Christians, are his subjects. For otherwise it were as much against the law of nations, to persecute a Christian stranger, for professing the religion of his own country, as an infidel; or rather more, in as much as they that are not against Christ, are with him.

From the same it is, that in every Christian state there are certain men, that are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the civil state; for so are the secular clergy, besides monks and friars, which in many places bear so great a proportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an army, sufficient for any war the Church militant should employ them in, against their own, or other princes.

Error from mistaking consecration for conjuration.

A second general abuse of Scripture, is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment. To consecrate, is, in Scripture, to offer, give, or dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to sanctify, or make it God's, and to be used only by those, whom God hath appointed to be his public ministers, (as I have already proved at large in the xxxvth chapter,) and thereby to change, not the thing consecrated, but only the use of it, from being profane and common, to be holy, and peculiar to God's service. But when by such words, the nature or quality of the thing itself, is pretended to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of God, or a vain and impious conjuration. But seeing, for the frequency of pretending the change of nature in their consecrations, it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a conjuration or incantation, whereby they would have men to believe an alteration of nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of man's sight, and of all the rest of his senses. As for example, when the priest, instead of consecrating bread and wine to God's peculiar service in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common use, to signify, that is, to put men in mind of their redemption, by the passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the cross for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our Saviour, This is my body, and this is my blood, the nature of bread is no more there, but his very body; notwithstanding there appeareth not to the sight, or other sense of the receiver, any thing that appeared not before the consecration. The Egyptian conjurers, that are said to have turned their rods to serpents, and the water into blood, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators, by a false show of things, yet are esteemed enchanters. But what should we have thought of them, if there had appeared in their rods nothing

like a serpent, and in the water enchanted, nothing like blood, nor like any thing else but water, but that they had faced down the king, that they were serpents that looked like rods, and that it was blood that seemed water? That had been both enchantment, and lying. And yet in this daily act of the priest, they do the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a charm, which produceth nothing new to the sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man; nay more, into a God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself present God and man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry. For if it be enough to excuse it of idolatry, to say it is no more bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say, the leeks and onions they worshipped, were not very leeks and onions, but a divinity under their species, or likeness. The words, This is my body, are equivalent to these, this signifies, or represents my body; and it is an ordinary figure of speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can it extend any further, than to the bread which Christ himself with his own hands consecrated. For he never said, that of what bread soever, any priest whatsoever, should say, This is my body, or, this is Christ's body, the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of Innocent the Third; which was not above 500 years ago, when the power of popes was at the highest, and the darkness of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they would have men believe it were transubstantiated, not only into the body of Christ, but also into the wood of his cross, and that they did eat both together in the sacrament.

Incantation in the ceremonies of baptism:

The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptism: where the abuse of God's name in each several

person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each name, maketh up the charm. As first, when they make the holy water, the priest saith, I conjure thee, thou creature of water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, and in virtue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become conjured water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant the enemy, &c. And the same in the benediction of the salt to be mingled with it: That thou become conjured salt, that all phantasms, and knavery of the devil's fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean spirit be conjured by Him that shall come to judge the quick and the dead. The same in the benediction of the oil; That all the power of the enemy, all the host of the devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by this creature of oil. And for the infant that is to be baptized, he is subject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows thrice in the child's face, and says: Go out of him unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the comforter. As if all children, till blown on by the priest, were demoniacs. Again, before his entrance into the church, he saith as before, I conjure thee, &c. to go out, and depart from this servant of God. And again the same exorcism is repeated once more before he be baptized. These, and some other incantations, are those that are used instead of benedictions, and consecrations, in administration of the sacraments of baptism, and the Lord's supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses, except the unhallowed spittle of the priest, hath some set form of exorcism.

And in marriage, in visitation of the sick, and in consecration of places.

Nor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches and churchyards, and the like, exempt from charms; inasmuch as there is in them the use of enchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross, and of the holy word of David, asperges

me Domine hyssopo, as things of efficacy to drive away phantasms, and imaginary spirits.

Errors from mistaking eternal life, and everlasting death:

Another general error, is from the misinterpretation of the words eternal life, everlasting death, and the second death. For though we read plainly in Holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of living for ever, which was conditional, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his commandment; which was not essential to human nature, but consequent to the virtue of the tree of life; whereof he had liberty to eat, as long as he had not sinned; and that he was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat thereof, and live for ever; and that Christ's Passion is a discharge of sin to all that believe on him; and by consequence, a restitution of eternal life to all the faithful, and to them only: yet the doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So that the flaming sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the tree of life, hinders him not from the immortality which God took from him for his sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the recovering of the same; and consequently, not only the faithful and righteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal life, without any death at all; much less a second, and everlasting death. To salve this, it is said, that by second, and everlasting death, is meant a second, and everlasting life, but in torments; a figure never used but in this very case.

All which doctrine is founded only on some of the obscurer places of the New Testament; which nevertheless, the whole scope of the Scripture considered, are clear enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to the Christian faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carcass; cannot God, that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his word, as easily raise a dead carcass to life

again, and continue him alive for ever, or make him die again, by another word? The soul in Scripture, signifieth always, either the life, or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly, the body alive. In the fifth day of the creation, God said: Let the waters produce reptile animæ viventis, the creeping thing that hath in it a living soul; the English translate it, that hath life. And again, God created whales, et omnem animam viventem; which in the English is, every living creature. And likewise of man, God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, et factus est homo in animam viventem, that is, and man was made a living creature. And after Noah came out of the ark, God saith, he will no more smite omnem animam viventem, that is, every living creature. And (Deut. xii. 23), Eat not the blood, for the blood is the soul; that is, the life. From which places, if by soul were meant a substance incorporeal, with an existence separated from the body, it might as well be inferred of any other living creature as of man. But that the souls of the faithful, are not of their own nature, but by God's special grace, to remain in their bodies, from the resurrection to all eternity, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved out of the Scriptures, in chapter XXXVIII. And for the places of the New Testament, where it is said that any man shall be cast body and soul into hell fire, it is no more than body and life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into the perpetual fire of Gehenna.

As the doctrine of purgatory, and exorcisms, and invocation of saints.

This window it is, that gives entrance to the dark doctrine, first, of eternal torments; and afterwards of purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of the ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcism and conjuration of phantasms; as also of invocation of men dead; and to the doctrine of indulgences, that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever, from the fire of purgatory, wherein these incorporeal substances are

pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for heaven. For men being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by contagion of the demonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that when the body was dead, the soul of every man, whether godly or wicked, must subsist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any supernatural gift of God; the doctors of the Church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be reunited to their bodies in the resurrection; supposing for a while, they lay under the altars; but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of purgatory; which by some other Churches in this latter age has been demolished.

The texts alleged for the doctrines aforementioned have been answered before.

Let us now consider what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three general errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinal Bellarmine hath alleged, for the present kingdom of God administered by the Pope, than which there are none that make a better show of proof; I have already answered them; and made it evident, that the kingdom of God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul; after which time the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. That which the high-priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in the right of the young king Joash her son: but Solomon in his own right deposed the high-priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought to prove the kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is alleged, not by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza, that will have it to begin from the resurrection of Christ. But whether he intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the supreme power ecclesiastical in the commonwealth of

Geneva, and consequently to every presbytery in every other commonwealth, or to princes, and other civil sovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery hath challenged the power to excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in religion, in the places where they have that form of Church-government, no less than the Pope challengeth it universally.

Answer to the text on which Beza inferreth that the kingdom of Christ began at the resurrection.

The words are (Mark ix. 1), Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power. Which words if taken grammatically, make it certain, that either some of those men that stood by Christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the kingdom of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more difficult. For when the apostles, after our Saviour's resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (Acts i. 6), Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel? he answered them, It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power; but ye shall receive power by the coming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and ye shall be my (martyrs) witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth. Which is as much as to say, My kingdom is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall come as a thief in the night; but I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world, by your preaching, of my resurrection, and the works I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may believe in me, and expect eternal life, at my coming again. How does this agree with the coming of Christ's kingdom at the resurrection? And that which St. Paul says (1 Thess. i. 9, 10), That they turned from idols, to serve the living and true God, and

to wait for his Son from heaven; where to wait for his Son from heaven, is to wait for his coming to be king in power; which were not necessary, if his kingdom had been then present. Again, if the kingdom of God began, as Beza on that place (Mark ix. 1) would have it, at the resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since the resurrection to say in their prayers, Let thy kingdom come? It is therefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are not so to be interpreted. There be some of them that stand here, saith our Saviour, that shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God come in power. If then this kingdom were to come at the resurrection of Christ, why is it said, some of them, rather than all? For they all lived till after Christ was risen.

Explication of the place in Mark ix. 1.

But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter, concerning St. John, (chap. xxi. 22), If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? upon which was grounded a report that he should not die. Nevertheless the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Mark. And if it be lawful to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately follows, both here, and in St. Luke, where the same is again repeated, it is not improbable, to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following: where it is said, that after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John (not all, but some of his disciples), and leadeth them up into a high mountain apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them: and his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them: and there appeared unto them, Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus, &c. So that they saw Christ in glory and majesty, as he is to come; insomuch as they were sore afraid. And

thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of vision. For it was a vision, as may probably be inferred out of St. Luke, that reciteth the same story (chap. ix. 28, &c.), and saith, that Peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep: but most certainly out of Matth. xvii. 9, where the same is again related; for our Saviour charged them, saying, Tell no man the vision until the Son of Man be risen from the dead. Howsoever it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument, to prove that the kingdom of God taketh beginning till the day of judgment.

Abuse of some other texts in defence of the power of the Pope.

As for some other texts, to prove the Pope's power over civil sovereigns, (besides those of Bellarmine,) as that the two swords that christ and his apostles had amongst them, were the spiritual and the temporal sword, which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ: and, that of the two luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the lesser the King; one might as well infer out of the first verse of the Bible, that by heaven is meant the Pope, and by earth the King. Which is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over princes, that came in fashion after the time the Popes were grown so secure of their greatness, as to contemn all Christian kings; and treading on the necks of emperors, to mock both them and the Scripture, in the words of Psalm XCI. 13, Thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion and the dragon thou shalt trample under thy feet.

The manner of consecrations in the Scripture, was without exorcisms.

As for the rights of consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgment of the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction, as the nature of the action itself requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures, be both decent and significant, or at least conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels

belonging to them, (Exod. xl. 9), he anointed them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose: and they were holy: there was nothing exorcised, to drive away phantasms. The same Moses, the civil sovereign of Israel, when he consecrated Aaron, the high-priest, and his sons, did wash them with water, not exorcised water, put their garments upon them, and anointed them with oil; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the priest's office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before he presented them to God, to be his servants. When king Solomon, the civil sovereign of Israel, consecrated the temple he had built, (1 Kings viii.), he stood before all the congregation of Israel; and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God, for putting into the heart of his father to build it; and for giving to himself the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that house, though it were not suitable to his infinite greatness; and to hear the prayers of his servants that should pray therein, or, if they were absent, towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of peaceoffering, and the house was dedicated. Here was no procession; the king stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no Asperges me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion; but a decent and rational speech, and such as in making to God a present of his new-built house, was most conformable to the occasion.

We read not that St. John did exorcise the water of Jordan; nor Philip the water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any pastor in the time of the apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, and say, in odorem suavitatis, that is, for a sweet savour unto the Lord; wherein neither the ceremony of spittle, for the uncleanness; nor the application of that Scripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.

The immortality of man's soul, not proved by Scripture to be of nature, but of grace.

To prove that the soul separated from the body, liveth eternally, not only the souls of the elect, by especial grace, and restoration of the eternal life which Adam lost by sin, and our Saviour restored by the sacrifice of himself, to the faithful; but also the souls of reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: but such, as when I compare them with that which I have before (chapter XXXVIII) alleged out of the 14th of Job, seem to me much more subject to a diverse interpretation, than the words of Job.

And first there are the words of Solomon (Eccles. xii. 7), Then shall the dust return to dust, as it was, and the spirit shall return to God that gave it. Which may bear well enough, if there be no other text directly against it, this interpretation, that God only knows, but man not, what becomes of a man's spirit, when he expireth; and the same Solomon, in the same book, (chapter iii. 20, 21) delivereth the same sentence in the same sense I have given it. His words are: All go, (man and beast), to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward, and that the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth? That is, none knows but God; nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we understand not, God knows what, and, God knows where. That of (Gen. v. 24) Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him; which is expounded, (Heb. xi. 5), He was translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because God had translated him. For before his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God; making as much for the immortality of the body, as of the soul, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; not common to them with the wicked, and

depending on grace, not on nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give besides the literal sense, of the words of Solomon (Eccles. iii. 19), That which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath, (one spirit); so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast, for all is vanity. By the literal sense, here is no natural immortality of the soul; nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternal, which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And (Eccles. chap. iv. 3.) Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they; that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the soul of all them that have lived, were immortal, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortal soul, were worse than to have no soul at all. And again, (chapter ix. 5), The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing; that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.

Another place which seems to make for a natural immortality of the soul, is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a life then actual; and in the same sense that God said to Adam, that on the day he should eat of the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ spake; but are not actually till the resurrection. And the history of Dives and Lazarus, makes nothing against this, if we take it, as it is, for a parable.

But there be other places of the New Testament, where an immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident that they shall all rise to judgment. And it is said besides in many places, that they shall go into everlasting fire, everlasting torments, everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dieth; and all this is comprehended in the word everlasting death, which is ordinarily interpreted everlasting life

in torments. And yet I can find no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the father of mercies; that doth in heaven and earth all that he will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to do, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evil, should punish men's transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of everlasting fire, and other the like phrases of Scripture.

I have showed already, that the kingdom of God by Christ beginneth at the day of judgment: that in that day the faithful shall rise again, with glorious and spiritual bodies, and be his subjects in that his kingdom, which shall be eternal: that they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, nor eat and drink, as they did in their natural bodies; but live for ever in their individual persons, without the specifical eternity of generation: and that the reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: as also, that those of the elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spiritual and immortal. But that the bodies of the reprobate, who make the kingdom of Satan, shall also be glorious, or spiritual bodies, or that they shall be as the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendering; or that their life shall be eternal in their individual persons, as the life of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam had been if he had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save only these places concerning eternal torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.

From whence may be inferred, that as the elect after the resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and

such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the reprobate.

Eternal torments, what.

These things considered, the texts that mention eternal fire, eternal torments, or the worm that never dieth, contradict not the doctrine of a second, and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the word death. The fire, or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any one eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adam's sin, may at the resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the resurrection, as they did before: for there is no place in Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection (1 Cor. xv.) understandeth it only of the resurrection to life eternal; and not the resurrection to punishment. And of the first, he saith, that the body is sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised in honour; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body. There is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them that rise to punishment. So also our Saviour, when he speaketh of the nature of man after the resurrection, meaneth the resurrection to life eternal, not to punishment. The text is, Luke xx. verses 34, 35, 36, a fertile text: The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: neither can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. The children of this world, that are in the estate which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is, corrupt, and generate successively; which is an

immortality of the kind, but not of the persons of men: they are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from the dead; but only a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end only to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The elect are the only children of the resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of eternal life: they only can die no more, it is they that are equal to the angels, and that are the children of God; and not the reprobate. To the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection, a second and eternal death: between which resurrection, and their second and eternal death, is but a time of punishment and torment; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of man by propagation shall endure; which is eternally.

Answer of the texts alleged for purgatory.

Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls, is founded, as I said, the doctrine of purgatory. For supposing eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body; and no immortality till the resurrection. The texts for purgatory alleged by Bellarmine out of the canonical Scripture of the Old Testament, are, first, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned 2 Sam. i. 12, and again, 2 Sam. iii. 35, for the death of Abner. This fasting of David, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at God's hands, after their death: because after he had fasted to procure the recovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead, he called for meat. Seeing then the soul hath an existence separate from the body, and nothing can be obtained by men's fasting for the souls that are already either in heaven, or hell, it followeth that there be some souls of dead men, that are neither in heaven, nor in hell; and therefore they must be in some third place, which must be purgatory. And thus with hard straining, he has wrested those places to the proof of a purgatory: whereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of mourning, and fasting, when they are

used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable to the mourners, they are used for honour's sake to their persons; and when it is done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular damage. And so David honoured Saul and Abner, with his fasting; and in the death of his own child, recomforted himself, by receiving his ordinary food.

In the other places, which he allegeth out of the Old Testament, there is not so much as any show, or colour of proof. He brings in every text wherein there is the word anger, or fire, or burning, or purging, or cleansing, in case any of the fathers have but in a sermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already believed. The first verse of Psalm xxxvii; O Lord, rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure: what were this to purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the wrath to the fire of hell, and the displeasure to that of purgatory? And what is it to purgatory, that of Psalm lxvi. 12, We went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place; and other the like texts, with which the doctors of those times intended to adorn, or extend their sermons, or commentaries, haled to their purposes by force of wit?

Places of the New Testament for purgatory answered.

But he allegeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easy to be answered. And first that of Matth. xii. 32: Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come: where he will have purgatory to be the world to come, wherein some sins may be forgiven, which in this world were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but three worlds; one from the creation to the flood, which was destroyed by water, and is called in Scripture the old world; another from the flood, to the day of judgment, which is the present world, and shall be destroyed by fire; and the third,

which shall be from the day of judgment forward, everlasting, which is called the world to come; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no purgatory: and therefore the world to come, and purgatory, are inconsistent. But what then can be the meaning of those our Saviour's words? I confess they are very hardly to be reconciled with all the doctrines now unanimously received: nor is it any shame, to confess the profoundness of the Scripture to be too great to be sounded by the shortness of human understanding. Nevertheless, I may propound such things to the consideration of more learned divines, as the text itself suggesteth. And first, seeing to speak against the Holy Ghost, as being the third person of the Trinity, is to speak against the Church, in which the Holy Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, between the easiness of our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while he himself taught the world, that is, when he was on earth, and the severity of the pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority, which was from the Holy Ghost. As if he should say, you that deny my power; nay you that shall crucify me, shall be pardoned by me, as often as you turn unto me by repentance: but if you deny the power of them that teach you hereafter, by virtue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this world, and leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unless you turn also to them), to the punishments, as much as lies in them, of the world to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy, or prediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the Christian Church. Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not peremptory in such difficult places), perhaps there may be places left after the resurrection, for the repentance of some sinners. And there is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 29), What shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they baptized for the dead? a man may probably

infer, as some have done, that in St. Paul's time, there was a custom, by receiving baptism for the dead, (as men that now believe, are sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants, that are not capable of believing), to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our Saviour for their king, at his coming again; and then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come, has no need of a purgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox, that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Only of thus much, I see evident Scripture, to persuade me, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the soul without the body; neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the souls of them which the Roman Church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory. For God, that could give a life to a piece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten carcase, into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.

Another place is that of 1 Cor. iii., where it is said, that they which build stubble, hay, &c. on the true foundation, their work shall perish; but they themselves shall be saved, but as through fire: this fire, he will have to be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zech. xiii. 9, where he saith, I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried: which is spoken of the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of judgment, and conflagration of the present world wherein the elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous doctrines and traditions, and have them as it were singed off; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the apostle saith of them, that holding this foundation, Jesus is the Christ, shall build

thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall pass through it to salvation; but so as to see, and relinquish their former errors. The builders, are the pastors; the foundation, that Jesus is the Christ; the stubble and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance, or frailty; the gold, silver, and precious stones, are their true doctrines; and their refining or purging, the relinquishing of their errors. In all which there is no colour at all for the burning of incorporeal, that is to say, impatible souls.

Baptism for the dead, how understood.

A third place is that of 1 Cor. xv. 29, before mentioned, concerning baptism for the dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a fire of purgatory: but neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word baptism, he approveth this in the first place, that by baptism is meant, metaphorically, a baptism of penance; and that men are in this sense baptized, when they fast, and pray, and give alms: and so, baptism for the dead, and prayer for the dead, is the same thing. But this is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture. The word baptism is used (Mark x. 38, and Luke xii. 50), for being dipped in one's own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles were, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that prayer, fasting, and alms, have any similitude with dipping. The same is used also Matth. iii. 11 (which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory) for a purging with fire. But it is evident the fire and purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the prophet Zechariah speaketh (chapter xiii. 9) I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them, &c. And St. Peter after him (1 Epistle i. 7), That the trial of your faith, which is much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire,

might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ; and St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 13), The fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is. But St. Peter and St. Paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second appearing of Christ; and the prophet Zechariah of the day of judgment. And therefore this place of St. Matthew may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory.

Another interpretation of baptism for the dead, is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability: and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the dead. For if after the resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ, or not believed in him, may be received into Christ's kingdom; it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them, till they should be risen. But granting that God, at the prayers of the faithful, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for purgatory; because to rise from death to life, is one thing; to rise from purgatory to life is another; as being a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.

A fourth place is that of Matth. v. 25, 26: Agree with thine adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison: verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing. In which allegory, the offender is the sinner; both the adversary and the judge is God; the way is this life; the prison is the grave; the officer, death; from which, the sinner shall not rise again to life eternal, but to a second death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his passion, which is a full ransom for all manner of sins, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally venial.

The fifth place, is that of Matth. v. 22: Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be guilty in judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty in the council: but whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be guilty to hell fire. From which words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three sorts of punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. Of which inference, there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them. Shall there be a distinction after this life of courts of justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviour's time, to hear, and determine divers sorts of crimes, as the judges, and the council? Shall not all judicature appertain to Christ and his apostles? To understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this chapter interpreteth the law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the grammatical sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the legislator. Therefore whereas they thought the sixth commandment was not broken, but by killing a man: nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them the inward anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide. You have heard, saith he, the Law of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, and that Whosoever shall kill, shall be condemned before the judges, or before the session of the Seventy: but I say unto you, to be angry with one's brother without cause, or to say unto him Raca, or Fool, is homicide, and shall be punished at the day of judgment, and session of Christ, and his apostles, with hell fire. So that those words were not used to distinguish between divers crimes, and divers courts of justice, and divers punishments; but to tax the distinction between sin and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God, but from the difference of their

temporal courts of justice; and to show them that he that had the will to hurt his brother, though the effect appear but in reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the judges, and by the session, which shall be the same, not different, courts at the day of judgment. This considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain purgatory, I cannot imagine.

The sixth place is Luke xvi. 9: Make ye friends of the unrighteous Mammon; that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting tabernacles. This he alleges to prove invocation of saints departed. But the sense is plain, that we should make friends with our riches, of the poor; and thereby obtain their prayers whilst they live. He that giveth to the poor, lendeth to the Lord.

The seventh is Luke xxiii. 42: Lord, remember me, when thou comest into thy kingdom. Therefore, saith he, there is remission of sins after this life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave him; and at his coming again in glory, will remember to raise him again to life eternal.

The eighth is Acts ii. 24, where St. Peter saith of Christ, that God had raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it: which he interprets to be a descent of Christ into purgatory, to loose some souls there from their torments: whereas it is manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was he that could not be holden of death, or the grave; and not the souls in purgatory. But if that which Beza says, in his notes on this place, be well observed, there is none that will not see, that instead of pains, it should be bands; and then there is no further cause to seek for purgatory in this text.

CHAPTER XLV. OF DEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELICS OF THE RELIGION OF THE GENTILES.

THE ORIGINAL OF demonology.

The impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from opaque, or refracted in the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures, in whom God hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object, from whence the impression proceedeth; which imagination is called sight; and seemeth not to be a mere imagination, but the body itself without us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himself; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only a motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call imagination and memory; and, in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sickness or violence, a dream; of which things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters.

This nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to natural knowledge; much less by those that consider not things so remote, as that knowledge is, from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: which some, because they vanish away, they know not whither nor how, will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say immaterial, or forms without matter; colour and

figure, without any coloured or figured body; and that they can put on airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are bodies and living creatures, but made of air, or other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Demons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed, were not inhabitants of their own brain, but of the air, or of heaven, or hell; not phantasms, but ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say, he saw his own ghost in a looking-glass, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the demon, or ghost of that great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world: and by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them good or harm; and consequently, given occasion to the governors of the heathen commonwealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that demonology, (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were specially employed or reverenced,) to the public peace, and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them good demons, and others evil; the one as a spur to the observance, the other as reins to withhold them from violation of the laws.

What were the demons of the ancients.

What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of demons, appeareth partly in the genealogy of their gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Grecians; and partly in other histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the twelfth chapter of this discourse.

How that doctrine was spread. How far received by the Jews.

The Grecians, by their colonies and conquests, communicated their language and writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by necessary consequence their demonology, or, as St. Paul calls it, (1 Tim. iv. 1) their

doctrines of devils. And by that means the contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judea and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of demon they did not, as the Grecians, attribute to spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity, if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a κακοδάιμων, an evil demon, that is a devil. And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is possessed by the devil, such as we call madmen or lunatics; or such as had the falling sickness, or that spoke any thing which they, for want of understanding, thought absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a dumb man, that he had a dumb devil; and of John the Baptist (Matt. xi. 18), for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a devil; and of our Saviour, because he said, he that keepeth his sayings should not see death in æternum, (John viii. 52), Now we know thou hast a devil; Abraham is dead, and the prophets are dead: and again, because he said (John vii. 20), They went about to kill him, the people answered, Thou hast a devil; who goeth about to kill thee? Whereby it is manifest, that the Jews had the same opinions concerning phantasms, namely, that they were not phantasms, that is, idols of the brain, but things real, and independant on the fancy.

Why our Saviour controlled it not.

Which doctrine, if it be not true, why, may some say, did not our Saviour contradict it, and teach the contrary? Nay, why does he use on divers occasions such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I answer, that first, where Christ saith, (Luke xxiv.39) A spirit hath not flesh and bone, though he show that there be spirits, yet he denies not that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says,(1 Cor. xv. 44) we shall rise spiritual bodies,he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits, but that they are bodily spirits; which is

not difficult to understand. For air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or any other gross body to be discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour speaketh to the devil, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the devil, he meant a disease, as phrensy, or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit, is not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full already of vital and animal spirits? Are there not, therefore spirits, that neither have bodies, nor are mere imaginations? To the first I answer, that the addressing of our Saviour's command to the madness, or lunacy he cureth, is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind and sea; for neither do these hear; or than was the command of God, to the light, to the firmament, to the sun, and stars, when he commanded them to be; for they could not hear before they had a being. But those speeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God's word; no more therefore is it improper, to command madness, or lunacy, under the appellation of devils by which they were then commonly understood, to depart out of a man's body. To the second, concerning their being incorporeal, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other corporeal spirit, but that of his own, by which his body is naturally moved.

The Scriptures do not teach that spirits are incorporeal.

Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the form of a dove, is said by St. Matthew (chapter iv. 1), to have been led up by the Spirit into the wilderness; and the same is recited (Luke iv. 1) in these words, Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the wilderness; whereby it is evident that by spirit there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for a possession; for Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another. And whereas in the verses following he is

said to have been taken up by the devil into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the temple, shall we conclude thence that he was possessed of the devil, or carried thither by violence? And again, carried thence by the devil into an exceeding high mountain, who showed him thence all the kingdoms of the world: wherein we are not to believe he was either possessed, or forced by the devil; nor that any mountain is high enough, according to the literal sense, to show him one whole hemisphere. What then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the wilderness; and that this carrying of him up and down from the wilderness to the city, and from thence into a mountain, was a vision? Conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led into the wilderness, not by, but in, the Spirit; whereas, concerning his being taken up into the mountain, and unto the pinnacle of the temple, he speaketh as St. Matthew doth: which suiteth with the nature of a vision.

Again, where St. Luke (chap. xxii. 3, 4) says of Judas Iscariot, that Satan entered into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Christ unto them; it may be answered, that by the entering of Satan, that is the enemy, into him, is meant, the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture understood, the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so by the entering of Satan may be understood the wicked cogitations, and designs of the adversaries of Christ, and his disciples. For as it is hard to say, that the devil was entered into Judas, before he had any such hostile design; so it is impertinent to say, he was first Christ's enemy in his heart, and that the devil entered into him afterwards. Therefore the entering of Satan, and his wicked purpose, was one and the same thing.

But if there be no immaterial spirit, or any possession of men's bodies by any spirit corporeal, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his

apostles did not teach the people so; and in such clear words, as they might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more curious, than necessary for a Christian man's salvation. Men may as well ask why Christ, that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all manner of moral virtues, gave it to some only, and not to all: and why he left the search of natural causes, and sciences, to the natural reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally; and many other such questions. Of which nevertheless there may be alleged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when he brought the Israelites into the land of Promise, did not secure them therein, by subduing all the nations round about them; but left many of them, as thorns in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety and industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions; but left them to exercise our industry, and reason; the scope of his preaching, being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation, namely, the belief of this article, that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins, and at his coming again, gloriously to reign over his elect, and to save them from their enemies eternally. To which, the opinion of possession by spirits, or phantasms, is no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own inventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God's commands, we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude; I find in Scripture that there be angels, and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream, or vision; which the Latins call spectra, and took for demons. And I find that there are spirits corporeal, though subtle and invisible; but not that any

man's body was possessed or inhabited by them; and that the bodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spiritual bodies, as St. Paul calls them.

The power of casting out devils, not the same it was in the primitive church.

Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeal spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of exorcism, that is to say, of ejection of devils by conjuration, is thereupon built; and, though rarely and faintly practised, is not yet totally given over. That there were many demoniacs in the primitive Church, and few madmen, and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of, and see many madmen, and few demoniacs, proceeds not from the change of nature, but of names. But how it comes to pass that whereas heretofore the apostles, and after them for a time, the pastors of the Church, did cure those singular diseases, which now they are not seen to do; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true believer now, to do all that the faithful did then, that is to say, as we read (Mark xvi. 17, 18), in Christ's name to cast out devils, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without harm-taking, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands, and all this without other words, but in the name of Jesus, is another question. And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to come; and consequently, that when they sought authority, and riches, and trusted to their own subtlety for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural gifts of God were again taken from them.

Another relic of Gentilism, worshipping of images, left in the Church, not brought into it.

Another relic of Gentilism is, the worship of images, neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them after they had given their names to

Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the general religion of the Gentiles to worship for gods those apparences that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of their senses, which are commonly called ideas, idols, phantasms, conceits, as being representations of those external bodies which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream. And this is the reason why St. Paul says, (1 Cor. viii, 4) we know that an idol is nothing; not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honoured, or feared in the image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the brain. And the worship of these with divine honour, is that which is in the Scripture called idolatry, and rebellion against God. For God being King of the Jews, and his lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the high-priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to images, which are representations of their own fancies, they had had no further dependance on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude; nor on his prime-ministers, Moses and the high-priests; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the commonwealth, and their own destruction for want of union. And therefore the first law of God was, they should not take for gods, Alienos Deos, that is, the gods of other nations, but that only true God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their enemies. And the second was, that they should not make to themselves any image to worship, of their own invention. For it is the same deposing of a king, to submit to another king, whether he be set up by a neighbour nation, or by ourselves.

Answer to certain seeming texts for images.

The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where God is worshipped, are first, two examples; one of the cherubims over the ark of God; the other of the brazen serpent. Secondly, some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to God; as to worship his footstool. And lastly, some other texts, by which is authorized a religious honouring of holy things. But before I examine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I must first explain what is to be understood by worshipping, and what by images and idols.

What is worship.

I have already shown in the xxth chapter of this discourse, that to honour, is to value highly the power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in power; we honour him not, but dishonour him by any value less than infinite. And thus honour is properly of its own nature, secret, and internal in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the signs of our honouring, and these go by the name of worship; in Latin, cultus. Therefore, to pray to, to swear by, to obey, to be diligent and officious in serving: in sum, all words and actions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is worship, whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they appear as signs of honouring, are ordinarily also called honour.

Distinction between divine and civil worship.

The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings, and men in authority, is civil worship: but the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures or other actions be, is divine worship. To fall prostrate before a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but civil worship: and he that putteth off his

hat in the church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the house of God, worshippeth with divine worship. They that seek the distinction of divine and civil worship, not in the intention of the worshipper, but in the words δουλεία and λατρεία, deceive themselves. For whereas there be two sorts of servants: that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves taken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the will of their masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience), and that are bought and sold as beasts, were called δουλοι, that is, properly slaves, and their service δουλεία: the other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters) voluntarily, are called θῆτες; that is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further right, than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another: and the word λάτρις, is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether as a slave, or a voluntary servant. So that λατρ˛εία signifieth generally all service; but δουλεία the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery: and both are used in Scripture, (to signify our service of God) promiscuously; δουλεία, because we are God's slaves; λατρεία, because we serve him. And in all kinds of service is contained, not only obedience, but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signify honour.

An image, what. Phantasms.

An image, in the most strict signification of the word, is the resemblance of something visible: in which sense the phantastical forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to the sight, are only images; such as are the show of a man, or other thing in the water, by reflection, or refraction; or of the sun, or stars by direct vision in the air; which are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their

magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of sight, or by glasses, and are present oftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours and shapes, as things that depend only upon the fancy. And these are the images, which are originally and most properly called ideas, and idols, and derived from the language of the Grecians, with whom the word εἴδω signifieth to see. They also are called phantasms, which is in the same language, apparitions. And from these images it is, that one of the faculties of man's nature, is called the imagination. And from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can be, any image made of a thing invisible.

It is also evident, that there can be, no image of a thing infinite: for all the images, and phantasms that are made by the impression of things visible, are figured; but figure is a quantity every way determined. And therefore there can be no image of God; nor of the soul of man; nor of spirits; but only of bodies visible; that is, bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.

Fictions. Material images.

And whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw; making up a figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the poets make their centaurs, chimeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to those shapes, and make them in wood, clay, or metal. And these are also called images, not for the resemblance of any corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some phantastical inhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in these idols, as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the material body made by art, may be said to be the image of the fantastical idol made by nature.

But in a larger use of the word image, is contained also, any representation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be called the image of God: and an inferior magistrate, the image of an earthly sovereign. And many times in the idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their material idol to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. For a stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. And at this day we see many images of the Virgin Mary, and other saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one man's fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the names only, to represent the persons mentioned in the history; to which every man applieth a mental image of his own making, or none at all. And thus an image in the largest sense, is either the resemblance, or the representation of some thing visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part.

But the name of idol is extended yet further in Scripture, to signify also the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for gods.

Idolatry, what.

Having shown what is worship, and what an image; I will now put them together, and examine what that idolatry is, which is forbidden in the second commandment, and other places of the Scripture.

To worship an image, is voluntarily to do those external acts, which are signs of honouring either the matter of the image, which is wood, stone, metal, or some other visible creature; or the phantasm of the brain, for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and figured; or both together, as one animate body, composed of the matter and the phantasm, as of a body and soul.

To be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other places as he ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man, or prince with civil worship; as being a sign, not of honouring the stool or place, but the person; and is not idolatry. But if he that doth it, should suppose the soul of the prince to be in the stool, or should present a petition to the stool, it were divine worship, and idolatry.

To pray to a king for such things, as he is able to do for us, though we prostrate ourselves before him, is but civil worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but human: but voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God only can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side, if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry: for the worship which the sovereign commandeth to be done unto himself by the terror of his laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internal honour, is no worship; and therefore no idolatry. Neither can it be said, that he that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of his sovereign.

To worship God, in some peculiar place, or turning a man's face towards an image, or determinate place, is not to worship, or honour the place, or image; but to acknowledge it holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the image, or the place to be set apart from common use. For that is the meaning of the word holy; which implies no new quality in the place or image, but only a new relation by appropriation to God; and therefore is not idolatry; no more than it was idolatry to worship God before the brazen serpent; or for the

Jews, when they were out of their own country, to turn their faces, when they prayed, towards the temple of Jerusalem; or for Moses to put off his shoes when he was before the flaming bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai, which place God had chosen to appear in, and to give his laws to the people of Israel, and was therefore holy ground, not by inherent sanctity, but by separation to God's use; or for Christians to worship in the churches, which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the authority of the king, or other true representant of the Church. But to worship God, as inanimating, or inhabiting such image, or place; that is to say, in infinite substance in a finite place, is idolatry: for such finite gods, are but idols of the brain, nothing real; and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of vanity, and lies, and nothing. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or present in the place, or image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some works of his, in case the place, or image be dedicated, or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our sovereign pastors, is idolatry. For the commandment is, thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image. God commanded Moses to set up the brazen serpent; he did not make it to himself; it was not therefore against the commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron, and the people, as being done without authority from God, was idolatry; not only because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a religious use, without warrant either from God their sovereign, or from Moses, that was his lieutenant.

The Gentiles worshipped for gods, Jupiter and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts: and for the children of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortal deity, and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternal law of reason, nor in his positive and revealed will. But though our Saviour was a

man, whom we also believe to be God immortal, and the Son of God, yet this is no idolatry; because we build not that belief upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures. And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, this is my body, signify, that he himself, and the seeming bread in his hand, and not only so, but that all the seeming morsels of bread that have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall be consecrated by priests, be so many Christ's bodies, and yet all of them but one body; then is that no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text do not signify that, (for there is no other that can be alleged for it) then, because it is a worship of human institution, it is idolatry. For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the bread into Christ's body: for the Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and might upon that ground no less excuse their idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their wood, and stone into God Almighty.

Whereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration to be the supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of God's graces, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous dilemma. For if they worship not the man whom they believe to be so inspired, they fall into impiety; as not adoring God's supernatural presence. And again, if they worship him, they commit idolatry; for the apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore the safest way is to believe, that by the descending of the dove upon the apostles; and by Christ's breathing on them, when he gave them the Holy Ghost; and by the giving of it by imposition of hands, are understood the signs which God has been pleased to use, or ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach his kingdom, and in their conversation, that it might not be scandalous, but edifying to others.

Scandalous worship of images.

Besides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous worship of them; which is also a sin, but not idolatry. For idolatry is to worship by signs of an internal, and real honour: but scandalous worship, is but seeming worship, and may sometimes be joined with an inward, and hearty detestation, both of the image, and of the phantastical demon, or idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed only from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is nevertheless a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of religion: whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling.

If therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, do external honour to an idol for fear; unless he make his fear and unwillingness to it, as evident as the worship; he scandalizeth his brother, by seeming to approve idolatry. For his brother arguing from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to be lawful in itself. And this scandal is sin, and a scandal given. But if one being no pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian doctrine, do the same, and another follow him; this is no scandal given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of scandal, which he taketh of himself for an excuse before men. For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an idolatrous king, or state, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, he detesteth the idol in his heart, he doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do better. But if a pastor, who as Christ's messenger, has undertaken to teach Christ's doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were not only a sinful scandal, in

respect of other Christian men's consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.

The sum of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the worship of images, is this, that he that worshippeth in an image, or any creature, either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it; or both together; or believeth that such things hear his prayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes, committeth idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of punishment, if he be a man whose example hath power amongst his brethren, committeth a sin. But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himself, but taken from the commandment of God's word, as the Jews did in worshipping God before the cherubims, and before the brazen serpent for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not idolatry.

Now for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome, from the doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of Rome.

Answer to the argument from the cherubims, and brazen serpent.

As for the proofs alleged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of images appointed by God to be set up; they were not set up for the people, or any man to worship, but that they should worship God himself before them; as before the cherubims over the ark, and the brazen serpent. For we read not, that the priest, or any other did worship the cherubims; but contrarily we read (2 Kings xviii. 4) that Hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had set up, because the people burnt incense to

it. Besides, those examples are not put for our imitation, that we also should set up images, under pretence of worshipping God before them; because the words of the second commandment, thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, &c. distinguish between the images that God commanded to be set up, and those which we set up to ourselves. And therefore from the cherubims or brazen serpent, to the images of man's devising; and from the worship commanded by God, to the will-worship of men, the argument is not good. This also is to be considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should do so no more; so also Christian sovereigns ought to break down the images which their subjects have been accustomed to worship, that there be no more occasion of such idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant people, where images are worshipped, do really believe there is a divine power in the images; and are told by their pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done by the saint, which they think either is the image itself, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the calf, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calf either was that God, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the image to be God, or a saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the golden calf was made, the people said, (Exod. xxxii. 4) These are thy gods, O Israel; and where the images of Laban (Gen. xxxi. 30) are called his gods. And we see daily by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study nothing but their food and ease, are content to believe any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entail unalienable, except by an express and new law.

Painting of fancies no idolatry; but abusing them to religious worship is.

But they infer from some other places, that it is lawful to paint angels, and also God himself: as from God's walking in the garden; from Jacob's seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other visions, and dreams. But visions, and dreams, whether natural, or supernatural, are but phantasms: and he that painteth an image of any of them, maketh not an image of God, but of his own phantasm, which is making of an idol. I say not, that to draw a picture after a fancy, is a sin; but when it is drawn, to hold it for a representation of God, is against the second commandment; and can be of no use, but to worship. And the same may be said of the images of angels, and of men dead; unless as monuments of friends, or of men worthy remembrance. For such use of an image, is not worship of the image; but a civil honouring of the person, not that is, but that was. But when it is done to the image which we make of a saint, for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the honour we do him, when dead, and without sense, we attribute to him more than human power; and therefore it is idolatry.

Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the law of Moses, nor in the Gospel, for the religious worship of images, or other representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the worship of the image of any creature in heaven or earth, or under the earth: and whereas Christian kings, who are living representants of God, are not to be worshipped by their subjects, by any act that signifieth a greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortal man is capable of; it cannot be imagined, that the religious worship now in use, was brought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the images themselves, in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.

How idolatry was left in the Church.

The cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the workmanship of them, which made the owners, though converted from worshipping them as they had done religiously for demons, to retain them still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honour of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the pastors of the primitive Church; as being easy, by giving them new names, to make that an image of the Virgin Mary, and of her son our Saviour, which before perhaps was called the image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a Jupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like. And as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new-made Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the images of Christ and his apostles, grew more and more idolatrous; save that somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers emperors, and bishops, and general councils, observed and opposed the unlawfulness thereof; but too late, or too weakly.

Canonizing of saints.

The canonizing of saints, is another relic of Gentilism: it is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custom as ancient as the commonwealth of Rome itself. The first that ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon the narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the senate, he spake with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in heaven, and was there called Quirinus, and would be propitious to the state of their new city: and thereupon the senate gave public testimony of his sanctity. Julius Cæsar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, were canonized for saints; for by such testimony is canonization now defined; and is the same with the ἀποθέωσις of the heathen.

The name of Pontifex.

It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the name, and power of pontifex maximus. This was the name of him that in the ancient commonwealth of Rome, had the supreme authority under the senate and people, of regulating all ceremonies and doctrines concerning their religion: and when Augustus Cæsar changed the state into a monarchy, he took to himself no more but this office, and that of tribune of the people, that is to say, the supreme power both in state, and religion; and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same. But when the emperor Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause religion to be regulated, under his authority, by the Bishop of Rome: though it do not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but rather, that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman provinces. For it is not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege of the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other bishops; as may be evidently seen by that, that the bishop of Constantinople, when the emperor made that city the seat of the empire, pretended to be equal to the bishop of Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carried it, and became the Pontifex Maximus; but in right only of the emperor; and not without the bounds of the empire; nor any where, after the emperor had lost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him. From whence we may by the way observe, that there is no place for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the emperor having sovereign power civil, hath expressly chosen the Pope for the chief pastor under himself, of his Christian subjects.

Procession of images.

The carrying about of images in procession, is another relic of the religion of the Greeks, and Romans. For they also carried their idols from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latins called thensa, and vehiculum Deorum; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they called ferculum: and that which they called pompa, is the same that now is named procession. According whereunto, amongst the divine honours which were given to Julius Cæsar by the senate, this was one, that in the pomp, or procession, at the Circæan games, he should have thensam et ferculum, a sacred chariot and a shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a god: just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers under a canopy.

Wax candles, and torches lighted.

To these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches, and candles, before the images of the gods, both amongst the Greeks, and Romans. For afterwards the emperors of Rome received the same honour; as we read of Caligula, that at his reception to the empire, he was carried from Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of people, the ways beset with altars, and beasts for sacrifice, and burning torches: and of Caracalla, that was received into Alexandria with incense, and with casting of flowers, and δαδοῦχίαις, that is, with torches; for δαδοῦχοι were they that amongst the Greeks carried torches lighted in the processions of their gods. And in process of time, the devout, but ignorant people, did many times honour their bishops with the like pomp of wax candles, and the images of our Saviour, and the saints, constantly, in the church itself. And thus came in the use of wax candles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councils.

The heathens had also their aqua lustralis, that is to say, holy water. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their holy days. They had their bacchanalia; and we have our wakes, answering to them: they their

saturnalia, and we our carnivals, and Shrove-Tuesday's liberty of servants: they their procession of Priapus; we our fetching in, erection, and dancing about May-poles; and dancing is one kind of worship: they had their procession called Ambarvalia; and we our procession about the fields in the Rogation-week. Nor do I think that these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles; but they are all that I can for the present call to mind; and if a man would well observe that which is delivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty bottles of Gentilism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, either by negligence or ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of Christianity, that will not fail in time to break them.

CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESS FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS.

WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS.

By Philosophy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties: or from the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit, such effects, as human life requireth. So the geometrician, from the construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; and from the properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end to be able to measure land, and water; and for infinite other uses. So the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun, and stars, in divers parts of the heavens, findeth out the causes of day, and night, and of the different seasons of the year; whereby he keepeth an account of time; and the like of other sciences.

Prudence no part of philosophy.

By which definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that original knowledge called experience, in which consisteth prudence: because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts, as in man; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general, eternal, and immutable truth.

No false doctrine is part of philosophy.

Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions: for he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an

error:

No more is revelation supernatural.

Nor to that which any man knows by supernatural revelation; because it is not acquired by reasoning:

Nor learning taken upon credit of authors.

Nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books; because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause; and is not knowledge but faith.

Of the beginnings and progress of philosophy.

The faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was not possible, but that there should have been some general truths found out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself. The savages of America, are not without some good moral sentences; also they have a little arithmetic, to add, and divide in numbers not too great: but they are not, therefore, philosophers. For as there were plants of corn and wine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men knew their virtue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in fields and vineyards; in which time they fed on acorns, and drank water: so also there have been divers true, general, and profitable speculations from the beginning; as being the natural plants of human reason. But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon gross experience; there was no method; that is to say, no sowing, nor planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds, and common plants of error and conjecture. And the cause of it being the want of leisure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great commonwealths, it should be otherwise. Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth, the mother of peace and leisure. Where first were great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of philosophy. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests

of Chaldea and Egypt, are counted the most ancient philosophers; and those countries were the most ancient of kingdoms. Philosophy was not risen to the Grecians, and other people of the west, whose commonwealths, no greater perhaps than Lucca or Geneva, had never peace, but when their fears of one another were equal; nor the leisure to observe anything but one another. At length, when war had united many of these Grecian lesser cities, into fewer, and greater; then began seven men, of several parts of Greece, to get the reputation of being wise; some of them for moral and politic sentences; and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, which was astronomy, and geometry. But we hear not yet of any schools of philosophy.

Of the schools of philosophy amongst the Athenians.

After the Athenians, by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten the dominion of the sea; and thereby, of all the islands, and maritime cities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says, Acts xvii. 21), in telling and hearing news, or in discoursing of philosophy publicly to the youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose. Plato, in certain public walks called Academia, from one Academus: Aristotle in the walk of the temple of Pan, called Lyceum: others in the Stoa, or covered walk, wherein the merchants' goods were brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their leisure, in teaching or in disputing of their opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the city together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades also did at Rome, when he was ambassador: which caused Cato to advise the senate to dispatch him quickly, for fear of corrupting the manners of the young men, that delighted to hear him speak, as they thought, fine things.

From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called schola, which in their tongue signifieth leisure; and their disputations, diatribæ, that is to say, passing of the time. Also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of them from these their Schools: for they that followed Plato's doctrine, were called Academics; the followers of Aristotle Peripatetics, from the walk he taught in; and those that Zeno taught Stoics, from the Stoa; as if we should denominate men from Moor-fields, from Paul's Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loiter.

Nevertheless, men were so much taken with this custom, that in time it spread itself over all Europe, and the best part of Afric; so as there were schools publicly erected and maintained, for lectures and disputations, almost in every commonwealth.

Of the schools of the Jews.

There were also schools, anciently, both before and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the Jews; but they were schools of their law. For though they were called synagogues, that is to say, congregations of the people; yet, inasmuch as the law was every sabbath-day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name only, from public schools; and were not only in Jerusalem, but in every city of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a school at Damascus, whereinto Paul entered, to persecute. There were others at Antioch, Iconium, and Thessalonica, whereinto he entered to dispute: and such was the synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia; that is to say, the school of Libertines, and of Jews that were strangers in Jerusalem; and of this school they were that disputed (Acts vi. 9) with St. Stephen.

The schools of the Grecians unprofitable.

But what has been the utility of those schools? What science is there at this day acquired by their readings and disputings? That we have of geometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we are not indebted for it to the schools. Plato, that was the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his school to all that were not already in some measure geometricians. There were many that studied that science to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their schools; nor was there any sect of geometricians; nor did they then pass under the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and insignificant language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in geometry. For nature worketh by motion; the ways and degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures. Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions. For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is honest and dishonest, what is just and unjust, and generally what is good and evil. Whereas they make the rules of good and bad, by their own liking and disliking: by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth, as far as he dares, whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of commonwealth. Their logic, which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and inventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old philosophers, as Cicero saith, (who was one of them,) have not some of them maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government, than much of

that he hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics.

The schools of the Jews unprofitable.

The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses; who commanded (Deut. xxxi. 10) that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear and learn it. Therefore the reading of the law, which was in use after the captivity, every Sabbath day, ought to have had no other end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandments which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the prophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries, and vain traditions; and so little understood the prophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he did, of which the prophets prophesied. So that by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God, and of spirits; which they compounded of the vain philosophy and theology of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most easily be wrested to their purpose; and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.

University, what it is.

That which is now called an University, is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools, in one and the same town or city. In which, the principal schools were ordained for the three professions, that is to say, of the Roman religion, of the Roman law, and of the art of medicine. And for the study of philosophy, it hath no otherwise place, than as a handmaid to the Roman religion: and since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study is not properly

philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on authors,) but Aristotelity. And for geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigid truth. And if any man by the ingenuity of his own nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.

Errors brought into religion from Aristotle's metaphysics.

Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from blindness of understanding; I shall first consider their principles. There is a certain philosophia prima, on which all other philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of all others the most universal; which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning; and are commonly called definitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a man's conceptions concerning the nature and generation of bodies. The explication, that is, the settling of the meaning, of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the Schools called metaphysics; as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title. But it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much as books written or placed after his natural philosophy: but the schools take them for books of supernatural philosophy: for the word metaphysics will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to natural reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to be understood by it, must needs think it supernatural.

Errors concerning abstract essences.

From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make school divinity, we are told, there be in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences, and substantial forms. For the interpreting of which jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse, for applying myself to those that are. The world, (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are), is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe, is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe: and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing; and consequently no where. Nor does it follow from hence, that spirits are nothing: for they have dimensions, and are therefore really bodies; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies only, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of opacity. But for spirits, they call them incorporeal; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him.

To know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract, or substantial forms, we are to consider what those words do properly signify. The use of words, is to register to ourselves, and make manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which words, some are the names of the things conceived; as the names of all sorts of bodies, that work upon the senses, and leave an impression in the imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those ideas, or mental images we have of all things we see, or remember. And others again

are names of names; or of different sorts of speech: as universal, plural, singular, are the names of names; and definition, affirmation, negation, true, false, syllogism, interrogation, promise, covenant, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence, or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, a man is a body, he intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man; as being but several names of the same thing, man; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. And as we use the verb is, so the Latins use their verb est, and the Greeks their Ἔστι through all its declinations. Whether all other nations of the world have in their several languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it. For the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their consequence, if it were the custom, (for custom is it, that gives words their force,) as well as the words is, or be, or are, and the like.

And if it were so, that there were a language without any verb answerable to est, or is, or be; yet the men that used it would be not a jot the less capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latins. But what then would become of these terms, of entity, essence, essential, essentiality, that are derived from it, and of many more than depend on these, applied as most commonly they are? They are therefore no names of things; but signs, by which we make known, that we conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another: as when we say, a man is a living body, we mean not that the man is one thing, the living body another, and the is, or being a third; but that the man, and the living body, is the same thing; because the consequence, if he be a man, he is a living body, is a true consequence, signified by that word is. Therefore, to be a body, to walk, to be speaking, to live, to see, and the like infinitives; also corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, that signify just

the same, are the names of nothing; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.

But to what purpose, may some man say, is such subtlety in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can walk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the figure, and colour, and taste of a piece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread. And upon the same ground they say, that faith, and wisdom, and other virtues, are sometimes poured into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven, as if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavour to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest, that can make God, rather than his sovereign, nay than God himself? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water, that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the errors, which are brought into the Church, from the entities and essences of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.

Being once fallen into this error of separated essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them some

place. But because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is corporeal; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed anywhere circumscriptivè, but definitivè; which terms being mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that the vanity of them may be concealed. For the circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but the determination, or defining of its place; and so both the terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a man, which, they say, is his soul, they affirm it, to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his body; and yet no more soul in the whole body, than in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated from the body.

And when they come to give account how an incorporeal substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn souls.

Again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a soul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and how the ghosts of men, and I may add of their clothes which they appear in, can walk by night in churches, churchyards, and other places of sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unless they will say, they walk definitivè, not circumscriptivè, or spiritually, not temporally: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever.

Nunc-stans.

For the meaning of eternity, they will not have it to be an endless succession of time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how

God's will, and preordaining of things to come, should not be before his prescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or agent before the action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach us, that eternity is the standing still of the present time, a nunc-stans, as the Schools call it; which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a hic-stans for an infinite greatness of place.

One body in many places, and many bodies in one place at once.

And whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbering parts of it, and, in numbering those parts, number also the parts of the place it filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, we make also many places of those parts; whereby there cannot be conceived in the mind of any man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us believe, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place: as if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And these are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing philosophically, instead of admiring, and adoring of the divine and incomprehensible nature; whose attributes cannot signify what he is, but ought to signify our desire to honour him, with the best appellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity.

Absurdities in natural philosophy, as gravity the cause of heaviness.

Then for physics, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events; they render none at all, but empty words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the earth, and others go naturally from it; the Schools will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are heavy; and that this heaviness is it that causes them to descend. But if you ask what they mean by heaviness, they will define it to be an endeavour to go to the centre of the earth. So that the cause why things sink downward, is an endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they do. Or they will tell you the centre of the earth is the place of rest, and conservation for heavy things; and therefore they endeavour to be there: as if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they would be at, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a piece of glass were less safe in the window, than falling into the street.

Quantity put into body already made.

If we would know why the same body seems greater, without adding to it, one time, than another; they say, when it seems less, it is condensed; when greater, rarified. What is that condensed, and rarified? Condensed, is when there is in the very same matter, less quantity than before; and rarified, when more. As if there could be matter, that had not some determined quantity; when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter; that is to say, of body, by which we say, one body is greater or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more or less were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be more or less dense.

Pouring in of souls.

For the cause of the soul of man, they say, creatur infundendo, and creando infunditur: that is, it is created by pouring it in, and poured in by creation.

Ubiquity of apparition.

For the cause of sense, an ubiquity of species; that is, of the shows or apparitions of objects; which when they be apparitions to the eye, is sight; when to the ear, hearing; to the palate, taste; to the nostril, smelling; and to the rest of the body, feeling.

Will, the cause of willing.

For cause of the will, to do any particular action, which is called volitio, they assign the faculty, that is to say, the capacity in general, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called voluntas; making the power the cause of the act. As if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their ability to do them.

Ignorance an occult cause.

And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own ignorance; but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also, as they think, to no man else. And to sympathy, antipathy, antiperistasis, specifical qualities, and other like terms, which signify neither the agent that produceth them, nor the operation by which they are produced.

If such metaphysics, and physics as this, be not vain philosophy, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.

One makes the things incongruent, another the incongruity

And for their moral, and civil philosophy, it hath the same, or greater absurdities. If a man do an action of injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the law, God they say is the prime cause of the law, and also the

prime cause of that, and all other actions; but no cause at all of the injustice; which is the inconformity of the action to the law. This is vain philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man maketh both a straight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their incongruity. And such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of their conclusions, before they know their premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is incomprehensible; and of attributes of honour to make attributes of nature; as this dictinction was made to maintain the doctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the will of God.

Private appetite the rule of public good.

Aristotle, and other heathen philosophers, define good and evil, by the appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law; for in the condition of men that have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good, and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state, is the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised; and men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own, and of other men's actions, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own passions; and no man calleth good or evil, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws; except only monks, and friars, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior, to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of good, is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public state.

And that lawful marriage is unchastity.

It is also vain and false philosophy, to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity, or continence, and by consequence to make them moral vices; as they do, that pretend chastity, and continence, for the ground

of denying marriage to the clergy. For they confess it is no more, but a constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy orders that continually attend the altar and administration of the eucharist, a continual abstinence from women, under the name of continual chastity, continence, and purity. Therefore they call the lawful use of wives, want of chastity and continence; and so make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the altar. If the law were made because the use of wives is incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice: if because it is a thing too impure, and unclean, for a man consecrated to God; much more should other natural, necessary, and daily works which all men do, render men unworthy to be priests, because they are more unclean.

But the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests, is not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errors in moral philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdom of St. Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of persecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one country to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the design of the Popes, and priests of after times, to make themselves the clergy, that is to say, sole heirs of the kingdom of God in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage; because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his kingdom the children of God shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven; that is to say, spiritual. Seeing then they had taken on them the name of spiritual, to have allowed themselves, when there was no need, the propriety of wives, had been an incongruity.

And that all government but popular is tyranny.

From Aristotle's civil philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of commonwealths but the popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens), tyranny. All kings they called tyrants; and the aristocracy of the thirty governors set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued them, the thirty tyrants. As also to call the condition of the people under the democracy, liberty. A tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a monarch. But when afterwards in most part of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the popular states bare towards it. As also the name of king became odious after the deposing of the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men, to conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute, that is given in despite, and to a great enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy, or aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger in; but call readily the one anarchy, and the other oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. And that which offendeth the people, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himself, but as the public representant, be it one man, or an assembly of men, thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they give evil names to their superiors; never knowing, till perhaps a little after a civil war, that without such arbitrary government, such war must be perpetual; and that it is men, and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.

That not men, but law governs.

And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in a well-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws. What man, that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? Or that believes the law can hurt him; that is, words

and paper, without the hands and swords of men? And this is of the number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their governors, to adhere to those that call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them: and yet they are many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy.

Laws over the conscience.

There is another error in their civil philosophy, which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen, to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination, and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions. By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true, that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him, if he be content to preach such and such doctrines; and in case of refusal, may deny him the employment. But to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature; and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of the Christian faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the natural care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his soul upon his own judgment, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?

Private interpretation of law.

For a private man, without the authority of the commonwealth, that is to say, without permission from the representant thereof, to interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics: but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen philosophers. For none of them deny, but that in the power of making laws, is comprehended also the power

of explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the commonwealth, and consequently, a part of the civil law?

Of the same kind it is also, when any but the sovereign restraineth in any man that power which the commonwealth hath not restrained; as they do, that impropriate the preaching of the gospel to one certain order of men, where the laws have left it free. If the state give me leave to preach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall not I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is, shall I not teach? But for this may some say, as also for administering to them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient mission; which is true: but this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no law that forbids it. Therefore to deny these functions to those, to whom the civil sovereign hath not denied them, is a taking away of a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civil government.

Language of School divines

More examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors of School-divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall only add this, that the writings of School-divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant trains of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, than in the common use of the Latin tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would see proved, let him, as I have said once before, see whether he can translate any School-divine into any of the modern tongues, as French, English, or any other

copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made intelligible, is not intelligible in the Latin. Which insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.

Errors from tradition.

Lastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain history, what is all the legend of fictitious miracles, in the lives of the saints; and all the histories of apparitions, and ghosts, alleged by the doctors of the Roman Church, to make good their doctrines of hell, and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines which have no warrant, neither in reason, nor Scripture; as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten word of God: but old wives' fables? Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the ancient fathers; yet those fathers were men, that might too easily believe false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they believed, hath no other force with them that, according to the counsel of St. John (1 Epist. iv. 1), examine spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Roman Church, (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it), to discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash belief of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of natural causes, such as the fathers were, are commonly the most subject to. For naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope, and St. Bernard have somewhat of apparitions of ghosts, that said they were in purgatory; and so has our Bede: but no where, I believe, but by report from others. But if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own infirmity, or fraud.

Suppression of reason.

With the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawful authority, nor sufficient study, are competent judges of the truth. Our own navigations make manifest, and all men learned in human sciences, now acknowledge there are antipodes: and every day it appeareth more and more, that years and days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have in their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the religion established? Let them be silenced by the laws of those, to whom the teachers of them are subject; that is, by the laws civil. For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the laws teach even true philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion, or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and the teachers punished by virtue of his power to whom the care of the public quiet is committed; which is the authority civil. For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon themselves, (in any place where they are subject to the state), in their own right, though they call it God’s right, is but usurpation.

CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH DARKNESS, AND TO WHOM IT ACCRUETH.

HE THAT RECEIVETH benefit by a fact, is presumed to be the author

Cicero maketh honourable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom he had, in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, cui bono; that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author, as doth the benefit of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may be that have possessed the people so long in this part of Christendom, with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind.

That the Church militant is the kingdom of God, was first taught by the Churcn of Rome:

And first, to this error, that the present Church now militant on earth, is the kingdom of God, (that is, the kingdom of glory, or the land of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the land), are annexed these worldly benefits; first, that the pastors and teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as God's public ministers, to a right of governing the Church; and consequently, because the Church and commonwealth are the same persons, to be rectors, and governors of the commonwealth. By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian princes, to believe, that to disobey him, was to disobey Christ himself; and in all differences between him and other princes, (charmed with the word power

spiritual), to abandon their lawful sovereigns; which is in effect an universal monarchy over all Christendom. For though they were first invested in the right of being supreme teachers of Christian doctrine, by and under Christian emperors, within the limits of the Roman empire, as is acknowledged by themselves, by the title of Pontifex Maximus, who was an officer subject to the civil state; yet after the empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subjected to them, another title, namely, the right of St. Peter; not only to save entire their pretended power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian provinces, though no more united in the empire of Rome. This benefit of an universal monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear rule), is a sufficient presumption, that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine, by which it was obtained; namely, that the Church now on earth, is the kingdom of Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his commandments.

After that certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would expect in reason, that the civil sovereigns in all those Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as before they had unadvisedly let it go, was their own right, and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the kings administered the government of religion, by maintaining their employment to be in God's right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, yet an independency on the civil power: and they but seemed to usurp it, inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king, to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure.

And maintained also by the Presbytery.

But in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this

doctrine, that the kingdom of Christ is already come, and that it began at the resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But cui bono? What profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from all places of God's public service in his own kingdom; and with force to resist him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it, without authority from the civil sovereign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his lawful liberty, that is, to usurp an unlawful power over their brethren? The authors therefore of this darkness in religion, are the Roman, and the presbyterian clergy.

Infallibility.

To this head, I refer also all those doctrines, that serve them to keep the possession of this spiritual sovereignty after it is gotten, As first, that the Pope in his public capacity cannot err. For who is there, that believing this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands?

Subjection of bishops.

Secondly, that all other bishops, in what commonwealth soever, have not their right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope, is a doctrine, by which there comes to be in every Christian commonwealth many potent men, (for so are bishops), that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to him, though he be a foreign prince; by which means he is able, as he hath done many times, to raise a civil war against the state that submits not itself to be governed accordingly to his pleasure and interest.

Exemptions of the clergy.

Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all monks, and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every commonwealth, that enjoy the benefit of the laws,

and are protected by the power of the civil state, which nevertheless pay no part of the public expense; nor are liable to the penalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him only, to uphold his universal monarchy.

The names of sacerdotes, and sacrificers.

Fourthly, the giving to their priests, which is no more in the New Testament but presbyters, that is, elders, the name of sacerdotes, that is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civil sovereign, and his public ministers, amongst the Jews, whilst God was their king. Also, the making the Lord's Supper a sacrifice, serveth to make the people believe the Pope hath the same power over all Christians, that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high-priest then had.

The sacramentation of marriage.

Fifthly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament, giveth to the clergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages; and thereby, of what children are legitimate; and consequently, of the right of succession to hereditary kingdoms.

The single life of priests.

Sixthly, the denial of marriage to priests, serveth to assure this power of the Pope over kings. For if a king be a priest, he cannot marry, and transmit his kingdom to his posterity; if he be not a priest, then the Pope pretendeth this authority ecclesiastical over him, and over his people.

Auricular confession.

Seventhly, from auricular confession, they obtain, for the assurance of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes, and great persons in the civil state, than these can have of the designs of the state ecclesiastical.

Canonization of saints, and declaring of martyrs.

Eighthly, by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs, they assure their power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns even to death, if by the Pope's excommunication, they be declared heretics or enemies to the Church; that is, as they interpret it, to the Pope.

Transubstantiation, penance, absolution.

Ninthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every priest, of making Christ; and by the power of ordaining penance; and of remitting, and retaining of sins.

Purgatory, indulgences, external works.

Tenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched.

Demonology and exorcism.

Eleventhly, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep, or think they keep, the people more in awe of their power.

School divinity.

Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities, which have been all erected and regulated by the Pope's authority, serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the ignis fatuus of vain philosophy, for the light of the Gospel.

The authors of spiritual darkness, who they be.

To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people; or for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly riches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule, of

cui bono, we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spiritual darkness, the Pope, and Roman clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the minds of men this erroneous doctrine, that the Church now on earth, is that kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament.

But the emperors, and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government these errors, and the like encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and of the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of their teachers, may nevertheless be esteemed accessories to their own, and the public damage. For without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publicly preached. I say they might have hindered the same in the beginning: but when the people were once possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy to be applied, that any man could invent. And for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the machinations of men against the truth, we are to attend his good pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the wariness of their predecessors had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let go all, as Peter's net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of fishes; whereas the impatience of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their subjects' eyes were opened, did but increase the power they resisted. I do not therefore blame the emperor Frederick for holding the stirrup to our countryman Pope Adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if he had not done it, he was not likely to have succeeded in the empire. But I blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have holden the stirrup to all the succeeding Popes,

whilst they mounted into the thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and their people at their pleasure.

But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is inverted. The web begins at the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other virtues of the Apostles, whom the people, converted, obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their words and actions subject to none but the civil power. Afterwards the presbyters, as the flocks of Christ increased, assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies, made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called excommunication), not as being infidels, but as being disobedient: and this was the first knot upon their liberty. And the number of presbyters increasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province, got themselves an authority over the parochial presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of bishops: and this was a second knot on Christian liberty. Lastly, the bishop of Rome, in regard of the imperial city, took upon him an authority, (partly by the wills of the emperors themselves, and by the title of Pontifex Maximus, and at last when the emperors were grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter), over all other bishops of the empire: which was the third and last knot, and the whole synthesis and construction, of the pontificial power.

And therefore the analysis, or resolution, is by the same way; but beginneth with the knot that was last tied; as we may see in the dissolution of the præterpolitical Church government in England. First, the power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the bishops, who before exercised their functions in right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in right of the Queen and her successors; though by retaining the

phrase of jure divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate right from God: and so was untied the third knot. After this, the presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of episcopacy: and so was the second knot dissolved. And almost at the same time, the power was taken also from the presbyterians: and so we are reduced to the independancy of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the person of his minister, (the fault which the apostle reprehended in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best. First, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men, but of the Word itself, working faith in every one, not always according to the purpose of them that plant and water, but of God himself, that giveth the increase. And secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little error, to require of a man endued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of any other man, or of the most voices of any other men, which is little better than to venture his salvation at cross and pile. Nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this loss of their ancient authority. For there is none should know better than they, that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation; and not by suppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural reason; nor by obscure language; nor by arrogating to themselves more knowledge than they make appear; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the pastors of God's Church are not only faults, but also scandals, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their authority.

Comparison of the papacy with the kingdom of fairies.

But after this doctrine, that the Church now militant, is the kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament, was received in the world;

the ambition, and canvassing for the offices that belong thereunto, and especially for that great office of being Christ's lieutenant, and the pomp of them that obtained therein the principal public charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward reverence due to the pastoral function: insomuch as the wisest men, of them that had any power in the civil state, needed nothing but the authority of their princes, to deny them any further obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their whole hierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may be compared not unfitly to the kingdom of fairies; that is, to the old wives' fables in England, concerning ghosts and spirits, and the feats they play in the night. And if a man consider the original of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of that heathen power.

The language also, which they use, both in the churches, and in their public acts, being Latin, which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world, what is it but the ghost of the old Roman language?

The fairies in what nation soever they converse, have but one universal king, which some poets of ours call King Oberon; but the Scripture calls Beelzebub, prince of demons. The ecclesiastics likewise, in whose dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one universal king, the Pope.

The ecclesiastics are spiritual men, and ghostly fathers. The fairies are spirits, and ghosts. Fairies and ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves. The ecclesiastics walk in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and church-yards.

The ecclesiastics have their cathedral churches, which, in what town soever they be erected, by virtue of holy water, and certain charms called

exorcisms, have the power to make those towns, cities, that is to say, seats of empire. The fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts, that domineer over the regions round about them.

The fairies are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the ecclesiastics vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice.

The ecclesiastics take from young men the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute what they command them. The fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles, and to change them into natural fools, which common people do therefore call elves, and are apt to mischief.

In what shop, or operatory the fairies make their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. But the operatories of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from authority pontificial.

When the fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their elves, to pinch them. The ecclesiastics, when they are displeased with any civil state, make also their elves, that is, superstitious, enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes, by preaching sedition; or one prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.

The fairies marry not; but there be amongst them incubi, that have copulation with flesh and blood. The priests also marry not.

The ecclesiastics take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant men, that stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So also it is in the fable of fairies, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the cream, which they skim from the milk.

What kind of money is current in the kingdom of fairies, is not recorded in the story. But the ecclesiastics in their receipts accept of the same money

that we do; though when they are to make any payment, it is in canonizations, indulgencies, and masses.

To this, and such like resemblances between the papacy, and the kingdom of fairies, may be added this, that as the fairies have no existence, but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the traditions of old wives, or old poets: so the spiritual power of the Pope, without the bounds of his own civil dominion, consisteth only in the fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunications; upon hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture.

It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry VIII by his exorcism; nor for queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him little fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabit this clean swept house, and make the end thereof worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only, that pretends the kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to have a power therein, distinct from that of the civil state. And this is all I had a design to say, concerning the doctrine of the politics. Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my country.

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.

REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.

From the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken, to infer an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgment, they say, makes men censorious, and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men: and on the other side, celerity of fancy, makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary, to discern exactly between right and wrong. Again, in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary: for without it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerful eloquence, which procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true or false; and upon the passions and interests of men, which are different, and mutable.

And amongst the passions, courage, (by which I mean the contempt of wounds, and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace: and timorousness, many times disposeth to the desertion of the public defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person.

And to consider the contrariety of men’s opinions, and manners, in general, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil amity with all those, with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse:

which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.

To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities: for by education, and discipline, they may be, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man; but by turns; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may the judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering about the world. So also reason, and eloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet, in the moral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor between abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistence of human nature, with civil duties, as some think. I have known clearness of judgment, and largeness of fancy; strength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.

To the Laws of Nature, declared in Chapter XV. I would have this added, that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace. For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: it is a manifest contradiction of himself. And though this law may be drawn by

consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the times require to have it inculcated, and remembered.

And because I find by divers English books lately printed, that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it is, that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what is conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his laws: therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by express words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have showed before in the end of Chapter XXI.; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the means of his life are within the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy, esteemed lawful; a total submission, which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission, or composition, an assistance; but rather a detriment to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his armies, or garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of protection, and means to live as a soldier. But when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully, if he will. If therefore

he do it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject: for a contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.

By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a conqueror consisteth: for this submission in itself implieth them all. Conquest, is not the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that s slain, is overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken, and put into prison, or chains, is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of obedience, hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered, and a subject; and not before. The Romans used to say, that their general had pacified such a province, that is to say, in English, conquered it; and that the country was pacified by victory, when the people of it had promised imperata facere, that is, to do what the Roman people commanded them: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be either express, or tacit: express, by promise: tacit, by other signs. As for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an express promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable; yet if he live under their protection openly, he is understood to submit himself to the government: but if he live there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy, and enemy of the state. I say not, he does any injustice; for acts of open hostility bear not that name; but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when his country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor subject: but if at his return, he submit to the government, he is bound to obey it. So that conquest, to define it, is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. Which right, is acquired in the people's submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience, for life and liberty.

In Chapter XXIX, I have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power; for want whereof, the civil sovereign is fain to handle the sword of justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason whereof, which I have not there mentioned, is this, that they will all of them justify the war, by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on the possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did depend on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and upon their lineal, and directest descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the subjects' obedience to their sovereign at this day in all the world: wherein whilst they needlessly think to justify themselves, they justify all the successful rebellions that ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of men's actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a commonwealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.

And because the name of tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor less, than the name of sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny, is a toleration of hatred to commonwealth in general, and another evil seed, not differing much from the former. For to the justification of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse.

In Chapter XXXV, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture, that in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the sovereign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called his peculiar people, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their consent, but by his own power: and that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth; and that it was he that told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to do execution; especially in capital punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as I find it since. We know that generally in all commonwealths, the execution of corporal punishments, was either put upon the guards, or other soldiers of the sovereign power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart, concurred, to make them sue for such an office. But amongst the Israelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign, that he that was convicted of a capital crime, should be stoned to death by the people; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses, then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed who were to be the executioners; but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding being not thoroughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some cases, by a right of zeal; as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdom of God in old time, proceeded not from the sovereign command, but from the authority of private zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.

First, where the Levites fell upon the people, that had made and worshipped the Golden Calf, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the commandment of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, Exod. xxxii. 27. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give sentence against him; as appears, Levit. xxiv. 11, 12. Again, (Numb. xxv. 6, 7), when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of private zeal: their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no witness; the law was known, and he the heir-apparent to the sovereignty; and, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety of a commonwealth; as in a sudden rebellion, any man that can suppress it by his own power in the country where it begins, without express law or commission, may lawfully do it, and provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst it is in doing, or after it is done. Also Numb. xxxv. 30, it is expressly said, Whosoever shall kill the murderer, shall kill him upon the word of witnesses: but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of jus zelotarum. The law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of God to a renouncing of his allegiance, (Deut. xiii. 8, 9), forbids to conceal him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be condemned. And (Deut. xvii. 4, 5, 6, 7), the process against idolatry is exactly set down: for God there speaketh to the people, as judge, and commandeth them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the fact, and finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the witness throweth the first stone. This is not private zeal, but public condemnation. In like manner when a father hath a rebellious son, the law

is, (Deut. xxi. 18-21), that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these laws it was, that St. Stephen was stoned, and not by pretence of private zeal: for before he was carried away to execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high-priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is against both the justice and peace of a commonwealth.

In chapter XXXVI, I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses: nor that he spake not to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to other prophets: for the manner how he spake unto him from the mercy-seat, is expressly set down, Numbers vii. 89, in these words, From that time forward, when Moses entered into the Tabernacle of the congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the mercy-seat, which is over the Ark of the testimony; from between the cherubims he spake unto him. But it is not declared in what consisteth the preeminence of the manner of God's speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he also spake by a voice, (that is, by vision), unless the difference consist in the clearness of the vision. For face to face, and mouth to mouth, cannot be literally understood of the infiniteness, and incomprehensibility of the Divine nature.

And as to the whole doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it are true and proper; and the ratiocination solid. For I ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the known natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law of nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power ecclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it on such texts, as are both evident in themselves, and

consonant to the scope of the whole Scripture. And therefore am persuaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose only to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that by writing, or public discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is natural for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before. Of which in a time wherein the interests of men are changed, (seeing much of that doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old), there cannot choose but be very many.

In that part which treateth of a Christian commonwealth, there are some new doctrines, which, it may be, in a state where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a teacher. But in this time, that men call not only for peace, but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer new wine, to be put into new casks, that both may be preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when novelty can breed no trouble nor disorder in a state, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity, as to prefer ancient errors, before new and well-proved truth.

There is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which nevertheless I am confident, excepting the mischances of the press, is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, whether I have done well or ill in it, proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason, or upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any writer.

Secondly, the matters in question are not of fact, but of right, wherein there is no place for witnesses. There is scarce any of those old writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself and others; which makes their testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity, are not intrinsically the judgment of those that cite them, but words that pass, like gaping, from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men's wit. Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite, took it for an ornament, to do the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of ancient time, that either have written truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves; yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will reverence the age, the present is the oldest. If the antiquity of the writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honour is given, were more ancient when they wrote, than I am that am writing. But if it be well considered, the praise of ancient authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the dead, but from the competition, and mutual envy of the living.

To conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I writ before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of God, or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the public tranquility. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers, and the gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their conversation), upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen

politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the state; and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace, and defence; and the governors themselves have the less cause, to maintain at the common charge any greater army, than is necessary to make good the public liberty, against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.

And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civil and Ecclesiastical Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition of human nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of states, there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new), yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of this artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth, as opposeth no man's profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.

FINIS.

De Corpore

1656 EDITION

Published in 1655, *De Corpore* (On the Body) forms the second part of a larger work, conceived as a trilogy. *De Cive* had already appeared, while *De Homine* would be published in 1658. Hobbes had been drafting *De Corpore* for at least ten years before publication, but various obstacles had preventing his completing it sooner. This delay affected the book's reception, as its approach seemed much less innovative than it would have done in the previous decade.

De Corpore is largely a work devoted to foundational matters. Hobbes states that the subject of philosophy is devoted to "bodies". He clarifies this by division: in English translation, natural philosophy is concerned with the concept of "natural body", while the bodies called commonwealths are the concern of "civil philosophy". He then applies "body" as synonymous with substance, breaking with the scholastic tradition.

The treatise consists of four sections, with Part I covering logic, Part II providing a repertoire of scientific concepts and Part III concerning geometry and mathematics generally, in a reductive way, which proved controversial. Hobbes proposes a kinematic foundation for geometry, which he equates with mathematics, adopting ideas from Galileo and Cavalieri. Part IV, dealing with natural phenomena, provides a compelling discussion of physics.

Hobbes supervised an English translation of *De Corpore*, which was published in 1656, a year after the original Latin text. It had a negative effect on Hobbes' scholarly reputation. The inclusion of a claimed solution for squaring the circle, an apparent afterthought rather than a systematic

development, led to an extended pamphlet conflict in the Hobbes-Wallis controversy. This polemic debate continued from the mid-1650's well into the 1670's, being fought between Hobbes and the mathematician John Wallis.

John Wallis (1616-1703) was an English clergyman and mathematician, who is given partial credit for the development of infinitesimal calculus.

CONTENTS

THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER.
THE AUTHORS EPISTLE DEDICATORY, TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE, MY MOST HONORED LORD, WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE.
THE AUTHORS EPISTLE TO THE READER.

THE FIRST PART, OR LOGIQUE.

CHAP. I. OF PHILOSOPHY.
CHAP. II. OF NAMES.
THE FORM OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF BODY.
THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF QUANTITY.
THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF QUALITY.
THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF RELATION.
CHAP. III. OF PROPOSITION.
CHAP. IV. OF SYLLOGISME.
CHAP. V. OF ERRING, FALSITY AND CAPTIONS.
CHAP. VI. OF METHOD

THE SECOND PART, OR THE FIRST GROUNDS OF PHILOSOPHY.

CHAP. VII. OF PLACE AND TIME.
CHAP. VIII. OF BODY AND ACCIDENT.
CHAP. IX. OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
CHAP. X. OF POWER AND ACT.
CHAP. XI. OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE.
CHAP. XII. OF QUANTITY.
CHAP. XIII. OF ANALOGISME OR THE SAME PROPORTION.
CHAP. XIV. OF STRAIGHT AND CROOKED, ANGLE AND FIGURE.

THE THIRD PART, OF THE PROPORTIONS OF MOTIONS AND MAGNITUDES.

CHAP. XV. OF THE NATURE, PROPERTIES, AND DIVERSE CONSIDERATIONS OF MOTION AND ENDEAVOUR.
CHAP. XVI. OF MOTION ACCELERATED AND VNIFORM, AND OF MOTION BY CONCOURSE.
CHAP. XVII. OF FIGURES DEFICIENT.
CHAP. XVIII. OF THE EQUATION OF STRAIGHT LINES WITH THE CROOKED LINES OF PARABOLAS AND OTHER FIGURES MADE IN IMITATION OF PARABOLAS.
CHAP. XIX. OF ANGLES OF INCIDENCE AND REFLECTION, EQUAL BY SUPPOSITION.
CHAP. XX. OF THE DIMENSION OF A CIRCLE, AND THE DIVISION OF ANGLES OR ARCHES.
CHAP. XXI. OF CIRCULAR MOTION.
CHAP. XXII. OF OTHER VARIETY OF MOTION.
CHAP. XXIII. OF THE CENTER OF EQUIPONDERATION OF BODIES PRESSING DOWNWARDS IN STRAIGHT PARALLEL LINES.
DEFINITIONS.
SUPPOSITIONS
CHAP. XXIV. OF REFRACTION AND REFLECTION.
DEFINITIONS.

THE FOURTH PART, OF PHYSIQUES, OR THE PHAENOMENA OF NATURE.

CHAP. XXV. OF SENSE AND ANIMAL MOTION.
CHAP. XXVI. OF THE WORLD, AND OF THE STARRES.
CHAP. XXVII. OF LIGHT, HEAT, AND OF COLOURS.

CHAP. XXVIII. OF COLD, WIND, HARD, ICE, RESTITUTION OF BODIES BENT, DIAPHANOUS, LIGHTNING AND THUNDER; AND OF THE HEADS OF RIVERS.
CHAP. XXIX. OF SOUND, ODOUR, SAVOUR, AND TOUCH
CHAP. XXX. OF GRAVITY.

ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY,

THE FIRST SECTION, CONCERNING BODY.

Written in Latine by THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.

LONDON, Printed by R. & W. Leybourn,

for Andrew Crocke, at the Green Dragon in Pauls Church-yard, 1656.

THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER.

IF WHEN I had finished my Translation of this first Section of the Elements of Philosophy, I had presently committed the same to the Press, it might have come to your hands sooner then now it doth. But as I undertook it with much diffidence of my own ability to perform it well; so I thought fit before I published it, to pray Mr. Hobbes to view, correct and order it according to his own minde and pleasure. Wherefore, though you find some places enlarged, others altered, and two Chapters (the 18th and 20th) almost wholly changed, you may nevertheless remain assured, that as now I present it to you, it doth not at all vary from the Authours own sense and meaning. As for the six Lessons to the Savilian Professors at Oxford, they are not of my translation, but were written, as here you have them in English, by Mr. Hobbes himself; and are joyned to this Book, because they are chiefly in defence of the same.

THE AUTHORS EPISTLE DEDICATORY, TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE, MY MOST HONORED LORD, WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE.

THIS FIRST SECTION of the Elements of Philosophy, the Monument of my Service, & your Lordships bounty, though (after the third Section published) long deferred, yet at last finished, I now present (my most Excellent Lord) and dedicate to your Lordship. A little Book but full; and great enough, if men count well for great; and to an attentive Reader versed in the Demonstrations of Mathematicians that is, to your Lordship & easy to understand; and almost new throughout without any offensive Novelty. I know that that part of Philosophy wherein are considered Lines and Figures, has been delivered to us notably improved by the Ancients; and withall a most perfect pattern of the Logique by which they were enabled to finde out and demonstrate such excellent Theoremes as they have done. I know also that the Hypothesis of the Earths Diurnal Motion was the invention of the Ancients; but that both it, and Astronomy (that is, Coelestial Physiques) springing up together with it, were by succeeding Philosophers strangled with the snares of Words. And therefore the beginning of Astronomy (except Observations) I think is not to be derived from farther time then from Nicolaus Copernicus; who in the Age next preceding the present, revived the opinion of Pythagoras, Aristarchus & Philolaus. After him, the Doctrine of the Motion of the Earth being now received, & a difficult Question thereupon arising concerning the Descent of Heavy Bodies, Galilaeus in our time striving with that difficulty, was the first that opened to us the Natural Philosophy Universal, which is the knowledge of the

Nature of Motion. So that neither can the Age of Natural Philosophy be reckoned higher then to him. Lastly, the Science of Mans Body, the most profitable part of Natural Science, was first discovered with admirable sagacity by our Countryman Doctor Harvey, principal Physician to King James and King Charles, in his Books of the Motion of the Blood and of the Generation of Living Creatures; who is the onely man I know, that conquering envy, hath established a new Doctrine in his life time. Before these, there was nothing certain in Natural Philosophy but every mans Experiments to himself, and the Natural Histories, if they may be called certain, that are no certainer then Civil Histories But since these, Astronomy & Natural Philosophy in general have for so little time been extraordinarily advanced by Joannes Keplerus, Petrus Gassendus, & Marinus Mersennus; & the Science of Humane Bodies in special by the wit & industry of Physicians (the onely true Natural Philosophers) especially of our most Learned Men of the Colledge of Physicians in London. Natural Philosophy is therefore but young; but Civil Philosophy yet much younger, as being no older (I say it provoked, & that my Detractors may know how little they have wrought upon me) then my own Book de Cive. But what? Were there no Philosophers Natural nor Civil among the ancient Greeks? There were men so called; Witness Lucian, by whom they are derided; Witness divers Cities, from which they have been often by publique Edicts banished. But it follows not that there was Philosophy. There walked in old Greece a certain Phantasme, for superficial gravity (though full within of fraud & filth) a little like Philosophy; which unwary men thinking to be it, adhered to the Professors of it, some to one, some to another (though they disagreed among themselves) and with great Salary put their children to them to be taught, in stead of Wisdome, nothing but to dispute; & neglecting the Laws, to determine every Question according to their own fancies. The first Doctors of the Church next the Apostles, born in those

times, whilest they endeavored to defend the Christian Faith against the Gentiles by Natural Reason, began also to make use of Philosophy, & with the Decrees of Holy Scripture to mingle the Sentences of Heathen Philosophers; & first some harmless ones of Plato; but afterwards also many foolish & false ones out of the Physicks & Metaphysicks of Aristotle; & bringing in the Enemies betrayed unto them the Cittadel of Christianity From that time, in stead of the Worship of God, there entred a thing called School-Divinity, walking on one foot firmly, which is the Holy Scripture, but halted on the other rotten foot, which the Apostle Paul called Vain, & might have called Pernicious Philosophy; for it hath raised an infinite number of Controversies in the Christian World concerning Religion, & from those Controversies Wars. It is like that Empusa in the Athenian Comick Poet, which was taken in Athens for a Ghost that changed shapes, having one brazenleg, but the other was the leg of an Ass, & was sent (as was believed) by Hecate, as a signe of some approaching evil fortune. Against this Empusa I think there cannot be invented a better Exorcisme, then to distinguish between the Rules of Religion, that is, the Rules of Honoring God, which we have from the Laws, and the Rules of Philosophy, that is, the Opinions of private men; & to yeild what is due to Religion to the Holy Scripture, and what is due to Philosophy to Natural Reason. And this I shall do, if I but handle the Elements of Philosophy truly & clearly as I endevour to do. Therefore having in the 2d Section w^{ch} I have published & dedicated to your Lordship long since reduced all Power Ecclesiastical and Civil by strong Argumennt of Reason, without repugnance to Gods Word, to one and the same Soveraign Authority; I intend now, by putting into a clear Method the true Foundations of Natural Philosophy, to fright and drive away this Metaphysical Empusa; not by skirmish, but by letting in the light upon her. For I am confident (if any confidence of a Writing can proceed from the Writers fear, circumspection & diffidence) that in the three former

parts of this Book, all that I have said is sufficiently demonstrated from Definitions; & all in the fourth part, from Suppositions not absurd. But if there appear to your Lordship any thing less fully demonstrated then to satisfie every Reader, the cause was this, that I professed to write not all to all, but some things to Geometricians onely. But that your Lordship will be satisfied J cannot doubt.

There remains the second Section, which is concerning Man. That part thereof where J handle the Optiques, contayning six Chapters, together with the Tables of the Figures belonging to them, I have already written & engravenlying by me above these six years. The rest shall, as soon as J can, be added to it; though by the contumelies & petty injuries of some unskilful men, I know already by experience how much greater thanks will be due, then payed me, for telling Men the truth of what Men are. But the burthen I have taken on me I mean to carry through; not striving to appease, but rather to revenge my self of Envy, by encreasing it. For it contents me that I have your Lordships favour; which, (being all you require) J acknowledge; and for which, with my prayers to Almighty God for your Lordships safety, J shall (to my power) be always thankefull.

London,April 23, 1655.

YOUR LORDSHIPS most humble Servant

Thomas Hobbes.

THE AUTHORS EPISTLE TO THE READER.

THINK NOT (COURTEOUS Reader) that the Philosophy the Elements whereof I am going to set in order, is that which makes Philosophers Stones, nor that which is found in the Metaphsique Codes. But that it is the Natural Reason of Man busily flying up and down among the Creatures, & bringing back a true report of their Order, Causes & Effects. Philosophy therefore, the Childe of the World and your own Mind, is within your self; perhaps not fashioned yet, but like the World its Father, as it was in the beginning, a thing confused. Do therefore as the Statuaries do, who by hewing off that which is superfluous, do not make but find the Image. Or imitate the Creation. If you will be a Philosopher in good earnest, let your Reason move upon the Deep of your own Cogitations and Experience. Those things that lie in Confusion must be set asunder, distinguished, and every one stampt with its own name set in order; that is to say, your Method must resemble that of the Creation. The order of the Creation was, Light, Distinction of Day and Night, the Firmament, the Luminaries, Sensible Creatures, Man; and after the Creation, the Commandement. Therefore the order of Contemplation will be, Reason, Definition, Space, the Starres, Sensible Quality, Man; and after Man is grown up, Subjection to Command. In the first part of this Section which is entitled Logique, I set up the light of Reason. In the Second (which hath for title the Grounds of Philosophy) I distinguish the most common Notions by accurate definition, for the avoiding of confusion and obscurity. The third part concerns the Expansion of Space, that is, Geometry. The fourth contains the Motion of the Starres, together with the doctrine of Sensible Qualities.

In the second Section (if it please God) shall be handled Man. In the third Section the doctrine of Subjection is handled already. This is the Method I followed; and if it like you you may use the same; for I do but propound, not commend to you any thing of mine. But whatsoever shall be the Method you will like, I would very fain commend Philosophy to you, that is to say, the study of Wisdome, for want of which we have all suffered much dammage lately. For even they that study Wealth, do it out of love to Wisdome; for their Treasures serve them but for a Looking-glass, wherin to behold and contemplate their owne Wisdome. Nor do they that love to be employed in publike business, aime at any thing but place wherein to shew their Wisdome. Neither do Voluptuous men neglect Philosophy, but onely because they know not how great a pleasure it is to the Mind of Man to be ravished in the vigorous and perpetual embraces of the most beauteous World. Lastly, though for nothing else, yet (because the Mind of Man is no less impatient of Empty Time, then Nature is of Empty Place) to the end you be not forced for want of what to do, to be troublesome to men that have business, or take hurt by falling into idle Company, but have somewhat of your own wherewith to fill up your time, I recommend unto you the Study of Philosophy. Farewell.

T. H.

THE FIRST PART, OR LOGIQUE.

CHAP. I. OF PHILOSOPHY.

1 THE INTRODUCTION.

2 The Definition of Philosophy explained.

3 Ratiocination of the Mind.

4 Properties what they are.

5 How Properties are known by Generation, & contrarily.

6 The Scope of Philosophy.

7 The Utility of it.

8 The Subject.

9 The Parts of it.

10 The Epilogue.

PHILOSOPHY seems to me to be amongst men now, in the same manner as Corn and Wine are said to have been in the world in ancient time. For from the beginning there were Vines and Ears of Corn growing here and there in the fields; but no care was taken for the planting and sowing of them. Men lived therefore upon Akorns; or if any were so bold as to venture upon the eating of those unknown and doubtfull fruits, they did it with danger of their health. In like manner, every man brought Philosophy, that is, Naturall Reason, into the world with him; for all men can reason to

some degree, and concerning some things: but where there is need of a long series of Reasons, there most men wander out of the way, and fall into Error for want of Method, as it were for want of sowing and planting, that is, of improving their Reason. And from hence it comes to passe, that they who content themselves with daily experience, which may be likened to feeding upon Akorns, and either reject, or not much regard Philosophy, are commonly esteemed, and are indeed, men of sounder judgement, then those, who from opinions, though not vulgar, yet full of uncertainty, and carelesly received, do nothing but dispute and wrangle, like men that are not well in their wits. I confesse indeed, that that part of Philophy by which Magnitudes and Figures are computed, is highly improved. But because I have not observed the like advancement in the other parts of it, my purpose is, as far forth as I am able, to lay open the few and first Elements of Philosophy in generall, as so many Seeds, from which pure and true Philosophy may hereafter spring up by little and little.

I am not ignorant how hard a thing it is to weed out of mens mindes such inveterate opinions as have taken root there, and been co¯firmed in them by the authority of most eloquent Writers; especially, seeing true (that is accurate) Philosophy, professedly rejects not only the paint and false colours of Language, but even the very ornaments and graces of the same; and the first Grounds of all Science, are not only not beautifull, but poore, aride, and in appearance deformed. Neverthelesse, there being certainly some men, though but few, who are delighted with Truth and strength of Reason in all things, I thought I might do well to take this pains for the sake even of those few. I proceed therefore to the matter, and take my beginning from the very Definition of Philosophy, which is this.

2 PHILOSOPHY is such knowledge of Effects or Appearances, as we acquire by true Ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their

Causes or Generation: And again, of such Causes or Generations as may be from knowing first their Effects.

For the better understanding of which Definition, we must consider; first, that although Sense and Memory of things, which are common to Man and all living Creatures, be Knowledge, yet because they are given us immediately by Nature, and not gotten by Ratiocination, they are not Philosophy.

Secondly, Seeing Experience is nothing but Memory; and Prudence, or Prospect into the future time, nothing but Expectation of such things as we have already had experience of, Prudence also is not to be esteemed Philosophy.

By RATIOCINATION, I mean Computation. Now to compute, is either to collect the sum of many things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another. Ratiocination therefore is the same with Addition and Substraction; and if any man adde Multiplication and Division, I will not be against it, seeing Multiplication is nothing but Addition of equals one to another, and Division nothing but a Substraction of equals one from another, as often as is possible. So that all Ratiocination is comprehended in these two operations of the minde, Addition and Substraction.

3 But how by the Ratiocination of our Minde, we Adde and Substract in our silent thoughts, without the use of words, it will be necessary for me to make intelligible by an example or two. If therefore a man see something a far off and obscurely, although no appellation had yet been given to any thing, he will notwithstanding have the same Idea of that thing, for which now by imposing a name on it, we call it Body. Again, when by comming neerer, he sees the same thing thus and thus, now in one place and now in another, he will have a new Idea thereof, namely that, for which we now call such a thing Animated. Thirdly, when standing neerer he perceives the

figure, hears the voice, and sees other things, which are signes of a Rationall minde, he has a third Idea, though it have yet no appellation, namely, that for which we now call any thing Rationall. Lastly, when by looking fully and distinctly upon it he conceaves all that he has seen as one thing, the Idea he has now, is compounded of his former Ideas, which are put together in the Minde, in the same order, in which these three single names Body, Animated, Rationall, are in speech compounded into this one name Body-Animated-Rationall, or Man. In like manner, of the severall conceptions of four sides, equality of sides, and right angles, is compounded the conception of a Square. For the mind may conceive a figure of foure sides without any conception of their equality; & of that equality without conceiving a right angle; and may joyne together all these single conceptions into one conception or one Idea of a Square. And thus we see how the Conceptions of the mind are compounded. Again, whosoever sees a man standing neer him, conceives the whole Idea of that man; and if as he goes away he follow him with his eyes onely, he will lose the Idea of those things which were signes of his being Rationall, whilest neverthelesse the Idea of a Body-Animated remaines still before his eies; so that the Idea of Rationall is substracted from the whole Idea of Man, that is to say of Body-Animated-Rationall, and there remaines that of Body-Animated; & a while after at a greater distance the Idea of Animated will be lost, & that of Body only will remain; so that at last, when nothing at all can be seen, the whole Idea will vanish out of sight. By which examples, I thinke it is manifest enough, what is the internall Ratiocination of the Mind, without words.

We must not therefore thinke that Computation, that is, Ratiocination, has place onely in numbers; as if man were distinguished from other living Creatures (which is said to have been the opinion of Pythagoras) by nothing but the faculty of numbring; for Magnitude, Body, Motion, Time, Degrees of Quality, Action, Conception, Proportion, Speech and Names (in which all

the kinds of Philosophy consist) are capable of Addition and Substraction. Now such things as we adde or substract, that is, which we put into an account, we are said to consider, in Greek ; in which language also signifies to Compute, Reason or Reckon.

4 But Effects and the Appearances of things to sense, are faculties or Powers of Bodies, which make us distinguish them from one another; that is to say, conceive one Body to be equall or unequall, like or unlike to another Body; as in the example above, when by coming neer enough to any Body, we perceive the Motion and Going of the same, we distinguish it thereby from a Tree, a Column and other fixed Bodies; and so that motion, or going is the Property thereof, as being proper to living creatures, and a faculty by which they make us distinguish them from other Bodies.

5 How the knowledge of any Effect may be gotten from the knowledge of the Generation thereof, may easily be understood by the example of a Circle: For if there be set before us a plain figure having as neer as may be the figure of a Circle, we cannot possibly perceive by sense whether it be a true Circle or no; then which neverthelesse nothing is more easie to be known, to him that knowes first the Generation of the propounded figure. For let it be known that the figure was made by the circumduction of a Body whereof one end remained unmoved, and we may reason thus; a Body carried about, retaining alwayes the same length, applies it selfe first to one Radius, then to another, to a third, a fourth, and successively to all; and therefore the same length, from the same point, toucheth the circumference in every part thereof; which is as much to say as all the Radii are equal. We know therefore that from such generation proceeds a figure, from whose one middle point all the extreame points are reached unto by equal Radii. And in like manner, by knowing first what figure is set before us, we may come by Ratiocination to some Generation of the same, though perhaps not that by which it was made, yet that by w^{ch} it might have been made; for he

that knows that a Circle has the property above declared, will easily know whether a Body carried about, as is said, will generate a Circle or no.

6 The End or Scope of Philosophy, is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that by applicatio¯ of Bodies to one another; we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our minde, as far forth as matter, strength & industry will permit, for the commodity of humane life. For he inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may have, for the mastering of some difficult and doutfull matter, or for the discovery of some hidden truth, is not worth so much paines as the study of Philosophy requires; nor need any man care much to teach another what he knowes himselfe, if he think that will be the onely benefit of his labour. The end of Knowledge is Power; and the use of Theoremes (which among Geometricians serve for the finding out of Properties) is for the construction of Problemes; and lastly, the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action, or thing to be done.

7 But what the Utility of Philosophy is, especially of Natural Philosophy and Geometry, will be best understood by reckoning up the chief commodities of which mankind is capable; and by comparing the manner of life of such as enjoy them, with that of others which want the same. Now the greatest commodities of mankind are the Arts, namely of measuring Matter and Motion; of moving ponderous Bodies; of Architecture; of Navigation; of making instruments for all uses; of calculating the Coelestiall Motions, the Aspects of the Stars, and the parts of Time; of Geography, &c. By which Sciences, how great benefits men receive, is more easily understood then expressed. These benefits are enjoyed by almost all the people of Europe, by most of those of Asia, and by some of Africa; but the Americans, and they that live neer the Poles do totally want them. But why? Have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one kinde of soule, and the same faculties of mind? What then makes this

difference, except Philosophy? Philosophy therefore is the cause of all these benefits. But the Utility of Morall and Civil Philosophy is to be estimated not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these Sciences, as by the calamities we receive from not knowing them. Now all such calamities as may be avoided by humane industry arise from warre, but chiefly from Civil warre; for from this proceed Slaughter, Solitude, and the want of all things. But the cause of warre is not that men are willing to have it; for the Will has nothing for Object but Good, at least that which seemeth good. Nor is it from this, that men know not that the effects of war are evil; for who is there that thinks not poverty and losse of life to be great evils? The cause therefore of Civill warre, is that men know not the causes neither of Warre nor Peace, there being but few in the world that have learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace, that is to say, that have learned the rules of civill life sufficiently. Now the knowledge of these rules is Morall Philosophy. But why have they not learned them, unlesse for this reason that none hitherto have taught them in a clear and exact method? For what shall we say? Could the ancient Masters of Greece, Egypt, Rome, and others perswade the unskillfull multitude to their innumerable opinions concerning the nature of their Gods, which they themselves knew not whether they were true or false, and which were indeed manifestly false & absurd; & could they not perswade the same multitude to civill duty, if they themselves had understood it? Or shall those few writings of Geometricians which are extant, be thought sufficient for the taking away of all controversy in the matters they treat of, and shall those innumerable and huge Volumes of Ethicks be thought unsufficient, if what they teach had been certain and well demonstrated? What then can be imagined to be the cause that the writings of those men have increased science, and the writings of these have increased nothing but words, saving that the former were written by men that knew, and the later by such as knew not the

doctrine they taught onely for ostentation of their wit and eloquence? Neverthelesse, I deny not but the reading of some such books is very delightfull; for they are most eloquently written, and containe many cleer, wholsome and choice sentences; which yet are not universally true, though by them universally pronounced. From whence it comes to passe, that the circumstances of times, places and persons being changed, they are no lesse frequently made use of to confirme wicked men in their purposes, then to make them understand the precepts of Civill duties. Now that which is chiefly wanting in them, is a true and certaine rule of our actions, by which we might know whether that we undertake be just or unjust. For it is to no purpose to be bidden in every thing to do Right, before there be a certain Rule and measure of Right established; which no man hitherto hath established. Seeing therefore from the not knowing of Civill duties, that is, from the want of Morall science proceed Civill warres, and the greatest calamities of mankind, we may very well attribute to such science the production of the contrary commodities. And thus much is sufficient, to say nothing of the prayses and other contentment proceeding from Philosophy, to let you see the Utility of the same in every kinde thereof.

8 The Subject of Philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every Body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may by any consideration thereof compare with other Bodies; or which is capable of composition and resolution; that is to say, every Body, of whose Generation or Properties we can have any knowledge.. And this may be deduced from the Definition of Philosophy, whose profession it is to search out the Properties of Bodies from their Generation, or their Generation from their Properties; and therefore where there is no Generation nor Property, there is no Philosophy. Therefore it excludes Theology, I meane the doctrine of God, Eternal, Ingenerable, Incomprehensible, and in whom there is nothing neither to divide nor compound, nor any Generation to be conceived.

It excludes the doctrine of Angels; and all such things as are thought to be neither Bodies, nor properties of Bodies; there being in them no place neither for composition, nor division, nor any capacity of more and lesse; that is to say, no place for Ratiocination.

It excludes History, as well Naturall as Politicall, though most usefull (nay necessary) to Philosophy; because such Knowledge is but Experience, or Authority, and not Ratiocination.

It excludes all such Knowledge as is acquired by Divine Inspiration, or Revelation, as not derived to us by Reason, but by Divine grace in an instant, and as it were by some sense supernaturall.

It excludes, not onely all Doctrines which are false, but such also as are not well grounded; for whatsoever we know by right Ratiocination, can neither be false nor doubtfull; and therefore Astrology, as it is now held forth, and all such Divinations rather then sciences, are excluded.

Lastly, the doctrine of Gods Worship is excluded from Philosophy, as being not to be known by naturall reason, but by the authority of the Church; and as being the object of Faith, and not of Knowledge.

9 The principall parts of Philosophy are two. For two chief kinds of Bodies, and very different from one another, offer themselves to such as search after their Generation & Properties; One whereof being the worke of Nature, is called a Naturall Body; the other is called a Commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. And from these spring the two parts of Philosophy called Naturall and Civill. But seeing that for the knowledge of the Properties of a Common-wealth, it is necessary first to know the Dispositions, Affections and Manners of men, Civill Philosophy is againe commonly divided into two parts; whereof one which treats of mens Dispositions and Manners is called Ethicks, and the other which takes cognisance of their Civil Duties is caled Politicks or simply Civill Philosophy. In the first place therefore (after I have set downe such

Premisses as appertaine to the nature of Philosophy in general) I will discourse of Bodies Naturall; in the second, of the Dispositions and Manners of men; and in the third, of the Civill Duties of Subjects.

10 To conclude, seeing there may be many who will not like this my Definition of Philosophy, and will say that from the liberty which a man may take of so defining as seemes best to himselfe, he may conclude any thing from any thing (though I thinke it no hard matter to demonstrate, that this Definition of mine agrees with the sense of all men;) yet lest in this point there should be any cause of dispute betwixt me and them, I here undertake no more then to deliver the Elements of that Science, by which the Effects of any thing may be found out from the known Generation of the same, or contrarily the Generation from the Effects; to the end that they who search after other Philosophy, may be admonished to seeke it from other Principles.

CHAP. II. OF NAMES.

1 THE NECESSITY of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory, A Marke defined.

2 The necessity of Marks for the signification of the conceptions of the Mind.

3 Names supply both those necessities.

4 The Definition of a Name.

5 Names are Signes not of Things, but of our Cogitations.

6 What it is we give Names to.

7 Names Positive and Negative.

8 Contradictory Names.

9 A Common Name.

10 Names of the first and second Intention.

11 Universall, Particular, Individuall, and Indefinite Names.

12 Names Univocall and Equivocal.

13 Absolute and Relative Names.

14 Simple and Compounded Names.

15 A Praedicament described.

16 Some things to be noted concerning Praedicaments.

1 HOW unconstant and fading mens thoughts are, and how much the recovery of them depends upon chance, there is none but knows by infallible experience in himself. For no man is able to remember Quantities without sensible and present Measures, nor Colours without sensible and present Patterns, nor Number without the Names of Numbers disposed in order and learned by heart. So that whatsoever a man has put together in his mind by ratiocination without such helps, will presently slip from him, and not be revocable but by beginning his ratiocination anew. From which it followes, that for the acquiring of Philosophy some sensible Moniments are necessary, by which our past thoughts may be not onely reduced, but also registred every one in its own order. These Moniments I call MARKS, namely, sensible things taken at pleasure, that by the sense of them such thoughts may be recalled to our mind, as are like those thoughts for which we [took them.]

2 Again, though some one man, of how excellent a wit soever, should spend all his time, partly in reasoning and partly in inventing Marks for the help of his memory, and advancing himself in learning; who sees not, that the benefit he reapes to himselfe will not be much, and to others none at all? For unlesse he communicate his notes with others, his science will perish with him. But if the same notes be made common to many, and so one mans inventions be taught to others, sciences will thereby be encreased to the generall good of mankind. It is therefore necessary for the acquiring of Philosophy that there be certain Signes, by which what one man finds out may be manifested and made known to others. Now those things we call SIGNES, are the Antecedents of their Consequents, and the Consequents of their Antecedents, as often as we observe them to go before or follow after in the same manner. For example, a thick Cloud is a Signe of Rain to follow; and Rain a Signe, that a Cloud has gone before, for this reason

onely, that we seldom see Clouds without the Consequence of Rain, nor Rain at any time but when a Cloud has gone before. And of Signs some are Naturall, whereof I have already given an example; others are Arbitrary, namely, those we make choice of at our own pleasure; as a bush hung up, signifies that Wine is to be sold there; a stone set in the ground, signifies the bound of a field; and words so and so connected, signifie the Cogitations and Motions of our Minde. The difference therefore betwixt Markes and Signes is this, that we make those for our own use, but these for the use of others.

3 Words so connected, as that they become signes of our Thoughts, are called SPEECH, of which every part is a Name. But seeing (as is said) both Markes and Signes are necessary for the acquiring of Philosophy, (Marks by which we may remember our own thoughts, and Signes by which we may make our thoughts known to others,) Names do both these offices; but they serve for Marks before they be used as Signes. For though a man were alone in the world, they would be usefull to him in helping him to remember; but to teach others, (unlesse there were some others to be taught,) of no use at all. Again, Names though standing singly by themselves, are Marks, because they serve to recall our own thoughts to mind; but they cannot be Signes, otherwise then by being disposed and ordered in Speech, as parts of the same. For example, a man may begin with a word, whereby the hearer may frame an Idea of something in his mind, which neverthelesse he cannot conceive to be the Idea which was in the mind of him that spake, but that he would say something which began with that word, though perhaps not as by it selfe, but as part of another word. So that the nature of a name consists principally in this, that it is a Mark ta ken for Memories sake; but it serves also by accident, to signifie and make known to others what we remember our selves; and therefore I will define it thus:

4 A NAME is a Word taken at pleasure to serve for a Mark, which may raise in our Mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a Sign of what thought the speaker had or had not before in his mind. And it is for brevities sake that I suppose the Originall of Names to be Arbitrary, judging it a thing that maybe assumed as unquestionable. For co¯sidering that new Names are daily made, and old ones laid aside; that diverse Nations use different Names, and how impossible it is either to observe similitude, or make any comparison betwixt a Name and a Thing, how can any man imagine that the Names of Things were imposed from their natures? For though some Names of living creatures and other things, which our first Parents used, were taught by God himselfe; yet they were by him arbitrarily imposed, and afterwards both at the Tower of Babel, and since in processe of time, growing every where out of use, are quite forgotten, and in their roomes have succeeded others, invented and received by men at pleasure. Moreover, whatsoever the common use of words be, yet Philosophers, who were to teach their knowledge to others, had alwayes the liberty, and sometimes they both had and will have a necessity, of taking to themselves such Names as they please for the signifying of their meaning, if they would have it understood. Nor had Mathematicians need to aske leave of any but themselves to name the figures they invented Parabolas, Hyperboles, Cissoeides, Quadratrices, &c. or to call one Magnitude A, another B.

5 But seeing Names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signes of our Conceptions, it is manifest they are not signes of the Things themselves; for that the sound of this word Stone should be the signe of a Stone, cannot be understood in any sense but this, that he that heares it, collects that he that pronouunces it thinkes of a Stone. And therefore that disputation, whether Names signifie the Matter or Form, or something compounded of both, and

other like subtleties of the Metaphysicks, is kept up by erring men, and such as understand not the words they dispute about.

6 Nor indeed is it at all necessary that every Name should be the Name of some Thing. For as these, a Man, a Tree, a Stone, are the Names of the Things themselves; so the Images of a Man, of a Tree and of a stone, which are represented to men sleeping, have their Names also, though they be not Things, but onely fictions and Phantasmes of things. For we can remember these; and therefore it is no lesse necessary that they have Names to mark and signifie them, then the Things themselves. Also this word Future is a Name, but no future thing has yet any being, nor do we know whether that which we call Future, shall ever have a being or no. Neverthelesse, seeing we use in our mind to knit together things Past with those that are Present, the Name Future serves to signifie such knitting together. Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever can be, has a name, namely, That which neither is, nor has been, &c. Or more briefly this, Impossible. To conclude, this word Nothing, is a name, which yet cannot be the name of any thing. For when (for example) we substract 2 and 3 from 5, and so nothing remaining we would call that substraction to mind, this speech Nothing remains, and in it the word Nothing is not unusefull. And for the same reason we say truly Lesse then Nothing remaines, when we substract More from Lesse; for the minde feigns such remaines as these for Doctrines sake, and desires as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though that which we name be not alwaies a thing that has a being in Nature, yet it is lawfull for Doctrines sake to apply the word Thing, to whasoever we name; as if it were all one whether that thing be truly existent or be onely feigned.

7 The first distinction of Names, is that some are Positive, or Affirmative; others Negative, which are also called Privative and Indefinite

Positive are such as we impose for the likenesse, Equality or Identity of the things we consider; Negative for the diversity, Unliknesse, or Inequality of the same. Examples of the former are a Man, a Philosopher; for a Man denotes any one of a multitude of men, and a Philosopher any one of many Philosophers by reason of their similitude; Also Socrates is a Positive name, because it signifies alwayes one and the same man. Examples of Negatives are such Positives as have the Negative particle Not added to them, as Not-Man, Not-Philosopher. But Positives were before Negatives; for otherwise there could have been no use at all of these. For when the name of White was imposed upon certain things, and afterwards upon other things the names of Black, Blew, Transparent, &c. the infinite dissimilitudes of these with White could not be comprehended in any one Name, save that which had in it the Negation of White, that is to say, the Name Not-White, or some other equivalent to it, in which the word White is repeated, such as Unlike to white, &c. And by these Negativenames, we take notice our selves, and signifie to others what we have not thought of.

8 Positive and Negative names are Contradictory to one another, so that they cannot both be the name of the same thing. Besides, of Contradictory names, one is the name of any thing whatsoever; for whatsoever is, is either Man or Not-man, White or Notwhite, and so of the rest. And this is so manifest, that it needs no further proofe or explication; for they that say the same thing cannot both be, and not be, speak obscurely; but they that say, Whatsoever is, either is, or is not, speake also absurdly and ridiculously. The certainty of this Axiome, viz. Of two Contradictory Names, one is the Name of any thing whatsoever, the other not, is the originall and foundation of all Ratiocination, that is, of all Philosophy; and therefore it ought to be so exactly propounded, that it may be of it selfe cleare and perspicuous to all men; as indeed it is, saving to such, as reading the long discourses made

upon this subject by the Writers of Metaphysicks (which they beleeve to be some egregious learning) thinke they understand not, when they do.

9 Secondly, of Names, some are Common to many things, as a Man, a Tree; others Proper to one thing, as he that writ the Iliad, Homer, this man, that man. And a Common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively of all together (as Man is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, Iohn, and the rest severally) is therefore called an Universall name; and therefore this word Universall is never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any Idea or Phantasme formed in the mind, but alwayes the name of some word or name; so that when a Living creature, a Stone, a Spirit, or any other thing is said to be Universal, it is not to be understood, that any Man, Stone, &c. ever was or can be Universall, but onely that these words, Living creature, Stone, &c. are Universall names, that is, Names common to many things; and the Conceptions answering them in our minde, are the Images and Phantasmes of severall Living Creatures, or other things. And therfore for the understanding of the extent of an Universal name, we need no other faculty but that of our imagination, by which we remember that such names bring sometimes one thing, sometimes another into our minde. Also of Common Names some are more, some lesse Common. More Common, is that which is the name of more things; Lesse Common, the name of fewer things. As Living-Creature is more Common then Man, or Horse or Lion, because it comprehends them all; and therefore a more Common name, in respect of a lesse Common, is called the Genus or a Generall name; and this in respect of that, the Species, or a Speciall Name.

10 And from hence proceeds the third distinction of Names, which is, that some are called names of the First, others of the Second Intention. Of the first Intention are the names of Things, a Man, Stone, &c. of the second are the names of names and speeches, as Universall, Particular, Genus,

Species, Syllogisme, and the like. But it is hard to say why those are called names of the First, and these of the Second Intention, unlesse perhaps it was first intended by us to give names to those things which are of daily use in this life, and afterwards to such things as appertaine to science, that is, that our Second Intention was to give names to Names. But whatsoever the cause hereof may be, yet this is manifest, that Genus, Species, Definition, &c. are names of Words and Names onely; and therefore to put Genus and Species for Things, and Definition for the nature of any thing, as the Writers of Metaphysicks have done, is not right, seeing they be only significations of what we thinke of the nature of Things.

11 Fourthly, some Names are of certaine and determined, others of uncertaine and undetermined signification. Of determined and certain signification is, first, that name which is giuen to any one thing by it self, and is called an Individuall Name; as Homer, this tree, that living Creature, &c. Secondly that which has any of these words All, Every, Both, Either, or the like added to it; and it is therefore called an Universall Name, because it signifies every one of those things to which it is Common; and of certaine signification for this reason, that he which heares, conceives in his minde the same thing that he which speakes would have him conceive. Of Indefinite signification is, first, that Name which has the word some, or the like added to it, and is called a Particular name; Secondly a Common Name set by it selfe without any note either of Universality or Particularity, as Man, Stone, and is called an Indefinite Name; but both Particular and Indefinite names are of uncertaine signification, because the Hearer knowes not what thing it is the Speaker would have him conceive; and therefore in Speech, Particular and Indefinite names are to be esteemed equivalent to one another. But these words, All, Every, Some, &c. which denote Universality and Particularity, are not Names, but parts onely of Names; So that Every Man, and That Man which the Hearer conceives in his mind, are

all one; and Some Man, and That Man which the Speaker thought of signifie the same. From whence it is evident, that the use of signes of this kind, is not for a mans own sake, or for his getting of knowledge by his own private meditation (for every man has his own, Thoughts sufficiently determined without such helpes as these) but for the sake of others; that is, for the teaching and signifying of our Conceptions to others; nor were they invented onely to make us remember, but to make us able to discourse with others.

12 Fifthly, Names are usually distinguished into Univocall, and Equivocall. Univocall are those which in the same train of Discourse signifie alwayes the same thing; but Equivocall those which meane sometimes one thing, and sometimes another. Thus, the Name Triangle is said to be Univocall, because it is alwayes taken in the same sense; and Parabola to be Equivocall, for the signification it has sometimes of Allegory or Similitude, and sometimes of a certaine Geometricall figure. Also every Metaphor is by profession Equivocall. But this distinction belongs not so much to Names, as to those that use Names; for some use them properly and accurately for the finding out of truth; others draw them from their proper sense, for Ornament, or Deceipt.

13 Sixtly, of Names, some are Absolute, others Relative. Relative are such as are imposed for some Comparison, as Father, Sonne, Cause, Effect, Like, Unlike, Equal, Unequal, Master, Servant, &c. And those that signifie no Comparison at all are Absolute Names. But as it was noted above, that Universality is to be attributed to Words & Names onely, and not to Things; so the same is to be said of other distinctions of Names; for no Things are either Univocall or Equivocall, or Relative or Absolute. There is also another distinction of Names into Concrete and Abstract; but because Abstract Names proceed from Proposition, and can have no place where there is no Affirmation, I shall speake of them hereafter.

14 Lastly there are Simple and Compounded Names. But here it is to be noted, that a name is not taken in Philosophy, as in Grammar, for one single word, but for any number of words put together to signifie one Thing; for among Philosophers Sentient Animated Body, passes but for one Name, being the Name of every living Creature; which yet, among Gra¯marians is accounted three Names. Also a Simple Name is not here distinguished from a Compounded Name by a Preposition, as in Grammar. But I call a Simple Name, that which in every kind is the most Common or most Universall; and that a Compounded Name, which by the joyning of another Name to it is made lesse Universall, and signifies that more conceptions then one were in the mind, for which that later Name was added. For example, in the conception of Man (as is shewn in the former Chap.) First, he is conceived to be something that has Extension, which is marked by the word Body. Body therefore is a Simple Name, being put for that first single Conception; Afterwards, upon the sight of such and such motion, another Conception arises for which he is called an Animated Body; and this I here call a Compounded Name, as I doe also the name Animal, which is equivalent to an Animated Body. And in the same manner an Animated Rational Body, as also a Man, which is equivalent to it, is a more Compounded Name. And by this we see how the Composition of Conceptions in the mind is answerable to the Composition of Names; for as in the minde one Idea or Phantasme succeeds to another, and to this a third; so to one Name is added another and another successively, and of them all is made one Compounded Name. Neverthelesse we must not thinke Bodies, which are without the Minde, are compounded in the same manner, namely that there is in Nature a Body, or any other imaginable Thing existent, which at the first has no Magnitude, and then by the addition of Magnitude, comes to have Quantity, and by more or lesse Quantity to have Density or Rarity, and again by the addition

of Figure to be Figurate, and after this by the injection of Light or Colour, to become Lucid or Coloured; though such has been the Philosophy of many.

15 The Writers of Logique have endeavoured to digest the Names of all the kinds of Things into certaine Scales or Degrees, by the continual subordination of Names lesse Common, to Names more Common. In the Scale of Bodies they put in the first and highest place Body simply, and in the next place under it lesse Common Names, by which it may be more limited and determined, namely Animated and Inanimated, and so on till they come to Individualls. In like manner in the Scale of Quantities they assign the first place to Quantity, and the next to Line, Superficies, and Solid, which are Names of lesse latitude; and these Orders or Scales of Names they usually call Praedicaments and Categories; And of this Ordination not onely Positive but Negative Names also are capable; which may be exemplified by such Formes of the Praedicaments as follow.

THE FORM OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF BODY.

- Not-Body; or Accident
- Body
    - Not animated
    - Animated
        - Not Living-Creature
        - Living-Creature
            - Not Man
            - Man
                - Not Peter
                - Peter

e

r

- Both Accident and Body are considered
    - Absolutely as,
        - Quantity, or so much
        - Quality, or such
    - or Comparatively, which is called their Relation

THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF QUANTITY.

- QUA¯TITY
  - Not Continual, as Number,
  - Continuall
    - Of it selfe, as
      - Line
      - Superficies
      - Solid
    - By Accident, as —
      - Time, by Line
      - Motion, by Line and Time
      - Force, by Motion and Solid

Where it is to be noted, that Line, Superficies and Solid may be said to be of such and such Quantity, that is, to be originally and of their own nature capable of Equality and Inequality; But we cannot say there is either Majority or Minority, or Equality, or indeed any Quantity at all, in Time, without the help of Line and Motion; nor in Motion, without Line and Time; nor in Force, otherwise then by Motion and Solid.

THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF QUALITY.

- Quality
  - Perceptio¯ by Sense
    - Primary
      - Seeing
      - Hearing
      - Smelling
      - Tasting
      - Touching
    - Secondary
      - Imagination
      - Affection

—

- P
  l
  e
  a
  s
  a

- Unpleasant
- Sensible Quality
    - By Seeing, as Light and Colour
    - By Hearing, as Sound
    - By Smelling, as Odors
    - By Tasting, as Savours
    - By Touching, as Hardnesse, Heat, Cold, &c.

THE FORME OF THE PRAEDICAMENT OF RELATION.

- RELATION OF
  - Magnitudes, as Equality and Inequality
  - Qualities, as Likenesse and Unlikenesse
  - Order
    - Together
      - In Place
      - In Time
    - Not together
      - In Place
        - Former
        - Latter

- In Time
  - Former
  - Later

16 Concerning which Praedicaments it is to be noted in the first place, That as the division is made in the first Praedicament into Contradictory Names, so it might have been done in the rest. For as there, Body is divided into Animated and Not-Animated, so in the second Praedicament Continuall Quantity may be divided into Line and Not-line, and again, Not-line into Superficies and Not-Superficies, and so in the rest; but it was not necessary.

Secondly, it is to be observed, that of Positive Names the former comprehends the later; but of Negatives the former is comprehended by the later. For example Living-Creature is the Name of every Man, and therefore it comprehends the Name Man; but on the contrary Not-Man is the Name of

every Thing which is Not-Living-Creature, and therefore the Name Not-Living-Creature which is put first, is comprehended by the later Name Not-Man.

Thirdly, we must take heed we do not thinke, that as Names, so the diversities of Things themselves may be searched out and determined by such Distinctions as these; or that arguments may be taken from hence (as some have done ridiculously) to prove that the kinds of Things are not infinite.

Fourthly, I would not have any man thinke I deliver the Forms above for a true and exact Ordination of Names; for this cannot be performed as long as Philosophy remains imperfect; Nor that by placing (for example) Light in the Praedicament of Qualities, while another places the same in the Praedicament of Bodies, I pretend that either of us ought for this to be drawn from his opinion; for this is to be done onely by Arguments and Ratiocination, and not by disposing of words into Classes.

Lastly, I confesse I have not yet seen any great use of the Praedicaments in Philosophy. I beleeve Aristotle when he saw he could not digest the Things themselves into such Orders, might neverthelesse desire out of his owne Authority to reduce Words to such Formes, as I have done; but I doe it onely for this end, that it may be understood what this Ordination of Words is, and not to have it received or true, till it be demonstrated by good reason to be so.

CHAP. III. OF PROPOSITION.

1 DIVERS KINDS of Speech.

2 Proposition defined.

3 Subject, Praedicate and Copula what they are, and Abstract and Concrete what. The Use and Abuse of Names Abstract.

5 Proposition Universal and Particular.

6 Affirmative and Negative.

7 True and False.

8 True and False belongs to Speech, and not to Things.

9 Proposition Primary, not Primary, Definion, Axiome, Petition.

10 Proposition Necessary and Contingent.

11 Categoricall and Hypotheticall.

12 The same Proposition diversly pronounced.

13 Propositions that may be reduced to the same Categoricall Proposition, are Equipollent.

14 Universal Propositions converted by Contradictory Names, are Equipollent.

15 Negative Propositions are the same, whether the Negation be before or after the Copula.

16 Particular Propositions simply converted, are Equipollent.

17 What are Subaltern, Contrary, Subcontrary and Contradictory Propositions.

18 Consequence what it is.

19 Falsity cannot follow from Truth.

20 How one Proposition is the Cause of another.

1 FROM the Connection or Contexture of Names arise diverse kinds of Speech, whereof some signifie the Desires and Affections of Men; such are first Interrogations, which denote the desire of Knowing; as Who is a good Man? In which speech there is one Name expressed, & another desired and expected from him of whom we aske the same. Then Prayers, which signifie the desire of having something; Promises, Threats, Wishes, Commands, Complaints, and other significations of other Affections. Speech may also be Absurd and Insignificant; as when there is a succession of Words, to which there can be no succession of Thoughts in the mind to answer them; and this happens often to such, as understanding nothing in some subtil matter, doe neverthelesse, to make others beleeve they understand, speake of the same incoherently; For the connection of incoherent Words, though it want the end of Speech (which is Signification) yet it is Speech; and is used by the Writers of Metaphysicks almost as frequently as Speech significative. In Philosophy there is but one kinde of Speech usefull, which some call in Latine Dictum, others Enuntiatum & Pronunciatum; but most men call it Proposition, and is the speech of those that Affirm or Deny, and expresseth Truth or Falsity.

2 A PROPOSITION is a Speech consisting of two Names copulated by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the later Name to be the Name of the same thing whereof the former is the Name; or (which is all

one) that the former Name is comprehended by the later. For example, this speech Man is a Living Creature, in which two Names are copulated by the verb Is, is a Proposition, for this reason, that he that speakes it conceives both Living Creature and Man to be Names of the same thing, or that the former Name Man is comprehended by the later Name Living Creature. Now the former Name is commonly called the Subject, or Antecedent, or the Contained Name, and the later the Praedicat, Consequent or Containing Name. The signe of Connection amongst most Nations is either some word, as the word is in the Proposition Man is a living Creature, or some Case or Termination of a word, as in this Proposition, Man walketh (which is equivalent to this, Man is walking) the Termination by which it is said he walketh, rather then he is walking, signifieth that those two are understood to be copulated, or to be Names of the same Thing.

But there are, or certainly may be some Nations that have no word which answers to our Verbe Is, who neverthelesse forme Propositions by the position onely of one Name after another, as if instead of Man is a Living Creature, it should be said Man a Living Creature; for the very order of the Names may sufficiently shew their connection; and they are as apt and usefull in Philosophy, as if they were copulated by the Verbe Is.

3 Wherefore in every Proposition three things are to be considered, viz. the two Names, which are the Subject and the Praedicate, and their Copulation; both which Names raise in our Minde the Thought of one and the same Thing; but the Copulation makes us thinke of the Cause for which those Names were imposed on that Thing. As for example, when we say a Body is moveable, though we conceive the same thing to be designed by both those Names, yet our Minde rests not there, but searches further what it is to be a Body, or to be Moveable, that is, wherein consists the difference betwixt these and other Things, for which these are so called, others are not

so called. They therefore that seeke what it is to be any thing, as to be Moveable, to be Hot, &c. seek in Things the causes of their Names.

And from hence arises that distinction of Names (touched in the last Chap.) into Concrete and Abstract. For Concrete is the Name of any thing which we suppose to have a being, and is therefore called the Subject, in Latine Suppositum, and in Greek ; as Body, Moveable, Moved, Figurate, a Cubit high, Hot, Cold, Like, Equal, Appius, Lentulus and the like; and Abstract is that which in any Subject denotes the Cause of the Concrete Name, as to be a Body, to be Moveable, to be Moved, to be Figurate, to be of such Quantity, to be Hot, to be Cold, to be Like, to be Equall, to be Appius, to be Lentulus, &c. Or Names equivalent to these, which are most commonly called Abstract Names, as Corporeity, Mobility, Motion, Figure, Quantity, Heat, Cold, Likenesse, Equality, and (as Cicero has it) Appiety and Lentulity. Of the same kind also are Infinitives; for to Live and to Move are the same with Life and Motion, or to be Living, and to be Moved. But Abstract Names denote onely the Causes of Concrete Names, and not the Things themselves. For example when we see any thing, or conceive in our Minde any Visible thing, that Thing appears to us, or is conceived by us, not in one Point, but as having Parts distant from one another, that is, as being extended and filling some space. Seeing therefore we call the Thing so conceived Body, the cause of that name is, that that Thing is extended, or the Extension or Corporeity of it. So when we see a Thing appeare sometimes here, sometimes there, and call it Moved or Removed, the Cause of that Name is that it is Moved or the Motion of the same.

And these Causes of Names; are the same with the Causes of our Conceptions, namely some Power or Action, or Affection of the Thing conceived, which some call the Manner by which any thing workes upon our senses, but by most men they are called Accidents; I say Accidents, not in that sense in which Accident is opposed to Necessary; but so, as being

neither the Things themselves, nor parts thereof, do neverthelesse accompany the Things in such manner, that (saving Extension) they may all perish and destroyed, but can never be abstracted.

4 There is also this difference betwixt Concrete and Abstract Names, that those were invented before Propositions, but these after; for these could have no being till there were Propositions, from whose Copula they proceed. Now in all matters that concerne this life, but chiefly in Philosophy, there is both great Use and great Abuse of Abstract Names; and the use consists in this, that without them we cannot for the most part either Reason, or compute the Properties of Bodies; for when we would multiply, divide, adde or substract Heat, Light, or Motion, if we should double or adde them together by Concrete Names, saying (for example) Hot is double to Hot, Light double to Light, or Moved double to Moved, we should not double the Properties, but the Bodies themselves that are Hot, Light, Moved, &c. which we would not doe. But the Abuse proceeds from this, that some men seeing they can consider, that is (as I said before) bring into account the Increasings and Decreasings of Quantity, Heat and other Accidents, without considering their Bodies or Subjects (which they call Abstracting, or making to exist apart by themselves,) they speake of Accidents, as if they might be separated from all Bodies. And from hence proceed the grosse errors of writers of Metaphysicks; for, because they can consider Thought without the consideration of Body, they inferre there is no need of a thinking-Body; and because Quantity may be considered without considering Body, they thinke also that Quantity may be without Body, and Body without Quantity; and that a Body has Quantity by the addition of Quantity to it. From the same fountaine spring those insignificant words, Abstract Substance, Separated Essence and the like; as also that confusion of words derived from the Latine Verb Est, as Essence, Essentiality, Entity, Entitative; besides Reality, Aliquiddity, Quiddity, &c. which could never

have been heard of among such Nations as do not Copulate their Names by the Verbe Is, but by Adjective Verbs, as Runneth, Readeth, &c. or by the mere placing of one Name after another; and yet seeing such Nations Compute and Reason, it is evident that Philosophy has no need of those words Essence, Entity and other the like barbarous Termes.

There are many Distinctions of Propositions, whereof the first is, that some are Universall, others Particular, others Indefinite, and others Singular; and this is commonly called the distinction of Quantity. An Universall Proposition is that whose subject is affected with the sign of an Universall Name, as Every man is a Living Creature. Particular, that whose subject is affected with the sign of a Particular Name, as Some Man is learned. An Indefinite Proposition has for its Subject a Common Name, and put without any sing; as Man is a Living Creature, Man is Learned. And a Singular Proposition is that whose Subject is a singular Name, as Socrates is a Philosopher, This man is black.

6 The Second Distinction is into Affirmative and Negative, and is called the Distinction of Quality. An Affirmative Proposition is that whose Praedicate is a Positive Name, as Man is a Living Creature. Negative, that whose Praedicate is a Negative Name, as Man is Not-a-stone.

7 The third Distinction is, that one is True, another False. A True Proposition is that, whose Praedicate containes, or comprehends its Subject, or whose Praedicate is the Name of every thing, of which the Subject is the Name; as Man is a Living Creature is therefore a True Proposition, because whatsoever is called Man, the same is also called Living Creature; and Some Man is sick, is True, because sick is the Name of Some Man. That which is not True, or that whose Praedicate does not containe its Subject, is called a False Proposition, as Man is a Stone.

Now these words True, Truth, and True Proposition are equivalent to one another; For Truth consists in Speech, and not in the Things spoken of; and

though True be sometimes opposed to to Apparent or Feigned, yet it is alwayes to be referred to the Truth of Proposition; for the Image of a Man in a Glasse, or a Ghost, is therefore denyed to be a very Man, because this Proposition, A Ghost is a man, is not True; for it cannot be denied but that a Ghost is a very Ghost. And therefore Truth or Verity is not any Affection of the Thing, but of the Proposition concerning it. As for that which the Writers of Metaphysicks say, that A thing, One thing, and a Very thing, are equivalent to one another, it is but trifling and childish; for who does not know, that A Man, One Man, and a Very Man, signifie the same.

8 And from hence it is evident, that Truth and Falsity have no place but amongst such Living Creatures as use Speech. For though some brute Creatures, looking upon the Image of a Man in a Glasse, may be affected with it as if it were the Man himselfe, and for this reason feare it or fawne upon it in vain; Yet they doe not apprehend it as True or False, but onely as Like; and in this they are not deceived. Wherefore, as men owe all their True Ratiocination to the right understanding of Speech; So also they owe their Errors to the misunderstanding of the same; and as all the Ornaments of Philosophy proceed onely from Man, so from Man also is derived the ugly absurdity of False opinions. For Speech has something in it like to a Spiders Web (as it was said of old of Solons laws;) for by contexture of words tender and delicate Wits are insnared and stopt; but strong Wits breake easily through them.

From hence also this may be deduced, that the first Truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed Names upon Things, or received them from the imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that Man is a Living Creature; but it is for this reason, that it pleased men to impose both those Names on the same thing.

9 Fourthly, Propositions are distinguished into Primary and not Primary. Primary is that wherein the Subject is explicated by a Praedicate of many

Names, as Man, is a Body Animated Rationall; for that which is comprehended in the Name Man is more largely expressed in the Names Body, Animated, and Rationall joyned together; and it is called Primary, because it is first in Ratiocination; for nothing can be proved, without understanding first the name of the Thing in question. Now Primary Propositions are nothing but Definitions, or parts of Definitions, and these onely are the principles of Demonstration, being Truths constituted arbitrarily by the Inventors of Speech, and therefore not to be demonstrated. To these Propositions, some have added others, which they call Primary and Principles; namely Axiomes and Common Notions; which (though they be so evident that they need no proofe, yet) because they may be proved, are not truly Principles; & the lesse to be received for such, in regard Propositions not intelligible, and sometimes manifestly false, are thrust on us under the Name of Principles by the clamour of Men, who obtrude for evident to others all that they themselves thinke True. Also certaine Petitions are commonly received into the number of Principles; as for example, That a streight line may be drawne between two points, and other Petitions of the Writers of Geometry; and these are indeed the Principles of Art or Construction, but not of Science and Demonstration.

10 Fiftly, Propositions are distinguished into Necessary, that is, necessarily True; and True, but not necessarily, which they call Contingent. A Necessary Proposition is when nothing can at any time be conceived or feigned, whereof the Subject is the Name, but the Praedicate also is the Name of the same thing; as Man is a Living-Creature is a necessary Proposition, because at what time soever we suppose the name Man agrees with any thing, at that time the name Living-Creature also agrees with the same. But a Contingent Proposition is that which at one time may be true, at another time false; as Every Crow is Black; which may perhaps be true now, but false hereafter. Again, in every Necessary Proposition, the

Praedicate is either equivalent to the Subject, as in this, Man is a Rational Living-Creature; or part of an equivalent Name, as in this, Man is a Living-Creature, for the Name Rational Living-Creature, or Man, is compounded of these two, Rational and Living-Creature. But in a Contingent Proposition this cannot be; for though this were true, Every Man is a Lyar, yet because the word Lyar is no part of a Compounded name equivalent to the Name Man, that Proposition is not to be called Necessary, but Contingent, though it should happen to be true alwayes. And therefore those Propositions only are Necessary, which are of Sempiternal Truth, that is, true at all times. From hence also it is manifest, that Truth adheres not to Things, but to Speech onely; for some Truths are eternal; for it will be eternally true, if Man, then Living-Creature; but that any Man, or Living-Creature should exist eternally, is not necessary.

11 A sixth Distinction of Propositions is into Categorical and Hypotheticall. A Categoricall Proposition is that which is simply or absolutely pronounced, as Every Man is a Living Creature, No Man is a Tree; and Hypotheticall is that which is pronounced conditionally, as, If any thing be a Man the same is also a Living Creature, If any thing be a Man the same is also Not-a-stone.

A Categoricall Proposition, and an Hypothetical answering it, doe both signifie the same, if the Propositions be Necessary; but not if they be Contingent. For example, if this, Every Man is a Living-Creature, be true, this also will be true, If any thing be a Man, the same is also a Living-Creature; but in Contingent Propositions, though this be true, Every Crow is Black; yet this, If any thing be a Crow the same is Black, is false. But an Hypotheticall Proposition is then rightly said to be true, when the Consequence is true; as Every Man is a Living-Creature is rightly said to be a true Proposition, because of whatsoever it is truly said That is a Man, it cannot but be truly said also The same is a Living-Creature. And therefore

whensoever an Hypotheticall Proposition is true, the Categoricall answering it is not only true, but also necessary; which I thought worth the noting, as an argument, that Philosophers may in most things reason more solidly by Hypotheticall then Categoricall Propositions.

12 But seeing every Proposition may be & uses to be pronounced and written in many formes, and we are obliged to speake in the same manner as most men speake; yet they that learne Philosophy from Masters, had need to take heed they be not deceived by the Variety of expressions. And therefore whensoever they meet with any obscure Proposition, they ought to reduce it to its most Simple and Categoricall forme; in which the Copulative word Is must be expressed by it selfe, and not mingled in any manner either with the Subject or Praedicate, both which must be separated and cleerly distinguished one from another. For example, if this Proposition Man can not sinne, be compared with this, Man cannot sinne, their difference will easily appeare if they be reduced to these, Man is able not to sinne, and Man is not able to sinne, where the Praedicates are manifestly different. But they ought to doe this silently by themselves, or betwixt them and their Masters onely; for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publiquely. Being therefore to speake of Equipollent Propositions, I put in the first place all those for Equipollent, that may be reduced purely to one and the same Categoricall Proposition.

13 Secondly, that which is Categoricall and Necessary, is Equipollent to its Hypotheticall Proposition; as this Categorical, A Right-lined Triangle has its three Angles equal to two Right angles, to this Hypotheticall, If any Figure be a Right-lined Triangle, the three Angles of it are equal to two Right Angles.

14 Also, any two Universall Propositions, of which the Termes of the one (that is, the Subject and Praedicate) are Contradictory to the Termes of the other, and their Order inverted, as these, Every man is a Living

Creature, and Every thing that is not a Living Creature, is not a Man, are Equipollent. For seeing Every Man is a Living Creature is a true Proposition, the Name Living Creature containes the Name Man; but they are both Positive Names; and therefore (by the last Article of the praecedent Chapter) the Negative Name Not Living Creature containes the Negative Name Not Man; Wherefore Everything that is not a Living Creature is not a Man is a true Proposition. Likewise these, No Man is a Tree, No Tree is a Man, are Equipollent. For if it be true that Tree is not the Name of any Man, then no one thing can be signified by the two Names Man and Tree, wherefore No Tree is a Man is a true Proposition. Also to this, Whatsoever is not a Living Creature is not a Man, where both the Termes are Negative, this other Proposition is Equipollent, Onely a Living Creature is a Man.

15 Fourthly, Negative Propositions, whether the particle of Negation be set after the Copula as some Nations doe, or before it, as it is in Latine and Greeke, if the Termes be the same, are equipollent; as for example, Man is not-a-Tree and Man is not-a-Tree, are equipollent, though Aristotle deny it. Also these, Every Man is not a Tree, and No Man is a Tree are equipollent, and that so manifestly, as it needs not be demonstrated.

16 Lastly, all Particular Propositions that have their Termes inverted, as these, Some Man is Blind, Some Blind thing is a Man, are equipollent; for either of the two Names, is the Name of some one and the same Man; and therefore in which soever of the two Orders they be connected, they signifie the same Truth.

17 Of Propositions that have the same Termes, and are placed in the same Order, but varied either by Quantity or Quality, some are called Subaltern, others Contrary, others Subcontrary, and others Contradictory.

Subaltern, are Universal and Particular Propositions of the same Quality; as, Every Man is a Living Creature, Some Man is a Living Creature; or, No

Man is Wise, Some Man is not Wise. Of these if the Universal be true, the Particular will be true also.

Contrary, are Universal Propositions of different Quality; asEvery Man is happy, No Man is happy. And of these if one be true the other is false; also they may both be false, as in the example given.

Subcontrary, are Particular Propositions of different Quality; as Some Man is learned, Some Man is not learned; which cannot be both false, but they may be both true.

Contradictory are those that differ both in Quantity and Quality; as Every Man is a Living Creature, Some Man is not a Living Creature; which can neither be both true, nor both false.

18 A Proposition is said to follow from two other Propositions, when these being granted to be true, it cannot be denyed but the other is true also. For example, let these two Propositions, Every Man is a Living Creature, and Every Living Creature is a Body, be supposed true, that is, that Body is the Name of Every Living Creature, and Living Creature, the Name of Every Man. Seeing therefore, if these be understood to be true, it cannot be understood that Body is not the name of Every man, that is, that Every Man is a Body, is false, this Proposition will be said to follow from those two, or to be necessarily inferred from them.

19 That a true Proposition may follow from false Propositions, may happen sometimes; but false from true, never. For if these, Every Man is a Stone, and Every Stone is a Living Creature, (which are both false) be granted to be true, it is granted also that Living Creature is the name of Every Stone, and Stone of Every Man, that is, that Living Creature is the Name of Every Man; that is to say, this Proposition Every Man is a Living Creature, is true, as it is indeed true. Wherefore a true Proposition may sometimes follow from false. But if any two Propositions be true, a false one can never follow from them. For if true follow from false, for this

reason onely, that the false are granted to be true, then truth from two truths granted will follow in the same manner.

20 Now seeing none but a true Proposition will follow from true, and that the understanding of two Propositions to be true, is the cause of understanding that also to be true which is deduced from them; the two Antecedent Propositions are commonly called the Causes of the inferred Proposition, or Conclusion. And from hence it is that Logicians say, the Premisses are Causes of the Conclusion; which may passe, though it be not properly spoken; for though Understanding be the cause of Understanding, yet Speech is not the cause of Speech. But when they say, the Cause of the Properties of any thing, is the Thing it self, they speake absurdly. Eor example, if a Figure be propounded which is Triangular; Seeing every Triangle has all its angles together equal to two right angles, from whence it follows that all the angles of that Figure are equal to two right angles, they say for this reason, that that Figure is the Cause of that Equality. But seeing the Figure does not it self make its angles, and therefore cannot be said to be the Efficient-Cause, they call it the Formall-Cause; whereas in deed it is no Cause at all; nor does the Property of any Figure follow the Figure, but has its Being at the same time with it; only the Knowledge of the Figure goes before the Knowledge of the Properties; and one Knowledge is truly the Cause of another Knowledge, namely the Efficient-Cause.

And thus much concerning Proposition; which in the Progress of Philosophy is the first Step, like the moving towards of one Foot. By the due addition of another Step I shall proceed to Syllogisme, and make a compleat Pace. Of which in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV. OF SYLLOGISME.

1 THE DEFINITION of Syllogisme.

2 In a Syllogisme there are but three Termes.

3 Major, Minor and Middle Term; also Major and Minor Proposition, what they are.

4 The Middle Terme in every Syllogisme ought to be determined in both the Propositions to one and the same thing.

5 From two Particular Propositions nothing can be concluded.

6 A Syllogisme is the Collection of two Propositions into one Summe.

7 The Figure of a Syllogisme what it is.

8 What is in the mind answering to a Syllogisme.

9 The first Indirect Figure how it is made.

10 The second Indirect Figure how made.

11 How the third Indirect Figure is made

12 There are many Moods in every Figure, but most of them Uselesse in Philosophy.

13 An Hypotheticall Syllogisme when equipollent to a Categoricall.

1. A Speech consisting of three Propositions, from two of which the third followes, is called a SYLLOGISME; and that which followes is called the Conclusion; the other two Premisses. For example this Speech, Every man is a Living Creature, Every Living Creature is a Body, therefore, Every Man is a Body, is a Syllogisme, because the third Proposition follows from the two first; that is, if those be granted to be true, this must also be granted to be true.

2 From two Propositions which have not one Terme common, no Conclusion can follow; and therefore no Syllogisme can be made of them. For let any two Premisses, A man is a Living Creature, A Tree is a Plant, be both of them true, yet because it cannot be collected from them that Plant is the Name of a Man, or Man the Name of a Plant, it is not necessary that this Conclusion, A Man is a Plant should be true. Corollary, Therefore in the Premisses of a Syllogisme there can be but three Termes.

Besides there can be no Terme in the Conclusion, which was not in the Premisses. For let any two Premisses be, A Man is a Living Creature, A Living Creature is a Body, yet if any other Terme be put in the Conclusion, as Man is two footed; though it be true, it cannot follow from the Premisses, because from them it cannot be collected, that the Name Two footed belongs to a Man; and therefore againe, In every Syllogisme there can be but three Termes.

3 Of these Termes, that which is the Predicate in the Conclusion, is commonly called the Major; that which is the Subject in the Conclusion, the Minor, and the other is the Middle Term; as in this Syllogisme, A Man is a Living Creature, A Living Creature is a Body, therefore, A Man is a Body, Body is the Major, Man the Minor and Living Creature the Middle Term. Also of the Premisses, that in which the Major Terme is found, is called the Major Proposition, and that which has the Minor Term the Minor Proposition.

4 If the Middle Terme be not in both the Premisses determined to one and the same singular thing, no Conclusion will follow, nor Syllogisme be made. For let the Minor Terme be Man, the Middle Terme Living Creature, and the Major Term Lyon; and let the Premisses be Man is a Living Creature, Some Living Creature is a Lyon, yet it will not follow that, Every or Any Man is a Lyon. By which it is manifest, that in every Syllogisme, that Proposition which has the Middle Terme for its Subject, ought to be either Universal or Singular, but not Particular nor Indefinite. For example, this Syllogism, Every man is a Living Creature, some Living Creature is four-footed, therefore some Man is four-footed, is therefore faulty, because the Middle Term, Living Creature, is in the first of the Premisses determined onely to Man, for there the Name of Living Creature is given to Man onely, but in the later Premisse it may be understood of some other Living Creature besides Man. But if the later Premisse had been Universall, as here, Every Man is a Living Creature, Every Living Creature is a Body, therefore Every Man is a Body, the Syllogisme had been true; for it would have followed that Body had been the Name of Every Living Creature, that is of Man, that is to say, the Conclusion Every Man is a Body had been true. Likewise when the Middle Term is a Singular Name, a Syllogisme may be made, I say a true Syllogisme, though uselesse in Philosophy, as this, Some Man is Socrates, Socrates is a Philosopher, therefore Some Man is a Philosopher; for the Premisses being granted, the Conclusion cannot be denyed.

5 And therefore of two Premisses, in both which the MiddleTerme is Particular, a Syllogisme cannot be made; for whether the Middle Terme be the Subject in both the Premisses, or the Predicate in both, or the Subject in one and the Predicate in the other, it will not be necessarily determined to the same thing. For let the Premisses be,

- Some Man is blind

- Some Man is learned

In both which the Middle Term is the Subject,

It will not follow, that Blind is the Name of any learned Man, or Learned the Name of any Blind Man, seeing the Name Learned does not containe the Name Blind, nor this that; and therefore it is not necessary that both should be Names of the same Man. So from these Premisses.

- Every Man is a Living Creature
- Every Horse is a Living Creature

In both which the Middle Terme is the Predicate,

Nothing will follow. For seeing Living Creature is in both of them Indefinite, which is equivalent to Particular, and that Man may be one kind of Living Creature, and Horse another kind, it is not necessary that Man should the be Name of Horse, or Horse of Man. Or if the Premisses be,

- Every Man is a Living Creature
- Some Living Creature is four-footed

In one of which the Middle Terme is the Subject, and in the other the Predicate,

The Conclusion will follow, because the Name Living Creature being not determined, it may in one of them be understood of Man in the other of Not-Man.

6 Now it is manifest from what has been said, that a Syllogisme is nothing but a Collection of the summe of two Propositions, joyned together by a common Term, which is called the Middle Terme. And as Proposition is the Addition of two Names, so Syllogisme is the adding together of three.

7 Syllogismes are usually distinguished according to their diversity of Figures, that is, by the diverse position of the Middle Term. And againe in Figure there is a distinction of certain Moods, which consist of the differences of Propositions in Quantity & Quality. The first Figure is that, in which the Terms are placed one after another according to their latitude of

Signification; in which order the Minor Term is first, the Middle Term next, and the Major last; as if the Minor Term be Man, the Middle Term Living Creature and the Major Term Body, then, Man is a Living Creature, is a Body, will be a Syllogisme in the first Figure; in which, Man is a Living Creature, is the Minor Proposition; the Major, Living Creature is a Body, and the Conclusion or sum of both Man is a Body. Now this Figure is called Direct, because the Termes stand in direct Order; and it is varied by Quantity and Quality into four Moods; of which the first is that wherein all the Terms are Positive, and the Minor Term Universal, as Every Man is a Living Creature, Every Living Creature is a Body; in which all the Propositions are Affirmative and Universall. But if the Major Term be a Negative Name, and the Minor an Universall Name, the Figure will be in the second Mood, as, Every Man is a Living Creature, Every Living Creature is not a Tree, in which the Major Proposition and Conclusion are both Universall and Negative. To these two are commonly addded two more, by making the Minor Term Particular. Also it may happen that both the Major and Middle Termes are Negative Terms, and then there arises another Mood, in which all the Propositions are Negative, and yet the Syllogisme will be good; as, if the Minor Term be Man, the Middle Term Not a Stone, and the Major Terme, Not a Flint, this Syllogisme, No Man is a Stone, Whatsoever is not a Stone is not a Flint, therefore No Man is a Flint, is true, though it consist of three Negatives. But in Philosophy, the Profession whereof is to establish Universall Rules concerning the Properties of Things, seeing the difference betwixt Negatives and Affirmatives is onely this, that in the former the Subject is affirmed by a Negative Name, and by a Positive in the later, it is superfluous to consider any other Mood in direct Figure, besides that, in which all the Propositions are both Universal and Affirmative.

8. The Thoughts in the mind answering to a Direct Syllogism, proceed in this manner; First, there is conceived a Phantasme of the thing named, with that Accident or Quality thereof for which it is in the Minor Proposition called by that name which is the Subject; next, the Mind has a Phantasme of the same thing with that Accident or Quality for which it hath the name that in the same Proposition is the Predicate; Thirdly, the Thought returns of the same thing as having that Accident in it, for which it is called by the Name that is in the Predicate of the Major Proposition; and lastly, remembring that all those are the Accidents of one and the same thing, it concludes that those three Names are also Names of one and the same thing; that is to say, the Conclusion is true. For example, when this Syllogisme is made, Man is a Living Creature, A Living Creature is a Body, therefore Man is a Body, the Mind conceives first an image of a Man speaking or discoursing, and remembers that that which so appears, is called Man; then it has the image of the same Man moving, and remembers that that which appeares so is called Living Creature; thirdly, it conceives an image of the same Man as filling some place or space, and remembers that what appeares so is called Body; and lastly, when it remembers, that that thing which was extended, and moved and spake, was one and the same thing, it concludes that the three Names Man, Living Creature, and Body, are Names of the same thing, and that therefore Man is a Living Creature is a true Proposition. From whence it is manifest, that Living Creatures that have not the use of Speech, have no Conception or Thought in the Mind, answering to a Syllogisme made of Universall Propositions; seeing it is necessary to Thinke not only of the Thing, but also by turnes to remember the diverse Names, which for diverse considerations thereof are applied to the same.

9 The rest of the Figures arise either from the Inflexion, or Inversion of the first or direct Figure; which is done by changing the Major, or Minor, or both the Propositions into converted Propositions aequipollent to them.

From whence follow three other Figures; of which, two are Inflected, and the third Inverted. The first of these three is made by the Conversion of the Major Proposition. For let the Minor, Middle and Major Terms stand in direct order, thus, Man is a Living Creature, Is not a Stone, which is the first or direct Figure; the Inflexion will be by converting the Major Proposition in this manner,

Man is a Living Creature,

A stone is not a Living Creature; And this is the second

Figure, or the first of the Indirect Figures; in which the Conclusion will be, Man is not a stone. For (having shewn in the last Cha Article, that Universall Propositions converted by contradiction of the Termes are aequipollent,) both those Syllogismes conclude alike; so that if the Major be read (like Hebrew) backwards, thus, A Living Creature is not a Stone, it will be direct again, as it was before. In like manner this Direct Syllogisme, Man is not a Tree, is not a Pear-tree, will be made Indirect by converting the Major Proposition (by contradiction of the Termes) into another aequipollent to it, thus,

Man is not a Tree,

A Pear-tree is a Tree; for the same Conclusion will follow, Man is not a Pear-tree.

But for the Conversion of the Direct Figure into the first Indirect Figure, the Major Terme in the Direct Figure ought to be Negative. For though this Direct, Man is a Living Creature, is a Body be made Indirect, by converting the Major Proposition, thus,

Man is a Living Creature.

Not a Body is not a Living Creature, Therefore

Every Man is a Body; yet this Conversion appeares so obscure, that this Mood is of no use at all. By the Conversion of the Major Proposition, it is

manifest, that in this Figure, the Mi dle Terme is alwayes the Predicate in both the Premisses.

10 The second Indirect Figure is made by converting the Minor Proposition, so as that the Middle Term is the Subject in both. But this never concludes Uniuersally, and therefore is of no use in Philosophy. Neverthelesse I will set down an example of it; by which this Direct.

Every Man is a Living Creature,

Every Living Creature is a Body, by Conversion of the Minor Proposition will stand thus,

Some Living Creature is a Man,

Every Living Creature is a Body, Therefore

Some Man is a Body.

For Every Man is a Living Creature, cannot be converted into this, Every Living Creature is a Man; and therefore if this Syllogisme be restored to its Direct forme, the Minor Proposition will be Some Man is a Living Creature, and consequently the Conclusion will be Some Man is a Body, seeing the Minor Terme Man, which is the Subject in the Conclusion, is a Particular Name.

11 The third Indirect or Inverted Figure, is made by the Conversion of both rhe Premisses. For Example, this Direct Syllogisme,

Every Man is a Living Creature,

Every Living Creature is not a Stone, Therefore

Every Man is not a Stone; being Inverted will stand thus,

Every Stone is not a Living Creature

Whatsoever is not a Living Creature, is not a Man, Therefore

Every Stone is not a Man. Which Conclusion is the Converse of the Direct Conclusion, and aequipollent to the same. The Figures therefore of Syllogisms, if they be numbred by the diverse scituation of the Middle Terme onely, are but three; in the first whereof the Middle Term has the

Middle place; in the second, the last; and in the third, the first place. But if they be numbred according to the scituation of the Termes simply, they are four; for the first may be distinguished againe into two, namely into Direct and Inverted. From whence it is evident, that the controversie among Logicians concerning the fourth Figure, is a meer , or contention about the Name thereof; for as for the thing it selfe, it is plain, that the scituation of the Termes (not considering the Quantity or Quality by which the Moods are distinguished) makes four differences of Syllogismes, which may be called Figures, or have any other Name at pleasure.

12 In every one of these Figures there are many Moods, which are made by varying the Premisses according to all the differences they are capable of, by Quantity and Quality; as namely, in the Direct Figure there are six Moods; in the first Indirect Figure, four; in the second, fourteen; and in the third, eighteen. But because from the Direct Figure I rejected as superfluous all Moods besides that which consists of Universal Propositions, and whose Minor Proposition is Affirmative, I doe together with it reject the Moods of the rest of the Figures which are made by Conversion of the Premisses in the Direct Figure.

13 As it was shewed before, that in Necessary Propositions a Categoricall and Hypotheticall Proposition are aequipollent; so likewise it is manifest that a Categoricall and Hypotheticall Syllogisme are aequivalent. For every Categoricall Syllogisme, as this,

Every Man is a Living Creature,

Every Living Creature is a Body, Therefore

Every Man is a Body, is of equall force with this Hypotheticall Syllogisme.

If any thing be a Man, the same is also a Living Creature,

If any thing be a Living Creature, the same is a Body, Therefore

If any thing be a Man, the same is a Body. In like manner, this Categorical Syllogisme in an Indirect Figure

No Stone is a Living Creature,

Every Man is a Living Creature, Therefore

No Man is a Stone, or

No Stone is a Man, is aequivalent to this Hypotheticall Syllogisme.

If any thing be a Man, the same is a Living Creature,

If any thing be a a Stone, the same is not a Living Creature, Therefore

If any thing be a Stone, the same is not a Man, or

If any thing be a Man, the same is not a Stone.

And thus much seemes sufficient for the nature of Syllogismes; (for the doctrine of Moods and Figures is cleerely delivered by others that have written largely and profitably of the same.) Nor are Precepts so necessary as Practice for the attaining of true Ratiocination; and they that study the Demonstrations of Mathematicians, will sooner learn true Logick, then they that spend time in reading the Rules of Syllogising which Logicians have made; no otherwise then little Children learn to goe, not by Precepts, but by exercising their feet. This therefore may serve for the first Pace in the way to Philosophy.

In the next place I shall speak of the Faults and Errors, into which men that reason unwarily, are apt to fall; and of their Kinds and Causes.

CHAP. V. OF ERRING, FALSITY AND CAPTIONS.

1 ERRING AND Falsity how they differ. Error of the Mind by it selfe without the use of Words, how it happens.

2 A sevenfold Incoherency of Names, every one of which makes allwayes a false Proposition.

3 Examples of the first manner of Incoherency.

4 Of the second.

5 Of the third.

6 Of the fourth.

7 Of the fifth.

8 Of the sixth.

9 Of the seventh.

10 Falsity of Propositions detected by resolving the Terms with Definitions continued till they come to Simple Names, or Names that are the most Generall of their kind.

11 Of the fault of a Syllogisme consisting in the Implication of the Termes which the Copula

12 Of the fault which consists in Equivocation.

13 Sophisticall Captions are oftner faulty in the matter then in the forme of Syllogismes.

1 Men are subject to Erre not onely in Affiming and Denying; but also in Perception, and in silent Cogitation. In Affirming and Denying, when they call any thing by a Name, which is not the Name thereof; as if from seeing the Sun first by reflection in Water, and afterwards again directly in the Firmament, we should to both those appearances give the Name of Sunne, and say there are two Sunnes; which none but men can doe; for no other Living Creatures have the use of Names. This kind of Error onely deserves the name of Falsity, as arising, not from sense, nor from the Things themselves but from pronouncing rashly; for Names have their constitution, not from the Species of Things, but from the Will and Consent of Men. And hence it comes to passe, that men pronounce Falsely by their own negligence, in departing from such appellations of things as are agreed upon, and are not deceived neither by the Things, nor by the Sense; for they do not perceive that the thing they see is called Sunne, but they give it that Name from their owne will and agreement. Tacite Errors, or the Errors of Sense and Cogitation, are made, by passing from one Imaginatition to the Imagination of another different thing; or by feigning that to be Past, or Future, which never was, nor ever shall be; as when by seeing the Image of the Sunne in Water, we imagine the Sunne it selfe to be there; or by seeing swords, that there has been or shall be fighting, because it uses to be so for the most part; or when from Promises we feigne the mind of the Promiser to be such and such; or lastly, when from any Signe we vainly imagine something to be signified, which is not. And Errors of this sort are common to all things that have sense; and yet the Deception proceeds neither from our senses, nor from the Things we perceive; but from our selves, while we feigne such things as are but meer Images, to be something more then Images. But neither Things, nor Imaginations of Things can be said to be False, seeing they are truly what they are; nor doe they as Signes promise any thing which they do not performe; for they indeed do not promise at all,

but we from them; nor doe the Clouds, but we from seeing the Clouds, say it shall rain. The best way therefore to free our selves from such Errors as arise from naturall Signes, is first of all, before we begin to reason concerning such conjecturall things, to suppose our selves ignorant, and then to make use of our Ratiocination; for these Errors proceed from the want of Ratiocination; whereas Errors which consist in Affirmation and Negation, (that is, the Falsity of Propositions) proceed only from Reasoning amisse. Of these therefore, as repugnant to Philosophy, I will speake principally.

2 Errors which happen in Reasoning, that is, in Syllogizing, consist either in the Falsity of the Premisses, or of the Inference. In the first of these cases, a Syllogisme is said to be faulty in the Matter of it; and in the second case, in the Forme. I will first consider the Matter, namely how many wayes a Proposition may be false; and next the Forme, and how it comes to pass, that when the Premises are True, the Inference is notwithstanding False.

Seeing therefore that Proposition onely is True, (Cha. Art. 7.) in which are copulated two Names of one and the same thing; and that alwayes False, in which Names of different things are copulated; look how many wayes Names of different things may be copulated, and so many wayes a False Proposition may be made.

Now all things to which we give Names, may be reduced to these four kinds, namely, Bodies, Accidents, Phantasmes, and Names themselves; and therefore in every true Proposition it is necessary that the Names copulated, be both of them Names of Bodies, or both Names of Accidents, or both Names of Phantasmes, or both Names of Names. For Names otherwise copulated are incoherent, and constitute a False Proposition. It may happen also that the Name of a Body, of an Accident, or of a Phantasme may be copulated with the Name of a Speech. So that copulated Names may be Incoherent seven manner of wayes.

1 If the Name of a Body be copulated with the Name of an Accident.

2 If the Name of a Body be copulated with the Name of a Phantasme.

3 If the Name of a Body be copulated with the Name of a Name.

4 If the Name of an Accident be copulated with the Name of a Phantasme.

5 If the Name of an Accident be copulated with the Name of a Name.

6 If the Name of a Phantasme be copulated with the Name of a Name.

7 If the Name of a Body, of an Accident or of a Phantasme be copulated with the Name of a Speech.

Of all which I will give some examples.

3 After the first of these wayes Propositions are false, when Abstract Names are copulated with Concrete Names; as (in Latine and Greek) Esse est Ens, Essenti est Ens, (i.) Quidditas est Ens, and many the like which are found in Aristotles Metaphysicks. Also, the Understanding worketh, the Understanding understandeth, the Sight seeth, A Body is Magnitude, A Body is Quantity, A Body is Extension, To Be a Man is a Man, Whitenesse is a White thing, &c. which is as if one should say The Runner is the Running, or the Walke Walketh. Moreover, Essence is separated, Substance is Abstracted; and others like these, or derived from these (with which common Philosophy abounds). For seeing no Subject of an Accident, (that is, No Body) is an Accident; no Name of an Accident ought to be given to a Body, nor of a Body to an Accident.

4 False in the second Manner are such Propositions as these, A Ghost is a Body, or a Spirit, that is, a thinne Body; Sensible Species fly up and down in the Air, or are moved hither and thither, which is proper to Bodies; also, A Shadow is Moved, or is a Body; Light is Moved, or is a Body; Colour is

the Object of Sight, Sound of Hearing; Space or Place is Extended; and innumerable others of this kind. For seeing Ghosts, sensible Species, a Shadow, Light, Colour, Sound, Space, &c. appeare to us no lesse sleeping then waking, they cannot be things without us, but onely Phantasmes of the mind that imagins them; and therefore the Names of these, copulated with the Names of Bodies, cannot constitute a true Proposition.

5 False Propositions of the third kind, are such as these; Genus est Ens, Universale est Ens, Ens de Ente Praedicatur. For Genus, and Universale, and Praedicare are Names of Names, and not of Things. Also Number is Infinite, is a false Proposition; for no number can be Infinite, but onely the word Number is then called an Indefinite Name when there is no determined Number answering to it in the Mind.

6 To the fourth kind belong such false Propositions as these, An Object is of such Magnitude or Figure as appeares to the Beholders; Colour, Light, Sound, are in the Object; and the like. For the same Object appeares sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, sometimes square, sometimes round according to the diversity of the Distance and Medium; but the true Magnitude and Figure of the thing seen is allwayes one and the same; so that the magnitude and figure which appeares, is not the true magnitude and figure of the Object, nor any thing but Phantasme; and therefore in such Propositions as these, the Names of Accidents are copulated with the Names of Phantasmes.

7 Propositions are false in the fifth manner, when it is said that The Definition is the Essence of a thing; Whitenesse, or some other Accident is the Genus, or Universal. For Definition is not the Essence of any thing, but a speech signifying what we conceive of the Essence thereof; and so also not Whitenesse it selfe, but the word Whitenesse, is a Genus, or an Universall Name.

8 In the sixth manner they Erre, that say the Idea of any thing is Universal; as if there could be in the Mind an Image of a Man which were not the Image of some one Man, but of Man simply, which is impossible; for every Idea is one, and of onething; but they are deceived in this, that they put the Name of the thing for the Idea thereof.

9 They erre in the seventh manner, that make this distinction between things that have being, that some of them exist by themselves, others by Accident; Namely, because Socrates is a Man is a Necessary Proposition, and Socrates is a Musician a Contingent Proposition, therefore they say some things exist necessarily or by themselves, others contingently or by Accident; whereby, seeing Necessary, Contingent, By it selfe, By Accident, are not Names of Things, but of Propositions, they that say any thing that has being, exists by Accident, copulate the Name of a Proposition with the Name of a Thing. In the same manner also they Erre, which place some Ideas in the Understanding, others in the Fancy; as if from the Understanding of this Proposition Man is a Living Creature, we had one Idea or Image of a Man derived from sense to the Memory, and another to the Understanding; wherein that which deceives them is this, that they think one Idea should be answerable to a Name, another to a Proposition; which is false; for Proposition signifies onely the order of those things one after another, which we observe in the same Idea of Man; so that this Proposition Man is a Living Creature, raises but one Idea in us, though in that Idea we consider that first, for which he is called Man, and next that for which he is called Living Creature. The Falsities of Propositions in all these several manners, is to be discovered by the Definitions of the Copulated Names.

10 But when Names of Bodies are copulated with Names of Bodies, Names of Accidents with Names of Accidents, Names of Names with Names of Names, and Names of Phantasmes with Names of Phantasmes, if we neverthelesse remaine still doubtfull whether such Propositions are true;

we ought then in the first place to find out the Definition of both those Names, and againe the Definitions of such Names as are in the former Definition, and so proceed by a continuall Resolution till we come to a simple Name, that is, to the most Generall or most Universall Name of that kind; and if after all this the Truth or Falsity thereof be not evident, we must search it out by Philosophy, and Ratiocination, beginning from Definitions. For every Proposition Universally true, is either a Definition, or part of a Definition, or the evidence of it depends upon Definitions.

11 That fault of a Syllogisme which lyes bid in the Forme thereof, will allwayes be found either in the implication of the Copula with one of the Termes, or in the Aequivocation of some word; and in either of these wayes there will be four Terms, which (as I have shewne) cannot stand in a true Syllogisme. Now the implication of the Copula with either Terme, is easily detected by reducing the Propositions to plain and cleere Praedication; as (for example) if any man should argue thus,

The Hand toucheth the Pen,

The Pen toucheth the Paper, Therefore

The Hand toucheth the Paper; the Fallacy will easily appear by reducing it, thus,

The Hand, is, touching the Pen,

The Pen, is, touching the Paper, Therefore

The Hand, is, touching the Paper; where there are manifestly these four Termes, The Hand, Touching the Pen, The Pen, and Touching the Paper. But the danger of being deceived by Sophismes of this kind, does not seem to be so great, as that I need insist longer upon them.

12 And though there may be Fallacy in Aequivocal Terms, yet in those that be manifestly such there is none at all; nor in Metaphors; for they professe the transferring of Names from one thing to another. Neverthelesse sometimes Aequivocalls (and those not very obscure) may deceive; as in

this argumentation, It belongs to Metaphysicks, to treat of Principles; But the first Principles of all, is, that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time; and therefore it belongs to Metaphysicks to treat whether the same thing may both exist and not exist at the same time; where the Fallacy lies in the Aequivocation of the word Principle; for whereas Aristotle in the beginning of his Metaphysicks sayes, that the treating of Principles belongs to primary science, he understands by Principles, Causes of things, and certaine Existences which he calls Primary; but where he sayes a Primary Proposition is a Principle, by Principle there he means the beginning and cause of Knowledge, that is the understanding of words, which if any man want, he is incapable of learning.

13 But the Captions of Sophists and Scepticks, by which they were wont of old to deride and oppose Truth, were faulty for the most part, not in the Forme, but in the Matter of Syllogisme; and they deceived not others oftner then they were themselves deceived. For the force of that famous argument of Zeno against Motion, consisted in this Proposition, Whatsoever may be divided into parts infinite in number, the same is infinite; which he without doubt thought to be true, yet neverthelesse is false. For to be divided into infinite parts, is nothing else but to be divided into as many parts as any man will. But it is not necessary that a Line should have parts infinite in number, or be infinite, because I can divide and subdivide it as often as I please; for how many parts soever I make, yet their number is finite; but because he that sayes Parts, simply, without adding how many, does not limit any number, but leaves it to the determination of the Hearer, therefore we say commonly a line may be divided infinitely; which cannot be true in any other sense.

And thus much may suffice concerning Syllogisme, which is as it were the first Pace towards Philosophy; in which I have said as much as is necessary, to teach any man from whence all true argumentation has its

force. And to enlarge this Treatise with all that may be heaped together, would be as superfluous, as if one should (as I said before) give a young child Precepts for the teaching of him to goe; for the Art of Reasoning is not so well learned by Precepts as by Practice, and by the reading of those books in which the Conclusions are all made by severe Demonstration. And so I pass on to the way of Philosophy, that is, to the Method of Study.

CHAP. VI. OF METHOD

1 METHOD AND Science defined.

2 It is more easily known concerning Singular then Universall things, That they are; and contrarily, it is more easily knowne concerning Universall then Singular things, Why they are, or what are their Causes.

3 What it is Philosophers seek to know.

4 The first Part, by which Principles are found out is purely Analyticall.

5 The highest Causes, and most Universall in every kind, are knowne by themselves.

6 Method from Principles fonnd out, tending to Science simply, what it is.

7 That Method of Civill and Naturall Science which proceeds from Sense to Principles, is Analytical; and againe that which begins at Principles, is Syntheticall.

8 The Method of searching out, whether any thing propounded, be Matter or Accident.

9 The Method of seeking whether any Accident be in this, or in that Subject.

10 The Method of searching after the Cause of any Effect propounded.

11 Words serve to Invention, as Markes; to Demonstration, as Signes.

12 The Method of Demonstration is Syntheticall.

13 Definitions onely are Primary and Universal Propositions.

14 The Nature and Definition of a Definition.

15 The Properties of a Definition.

16 The Nature of a Demonstration.

17 The Properties of a Demonstration, and Order of things to be demonstrated.

18 The Faults of a Demonstration.

19 Why the Analyticall Method of Geometricians cannot be treated of in this place.

1 FOR the understanding of Method, it will be necessary for me to repeat the definition of Philosophy, delivered above (Cha. Art. 2.) in this manner, Philosophy is the knowledge we acquire by true Ratiocination, of Appearances, or apparent Effects, from the knowledge we have of some possible Production or Generation of the same; and of such Production as has been or may be, from the knowledge we have of the Effects. METHOD therefore in the Study of Philosophy, is the shortest way of finding out Effects by theirknown Causes, or of Causes by their known Effects. But we are then said to know any Effect, when we know, that there be Causes of the same, and in what Subiect those Causes are, and in what Subiect they produce that Effect, and in what Manner they work the same. And this is the Science of Causes, or as they call it of the . All other Science, which is called the , is either Perception by Sense, or the Imagination, or Memory remaining after such Perception.

The first Beginnings therefore of Knowledge, are the Phantasmes of Sense and Imagination; and that there be such Phantasmes we know well enough by Nature; but to know why they be, or from what Causes they proceed, is the work of Ratiocination; which consists (as is said above, in the 1. Cha. Art.) in Composition, and Division or Resolution. There is

therefore no Method, by which we find out the Causes of things, but is either Compositive, or Resolutive, or partly Compositive, and partly Resolutive. And the Resolutive is commonly called Analyticall Method, as the Compositive is called Syntheticall.

2 It is common to all sorts of Method, to proceed from known things to unknown; and this is manifest from the cited Definition of Philosophy. But in Knowledge by Sense, the whole object is more known, then any part thereof; as when we see a Man, the Conception or whole Idea of that Man is first or more known, then the particular Ideas of his being figurate, animate, and rationall; that is, we first see the whole Man, and take notice of his Being, before we observe in him those other Particulars. And therefore in any knowledge of the , or that any thing is, the beginning of our search is from the whole Idea; and contrarily, in our knowledge of the , or of the Causes of any thing, that is, in the Sciences, we have more knowledge of the Causes of the Parts, then of the Whole. For the Cause of the Whole is compounded of the Causes of the Parts; but it is necessary that we know the things that are to be compounded, before we can know the whole Compound. Now by Parts, I do not here mean Parts of the thing it self, but Parts of its Nature; as, by the Parts of Man I do not understand his Head, his Shoulders, his Arms, &c. but his Figure, Quantity, Motion, Sense, Reason, and the like; which Accidents being compounded or put together, constitute the whole Nature of Man, but not the man himselfe. And this is the meaning of that common saying, namely, that some things are more knowne to us, others more known to Nature; for I do not thinke that they which so distinguish, mean, that something is known to Nature, which is known to no man; and therefore, by those things that are more known to Us, we are to understand, things we take notice of by our Senses, and by more known to Nature, those we acquire the knowledge of by Reason; for in this sense it is, that the Whole, that is, those things that have Universal Names, (which for

brevities sake I call Universall) are more knowne to us then the Parts, that is, such things as have Names lesse Universal, (which I therefore call Singular;) and the Causes of the Parts, are more known to Nature then the Cause of the Whole; that is, Universalls then Singulars.

3 In the Study of Philosophy men search after Science either Simply, or Indefinitely; that is, to know as much as they can, without propounding to themselves any limited question; or they enquire into the Cause of some determined Appearance, or endeavour to find out the certainty of something in question; as what is the cause of Light, of Heat, of Gravity, of a Figure propounded, and the like; or in what Subiect any propounded Accident is inhaerent; or what may conduce most to the generation of some propounded Effect from many Accidents; or in what manner particular Causes ought to be compounded for the production of some certaine Effect. Now according to this variety of things in question, sometimes the Analyticall Method is to be used, and sometimes the Syntheticall.

4 But to those that search after Science indefinitely, which consists in the knowledge of the Causes of all things, as far forth as it may be attained, and the Causes of Singular things are compounded of the Causes of Universall or Simple things, it is necessary that they know the Causes of Universall things, or of such Accidents as are common to all Bodies, that is, to all Matter, before they can know the Causes of Singular things, that is, of those Accidents by which one thing is distinguished from another. And againe they must know what those Universall things are, before they can know their Causes. Moreover, seeing Universall things are contained in the Nature of Singular things, the knowledge of them is to be acquired by Reason, that is, by Resolution. For example, if there be propounded a Conception or Idea of some Singular thing, as of a Square, this Square is to be resolved into a Plain, terminated with a certaine number of equall and straight lines and right angles. For by this Resolution we have these things

Universall or agreeable to all Matter, namely, Line, Plain, (which containes Superficies,) Terminated, Angle, Straightness, Rectitude and Equality; and if we can find out the Causes of these, we may compound them all together into the Cause of a Square. Againe, if any man propound to himselfe the Conception of Gold, he may by Resolving come to the Ideas of Solid, Visible, Heavy, (that is, tending to the Center of the Earth, or downwards,) and many other more Universall then Gold it selfe; and these he may Resolve againe, till he come to such things as are most Universall. And in this manner by Resolving continually, we may come to know what those things are, whose Causes being first known severally, and afterwards compounded, bring us to the Knowledge of Singular things. I conclude therefore, that the Method of attaining to the Universall Knowledge of Things, is purely Analyticall.

5 But the Causes of Universall things (of those at least that have any Cause) are manifest of themselues, or (as they say commonly) known to Nature; so that they need no Method at all; for they have all but one Universall Cause, which is Motion. For the variety of all Figures arises out of the variety of those Motions by which they are made; and Motion cannot be understood to have any other Cause besides Motion; nor has the Variety of those things we perceive by Sense, as of Colours, Sounds, Savours, &c. any other Cause then Motion, residing partly in the Objects that work upon our Senses, and partly in our selves, in such manner, as that it is manifestly some kind of Motion, though we cannot without Ratiocination come to know what kind. For though many cannot understand till it be in some sort demonstrated to them, that all Mutation consists in Motion; yet this happens not from any obscurity in the thing it selfe, (for it is not intelligible that any thing can depart either from Rest, or from the Motion it has, except by Motion;) but either by having their Naturall Discourse corrupted with

former Opinions received from their Masters, or else for this, that they do not at all bend their mind to the enquiring out of Truth,

6 By the Knowledge therefore of Universalls, and of their Causes (which are the first Principles by which we know the of things,) we have in the first place their Definitions, (which are nothing but the explication of our Simple Conceptions.) For example, he that has a true Conception of Place, cannot be ignorant of this Definition, Place is that space which is possessed or filled adaequately by some Body; and so, he that conceives Motion aright, cannot but know, that Motion is the privation of one Place, and the acquisition of another. In the next place, we have their Generations or Descriptions; as, (for example,) that a Line is made by the Motion of a Point, Superficies by the Motion of a Line, and one Motion by another Motion, &c. It remains, that we enquire, what Motion begets such and such Effects; as, what Motion makes a Straight line, and what a Circular; what Motion thrusts, what drawes, and by what way; what makes a thing which is seen or heard, to be seen or heard sometimes in one manner, sometimes in another. Now the Method of this kind of Enquiry, is Compositive. For first we are to observe what Effect a Body moved produceth, when we consider nothing in it besides its Motion; and we see presently that this makes a Line, or length; next, what the Motion of a long Body produces, which we find to be Superficies; and so forwards, till we see what the Effects of Simple Motion are; and then in like manner, we are to observe what proceeds from the Addition, Multiplication, Substraction and Division of these Motions, and what Effects, what Figures, and what Properties they produce; from which kind of Contemplation sprung that part of Philosophy which is called Geometry.

From this consideration of what is produced by Simple Motion, we are to passe to the consideration of what Effects one Body moved worketh upon another; and because there may be Motion in all the severall parts of a

Body, yet so as that the whole Body remain still in the same place, we must enquire, first, what Motion causeth such and such Motion in the whole, that is, when one Body invades another Body which is either at Rest, or in Motion, what way, and with what swiftnesse the invaded Body shall move; and again, what Motion this second Body will generate in a third, and so forwards. From which Contemplation shall be drawn that part of Philosophy which treats of Motion.

In the Third place we must proceed to the Enquiry of such Effects, as are made by the Motion of the Parts of any Body, as, how it comes to passe, that things when they are the same, yet seeme not to be the same, but changed. And here the things we search after are sensible Qualities, such as Light, Colour, Transparency, Opacity, Sound, Odour, Savour, Heat, Cold and the like; which because they cannot be known till we know the Causes of Sense it selfe, therefore the consideration of the Causes of Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting and Touching belongs to this third place; and all those qualities and Changes above mentioned are to be referred to the fourth place; which two considerations comprehend that part of Philosophy which is called Physiques. And in these four parts is contained whatsoever in Naturall Philosophy may be explicated by Demonstration properly so called. For if a Cause were to be rendred of Natural Appearances in special, as, what are the Motions and Influences of the heavenly Bodies, and of their parts, the reason hereof must either be drawn from the parts of the Sciences above mentioned, or no reason at all will be given, but all left to uncertaine conjecture.

After Physiques we must come to Morall Philosophy; in which we are to consider the Motions of the Mind, namely Appetite, Aversion, Love, Benevolence, Hope, Fear, Anger, Emulation, Envy, &c. what Causes they have, and of what they be Causes. And the reason why these are to be considered after Physiques, is, that they have their Causes in Sense and

Imagination, which are the Subject of Physicall Contemplation. Also the reason why all these Things are to be searched after in the order abovesaid, is, that Physiques cannot be understood, except we know first what Motions are in the smallest parts of Bodies; nor such Motion of Parts, till we know what it is that makes another Body move; nor this, till we know what Simple Motion will effect. And because all Appearance of things to sense is determined, and made to be of such and such Quality and Quantity by Compounded Motions, every one of which has a certaine degree of Velocity, and a certaine and determined way; therefore in the first place we are to search out the wayes of Motion simply, (in which Geometry consists;) next the wayes of such generated Motions as are manifest; and lastly the wayes of internal and invisible Motions, (which is the Enquiry of Naturall Philosophers.) And therefore they that study Naturall Philosophy, study in vaine, except they begin at Geometry; and such Writers or Disputers thereof, as are ignorant of Geometry, do but make their Readers and Hearers lose their time.

7 Civill and Morall Philosophy doe not so adhere to one another, but that they may be severed. For the Causes of the Motions of the Mind are known not onely by Ratiocination, but also by the Experience of every man that takes the paines to observe those Motions within himselfe. And therefore not only they that have attained the knowledge of the Passions and Perturbations of the Mind, by the Syntheticall Method and from the very first Principles of Philosophy, may by proceeding in the same way come to the Causes and Necessity of constituting Common-wealths, and to get the Knowledge of what is Naturall Right, and what are Civill Duties; and in every kind of Government, what are the Rights of the Commonwealth, and all other Knowledge appertaining to Civill Philosophy, for this reason, that the Principles of the Politiques consist in the Knowledge of the Motions of the Mind, and the Knowledge of these Motions from the knowledge of

Sense and Imagination; but even they also that have not learned the first part of Philosophy, namely Geometry and Physiques, may notwithstanding attain the Principles of Civill Philosophy, by the Analyticall Method. For if a Question be propounded, as Whether such an Action be Just or Uniust; if that Uniust be resolved into Fact against Law, and that notion of Law into the Command of him or them that have Coercive Power; and that Power be derived from the Wills of Men that constitute such Power to the end they may live in Peace, they may at last come to this, that the Appetites of Men and the Passions of their Minds are such, that unlesse they be restrained by some Power, they will alwayes be making warre upon one another; which may be known to be so by any mans experience, that will but examine his owne Mind. And therefore from hence he may proceed by Compounding, to the determination of the Justice or Injustice of any propounded Action. So that it is manifest by what has been said, that the Method of Philosophy to such as seek Science simply, without propounding to themselves the Solution of any Particular question, is partly Analyticall, and partly Syntheticall; namely, that which proceeds from Sense to the invention of Principles, Analyticall; and the rest Syntheticall.

8 To those that seek the Cause of some certaine and pro pounded Appearance or Effect, it happens sometimes, that they know not whether the thing whose Cause is sought after, be Matter or Body, or some Accident of a Body. For though in Geometry, when the Cause is sought of Magnitude, or Proportion, or Figure, it be certainly known that these things, namely Magnitude, Proportion and Figure are Accidents; yet in Naturall Philosophy, where all questions are concerning the Causes of the Phantasmes of sensible things, it is not so easie to discern between the things themselves from which those Phantasmes proceed, and the Appearances of those things to the sense; which have deceived many, especially when the Phantasmes have been made by Light. For Example, a

Man that looks upon the Sunne, has a certaine shining Idea of the Magnitude of about a foot over; and this he calls the Sunne, though he know the Sunne to be truly a great deale bigger and in like , the Phantasme of the same thing appears sometimes found by being a carre off, and sometimes square, by being neerer. Whereupon it may well be doubted whether that Phantasme be Ma… or some Body Naturall, or onely some Accident of a Body; in the examination of which doubt we may use this Method. The Properties of Matter and Accidents already found out by Us by the Syntheticall Method from their Definitions, are to be compared with the Idea we have before us; and if it agree with the Properties of Matter or Body, then it is a Body; otherwise it is an Accident. Seeing therefore Matter cannot by any endeavour of ours be either Made or Destroyed, or Encreased, or Diminished, or Moved out of its place, whereas that Idea Appeares, Vanishes, is Encreased, and Diminished, and Moved hither and thither at pleasure; we may certainly conclude that it is not a Body, but an Accident onely. And this Method is Syntheticall.

9 But if there be a doubt made concerning the Subject of any known Accident, (for this may be doubted sometimes, as in the praecedent example doubt may be made in what Subject that Splendor and apparent Magnitude of the Sunne is) then our enquiry must proceed in this manner. First, Matter in Generall must be divided into parts, as into Object, Medium, and the Sentient it selfe, or such other parts as seem most conformable to the thing propounded. Next, these parts are severally to be examined how they agree with the Definition of the Subject; and such of them as are not capable of that Accident are to be rejected. For example, If by any true Ratiocination the Sunne be found to be greater then its apparent Magnitude, then that Magnitude is not in the Sunne; If the Sunne be in one determined straight line, and one determined distance, and the Magnitude and Splendor be seen in more lines and distances then one, as it is in Reflection or Refraction,

then neither that Splendor nor apparent Magnitude are in the Sun it self, and therefore the Body of the Sun cannot be the Subject of that Splendor and Magnitude. And for the same reasons the Aire and other parts will be rejected, till at last nothing remain which can be the Subject of that Splendor and Magnitude but the Sentient it selfe. And this Method, in regard the Subject is divided into parts is Analitycall; and in regard the Properties both of the Subject and Accident are compared with the Accident concerning whose Subject the enquiry is made, it is Syntheticall.

10 But when we seek after the Cause of any propounded Effect; we must in the first place get into our Mind an exact Notion or Idea of that which we call Cause, namely, that A Cause is the Summe or Aggregate of all such Accidents both in the Agents and the Patient, as concurre to the producing of the Effect propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the Effect existeth with them; or that it cannot possibly exist if any one of them be absent. This being known, in the next place we must examine singly every Accident that accompanies or praecedes the Effect, as farre forth as it seemes to conduce in any manner to the production of the same, and see whether the propounded Effect may be conceived to exist, without the existence of any of those Accidents; and by this meanes separate such Accidents as do not concurre, from such as concurre to produce the said Effect; which being done, we are to put together the concurring Accidents, and consider whether we can possibly conceive that when these are all present, the Effect propounded will not follow; and if it be evident that the Effect will follow, then that Aggregate of Accidents is the entire Cause, otherwise not; but we must still search out and put together other Accidents. For example, if the Cause of Light be propounded to be sought out; first, we examine things without us, and find that whensoever Light appeares, there is some principall Object, as it were the fountaine of Light, without which we cannot have any perception of

Light; and therefore the concurrence of that Object is necessary to the generation of Light. Next we consider the Medium, and find that unlesse it be disposed in a certaine manner, namely, that it be transparent, though the Object remain the same, yet the Effect will not follow; and therefore the concurrence of Transparency is also necessary to the generation of Light. Thirdly, we observe our own Body, and find that by the indisposition of the Eyes, the Brain, the Nerves, and the Heart, that is, by Obstructions, Stupidity and Debility we are deprived of Light, so that a fitting disposition of the Organs to receive impressions from without is likewise a necessary part of the Cause of Light. Again, of all the Accidents inhaerent in the Object, there is none that can conduce to the effecting of Light, but onely Action, (or a certain Motion,) which cannot be conceived to be wanting, whensoever the Effect is present; for, that any thing may shine, it is not requisite that it be of such or such magnitude or Figure, or that the whole Body of it be moved out of the place it is in, (unlesse it may perhaps be said, that in the Sun or other Body, that which causeth Light is the light it hath in it selfe; which yet is but a trifling exception, seeing nothing is meant thereby but the Cause of Light; as if any man should say that the Cause of Light is that in the Sunne which produceth it;) it remaines therefore that the Action by which Light is generated, is Motion only in the parts of the Object. Which being understood, we may easily conceive what it is the Medium contributes, namely, the continuation of that Motion to the Eye; and lastly what the Eye and the rest of the Organs of the Sentient contribute, namely, the continuation of the same Motion to the last Organ of Sense, the Heart. And in this manner the Cause of Light may be made up of Motion continued from the Original of the same Motion, to the Original of Vitall Motion, Light being nothing but the alteration of Vitall Motion, made by the impression upon it of Motion continued from the Object. But I give this onely for an example, for I shall speak more at large of Light, and the

generation of it in its proper place. In the mean time it is manifest, that in the searching out of Causes, there is need partly of the Analyticall, and partly of the Syntheticall Method; of the Analyticall, to conceive how circumstances conduce severally to the production of Effects; and of the Syntheticall, for the adding together and compounding of what they can effect singly by themselves. And thus much may serve for the Method of Invention. It remaines that I speake of the Method of Teaching, that is, of Demonstration, and of the Meanes by which we demonstrate.

11 In the Method of Invention the use of words consists in this, that they may serve for Marks, by which, whatsoever we have found out may be recalled to memory; for without this all our Inventions perish, nor will it be possible for us to go on from Principles beyond a Syllogisme or two, by reason of the weaknesse of Memory. For example, if any man by considering a Triangle set before him, should find that all its angles together taken are equall to two right angles, and that by thinking of the same tacitely, without any use of words either understood or expressed; and it should happen afterwards that another Triangle unlike the former, or the same in different scituation should be offered to his consideration, he would not know readily whether the same property were in this last or no; but would be forced as often as a different Triangle were brought before him (and the difference of Triangles is infinite) to begin his contemplation anew; which he would have no need to do if he had the use of Names; for every Universal Name denotes the conceptions we have of infinite Singular things.. Neverthelesse as I said above, they serve as Markes for the helpe of our Memory, whereby we register to our selves our own Inventions; but not as Signes by which we declare the same to others; so that a man may be a Philosopher alone by himselfe without any Master; Adam had this capacity; But to Teach, that is to Demonstrate, supposes two at the least, and Syllogisticall Speech.

12 And seeing Teaching is nothing but leading the Mind of him we teach, to the knowledge of our Inventions, in that Track by which we attained the same with our own Mind; therefore the same Method that served for our Invention, will serve also for Demonstration to others, saving that we omit the first part of Method which proceeded from the Sense of Things to Universal Principles; which because they are Principles, cannot be demonstrated; and seeing they are known by Nature (as was said above in the 5th. Article) they need no Demonstration, though they need Explication. The whole Method therefore of Demonstration is Syntheticall, consisting of that order of Speech, which begins from Primary or most Universall Propositions, which are manifest of themselves, and proceeds by a perpetuall composition of Propositions into Syllogismes, till at last the Learner understand the truth of the Conclusion sought after.

13 Now such Principles are nothing but Definitions; whereof there are two sorts; one, of Names that signifie such things as have some conceiveable Cause, and another of such Names as signifie things of which we can conceive no Cause at all. Names of the former kind are, Body or Matter, Quantity or Extension, Motion, and whatsoever is common to all Matter. Of the second kind are, such a Body, such and so great Motion, so great Magnitude, such Figure, and whatsoever we can distinguish one Body from another by. And Names of the former kind are well enough defined, when by Speech as short as may be, we raise in the Mind of the Hearer perfect and cleer Ideas or Conceptions of the Things named, as when we Define Motion to be the leaving of one place, and the acquiring of another continually; for though no Thing Moved, nor any Cause of Motion be in that Definition, yet at the hearing of that Speech, there will come into the Mind of the Hearer an Idea of Motion clear enough. But Definitions of things which may be understood to have some Cause, must consist of such Names as expresse the Cause or Manner of their Generation, as when we

Define a Circle to be a Figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in a plaine, &c. Besides Definitions, there is no other Proposition that ought to be called Primary, or (according to severe truth) be received into the number of Principles. For those Axiomes of Euclide, seeing they may be demonstrated are no Principles of Demonstration, though they have by the consent of all Men gotten the authority of Principles, because they need not be Demonstrated. Also those Petitious or Postulata (as they call them) though they be Principles yet they are not Principles of Demonstration, but of Construction onely; that is, not of Science, but of Power; or (which is all one) not of Theoremes, which are Speculations, but of Problemes, which belong to Practice, or the doing of something. But as for those common received Opinions, Nature abhorres Vanity, Nature doth nothing in Vaine, and the like, which are neither evident in themselves, nor at all to be demonstrated, and which are oftner false then true, they are much lesse to be ackowledged for Principles.

To returne therefore to Definitions, The reason why I say that the Cause and Generation of such things as have any Cause or Generation, ought to enter into their Definitions, is this. The End of Science, is the Demonstration of the Causes and Generations of Things; which if they be not in the Definitions, they cannot be found in the Conclusion of the first Syllogisme that is made from those Definitions; and if they be not in the first Conclusion, they will not be found in any further Conclusion deduced from that; and therefore by proceeding in this manner we shall never come to Science; which is against the scope and intention of Demonstration.

14 Now seeing Definitions (as I have said) are Principles or Primary Propositions, they are therefore Speeches; and seeing they are used for the raising of an Idea of some Thing in the mind of the Learner, whensoever that Thing has a Name, the Definition of it can be nothing but the Explication of that Name by Speech; and if that Name be given it for some

compounded Conception, the Definition is nothing but a Resolution of that Name into its most Universall parts. As when we define Man, saying, Man is a Body Animated, Sentient, Rationall, those Names Body Animated, &c. are parts of that whole Name Man; so that Definitions of this kind alwayes consist of Genus and Difference; the former Names being all till the last, Generall; and the last of all, Difference. But if any Name be the most Universall in its kind, then the Definition of it cannot consist of Genus and Difference, but is to be made by such circumlocution as best explicateth the force of that Name. Again, it is possible, and happens often that the Genus and Difference are put together, and yet make no Definition; as these Words a Straight Line containe both the Genus and Difference; but are not a Definition, unlesse we should thinke a Straight Line may be thus defined, A Straight Line is a Straight Line; and yet if there were added another Name consisting of different Words, but signifying the same thing which these signifie, then these might be the Definition of that Name. From what has been said it may be understood how a Definition ought to be defined, namely, That it is a Proposition, whose Praedicate Resolves the Subiect, when it may, and when it may not, it exemplifies the same.

15 The Properties of a Definition are,

First, that it takes away Aequivocation, as also all that multitude of Distinctions, which are used by such as think they may learn Philosophy by Disputation. For the Nature of a Definition is to define, that is, to determine the signification of the defined Name, and to pare from it all other Signification besides what is contained in the Definition it selfe; and therefore one Definition does as much, as all the Distinctions (how many soever) that can be used about the Name defined.

Secondly, That it gives an Universall Notion of the thing defined, representing a certaine Universall Picture thereof, not to the Eye, but to the Mind. For as when one paints a Man, he paints the image of some Man; so

he that defines the Name Man, makes a Representation of some Man to the mind.

Thirdly, That it is not necessary to dispute whether Definitions are to be admitted or no. For when a Master is instructing his Scholar, if the Scholar understand all the parts of the thing defined, which are Resolved in the Definition, and yet will not admit of the Definition, there needs no further Controversie betwixt them, it being all one as if he refused to be taught. But if he understand nothing, then certainely the Definition is faulty; for the nature of a Definition consists in this, that it exhibit a cleare Idea of the thing defined; and Principles are either known by themselves, or else they are not Principles.

Fourthly, That in Philosophy, Definitions are before defined Names. For in teaching Philosophy, the first beginning is from Definitions, and all progression in the same till we come to the Knowledge of the thing compounded, is Compositive. Seeing therefore Definition is the explication of a Compounded Name by Resolution, and the progression is from the parts to the compound, Definitions must be understood before Compounded Names; nay when the Names of the parts of any Speech be explicated, is it not necessary that the Definition should be a Name Compounded of them. For example, when these Names, Aequilaterall, Quadrilaterall, Right-angled, are sufficiently understood, it is not necessary in Geometry that there should be at all such a Name as Square; for defined Names are received in Philosophy for brevities sake onely.

Fiftly, That Compounded Names which are defined one way in some one part of Philosophy, may in another part of the same be otherwise defined; as a Parabola and an Hyperbole have one Definition in Geometry, and another in Rhetorique; for Definitions are instituted and serve for the understanding of the Doctrine which is treated of. And therefore as in one part of Philosophy, a Definition may have in it some one fit Name for the more

briefe explanation of some proposition in Geometry; so it may have the same liberty in other parts of Philosophy; for the use of Names is particular (even where many agree to the setling of them) and arbitrary.

Sixtly, That no Name can be defined by any one Word; because no one Word is sufficient for the Resolving of one or more words.

Seventhly, That a defined Name ought not to be repeated in the Definition. For a defined Name, is the whole Compound, and a Definition is the Resolution of that Compound into parts; but no Totall can be part of it selfe.

16 Any two Definitions that may be compounded into a Syllogisme, produce a Conclusion; which because it is derived from Principles, that is, from Definitions, is said to be Demonstrated; and the Derivation or Composition it selfe is called a Demonstration. In like manner, if a Syllogisme be made of two Propositions, whereof one is a Definition, the other a Demonstrated Conclusion, or neither of them is a Definition, but both formerly demonstrated, that Syllogisme is also called a Demonstration, and so successively. The Definition therefore of a Demonstration is this, A DEMONSTRATION is a Syllogism or Series of Syllogisms derived and continued from the Definitions of Names, to the last Conclusion. And from hence it may be understood, that all true Ratiocination, which taketh its beginning from true Principles, produceth Science, and is true Demonstration. For as for the Originall of the Name, although that which the Greeks called , and the Latines Demonstratio was understood by them for that sort onely of Ratiocination, in which by the describing of certaine Lines and Figures, they placed the thing they were to prove, as it were before mens Eyes, which is properly , or to shew by the Figure; yet they seem to have done it for this reason, that unlesse it were in Geometry (in which only there is place for such Figures) there was no Ratiocination certaine, and ending in Science, their Doctrines concerning all other things

being nothing but Controversie and Clamour; which neverthelesse hapned not because the Truth to which they pretended could not be made evident without Figures, but because they wanted true Principles, from which they might derive their Ratiocination; and therefore there is no reason but that if true Definitions were praemised in all sorts of Doctrines, the Demonstrations also would be true.

17 It is proper to Methodical Demonstration,

First, That there be a true Succession of one Reason to another, according to the Rules of Syllogizing delivered above.

Secondly, That the Praemisses of all Syllogismes be demonstrated from the first Definitions.

Thirdly, That after Definitions, he that Teaches or Demonstrates any thing, proceed in the same Method by which he found it out; namely, that in the first place those things be demonstrated which immediately succeed to Universal Definitions (in which is contained that part of Philosophy which is called Philosophia Prima.) Next, those things which may be demonstrated by Simple Motion (in which Geometry consists.) After Geome try, such things as may be taught or shewed by manifest Action, that is, by Thrusting from, or Pulling towards. And after these, the Motion or Mutation of the invisible parts of Things, and the Doctrine of Sense & Imagination & of the internal Passions, especially those of Men, in which are comprehended the Grounds of Civil Duties, or Civil Philosophy; which takes up the last place. And that this Method ought to be kept in all sorts of Philosophy, is evident from hence, that such things as I have said are to be taught last cannot be demonstrated, till such as are propounded to be first treated of, be fully understood. Of which Method no other Example can be given, but that Treatise of the Elements of Philosophy, which I shall begin in the next Chapter, and continue to the end of the worke.

18 Besides those Paralogismes, whose fault lies either in the Falsity of the Praemisses, or the want of true Composition, of which I have spoken in the praecedent Chapter, there are two more which are frequent in Demonstration; one whereof is commonly called Petitio Principii; the other is the supposing of a False Cause; and these do not onely deceive Unskilfull Learners but sometimes Masters themselves, by making them take that for well demonstrated which is not demonstrated at all. Petitio Principii, is when the Conclusion to be proved, is disguised in other Words, and put for the Definition or Principle from whence it is to be demonstrated; and thus by putting for the Cause of the Thing sought, either the Thing it selfe or some Effect of it, they make a Circle in their Demonstration. As for example, He that would Demonstrate that the Earth stands still in the Center of the World, and should suppose the Earths Gravity to be the Cause thereof, and define Gravity to be a quality by which every heavy Body tends towards the Center of the World, would lose his labour; for the question is, What is the Cause of that quality in the Earth; and therefore he that supposes Gravity to be the Cause, puts the Thing it selfe for its own Cause.

Of a False Cause I find this example in a certaine Treatise where the thing to be demonstrated is the Motion of the Earth. He begins therefore with this, that seeing the Earth and the Sun are not alwayes in the same scituation, it must needs be that one of them be locally moved; which is true; next he affirms that the Vapours which the Sun raises from the Earth and Sea are by reason of this Motion necessarily moved; which also is true; from whence he infers the Winds are made, and this may passe for granted; and by these Winds he sayes the Waters of the Sea are moved, and by their Motion the bottome of the Sea, as if it were beaten forwards, moves round; and let this also be granted; wherefore he concludes, the Earth is moved; which is neverthelesse is a Paralogisme. For if that wind were the Cause

why the Earth was from the beginning moved round, and the Motion either of the Sunne or the Earth were the Cause of that Wind, then the Motion of the Sunne or the Earth was before the Wind it self; and if the Earth were Moved before the Wind was made, then the Wind could not be the cause of the Earths revolution; but if the Sunne were Moved, and the Earth stand still, then it is manifest the Earth might remain Unmoved notwithstanding that Wind; and therefore that motion was not made by the Cause which he alledgeth. But Parallogismes of this kind are very frequent among the Writers of Physiques, though none can be more elaborate then this in the Example given.

19 It may to some men seem pertinent to treat in this place of that Art of the Geometricians, which they call Logistica, that is, the Art, by which, from supposing the thing in question to be true, they proceed by Ratiocination, till either they come to something knowne, by which they may demonstrate the truth of the thing sought for; or to something which is impossible, from whence they collect that to be false which they supposed true. But this Art cannot be explicated here, for this reason, that the Method of it can neither be practised, nor understood unlesse by such as are well versed in Geometry; and among Geometricians themselves, they that have most Theoremes in readiness, are the most ready in the use of this Logistica; so that indeed it is not a distinct thing from Geometry it selfe; for there are in the Method of it three parts; the first whereof consists in the finding out of Equality betwixt known and unknown things, which they call Equation; and this Equation cannot be found out but by such as know perfectly the Nature, Properties and Transpositions of Proportion, as also the Addition, Substraction, Multiplication, and Division of Lines and Superficies, and the Extraction of Roots; which are the parts of no meane Geometrician. The Second is, when an Equation is found, to be able to judge whether the Truth or Falsity of the Question may be deduced from it

or no; which yet requires greater Knowledge. And the third is, when such an Equation is found, as is fit for the solution of the Question, to know how to Resolve the same in such manner, that the Truth or Falsity may thereby manifestly appeare, which in hard questions cannot be done without the Knowledge of the Nature of Crooked-lined Figures; but he that understands readily the Nature and Properties of these, is a Compleat Geometrician. It happens besides, that for the finding out of Equations there is no certaine Method, but he is best able to do it, that has the best Naturall Wit.

THE SECOND PART, OR THE FIRST GROUNDS OF PHILOSOPHY.

CHAP. VII. OF PLACE AND TIME.

1 THINGS THAT have no existence, may neverthelesse be under stood and computed.

2 What is space.

3 Time.

4 Part.

5 Division.

6 One

7 Number.

8 Composition.

9 The Whole.

10 Spaces and Times Contiguous, and Continuall.

11 Beginning, End, Way, Finite, Infinite.

12 What is Infinite in Power. Nothing Infinite can be truly said to be either Whole, or One; Nor Infinite Spaces or Times, Many.

13 Division proceeds not to the Least.

1 IN the Teaching of Naturall Philosophy, I cannot begin better (as I have already shewn) then from Privation; that is, from feigning the World to be annihilated. But if such annihilation of all things be supposed, it may perhaps be asked, what would remain for any Man (whom onely I except from this Universal annihilation of things) to consider as the Subject of Philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what to give Names unto for Ratiocinations sake.

I say therefore there would remain to that Man Ideas of the World, and of all such Bodies as he had, before their annihilation, seen with his eies, or perceived by any other Sense; that is to say, the Memory and Imagination of Magnitudes, Motions, Sounds, Colours, &c. as also of their order & parts. All w^{ch} things though they be nothing but Ideas & Phantasms hapning internally to him that imagineth; yet they will appear as if they were externall, and not at all depending upon any power of the Mind. And these are the things to which he would give Names, and substract them from, and compound them with one another. For seeing that after the destruction of all other things, I suppose Man still remaining, and namely that he thinkes, imagines, and remembers, there can be nothing for him to thinke of but what is Past; Nay, if we do but observe diligently what it is we doe when we consider and reason, we shall find, that though all things be still remaining in the world, yet we compute nothing but our own Phantasmes. For when we calculate the magnitude and motions of Heaven or Earth, we doe not ascend into Heaven that we may divide it into parts, or measure the motions thereof, but we doe it sitting still in our Closets or in the Darke. Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into Account, either as internal Accidents of our Mind, in which manner we consider them when the question is about some Faculty of the Mind; or as Species of external things, not as really existing, but appearing onely to exist, or to have a Being without Us. And in this manner we are now to consider them.

2 If therefore we remember, or have a Phantasme of any thing that was in the world before the supposed annihilation of the same; and consider, not that the thing was such or such, but onely that it had a Being without the Mind, we have presently a Conception of that we call Space: an Imaginary Space indeed, because a meere Phantasme, yet that very thing which all men call so. For no man calls it Space for being already filled, but because it may be filled; nor does any man think Bodies carry their Places away with them, but that the same Space contains sometimes one, sometimes another Body; which could not be if Space should alwayes accompany the Body which is once in it. And this is of it selfe so manifest, that I should not thinke it needed any explaining at all, but that I finde Space to be falsely defined by certaine Philosophers, who inferre from thence, One, that the world is Infinite; for taking Space to be the Extension of Bodies, and thinking Extension may encrease continually, he inferres that Bodies may be infinitely Extended; and Another from the same Definition concludes rashly, that it is impossible even to God himselfe to create more Worlds then one; for if another World were to be created, he sayes, that seeing there is nothing without this world, and therefore (according to his Definition) no Space, that new world must be placed in nothing; but in nothing nothing can be placed; which he affirms onely, without shewing any reason for the same; whereas the contrary is the truth: for more cannot be put into a Place allready filled, so much is Empty Space fitter then that which is Full for the receiving of new Bodies. Having therefore spoken thus much for these mens sakes, and for theirs that assent to them, I return to my purpose, and define Space thus, SPACE is the Phantasme of a Thing existing without the Mind simply; that is to say, that Phantasme, in which we consider no other Accident, but onely that it appears without us.

3 As a Body leaves a Phantasme of its Magnitude in the mind, so also a Moved Body leaves a Phantasme of its Motion, namely an Idea of that

Body passing out of one Space into another by continuall succession. And this Idea or Phantasme, is that which (without receding much from the common opinion, or from Aristotles Definition) I call Time. For seeing all men confesse a Yeare to be Time, and yet do not think a Year to be the Accident or Affection of any Body, they must needs confesse it to be, not in the things without Us, but only in the Thought of the Mind. So when they speake of the Times of their Predecessors, they do not think after their Predecessors are gone, that their Times can be any where else then in the Memory of those that remember them. And as for those that say, Dayes, Years and Moneths are the Motions of the Sunne and Moon, seeing it is all one to say, Motion Past and Motion Destroyed, and that Future Motion is the same with Motion which Is not yet begun, they say, that which they do not meane, that there neither is, nor has been, nor shall be any Time: for of whatsoever it may be said, It has been or It shall be, of the same also it might have been said heretofore, or may be said hereafter, It is. What then can Dayes, Moneths and Yeares be, but the Names of such Computations made in our Mind? Time therefore is a Phantasme, but a Phantasme of Motion, for if we would know by what Moments Time passes away, we make use of some Motion or other, as of the Sun, of a Clock, of the sand in an Hourglasse, or we mark some Line upon which we imagine something to be Moved, there being no other means by which we can take notice of any Time at all. And yet when I say Time is a Phantasme of Motion, I doe not say this is sufficient to define it by; for this word Time comprehends the notion of Former and Later, or of Succession in the motion of a Body, in as much as it is first Here then There. Wherefore a compleat Definition of Time is such as this, TIME is the Phantasme of Before and After in Motion; which agrees with this Definition of Aristotle, Time is the Number of Motion according to Former and Later; for that Numbring is an act of the Mind; and therefore it is all one to say, Time is the Number of Motion

according to Former and Later; and Time is a Phantasme of Motion Numbred. But that other Definition, Time is the Measure of Motion, is not so exact; for we measure Time by Motion and not Motion by Time.

4 One Space is called Part of another Space, and one Time Part of another Time, when this containes that and something besides. From whence it may be collected, that nothing can rightly be called a PART, but that which is compared with something that contains it.

5 And therefore to make parts, or to Part or DIVIDE Space or Time, is nothing else but to consider One and Another within the same; so that if any Man Divide Space or Time, the diverse Conceptions he has are more by one, then the Parts he makes; for his first Conception is of that which is to be divided, then of some Part of it, and again of some other Part of it, and so forwards as long as he goes on in Dividing.

But it is to be noted, that here by Division, I doe not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one Space or Time from another (for does any man think that one Hemisphere may be separated from the other Hemisphere, or the first Hour from the second?) but Diversity of Consideration; so that Division is not made by the operation of the Hands but of the Mind.

6 When Space or Time is considered among other Spaces or Times, it is said to be ONE, namely One of them; for except One Space might be added to another, and substracted from another Space, and so of Time, it would be sufficient to say Space or Time simply, and superfluous to say One Space or One Time, if it could not be conceived that there were another. The common Definition of One, namely, that One is that which is Undivided, is obnoxious to an absurd Consequence; for it may thence be inferred, that whatsoever is Divided, is many things, that is, that every Divided thing, is Divided Things, which is Insignificant.

7 NUMBER is. One and One, or One One and One, and so forwards; namely One and One make the Number Two, and One One and One, the

Number Three; and so are all other Numbers made; which is all one as if we should say, Number is Unities.

8 To COMPOUND Space of Spaces, or Time of Times, is first to Consider them one after another, and then altogether as One; as if one should reckon first the Head, the Feet, the Armes and the Body severally, and then for the account of them all together put Man. And that which is so put for all the severalls of which it consists, is called the WHOLE; and those severalls, when by the Division of the Whole, they come again to be considered singly, are parts thereof; and therefore the Whole, and all the Parts taken together, are the same thing. And as I noted above, that in Division it is not necessary to pull the Parts asunder; so in Composition it is to be understood, that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the Parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but onely of collecting them into one summe in the Mind. For thus all Men being considered together, make up the Whole of Mankind, though never so much dispersed by Time and Place; and twelve Hours, though the hours of severall dayes, may be Compounded into one Number of Twelve.

9 This being well understood, it is manifest, that nothing can rightly be called a Whole, that is not conceived to be compounded of Parts, and that it may be divided into parts; so that if we deny that a thing has parts, we deny the same to be a Whole. For example, if we say the soul can have no Parts, we affirme that no soul can be a Whole soul. Also it is manifest, that Nothing has Parts till it be Divided; and when a Thing is Divided, the Parts are onely so many as the Division makes them. Againe, that a Part of a Part is a Part of the Whole; & thus any Part of the Number Four, as Two, is a Part of the Number Eight; for Four is made of Two and Two; but Eight is compounded of Two, Two and Four; and therefore Two which is a Part of the Part Four, is also a Part of the whole Eight.

10 Two Spaces are said to be CONTIGUOUS, when there is no other Space betwixt them. But two Times, betwixt which there is no other Time, are called IMMEDIATE, A — B — C as AB, BC. And any two Spaces as well as Times are said to be CONTINUALL, when they have one common part, A — B — C — D as AC, BD, where the part BC is common; and more Spaces and Times are Continual, when every two which are next one another are Continual.

11 That Part which is between two other Parts, is called a MEAN; & that which is not between two other parts, an EXTREME. And of Extremes, that which is first reckoned is the BEGINNING, and that which last, the END; and all the Means together taken, are the WAY. Also Extreme Parts and Limits are the same thing. And from hence it is manifest, that Beginning and End depend upon the order in which we number them; and that to Terminate or Limit Space and Time, is the same thing with imagining their Beginning and End; as also that every thing is FINITE or INFINITE, acording as we imagine or not imagine it Limited or Terminated every way; and that the Limits of any Number are Unities, and of these, that which is the first in our Numbering is the Beginning, and that which we number last, is the End. When we say Number is Infinite, we mean only that no Number is expressed; for when we speak of the Numbers Two, Three, a Thousand, &c. they are always Finite. But when no more is said but this, Number is Infinite, it is to be understood as if it were said, this Name Number is an Indefinite Name.

12 Space or Time is said to be Finite in Power, or Terminable, when there may be assigned a Number of finite Spaces or Times, as of Paces or Hours, than which there can be no greater Number of the same measure, in that Space or Time; and Infinite in Power is that Space or Time, in which a greater Number of the said Paces or Hours may be assigned, than any Number that can be given. But we must note, that although in that Space or

Time which is Infinite in Power, there may be numbered more Paces or Hours then any number that can be assigned, yet their number will alwayes be Finite; for every Number is Finite. And therefore his Ratiocination was not good, that undertaking to prove the World to be Finite, reasoned thus; If the world be Infinite, then there may be taken in it some Part which is distant from us an Infinite number of Paces: But no such Part can be taken; wherefore theworld is not infinite; because that Consequence of the Major Proposition is false; for in an Infinite space, whatsoever we take, or design in our Mind, the distance of the same from us is a Finite space; for in the very designing of the place thereof, we put an End to that space, of whch we our selves are the Beginning, and whatsoever any man with his Mind cuts off both wayes from Infinite, he determines the same, that is, he makes it Finite.

Of Infinite Space or Time, it cannot be said that it is a Whole, or One; not a Whole, because not compounded of Parts; for seeing Parts, how many soever they be, are severally Finite, they will also when they are all put together make a whole Finite; Nor One, because nothing can be said to be One, except there be Another to compare it with; but it cannot be conceived that there are two Spaces, or two Times Infinite. Lastly, when we make question whether the World be Finite or Infinite, we have nothing in our Minde answering to the Name World; for whatsoever we Imagine, is therefore Finite, though our Computation reach the fixed Stars, or the ninth or tenth, nay, the thousanth Sphere. The meaning of the Question is this onely, whether God has actually made so great an Addition of Body to Body, as we are able to make of Space to Space.

13 And therefore that which is commonly said, that Space and Time may be divided Infinitely, is not to be so understood, as if there might be any Infinite or Eternal Division; but rather to be taken in this sense, Whatsover is Divided, is divided into such Parts as may again be Divided; or thus, The

Least Divisible thing is not to be given; or as Geometricians have it, No Quantity is so small, but a Less may be taken; which may easily be demonstrated in this manner. Let any Space or Time (that which was thought to be the Least Divisible) be divided into two equal Parts A and B. I say either of them, as A, may be divided again. For suppose the Part A to be contiguous to the Part B of one side, and of the other side to some other Space equal to B. This whole Space therefore (being greater then the Space given) is divisible. Wherefore if it be divided into two equal Parts, the Part in the middle, which is A, will be also divided into two equal Parts; and therefore A was Divisible.

CHAP. VIII. OF BODY AND ACCIDENT.

1 BODY DEFINED.

2 Accident defined.

3 How an Accident may be understood to be in its subject.

4 Magnitude, what it is.

5 Place what it is, and that it is Immoveable.

6 What is Full and Empty.

7 Here, There, Somewhere, what they signifie.

8 Many Bodies cannot be in One place, nor One Body in Many places.

9 Contiguous and Continual what they are.

10 The definition of Motion. No Motion intelligible but with Time.

11 What it is to be at Rest, to have been Moved, and to be Moved. No Motion to be conceived, without the conception of Past and Future.

12 A Point, a Line, Superficies and Solid, what they are.

13 Equal, Greater and Lesse in Bodies and Magnitudes, what they are.

14 One and the same Body has alwayes one and the the same Magnitude.

15 Velocity what it is.

16 Equal, Greater and Lesse in Times what they are.

17 Equal, Greater and Lesse in Velocity, what.

18 Equal, Greater and Lesse in Motion, what.

19 That which is at Rest will alwayes be at Rest except it be Moved by some external thing; and that which is Moved will alwayes be Moved, unless it be hindered by some external thing.

20 Accidents are Generated and Destroyed, but Bodies not so.

21 An Accident cannot depart from its Subject.

22 Nor be Moved.

23 Essence, Form, and Matter, what they are.

24 First Matter, what.

25 That the whole is greater then any Part thereof, why demonstrated.

1 HAVING understood what Imaginary Space is, in which we supposed nothing remaining without us, but all those things to be destroyed that by existing heretofore left Images of themselves in our Minds; let us now suppose some one of those things to be placed again in the World, or created anew. It is necessary therefore that this new created or replaced thing do not onely fill some part of the Space above-mentioned, or be coincident and coextended with it, but also, that it have no dependance upon our thought. And this is that which for the Extension of it we commonly call Body; and because it depends not upon our Thought, we say is a thing subsisting of itself; as also existing, because without Us; and lastly, it is

called the Subject, because it is so placed in and subjected to Imaginary Space, that it may be understood by Reason, as well as perceived by Sense. The Definition therefore of Body may be this, A BODY is that which having no dependance upon our Thought is coincident or coextended with some part of Space.

2 But what an Accident is, cannot so easily be explained by any Definition, as by Examples. Let us imagine therefore that a Body fills any Space, or is coextended with it, that Coextention is not the coextended Body; And in like manner, let us imagine that the same Body is removed out of its place, that Removing is not the removed Body; Or let us think the same not removed, that notremoving or Rest, is not the resting Body. What then are these things? They are Accidents of that Body. But the thing in question is What is an Accident; which is an Enquiry after that which we know already, and not that which we should enquire after. For who does not alwayes and in the same manner understand him that sayes any thing is Extended, or Moved, or not Moved? But most men will have it be said that an Accident is something, namely some part of a natural thing, when indeed it is no part of the same. To satisfie these men, as well as may be, they answer best that define an Accident to be the Manner by which any Body is conceived; which is all one as if they should say, An Accident is that faculty of any Body by which it works in us a Conception of itself. Which Definition though it be not an Answer to the Question propounded, yet it is an Answer to that Question which should have been propounded, namely, whence does it happen that one part of any Body appears here, another part there? For this is well answered thus, It happens from the Extension of that Body. Or, How comes it to pass that the whole Body by succession is seen now here now there? and the answer will be, By reason of its Motion. Or lastly, Whence is it that any Body possesseth the same space for sometime? And the answer will be, because it is not moved. For if concerning the

Name of a Body, that is, concerning a Concrete Name, it be asked, what is it? the answer must be made by Definition; for the Question is concerning the signification of the Name. But if it be asked concerning an Abstract Name, what is it? the Cause is demanded why a thing appears so or so. As if it be asked, what is Hard? The Answer will be, Hard is that, whereof no Part gives place, but when the Whole gives place. But if it be demanded, what is Hardness? A Cause must be shewn why a Part does not give place except the Whole give place. Wherefore I define an ACCIDENT to be the Manner of our conception of Body.

3 When an Accident is said to be in a Body, it is not so to be understood, as if any thing were conteined in that Body; as if, for example, Redness were in Blood, in the same manner, as Blood is in a bloody cloth, that is, as a Part in the Whole; for so an Accident would be a Body also. But as Magnitude, or Rest, or Motion, is in that which is Great, or which Resteth, or which is Moved (which how it is to be understood, every man understands) so also it is to be understood that every other Accident is in its Subject. And this also is explicated by Aristotle no otherwise then negatively, namely, that An Accident is in its Subject, not as any part thereof, but so as that it may be away, the Subject still remaining; which is right, saving that there are certain Accidents which can never perish except the Body perish also; for no Body can be conceived to be without Extension, or without Figure. All other Accidents, which are not common to all Bodies, but peculiar to some onely, as To be at Rest, to be Moved, Colour, Hardness, and the like, do perish continually, and are succeeded by others; yet so, as that the Body never perisheth. And as for the opinion that some may have, that all other Accidents are not in their Bodies in the same manner that Extension, Motion, Rest, or Figure are in the same; for example, that Colour, Heat, Odour, Vertue, Vice and the like, are otherwise in them, and (as they say) inherent; I desire they would suspend their

judgement for the present, and expect a little, till it be found out by Ratiocination, whether these very Accidents are not also certain Motions, either of the Mind of the perceiver; or of the Bodies themselves which are perceived; for in the search of this, a great part of Naturall Philosophy consists.

4 The Extension of a Body, is the same thing with the MAGNITUDE of it, or that which some call Real Space. But this Magnitude does not depend upon our Cogitation, as Imaginary Space doth; for this is an Effect of our Imagination, but Magnitude is the Cause of it; this is an Accident of the Mind, that of a Body existing out of the Mind.

5 That Space (by which word I here understand Imaginary Space) which is coincident with the Magnitude of any Body, is called the PLACE of that Body; and the Body it self is that which we call the Thing Placed. Now Place, and the Magnitude of the Thing Placed differ: First in this, that a Body keeps alwayes the same Magnitude both when it is at Rest, and when it is Moved; but when it is Moved, it does not keep the same Place. Secondly, in this, that Place is a Phantasme of any Body of such and such Quantity and Figure; but Magnitude is the peculiar Accident of every Body; for one Body may at several times have several Places, but has always one and the same Magnitude. Thirdly, in this, that Place is nothing out of the Mind, nor Magnitude any thing within it. And lastly, Place is feigned Extension but Magnitude true Extension, and a Placed Body is not Extension, but a Thing Extended. Besides, Place is Immoveable; for seeing that which is Moved, is understood to be carried from Place to Place, if Place were Moved, it would also be carried from Place to Place, so that one Place must have another Place, and that Place another Place, and so on infinitely, which is ridiculous. And as for those, that by making Place to be of the same Nature with Real Space, would from thence maintain it to be Immoveable, they also make Place (though they do not perceive they make

it so) to be a meer Phantasme. For whilest One affirms that Place is therefore said to be Immoveable, because Space in general is considered there; if he had remembred that nothing is General or Universal besides Names or Signes, he would easily have seen that that Space which he sayes is considered in general, is nothing but a Phantasme in the Mind or the Memory, of a Body of such Magnitude and such Figure. And whilest another sayes, Real Space is made Immoveable by the Understanding; as when under the Superficies of running water, we imagine other and other water to come by continual succession, that Superficies fixed there by the Understanding is the Immoveable Place of the River, what else does he make it to be but a Phantasm, though he doe it obscurely, and in perplexed words? Lastly, the nature of Place does not consist in the Superficies of the Ambient, but in Solid Space; for the whole Placed Body is coextended with its whole Place, and every part of it with every answering part of the same Place; but seeing every Placed Body is a Solid thing, it cannot be understood to be coextended with Superficies. Besides, how can any whole Body be Moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it? Or how can the internall Parts of it be Moved, but by leaving their Place? But the internal Parts of a body cannot leave the Superficies of an external part contiguous to it; and therefore it followes, that if Place be the Superficies of the Ambient, then the parts of a Body Moved, that is Bodies moved, are not Moved.

6 Space (or Place) that is possessed by a Body, is called FULL, and that which is not so possessed is called EMPTY.

7 Here, There, In the Country, In the City, and other the like Names by which answer is made to the question Where is it, are not properly Names of Place, nor doe they of themselves bring into the mind the Place that is sought; for Here and There signifie nothing, unlesse the thing be shewn at the same time with the finger or something else, but when the Eye of him

that seeks, is by pointing, or some other signe directed to the thing sought, the Place of it is not hereby defined by him that answers, but found out by him that askes the question. Now such Shewings as are made by words onely, as when we say, In the Countrey, or In the City, are some of greater latitude then others, as when we say In the Countrey, In the City, In such a Street, In a House, In the Chamber, In Bed, &c. For these do by little and little direct the Seeker neerer to the proper Place; & yet they do not determine the same, but onely restrain it to a lesser Space, & signifie no more then that the Place of the Thing is within a certain Space designed by those Words, as a Part is in the Whole. And all such Names (by which answer is made to the question Where) have for their highest Genus the Name Somewhere. From whence it may be understood, that whatsoever is Somewhere, is in some Place properly so called, which Place is part of that greater Space that is signified by some of these Names, In the Countrey, In the City, or the like.

8 A Body, and the Magnitude, and the Place thereof, are divided by one and the same act of the Mind; for, to divide an Extended Body, and the Extension thereof, and the Idea of that Extension, which is Place, is the same with dividing any one of them; because they are coincident, and it cannot be done but by the Mind, that is by the Division of Space. From whence it is manifest, that neither Two Bodies can be together in the same Place, nor One Body be in Two Places at the same Time. Not Two Bodies in the same Place; because when a Body that fills its whole Place is divided into Two, the Place it self is divided into Two also, so that there will be Two Places, Nor One Body in Two Places; for, the Place that a Body fills being divided into Two, the Placed Body will be also divided into Two, (for, as I said, a Place and the Body that fills that Place are divided both together) and so there will be two Bodies.

9 Two Bodies are said to be Contiguous to one another, and Continual, in the same manner as Spaces are; namely, those are Contiguous, between which there is no Space. Now by Space I understand here as formerly an Idea or Phantasme of a Body. Wherefore, though between two Bodies there be put no other Body, and consequently no Magnitude, or (as they call it) Real Space, yet if another Body may be put between them, that is, if there intercede any imagined Space which may receive another Body, then those Bodies are not Contiguous. And this is so easie to be understood, that I should wonder at some men, who being otherwise skilful enough in Philosophy, are of a different opinion, but that I finde that most of those that affect Metaphysical subtilties, wander from Truth, as if they were led out of their way by an Ignis Fatuus. For can any man that has his natural Senses, think that two Bodies must therefore necessarily Touch one another, because no other Body is between them? Or that there can be no Vacuum, because Vacuum is nothing, or as they call it, Non Ens? Which is as childish, as if one should reason thus; No Man can Fast, because to Fast is to eat Nothing; but Nothing cannot be eaten. Continual, are any two Bodies that have a common part; and more then two are Continual, when every two that are next to one another, are continual.

10 MOTION, is a continual reliaquishing of one Place, and acquiring of another; and that Place which is relinquished is commonly called the Terminus à quo, as that which is acquired is called the Terminus adquem; I say a continual Relinquishing, because no Body, how little soever, can totally and at once go out of its former Place into on other, so, but that some part of it will be in a part of Place which is common to both, namely, to the relinquished and the acquired Places. For example, let any Body be in the Place

ACBD; the same Body ca¯not come into the Place BDEF, but it must first be in GHIK, whose part GHBD is common to both the Places ACBD,

and GHIK; and whose part BDIK is common to both the Places GHIK, and BDEF. Now it cannot be conceived that any thing can be Moved without Time; for Time, is by the Definition of it, a Phantasme, that is a Conception of Motion; and therefore to conceive that any thing may be Moved without Time, were to conceive Motion without Motion, which is impossible.

11 That is said to be at Rest, which during anytime is in one place; and that. to be Moved, or to have been Moved, which whether it be now at Rest, or Moved, was formerly in another Place then that which it is now in. From which Definitions it may be inferred, First, that Whatsoever is Moved, has been Moved; for if it be still in the same Place in which it was formerly, it is at Rest, that is, it is not Moved, by the Definition of Rest; but if it be in another Place, it has been Moved, by the Definition of Moved. Secondly, that what is Moved, will yet be Moved; for that which is Moved, leaveth the Place where it is, and therefore will be in another Place, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is Moved, is not in One place during any time, how little soever that time be; for by the Definition of Rest, that which is in one Place during any time, is at Rest.

There is a certain Sophisme against Motion, which seems to spring from the not understanding of this last Proposition. For they say, that, If any Body be Moved, it is Moved either in the Place where it is, or in the Place where it is not; both which are false; and therefore nothing is Moved. But the falsity lies in the Major Proposition; for that which is Moved, is neither Moved in the Place where it is, nor in the Place where it is not; but from the Place where it is, to the Place where it is not. Indeed it cannot be denied but that whatsoever is Moved, is Moved somewhere, that is, within some Space; but then the Place of that Body is not that whole Space, but a part of it, as is said above in the seventh Article. From what is above demonstrated, namely, that whatsoever is Moved, has also been Moved, and will be

Moved, this also may be collected, that there can be no conception of Motion, without conceiving Past and Future time.

12 Though there be no Body which has not some Magnitude, yet if when any Body is moved, the Magnitude of it be not at all considered, the way it makes it called a LINE, or one single Dimension; & the Space through which it passeth, is called LENGTH; and the Body it self, a POINT; in which sense the Earth is called a Point, and the Way of its yearly Revolution, the Ecliptick Line. But if a Body which is Moved, be considered as long, and be supposed to be so Moved, as that all the several parts of it be understood to make several Lines, then the Way of every part of that Body is called BREADTH, and the Space which is made is called SUPERFICIES, consisting of two Dimensions, one whereof to every several part of the other is applyed whole. Again, if a Body be considered as having Superficies, and be understood to be so Moved, that all the several parts of it describe several Lines, then the Way of every part of that Body is called THICKNESS, or DEPTH, and the Space which is Made is called SOLID, consisting of three Dimensions, any two whereof are applyed whole to every several part of the third.

But if a Body be considered as Solid, then it is not possible that all the several parts of it should describe several lines; for what way soever it be Moved, the way of the following part will fall into the way of the part before it, so that the same Solid will still be made which the formost Superficies would have made by it self. And therefore there can be no other Dimension in any Body, as it is a Body, then the three which I have now described; though as it shall be shewed hereafter, Velocity, which is Motion according to Length, may be being applyed to all the parts of a Solid, make a Magnitude of Motion consisting of four Dimensions; as the goodness of Gold computed in all the parts of it makes the Price and Value thereof.

13 Bodies (how many soever they be) that can fill every one the place of every one, are said to be EQUAL every one to every other. Now one Body may fill the same Place which another Body filleth, though it be not of the same Figure with that other Body, if so be that it may be understood to be reducible to the same Figure, either by Flexion or Transposition of the parts. And One Body is GREATER then another Body, when a part of that is equal to all this; and LESSE, when all that is equal to a part of this. Also Magnitudes are Equal, or Greater, or Lesser then one another for the same consideration, namely, when the Bodies of which they are the Magnitudes, are either Equal or Greater or Lesse, &c.

14 One and the same Body, is alwayes of one and the same Magnitude. For seeing a Body and the Magnitude and Place thereof cannot be comprehended in the Minde, otherwise then as they are Coincident, if any Body be understood to be at Rest, that is, to remain in the same Place during some time, and the Magnitude thereof be in one part of that time Greater, and in another part Lesse, that Bodies Place, which is one and the same, will be coincident sometimes with Greater, sometimes with Lesse Magnitude, that is, the same Place will be greater and lesse then it self, which is impossible. But there would be no need at all of Demonstrating a thing that is in it self so manifest, if there were not some, whose opinion concerning Bodies and their Magnitudes is, that a Body may exist separated from its Magnitude, and have greater or lesse Magnitude bestowed upon it, making use of this Principle for the explication of the nature of Rarum and Densum.

15 Motion, in as much as a certain Length may in a certain Time be transmitted by it, is called VELOCITY or Swiftness: &c. For though Swift be very often understood with relation to Slower or less Swift, as Great is in respect of Less, yet nevertheless, as Magnitude is by Philosophers taken

absolutely for Extension, so also Velocity or Swiftness may be put absolutely for Motion accord ing to Length.

16 Many Motions are said to be made in Equal Times, when every one of them begins and ends together with some other Motion, or if it had begun together, would also have ended together with the same. For Time which is a Phantasme of Mo tion, cannot be reckoned but by some exposed Motion; as in Dials by the Motion of the Sun or of the Hand; and if two or more Motions begin and end with this Motion, they are said to be made in equal times; from whence also it is easie to understand what it is to be moved in Greater or Longer time, & in lesse time or not so long; namely, that that is longer Moved, which beginning with another, ends later; or ending together, began sooner.

17 Motions are said to be Equally Swift, when Equal lengths are transmitted in Equal times; and Greater Swiftness is that, wherein Greater length is passed in Equal time, or Equal length in less time. Also that Swiftness by which Equal lengths are passed in Equal parts of time, is called Uniform Swiftness or Motion; and of Motions not Uniform, such as become Swifter or Slower by equal Increasings or Decreasings in equal parts of time, are said to be Accelerated or Retarded Uniformly.

18 But Motion is said to be Greater, Lesse, and Equal, not onely in regard of the Length which is transmitted in a certain time, that is, in regard of Swiftness onely, but of Swiftness applyed to every smallest particle of Magnitude; For when any Body is Moved, every part of it is also Moved; and supposing the parts to be halves, the Motions of those halves have their Swiftness equal to one another, and severally equal to that of the Whole; but the Motion of the Whole is equal to those two Motions, either of which is of equal Swiftness with it; and therefore it is one thing for two Motions to be Equal to one another, & another thing for them to be Equally Swift. And this is manifest in two Horses that draw abreast, where the Motion of both

the Horses together is of Equal Swiftness with the Motion of either of them singly; but the Motion of both is Greater then the Motion of one of them, namely Double. Wherefore Motions are said to be simply Equal to one another when the Swiftness of one computed in every part of its Magnitude, is Equal to the Swiftness of the other co¯puted also in every part of its Magnitude: & Greater then one another, when the Swiftness of one computed as above, is Greater then the Swiftness of the other so computed; and Lesse, when Lesse. Besides, the Magnitude of Motion computed in this manner is that which is commonly called FORCE.

19 Whatsoever is at Rest, will alwayes be at Rest, unless there be some other Body besides it, which by endeavouring to get into its Place by motion, suffers it no longer to remain at Rest. For suppose that some Finite Body exist, and be at Rest, and that all Space besides be Empty; if now this Body begin to be Moved, it will certainly be Moved some way; Seeing therefore there was nothing in that Body which did not dispose it to Rest, the reason why it is Moved this way is in something out of it; and in like manner, if it had been Moved any other way, the reason of Motion that way had also been in something out of it; but seeing it was supposed that Nothing is out of it, the reason of its Motion one way would be the same with the reason of its Motion every other way; wherefore it would be Moved alike all wayes at once; which is impossible.

In like manner, Whatsoever is Moved, will alwayes be Moved, except there be some other Body besides it, which causeth it to Rest. For if we suppose Nothing to be without it, there will be no reason why it should Rest now, rather then at another time; wherefore its Motion would cease in every particle of time alike; which is not intelligible.

When we say a Living Creature, a Tree, or any other specified Body is Generated, or Destroyed, it is not to be so understood as if there were made a Body of that which is not-Body, or not a Body of a Body, but of a Living

Creature not a Living Creature, of a Tree not a Tree, &c. that is, that those Accidents for which we call one thing a Living Creature, another thing a Tree, and another by some other Name, are Generated and Destroyed; and that therefore the same Names are not to be given to them now, which were given them before. But that Magnitude for which we give to any thing the Name of Body is neither Generated nor Destroyed. For though we may feign in our Mind that a Point may swell to a huge bulk, and that this may again contract it selfe to a Point; that is, though we may imagine something to arise where before was Nothing, and Nothing to be there where before was something, yet we cannot comprehend in our Minde how this may possibly be done in Nature. And therefore Philosophers, who tye themselves to Naturall Reason, Suppose that a Body can neither be Generated nor Destroyed, but onely that it may appear otherwise then it did to Us, that is under different Species, and consequently be called by other and other Names; so that that which is now called Man, may at another time have the Name of Not-Man; but that which is once called Body, can never be called Not-Body. But it is manifest, that all other Accidents besides Magnitude or Extension may be Generated and Destroyed; as when a White thing is made Black, the Whiteness that was in it Perisheth, and the Blackness that was not in it is now Generated; and therefore Bodies, and the Accidents under which they appear diversly, have this difference, that Bodies are Things, and not Generated; Accidents are Generated, and not Things.

21 And therefore when any thing appears otherwise then it did, by reason of other and other Accidents, it is not to be thought that an Accident goes out of one Subject into another (for they are not, as I said above, in their Subjects as a Part in the Whole, or as a Conteined thing in that which Conteins it, or as a Master of a Family in his House,) but that one Accident Perisheth, and another is Generated. For example, when the Hand being

Moved, Moves the Pen, Motion does not go out of the Hand into the Pen, for so the Writing might be continued though the Hand stood still, but a new Motion is Generated in the Pen, and is the Pens Motion.

22 And therefore also it is improper to say an Accident is Moved; as when in stead of saying, Figure is an Accident of a Body carried away, we say, A Body carries away its Figure.

23 Now that Accident for which we give a certain Name to any Body, or the Accident which denominates its Subject, is commonly called the ESSENCE thereof; as Rationality is the Essence of a Man, Whiteness; of any White Thing and Extension the Essence of a Body. And the same Essence in as much as it is Generated, is called the FORM. Again, a Body, in respect of any accident is called the SUBJECT, and in respect of the Form it is called the MATTER.

Also, the Production or Perishing of any Accident, makes its Subject be said to be Changed; onely the Production or Perishing of Form, make it be said it is Generated or Destroyed; but in all Generation and Mutation, the name of Matter still remains. For a Table made of Wood, is not onely Wooden, but Wood; and a Statue of Brass is Brass as well as Brazen; though Aristotle in his Metaphysiques say, that whatsoever is made of any thing ought not to be called , but , as that which is made of Wood not , but , that is, not Wood, but Wooden.

24 And as for that Matter which is common to all things, and which Philosophers following Aristotle, usually call Materia Prima, that is, First Matter, it is not any Body distinct from all other Bodies, nor is it one of them. What then is it? A mere Name; yet a Name which is not of vain Use; for it signifies a conception of Body without the consideration of any Form or other Accident except onely Magnitude or Extension, & aptness to receive Form & other Accidents; so that whensoever we have use of the Name Body in general, if we use that of Materia Prima, we do well. For as,

when a Man not knowing which was first, Water or Ice, would finde out which of the two were the Matter of both, he would be fain to suppose some third Matter which were neither of these two; so he that would finde out what is the Matter of all things, ought to suppose such as is not the Matter of any thing that exists. Wherefore Materia Prima is no Thing; and therefore they do not attribute to it either Form or any other Accident besides Quantity; whereas all singular things have their Forms and Accidents certain.

Materia Prima therefore is Body in general, that is Body considered Universally, not as having neither Form nor any Accident, but in which no Form nor any other Accident but Quantity are at all considered, that is, they are not drawn into Argumentation.

25 From what has been said, those Axiomes may be demonstrated which are assumed by Euclide in the beginning of his first Element about the Equality and Inequality of Magnitudes; of (which omitting the rest) I will here demonstrate onely this one, The Whole is greater then any Part thereof; to the end that the Reader may know that those Axioms are not indemonstrable, & therefore not Principles of Demonstration; and from hence learn to be wary how he admits any thing for a Principle, which is not at least as evident as these are. Greater is defined to be that, whose Part is Equal to the Whole of another. Now if we suppose any Whole to be A, and a Part of it to be B; seeing the Whole B is Equal to it self, and the same B is a Part of A; therefore a Part of A will be Equal to the Whole B. Wherefore by the Definition above, A is Greater then B, which was to be proved.

CHAP. IX. OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.

1 ACTION AND Passion what they are.

2 Action and Passion Mediate and Immediate.

3 Cause simply taken. Cause without which no Effect follows, or Cause Necessary by Supposition.

4 Cause Efficient and Material.

5 An Entire Cause is alwayes sufficient to produce its Effect. At the same instant that the Cause is Entire, the Effect is produced. Every Effect has a Necessary Cause.

6 The Generation of Effects is Continual. What is the Beginning in Causation.

7 No Cause of Motion but in a Body Contiguous and Moved.

8 The same Agents and Patients if alike disposed, produce like Effects, though at different times.

9 All Mutation is Motion.

10 Contingent Accidents what they are.

1 A Body is said to Work upon or Act, that is to say, Do some thing to another Body, when it either generates or destroys some Accident in it; and the Body in which an Accident is generated or destroyed is said to Suffer, that is, to have something Done to it by another Body, As when one Body by putting forwards another Body generates Motion in it, it is called the AGENT; and the Body in which Motion is so generated, is called the

PATIENT; so Fire that warms the Hand is the Agent, and the Hand which is warmed is the Patient. That Accident which is generated in the Patient is called the EFFECT.

2 When an Agent and Patient are Contiguous to one another, their Action and Reason are then said to be Immediate, otherwise Mediate; and when another Body lying betwixt the Agent and Patient is Contiguous to them both, it is then it self both an Agent and a Patient, an Agent in respect of the Body next after it, upon which it Works, and a Patient in respect of the Body next before it, from which it suffers. Also if many Bodies be so ordered that every two which are next to one another be contiguous, then all those that are betwixt the first and the last are both Agents and Patients, and the first is an Agent onely, and the last a Patient onely.

3 An Agent is understood to produce its determined or certain Effect in the Patient, according to some certain Accident, or Accidents, with which both it and the Patient are affected; that is to say, the Agent hath its Effect precisely such, not because it is a Body, but because such a Body, or so Moved; For otherwise all Agents, seeing they are all Bodies alike, would produce like Effects in all Patients; and therefore the Fire (for example) does not warm, because it is a Body, but because it is Hot; nor does one Body put forward another Body because it is a Body, but because it is moved into the place of that other Body. The Cause therefore of all Effects consists in certain Accidents both in the Agents and in the Patient; which when they are all present, the Effect is produced; but if any one of them be wanting it is not produced; and that Accident either of the Agent or Patient, without which the Effect cannot be produced, is called Causa sine qua non, or Cause Necessary by Supposition, as also the Cause Requisite for the Production of the Effect. But a CAUSE. simply, or An Entire Cause, is the Aggregate of all the Accidents both of the Agents how many soever they be, and of the Patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be

present, it cannot be understood but that the Effect is produced at the same instant; and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the Effect is not produced.

4 The Aggregate of Accidents in the Agent or Agents, requisite for the production of the Effect, the Effect being produced, is called the Efficient Cause thereof; and the Aggregate of Accidents in the Patient, the Effect being produced, is usually called the Material Cause; I say the Effect being produced; for where there is no Effect, there can be no Cause; for nothing can be called a Cause where there is nothing that can be called an Effect. But the Efficient and Material Causes, are both but Partial Causes, or Parts of that Cause which in the next precedent article I called an Entire Cause. And from hence it is manifest, that the Effect we expect, though the Agents be not defective on their part, may nevertheless be frustrated by a defect in the Patient; and when the Patient is sufficient, by a defect in the Agents.

5 An Entire Cause is alwayes sufficient for the production of its Effect, if the Effect be at all possible. For let any Effect whatsoever be propounded to be produced; if the same be produced, it is manifest that the Cause which produced it was a sufficient Cause; but if it be not produced, and yet be possible, it is evident that something was wanting either in some Agent, or in the Patient, without which it could not be produced; that is, that some Accident was wanting which was requisite for its Production; and therefore that Cause was not Entire, which is contrary to what was supposed.

It follows also from hence, that in whatsoever instant the Cause is Entire, in the same instant the Effect is produced. For if it be not produced, something is still wanting, which is requisite for the production of it; and therefore the Cause was not Entire, as was supposed.

And seeing a Necessary Cause is defined to be that, which being supposed, the Effect cannot but follow; this also may be collected, that whatsoever Effect is produced at any time, the same is produced by a

Necessary Cause. For whatsoever is produced, in as much as it is produced, had an Entire Cause, that is, had all those things, which being supposed, it cannot be understood but that the Effect follows; that is, it had a Necessary Cause. And in the same manner it may be shewn, that whatsoever Effects are hereafter to be produced, shall have a Necessary Cause; so that all the Effects, that have been or shall be produced, have their Ne cessity in things antecedent.

6 And from this, that whensoever the Cause is Entire, the Effect is produced in the same instant, it is manifest, that Causation and the Production of Effects consist in a certain continual Progress; so that as there is a continual Mutation in the Agent or Agents by the working of other Agents upon them, so also the Patient upon which they work is continually altered and changed. For example, as the Heat of the Fire encreases more and more, so also the Effects thereof, namely the Heat of such Bodies as are next to it, & again of such other Bodies as are next to them, encreases more & more accordingly; which is already no litle argument that all Mutation consists in Motion onely; the truth whereof shall be further demonstrated in the ninth Article. But in this Progress of Causation, that is, of Action and Passion, if any man comprehend in his imagination a part thereof, and divide the same into parts, the first part or Beginning of it cannot be considered otherwise then as Action or Cause; for if it should be considered as Effect or Passion, then it would be necessary to consider something before it for its Cause or Action; which cannot be; for nothing can be before the Beginning. And in like manner, the last part is considered onely as Effect; for it cannot be called Cause if nothing follow it; but after the last nothing follows. And from hence it is, that in all Action the Beginning and Cause are taken for the same thing. But every one of the intermediate parts are both Action and Passion, and Cause and Effect, according as they are compared with the antecedent or subsequent part.

7 There can be no Cause of Motion, except in a Body Contiguous, and Moved. For let there be any two Bodies which are not contiguous, and betwixt which the intermediate Space is empty, or if filled, filled with another Body which is at Rest; and let one of the propounded Bodies be supposed to be at Rest, I say it shall always be at Rest. For if it shall be Moved, the Cause of that Motion (by the 8th. Chapter 19th. Article) will be in some external Body; and therefore if between it and that external Body there be nothing but empty Space, then whatsoever the disposition be of that external Body, or of the Patient it self, yet if it be supposed to be now at Rest, we may conceive it wil continue so til it be touched by some other Body; but seeing Cause (by the Definition) is the Aggregate of all such Accidents, which being supposed to be present it cannot be conceived but that the Effect will follow, those Accidents which are either in external Bodies, or in the Patient it self, cannot be the Cause of future Motion; and in like manner, seeing we may conceive, that whatsoever is at Rest, will still be at Rest, though it be touched by some other Body, except that other Body be moved, therefore in a contiguous Body which is at Rest, there can be no Cause of Motion. Wherefore there is no Cause of Motion in any Body, except it be Contiguous and Moved.

The same reason may serve to prove, that whatsoever is Moved, will alwayes be Moved on in the same way and with the same Velocity, except it be hindered by some other Contiguous and Moved Body; and consequently that no Bodies either when they are at Rest, or when there is an interposition of Vacuum, can generate or distinguish or lesson Motion in other Bodies. There is one that has written, that things Moved are more resisted by things at Rest, then by things contrarily Moved, for this reason, that he conceived Motion not to be so contrary to Motion as Rest. That which deceived him was, that the words Rest and Motion are but

contradictory Names; whereas Motion indeed is not resisted by Rest, but by contrary Motion.

8 But if a Body work upon another Body at one time, and afterwards the same Body work upon the same Body at another time so, that both the Agent and Patient, and all their parts, be in all things as they were; and there be no difference except onely in time, that is, that one Action be former the other later in time; it is manifest of it self, that the Effects will be Equal and Like; as not differing in any thing besides time. And as Effects themselves proceed from their Causes; so the diversity of them depends upon the diversity of their Causes also.

9 This being true, it is necessary that Mutation can be nothing else, but Motion of the Parts of that Body which is Changed. For First, we do not say any thing is Changed, but that which appears to our Senses otherwise then it appeared formerly. Secondly, both those Appearances are Effects produced in the Sentient; & therefore if they be differe¯t, it is necessary (by the preceding article) that either some part of the Agent which was formerly at Rest, is now Moved, and so the Mutation consists in this Motion; or some part which was formerly Moved, is now otherwise Moved, and so also the Mutation consists in this new Motion; or which being formerly Moved, is now at Rest, which (as I have shewn above) cannot come to pass without Motion, and so again Mutation is Motion; or, lastly, it happens in some of these manners to the Patient or some of its parts; so that Mutation, howsoever it be made, will consist in the Motion of the parts either of the Body which is perceived, or of the Sentient Body, or of both. Mutation therefore is Motion, (namely of the parts either of the Agent or of the Patient;) which was to be demonstrated. And to this it is consequent, that Rest cannot be the Cause of any thing; nor can any Action proceed from it, seeing neither Motion nor Mutation can be caused by it.

10 Accidents, in respect of other Accidents which precede them, or are before them in time, & upon which they do not depend as upon their Causes, are called Contingent Accidents; I say in respect of those Accidents by which they are not generated; for in respect of their Causes all things come to pass with equal necessity, for otherwise, they would have no Causes at all; which of things generated is not intelligible.

CHAP. X. OF POWER AND ACT.

1 POWER AND Cause are the same thing.

2 An Act is produced at the same instant in which the Power is Plenary.

3 Active and Passive Power are parts onely of Plenary Power.

4 An Act when said to be Possible.

5 An Act Necessary and Contingent, what.

6 Active Power consists in Motion.

7 Cause Formal and Final, what they are.

1 CORRESPONDENT to Cause and Effect are POWER and ACT; Nay, those and these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have divers names. Forwhensoever any Agent has all those Accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some Effect in the Patient, then we say that Agent has Power to produce that Effect, if it be applyed to a Patient. But (as I have shewn in the precedent Chapter,) those Accidents constitute the Efficient Cause; and therefore the same Accidents which constitute the Efficient Cause, constitute also the Power of the Agent. Wherefore the Power of the Agent, and the Efficient Cause are the same thing. But they are considered with this difference, that Cause is so called in respect of the Effect already produced, and Power in respect of the same Effect to be produced hereafter, so that Cause respects the Past, Power the

Future time. Also the Power of the Agent, is that which is commonly called Active Power.

In like manner, whensoever any Patient has all those Accidents which it is requisite it should have for the production of some Effect in it, we say it is in the Power of that Patient to produce that Effect, if it be applyed to a fitting Agent. But those Accidents (as is defined in the precedent Chapter) constitute the Material Cause; and therefore the Power of the Patient, (commonly called Passive Power) and Material Cause are the same thing; but with this different consideration, that in Cause the Past time, and in Power the Future is respected. Wherefore the Power of the Agent and Patient together, which may be called Entire or Plenary Power, is the same thing with Entire Cause; for they both consist in the Sum or Aggregate of all the Accidents as well in the Agent as in the Patient, which are requisite for the production of the Effect. Lastly, as the Accident produced is in respect of the Cause called an Effect; so in respect of the Power it is called an Act.

2 As therefore the Effect is produced in the same instant in which the Cause is Entire; so also every Act that may be produced, is produced in the same instant, in which the Power is Plenary. And as there can be no Effect, but from a Sufficient and Necessary Cause; so also no Act can be produced, but by Sufficient Power, or that Power by which it could not but be produced.

3 And as it is manifest, (as I have shewn) that the Efficient and Material Causes are severally and by themselves parts onely of an Entire Cause, and cannot produce any Effect but by being joyned together; so also Power Active and Passive, are parts onely of Plenary and Entire Power; nor, except they be joyned, can any Act proceed from them; and therefore these Powers (as I said in the first Article) are but conditionall, namely, the Agent has Power, if it be applyed to a Patient; and the Patient has Power, if it be

applyed to an Agent; otherwise neither of them have Power, nor can the Accidents which are in them severally be properly called Powers; nor any Action be said to be Possible, for the Power of the Agent alone, or of the Patient alone.

4 For that is an Impossible Act, for the production of which there is no Power Plenary. For seeing Plenary Power is that in which all things concurre which are requisite for the production of an Act, if the Power shall never be Plenary, there will always be wanting some of those things, without which the Act cannot be produced; wherefore that Act shall never be produced, that is, that Act is IMPOSSIBLE: And every Act which is not Impossible, is POSSIBLE. Every Act therefore which is Possible shall at some time be produced; for if it shall never be produced, then those things shall never concurre which are requisite for the production of it; wherefore that Act is Impossible by the Definition; which is contrary to what was supposed.

5 A Necessary Act is that, the production whereof it is Impossible to hinder; and therefore every Act that shall be produced; shall necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is Impossible, because (as is already demonstrated) every Possible Act shall at some time be produced; Nay, this Proposition, What shall be, shall be, is as necessary a Proposition, as this, A Man is a Man.

But here perhaps some man may ask, whether those Future things, which are commonly called Contingents, are Necessary. I say therefore that generally all Contingents, have their Necessary Causes, (as is shewn in the preceding Chapter,) but are called Contingents in respect of other Events upon which they do not depend; as the Rain which shall be to morrow, shall be Necessarily, (that is from necessary Causes;) but we think and say it happens by chance, because we doe not yet perceive the Causes thereof, though they exist now; for men commonly call that Casuall or Contingent,

whereof they do not perceive the necessary Cause; and in the same manner they use to speake of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or no, they say it is possible it never was done.

Wherefore all Propositions concerning Future things contingent or not contingent, as this, It will rayne to morrow, or this, To morrow the Sun will rise, are either necessarily true, or necessarily false; but we call them Contingent because we doe not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their Verity depends not upon our Knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their Causes. But there are some who though they confess this whole Proposition, To morrow it will either rain or not rain, to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as To morrow it will rain, or To morrow it will not rain, to be either of them true by it self, because they say neither this nor that is true determinately. But what is this determinately true, but true upon our knowledge, or evidently true? and therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the Evidence of the truth with the same words with which they endevour to hide their own ignorance.

6 In the 9th. Article of the precedent Chapter I have shewn, that the Efficient Cause of all Motion and Mutation consists in the Motion of the Agent or Agents; And in the first Article of this Chapter, that the Power of the Agent is the same thing with the Efficient Cause. From whence it may be understood, that all Active Power consists in Motion also; and that Power is not a certain Accident which differs from all Acts, but is indeed an Act, namely Motion, which is therefore called Power, because another Act shall be produced by it afterwards. For example, if of three Bodies the first put forwards the second, and this the third, the Motion of the second in respect of the first which produceth it, is the Act of the second Body, but in respect of the third it is the Active Power of the same second Body.

7 The Writers of Metaphysiques reckon up two other Causes besides the Efficient and Material, namely the ESSENCE, which some call the Formal Cause; and the End, or Final Cause; both which are nevertheless Efficient Causes. For when it is said, the Essence of a thing is the Cause thereof, as to be Rational, is the Cause of Man, it is not intelligible; for it is all one as if it were said, To be a Man is the Cause of Man, which is not well said. And yet the knowledge of the Essence of any thing, is the Cause of the knowledge of the thing it selfe; for if I first know that a thing is Rational, I know from thence that the same is Man; but this is no other then an Efficient Cause. A Final Cause has no place but in such things as have Sense and Will; and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an Efficient Cause.

CHAP. XI. OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE.

1 WHAT IT is for one thing to Differ from another.

2 To Differ in Number, Magnitude, Species and Genus, what.

3 What is Relation, Proportion, and Relatives.

4 Proportionals what.

5 The Proportion of Magnitudes to one another, wherein it consists.

6 Relation is no new Accident, but one of those that were in the Relative before the Relation or Comparison was made. Also the Causes of Accidents in the Correlatives are the Cause of Relation.

7 Of the Beginning of Individuation.

1 HITHERTO I have spoken of Body simply, and of Accidents common to all Bodies as Magnitude, Motion, Rest, Action, Passion, Power, Possible, &c. And I should now descend to those Accidents by which one Body is distinguished from another, but that it is first to be declared what it is to be Distinct, and not Distinct, namely what are the SAME and DIFFERENT; for this also is common to all Bodies, that they may be distinguished and differenced from one another. Now two Bodies are said to Differ from one another, when something may be said of one of them, which cannot be said of the other at the same time.

2 And first of all, it is manifest that no Two Bodies are the Same; for seeing they are Two, they are in two places at the same time; as that which

is the Same, is at the same time in one and the same place. All Bodies therefore differ from one another in Number, namely, as One and Another; so that the Same and different in Number are Names opposed to one another by Contradiction.

In Magnitude Bodies differ when One is greater then Another, as a Cubit long, and two Cubits long, of two pound weight, and of three pound weight. And to these, Equals are opposed.

Bodies which differ more then in Magnitude are called Unlike, and those which differ onely in Magnitude, Like. Also of Unlike Bodies some are said to differ in the Species, other in the Genus; in the Species when their difference is perceived by one and the same Sense, as White and Black; and in the Genus, when their difference is not perceived but by divers Senses, as White and Hot.

3 And the Likeness, or Unlikeness, Equality or Inequality of one Body to another, is called their RELATION; and the Bodies themselves Relatives or Correlatives; Aristotle calls them ; the first whereof is usually named the Antecedent, and the second the Consequent; and the Relation of the Antecedent to the Consequent according to Magnitude, namely, the Equality, the Excess or Defect thereof, is called the PROPORTION of the Antecedent to the Consequent, so that Proportion is nothing but the Equality or Inequality of the Magnitude of the Antecedent compared to the Magnitude of the Consequent by their difference only, or compared also with their difference. For Example, the Proportion of Three to Two consists only in this, that Three exceeds Two by Unity; and the Proportion of Two to Five in this, that Two compared with Five is deficient of it by Three, either simply, or compared with the numbers different; and therefore in the Proportion of Unequals, the Proportion of the Lesse to the Greater is called DEFECT, and that of the Greater to the Lesse EXCESS.

4 Besides, of Unequals, some are more, some lesse, and some equally unequall; so that there is Proportion of Proportions, as well as of Magnitudes, namely, where two Unequals have relation to two other Unequals; as when the Inequality which is between 2 and 3 is compared with the Inequality which is between 4 and 5. In which Comparison there are alwayes four Magnitudes, or (which is all one) if there be but three, the midlemost is twice numbred; and if the Proportion of the first to the second be equal to the Proportion of the third to the fourth, then the four are said to be Proportionals; otherwise they are not Proportionals.

5 The Proportion of the Antecedent to the Consequent, consists in their Difference, not onely simply taken, but also as compared with one of the Relatives; that is, either in that part of the greater by which it exceeds the lesse, or in the Remainder after the lesse is taken out of the greater; as the Proportion of Two to Five, consists in the Three by which Five exceeds Two, not in Three, simply onely, but also as compared with Five or Two. For though there be the same difference between Two & Five, which is between Nine and Twelve, namely Three, yet there is not the same Inequality; and therefore the Proportion of Two to Five, is not in all Relation the same with that of Nine to Twelve, but onely in that which is called Arithmetical.

6 But we must not so think of Relation, as if it were an Accident differing from all the other Accidents of the Relative; but one of them; namely that, by which the Comparison is made. For example, the likeness of one White to another White, or its Unlikeness to Black, is the same Accident with its Whiteness; and Equality and Inequality, the same Accident with the Magnitude of the thing compared, though under another Name; for that which is called White or Great, when it is not compared with something else, the same when it is compared is called Like or Unlike, Equal or Unequal. And from this it follows, that the Causes of the

Accidents which are in Relatives, are the Causes also of Likeness, Unlikeness, Equality and Inequality; namely, that he that makes two Unequal Bodies, makes also their Inequality; and he that makes a Rule and an Action, makes also, if the Action be congruous to the Rule, their Congruity; if Incongruous, their Incongruity. And thus much concerning Comparison of one Body with another.

7 But the same Body may at different times be Compared with it self. And from hence springs a great controversie among Philosophers about the Beginning of Individuation; namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a Body is at one time the same, at another time not the same it was formerly. For example, whether a Man grown old be the same Man he was whilest he was young, or another Man; or whether a City be in different Ages the same, or another City. Some place Individuity in the Unity of Matter; others in the Unity of Form; and one sayes it consists in the Unity of the Aggregate of all the Accidents together. For Matter, it is pleaded, that a lump of Wax, whether it be Spherical or Cubical, is the same Wax, because the same Matter. For Form, that when a Man is grown from an Infant to be an Old Man, though his Matter be changed, yet he is still the same Numerical Man; for that Identity which cannot be attributed to the Matter, ought probably to be ascribed to the Form. For the Aggregate of Accidents no Instance can be made; but because when any new Accident is generated, a new Name is commonly imposed on the Thing, therefore he that assigned this cause of Individuity, thought the thing it self also was become another thing. According to the first Opinion, He that sins, and he that is punished should not be the same Man, by reason of the perpetual flux and change of Mans Body; nor should the City which makes Lawes in one Age, and abrogates them in another, be the same City; which were to confound all Civil Rights. According to the second Opinion, two Bodies existing both at once, would be one and the same Numerical Body; for if

(for example) that Ship of Theseus (concerning the Difference whereof, made by continual reparation, in taking out the old Planks, and putting in new, the Sophisters of Athens were wont to dispute) were, after all the Planks were changed, the same Numerical Ship it was at the beginning; and if some Man had kept the Old Planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together in the same order, had again made a Ship of them, this without doubt had also been the same Numerical Ship with that which was at the beginning; and so there would have been two Ships Numerically the same, which is absurd. But according to the third Opinion, Nothing would be the same it was; so that a Man standing, would not be the same he was sitting; nor the Water which is in the Vessel, the same with that which is poured out of it. Wherefore the beginning of Individuation is not alwayes to be taken either from Matter alone, or from Form alone.

But we must consider by what name any thing is called, when we enquire concerning the Identity of it; for it is one thing to ask concerning Socrates whether he be the same Man, and another to ask whether he be the same Body; for his Body when he is Old, cannot be the same it was when he was an Infant, by reason of the difference of Magnitude; for One Body has alwayes One and the same Magnitude; yet nevertheless he may be the same Man. And therefore whensoever the Name by which it is asked whether a thing be the same it was, is given it for the Matter onely, then if the Matter be the same, the thing also is Individually the same; as the Water which was in the Sea, is the same which is afterwards in the Cloud; and any Body is the same, whether the parts of it be put together, or dispersed, or whether it be congealed or dissolved. Also if the Name be given for such Form as is the beginning of Motion, then as long as that Motion remains it will be the same Individual thing; as that Man will be alwayes the same, whose Actions and Thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of Motion, namely, that which was in his generation; and that will be the same

River, which flows from one and the same Fountain, whether the same Water, or other Water, or something else then Water flow from thence; and that the same City, whose Acts proceed continually from the same Institution, whether the Men be the same or no. Lastly, if the Name be given for some Accident, then the Identity of the thing will depend upon the Matter; for by the taking away and supplying of Matter, the Accidents that were are destroyed, and other new ones are generated, which cannot be the same Numerically; so that a Ship, which signifies Matter so figured, will be the same, as long as the Matter remains the same; but if no part of the Matter be the same, then it is Numerically another Ship; and if part of the Matter remain, and part be changed, then the Ship will be partly the same, and partly not the same.

CHAP. XII. OF QUANTITY.

1 THE DEFINITION of Quantity.

2 The Exposition of Quantity what it is.

3 How Line, Superficies and Solid are exposed.

4 How Time is exposed.

5 How Number is exposed.

6 How Velocity is exposed.

7 How Weight is exposed.

8 How the Proportion of Magnitudes is exposed.

9 How the Proportion of Times and Velocities is exposed.

1 WHAT, and how manifold Dimension is, has been said in the 8th. Chapter, namely, that there are three Dimensions, Line (or Length) Superficies and Solid; Every one of which, if it be determined, that is, if the limits of it be made known is commonly called Quantity; For by Quantity all men understand that which is signified by that word, by which answer is made to the question How much is it. Whensoever therefore it is asked (for example) How long is the Journey, it is not answered indefinitely Length; nor when it is asked, How big is the Field is it answered indefinitely Superficies; nor if a man ask How great is the bulk, indefinitely Solid; but it

is answered determinately, The Journey is a hundred Miles; the Field is a hundred Acres; the Bulk is a hundred Cubical Feet; or at least in some such manner, that the Magnitude of the thing enquired after may by certain Limits be comprehended in the Mind. QUANTITY therefore cannot otherwise be defined, then to be a Dimension determined or a Dimension, whose Limits are set out, either by their Place, or by some Comparison.

2 And Quantity is determined two wayes; One, by the Sense, when some sensible Object is set before it; as when a Line, a Superficies or Solid, of a Foot or Cubit, marked out in some Matter, is objected to the Eyes; which way of Determining is called Exposition, and the Quantity so known is called Exposed Quantity; The Other, by Memory, that is, by Comparison with some Exposed Quantity. In the first manner, when it is asked of what Quantity a thing is, it is answered, of such Quantity as you see Exposed. In the second manner, answer cannot be made but by Comparison with some exposed Quantity; for if it be asked, How long is the Way, the answer is, so many thousand Paces; that is, by Comparing the Way with a Pace, or some other Measure determined and known by Exposition; or the Quantity of it is to some other Quantity known by Exposition, as the Diameter of a Square is to the Side of the same, or by some other the like means. But it is to be understood that the Quantity Exposed must be some standing or permanent thing, such as is marked out in consistent or durable matter; or at least something which is revocable to sense; for otherwise no Comparison can be made by it. Seeing therefore (by what has been said in the next preceding Chapter) Comparison of one Magnitude with another, is the same thing with Proportion; it is manifest, that Quantity determined in the second manner, is nothing else but the Proportion of a Dimension not Exposed to another which is Exposed; that is, the Comparison of the Equality or Inequality thereof with an Exposed Quantity.

3 Lines, Superficies and Solids are Exposed, First, by Motion, in such manner, as (in the 8th Chapter) I have said they are generated; but so, as that the Marks of such Motion be permanent; as when they are designed upon some Matter, as a Line upon Paper; or graven in some durable Matter. Secondly, by Apposition; as when one Line or Length is applyed to another Line or Length, one Breadth to another Breadth, and one Thickness to another Thickness; which is as much as to describe a Line by Points, a Superficies by Lines, and a Solid by Superficies, saving that by Points in this place are to be understood very short Lines, and by Superficies very Thin Solids. Thirdly, Lines and Superficies may be Exposed by Section; namely a Line may be made by Cutting an Exposed Superficies, and a Superficies by the Cutting of an Exposed Solid.

4 Time is Exposed not onely by the Exposition of a Line, but also of some Moveable thing, which is moved Uniformly upon that Line, or at least is supposed so to be Moved. For seeing Time is an Idea of Motion in which we consider Former and Later, that is, Succession, it is not sufficient for the Exposition of Time that a Line be described, but we must also have in our Minde an Imagination of some Moveable thing passing over that Line, and the Motion of it must be Uniform, that Time may be divided and compounded as often as there shall be need. And therefore when Philosophers in their Demonstrations draw a Line, and say, Let that Line be Time, it is to be understood as if they said, Let the Conception of Uniform Motion upon that Line, be Time. For though the Circles in Dials be Lines, yet they are not of themselves sufficient to note Time by, except also there be, or be supposed to be a Motion of the Shadow or the Hand.

5 Number is Exposed either by the Exposition of Points, or of the Names of Number One, Two, Three, &c. and those Points must not be contiguous, so as that they cannot be distinguished by Notes, but they must be so placed that they may be discerned one from another; for from this it is that Number

is called Discrete Quantity, whereas all Quantity which is designed by Motion, is called Continual Quantity. But that Number may be Exposed by the Names of Number, it is necessary that they be recited by heart and in order, as One, Two, Three, &c. for by saying One, One, One and so forward, we know not what Number we are at beyond Two or Three, which also appear to Us in this manner not as Number, but as Figure.

6 For the Exposition of Velocity (which by the Definition therof is a Motion which in a certain Time passeth over a certain Space) it is requisite not onely that Time be Exposed, but that there be also Exposed that Space which is transmitted by the Body whose Velocity we would determine, and that a Body be understood to be Moved in that Space also; so that there must be Exposed two Lines, upon One of which Uniform Motion must be understood to be made, that the Time may be determined, and upon the other the Velocity is to be computed. As if we would Expose the Velocity of the Body A, we draw two lines AB and CD, and place a Body in C also, which done, we say, the Velocity of the Body A is so great, that it passeth over the Line AB in the same Time, in which the Body C passeth over the Line CD with Uniform Motion.

7 Weight is Exposed by any Heavy Body, of what Matter soever, so it be alwayes alike Heavy.

8 The Proportion of two Magnitudes is then Exposed when the Magnitudes themselves are Exposed; namely, the Proportion of Equality, when the Magnitudes are Equal; and of Inequality, when they are Unequal. For seeing (by the 5th Article of the precedent Chapter) the Proportion of two Unequal Magnitudes consists in their Difference compared with either of them; and when two Unequal Magnitudes are Exposed, their Difference is also Exposed; it follows, that when Magnitudes which have Proportion to one another are Exposed, their Proportion also is Exposed with them; and in like manner, the Proportion of Equals (which consists in this, that there is

no Difference of Magnitude betwixt them) is Exposed at the same time when the Equal Magnitudes themselves are Exposed. For Example, if the Exposed Lines AB and CD be Equal, the Proportion of Equality is Exposed in them; and if the Exposed Lines EF & EG be Unequal, the Proportion which EF has to EG, and that which EG has to EF are also Exposed in them; for not onely the Lines themselves, but also their Difference GF is Exposed. The Proportion of Unequals is Quantity; for the Difference GF, in which it consists, is Quantity. But the Proportion of Equality is not Quantity, because between Equals there is no Difference; nor is one Equality greater then another, as one Inequality is greater then another Inequality.

9 The Proportion of two Times, or of two Uniform Velocities, is then Exposed, when two lines are exposed, by which two Bodies are understood to be Moved Uniformly; and therefore the same two Lines serve to exhibit both their own Proportion, and that of the Times and Velocities, according as they are considered to be Exposed for the Magnitudes themselves, or for the Times or Velocities. For let the two Lines A and B be Exposed; their Proportion therefore (by the last foregoing Article) is Exposed; and if they be considered as drawn with equal and Uniform Velocity, then seeing their Times are greater, or equal, or lesse, according as the same Spaces are transmitted in greater, or equal, or lesse Time, the Lines A and B will exhibit the Equality or Inequality, that is, the Proportion of the Times. To conclude, If the

same Lines A and B be considered as drawn in the same Time, then seeing their Velocities are greater, or equal, or lesse, according as they pass over in the same time longer, or equal, or shorter Lines, the same Lines A and B will exhibit the Equality or Inequality, that is, the Proportion of their Velocities.

CHAP. XIII. OF ANALOGISME OR THE SAME PROPORTION.

1, 2, 3, 4. The Nature and Definition of Proportion Arithmetical and Geometrical.

5 The Definition and some properties of the Same Arithmetical Proportion.

6, 7. The Definition and Transmutations of Analogisme, or The Same Geometrical Proportion.

8, 9. The Definitions of Hyperlogisme and Hypologisme, that is, of Greater and Lesse Proportion, and their Transmutations.

10, 11, 12. Comparison of Analogical quantities according to Magnitude.

13, 14, 15. Composition of Proportions.

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. The Definition and Properties of Continual Proportion.

26, 27, 28, 29. Comparison of Arithmetical and Geometrical Proportions.

Note that in this Chapter, the signe +, signifies that the quantities betwixt which it is put, are added together; and this signe -, the Remainder, after the later quantity is taken out of the former. So that A+B is equal to both A and B together; and where you see A−B, there A is the Whole, B the part taken out of it, and A−B the Remainder. Also two letters set together without any sign, signifies (unlesse they belong to a Figure) that one of the quantities is multiplyed by the other; as A B signifies the Product of A multiplyed by B.

1 GREAT & Little are not intelligible but by Comparison. Now that to which they are compared is something Exposed, that is, some Magnitude either perceived by Sense, or so defined by Words, that it may be comprehended by the Mind. Also that to which any Magnitude is compared, is either Greater, or Less, or Equal to it. And therefore Proportion (which as I have shewn, is the Estimation, or Comprehension of Magnitudes by Comparison) is threefold; namely Proportion of Equality, that is, of Equal to Equal; or of Excesse, which is of the Greater to the Lesse; or of Defect, which is the Proportion of the Lesse to the Greater.

Again, every one of these Proportions is twofold; For if it be asked concerning any Magnitude given, how Great it is, the answer may be made by Comparing it two wayes; First, by saying it is greater or lesse then another Magnitude by so much; as Seven is lesse then Ten by three Unities; and this is called Arithmetical Proportion. Secondly, by saying it is greater or lesse then another Magnitude by such a part or parts thereof; as Seven is less then Ten by three tenth parts of the same Ten. And though this Proportion be not alwayes explicable by Number, yet it is a determinate Proportion, and of a different kind from the former, and called Geometrical Proportion, and most commonly Proportion simply.

2 Proportion, whether it be Arithmetical or Geometrical, cannot be Exposed but in two Magnitudes (of which the former is co¯monly called the Antecedent, & the later the Consequent of the Proportion) as I have shewn in the 8th. Article of the precedent Chapter. And therefore if two Proportions be to be compared, there must be four Magnitudes Exposed, namely two Antecedents and two Consequents; for though it happen sometimes, that the Consequent of the former Proportion be the same with the Antecedent of the later, yet in that double Comparison it must of necessity be twice numbred; so that there will be alwayes four Terms.

3 Of two Proportions, whether they be Arithmetical or Geometrical, when the Magnitudes compared in both (which Euclide in the fifth Definition of his sixth Book calls the Quantities of Proportions) are equal, then one of the Proportions cannot be either greater or lesse then the other; For one Equality is neither greater nor lesse then another Equality. But of two Proportions of Inequality, whether they be Proportions of Excesse or of Defect, one of them may be either greater or lesse then the other, or they may both be equal; for though there be propounded two Magnitudes that are unequal to one another, yet there may be other two more unequal, and other two equally unequall, and other two less unequal then the two which were propounded. And from hence it may be understood that the Proportions of Excess and Defect are Quantity, being capable of More & Less; but the Proportion of Equality is not Quantity, because not capable, neither of More nor of Less. And therefore Proportions of Inequality may be added together or substracted from one another, or be multiplyed or divided by one another, or by Number; but Proportions of Equality not so.

4 Two Equal Proportions are commonly called The Same Proportion; and it is said, that the Proportion of the first Antecedent to the first Consequent is the same with that of the second Antecedent to the second Consequent. And when four Magnitudes are thus to one another in Geometrical Proportion, they are called Proportionals, and by some more briefly Analogisme. And Greater Proportion, is the Proportion of a Greater Antecedent to the same Consequent, or of the same Antecedent to a Less Consequent; and when the Proportion of the first Antecedent to the first Consequent, is greater then that of the second Antecedent to the second Consequent, the four Magnitudes which are so to one another may be called Hyperlogisme.

Less Proportion is the Proportion of a Less Antecedent to the same Consequent, or of the same Antecedent to a Greater Consequent; and when

the Proportion of the first Antecedent to the first Consequent, is less then that of the second to the second, the four Magnitudes may be called Hypologisme.

5 One Arithmetical Proportion is the Same with another Arithmetical Proportion, when one of the Antecedents exceeds its Consequent, or is exceeded by it, as much as the other Antecedent exceeds its Consequent, or is exceeded by it. And therefore in four Magnitudes Arithmetically Proportional, the sum of the Extremes is equal to the sum of the Means. For if A. B :: C. D be Arithmetically Proportional, and the Difference on both sides be the same Excess or the same Defect E; then B+C (if A be greater then B) will be equal to A−E+C; and A+D will be equal to A+C−E; But A−E+C and A+C−E are equal. Or if A be less then B, then B+C will be equal to A+E+C; and A+D will be equal to A+C+E; But A+E+C, and A+C+E are equal.

Also if there be never so many Magnitudes Arithmetically Proportional, the Sum of them all will be equal to the Product of half the number of the Terms multiplyed by the Sum of the Extremes. For if A. B :: C. D :: E. F be Arithmetically Proportional, the Couples A+F, B+E, C+D will be equal to one another; and their Sum will be equal to A+F multiplyed by the number of their Combinations, that is, by half the number of the Terms.

If of four Unequal Magnitudes, any two together taken be equal to the other two together taken, then the greatest and the least of them will be in the same Combination. Let the Unequal Magnitudes be A, B, C, D; and let A+B be equal to C+D; & let A be the greatest of them all; I say B will be the least. For if it may be, let any of the rest, as D, be the least. Seeing therefore A is greater then C, and B then D, A+B will be greater then C+D; which is contrary to what was supposed.

If there be any four Magnitudes, the Sum of the greatest and least, the Sum of the Means, the difference of the two greatest, and the difference of

the two least will be Arithmetically Proportional. For let there be four Magnitudes, whereof A is the greatest, D the least, and B and C the Means; I say A+D. B+C :: A−B. C−D are Arithmetically Proportional. For the difference between the first Antecedent and its Consequent is this, A+D−B−C; and the difference between the second Antecedent and its Consequent this, A−B−C+D; but these two Differences are equal, and therefore (by this 5th. Article) A+D. B+C :: A−B. C−D are Arithmetically Proportional.

If of four Magnitudes, two be equal to the other two, they will be in reciprocal Arithmetical Proportion. For let A+B be equal to C+D; I say A. C :: D. B are Arithmetically Proportional. For if they be not, let A. C :: D. E (supposing E to be greater or less then B) be Arithmetically Proportional, and then A+E will be equal to C+D; wherefore A+B and C+D are not equal; which is contrary to what was supposed.

6 One Geometrical Proportion is the same with another Geometrical Proportion, when the same Cause producing equal Effects in equal Times, determines both the Proportions.

If a Point Uniformly moved, describe two Lines either with the same, or different Velocity, all the parts of them which are contemporary, that is, which are described in the same time, will be Two to Two in Geometrical Proportion, whether the Antecedents be taken in the same Line, or not. For, from the point A (in the 10 Figure at the end of the 14 Chapter) let the two Lines A D, A G, be described with Uniform Motion; and let there be taken in them two parts AB, AE, and again two other parts AC, AF; in such manner, that AB, AE, be contemporary, and likewise AC, AF contemporary. I say first (taking the Antecedents AB, AC in the Line AD, and the Consequents AE, AF in the Line AG) that AB. AC :: AE AF are Proportionals. For seeing (by the 8th. Chapter and the 15 Article) Velocity is Motion considered as determined by a certain Length or Line, in a certain

Time transmitted by it, the quantity of the Line AB will be determined by the Velocity and Time by which the same AB is described; and for the same reason, the quantity of the Line AC will be determined by the Velocity and Time, by which the same AC is described; and therefore the proportion of AB to AC, whether it be Proportion of Equality, or of Excess or Defect, is determined by the Velocities and Times by which AB, AC are described; But seeing the Motion of the Point A upon AB and AC is Uniform they are both desribed with equal Velocity; and therefore whether one of them have to the other the Proportion of Majority or of Minority, the sole cause of that Proportion is the difference of their Times; and by the same reason it is evident, that the proportion of AE to AF is determined by the difference of their Times onely. Seeing therefore AB, AE, as also AC, AF are contemporary, the difference of the Times in which AB and AC are described, is the same with that in which AE and AF are described. Wherfore the proportion of AB to AC, and the proportion of AE to AF are both determined by the same Cause. But the Cause which so determines the proportion of both, works equally in equal Times, for it is Uniform Motion; and therefore (by the last precedent Definition) the proportion of AB to AC is the same with that of AE to AF; and consequently AB. AC :: AF. AF are Proportionals; which is the first.

Secondly (taking the Antecedents in different Lines,) I say, AB. AE :: AC. AF are Proportionals; For seeing AB, AE are described in the same Time, the difference of the Velocities in which they are described are the sole Cause of the proportion they have to one another. And the same may be said of the proportion of AC to AF. But seeing both the Lines AD and AG are passed over by Uniform Motion, the difference of the Velocities in which AB, AE are described, will be the same with the difference of the Velocities, in which AC, AF are described. Wherefore the Cause which determines the proportion of AB to AE, is the same with that which

determines the proportion of AC to AF; and therefore AB. AE :: AC. AF, are Proportionals; which remained to be proved.

- 1 Corollary. If four Magnitudes be in Geometrical Proportion, they will also be Proportionals by Permutation, (that is, by transposing the Middle Terms.) For I have shewn, that not onely AB. AC :: AE. AF, but also that (by Permutation) AB. AE :: AC. AF are Proportionals.
- 2 Coroll. If there be four Proportionals, they will also be Proportionals by Inversion or Conversion, that is, by turning the Antecedents into Consequents. For if in the last Analogisme, I had for AB, AC, put by Inversion AC, AB, and in like manner converted AE, AF into AF, AE, yet the same Demonstration had served. For as well AC, AB, as AB, AC are of equal Velocity; and AC, AF, as well as AF, AC are Contemporary.
- 3 Coroll. If Proportionals be added to Proportionals, or taken from them, the Aggregates, or Remainders will be Proportionals. For Contemporaries whether they be added to Contemporaries, or taken from them; make the Aggregates or Remainders Contemporary, though the Addition or Substraction be of all the Terms, or of the Antecedents alone, or of the Consequents alone.
- 4 Coroll. If both the Antecedents of four Proportionals, or both the Consequents, or all the Terms, be multiplyed or divided by the same Number or Quantity, the Products or Quotients will be Proportionals. For the Multiplication and Division of Proportionals, is the same with the Addition and Substraction of them.

- 5 Coroll. If there be four Proportionals, they will also be Proportionals by Composition (that is, by compounding an Antecedent of the Antecedent and Consequent put together, and by taking for Consequent either the Consequent singly, or the Antecedent singly). For this Composition is nothing but Addition of Proportionals, namely, of Consequents to their own Antecedents, which by Supposition are Proportionals.
- 6 Coroll. In like manner, if the Antecedent singly, or Consequent singly be put for Antecedent, and the Consequent be made of both put together, these also will be Proportionals. For it is the Inversion of Porportion by Composition.
- 7 Coroll. If there be four Proportionals, they will also be Proportionals by Division (that is, by taking the Remainder after the Consequent is substracted from the Antecedent, or the Difference between the Antecedent and Consequent for Antecedent, and either the Whole or the Remainder for Consequent;) As if A. B :: C. D be Proportionals, they will by Division be A−B. B :: C−D. D, and A−B. A :: C−D. C; and when the Consequent is greater then the Antecedent, B−A. A :: D−C. C, and B−AB :: D−C. D. For in all these Divisions, Proportionals are (by the very supposition of the Analogisme A. B :: C. D) taken from A and B, and from C and D.
- 8 Coroll. If there be four Proportionals, they will also be Proportionals by the Conversion of Proportion, (that is, by Inserting the Divided Proportion, or by taking the Whole for Antecedent, & the Difference or Remainder for Consequent.) As, if A. B :: C. D be Proportionals, then A. A−B :: C. C−D, as also B. A−B :: D. C−D will be Proportionals. For seeing these

Inverted be Proportionals, they are also themselves Proportionals.

- 9 Coroll. If there be two Analogismes which have their quantities equal, the second to the second, and the fourth to the fourth, then either the Sum or Difference of the first quantities will be to the second, as the Sum or Difference of the third quantities is to the fourth. Let A. B :: C. D and E. B :: F. D be Analogismes; I say C+E. B :: F. D are Proportionals. For the said Analogismes will by Permutation be A. C :: B. D, and E. F :: B. D; and therefore A. C :: E. F will be Proportionals (for they have both the proportion of B to D common.) Wherefore if in the Permutation of the first Analogisme, there be added E and F to A and C, which E and F are proportional to A and C, then (by the 3d Coroll.) A+E. B :: C+F. D will be Proportionals; which was to be proved.

Also in the same manner it may be shewn, that A−E. B :: C+F. D are Proportionals.

7 If there be two Analogismes, where foure Antecedents make an Analogisme, their Consequents also shall make an Analogisme; as also the Sums of their Antecedents will be proportionall to the Sums of their Consequents. For if A. B :: C. D and E. F :: G. H be two Analogismes; and A. E :: C. G be Proportionals, then by Permutation A. C :: E. G, and E. G :: F. H, and A. C :: B. D will be Proportionals; Wherefore B. D :: E. G, that is, B. D :: F. H, and by Permutation B. F :: D. H are Proportionals; which is the first. Secondly, I say A+E. B+F :: C+G. D+H will be Proportionalls. For seeing A. E :: C. G are Proportionals, A+E. E :: C+G. G will also by Composition be Proportionals, and by Permutation A+E. C+G :: E. G will be Proportionals; Wherefore also A+E. C+G :: F. H will be Proportionals. Again, seeing (as is shewn above) P. F :: D. H are Proportionals, B+F. F ::

D+H. H will also by Composition be Proportionals; and by Permutation B+F. D+H :: F. H will also be Proportionals; Wherefore A+E. C+G :: B+F. D+H are Proportionals; which remained to be proved.

Coroll. By the same reason, if there be never so many Analogismes, and the Antecedents be proportional to the Antecedents, it may be demonstrated also that the Consequents will be proportional to the Consequents, as also the Sum of the Antecedents to the Sum of the Consequents.

8 In an Hyperlogisme, that is, where the Proportion of the first Antecedent to its Consequent, is greater then the proportion of the second Antecedent to its Consequent, the Permutation of the Proportionals, and the Addition of Proportionals to Proportionals, & Substraction of them from one another; as also their Composition & Division, & their Multiplication & Division by the same Number, produce always an Hyperlogisme. For suppose A. B :: C. D & A. C :: E. F be Analogismes, A+E. B :: C+F. D will be also an Analogisme; But A+E. B :: C. D will be an Hyperlogisme; Wherefore by Permutation, A+E. C :: B. D is an Hyperlogisme, because A. B :: C. D is an Analogisme. Secondly, if to the Hyperlogisme A+E. B :: C. D the Proportionals G and H be added, A+E+G. B ::, C+H. D will be an Hyperlogisme, by reason A+E+G. B :: C+F+H. D is an Analogisme. Also if G and H be taken away, A+E G. B :: C−H. D will he an Hyperlogisme; for A+E−G. B :: C+F−H. D are an Analogisme. Thirdly, by Composition A+E+B. B :: C+D. D will be an Hyperlogisme, because A+E+B. B :: C+F+D. D is an Analogisme, & so it will be in all the varieties of Composition. Fourthly, by Division A+E−B. B :: C−D. D will be an Hyperlogisme, by reason A+E−B. B :: C+F−D. D is an Analogisme. Also A+E−B. A+E :: C−D. C is an Hyperlogisme; for A+E−B. A+E :: C+F−D. C is an Analogisme. Fifthly, by Multiplication 4 A+E. B :: 4 C. D is an Hyperlogisme, because 4 A. B :: 4 C. D is an Analogisme; and by Division

¼A+¼E. B :: ¼C. D is an Hyperlogisme, because ¼A. B :: ¼C. D is an Analogisme.

9 But if A+E. B :: C. D be an Hyperlogisme, then by Inversion B. A+E :: D. C will be an Hypologisme, because B. A :: D. C being an Analogisme, the first Consequent will be too great. Also by Conversion of Proportion A+E. A+E−B :: C. C−D is an Hypologisme, because the Inversion of it, namely A+E−B. A+E :: C−D. C is an Hyperlogisme (as I have shewn but now). So also B. A+E−B :: D. C−D is an Hypologisme, because (as I have newly shewn) the Inversion of it, namely A+E−B. B :: C−D. D is an Hyperlogisme. Note that this Hypologisme A+E. A+E−B :: C. C−D is commonly thus expressed; If the proportion of the Whole (A+E) to that which is taken out of it (B), be greater then the proportion of the Whole (C) to that which is taken out of it (D,) then the proportion of the whole (A+E) to the Remainder (A+E−B) wilbe less then the proportion of the whole (C) to the Remainder (C−D.)

10 If there be four Proportionals, the Difference of the two first, to the Difference of the two last will be as the first Antecedent is to the second Antecedent, or as the first Consequent to the second Consequent. For if A. B :: C. D be Proportionals, then by Division A−B. B :: C−D. D will be Proportionals; and by Permutation A−B. C−D :: B. D; that is, the Differences are proportional to the Consequents, and therefore they are so also to the Antecedents.

11 Of four Proportionals, if the first be greater then the second, the third also shall be greater then the fourth. For seeing the first is greater then the second, the proportion of the first to the second is the proportion of Excess; But the proportion of the third to the fourth is the same with that of the first to the second; and therefore also the proportion of the third to the fourth is the Proportion of Excess; Wherefore the third is greater then the fourth. In the same manner it may be proved, that whensoever the first is less then the

second, the third also is less then the fourth; and when those are equal, that these also are equal.

12 If there be four Proportionals whatsoever A. B :: C. D, and the first and third be multiplyed by any one number, as by 2; and again the second and fourth be multiplyed by any one number, as by 3; and the product of the first 2 A, be greater then the product of the second 3 B; the product also of the third 2 C, will be greater then the product of the fourth 3 D. But if the product of the first be less then the product of the second, then the product of the third will be less then that of the fourth. And lastly, if the products of the first and second be equal, the products of the third and fourth shall also be equal. Now this Theoreme is all one with Euclides Definition of The Same Proportion; and it may be demonstrated thus. Seeing A. B :: C. D are Proportionals, by Permutation also (Art. 6. Corol. 1.) A. C :: B. D will be Proportionals; Wherefore (by the 4 Corol. of the same 6 Article) 2 A. 2 C :: 3 B. 3 D will be Proportionals; and again by Permutation 2 A. 3 B :: 2 C. 3 D will be Proportionals; and therefore (by the last Article) If 2 A be greater then 3 B, then 2 C will be greater then 3 D; if less, less; and if equal, equal; which was to be demonstrated.

13 If any three Magnitudes be propounded, or three things whatsoever that have any proportion one to another, as three Nu¯bers, three Times, three Degrees, &c; the proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third together taken; are equal to the proportion of the first to the third. Let there be three Lines (for any proportion may be reduced to the proportion of Lines) AB, AC, AD; And in the first place, let the proportion as well of the first AB to the second AC, as of the second AC to the third AD be the proportion of Defect, or of Less to Greater; I say the proportions together taken of AB to AC, and of AC to AD, are equal to the proportion of AB to AD. Suppose the Point A to be moved over the whole Line AD with Uniform Motion; then the proportions as well of AB to AC, as of AC

to AD are determined by the difference of the Times in which they are described; that is, AB has to AC such proportion as is determined by the different Times of their description; and AC to AD such proportion as is determined by their Times. But the proporrion of AB to AD is such as is determined by the difference of the Times in which AB and AD are described; and the difference of the Times in which AB and AC are described, together with the difference of the Times in which AC and AD are described, is the same with the difference of the Times in which AB and AD are

described. And therefore the same Cause which determines the two proportions of AB to AC and of AC to AD, determines also the proportion of AB to AD. Wherefore (by the Definition of the Same Proportion delivered above in the 6 Art.) the proportion of AB to AC together with the proportion of AC to AD, is the same with the proportion of AB to AD.

In the second place, let AD be the first, AC the second, & AB the third, and let their proportion be the Porportion of Excess, or of Greater to Less; then, as before, the proportions of AD to AC, and of AC to AB, and of AD to AB will be determined by the difference of their Times; which in the description of AD and AC, and of AC and AB together taken, is the same with the difference of the Times in the description of AD and AB. Wherefore the proportion of AD to AB is equal to the two proportions of AD to AC and of AC to AB.

In the last place. If one of the proportions, namely of AD to AB be the Proportion of Excess; and another of them, as of AB to AC be the Proportion of Defect, thus also the proportion of AD to AC will be equal to the two proportions together taken of AD to AB, and of AB to AC. For the difference of the Times in which AD and AB are described is Excess of Time; for there goes more time to the description of AD then of AB; and the difference of the Times in which AB and AC are described is Defect of

Time, for less Time goes to the description of AB then of AC; but this Excess, and Defect being added together make DB−BC, which is equal to DC, by which the first AD exceeds the third AC; and therefore the proportions of the first AD to the second AB, and of the second AB to the third AC, are determined by the same Cause which determines the Proportion of the first AD to the third AC. Wherefore, If any three Magnitudes, &c.

- 1 Coroll. If there be never so many Magnitudes having proportion to one another, the proportion of the first to the last is compounded of the proportions of the first to the second, of the second to the third, & so on till you come to the last; or, the proportion of the first to the last, is the same with the Sum of all the intermediate proportions. For any Number of Magnitudes having proportion to one another, as A, B, C, D, E being propounded, the proportion of A to E (as is newly shewn) is compounded of the Proportions of A to D and of D to E; and again the proportion of A to D, of the proportions of A to C, and of C to D; and lastly, the proportion of A to C, of the proportions of A to B, and of B to C.
- 2 Coroll. From hence it may be understood how any two proportions may be compounded. For if the proportions of A to B, and of C to D be propounded to be added together, let B have to something else, as to E, the same proportion which C has to D, and let them be set in this order A, B, E; for so the proportion of A to E will evidently be the Sum of the two Proportions of A to B, and of B to E, that is, of C to D. Or let it be as D to C, so A to something else, as to E, and let them be ordered thus E, A, B; for the proportion of E to B will be compounded of the proportions of E to A (that is, of C to D),

and of A to B. Also it may be understood how one Proportion may be taken out of another. For if the proportion of C to D be to be substracted out of the proportion of A to B, let it be as C to D, so A to something else, as E, and setting them in this order, A, E, B, and taking away the proportion of A to E, that is, of C to D, there will remain the proportion of E to B.

- 3 Coroll. If there be two Orders of Magnitudes which have proportion to one another beginning and ending with the same Magnitudes, and the several proportions of the first Order be the same and equal in number with the proportions of the second Order; then, whether the proportions in both Orders be successively answerable to one another, which is called Ordinate Proportion, or not successively answerable, which is called Perturbed Proportion, the first and the last in both will be Proportionals. For the Proportion of the first to the last is equal to all the intermediate proporons; which being in both Orders the same, and equal in number, the Aggregates of those proportions will also be equal to one another; but to their Aggregates the proportions of the first to the last are Equal; and therefore the proportion of the first to the last in one Order, is the same with the proportion of the first to the last in the other Order. Wherefore the first and the last in both are Proportionals.

14 If any two quantities be made of the mutual Multiplication of many quantities which have proportion to one another, and the Efficient quantities on both sides be equal in number, the proportion of the Products will be compounded of the several proportions which the Efficient quantities have to one another.

First, let the two Products be A B, and C D, whereof one is made of the Multiplication of A into B, and the other of the Multiplication of C into D. I say the proportion of A B to C D is compounded of the proportions of the Efficient A to the Efficient C, and of the Efficient B to the Efficient D. For let A B, C B and C D be set in Order; and as B is to D, so let C be to another quantity as E; and let A, C, E, be set also in Order. Then by (the 4 Coroll. of the 6 Art.) it will be as A B the first quantity, to C B the second quantity in the first Order, so A to C in the second Order; and again, as C B to C D in the first Order, so B to D, that is, (by Construction) so C to E in the second Order; and therefore (by the last Corollary) A B. C D :: A. E will be Proportionals. But the proportion of A to E is compounded of the Proportions of A to C, and of B to D; Wherefore also the proportion of A B to C D is compounded of the same.

Secondly, let the two Products be A B F, and C D G, each of them made of three Efficients, the first of A, B and F, and the second of C, D and G; I say, the proportion of A B F to C D G is compounded of the proportions of A to C, of B to D and of F to G. For let them be set in Order as before; and as B is to D, so let C be to another quantity E; and again, as F is to G, so let E be to another, H; and let the first Order stand thus, A B F, C B F, C D F and C D G; and the second Order thus, A, C, E, H, Then the proportion of A B F to C B F in the first Order, will be as A to C in the second; and the Proportion of C B F to C D F in the first Order, as B to D, that is, as C to E (by Construction) in the second Order; and the Proportion of C D F to C D G in the first, as F to G, that is, as E to H (by Construction) in the second Order; and therefore A B F. C D G :: A. H will be Proportionals. But the Proportion of A to H is compounded of the Proportions of A to C, B to D, and F to G. Wherefore the Proportion of the Product A B F to C D G is also

compounded of the same. And this operation serves, how many soever the Efficients be that make the Quantities given.

From hence ariseth another way of Compounding many Proportions into One, namely, that which is supposed in the 5 Definition of the 6 Book of Euclide; which is, by multiplying all the Antecedents of the Proportions into one another, and in like manner all the Consequents into one another. And from hence also it is evident, in the first place, That the Cause why Parallelograms, which are made by the Duction of two straight Lines into one anther, and all Solids which are equal to Figures so made, have their proportions compounded of the proportions of the Efficients; And in the second place, why the Multiplication of two or more Fractions into one another, is the same thing with the Composition of the proportions of their several Numerators to their several Denominators. For example, if these Fractions ½, ⅔, ¾ be to be multiplyed into one another, the Numerators 1, 2, 3 are first to be multiplyed into one another, which make 6; and next the Denominators 2, 3, 4, which make 24; and these two Products make the Fraction 6/24. In like manner, if the proportions of 1 to 2, of 2 to 3, and of 3 to 4 be to be compounded, by working as I have shewn above, the same proportion, of 6 to 24 will be produced.

15 If any Proportion be compounded with it self inverted, the Compound will be the Proportion of Equality. For let any Proportion be given, as of A to B, and let the Inverse of it be that of C to D; and as C to D, so let B be to another quantity; for thus they will be compounded (by the 2 Coroll. of the 12 Art.) Now seeing the proportion of C to D is the Inverse of the proportion of A to B, it will be as C to D, so B to A; and therefore if they be placed in Order A, B, A, the proportion compounded of the proportions of A to B, and of C to D will be the proportion of A to A, that is, the proportion of Equality. And from hence the cause is evident, why two equal products have their Efficients reciprocally proportional. For, for the making of two products equal, the proportions of their Efficients must be such, as being compounded may make the proportion of Equality, which cannot be,

except one be the Inverse of the other; for if betwixt A and A any other quantity as C be interposed, their order will be A, C, A, and the later proportion of C to A will be the Inverse of the former proportion of A to C.

16 A Proportion is said to be multiplied by a Number when it is so often taken as there be Unities in that Number; and if the Proportion be of the Greater to the Less, then shall also the quantity of the Proportion be increased by the Multiplication; but when the Proportion is of the Less to the Greater, then as the Number increaseth, the quantity of the Proportion diminisheth; as in these three Numbers 4, 2, 1, the Proportion of 4 to 1, is not onely the Duplicate of 4 to 2, but also twice as great; but inverting the order of those Numbers thus 1, 2, 4, the Proportion of 1 to 2 is greater then that of 1 to 4; and therefore though the proportion of 1 to 4 be the Duplicate of 1 to 2, yet it is not twice so great as that of 1 to 2, but contrarily the half of it. In like manner, a Proportion is said to be Divided, when between two quantities are interposed one or more Means in continual Proportion, and then the Proportion of the first to the second is said to be Subduplicate of that of the first to the third, and Subtriplicate of that of the first to the fourth, &c.

This mixture of Proportions, where some are Proportions of Excess, others of Defect (as in a Merchants accompt of Debitor and Creditor) is not so easily reckoned as some think; but maketh the Composition of Proportions sometimes to be Addition, sometimes Substraction; which soundeth absurdly to such as have alwayes by Composition understood Addition, and by Diminution Substraction. Therefore to make this account a little clearer, we are to consider (that which is commonly assumed, and truly) that if there be never so many Quantities, the Proportion of the first to the last is compounded of the Proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third, and so on to the last, without regarding their Equality, Excess or Defect; So that if two Proportions, one of Inequality, the

other of Equality be added together, the Proportion is not thereby made Greater nor Less; as for example, if the Proportions of A to B and of B to B be compounded, the Proportion of the first to the second is as much as the Sum of both, because Proportion of Equality (being not quantity) neither augmenteth quantity nor lesseneth it. But if there be three quantities A, B, C, unequal, and the first be greatest, the last least, then the Proportion of B to C is an addition to that of A to B, and makes it greater; and on the contrary, if A be the least, and C the greatest quantity, then doth the addition of the Proportion of B to C make the co¯pounded Proportion of A to C less then the Proportion of A to B, that is, the Whole less then the Part. The Compositiont herefore of Proportions is not in this case the Augmentation of them, but the Diminution; for the same quantity (Euclide the 5, 8.) compared with two other quantities hath a greater Proportion to the lesser of them then to the greater. Likewise, when the Proportions compounded are one of Excess, the other of Defect, if the first be of Excess, as in these numbers 8, 6, 9, the Proportion compounded, namely, of 8 to 9, is less then the Proportion of one of the parts of it, namely of 8 to 6; but if the Proportion of the first to the second be of Defect, and that of the second to the third be of Excess, as in these Numbers 6, 8, 10, then shall the Proportion of the first to the third be greater then that of the first to the second, as 6 hath a greater Proportion to 4 then to 8; the reason whereof is manifestly this, that the less any quantity is deficient of another, or the more one exceedeth another, the proportion of it to that other is the greater.

Suppose now three quantities in continual Proportion A B 4, A C 6, A D 9. Because therefore A D is greater then A C, but not greater then A D, the proportion of A D to A C will be (by Euclide 5, 8.) greater then that of A D to A D; and likewise, because the Proportions of A D to A C, and of A C to A B are the same, the proportions of A D to A C and of A C to A B (being both Proportions of Excess) make the whole Proportion of A D to A B (or

of 9 to 4) not onely the Duplicate of A D to A C (that is, of 9 to 6) but also the Double, or twice so great. On the other side, because the proportion of A D to A D (or 9 to 9) being Proportion of Equality, is no quantity, & yet greater then that of A C to A D (or 6 to 9) it will be as 0-9 to 0-6, so A C to A D, and again, as 0-9 to 0-6, so 0-6 to 0-4; but 0-4, 0-6, 0-9 are in continual proportion; and because 0-4 is greater then 0-6, the protion of 0-4 to 0-6 will be Double to the proportion of 0-4 to 0-9, Double I say, and yet not Duplicate, but Subduplicate.

If any be unsatisfied with this ratiocination, let him first consider that (by Euclide 5, 8) the proportion of A B to A C is greater then that of A B to A D wheresoever D be placed in the line A C prolonged; and the further off the point D is from C, so much the greater is the proportion of A B to A C then that of A B to A D.

There is therefore some point (which suppose be E) in such distance from C, as that the proportion of A B to A C will be twice as great as that of A B to A E. That considered, let him determine the length of the line A E, and demonstrate (if he can) that A E is greater or less then A D.

By the same method, if there be more quantities then three, as A, B, C, D in continual Proportion, and A be the least, it may be made appear, that the Proportion of A to B is Triple Magnitude (though Subtriple in Multitude) to the Proportion of A to D.

17 If there be never so many quantities, the number whereof is odd, and their Order such, that from the middlemost quantity both wayes they proceed in continual Proportion, the proportion of the two which are next on either side to the middlemost, is Subduplicate to the proportion of the two which are next to these on both sides, and Subtriplicate of the proportion of the two which are yet one place more remote, &c. For let the Magnitudes be C, B, A, D, E, and let A, B, C, as also A, D, E be in Continual Proportion; I say the proportion of D to B is Subduplicate of the

proportion of E to C. For the proportion of D to B is compounded of the proportions of D to A, and of A to B once taken; But the proportion of E to C is compounded of the same twice taken; and therefore the proportion of D to B is Subduplicate of the proportion of E to C- And in the same manner, if there were three Terms on either side, it might be demonstrated that the proportion of D to B would be Subtriplicate of that of the Extremes, &c.

18 If there be never so many continual Proportionals, as the first, second, third, &c. their Differences will be Proportional to them. For the second, third, &c. are severally Consequents of the preceding, and Antecedents of the following Proportion. But (by the 10 Art.) the Difference of the first Antecedent and Consequent, to Difference of the second Antecedent and Consequent, is as the first Antecedent to the second Antecedent, that is, as the first Term to the second, or as the second to the third, &c. in continuall Proportionals.

19 If there be three Continual Proportionals, The Sum of the Extremes, together with the Mean twice taken; The Sum of the Mean and either of the Extremes; and the same Extreme, are Continual Proportionals. For let A. B. C ∝ be Continual Proportionals. Seeing therefore A. B :: B. C are Proportionals; by Composition also A+B. B :: B+C. C will be Proportionals; and by Permutation A+B. B+C :: B. C will also be Proportionals; and again by Composition A+2 B+C. B+C :: B+C. C; which was to be proved.

20 In four Continual Proportionals, the greatest and the least put together, is a greater quantity then the other two put together. Let A. B :: C. D be Continual Proportionals; whereof let the greatest be A, and the least be D; I say A+D is greater then B+C. For (by the 10 Art.) A−B. C−D :: A. C are Proportionals; and therefore A−B is (by the 11 Art.) greater then C−D. Add B on both sides, and A will be greater then C+B−D. And again, add D on both sides, and A+D will be greater then B+C; which was to be proved.

21 If there be four Proportionals, the Extremes multiplyed into one another, & the Means multiplied into one another wil make equal Products. Let A. B :: C. D be Proportionals; I say A D is equal to B C. For the Proportion of A D to B C is compounded (by the 13 Art.) of the Proportions of A to B, and D to C, that is, its Inverse B to A; and therefore (by the 14 Art) this Compounded Proportion is the Proportion of Equality; and therefore also the Proportion of A D to B C is the Proportion of Equality. Wherefore they are equal.

22 If there be four quantities, and the Proportion of the first to the second be Duplicate of the Proportion of the third to the fourth, the Product of the Extremes to the Product of the Means will be as the third to the fourth. Let the four Quantities be A, B C and D; and let the Proportion of A to B be Duplicate of the Proportion of C to D, I say A D, that is, the Product of A into D, is to BC, that is, to the Product of the Means, as C to D. For seeing the Proportion of A to B is Duplicate of the proportion of C to D, if it be as C to D, so D to another E, then A. B :: C. E will be Proportionals; for the proportion of A to B is by supposition duplicate of the Proportion of C to D; and C to E duplicate also of that of C to D by the Definition (15 Art.) Wherefore (by the last Article) A E or A into E, is equal to B C or B into C; But (by the 4 Coroll. of the 6 Art.) A D is to A E as D to E, that is, as C to D; and therefore A D is to B C (which as I have shewn, is equal to A E) as C to D; which was to be proved.

Moreover, If the proportion of the first A, to the second B be triplicate of the proportion of the third C to the fourth D, the Product of the Extremes to the product of the Means will be duplicate of the Proportion of the third to the fourth. For if it be as C to D so D to E, and again, as D to E so E to another F, then the proportion of C to F will be triplicate of the proportion of C to D; and consequently A. B :: C. F will be proportionals, and A F equal to B C. But as A D to A F, so is D to F; and therefore also as A D to B

C, so D to F, that is, so C to E; But the proportion of C to E is duplicate of the proportion of C to D; Wherefore also the proportion of A D to B C is duplicate of that of C to D, as was propounded.

23 If there be four Proportionals, and a Mean be interposed betwixt the first and second, and another betwixt the third and fourth, the first of these Means will be to the second, as the first of the Proportionals is to the third, or as the second of them is to the fourth. For let A. B :: C. D be Proportionals, and let E be a Mean betwixt A and B, & F a Mean betwixt C and D; I say A. C :: E. F are Proportionals. For the proportion of A to E is Subduplicate of the proportion of A to B, or of C to D. Also the proportion of C to F is Subduplicate of that of C to D; and therefore A. E :: C. F are Proportionals; and by Permutation A. C :: E. F are also Proportionals; which was to be proved.

24 Any thing is said to be divided into Extreme and Mean Proportion, when the Whole and the Parts are in Continual Proportion. As (for example) when A + B. A. B ∝ are Continual Proportionals; or when the straight line A C is so divided in B, that A C. A B. B C ∝ are in Continual Proportion. And if the same Line A C be again divided in D, so as that A C. C D. A D ∝ be continual Proportionals; then also A C. A B. A D ∝ will be continual Proportionals; and in like manner, though in

contrary order, CA. CD. CB:: will be continual Proportionals; which cannot happen in any Line otherwise divided.

25 If there be three continual Proportionals, and again, three other continual Proportionals which have the same Middle Term, their Extremes will be in reciprocal Proportion. For let A. B. C:: and D. B. E:: be continual Proportionals, I say A. D:: E. C shall be Proportionals. For the Proportion of A to D is compounded of the Proportions of A to B, and of B to D; and the Proportion of E to C is compounded of those of E to B, that is, of B to A,

and of B to C, that is, of A to B. Wherefore (by Equality) A. D:: E. C. are Proportionals.

26 If any two unequal quantities be made Extremes, and there be interposed betwixt them any Number of Means in Geometrical Proportion, and the same Number of Means in Arithmetical Proportio¯, the several Means in Geometrical Proportion wil be less then the several Means in Arithmetical proportion. For betwixt A the lesser, & E the greater Extreme, let there be interposed three Means B, A, D in Geometrical Proportion, & as many more F, G, H in Arithmetical Proportion; I say B will be less then F, A then G, & D then H. For first, the difference between A & F is the same with that between F & G, & with that between G & H (by the Definition of Arithmetical Proportion;) & therefore the difference of the pro portionals which stand next to one another, to the difference of the Extremes, is, when there is but one Mean, half their difference; when two, a 3d part of it; when three, a quarter, &c. so that in this example it is a quarter. But the difference between D and E (by the 17. Art.) is more then a quarter of the difference between the Extremes, because the Proportion is Geometrical; & therefore the difference between A and D is less then 3 quarters of the same difference of the Extremes. In like manner, if the difference between A & D be understood to be divided into three equall parts, it may be proved, that the difference between A and C is less then two quarters of the difference of the Extremes A & E. And lastly, if the difference between A and C be divided into two equal parts, that the difference between A and B is less then a quarter of the difference of the Extremes A and E.

From the consideration hereof it is manifest, that B, that is, A together with something else which is less then a fourth part of the difference of the Extremes A and E, is less then F, that is, then the same A with something else which is equal to the said fourth part. Also, that C, that is A with something else which is less then two fourth parts of the said difference, is

less then G, that is, then A together with the said two fourths. And lastly, that D which exceeds A by less then three fourths of the said difference, is less then H, which exceeds the same A by three entire fourths of the said difference. And in the same manner it would be if there were four Means, saving that in stead of fourths of the difference of the Extremes, we are to take fifth parts; and so on.

27 Lemma. If a quantity being given, first one quantity be both added to it and substracted from it, and then another greater or lesse, the proportion of the Remainder to the Aggregate, is greater where the less quantity is added and substracted, then where the greater quantity is added and substracted. Let B be added to, and substracted from the quantity A; so that A−B be the Remainder, and A+B the Aggregate; And again let C, a greater quantitity then B be added to, and substracted from the same A, so that A−C be the Remainder and A+C the Aggregate; I say A−B. A+B:: A−C. A+C will be an Hyperlogisme. For A−B. A:: A−C. A is an Hyperlogisme of a less Antecedent to the same Consequent; and therefore A−B. A+B:: A−C. A+C is a much greater Hyperlogisme, being made of a less Antecedent to a greater Consequent.

28 If unequal parts be taken from two equal quantities, and betwixt the whole and the part of each there be interposed two Means, One in Geometrical, the other in Arithmetical proportion; The Difference betwixt the two Means will be greatest, where the Difference betwixt the Whole and its part is greatest. For let AB & AB be two equal quantities; from which let two unequal parts be taken, namely, AE the less, and AF the greater; and betwixt AB and AE let AG be a Mean in Geometrical Proportion, and AH, a Mean in Arithmetical Proportion. Also betwixt AB and AF let AI be a Mean in Geometrical Porportion, and AK a Mean in Arithmetical Proportion; I say HG is greater then KI. For in the first

place we have this Analogisme AB. AG:: BG. GE (by the 18 Art.)

- Then by Composition we have this AB+AG. AB:: BG+GE (that is BE). BG.
- And by taking the halves of the Antecedents this third ½AB+½AG. AB:: ½BG+½GE (that is BH). BG.
- And by Conversion a fourth AB. ½AB+½AG:: BG. BH
- And by Division this fifth ½AB−½AG. ½AB+½AG:: HG. BH.
- And by doubling the first Antecedent and the first Consequent AB−AG. AB+AG:: HG. BH.
- Also by the same method may be found out this Analogisme AB−AI. AB+AI:: KI. BK.

Now seeing the proportion of AB to AE is greater then that of AB to AF, the proportion of AB to AG, which is half the greater proportion, is greater then the proportion of AB to AI the half of the less Proportion; and therefore AI is greater then AG. Wherefore the proportion of AB−AG to AB+AG (by the precedent Lemma) will be greater then the proportion of AB−AI to AB+AI; & therefore also the proportion of HG to BH will be greater then that of KI to BK, and much greater then the proportion of KI to BH, which is greater then BK, (for BH is the half of BE, as BK is the half of BF, which (by supposition) is less less then BE). Wherefore HG is greater then KI; which was to be proved.

Coroll. It is manifest from hence, that if any quantity be supposed to be divided into equal parts infinite in number, the difference between the Arithmetical and Geometrical Means will be infinitely little, that is, none at all. And upon this foundation chiefly, the Art of making those Numbers which are called Logarithmes seems to have been built.

29 If any number of quantities be propounded, whether they be unequall, or equall to one another; and there be another quantity which multiplied by the number of the propounded quantities is equall to them all; that other

Quantity is a mean in Arithmeticall Proportion to all those propounded quantities.

CHAP. XIV. OF STRAIGHT AND CROOKED, ANGLE AND FIGURE.

1 THE DEFINITION and Properties of a Straight Line

2 The Definition and Properties of a Plain Superficies.

3 Several sorts of Crooked Lines.

4 The Definition and Properties of a Circular Line.

5 The Properties of a Straight Line taken in a Plain.

6 The Definition of Tangent Lines.

7 The Definition of an Angle, and the kindes thereof.

8 In Concentrick Circles, Arches of the same Angle are to one another as the whole Circumferences are.

9 The Quantity of an Angle in what it consists.

10 The Distinction of Angles simply so called.

11 Of Straight Lines from the Center of a Circle to a Tangent of the same.

12 The general Definition of Parallels; and the Properties of Straight Parallels.

13 The Circumferences of Circles are to one another as their Diameters are.

14 In Triangles, Straight Lines parallel to the Bases, are to one another, as the parts of the Sides which they cut off from the Vertex.

15 By what Fraction of a Straight Line the Circumference of a Circle is made.

16 That an Angle of Contingence is Quantity, but of a Different kinde from that of an Angle simply so called; and that it can neither add nor take away any thing from the same.

17 That the Inclination of Plains is Angle simply so called.

18 A Solid Angle what it is.

19 What is the Nature of Asymptotes.

20 Situation, by what it is determined.

21 What is like Situation; What is Figure; and what are like Figures.

1 BETWEEN two points given, the shortest Line is that, whose extreme points cannot be drawn further asunder, withour altering the quantity, that is, without altering the proportion of that line to any other line given. For the Magnitude of a Line is computed by the greatest distance which may be between its extreme points; So that any one Line, whether it be extended, or bowed, has alwayes one and the same Length, because it can have but one greatest distance between its extreme points.

And seeing the action by which a Straight Line is made Crooked, or contrarily a Crooked Line is made Straight, is nothing but the bringing of its extreme points neerer to one another, or the setting of them further asunder, a CROOKED Line may rightly be defined to be That, whose extreme points may be understood to be drawn further asunder; and a STRAIGHT Line to be That, whose extreme points cannot be drawn further asunder; and comparatively, A more Crooked, to be That line whose extreme points are

neerer to one another then those of the other, (supposing both the Lines to be of equal Length.) Now howsoever a Line be bowed, it makes alwayes a Sinus or Cavity, sometimes on one side, sometimes on another; So that the same Crooked Line may either have its whole Cavity on one Side onely, or it may have it part on one side and part on other sides. Which being well understood, it will be easie to understand the following Comparisons of Straight and Crooked Lines.

First, If a Straight & a Crooked Line have their Extreme points common, the Crooked Line is longer then the Straight Line. For if the extreme points of the Crooked Line be drawn out to their greatest distance, it wil be made a straight line, of which that which was a Straight Line from the beginning will be but a part; and therefore the Straight Line was shorter then the Crooked Line which had the same extreme points. And for the same reason, if two Crooked Lines have their extreme points common, and both of them have all their cavity on one and the same side, the outermost of the two will be the longest Line.

Secondly, A Straight Line and a perpetually Crooked Line ca¯not be coincident, no not in the least part. For if they should, then not onely some Straight Line would have its extreme points common with some Crooked Line, but also they would by reason of their coincidence, be equal to one another; which, as I have newly shewn, cannot be.

Thirdly, Between two points given there can be understood but one straight Line; because there cannot be more then one least Interval or Length between the same points. For if there may be two, they will either be coincident, and so both of them will be one Straight Line; or if they be not coincident, then the application of one to the other by extension, will make the extended Line have its extreme points at greater distance then the other; and consequently it was Crooked from the beginning.

Fourthly, From this last it follows, that two Straight Lines cannot include a Superficies. For if they have both their extreme points common, they are coincident; and if they have but one, or neither of them common, then at one, or both ends, the extreme points will be disjoyned, and include no Superficies, but leave all open and undetermined.

Fifthly, Every part of a Straight Line is a Straight Line. For seeing every part of a Straight Line is the least that can be drawn between its own extreme points, if all the parts should not constitute a Straight Line, they would all together be longer then the whole Line.

2 APLAIN, or a Plain Superficies, is that which is described by a Straight Line so moved that all the several points thereof describe several Straight Lines. A straight line therefore is necessarily all of it in the same Plain which it describes. Also the Straight Lines which are made by the points that describe a Plain, are all of them in the Same Plain. Moreover, if any Line whatsoever be moved in a Plain, the Lines which are described by it are all of them in the same Plain.

All other Superficies which are not Plain, are Crooked, that is, are either Concave or Convex. And the same Comparisons which were made of Straight and Crooked Lines: may also be made of Plain and Crooked Superficies. For

First, If a Plain and a Crooked Superficies be terminated with the same Lines, the Crooked Superficies is greater then the Plain Superficies. For if the Lines of which the Crooked Superficies consists be extended, they will be found to be longer then those of which the Plain Superficies consists, which cannot be extended because they are Straight.

Secondly, Two Superficies, wherof the one is Plain, and the other continually Crooked, cannot be coincident, no not in the least part. For if they were coincident they would be equal; nay, the same Superficies would be both Plain and Crooked, which is impossible.

Thirdly, Within the same terminating Lines, there can be no more then one Plain Superficies; because there can be but one least Superficies within the same.

Fourthly, No number of Plain Superficies can include a Solid, unless more then two of them end in a Common Vertex. For if two Plains have both the same terminating Lines, they are coincident, that is, they are but one Superficies; and if their terminating Lines be not the same, they leave one or more sides open.

Fifthly, Every part of a Plain Superficies is a Plain Superficies. For seeing the whole Plain Superficies is the least of all those that have the same terminating Lines; and also every part of the same Superficies is the least of all those that are terminated with the same Lines; if every part should not constitute a Plain Superficies, all the parts put together would not be equal to the whole.

3 Of Straightness, whether it be in Lines, or in Superficies there is but one kinde; but of Crookedness there are many kindes; for of Crooked Magnitudes, some are Congruous, that is, are coincident when they are applyed to one another; others are Incongruous. Again, some are or Uniform, that is, have their parts howsoever taken, congruous to one another; others are or of several Forms. Moreover, of such as are Crooked, some are Continually Crooked, others have parts which are not Crooked.

4 If a Straight Line be moved in a Plain, in such manner, that while one end of it stands still, the whole Line be carried round about, til it come again into the same place from whence it was first moved, it will describe a plain Superficies, which will be terminated every way by that Crooked Line which is made by that end of the Straight Line which was carried round. Now this Superficies is called a CIRCLE; and of this Circle, the Unmoved Point, is the the Center; the Crooked Line which terminates it, the Perimeter; and every part of that Crooked Line, a Circumference or Arch;

the straight Line which generated the Circle, is the Semidiameter or Radius; and any straight Line which passeth through the Center, and is terminated on both sides in the Circumference is called the Diameter. Moreover, every point of the Radius which describes the Circle, describes in the same time its own Perimeter, terminating its own Circle, which is said to be Concentrick to all the other Circles, because this and all those have one common Center.

Wherefore in every Circle, all Straight Lines from the Center to the Circumference are equal. For they are all coincident with the Radius which generates the Circle.

Also the Diameter divides both the Perimeter and the Circle it self into two equal parts. For if those two parts be applyed to one another, and the Semiperimeters be coincident, then seeing they have one common Diameter, they will be equal; and the Semicircles will be equal also; for these also will be coincident. But if the Semiperimeters be not coincident, then some one straight Line which passes through the Center (which Center is in the Diameter) will be cut by them in two points. Wherefore, seeing all the straight Lines from the Center to the Circumference are equal, a part of the same straight Line will be equal to the whole; which is impossible.

For the same reason the Perimeter of a Circle will be Uniform, that is, any one part of it will be coincident with any other equal part of the same.

5 From hence may be collected this property of a Straight Line, namely, that it is all conteined in that Plain which conteins both its extreme points. For seeing both its extreme points are in the Plain, that Straight Line which describes the Plain will pass through them both; and if one of them be made a Center, and at the distance between both, a Circumference be described, whose Radius is the Straight Line which describes the Plain, that Circumference will pass through the other point. Wherefore between the two propounded points, there is one straight line (by the Definition of a

Circle) conteined wholly in the propounded Plain; and therefore if another straight Line might be drawn between the same points, and yet not be conteined in the same Plain, it would follow, that between two points two straight lines may be drawn; which has been demonstrated to be impossible.

It may also be collected, That if two Plains cut one another, their common section will be a straight Line. For the two extreme points of the intersection are in both the intersecting Plains; and between those points a straight Line may be drawn; but a straight Line between any two points is in the same Plain in which the Points are; and seeing these are in both the Plains, the straight line which connects them will also be in both the same Plains, and therefore it is the co¯mon section of both. And every other Line that can be drawn between those points will be either coincident with that Line, that is, it will be the Same Line; or it will not be coincident; and then it wil be in neither, or but in one of those Plains.

As a straight Line may be understood to be moved round about whilest one end thereof remains fixed, as the Center; so in like manner it is easie to understand, that a Plain may be circumduced about a straight line, whilest the straight line remaines still in one and the same place, as the Axis of that motion. Now from hence it is manifest, that any three Points are in some one Plain. For as any two Points, if they be connected by a straight Line, are understood to be in the same Plaine in which the straight Line is; so, if that Plaine be circumduced about the same straight Line, it will in its revolution take in any third Point, howsoever it be situate; and then the three Points will be all in that Plaine; and consequently the three straight Lines which connect those Points, will also be in the same Plain.

6 Two Lines are said to Touch one another, which being both drawne to one and the same point, will not cut one another, though they be produced, produced I say in the same manner in which they were generated. And therefore if two straight Lines touch one another in any one point, they wil

be contiguous through their whole length. Also two Lines continually crooked wil do the same, if they be congruous, and be applyed to one another according to their congruity; otherwise, if they be incongruously applyed, they will, as all other crooked Lines, touch one another (where they touch) but in one point onely. Which is manifest from this, that there can be no congruity between a straight line and a line that is continually crooked; for otherwise the same line might be both straight and crooked. Besides when a straight line touches a crooked line, if the straight line be never so little moved about upon the point of contact, it will cut the crooked line; for seeing it touches it but in one point, if it incline any way, it will do more then touch it; that is, it will either be congruous to it, or it will cut it; but it cannot be congruous to it; and therefore it will cut it.

7 An Angle, according to the most general acception of the word, may be thus defined; When two Lines, or many Superficies concurre in one sole point, and diverge every where else, the quantity ofthat divergence is an ANGLE. And an Angle is of two sorts; for first it may be made by the concurrence of Lines, and then it is a Superficiall Angle; or by the concurrence of Superficies, and then it is called a Solid Angle.

Again, from the two wayes by which two lines may diverge from one another, Superficial Angles are divided into two kindes. For two straight lines which are applyed to one another, and are contiguous in their whole length, may be separated or pulied open in such manner, that their concurrence in one point will still remain; And this Separation or Opening may be either by Circular Motion, the Center whereof is their point of concurrence, and the Lines will still retain their straightness, the quantity of which Separation, or Divergence is an Angle simply so called; Or they may be separated by continual Flexion or Curvation in every imaginable point; and the quantity of this Separation is that which is called an Angle of Contingence.

Besides of Superficial Angles simply so called, those which are in a plain Superficies are Plain; and those which are not plain, are denominated from the Superficies in which they are

Lastly, those are Straight-lined Angles which are made by straight lines; as those which are made by crooked lines are Crooked-lined; and those which are made both of straight and crooked lines, are Mixed Angles.

8 Two Arches inter cepted between two Radii of Concentrick Circles, have the same proportion to one another, which their whole Perimeters have to one another. For let the point A (in the first Figure) be the Center of the two Circles B C D and E F G; in which the Radii A E B and A F C intercept the Arches B C and E F; I say the proportion of the Arch B C to the Arch E F, is the same with that of the Perimet B C D to the Perimerer er E F G. For if the Radius A F C be understood to be moved about the Center A with Circular & Uniform Motion, that is, with equal Swiftness every where, the point C will in a certain time describe the Perimeter B C D, and in a part of that time the Arch B C; and because the Velocities are equal by which both the Arch and the whole Perimeter are described, the proportion of the magnitude of the Perimeter B C D to the magnitude of the Arch B C, is determined by nothing but the difference of the times in which the Perimeter and the Arch are described. But both the Perimeters are described in one and the same time, and both the Arches in one and the same time; and therefore the proportions of the Perimeter B C D to the Arch B C, and of the Perimeter E F G to the Arch E F, are both determined by the same cause. Wherefore B C D, B C :: E F G. E F are Proportionals (by the 6 Art. of the last Chapter), and by Permutation B C D. E F G :: B C. E F will also be Proportionals, which was to be demonstrated.

9 Nothing is contributed towards the Quantity of an Angle, neither by the Length, nor by the Equality, nor by the Inequality of the lines which comprehend it. For the lines A B and A C comprehend the same Angle

which is comprehended by the lines A E and A F, or A B and A F. Nor is an Angle either increased or diminished by the absolute quantity of the Arch which subtends the same; for both the greater Arch B C, and the lesser Arch E F are subtended to the same Angle. But the quantity of an Angle is estimated by the quantity of the subtending Arch compared with the quantity of the whole Perimeter. And therefore the Quantity of an Angle simply so called may be thus defined.

The Quantity of an Angle, is an Arch or Circumference of a Circle, determined by its proportion to the whole Perimeter. So that when an Arch is intercepted between two straight lines drawn from the Center, look how great a portion that Arch is of the whole Perimeter, so great is the Angle. From whence it may be understood, that when the lines which contein an Angle are straight lines, the quantity of that Angle may be taken at any distance from the Center. But if one, or both of the conteining lines be crooked, then the quantity of the Angle is to be taken in the least distance from the Center, or from their concurrence; for the least distance is to be considered as a straight line, seeing no crooked line can be imagined so little, but that there may he a less straight line. And although the least straight line cannot be given, because the least given line may still be divided, yet we may come to a part so small, as is not at all considerable; which we call a Point. And this point may be understood to be in a straight line which touches a crooked line; for an Angle is generated by separating by circular motion one straight line from another which touches it, (as has been said above in the 7th Article). Wherefore an Angle which two crooked lines make is the same with that which is made by two straight lines which touch them.

10 From hence it follows, that Vertical Angles, such as are ABC, D B F (in the second Figure) are equal to one another. For if from the two Semiperimeters D A C, F D A which are equal to one another, the common

Arch D A be taken away, the remayning Arches A C, D F will be equal to one another.

Another distinction of Angles is, into Right and Oblique. A Right Angle is that, whose quantity is the fourth part of the Perimeter. And the lines which make a Right Angle are said to be Perpendicular to one another. Also of Oblique Angles, that which is greater then a Right, is called an Obtuse Angle; and that which is less, an Acute Angle. From whence it follows, that all the Angles that can possibly be made at one and the same Point, together taken, are equal to four Right Angles; because the quantities of them all put together make the whole Perimeter. Also, that all the Angles which are made on one side of a straight line from any one point taken in the same, are equal to two Right Angles; for if that point be made the Center, that straight line will be the Diameter of a Circle, by whose Circumference the quantity of an Angle is determined; and that Diameter will divide the Perimeter into two equal parts.

11 If a Tangent be made the Diameter of a Circle whose Center is the point of Contact, a straight line drawn from the Center of the former Circle to the Center of the later Circle, will make two Angles with the Tangent (that is, with the Diameter of the later Circle) equal to two Right Angles (by the last Article). And because (by the 6th Article) the Tangent has on both sides equal inclination to the Circle, each of them will be a Right Angle; as also the Semidiameter will be perpendicular to the same Tangent. Moreover, the Semidiameter, in as much as it is the Semidiameter, is the least straight line which can be drawn fro¯ the Center to the Tangent; and every other straight line that reaches the Tangent will pass out of the Circle, and will therefore be greater then the Semidiameter. In like manner, of all the straight lines which may be drawn from the Center to the Tangent, that is the greatest which makes the greatest Angle with the Perpenpicular; which will be manifest, if about the same Center another Circle be described,

whose Semidiameter is a straight line taken neerer to the Perpendicular, and there be drawn a Perpendicular (that is, a Tangent) to the same.

From whence it is also manifest, that if two straight lines which make equal Angles on either side of the Perpendicular, be produced to the Tangent, they will be equal.

12 There is in Euclide a Definition of Straight-lined Parallels; but I do not find that Parallels in general, are any where defined; and therefore for an Universal definition of them, I say, that Any two lines whatsoever (Straight or Crooked) as also any two Superficies, are PARALLEL, when two equal straight lines wheresoever they fall upon them, make always equal Angles with each of them. From which Definition it follows.

First, that any two straight lines not enclined opposite wayes, falling upon two other straight lines which are Parallel, and intercepting equal parts in both of them, are themselves also equal and Parallel. As if AB and CD (in the third Figure) enclined both the same way (fall upon the Parallels AC and BD, and AC and BD be equal, AB and CD will also be equal and Parallel. For the Perpendiculars BE and DF being drawn, the Right Angles EBD and FDH will be equal. Wherefore seeing EF and BD are parallel, the angles EBA and FDC will be equal. Now if DC be not equal to BA, let any other straight line equal to BA be drawn from the point D; which seeing it cannot fall upon the point C, let it fall upon G. Whereore AG will be either greater or less then BD; and therefore the angles EBA and FDG are not equal, as was supposed. Wherefore AB and CD are equal; which is the first.

Again, because they make equal Angles with the Perpendiculars BE and DF; therefore the Angle CDH will be equal to the Angle ABD, and (by the Definition of Parallels) AB and CD will be parallel; which is the second.

That Plain which is included both wayes within parallel lines is called a PARALLELOGRAM.

- 1 Corollary. From this last it follows, That the Angles ABD and CDH are equal; that is, that a straight line (as BH) falling upon two Parallels (as AB and CD) makes the internal Angle ABD equal to the external and opposite Angle CDH.
- 2 Coroll. And from hence again it follows, that a straight line falling upon two Parallels, makes the alternate Angles equal; that is, the Angle AGF (in the fourth figure) equal to the Angle GFD. For seeing GFD is equal to the external opposite Angle EGB, it will be also equal to its vertical Angle AGF, which is alternate to GFD.
- 3 Coroll. That the internal Angles on the same side of the line FG are equal to two Right Angles. For the Angles at F, namely GFC and GFD are equal to two Right Angles. But GFD is equal to its alternate Angle AGF. Wherefore both the Angles GFC and AGF which are internal on the same side of the line FG, are equal to two Right Angles.
- 4 Coroll. That the three Angles of a straight-lined plain Triangle are equal to two Right Angles; and any side being produced, the external Angle will be equal to the two opposite internal Angles. For if there be drawn by the Vertex of the plain Triangle ABC (figure 5.) a Parallel to any of the sides, as to AB, the Angles A and B will be equal to their alternate Angles E & F, & the Angle C is common. But (by the 10th Article) the three Angles E, C and F are equal to two Right Angles; and therefore the three Angles of the Triangle are equal to the same; which is the first. Again, the two Angles B and D are equal to two Right Angles (by the 10th Article). Wherefore taking away B, there will remain the Angles A and C equal to the Angle D; which is the second.

- 5 Coroll. If the Angles A and B be equal, the sides AC and CB will also be equal, because AB and EF are parallel; And on the contrary, if the sides AC and CB be equal, the Angles A and B will also be equal. For if they be not equal, let the Angles B and G be equal. Wherefore seeing GB and EF are parallels, and the Angles G and B equal, the sides GC and CB will also be equal; and because CB and AC are equal by supposition, CG and CA will also be equal; which cannot be (by the 11th Article.)
- 6 Coroll. From hence it is manifest, that if two Radii of a Circle be connected by a straight Line, the Angles they make with that connecting Line will be equal to one another; and if there be added that segment of the Circle which is subtended by the same line which connects the Radii, then the Angles which those Radii make with the circumference wil also be equal to one another. For a straight line which subtends any Arch, makes equal Angles with the same, because if the Arch and the Subtense be divided in the middle, the two halves of the segment wil be congruous to one another, by reason of the Uniformity both of the Circumference of the Circle and of the straight Line.

13 Perimeters of Circles are to one another as their Semidiameters are. For let there be any two Circles, as (in the first figure) BCD the greater, and EFG the lesser, having their common Center at A; and let their Semidiameters be AC and AE. I say AC has the same proportion to AE which the Perimeter BCD has to the Perimeter EFG. For the magnitude of the Semidiameters AC and AE is determined by the distances of the points C and E from the Center A; and the same distances are acquired by the uniform motion of a point from A to C in such manner that in equal times the distances acquired be equal. But the Perimeters BCD and EFG are also

determined by the same distances of the points C and E from the Center A; and therefore the Perimeters BCD and EFG, as well as the Semidiameters AC and AE have their magnitudes determined by the same cause, which cause makes in equal times equal spaces. Wherefore (by the 13 Chapter and 6th Article) the Perimeters of Circles and their Semidiameters are Proportionals; which was to be proved.

14 If two straight Lines w^{ch} co^{-}stitute an Angle, be cut by straightlined Parallels, the intercepted Parallels will be to one another, as the parts w^{ch} they cut off fro^{-} the Vertex. Let the straight lines AB and AC (in the 6 figure) make an Angle at A, & be cut by the two straight-lined Parallels BC and DE, so that the parts cut off from the Vertex in either of those Lines (as in AB) may be AB and AD. I say the Parallels BC and DE are to one another as the parts AB and AD. For let AB be divided into any number of equal parts, as into AF, FD, DB; and by the points F and D, let FG and DE be drawn Parallel to the base BC, and cut AC in G and E; and again by the points G and E let other straight lines be drawn Parallel to AB, and cut BC in H and I. If now the point A be understood to be moved uniformly over AB, and in the same time B be moved to C, and all the points F, D and B be moved uniformly and with equal Swiftness over FG, DE, and BC; then shall B pass over BH (equal to FG) in the same time that A passes over AF; and AF and FG will be to one another as their Velocities are; and when A is in F, D will be in K; when A is in D, D will be in E; and in what manner the point A passes by the points F, D and B, in the same manner the point B will pass by the points H, I and C; & the straight lines FG, DK, KE, BH, HI & IC are equal by reason of their Parallelisme; and therefore, as the velocitie in AB is to the velocity BC, so is AD to DE; but as the velocity in AB is to the velocity in BC, so is AB to BC; that is to say, all the Parallels will be severally to all the parts cut off from the Vertex, as AF is to FG. Wherefore, AF. GF:: AD. DE:: AB. BC are Proportionals.

The Subtenses of equal Angles in different Circles (as the straight lines BC and FE (in the 1 figure) are to one another as the Arches which they subtend. For (by the 8th Article) the Arches of equal Angles are to one another as their Perimeters are; and (by the 13th Art.) the Perimeters as their Semidiameters; But the the Subtenses BC and FE are parallel to one another by reason of the equality of the Angles which they make with the Semidiameters; and therefore the same Subtenses (by the last precedent Article) will be proportional to the Semidiameters, that is, to the Perimeters, that is, to the Arches which they subtend.

15 If in a Circle any number of equal Subtenses be placed immediatly after one another, and straight lines be drawn from the extreme point of the first Subtense to the extreme points of all the rest, The first Subtense being produced will make with the second Subtense an external Angle double to that which is made by the same first Subtense and a Tangent to the Circle touching it in the extreme point thereof; and if a straight line which subtends two of those Arches be produced, it will make an external Angle with the third Subtense, triple to the Angle which is made by the Tangent with the first Subtense; and so continually. For with the Radius AB (in the 7th figure) let a circle be described, & in it let any number of equal Subtenses BC, CD & DE be placed; also let BD & BE be drawn; & by producing BC, BD & BE to any distance in G, H and I, let them make Angles with the Subtenses which succeed one another, namely the external Angles GCD, and HDE. Lastly, let the Tangent KB be drawn, making with the first Subtense the Angle KBC. I say the Angle GCD is double to the Angle KBC, and the Angle HDE triple to the same Angle KBC. For if AC be drawn cutting BD in M, and from the point C there be drawn LC perpendicular to the same AC, then CL and MD will be parallel by reason of the right Angles at C and M; and therefore the alterne Angles LCD and BDC wil be equal; as also the Angles BDC and CBD will be equal because

of the equality of the straight lines BC and CD. Wherefore the Angle GCD is double to either of the Angles CBD or CDB; and therefore also the Angle GCD is double to the Angle LCD, that is, to the Angle KBC. Again, CD is parallel to BE by reason of the equality of the Angles CBE and DEB, and of the straight lines CB and DE; and therefore the Angles GCD and GBE are equal; and consequently GBE, as also DEB is double to the Angle KBC. But the external Angle HDE is equal to the two internal DEB and DBE; and therefore the Angle HDE is triple to the Angle KBC, &c. which was to be proved.

1 Corollary. From hence it is manifest, that the Angles KBC and CBD, as also, that all the Angles that are comprehended by two straight lines meeting in the circumference of a Circle and insisting upon equal Arches, are equal to one another.

2 Coroll. If the Tangent BK be moved in the Circumference with Uniform motion about the Center B, it will in equal times cut off equal Arches; and will pass over the whole Perimeter in the same time in which it self describes a semiperimeter about the Center B.

3 Coroll. From hence also we may understand what it is that determines the bending or Curvation of a straight line into the circumference of a Circle; namely, that it is Fraction continually encreasing in the same manner as Nu¯bers from One upwards encrease by the continual addition of Unity. For the indefinite straight Line KB being broken in B according to any Angle, as that of KBC, & again in C according to a double Angle, and in D according to an Angle which is triple, and in E according to an Angle which is quadruple to the first Angle, and so continually, there will be described a figure which will indeed be rectilineal if the broken parts be considered as having magnitude; but if they be understood to be the least that can, that is, as so many Points; then the figure described will not be rectilineal, but a Circle, whose Circumference was a broken line.

4 been said in this present Article it may Angle in the center is double to an Anglein the Circumference of the same Circle, if the intercepted Arches be equal. For seeing that straight Line by whose motion an Angle is determined, passes over equal Arches in equal times, as well from the

Center as from the Circumference; and while that which is from the Circumference is passing over half its own Perimeter, it passes in the same time over the whole Perimeter of that which is from the Center, the Arches w^{ch} it cuts off in the Perimeter whose Center is A, wil be double to those which it makes in its own Semiperimeter whose Center is B. But in equal Circles, as Arches are to one another, so also are Angles.

It may also be demonstrated that the external Angle made by a Subtense produced and the next equal Subtense, is equal to an Angle from the Center insisting upon the same Arch; As in the last Diagram, the Angle GCD is equal to the Angle CAD; For the external Angle GCD is double to the Angle CBD; and the Angle CAD insisting upon the same Arch CD, is also double to the same Angle CBD or KBC.

16 An Angle of Contingence, if it be compared with an Angle simply so called how little soever, has such proportion to it as a Point has to a Line; that is, no proportion at all, nor any quantity. For first, an Angle of co¯tingence is made by co¯tinual flexion, so that in the generation of it there is no circular motion at all, in which consists the nature of an Angle simply so called; and therefore it cannot be compared with it according to Quantity. Secondly, seeing the external Angle made by a Subtense produced and the next Subtense, is equal to an Angle from the Center insisting upon the same Arch (as in the last figure the Angle GCD is equal to the Angle CAD) the Angle of Contingence wil be equal to that Angle from the Center which is made by AB and the same AB; for no part of a Tangent can subtend any Arch; but as the point of Contact is to be taken for the Subtense, so the Angle of Contingence is to be accounted for the external Angle, and equal to that Angle whose Arch is the same point B.

Now seeing an Angle in general is defined to be the Opening of Divergence of two lines which concurre in one sole point; & seeing one Opening is greater then another, it ca¯not be denied but that by the very generation of it an Angle of Contingence is Quantity; for wheresoever there

is Greater and Less, there is also Quantity; but this quantity consists in greater and less Flexion; for how much the greater a Circle is, so much the neerer comes the Circumference of it to the nature of a straight Line; for the Circumference of a Circle being made by the curvation of a straight line, the less that straight line is, the greater is the curvation; & therfore when one straight line is a Tangent to many Circles, the Angle of Contingence which it makes with a less Circle is greater then that which it makes with a greater Circle.

Nothing therefore is added to, or taken from an Angle simply so called, by the addition to it or taking from it of never so many Angles of Contingence. And as an Angle of one sort can never be equal to an Angle of the other sort, so they cannot be either greater or less then one another.

From whence it follows, that an Angle of a Segment, that is, the Angle which any straight line makes with any Arch, is equal to the Angle which is made by the same straight line, & another which touches the Circle in the point of their Concurrence; as in the last figure, the Angle which is made between GB and BK is equal to that which is made between GB and the Arch BC.

17 An Angle which is made by two Plains, is commonly called the Inclination of those Plains; And because Plains have equal Inclination in all their parts, instead of their Inclination an Angle is taken which is made by two straight lines, one of which is in one, the other in the other of those Plains, but both perpendicular to the common Section.

18 A Solid Angle may be conceived two wayes. First, for the aggregate of all the Angles which are made by the motion of a straight line, while one extreme point thereof remayning fixed, it is carried about any plain figure in which the fixed point of the straight line is not conteined. And in this sense it seems to be understood by Euclide. Now it is manifest that the quantity of a Solid Angle so conceived is no other then the aggregate of all the Angles

in a Superficies so described, that is, in the Superficies of a Pyramidal Solid. Secondly, when a Pyramis or Cone has its Vertex in the Center of a Sphere, a Solid Angle may be understood to be the proportion of a Spherical Superficies subtending that Vertex, to the whole Superficies of the Sphere. In which sense solid Angles are to one another as the Spherical Bases of Solids which have their Vertex in the Center of the same Sphere.

19 All the wayes by which two lines respect one another, or all the variety of their position may be comprehended under four kindes; For any two lines whatsoever are either Parallels or being produced (if need be) or moved one of them to the other parallelly to it self, they make an Angle; or else (by the like production and motion) they Touch one another; or lastly, they are Asymptotes. The nature of Parallels, Angles and Tangents has been already declared. It remains that I speak briefly of the nature of Asymptotes.

Asymptosy depends upon this, that Quantity is infinitly divisible. And from hence it follows, that any line being given, and a Body supposed to be moved from one extreme thereof towards the other, it is possible (by taking degrees of Velocity alwayes lesse and lesse in such proportion as the parts of the Line are made lesse by continual division) that the same Body may be alwayes moved forwards in that Line, and yet never reach the end of it. For it is manifest that if any straight Line, as AF (in the 8th figure) be cut any where in B, and again BF be cut in C, and CF in D, and DF in E, and so eternally, and there be drawn from the point F the straight Line FF at any Angle AFF; and lastly, if the straight Lines AF, BF, CF, DF, EF, &c. having the same proportion to one another with the Segments of the Line AF, be set in order and parallel to the same AF, the crooked Line ABCDE and the straight Line FF will be Asymptotes, that is, they will alwayes come neerer and neerer together, but never touch one another. Now because any Line may be cut eternally according to the proportions which the Segments have to one another, therefore the divers kindes of Asymptotes are infinite in

number, and not necessary to be further spoken of in this place. In the nature of Asymptotes in general there is no more, then that they come still neerer and neerer but never touch. But in special in the Asymptosie of Hyperbolique Lines, it is understood they should approach to a distance lesse then any given quantity.

20 SITUATION is the relation of one place to another; & where there are many places, their Situation is determined by four things; By their Distances from one another; By several Distances from a place assigned; By the order of straight lines drawn from a place assigned to the places of them all; and by the Angles which are made by the lines so drawn. For if their Distances, Order, and Angles be given, that is, be certainly known, their several places will also be so certainly known, as that they can be no other.

21 Points, how many soever they be, have Like Situation with an equal number of other Points, when all the straight lines that are drawn from some one point to all these, have severally the same proportion to those that are drawn in the same order and at equal Angles from some one point to all those. For let there be any number of Points as A, B and C, (in the 9 figure), to which from some one point D let the straight Lines DA, DB and DC be drawn; and let there be an equal number of other Points as E, F and G, and from some point H let the straight Lines HE, HF and HG be drawn, so that the Angles ADB and BDC be severally and in the same order equal to the Angles EHF and FHG, and the straight Lines DA, DB and DC proportional to the straight Lines HE, HF and HG; I say the three points A, B and C, have Like Situation with the three points E, F & G, or are placed Alike. For if HE be understood to be layed upon DA, so that the point H be in D, the point F will be in the straight Line DB by reason of the equality of the Angles ADB and EHF; and the point G will be in the straight Line DC by reason of the equality of the Angles BDC and FHG; and the strright Lines

AB and EF, as also BC and FG will be parallel, because AD. ED :: BH. FH :: CD. GH are Proportionals by construction; and therefore the distances between the points A and B, and the points B and C, will be proportional to the distances between the points E and F, and the points F and G. Wherefore in the situation of the points A, B and C, and the situation of the points E, F and G the Angles in the same order are equal, so that their situations differ in nothing but the inequality of their distances from one another, and of their distances from the points D and H. Now in both the orders of Points those inequalities are equal; for AB. BC :: EF. FG, which are their distances from one another, as also DA. DB. DC :: HE. HF. HG which are their distances from the assumed points D and H, are Proportionals. Their difference therefore consists solely in the magnitude of their distances. But by the definition of Like (Cha. Art, 2) those things which differ onely in Magnitude are Like. Wherefore the points A, B and C have to one another Like Situation with the points E, F and G, or are placed Alike; which was to be proved.

FIGURE, is quantity determined by the Situation, or placing of all its extreme Points. Now I call those points Extreme which are contiguous to the place which is without the figure. In Lines therefore and Superficies all Points may be called Extreme, but in Solids onely those which are in the Superficies that includes them.

Like Figures, are those, whose extreme points in one of them, are all placed like all the extreme points in the other; for such Figures differ in nothing but Magnitude.

And like Figures are alike placed, when in both of them the homologal straight lines, that is, the straight lines which connect the points which answer one another are parallel, and have their proportional sides enclined the same way.

And seeing every Straight Line is like every other Straight Line, and every Plain like every other Plain when nothing but Plainness is considered; if the Lines which include Plains, or the Superficies which include Solids have their proportions known, it will not be hard to know whether any Figure be like or unlike to another propounded Figure.

And thus much concerning the First Grounds of Philosophy. The next place belongs to Geometry; in which the Quantities of Figures are sought out from the Proportions of Lines and Angles. Wherefore it is necessary for him that would study Geometry to know first what is the nature of Quantity, Proportion, Angle and Figure. Having therefore explained these in the three last Chapters, I thought fit to add them to this Part; and so passe to the next.

THE THIRD PART, OF THE PROPORTIONS OF MOTIONS AND MAGNITUDES.

CHAP. XV. OF THE NATURE, PROPERTIES, AND DIVERSE CONSIDERATIONS OF MOTION AND ENDEAVOUR.

1 REPETITION OF some Principles of the doctrine of Motion formerly set down.

2 Other Principles added to them.

3 Certain Theoremes concerning the nature of Motion.

4 Diverse Considerations of Motion

5 The way by which the first Endeavour of Bodies Moved sendoth.

6 In Motion which is made by Concourse, one of the Movents ceasing, the Endeavour is made by the way by which the rest tend.

7 The Endeavour of any Moved Body, which having its Motion in the Circumference of a Circle, parts from the same, proceeds afterwards in a straight line which toucheth the Circle.

8 How much greater, the Velocity or Magnitude is of a Movent, so much greater is the Efficacy thereof upon any other Body in its way.

1 THE next things in order to be treated of are MOTION and MAGNITUDE, which are the most common Accidents of all Bodies. This place therefore most properly belongs to the Elements of Geometry. But because this part of Philosophy having been improved by the best Wits of all Ages has afforded greater plenty of matter then can well be thrust together within the narrow limits of this discourse; I thought fit to admonish

the Reader, that before he proceed further, he take into his hands the Works of Euclide, Archimedes, Apollonius and other as well Ancient as Modern Writers. For to what end is it to do over again that which is already done? The little therefore that I shall say concerning Geometry in some of the following Chapters, shall be such onely as is new, and conducing to Natural Philosophy.

I have already delivered some of the Principles of this doctrine in the 8 & 9 Chapters, which I shall briefly put together here, that the Reader in going on may have their light neerer at hand.

First therefore in the 8th Chap. and 10 Article, Motion is defined to be the continual privation of one place, and acquisition of another.

Secondly, it is there shewn, that Whatsoever is Moved is Moved in Time.

Thirdly, in the same Cha. Article, I have defined Rest to be when a Body remains for some time in one place.

Fourthly, it is there shewn, that Whatsoever is Moved is not in any determined place; as also that the same has been Moved, is still Moved, and will yet be Moved; So that in every part of that Space in which Motion is made, we may consider three Times, namely the Past, the Present, and the Future Time.

Fiftly, in the 15 Article of the same Chapter, I have defined Velocity or Swiftness to be Motion considered as Power, namely, that Power by which a Body Moved may in a certain Time transmit a certain Length; which also may more briefly be enunciated thus, Velocity is the quantity of Motion determined by Time and Line.

Sixthly, in the same Cha. Article, I have shewn that Motion is the Measure of Time.

Seventhly, in the same Chath Art. I have defined Motions to be Equally Swift, when in Equal Times Equal Lengths are transmitted by them.

Eighthly, in the 18 Article of the same Chapter, Motions are defined to be Equal, when the Swiftness of one Moved Body computed in every part of its magnitude, is equal to the Swiftness of another computed also in every part of its magnitude. From whence it is to be noted, that Motions Equal to one another, and Motions Equally Swift, do not signifie the same thing; for when two horses draw abrest, the Motion of both is greater then the Motion of either of them singly; but the Swiftness of both together is but Equal to that of either.

Ninthly, in the 19 Article of the same Chapter, I have shewn, that Whatsoever is at Rest will alwayes be at Rest, unless there be some other Body besides it, which by getting into its place, suffers it no longer to remain at Rest. And that Whatsoever is Moved, will alwayes be Moved, unless there be some other Body besides it, which hinders its Motion.

Tenthly, In the 9 Chapter and 7 Article, I have demonstrated, that When any Body is moved which was formerly at Rest, the immediate efficient cause of that Motion is in some other Moved and Contiguous Body.

Eleventhly, I have shewn in the same place, that Whatsoever is Moved, will always be Moved in the same way, and with the same Swiftness, if it be not hindered by some other Moved and Contiguous Body.

2 To which Principles I shall here add these that follow. First, I define ENDEAVOUR to be Motion made in less Space and Time then can be given; that is, less then can be determined or assigned by Exposition or Number; that is, Motion made through the length of a Point, and in an Instant or Point of Time. For the explayning of which Definition it must be remembred, that by a Point is not to be understood that which has no quantity, or which cannot by any means be divided (for there is no such thing in Nature); but that whose quantity is not at all considered, that is, whereof neither quantity nor any part is computed in demonstration; so that a Point is not to be taken for an Indivisible, but for an Undivided thing; as

also an Instant is to be taken for an Undivided, and not for an Indivisible Time.

In like manner Endeavour is to be conceived as Motion; but so, as that neither the quantity of the Time in which, nor of the Line in which it is made may in demonstration be at all brought into comparison with the quantity of that Time, or of that Line of which it is a part. And yet, as a Point may be compared with a Point, so one Endeavour may be compared with another Endeavour, and one may be found to be greater or lesse then another. For if the Vertical points of two Angles be compared, they will be equal or unequal in the same proportion which the Angles themselves have to one another. Or if a straight Line cut many Circumferences of Concentrick Circles, the inequality of the points of intersection will be in the same proportion which the Perimeters have to one another. And in the same manner, if two Motions begin and end both together, their Endeavours will be Equal or Unequal according to the proportion of their Velocities; as we see a bullet of Lead descend with greater Endeavour then a ball of Wooll,

Secondly, I define IMPETUS or Quickness of Motion, to be the Swiftness or Velocity of the Body moved, but considered in the several points of that time in which it is moved; In which sense Impetus is nothing else but the quantity or velocity of Endeavour. But considered with the whole time, it is the whole velocity of the Body moved, taken together throughout all the time, and equal to the Product of a Line representing the time multiplyed into a Line representing the arithmetically mean Impetus or Quickness. Which Arithmetical Mean what it is, is defined in the 29th Article of the 13th Chapter.

And because in equal times the wayes that are passed are as the Velocities, and the Impetus is the Velocity they go withal reckoned in all the several points of the times, it followeth that during any time whatsoever,

howsoever the Impetus be encreased or decreased, the length of the way passed over shall be encreased or decreased in the same proportion; and the same Line shall represent both the way of the Body moved, and the several Impetus or degrees of Swiftness wherewith the way is passed over.

And if the Body moved be not a point, but a straight line moved so as that every point thereof make a several straight line, the Plain described by its motion, whether Uniform, Accelerated or Retarded, shall be greater or less (the time being the same) in the same proportion with that of the Impetus reckoned in one motion to the Impetus reckoned in the other. For the reason is the same in Parallelograms and their Sides,

For the same cause also if the Body moved be a Plain, the Solid described shall be still greater or less in the proportions of the several Impetus or Quicknesses reckoned through one Line, to the several Impetus reckoned through another.

This understood, let ABCD (in the first figure of the 17th Chapter) be a Parallelogram; in which suppose the side AB to be moved parallelly to the opposite side CD, decreasing al the way till it vanish in the point C, and so describing the figure ABEFC; the point B as AB decreaseth, will therefore describe the Line BEFC; and suppose the time of this motion designed by the line CD; and in the same time CD suppose the side AC to be moved parallelly and uniformly to BD. From the point O taken at adventure in the Line CD, draw OR parallel to BD, cutting the Line BEFC in E, and the side AB in R. And again from the point Q taken also at adventure in the Line CD, draw QS parallel to BD, cutting the Line BEFC in F, and the side AB in S; and draw EG and FH parallel to CD, cutting AC in G and H. Lastly, suppose the same construction done in all the points possible of the Line BEFC. I say, that as the proportions of the Swiftnesses wherewith QF, OE, DB, and all the rest supopsed to be drawn parallel to DB, and terminated in the Line BEFC, are to the proportions of their several Times designed by

the several parallels HF, GE, AB and all the rest supposed to be drawn parallel to the Line of time CD, and terminated in the Line BEFC (the aggregate to the aggregate) so is the Area or Plain DBEFC to the Area or Plain ACFEB. For as AB decreasing continually by the line BEFC vanisheth in the time CD into the point C, so in the same time the line DC continually decreasing vanisheth by the same line CFEB into the point B; and the point D describeth in that decreasing motion the line DB equall to the line AC described by the point A in the decreasing motion of A & B; & their swiftnesses are therefore equal. Again, because in the time GE the point O describeth the line OE, and in the same time the point R describeth the line RE, the line OE shall be to the line RE, as the swiftness wherewith OE is described to the swiftness wherwith RE is described. In like ma¯ner, because in the same time HF the point Q describeth the Line QF, and the point S the Line SF, it shall be as the swiftness by which QF is described to the swiftness by which SF is described, so the Line it self QF to the Line it self SF; and so in all the Lines that can possibly be drawn parallel to BD in the points where they cut the Line BEFC. But all the parallels to BD, as RE, SF, AC and the rest that can possibly be drawn from the Line AB to the Line BEFC make the Area of the Plain ABEFC; and all the parallels to the same BD, as QF, OE, DB & the rest drawn to the points where they cut the same Line BEFC make the Area of the Plain BEFCD. As therefore the aggregate of the Swiftnesses wherwith the Plain BEFCD is described is to the aggregate of the Swiftnesses wherewith the Plain ACFEB is described, so is the Plain it self BEFCD to the Plain it self ACFEB. But the aggregate of the Times represented by the parallels AB, GE, HF and the rest, maketh also the Area ACFEB. And therefore as the aggregate of all the Lines QF, OE, DB and all the rest of the Lines parallel to BD and terminated in the Line BEFC is to the aggregate of all the Lines HF, GE, AB and all the rest of the Lines parallel to CD & terminated in the same Line BEFC; that is, as

the aggregate of the Lines of Swiftness to the aggregate of the lines of Time, or as the whole Swiftness in the parallels to DB to the whole Time in the parallels to CD, so is the Plain BEFCD to the Plain ACFEB. And the proportions of QF to FH, and of OE to EG, and of DB to BA, and so of all the rest taken together, are the proportion of the Plain DBEFC to the Plain ABEFC. But the Lines QF, OE, DB and the rest are the Lines that designe the Swifness; and the Lines HF, GE, AB & the rest are the Lines that designe the Times of the motions; and therefore the proportion of the Plain DBEFC to the Plain ABEFC is the proportions of all the Velocities taken together, to all the Times taken together. Wherefore as the proportions of the Swiftnesses, &c. which was to be demonstrated.

The same holds also in the diminution of the Circles whereof the lines of Time are the Semidiameters, as may easily be conceived by imagining the whole Plain ABCD turned round upon the Axis BD; for the Line BEFC will be every where in the Superficies so made, and the Lines HG, GE, AB which here are Parallelograms will be there Cylinders, the Diameters of whose bases are the lines HF, GE, AB, &c. and the Altitude a point, that is to say, a quantity less then any quantity that can possibly be named; and the Lines QF, OE, DB, &c. small solids whose lengths and breadths are less then any quantity that can be named.

But this is to be noted, that unless the proportion of the summe of the Swiftnesses to the proportion of the summe of the Times be determined, the proportion of the Figure DBEFC to the Figure ABEFC cannot be determined.

Thirdly, I define RESISTANCE to be the endeavour of one moved Body, either wholly or in part contrary to the endeavour of another moved Body, which toucheth the same. I say wholly contrary, when the endeavour of two Bodies proceeds in the same straight Line from the opposite extremes, and contrary in part, when two Bodies have their endeavour in two Lines, which

proceeding from the extreme points of a straight Line, meet without the same.

Fourthly, that I may define what it is to PRESSE, I say that Of two moved Bodies one Presses the other, when with its Endeavour it makes either all or part of the other Body to go out of its place.

Fifthly, A Body which is pressed and not wholly removed is said to RESTORE it self, when (the pressing Body being taken away) the parts which were moved, do by reason of the internal constitution of the pressed Body, return every one into its own place. And this we may observe in Springs, in blown Bladders, and in many other Bodies, whose parts yeild more or less to the Endeavour which the pressing Body makes at the first arrival; but afterwards (when the pressing Body is removed) they do by some force within them Restore themselves, and give their whole Body the same figure it had before.

Sixthly, I define FORCE to be the Impetus or Quickness of Motion multiplyed either into it self, or into the Magnitude of the Movent, by means wherof the said Movent works more or less upon the Body that resists it.

3 Having premised thus much, I shal now demonstrate, First, That if a point moved come to touch another point which is at rest, how little soever the Impetus or quickness of its motion be, it shall move that other point. For if by that Impetus it do not at all move it out of its place, neither shall it move it, with double the same Impetus; for nothing doubled is still nothing; and for the same reason it shall never move it with that Impetus how many times soever it be multiplyed, because nothing how soever it be multiplyed will for ever be nothing. Wherefore when a point is at rest, if it do not yeild to the least Impetus, it will yeild to none, and consequently it will be impossible that that which is at rest should ever be moved.

Secondly, that when a point moved, how little soever the Impetus thereof be, falls upon a point of any Body at rest, how hard soever that Body be, it will at the first touch make it yeild a little. For if it do not yeild to the Impetus which is in that point, neither will it yeild to the Impetus of never so many points, which have all their Impetus severally equal to the Impetus of that point. For seeing all those points together work equally, if any one of them have no effect, the aggregate of them all together shall have no effect as many times told as there are points in the whole Body, that is, still no effect at all; and by consequent there would be some Bodies so hard that it would be impossible to break them; that is, a finite hardnesse, or a finite force would not yeild to that which is infinite; which is absurd.

Corollary. It is therefore manifest, that Rest does nothing at all, nor is of any efficacy; and that nothing but Motion gives Motion to such things as be at Rest, and takes it from things moved,

Thirdly, that Cessation in the Movent does not cause Cessation in that which was moved by it. For (by the 11th Number of the 1 Article of this Chapter) whatsoever is moved, persevers in the same way, & with the same Swiftness, as long as it is not hindered by some thing that is moved against it. Now it is manifest, that Cessation is not contrary Motion; and therefore it follows, that the standing still of the Movent, does not make it necessary that the thing moved should also stand still.

Corollary. They are therefore deceived, that reckon the taking away of the impediment or resistance, for one of the causes of Motion.

4 Motion is brought into account for divers respects; First, as in a Body Undivided, (that is, considered as a point); or, as in a Divided Body. In an Undivided Body, when we suppose the way by which the Motion is made, to be a Line; and in a Divided Body, when we compute the Motion of the several parts of that Body, as of Parts.

Secondly, From the diversity of the regulation of Motion, it is in a Body considered as Undivided, sometimes Uniform, and sometimes Multiform. Uniform is that by which equal Lines are alwayes transmitted in equal times; & Multiform, when in one time more, in another time less space is transmitted. Again, of Multiform Motions, there are some in which the degrees of Acceleration and Retardation proceed in the same proportions which the Spaces transmitted have, whether duplicate, or triplicate, or by whatsoever number multiplyed; and others in which it is otherwise.

Thirdly, from the number of the Movents; that is, one Motion is made by one Movent onely, and another by the concourse of many Movents.

Fourthly, from the position of that Line in which a Body is moved, in respect of some other Line; and from hence one Motion is called Perpendicular, another Oblique, another Parallel.

Fifthly, from the position of the Movent in respect of the Moved Body; from whence one Motion is Pulsion or Driving; another Traction or Drawing. PULSION, when the Movent makes the Moved Body goe before it; and TRACTION, when it makes it follow. Again, there are two sorts of Pulsion; one, when the motions of the Movent and Moved Body begin both together, which may be called TRUSION or Thrusting and VECTION; the other, when the Movent is first moved, and afterwards the Moved Body, which Motion is called PERCUSSION or Stroke.

Sixthly, Motion is considered sometimes from the Effect onely which the Movent works in the Moved Body, which is usually called Moment. Now MOMENT is the Excess of Motion which the Movent has, above the Motion or Endeavour of the Resisting Body.

Seventhly, it may be considered from the diversity of the Medium; as one Motion may be made in Vacuity or empty Place; another in a fluid; another in a consistent Medium, that is, a Medium whose parts are by some

power so consistent and cohering, that no part of the same will yeild to the Movent, unless the whole yeild also.

Eighthly, when a Moved Body is considered as having parts, there arises another distinction of Motion into Simple and Compounded. Simple, when all the several parts describe several equal lines; Compounded, when the lines described are Unequal.

5 All Endeavour tends towards that part, that is to say, in that way which is determined by the Motion of the Movent, if the Movent be but one; or, if there be many Movents, in that way which their concourse determines. For example, if a Moved Body have direct Motion, its first Endeavour will be in a Straight line; if it have Circular Motion, its first Endeavour will be in the Circumference of a Circle; & whatsoever the line be in which a Body has its Motion from the concourse of two Movents, as soon as in any point thereof the force of one of the Movents ceases, there immediately the former Endeavour of that Body will be changed into an Endeavour in the line of the other Movent.

6 Wherefore, when any Body is carried on by the concourse of two Winds, one of those Winds ceasing, the Endeavour and Motion of that Body will be in that line, in which it would have been carried by that Wind alone which blows still. And in the describing of a Circle, where that which is moved has its Motion determined by a Movent in a Tangent, and by the Radius which keeps it in a certain distance from the Center, if the retention of the Radius cease, that Endeavour which was in the Circumference of the Circle, will now be in the Tangent, that is, in a Straight line. For seeing Endeavour is computed in a lesse part of the Circumference then can be given, that is, in a point, the way by which a Body is moved in the Circumference is compounded of innumerable Straight lines; of which every one is less then can be given, which are therefore called Points. Wherefore when any Body which is moved in the Circumference of a

Circle, is freed from the retention of the Radius, it will proceed in one of those Straight lines, that is, in a Tangent.

7 All Endeavour, whether strong or weak, is propagated to infinite distance; for it is Motion. If therefore the first Endeavour of a Body be made in Space which is empty, it will alwayes proceed with the same Velocity; for it cannot be supposed that it can receive any resistance at all from empty Space; and therefore (by the 7 Article of the 9 Chapter) it will alwayes proceed in the same way and with the same Swiftness. And if its Endeavour be in Space which is filled, yet seeing Endeavour is Motion, that which stands next in its way shall be removed, and endeavour further, and again remove that which stands next, & so infinitely. Wherefore the propagation of Endeavour from one part of full Space to another, proceeds infinitely. Besides, it reaches in any instant to any distance, how great soever; For in the same instant in which the first part of the full Medium removes that which is next it, the second also removes that part which is next to it; and therefore all Endeavour, whether it be in empty or in full Space, proceeds not onely to any distance how great soever, but also in any time how little soever, that is, in an instant. Nor makes it any matter, that Endeavour by proceeding growes weaker and weaker, till at last it can no longer be perceived by Sense; for Motion may be insensible; and I do not here examine things by Sense and Experience, but by Reason.

8 When two Movents are of equal Magnitude, the swifter of them works with greater force then the slower upon a Body that resists their Motion. Also if two Movents have equal Velocity, the greater of them works with more force then the less. For where the Magnitude is equal, the Movent of greater Velocity makes the greater impression upon that Body upon which it falls; and where the Velocity is equal, the Movent of greater Magnitude falling upon the same point, or an equal part of another Body, loses less of its Velocity, because the resisting Body works onely upon that part of the

Movent which it touches, and therefore abates the Impetus of that part onely, whereas in the mean time the parts which are not touched proceed, and retein their whole force till they also come to be touched, and their force has some effect. Wherfore (for example) in Batteries, a longer then a shorter piece of Timber of the same thickness and velocity, and a thicker then a slenderer piece of the same length and velocity, works a greater effect upon the Wall.

CHAP. XVI. OF MOTION ACCELERATED AND VNIFORM, AND OF MOTION BY CONCOURSE.

1 THE VELOCITY of any Body, in what Time soever it be computed, is that which is made of the multiplication of the Impetus, or Quickness of its Motion into the Time. 2, &c. In all Motion, the Lengths which are passed through, are to one another, as the Products made by the Impetus multipyed into the Time.

6 If two Bodies be moved with Uniform Motion through two Lengths, the proportion of those Lengths to one another will be compounded of the proportions of Time to Time, and Impetus to Impetus, directly taken.

7 If two Bodies pass through two Lengths with Uniform Motion, the proportion of their Times to one another will be compounded of the proportions of Length to Length and Impetus to Impetus, reciprocally taken; also the proportion of their Impetus to one another will be compounded of the proportions of Length to Length and Time to Time, reciprocally taken.

8 If a Body be carried on with Uniform Motion by two Movents together, which meet in an Angle, the line by which it passes will be a straight line subtending the complement of that Angle to two right Angles. 9, &c. If a Body be carried by two Movents together, one of them being moved with Uniform, the other with Accelerated Motion, and the proportion of their Lengths to their Times being explicable in numbers, How to find out what line that Body describes.

1 THE Velocity of any Body, in whatsoever Time it be moved, has its quantity determined by the sum of all the several Quicknesses or Impetus which it hath in the several points of the Time of the Bodies Motion. For seeing Velocity (by the Definition of it Cha. Art. 15.) is that Power by which a Body can in a certain time pass through a certain length; and

Quickness of Motion, or Impetus (by the 15 Chap. Artic. 2. Numb. 2.) is Velocity taken in one point of time onely, all the Impetus together taken in all the points of time, will be the same thing with the Mean Impetus multiplyed into the whole Time, or which is all one, will be the Velocity of the whole Motion.

Corollary. If the Impetus be the same in every point, any straight line representing it may be taken for the measure of Time; and the Quicknesses or Impetus applyed ordinately to any straight line making an Angle with it, and representing the way of the Bodies motion, will designe a parallelogram which shall represent the Velocity of the whole Motion. But if the Impetus or Quickness of Motion begin from Rest, and increase Uniformly, that is, in the same proportion continually with the times which are passed, the whole. Velocity of the Motion shall be represented by a Triangle, one side whereof is the whole time, and the other the greatest Impetus acquired in that time; or else by a parallelogram, one of whose sides is the whole time of Motion, and the other, half the greatest Impetus; or lastly by a parallelogram having for one side a mean proportional between the whole time & the half of that time, & for the other side the half of the greatest Impetus. For both these parallelograms are equal to one another, & severally equal to the triangle which is made of the whole line of time, and the greatest acquired Impetus; as is demonstrated in the Elements of Geometry.

2 In all Uniform Motions the Lengths which are transmitted are to one another, as the product of the mean Impetus multiplyed into its time, to the product of the mean Impetus multiplyed also into its time.

For let AB (in the first Figure) be the Time, and AC the Impetus by which any Body passes with Uniform Motion through the Length DE; & in any part of the time AB, as in the time AF, let another Body be moved with Uniform Motion, first, with the same Impetus AC. This Body therefore in the time AB with the Impetus AC will pass through the length AF. Seeing

therefore, when Bodies are moved in the same Time, & with the same Velocity & Impetus in every part of their motion, the proportion of one Length transmitted to another Length tra¯smitted, is the same wth that of Time to Time, it followeth, that the Length transmitted in the time AB with the Impetus AC will be to the Length transmitted in the time AF with the same Impetus AC, as AB it self is to AF, that is, as the parallelogram AI is to the parallelogram AH, that is, as the product of the time AB into the mean Impetus AC is to the product of the time AF into the same Impetus AC. Again, let it be supposed that a Body be moved in the time AF, not with the same but with some other Uniform Impetus, as A L. Seeing therfore one of the Bodies has in all the parts of its motion the Impetus A C, and the other in like manner the Impetus A L, the Length tra¯smitted by the Body moved with the Impetus A C will be to the Length transmitted by the Body moved with the Impetus A L, as A C it self is to A L, that is, as the parallelogram A H is to the parallelogram F L. Wherefore, by ordinate proportion it will be, as the parallelogram A I to the parallelogram F L, that is, as the product of the mean Impetus into the Time is to the product of the mean Impetus into the Time, so the Length transmitted in the time A B with the Impetus A C, to the length transmitted in the time A F with the Impetus, A L; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. Seeing therefore in Uniform Motion (as has been shewn) the Lengths transmitted are to one another as the parallelograms which are made by the multiplication of the mean Impetus into the Times, that is, (by reason of the equality of the Impetus all the way) as the Times themselves, it will also be by permutation, as to Time to Length, so Time to Length; and in general, to this place are applicable all the properties and transmutations of Analogismes which I have set down and demonstrated in the 13 Chapter.

3 In Motion begun from Rest, and Uniformly Accelerated (that is, where the Impetus encreaseth continually according to the proportion of the

Times) it will also be, as one product made by the Mean Impetus multiplyed into the Time, to another product made likewise by the Mean Impetus multiplyed into the Time, so the Length transmitted in the one Time, to the Length transmitted in the other Time.

For let A B (in the same 1 figure) represent a Time; in the beginning of which Time A, let the Impetus be as the point A; but as the Time goes on, so let the Impetus encrease Uniformly till in the last point of that Time A B, namely in B, the Impetus acquired be B I. Again, let A F represent another Time, in whose beginning A, let the Impetus be as the point it self A; but as the Time proceeds, so let the Impetus encrease Uniformly till in the last point F of the Time A F the Impetus acquired be F K; and let D E be the Length passed through in the Time A B with Impetus Uniformly encreased. I say the Length D E, is to the Length transmitted in the Time A F, as the Time A B multiplyed into the Mean of the Impetus encreasing through the time A B, is to the Time A F multiplyed into the Mean of the Impetus encreasing through the time A F.

For seeing the Triangle A B I is the whole Velocity of the Body moved in the Time A B till the Impetus acquired be B I; and the Triangle A F K the whole Velocity of the Body moved in the Time A F with Impetus encreasing till there be acquired the Impetus F K; the Length D E to the Length acquired in the Time A F with Impetus encreasing from Rest in A till there be acquired the Impetus F K, will be as the Triangle A B I to the Triangle A F K, that is, if the Triangles A B I and A F K be like, in duplicate proportion of the Time A B to the Time A F; but if unlike, in the proportion compounded of the proportions of A B to B I, & of A K to A F. Wherefore, as A B I is to A F K, so let D E be to D P; for so, the Length transmitted in the Time A B with Impetus encreasing to B I, will be to the Length transmitted in the Time A F with Impetus encreasing to F K, as the triangle A B I is to the triangle A F K; But the triangle A B I is made by the

multiplication of the Time A B into the Mean of the Impetus encreasing to B I, and the triangle A F K is made by the multiplication of the Time A F into the Mean of the Impetus encreasing to F K; and therefore the Length D E which is transmitted in the Time A B with Impetus encreasing to B I, to the Length D P which is transmitted in the Time A F with Impetus encreasing to F K, is as the product which is made of the Time A B multiplyed into its mean Impetus, to the product of the Time A F multiplyed also into its mean Impetus; which was to be proved.

- Corol. 1 In Motion Uniformly accelerated, the proportion of the Lengths transmitted, to that of their Times, is compounded of the proportions of their Times to their Times and Impetus to Impetus.
- Corol. 2 In Motion Uniformly accelerated, the Lengths transmitted in equal times taken in continual succession from the beginning of Motion, are as the differences of square numbers beginning from Unity, namely, as 3, 5, 7, &c. For if in the first time the Length transmitted be as 1, in the first and second times the Length transmitted will be as 4, which is the Square of 2, and in the three first times, it will be as 9, which is the Square of 3, and in the four first times as 16, and so on. Now the differences of these Squares are 3, 5, 7, &c.
- Corol. 3 In Motion Uniformly accelerated from Rest, the Length transmitted, is to another Length transmitted vniformly in the same Time, but with such Impetus as was acquired by the accelerated Motion in the last point of that Time, as a triangle to a parallelogram which have their altitude and base common. For seeing the Length D E (in the same 1 figure) is passed through with Velocity as the triangle A B I, it is necessary that for the passing through of a Length which is double to D E, the

Velocity be as the parallelogram A I; for the parallelogram A I is double to the triangle A B I.

4 In Motion which beginning from Rest, is so accelerated, that the Impetus thereof encrease continually in proportion duplicate to the proportion of the times in which it is made, a Length transmitted in one time will be to a Length transmitted in another time, as the product made by the Mean Impetus multiplyed into the time of one of those Motions, to the product of the Mean Impetus multiplyed into the time of the other Motion.

For let A B (in the 2d. figure) represent a Time, in whose first instant A let the Impetus be as the point A; but as the time proceeds, so let the Impetus encrease continually in duplicate proportion to that of the times, till in the last point of time B the Impetus acquired be B I; then taking the point F any where in the time A B, let the Impetus F K acquired in the time A F be ordinately applyed to that point F. Seeing therefore the proportion of F K to B I is supposed to be duplicate to that of A F to A B, the proportion of A F to A B will be subduplicate to that of F K to B I; and that of A B to A F will be (by Cha. Article 16) duplicate to that of B I to F K, and consequently the point K will be in a parabolical line whose diameter is A B and base B I; and for the same reason, to what point soever of the time A B the Impetus acquired in that time be ordinately applyed, the straight line designing that Impetus will be in the same parabolical line A K I. Wherefore the mean Impetus multiplyed into the whole time A B will be the Parabola A K I B, equal to the parallelogram A M, which parallelogram has for one side the line of time A B and for the other the line of the Impetus A L, which is two thirds of the Impetus B I; for every Parabola is equal to two thirds of that parallelogram with which it has its altitude and base common. Wherefore the whole Velocity in A B will be the parallelogram A M, as being made by the multiplication of the Impetus A L into the time A B. And in like manner, if F N be taken, which is two thirds

of the Impetus F K, and the parallelogram F O be completed, F O will be the whole Velocity in the time A F, as being made by the Uniform Impetus A O or F N multiplyed into the time A F. Let now the length transmitted in the time A B and with the Velocity A M be the straight line D E; and lastly, let the Length transmitted in the time A F with the Velocity A N, be D P; I say that as A M is to A N, or as the Parabola A K I B to the Parabola A F K, so is D E to D P. For as A M is to F L (that is, as A B is to A F) so let D E be to D G. Now the proportion of A M to A N is compounded of the proportions of A M to F L, and of F L to A N. But as A M to F L, so (by construction) is D E to D G; and as F L is to A N (seeing the time in both is the same, namely, A F), so is the Length D G to the Length D P; for Lengths transmitted in the same time are to one another as their Velocities are. Wherefore by ordinate proportion, as A M is to A N, that is, as the mean Impetus A L multiplyed into its time A B, is to the mean Impetus A O multiplyed into A F, so is D E to D P; which was to be proved.

- Corol. 1 Lengths transmitted with Motion so accelerated that the Impetus encrease continually in duplicate proportion to that of their times, if the base represent the Impetus, are in triplicate proportion of their Impetus acquired in the last point of their times. For as the Length D E is to the Length D P, so is the parallelogram A M to the parallelogram A N, and so the Parabola A B I K to the Parabola A F K; But the proportion of the Parabola A B I K to the Parabola A F K is triplicate to the proportion which the base B I has to the base F K. Wherefore also the proportion of D E to D P, is triplicate to that of B I to F K.

- Corol. 2 Lengths transmitted in equal Times succeeding one another from the beginning, by Motion so accelerated, that the

proportio¯ of the Impetus be duplicate to the proportio¯ of the times, are to one another as the differences of Cubique Numbers beginning at Unity, that is, as 7, 19, 37, &c. For if in the first time the Length transmitted be as 1, the Length at the end of the second time will be as 8, at the end of the third time as 27, and at the end of the fourth time as 64, &c. which are Cubique Numbers, whose differences are 7, 19, 37, &c.

- Corol. 3 In Motion so accelerated, as that the Length transmitted be alwayes to the Length transmitted in duplicate proportion to their Times, the Length Uniformly transmitted in the whole time and with Impetus all the way equal to that which is last acquired, is as a Parabola to a parallelogram of the same altitude & base, that is, as 2 to 3. For the Parabola A B I K is the Impetus encreasing in the time A B; and the parallelogram A I is the greatest Uniform Impetus multiplyed into the same time A B. Wherefore the Lengths transmitted will be as a Parabola to a parallelogram &c. that is, as 2 to 3.

5 If I should proceed to the explication of such Motions as are made by Impetus encreasing in proportion triplicate, quadruplicate, quintuplicate, &c. to that of their times, it would be a labour infinite and unnecessary. For by the same method by which I have computed such Lengths as are transmitted with Impetus encreasing in single and duplicate proportion, any man may compute such as are transmitted with Impetus encreasing in triplicate, quadruplicate or what other proportion he pleases.

In making which computation he shall finde, that where the Impetus encrease in proportion triplicate to that of the times, there the whole Velocity will be designed by the first Parabolaster (of which see the next Chapter); and the Lengths transmitted will be in proportion quadruplicate to

that of the times. And in like manner, where the Impetus encrease in quadruplicate proportion to that of the times, that there the whole Velocity will be designed by the second Parabolaster, and the Lengths transmitted will be in quintuplicate proportion to that of the times; and so on continually.

6 If two Bodies with Uniform Motion transmit two Lengths, each with its own Impetus and Time, the proportion of the Lengths transmitted will be compounded of the proportions of Time to Time, and Impetus to Impetus, directly taken.

Let two Bodies be moved Uniformly (as in the 3d figure) One in the time A B with the Impetus A C, the other in the time A D with the Impetus A E. I say the Lengths transmitted have their proportion to one another compounded of the proportions of A B to A D, and of A C to A E. For let any Length whatsoever, as Z, be transmitted by one of the Bodies in the time A B with the Impetus A C; and any other Length, as X, be transmitted by the other Body in the time A D with the Impetus A E; and let the parallelograms A F and A G be completed. Seeing now Z is to X (by the 2d Article) as the Impetus A C multiplyed into the time A B is to the Impetus A E multiplyed into the time A D, that is, as A F to A G; the proportion of Z to X will be compounded of the same proportions, of which the proportion of A F to A G is compounded; But the proportion of A F to A G is compounded of the proportions of the side A B to the side A D, and of the side A C to the side A E (as is evident by the Elements of Euclide), that is, of the proportions of the time A B to the time A D, and of the Impetus A C to the Impetus A E. Wherefore also the proportion of Z to X is compounded of the same proportions of the time A B to the time A D, and of the Impetus A C to the Impetus A E; which was to be demonstrated.

- Corol. 1 When two Bodies are moved with Uniform Motion, if the Times and Impetus be in reciprocal proportion, the Lengths

transmitted shall be equal. For if it were as A B to A D (in the same 3d figure) so reciprocally A E to A C, the proportion of A F to A G would be compounded of the proportions of A B to A D and of A C to A E, that is, of the proportions of A B to A D and of A D to A B. Wherefore, A F would be to A G as A B to A B, that is equal; and so the two products made by the multiplication of Impetus into Time would be equal; and by consequent, Z would be equal to X.

- Corol. 2 If two Bodies be moved in the same Time, but with different Impetus, the Lengths transmitted will be as Impetus to Impetus. For if the Time of both of them be A D, and their different Impetus be A E and A C, the proportion of A G to D C will be compounded of the proportions of A E to A C and of A D to A D, that is, of the proportions of A E to A C and of A C to A C; and so the proportion of A G to D C, that is, the proportion of Length to Length will be as A E to A C, that is, as that of Impetus to Impetus. In like manner, if two Bodies be moved Uniformly, and both of them with the same Impetus, but in different times, the proportion of the Lengths transmitted by them will be as that of their times. For if they have both the same Impetus A C, and their different times be A B & A D, the proportion of A F to D C will be compounded of the proportions of A B to A D and of A C to A C; that is, of the proportions of A B to A D and of A D, to A D; and therefore the proportion of A F to D C, that is, of Length to Length, will be the same with that of A B to A D, which is the proportion of Time to Time.

7 If two Bodies pass through two Lengths with Uniform Motion, the proportion of the Times in which they are moved will be compounded of

the proportions of Length to Length and Impetus to Impetus reciprocally taken.

For let any two Lengths be given, as (in the same 3d figure) Z and X, and let one of them be transmitted with the Impetus A C, the other with the Impetus A E. I say the proportion of the Times in which they are transmitted, will be compounded of the proportions of Z to X, and of A E (which is the Impetus with which X is transmitted) to A C (the Impetus with which Z is transmitted.) For seeing A F is the product of the Impetus A C multiplyed into the Time A B, the time of Motion through Z will be a line w^{ch} is made by the applicatio$^{\bar{}}$ of the parallelogram A F to the straight line A C, which line is A B; and therefore A B is the time of motion through Z. In like manner, seeing A G is the product of the Impetus A E multiplied into the Time A D, the time of motion through X wil be a line which is made by the application of A G to the straight line A D; but A D is the time of motio$^{\bar{}}$ through X. Now the proportion of A B to A D is co$^{\bar{}}$pounded of the proportions of the parallelogram A F to the parallelogram A G, and of the Impetus A E to the Impetus A C; which may be demonstrated thus. Put the parallelograms in order A F, A G, D C; and it will be manifest that the proportion of A F to D C is compounded of the proportions of A F to A G and of A G to D C; but A F is to D C as A B to A D; wherefore also the proportion of A B to A D is compounded of the propotrions of A F to A G & of A G to D C. And because the Length Z is to the Length X as A F is to A G, & the Impetus A E to the Impetus A C as A G to D C, therefore the proportion of A B to A D will be compounded of the proportions of the Length Z to the Length X, and of the Impetus A E to the Impetus A C; which was to be demonstrated.

In the same manner it may be proved, that in two Uniform Motions the proportion of the Impetus is compounded of the proportions, of Length to Length, and of Time to Time reciprocally taken.

For if we suppose A C (in the same 3d figure) to be the Time, and A B the Impetus with which the Length Z is passed through; and A E to be the Time, and A D the Impetus with which the Length X is passed through, the demonstration will proceed as in the last Article.

8 If a Body be carried by two Movents together which move with straight and Uniform Motion, and concurre in any given angle, the line by which that Body passes will be a straight line.

Let the Movent A B (in the 4th figure) have straight and Uniform Motion, and be moved till it come into the place C D; and let another Movent A C, having likewise straight and Uniform Motion, and making with the Movent A B any given angle C A B, be understood to be moved in the same time to D B; and let the Body be placed in the point of their concourse A. I say the line which that Body describes with its Motion is a straight line. For let the parallelogram A B D C be completed, and its diagonal A D be drawn; and in the straight line A B let any point E be taken; and from it let E F be drawn parallel to the straight lines A C and B D, cutting A D in G; and through the point G let H I be drawn parallel to the straight lines A B and C D; and lastly, let the measure of the time be A C. Seeing therefore both the Motions are made in the same time, when A B is in C D, the Body also will be in C D; and in like manner, when A C is in B D, the Body will be in B D. But A B is in C D at the same time when A C is in B D; and therefore the Body will be in C D and B D at the same time; Wherefore it will be in the common point D. Again, seeing the Motion from A C to B D is Uniform, that is, the Spaces transmitted by it are in proportion to one another as the Times in which they are transmitted, when A C is in E F, the proportion of A B to A E will be same with that of E F to E G, that is, of the Time A C to the Time A H. Wherefore A B will be in H I in the same time in which A C is in E F, so that the Body will at the same time be in E F and in H I, and therefore in their common point G. And in

the same manner it will, be wheresoever the point E be taken between A and B. Wherefore the Body will alwayes be in the Diagonal A D; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From hence it is manifest, that the Body will be carried through the same straight line A D, though the Motion be not Uniform, provided it have like acceleration; for the proportion of A B to A E will alwayes be the same with that of A C to A H.

9 If a Body be carried by two Movents together, which meet in any given angle, and are moved, the one Uniformly, the other with Motion Uniformly accelerated from Rest (that is, that the proportion of their Impetus be as that of their Times) that is, that the proportion of their Le¯gths be duplicate to that of the lines of their Times, till the line of greatest Impetus acquired by acceleration be equal to that of the line of Time of the Uniform Motion; the line in which the Body is carried will be the crooked line of a Semiparabola, whose base is the Impetus last acquired, and Vertex the point of Rest.

Let the straight line A B (in the 5th Figure) be understood to be moved with Uniform Motion to C D; and let another Movent in the straight line A C be supposed to be moved in the same time to B D, but with motion Uniformly accelerted, that is, with such motion, that the proportion of the spaces which are transmitted be alwayes duplicate to that of the Times, till the Impetus acquired be B D equal to the straight line A C; and let the Semiparabola A G D B be described. I say that by the concourse of those two Movents, the Body will be carried through the Semipabolical crooked line A G D. For let the parallelelogram A B D C be completed; & from the point E taken any where in the straight line A B let E F be drawn parallel to A C, and cutting the crooked line in G, and lastly, through the point G let A I be drawn parallel to the straight lines A B and C D. Seeing therefore the proportion of A B to A E is by supposition duplicate to the proportion of E F to E G, that is, of the time A C to the time A H, at the same time when A

C is in E F, A B will be in H I; and therefore the moved Body will be in the common point G. And so it will alwayes be in what part soever of A B the point E be taken. Wherefore the moved Body will always be found in the parabolical line A G D; which was to be demonstrated.

10 If a Body be carried by two Movents together, which meet in any given angle, and are moved, the one Uniformly, the other with Impetus encreasing from Rest till it be equal to that of the Uniform Motion, and with such acceleration, that the proportion of the Lengths transmitted be every where triplicate to that of the Times in which they are transmitted, The line in which that Body is moved, will be the crooked line of the first Semiparabolaster of two Means, whose base is the Impetus last acquired.

Let the straight line A B (in the 6th. Figure) be moved Uniformly to C D; and let another Movent A C be moved at the same time to B D with motion so accelerated, that the proportion of the Lengths transmitted by every where triplicate to the proportion of their Times; and let the Impetus acquired in the end of that motion be B D, equal to the straight line A C; & lastly, let A D be the crooked line of the first Semiparabolaster of two Means. I say that by the concourse of the two Movents together, the Body will be alwayes in that crooked line A D. For let the parallelogram A B D C be completed; and from the point E taken any where in the straight line A B let E F be drawn parallel to A C and cutting the crooked line in G; and through the point G let H I be drawn parallel to the straight lines A B and C D. Seeing therefore the proportion of A B to A E is (by supposition) triplicate to the proportion of E F to E G, that is, of the time A C to the time A H, at the same time when A C is in E F, A B will be in H I; and therefore the moved Body will be in the common point G. And so it will alwayes be in what part soever of A B the point E be taken; and by consequent the Body will always be in the crooked line A G D; which was to be demonstrated.

11 By the same method it may be shewn what line it is that it made by the motion of a Body carried by the concourse of any two Movents, which are moved, one of them Uniformly, the other with acceleration, but in such proportions of Spaces and Times as are explicable by Numbers, as duplicate, triplicate &c. or such as may be designed by any broken number whatsoever. For which this is the Rule.

Let the two numbers of the Length & Time be added together; & let their Sum be the Denominator of a Fraction, whose Numerator must be the number of the Length. Seek this Fraction in the Table of the third Article of the 17th Chapter, and the line sought will be that which denominates the three-sided Figure noted on the left hand, and the kind of it will be that which is numbred above over the Fraction. For example, Let there be a concourse of two Movements, whereof one is moved Uniformly, the other with motion so accelerated that the Spaces are to the Times as 5 to 3. Let a Fraction be made whose Denominator is the Sum of 5 and 3, and the Numerator 5, namely the Fraction $\frac{5}{8}$. Seek in the Table, and you will find $\frac{5}{8}$ to be the third in that row which belongs to the three-sided Figure of four Means. Wherfore the line of Motion made by the concourse of two such Movents as are last of all described, will be the crooked line of the third Parabolaster of four Means.

12 If Motion be made by the concourse of two Movents whereof one is moved Uniformly, the other beginning from Rest in the Angle of concourse with any acceleration whatsoever; the Movent which is Moved Uniformly shall put forward the moved Body in the several parallel Spaces, lesse, then if both the Movents had Uniform motion; and still lesse and lesse, as the Motion of the other Movent is more and more accelerated.

Let the Body be placed in A (in the 7th figure) and be moved by two Movents, by one with Uniform Motion from the straight line A B to the straight line C D parallel to it; and by the other with any acceleration from

the straight line A C to the straight line B D parallel to it; and in the parallelogram A B D C let a Space be taken between any two parallels E F and G H. I say, that whilest the Movent A C passes through the latitude which is between E F and G H, the Body is lesse moved forwards from A B towards C D, then it would have been, if the Motion from A C to B D had been Uniform.

For suppose that whilest the Body is made to descend to the parallel E F by the power of the Movent from A C towards B D, the same Body in the same time is moved forwards to any point F in the line E F by the power of the Movent from A B towards C D; and let the straight line A F be drawn and produced indeterminately, cutting G H in H. Seeing therefore it is as A E to A G, so E F to G H; if A C should descend towards B D with uniform Motion, the Body in the time G H (for I make A C and its parallels the measure of time) would be found in the point H. But because A C is supposed to be moued towards B D which motion continually accelerated, that is, in greater proportion of Space to Space then of Time to Time, in the time G H the Body will be in some parallel beyond it, as between G H and B D. Suppose now that in the end of the time G H it be in the parallel I K, & in I K let I L be taken equal to G H. When therefore the Body is in the parallel I K, it will be in the point L. Wherefore when it was in the parallel G H, it was in some point between G and H, as in the point M; but if both the Motions had been Uniform it had been in the point H; and therefore whilest the Movent A C passes over the latitude which is between E F and G A, the Body is less moved forwards from A B towards C D, then it would have been if both the Motions had been Uniform; which was to be demonstrated.

13 Any Length being given whch is passed through in a given time with uniform motion, To find out what Length shall be passed through in the same time with Motion uniformly accelerated, that is, with such Motion,

that the proportion of the Lengths passed through be continually duplicate to that of their Times, and that the line of the Impetus last acquired, be equal to the line of the whole time of the Motion.

Let A B (in the 8th. figure) be a Length transmitted with Uniform Motion in the time A C; and let it be required to find another Length which shall be transmitted in the same time with Motion Uniformly accelerated, so, that the line of the Impetus last acquired be equal to the straight line A C.

Let the parallelogram A B D C be completed; and let B D be divided in the middle at E; and between B E and B D let B F be a mean proportional; and let A F be drawn and produced till it meet with C D produced in G; and lastly, let the parallelogram A C G H be completed. I say A H is the Length required.

For as duplicate proportion is to single proportion, so let A H be to A I, that is, let A I be the half of A H; and let I K be drawn parallel to the straight line A C, and cutting the Diagonal A D in K, and the straight line A G in L. Seeing therefore A I is the half of A H, I L will also be the half of B D, that is, equal to B E, and I K equal to B F; for B D, (that is, G H), B F, and B E (that is, I L) being continual proportionals, A H, A B, and A I will also be continual proportionals. But as A B is to A I, that is, as A H is to A B, so is B D to I K, and so also is G H, that is, B D to B F; and therefore B F and I K are equal. Now the proportion of A H to A I is duplicate to the proportion of A B to A I, that is, to that of BD to IK, or of GH to IK. Wherefore the point K will be in a Parabola, whose diameter is AH & base GH, which GH is equal to AC. The Body therefore proceeding from Rest in A with motion Uniformly accelerated in the time AC, when it has passed through the Length AH, will acquire the Impetus GH equal to the time AC; that is, such Impetus, as that with it the Body will pass through the Length

AC in the time AC. Wherefore any Length being given, &c. which was propounded to be done.

14 Any Length being given which in a given Time is transmitted with Uniform Motion, To find out what Length shall be transmitted in the same Time with Motion so accelerated, that the Lengths transmitted be continually in triplicate proportion to that of their Times, and the line of the Impetus last of all acquired be equal to the Line of Time given.

Let the given Length AB (in the 9th figure) be transmitted with Uniform motion in the Time AC; and let it be required to find what Length shall be transmitted in the same time with motion so accelerated, that the Lengths transmitted be continually in triplicate proportion to that of their Times, and the Impetus last acquired be equal to the Time given.

Let the parallelogram ABDC be completed; and let BD be so divided in E, that BE be a third part of the whole BD; and let BF be a mean proportional between BD and BE; and let AF be drawn and produced till it meet the straight line CD in G; and lastly, let the parallelogram ACGH be completed. I say AH is the Length required.

For as triplicate proportion is to single proportion, so let AH be to another line AI, that is, make AI a third part of the whole AH; and let IK be drawn parallel to the straight line AC, cutting the Diagonal AD in K, and the straight line AG in L; then, as AB is to AI, so let AI be to another AN; and from the point N let NQ be drawn parallel to AC, cutting AG, AD, and FK produced, in P, M and O; and last of all let FO and LM be drawn, which will be equal and parallel to the straight lines BN and IN. By this construction, the Lengths transmitted AH, AB, AI and AN will be continual proportionals; and in like manner, the Times GH, BF, IL and NP, that is, NQ, NO, NM and NP will be continual proportionals, and in the same proportion with AH, AB, AI, and AN. Wherefore the proportion of AH to AN is the same with that of BD, that is, of NQ to NP; and the proportion of

NQ to NP triplicate to that of NQ to NO, that is, triplicate to that of BD to IK; Wherefore also the Length AH is to the Length AN in triplicate proportion to that of the Time BD to the Time IK; and therefore the crooked line of the first three sided figure of two means, whose Diameter is AH, and base GH equal to AC, shall pass through the point O; and consequently AH shall be transmitted in the time AC, and shall have its last acquired Impetus GH equal to AC, and the proportions of the Lengths acquired in any of the times triplicate to the proportions of the times themselves. Wherefore AH is the Length required to be found out,

By the same method, if a Length be given which is transmitted with Uniform Motion in any given Time, another Length may be found out, which shall be transmitted in the same Time with motion so accelerated, that the Lengths transmitted shall be to the Times in which they are transmitted, in proportion quadruplicate, quintuplicate, and so on infinitely. For if BD be divided in E, so, that BD be to BE as 4 to 1; and there be taken between BD and BE a mean proportional FB; and as AH is to AB, so AB be made to a third, and again so that third to a fourth, and that fourth to a fifth AN, so that the proportion of AH to AN be quadruplicate to that of AH to AB, and the parallelogram NBFO be completed; the crooked line of the first three-sided Figure of three Means will pass through the point O and consequently the Body moved will acquire the Impetus GH equal to AC in the time AC. And so of the rest.

15 Also, if the proportion of the Lengths transmitted, be to that of their Times, as any number to any number, the same method serves for the finding out of the Length transmitted with such Impetus, and in such Time.

For let AC (in the 10 figure) be the time, in which a Body is transmitted with Uniform Motion from A to B; and the parallelogram ABDC being completed, let it be required to find out a Length in which that Body may be moved in the same time AC, fro$^{\overline{\ }}$ A wth motion so accelerated, that the

proportion of the Lengths transmitted, to that of the Times be continually as 3 to 2.

Let BD be so divided in E, that BD be to BE as 3 to 2; and between BD and BE let BF be a mean proportionall; and let AF be drawn and produced till it meet with CD produced in G; and making AM a mean proportional between AH and AB, let it be as AM to AB, so AB to AI; and so the proportion of AH to AI will be to that of AH to AB, as 3 to 2. (for of the proportions of which that of AH to AM is one, that of AH to AB is two, and that of AH to AI is three;) & consequently as 3 to 2 to that of GH to BF, & (FK being drawn parallel to BI, and cutting AD in K) so likewise to that of GH or BD to IK; Wherefore the proportion of the Length AH to AI is to the proportion of the Time BD to IK, as 3 to 2; and therefore, if in the time AC, the Body be moved with accelerated motion, as was propounded, till it acquire the Impetus HG equal to AC, the Length transmitted in the same Time will be AH.

16 But if the proportion of the Lengths to that of the Times had been as 4 to 3, there should then have been taken two mean proportionals between AH and AB, and their proportion should have been continued one term further, so that AH to AB might have three of the same proportions, of which AH to AI has four; and all things else should have been done as is already shewn. Now the way how to interpose any number of Means between two Lines given, is not yet found out. Nevertheless, this may stand for a general Rule; If there be a Time given, and a Length be transmitted in that Time with Uniform Motion; as for example, if the Time be AC, and the Length AB; the straight line AG, which determines the Length CG or AH transmitted in the same Time AC with any accelerated motion, shall so cut BD in F, that BF shall be a mean proportional between BD and BE, BE being so taken in BD, that the proportion of Length to Length be every where to the proportion of Time to Time, as the whole BD is to its part BE.

17 If in a given Time, two Lengths be transmitted, One with uniform motion, the other with motion accelerated in any proportion of the Lengths to the Times; and again in part of the same Time, parts of the same Lengths be transmitted with the same motions, the whole Length will exceed the other Length in the same proportion in which one part exceeds the other part.

For example, let AB (in the 8th. figure) be a Length transmitted in the time AC with uniform Motion; and let AH be another Length transmitted in the same time with Motion uniformly accelerated, so that the Impetus last acquired be GH equal to AC; and in AH let any part AI be taken, and transmitted in part of the time AC with uniform Motion; and let another part AB be taken, and transmitted in the same part of the time AC with Motion uniformly accelerated. I say, that as AH is to AB, so will AB be to AI.

Let BD be drawn parallel and equal to HG, and divided in the midst at E, and between BD and BE, let a mean proportional be taken as BF; & the straight line AG (by the demonstration of the 13th Art.) shal pass through F. And dividing AH in the midst at I, AB shall be a mean proportional between AH and AI. Again (because AI and AB are described by the same Motions) if IK be drawn parallel and equal to BF or AM, and divided in the midst at N, and between IK and IN be taken the mean proportional IL, the straight line AF will (by the demonstration of the same 13th Arc.) pass through L. And dividing AB in the midst at O, the line AI will be a mean proportional between AB and AO. Where AB is divided in I and O in like manner as AH is divided in B and I; and as AH to AB so is AB to AI. Which was to be proved.

Coroll. Also as AH to AB, so is HB to BI; and so also BI to IO.

And as this (where one of the Motions is uniformly accelerated) is proved out of the demonstration of the 13th Article; so (when the accelerations are in double proportion to the times) the same may be proved

by the demonstration of the 14th Art. and by the same method in all other accelerations, whose proportions to the times are explicable in numbers.

18 If two sides which contain an Angle in any Parallelogram, be moved in the same time to the sides opposite to them, one of them with Uniform Motion, the other with Motion Uniformly accelerated; that side which is moved Uniformly will effect as much with its concourse through the whole Length transmitted, as it would do if the other Motion were also Uniform, and the Length transmitted by it in the same time were a mean proportional between the whole and the half.

Let the side AB of the Parallelogram ABDC (in the 11th Figure) be understood to be moved with Uniform Motion till it be coincident with CD; and let the time of that Motion be AC or BD. Also in the same time let the side AC be understood to be moved with Motion uniformly accelerated, till it be coincident with BD; then dividing AB in the middle in E, let AF be made a mean proportional between AB and AE; and drawing FG parallel to AC, let the side AC be understood to be moved in the same time AC with uniform Motion till it be coincident with FG. I say the whole AB confers as much to the velocity of the Body placed in A when the Motion of AC is uniformly accelerated till it come to BD, as the part AF confers to the same when the side AC is moved Uniformly and in the same time to FG.

For seeing AF is a mean proportional between the whole AB & it is half AE, BD wil (by the 13th Art.) be the last Impetus acquired by AC with motion uniformly accelerated till it come to the same BD; and consequently the straight line FB will be the excess by w^{ch} the Length transmitted by AC with motion uniformly accelerated, will exceed the Length transmitted by the same AC in the same time with Uniform Motion, and with Impetus every where equal to BD. Wherefore if the whole AB be moved Uniformly to CD in the same time in which AC is moved Uniformly to FG, the part FB (seeing it concurs not at all with the Motion of the side AC which is

supposed to be moved onely to FG) will co¯fer nothing to its motion. Again, supposing the side AC to be moved to BD with Motion Uniformly accelerated, the side AB with its uniform Motion to CD will less put forwards the Body when it is accelerated in all the parallels, then when it is not at all accelerated; & by how much the greater the acceleration is, by so much the less it will put it forwards (as is shewn in the 12th Artic.) When therefore AC is in FG with accelerated Motion, the Body will not be in the side CD at the point G, but at the point D; so that GD wil be the excess by which the Length transmitted with accelerated Motion to BD, exceeds the Length transmitted with Uniform Motion to FG; so that the Body by its acceleration avoids the action of the part AF, & comes to the side CD in the time AC, and makes the Length CD, which is equal to the Length AB. Wherefore Uniform Motion from AB to CD in the time AC works no more in the whole Length AB upon the Body uniformly accelerated from AC to BD, then if AC were moved in the same time with uniform Motion to FG; the difference consisting onely in this, that when AB works upon the Body uniformly moved from AC to FG, that by which the accelerated Motion exceeds the Uniform Motion, is altogether in FB, or GD; but when the same AB works upon the Body acclerated, that by which the accelerated Motion exceeds the Uniform Motion, is dispersed through the whole Length AB or CD, yet so that if it were collected and put together, it would be equal to the same FB or GD. Wherefore, If two sides which contain an angle &c; which was to be demonstrated.

19 If two transmitted Lengths have to their Times any other proportion explicable by number, & the side AB be so divided in E, that AB be to AE in the same proportion which the Lengths transmitted have to the Times in which they are transmitted, and between AB and AE there be taken a mean proportional AF, it may be shewn by the same method, that the side which is moved with Uniform Motion, works as much with its concourse through

the whole Length AB, as it would do if the other Motion were also Uniform, and the Length transmitted in the same Time AC were that mean proportional AF.

And thus much concerning Motion by concourse.

CHAP. XVII. OF FIGURES DEFICIENT.

1 DEFINITIONS OF a Deficient Figure; of a Complete Figure; of the Complement of a Deficient Figure; and of Proportions which are Proportional and Commensurable to one another.

2 The proportion of a Deficient Figure to its Complement.

3 The proportions of Deficient Figures to the Parallelograms in which they are described, set forth in a Table.

4 The Description and Production of the same Figures.

5 The drawing of Tangents to them.

6 In what proportion the same Figures exceed a straight lined Triangle of the same Altitude and Base.

7 A Table of Solid Deficient Figures described in a Cylinder.

8 In what proportion the same Figures exceed a Cone of the same Altitude and Base.

9 How a plain Deficient Figure may be described in a Parallelogram, so, that it be to a Triangle of the same Base and Altitude, as another Deficient Figure (plain or solid) twice taken, is to the same Deficient Figure together with the Complete Figure in which it is described.

10 The transferring of certain properties of Deficient Figures described in a Parallelogram to the proportions of the Spaces transmitted with several degrees of Velocity.

11 Of Deficient Figures described in a Circle.

12 The proposition demonstrated in the 2d. Article, confirmed from the Elements of Philosophy.

13 An unusual way of reasoning concerning the Equality between the superficies of a portion of a Sphere, and a Circle.

14 How from the description of Deficient Figures in a Parallelogram, any number of mean Proportionals may be found out between two given straight lines.

1 I Call those Deficient Figures, which may be understood to be generated by the Uniform Motion of some quantity, which decreases continually, till at last it have no magnitude at all.

And I call that a Complete Figure, answering to a Deficient Figure, which is generated with the same motion, and in the same time, by a Quantity which retaines alwayes its whole magnitude.

The Complement of a Deficient Figure is that, which being added to the Deficient Figure, makes it Complete.

Four Proportions are said to be Proportionall, when the first of them is to the second, as the third is to the fourth. For example, if the first proportion be duplicate to the second; and again the third be duplicate to the fourth, those Proportions are said to be Proportionall.

And Commensurable Proportions are those, which are to one another as number to number. As when to a proportion given, one proportion is duplicate, another triplicate, the duplicate proportion will be to the triplicate proportion as 2 to 3; but to the given proportion it will be as 2 to 1; and therefore I call those three proportions Commensurable.

2 A Deficient Figure, which is made by a Quantity continually decreasing to nothing by proportions every where proportionall and commensurable, is to its Complement, as the proportion of the whole altitude, to an altitude diminished in any time, is to the proportion of the whole Quantity which describes the Figure, to the same Quantity diminished in the same time.

Let the quantity AB (in the 1 figure) by its motion through the altitude AC, describe the Complete Figure AD; and againe, let the same quantity, by decreasing continually to nothing in C, describe the Deficient Figure ABEFC, whose Complement will be the Figure BDCFE. Now let AB be supposed to be moved till it lie in GK, so that the altitude diminished be GC, and AB diminished be GE; and let the proportion of the whole altitude AC to the diminished altitude GC, be (for example) triplicate to the proportion of the whole quantity AB or GK, to the diminished quantity GE. And in like manner, let HI be taken equal to GE, & let it be diminished to HF; and let the proportion of GC to HC be triplicate to that of HI to HF; & let the same be done in as many parts of the straight line AC as is possible; and a line be drawn through the points B, E, F and C. I say the Deficient Figure ABEFC, is to its Complement BDCEF as 3 to 1, or as the proportion of AC to GC is to the proportion of AB, that is, of GK to GE.

For (by the second Article of the 15. Chap.) the proportion of the complement BEFCD to the deficient figure ABEFC, is all the proportions of DB to OE, and of DB to QF, and of all the lines parallel to DB terminated in the line BEFC, to all the parallels to AB terminated in the same points of the line BEFC. And seeing the proportions of DB to OE, and of DB to QF &c are every where triplicate of the proportions of AB to GE, and of AB to HF &c. the proportions of HF to AB, and of GE to AB &c. (by the 16 Article of the 13 Chap.) are triplicate of the proportions of QF to DB, and of OE to DB &c. and therefore the deficient figure ABEFC which is the aggregate of all the lines HF, GE, AB, &c. is triple to the complement BEFCD made of all the lines QF, OE, DB, &c. which was to be proved.

It follows from hence, That the same complement BEFCD is ¼ of the whole Parallelogram. And by the same method may be calculated in all other Deficient Figures generated as above declared, the proportion of the Parallelogram to either of its parts; as that when the parallels encrease fom a

point in the same proportion, the Parallelogram will be divided into two equal Triangles; when one encrease is double to the other, it will be divided into a Semiparabola and its Complement, or into 2 and 1.

The same construction standing, the same conclusion may otherwise be demonstrated, thus.

Let the straight line CB be drawn cutting GK in L, & through L let MN be drawn parallel to the straight line AC; wherefore the Parallelograms GM and LD will be equal. Then let LK be divided into three equal parts, so that it may be to one of those parts in the same proportion which the proportion of AC to GC or of GK to GL hath to the proportion of GK to GE. Therefore LK will be to one of those three parts as the Arithmetical proportion between GK and GL is to the Arithmetical proportion between GK and the same GK want the third part of LK; and KE will be somwhat greater then a third of LK. Seeing now the altitude AG or ML is by reason of the continual decrease, to be supposed less then any quantity that can be given; LK (which is intercepted between the Diagonal BC and the side BD) will be also less then any quantity that can be given; and consequently, if G be put so neer to A in g, as that the difference between Cg and CA be less then any quantity that can be assigned, the difference also between Cl (removing L to l) and CB, will be less then any quantity that can be assigned; and the line gl being drawn & produced to the line BD in k cutting the crooked line in e, the proportion of Gk to Gl will still be triplicate to the proportion of Gk to Ge, and the difference between k and e the third part of kl will be less then any quantity that can be given; and therefore the Parallelogram eD will differ from a third part of the Parallelogram Ae by a less difference then any quantity that can be assigned. Again, let HI be drawn parallel and equal to ge, cutting CB in P, the crooked line in F, and BD in I, and the proportion of Cg, to CH will be triplicate to the proportion of HF to HP, and IF will be greater then the third part of PI. But again, setting H in h so neer to g, as

that the difference between Ch and Cg may be but as a point, the point P will also in p be so neer to l, as that the difference between Cp and Cl will be but as a point; and drawing hp till it meet with gk in i, cutting the crooked line in f, and having drawn eo parallel to BD, cutting DC in o, the Parallelogram fo will differ less from the third part of the Parallelogram gf, then by any quantity that can be given. And so it will be in all other Spaces generated in the same manner. Wherefore the differences of the Arithmetical and Geometrical Means, which are but as so many points B, e, f, &c. (seeing the whole Figure is made up of so many indivisible Spaces) will constitute a certain line, such as is the line BEFC, which will divide the complete Figure AD into two parts; whereof one, namely ABEFC, which I call a Deficient Figure, is triple to the other, namely BDCEF, which I call the Complement thereof. And whereas the proportion of the altitudes to one another, is in this case everywhere triplicate to that of the decreasing quantities to one another; in the same manner if the proportion of the altitudes had been every where quadruplicate to that of the decreasing quantities it might have been demonstrated, that the Deficient Figure had been quadruple to its Complement; and so in any other proportion, Wherefore, a Deficient Figure, which is made, &c. Which was to be demonstrated.

The same rule holdeth also in the diminution of the Bases of Cylinders, as is demonstrated Cha. Art. 2.

By this Proposition, the magnitudes of all Deficient Figures (when the proportions by which their bases decrease continually, are proportionall to those by which their altitudes decrease) may be compared with the magnitudes of their Complements; and consequently, with the magnitudes of their Complete Figures. And they will be found to be as I have set them down in the following Tables; in which I compare a Parallelogram with threesided Figures; and first with a straight lined triangle, made by the base

of the Parallelogram continually decreasing in such manner; that the altitudes be alwayes in proportion to one another as the bases are, and so the triangle will be equal to its Complement; or the proportions of the altitudes and bases wil be as 1 to 1, and then the triangle will be half the Parallelogram. Secondly, with that three-sided Figure which is made by the continual decreasing of the bases in subduplicate proportion to that of the altitudes; and so the Deficient Figure will be double to its Complement, and to the Parallelogram as 2 to 3. Then, with that, where the proportion of the altitudes is triplicate to that of the bases; and then the Deficient Figure will be triple to its Complement, and to the Parallelogram as 3 to 4. Also the proportion of the altitudes to that of the bases may be as 3 to 2; and then the Deficient Figure will be to its Complement as 3 to 2, & to the Parallelogram as 3 to 5; and so forwards according as more mean proportionals are taken, or as the proportions are more multiplyed, as may be seen in the following Table. For example, if the bases decrease so, that the proportion of the altitudes to that of the bases be alwayes as 5 to 2, and it be demanded what proportion the Figure made has to the Parallelogram, which is supposed to be Unity; then, seeing that where the proportion is taken five times, there must be four Means; look in the Table amongst the three-sided figures of four Means, and seeing the proportion was as 5 to 2, look in the uppermost row for the number 2, and descending in the 2d Columne till you meet with that three-sided Figure, you will finde 5/7; which shews that the Deficient Figure is to the Parallelogram as 5/ to 1, or as 5 to 7.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Parallelogram:	1						
Straight-sided Triangle	½						

Three-sided figure of 1 Mean	⅔						
Three-sided figure of 2 Means	¾	⅗					
Three-sided figure of 3 Means	⅘	4/6	4/7				
Three-sided figure of 4 Means	⅚	5/7	⅝	5 9			
Three-sided figure of 5 Means	6/7	6/8	6/9	6/10	6/11		
Three-sided figure of 6 Means	⅞	7/9	7/10	7/11	7/12	7/13	
Three-sided figure of 7 Means	8/9	8/10	8/11	8/12	8/13	8/14	8/15

4 Now for the better understanding of the nature of these three-sided figures, I will shew how they may be described by points; and first, those which are in the first column of the Table. Any Parallelogram being described, as ABCD (in the 2d. figure,) let the Diagonal BD be drawn; and the straight-lined triangle BCD will be half the Parallelogram; Then let any number of lines, as EF, be drawn parallel to the Side BC, and cutting the Diagonal BD in G; & let it be every where, as EF to EG, so EG to another EH; and through all the points H let the line BHHD be drawn; and the Figure BHHDC will be that which I call a Three-sided Figure of one Mean, because in three proportionals, as EF, EG and EH, there is but one Mean, namely, EG; and this three-sided figure will be ⅔ of the Parallelogram, and is called a Parabola. Again, let it be as EG to EH, so EH to another EI, and let the line BIID be drawn, making the three-sided figure BIIDC; & this will be ¾ of the Parallelogram, and is by many called a Cubique Parabola. In like manner, if the proportions be further continued in EF, there will be

made the rest of the threesided figures of the first Column; which I thus demonstrate. Let there be drawn straight lines, as HK and GL parallel to the base DC. Seeing therefore the proportion of EF to EH is duplicate of that of EF to EG, or of BC to BL, that is, of CD to LG, or of KM (producing KH to AD in M) to KH, the proportion of BC to BK will be duplicate to that of KM to KH; but as BC is to BK, so is DC, or KM to KN; and therefore the proportion of KM to KN is duplicate to that of KM to KH; and so it will be wheresoever the parallel KM be placed. Wherefore the Figure BHHDC is double to its Complement BHHDA, and consequently ⅔ of the whole Parallelogram. In the same manner if through I, be drawn OPIQ parallel and equal to CD, it may be demonstrated that the proportion of OQ to OP, that is, of BC to BO, is triplicate to that of OQ to OI, and therefore that the Figure BIIDC is triple to its Complement BIIDA, and consequently ¾ of the whole Parallelogram, &c.

Secondly, such three-sided figures as are in any of the transverse rowes, may be thus described. Let ABCD (in the 3d. Figure) be a Parallelogram, whose Diagonal is BD. I would describe in it such figures, as in the preceding Table I call Three-sided Figures of three Means. Parallel to DC, I draw EF as often as is necessary, cutting BD in G; and between EF and EG I take three proportionals EH, EI and EK. If now there be drawn lines through all the points H, I & K; that through all the points H will make the figure BHDC, which is the first of those three-sided figures; and that through all the points I, will make the figure BIDC, which is the second; and that which is drawn through all the points K, will make the figure BKDC the third of those three-sided figures. The first of these (seeing the proportion of EF to EC is quadruplicate of that of EF to EH) will be to its Complement as 4 to 1, and to the Parallelogram as 4 to 5. The second (seeing the proportion of EF to EG is to that of EF to EI as 4 to 2) will be double to its Complement, and 4/6 or ⅔ of the Parallelogram. The third

(seeing the proportion of EF to EG is to that of EF to EK as 4 to 3) will be to its Complement as 4 to 3, and to the Parallelogram as 4 to 7.

Any of these, figures being described, may be produced at pleasure, thus; Let ABCD (in the 4th figure) be a Parallelogram, and in it let the figure BKDC be described, namely, the third three-sided figure of three Means. Let BD be produced indefinitely to E, and let EF be made parallel to the base DC, cutting AD produced in G, and BC produced in F; and in GE let the point H be so taken, that the proportion of FE to FG may be quadruplicate to that of FE to FH (which may be done by making FH the greatest of three proportionals between FE and FG); the crooked line BKD produced, will pass through the point H. For if the straight line BH be drawn, cutting CD in I, and HL be drawn parallel to GD, and meeting CD produced in L; it will be as FE to FG, so CL to CI; that is, in quadruplicate proportion to that of FE to FH, or of CD to CI. Wherefore if the line BKD be produced according to its generation, it will fall upon the point H.

5 A straight line may be drawn so, as to touch the crooked line of the said figure in any point, in this manner. Let it be required to draw a Tangent to the line BKDH (in the 4th figure) in the point D. Let the points B and D be connected, and drawing DA equal and parallel to BC, let B and A be connected; and because this figure is by construction the third of three Means, let there be taken in AB three points, so, that by them the same AB be divided into four equal parts; of which take three, namely, AM, so that AB may be to AM, as the figure BKDC is to its Complement. I say the straight line MD, will touch the figure in the point given D. For let there be drawn any where between AB and DC a parallel, as RQ, cutting the straight line BD, the crooked line BD, the straight line MD, and the straight line AD in the points P, K, O and Q. RK will therefore (by construction) be the least of three Means in Geometrical proportion between RQ and RP. Wherefore (by the Coroll. of the 28th Article of the 13th Chapter) RK will be less then

RO; and therefore MD will fall without the figure. Now if MD be produced to N, FN will be the least of three Means in Arithmetical proportion between FE and FG; and FH will be the greatest of three Means in Geometrical proportion between the same FE and FG. Wherefore (by the same Coroll. of the 28 Artic. of the 13th Chap.) FH will be less then FN; and therefore DN will fall without the figure, and the straight line MN will touch the same figure onely in the point D.

6 The proportion of a Deficient Figure to its Complement being known, it may also be known what proportion a straightlined triangle has to the excess of the Deficient Figure above the same triangle; and these proportions I have set down in the following Table; where if you seek (for example) how much the fourth three-sided figure of five Means exceeds a triangle of the same altitude and base, you will find in the concourse of the fourth column with the three-sided figures of five Means, 2/10; by which is signified, that that three-sided figure exceeds the triangle by two tenths, or by one fifth part of the same triangle.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The Triangle	1						
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of one Mean	⅓						
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of 2 Means	2/4	⅕					
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of 3 Means	⅗	2/6	1/7				
The Excess of a	4/6	3/7	2/8	1/9			

Three-sided figure of 4 Means							
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of 5 Means	5/7	4/8	3/9	2/10	1/11		
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of 6 Means	6/8	5/9	4/10	3/11	2/12	1/13	
The Excess of a Three-sided figure of 7 Means	7/9	6/10	5/11	4/12	3/13	2/14	1/15

7 In the next Table are set down the proportion of a Cone, and the Solids of the said three-sided figures, namely, the proportions between them and a Cylinder. As for example, in the concourse of the second Column with the three-sided figures of four Means, you have /9; which gives you to understand, that the Solid of the second three-sided figure of four Means is to the Cylinder as /9 to 1, or as 5 to 9,

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The Cylinder	1						
A Cone	⅓						
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of one Mean	2/4						
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of 2 Means	⅗	3/7					
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of	4/6	4/8	4/10				

3 Means							
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of 4 Means	5/7	5/9	5/11	5/13			
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of 5 Means	6/8	6/10	6/12	6/14	6/16		
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of 6 Means	7/9	7/11	7/13	7/15	7/17	7/19	
The Solids of a Three-sided figure of 7 Means	8/10	8/12	8/14	8/16	8/18	8/20	8/22

8 Lastly, the Excess of the Solids of the said three-sided figures, above a Cone of the same altitude and base, are set down in the Table which follows

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The Cone	1						
The Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a three-sided figure of one Mean	6/12						
The	12/15	6/21					

Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a three-sided figure of 2 Means				
The Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a three-sided figure of 3 Means	18/18	12/24	6/30	
The Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a	24/21	18/27	12/33	6/39

three-sided figure of 4 Means							
The Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a three-sided figure of 5 Means	30/24	24/30	18/36	12/42	6/48		
The Excesses of the Solids of these threesided figures above a C n Of the Solid of a three-sided figure of 6 Means	36/27	30/33	24/39	18/45	12/51	6/57	
The Excesses of the Solids of these	42/30	36/36	20/42	24/48	18/54	12/60	6/66

threesided
figures above
a C n Of the
Solid of a
three-sided
figure of
Means

9 If any of these Deficient Figures, of which I have now spoken, as A B C D (in the 5th figure) be inscribed within the Complete figure B E, having A D C E for its Complement; and there be made upon C B produced, the triangle A B I; and the Parallelogram A B I K be completed; and there be drawn parallel to the straight line C I, any number of lines as M F, cutting every one of them the crooked line of the Deficient Figure in D, and the straight lines A C, A B and A I in H, G and L; and as G F is to G D, so G L be made to another G N; and through all the points N there be drawn the line A N I, there will be a Deficient Figure A N I B, whose Complement will be A N I K. I say the figure A N I B is to the triangle A B I, as the Deficient Figure A B C D twice taken, is to the same Deficient Figure together with the Complete figure B E.

For as the proportion of A B to A G, that is, of G M to G L, is to the proportion of G M to G N; so is the magnitude of the figure A N I B, to that of its Complement A N I K (by the 2d. Art. of this Chapter.)

But (by the same Article), As the proportion of A B to A G, that is, of G M to G L, is to the proportion of G F to G D, that is, (by construction) of G L to G N; so is the figure A B C D to its Complement A D C E.

And by Composition, As the proportion of G M to G L, together with that of G L to G N, is to the proportion of G M to G L; so is the complete figure B E, to the Deficient Figure A B C D.

And by Conversion, As the proportion of G M to G L, is to both the proportions of G M to G L and of G L to G N, that is, to the proportion of G M to G N (which is the proportion compounded of both); so is the Deficient Figure A B C D, to the complete Figure B E.

But it was, As the proportion of G M to G L, to that of G M to G N; so the figure A N I B to its Complement A N I K. And therefore, A B C D. B E :: A N I B. A N I K are proportionals. And by Composition, A B C D+B E. A B C D :: B K. A N I B are proportionals.

And by doubling the Consequents A B C D+B E. 2 A B C D :: B K. 2 A N I B are proportionals.

And by taking the halfes of the third & the fourth A B C D+B E. 2 A B C D :: A B I. A N I B are also proportionals; which was to be proved.

10 From what has been said of Deficient Figures described in a Parallelogram, may be found out what proportions Spaces transmitted with accelerated Motion in determined times, have to the times themselves, according as the moved Body is accelerated in the several times with one or more degrees of Velocity.

For, let the Parallelogram A B C D (in the 6th figure) and in it the three-sided figure D E B C be described; and let F G be drawn any where parallel to the base, cutting the Diagonal B D in H, and the crooked line B E D in E; & let the proportion of B C to B F be (for example) triplicate to that of F G to F E; whereupon the figure D E B C will be triple to its Complement B E D A; and in like manner, I F being drawn parallel to B C, the three-sided figure E K B F will be triple to its Complement B K E I. Wherefore, the parts of the Deficient Figure cut off from the Vertex by straight lines parallel to the base, namely D E B C and E K B F, will be to one another as the Parallelograms A C and I F; that is, in proportion compounded of the proportions of the altitudes and bases. Seeing therefore the proportion of the altitude B C to the altitude B F is triplicate to the proportion of the base D C

to the base F E, the figure D E B C to the figure E K B F will be quadruplicate to the proportion of the same D C to F E. And by the same method, may be found out, what proportion any of the said three-sided figures, has to any part of the same cut off from the Vertex by a straight line parallel to the base.

Now as the said figures are understood to be described by the continual decreasing of the base, as of C D (for example) till it end in a point, as in B; so also they may be understood to be described by the continual encreasing of a point, as of B, till it acquire any magnitude, as that of C D.

Suppose now the figure B E D C to be described by the encreasing of the point B to the magnitude C D. Seeing therefore the propor ion of B C to B F is triplicate to that of C D to F E, the proportion of F E to C D will by Conversion (as I shall presently demonstrate) be triplicate to that B F to B C. Wherefore, if the straight line B C be taken for the measure of the time in which the point B is moved, the Figure E K B F will represent the Sum of all the encreasing Velocities in the time B F; and the figure D E B C will in like manner represent the Summe of all the encreasing Velocities in the time B C. Seeing therefore the proportion of the figure E K B F to the figure D E B C, is compounded of the proportions of altitude to altitude, and base to base; and seeing the proportion of F E to C D is triplicate to that of B F to B C; the proportion of the figure E K B F to the figure D E B C, will be quadruplicate to that of B F to B C; that is, the proportion of the Sum of the Velocities in the time B F, to the Sum of the Velocities in the time B C wil be quadruplicate to the proportion of B F to B C. Wherfore if a Body be moved from B with Velocity so encreasing, that the Velocity acquired in the time B F, be to the Velocity acquired in the time B C in triplicate proportion to that of the times themselves B F to B C, and the Body be carried to F in the time B F; the same Body in the time B C will be carried through a line equal to the fifth proportional from B F in the continual proportion of B F to

B C. And by the same manner of working, we may determine, what Spaces are transmitted by Velocities encreasing according to any other proportions.

It remains, that I demonstrate the proportion of F E to C D, to be triplicate to that of B F to B C. Seeing therefore the proportion of C D, that is of F G to F E is subtriplicate to that of B C to B F; the proportion of F G to F E will also be subtriplicate to that of F G to F H. Wherefore the proportion of F G to F H is triplicate to that of F G, that is, of C D to F E. But in four continual proportionals, of which the least is the first, the proportion of the first to the fourth (by the 16 Art. of the 13 Chap.) is subtriplicate to the proportion of the third to the same fourh. Wherefore the proportion of F H to G F is subtriplicate to that of F E to C D; and therefore the proportion of F E to C D is triplicate to that of F H to F G, that is, of B F to B C, which was to be proved.

It may from hence be collected, that when the Velocity of a Body, is encreased in the same proportion with that of the times, the degrees of Velocity above one another proceed as numbers do in immediate succession from Unity, namely, as 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. And when the Velocity is encreased in proportion duplicate to that of the times, the degrees proceed as numbers from Unity skipping One, as 1, 3, 5, 7, &c. Lastly, when the proportions of the Velocities are triplicate to those of the times, the progression of the degrees is as that of numbers from Unity skipping Two in every place, as 1, 4, 7, 10, &c. and so of other proportions. For Geometrical proportionals, when they are taken in every point, are the same with Arithmetical proportionals.

11 Moreover, it is to be noted, that as in quantities which are made by any magnitudes decreasing, the proportions of the figures to one another, are as the proportions of the altitudes to those of the bases; so also it is in those which are made with motion decreasing, which motion is nothing else but that power by which the described figures are greater or less. And

therefore in the description of Archimedes his Spiral, which is done by the continual diminution of the Semidiameter of a Circle in the same proportion in which the Circumference is diminished, the Space which is contained within the Semidiameter and the Spiral Line, is a third part of the whole Circle. For the Semidiameters of Circles, in as much as Circles are understood to be made up of the aggregate of them, are so many Sectors; and therefore in the description of a Spiral, the Sector which describes it, is diminished in duplicate proportions to the diminutions of the Circumference of the Circle in which it is inscribed; so that the Complement of the Spiral (that is, that space in the Circle which is without the Spiral Line,) is double to the space within the Spiral Line. In the same manner, if there be taken a mean proportional every where between the Semidiameter of the Circle which contains the Spiral, and that part of the Semidiameter which is within the same, there will be made another figure, which will be half the Circle. And to conclude, this Rule serves for all such Spaces as may be described by a Line or Superficies decreasing either in magnitude or power; so that if the proportions in which they decrease, be commensurable to the proportions of the times in which they decrease, the magnitudes of the figures they describe will be known.

12 The truth of that proposition which I demonstrated in the second Article (which is the foundation of all that has been said concerning Deficient Figures) may be derived from the Elements of Philosophy, as having i original in this; That all equality and inequality between two effects, (that is, all Proportion) proceeds from, and is determined by the equal and unequal causes of those effects, or from the proportion which the causes concurring to one effect, have to the causes which concurre to the producing of the other effect; and that therefore the proportions of Quantities are the same with the proportions of their causes. Seeing therefore two Deficient Figures (of which one is the Complement of the

other) are made, one by motion decreasing in a certain time and proportion, the other by the loss of Motion in the same time, the causes which make and determine the quantities of both the figures, so, that they can be no other then they are, differ onely in this, that the proportions by which the quantity which generates the figure proceeds in describing of the same, (that is, the proportions of the remainders of all the times and altitudes) may be other proportions then those by which the same generating quantity decreases in making the Complement of that Figure, (that is, the proportions of the quantity which generates the Figure continually diminished.) Wherefore, as the proportions of the quantity in which Motion is lost, is to that of the decreasing quantities by which the Deficient Figure is generated, so will the Defect or Complement be to the Figure it self which is generated.

13 There are also other quantities which are determinable from the knowledge of their causes, namely, from the comparison of the Motions by which they are made, and that more easily then from the common Elements of Geometry. For example, That the Superficies of any portion of a Sphere, is equal to that Circle, whose Radius is a straight Line drawn from the Pole of the portion to the Circumference of its base, I may demonstrate in this manner. Let B A C (in the 7 Figure) be a portion of a Sphere, whose Axis is A E, & whose base is B C; & let A B be the straight line drawn from the Pole A to the base in B; and let A D, equal to A B, touch the great Circle B A C in the Pole A. It is to be proved that the Circle made by the Radius A D, is equal to the Superficies of the portion B A C. Let the plain A E B D be understood to make a revolution about the Axis A E; & it is manifest that by the straight line A D a Circle will be described; and by the arch A B the Superficies of a portion of a Sphere, and lastly, by the Subtense A B the Superficies of a right Cone. Now seeing both the straight line A B, and the arch A B make one and the same revolution, and both of them have the same extreme points A and B, the cause why the the Spherical Superficies

which is made by the arch, is greater then the Conical Superficies which is made by the Subtense, is, that A B the arch, is greater then A B the Subtense; and the cause why it is greater consists in this, that although they be both drawn from A to B, yet the Subtense is drawn straight, but the arch angularly, namely according to that angle which the arch makes with the Subtense, which angle is equal to the angle D A B (for an angle of contingence adds nothing to an angle of a Segment, as has been shewn in the 14 Chapter at the 16th Article.) Wherefore the magnitude of the angle D A B is the cause why the Superficies of the portion described by the arch A B, is greater then the Superficies of the right Cone described by the Subtense A B.

Again, the cause why the Circle described by the Tangent A D is greater then the Superficies of the right Cone described by the Subtense A B (notwitstanding that the Tangent and the Subtense are equal, and both moved round in the same time) is this, that A D stands at right angles to the Axis, but A B obliquely; which obliquity consists in the same angle D A B. Seeing therefore the quantity of the angle D A B is that which makes the excess both of the Superficies of the Portion, and of the Circle made by the Radius A D, above the superficies of the Right Cone described by the subtense A B; it follows, that both the Superficies of the Portion, and that of the Circle, do equally exceed the Superficies of the Cone. Wherefore, the Circle made by A D, or A B, and the Spherical Superficies made by the arch A B, are equal to one another; which was to be proved.

4 If these Deficient Figures which I have described in a , were capable of exact description, then any number of mean proportionals might be found out between two straight lines given. For example, in the Parallelogram A B C D, (in the 8th. Figure) let the three-sided figure of two Means be described, (which many call a Cubical Parabola); and let R and S be two given straight lines; between which, if it be required to find two mean

proportionals, it may be done thus. Let it be as R to S, so B C to B F; and let F E be drawn parallel to B A, and cut the crooked line in E; then through E let G H be drawn parallel and equal to the straight line A D, and cut the Diagonal B D in I; for thus we have G I the greatest of two Means between G H and G E, as appears by the description of the figure in the 4th Article. Wherefore if it be as G H to G I, so R to another line T, that T will be the greatest of two Means between R and S. And therefore if it be again as R to T, so T to another line X, that will be done which was required.

In the same manner, four mean proportionals may be found out, by the description of a three-sided figure of four Means; and so, any other number of Means, &c.

CHAP. XVIII. OF THE EQUATION OF STRAIGHT LINES WITH THE CROOKED LINES OF PARABOLAS AND OTHER FIGURES MADE IN IMITATION OF PARABOLAS.

1 TO FIND a straight Line equal to the crooked Line of a Semiparabola.

2 To find a straight Line equal to the Crooked Line of the first Semiparabolaster, or to the Crooked Line of any other of the Deficient Figures of the Table of the 3d. Article of the precedent Chapter.

1 A Parabola being given, to find a Straight Line equal to the Crooked Line of the Semiparabola.

Let the Parabolical Line given be ABC (in the first Figure), and the Diameter found be AD, and the base drawn DC, and the Parallelogram ADCE being completed, draw the straight Line AC. Then dividing AD into two equal parts in F, draw FH equal and parallel to DC, cutting AC in K, and the parabolical line in O; and between FH and FO take a mean proportional FP, and draw AO, AP and PC. I say that the two Lines AP and PC taken together as one Line, is equal to the parabolical line ABOC.

For the line ABOC being a parabolical line, is generated by the concourse of two Motions, one Uniform from A to E, the other in the same time uniformly accelerated from rest in A to D. And because the motion from A to E is uniform, AE may represent the times of both those motions from the beginning to the end. Let therefore AE be the time; and consequently the lines ordinately applyed in the Semiparabola, will designe the parts of time wherein the Body that describeth the line ABOC is in every point of the same; so that as at the end of the time AE or DC it is in C, so at the end of the time FO it will be in O. And because the Velocity in

AD is encreased uniformly, that is, in the same proportion with the time, the same lines ordinately applyed in the Semiparabola will designe also the continual augmentations of the Impetus, till it be at the greatest, designed by the base DC. Therefore supposing Uniform motion in the line AF, in the time FK the Body in A by the concourse of the two uniform motions in AF and FK will be moved uniformly in the line AK; and KO wil be the encrease of the Impetus or Swiftness gained in the time FK; and the line AO will be uniformly described by the concourse of the two uniform motions in AF and FO in the time FO. From O draw OL parallel to EC, cutting AC in L; & draw LN parallel to DC, cutting EC in N, and the parabolical line in M; and produce it on the other side to AD in I; and IN, IM and IL will be (by the construction of a Parabola) in continual proportion, & equal to the three lines FH, FP and FO; and a straight line parallel to EC passing through M will fall on P; and therefore OP will be the encrease of Impetus gained in the time FO or IL. Lastly, produce PM to CD in Q; and QC, or MN, or PH will be the encrease of Impetus proportional to the time FP, or IM, or DQ. Suppose now uniform motion from H to C in the time PH. Seeing therefore in the time FP with uniform motion and the Impetus encreased in proportion to the times, is described the straight line AP; and in the rest of the time and Impetus, namely PH, is described the line CP uniformly; it followeth that the whole line APC is described with the whole Impetus, and in the same time wherewith is described the parabolicall line ABC; and therefore the line APC, made of the two straight lines AP and PC, is equal to the parabolical line ABC; which was to be proved.

2 To find a Straight line equal to the Crooked line of the first Semiparabolaster.

Let ABC be the Crooked line of the first Semiparabolaster; AD the Diameter; DC the Base; and let the Parallelogram completed be ADCE, whose Diagonal is AC. Divide the Diameter into two equal parts in F, and

draw FH equal and parallel to DC, utting AC in K, the Crooked line in O, and EC in H. Then draw OL parallel to EC, cutting AC in L; and draw LN parallel to the base DC, cutting the Crooked line in M, and the straight line EC in N; and produce it on the other side to AD in I. Lastly, through the point M draw PMQ parallel and equal to HC, cutting FH in P; and joyn CP, AP and AO. I say the two Straight lines AP and PC are equal to the Crooked line ABOC.

For the line ABOC being the Crooked line of the first Semiparabolaster, is generated by the concourse of two Motions, one uniform from A to E, the other in the same time accelerated from rest in A to D, so as that the Impetus encreaseth in proportion perpetually triplicate to that of the encrease of the time, or (which is all one) the lengths transmitted are in proportion triplicate to that of the times of their transmission; for as the Impetus or Quicknesses encrease, so the Lengths transmitted encrease also. And because the motion from A to E is uniform, the line AE may serve to represent the time, and consequently the lines ordinately drawn in the Semiparabolaster, will designe the parts of time wherein the Body beginning from rest in A, describeth by its motion the Crooked line ABOC. And because DC which represents the greatest acquired Impetus is equal to AE, the same ordinate lines will represent the several augmentations of the Impetus encreasing from rest in A. Therefore supposing uniform Motion from A to F in the time FK, there will be described by the concourse of the two uniform Motions AF and FK the line AK uniformly, and KO will be the encrease of Impetus in the time FK; And by the concourse of the two uniform Motions in AF and FO, will be described the line AO uniformly. Through the point L draw the straight line LMN parallel to DC, cutting the straight line AD in I, the crooked line ABC in M, and the straight line EC in N; and through the point M the straight line PMQ parallel and equal to HC, cutting DC in Q, and FH in P. By the concourse therefore of the two

uniform Motions in AF and FP in the time FP will be uniformly described the straight line AP; and LM or OP will be the encrease of Impetus to be added for the time FO. And because the proportion if IN to I L is triplicate to the proportion of I N to I M, the proportion of F H to F O will also be triplicate to the proportion of F H to F P; and the proportional Impetus gained in the time F P is P H. So that F H being equal to P C which designed the whole Impetus acquired by the acceleration, there is no more encrease of Impetus to be computed. Now in the time P H suppose an uniform motion from H to C; and by the two uniform motions in C H and H P will be described uniformly the Straight line P C. Seeing therefore the two Straight lines A P and P C are described in the time A E with the same encrease of Impetus wherewith the Crooked line A B C is described in the same time A E, that is, seeing the Line A P C and the Line A B C are transmitted by the same Body in the same Time, & with equal Velocities, the Lines themselves are equal; which was to be demonstrated.

By the same method, if any of the Semiparabolasters in the Table of the 3d Article of the precedent Chapter be exhibited, may be found a Straight line equal to the Crooked line thereof, namely, by dividing the Diameter into two equal parts, and proceeding as before. Yet no man hitherto hath compared any Crooked with any Straight Line, though many Geometricians of every Age have endeavoured it. But the cause why they have not done it may be this, that there being in Euclide no Definition of Equality, nor any mark by which to judge of it besides Congruity (which is the 8th. Axiome of the first Book of his Elements) a thing of no use at all in the comparing of Straight and Crooked; and others after Euclide (except Archimedes and Apollonius, and in our time Boaentura) thinking the industry of the Ancients had reached to all that was to be done in Geometry, thought also, that all that could be propounded, was either to be deduced from what they had written, or else that it was not at all to be done. It was therefore

disputed by some of those Ancients themselves, whether there might be any Equality at all between Crooked and Straight Lines; Which question Archimedes (who assumed that some Straight line was equal to the Circumference of a Circle) seems to have despised, as he had reason. And there is a late Writer that granteth that between a Straight and a Crooked Line there is Equality; but now, now sayes he, since the fall of Adam, without the special assistance of Divine Grace, it is not to be found

CHAP. XIX. OF ANGLES OF INCIDENCE AND REFLECTION, EQUAL BY SUPPOSITION.

1 IF TWO straight lines falling upon another straight line be parallel, the lines reflected from them shall also be parallel.

2 If two straight lines drawn from one point, fall upon another straight line, the lines reflected from them, if they be drawn out the other way, will met in an angle equal to the angle made by the lines of Incidence.

3 If two straight parallel lines drawn (not oppositely but) from the same parts, fall upon the Circumference of a Circle, the lines reflected from them, if produced they meet within the Circle, will make an angle double, to that which is made by two straight lines drawn from the Center to the points of Incidence.

4 If two straight lines drawn from the same point without a Circle fall upon the Circumference, and the lines reflected from them, being produced meet within the Circle, they will make an angle equal to twice that angle which is made by two straight lines drawn from the Center to the points of Incidence, together with the angle which the incident lines themselves make.

5 If two straight lines drawn from one point fall upon the concave Circumference of a Circle, and the angle they make be less then twice the angle at the Center, the lines reflected from them, and meeting within the Circle, will make an angle which being added to the angle of the incident lines, will be equal to twice the angle at the Center.

6 If through any one point two unequal Chords be drawn cutting one another, and the Center of the Circle be not placed between them, and the lines reflected from them concurre wheresoever, there

cannot through the point through which the two former lines were drawn, be drawn any other straight line, whose reflected line shall pass through the common point of the two former lines reflected.

7 In equal Chords the same is not true.

8 Two points being given in the Circumference of a Circle, to draw two straight lines to them, so as that their reflected lines may contain any angle given.

9 If a straight line falling upon the Circumference of a Circle be produced till it reach the Semidiameter, and that part of it which is intercepted between the Circumference and the Semidiameter, be equal to that part of the Semidiameter which is between the point of concourse & the center, the reflected line will be parallel to the Semidiameter.

10 If from a point within a Circle, two straight lines be drawn to the Circumference, and their reflected lines meet in the Circumference of the same Circle, the angle made by the reflected lines, will be a third part of the angle made by the incident lines.

WHETHER a Body, falling upon the superficies of another Body and being reflected from it, do make equal angles at that superficies, it belongs not to this place to dispute, being a knowledge which depends upon the natural causes of Reflection; of which hitherto nothing has been said, but shall be spoken of hereafter.

In this place therefore let it be supposed, that the angle of Incidence is equal to the angle of Reflection, that our present search may be applyed not to the finding out of the causes, but some consequences of the same.

I call an Angle of Incidence, that which is made between a straight line and another line (straight or crooked) upon which it falls, and which I call the Line Reflecting; and an Angle of Reflection equal to it, that which is made at the same point between the straight line which is reflected, and the line reflecting.

1 If two straight lines which fall upon another straight line be be parallel, their reflected lines shall be also parallel.

Let the two straight lines AB and CD (in the 1 figure) which fall upon the straight line EF, at the points B and D, be parallel; and let the lines reflected from them be BG and DH. I say BG and DH are also parallel.

For the angles ABE and CDE are equal by reason of the parallellelisme of AB and CD; and the angles GBF and HDF are equal to them by supposition; for the lines BG and DH are reflected from the lines AB and CD. Wherefore BG and DH are parallel.

2 If two straight lines drawn from the same point, fall upon another straight line, the lines reflected from them, if they be drawn out the other way, will meet in an angle equal to the angle of the Incident lines.

From the point AC (in the 2d. figure) let the two straight lines AB and AD be drawn; and let them fall upon the straight line EK at the points B and D; and let the lines BI and DG be reflected from them. I say, IB and GD do converge, and that if they be produced on the other side of the line EK they shall meet, as in F; and that the angle BFD shal be equal to the angle BAD.

For the angle of Reflection IBK is equal to the angle of Incidence ABE; and to the angle IBK, its vertical angle EBF is equal; and therefore the angle ABE is equal to the angle EBF. Again the angle ADE is equal to the angle of Reflection GDK, that is, to its vertical angle EDF; and therefore the two angles ABD and ADB of the triangle ABD, are one by one equal to the two angles FBD and FDB of the triangle FBD; Wherfore also the third angle BAD is equal to the third angle BFD, which was to be proved.

- Corollary 1. If the straight line AF be drawn, it will be perpendicular to the straight line EK. For both the angles at E will be equal, by reason of the equality of the two angles ABE and FBE, and of the two sides AB and FB.

- Corollary 2. If upon any point between B and D there fall a straight line, as AC, whose reflected line is CH, this also produced beyond C, will fall upon F; which is evident by the demonstration above.

3 If from two points taken without a Circle, two straight parallel lines drawn (not oppositely but) from the same parts, fall upon the Circumference; the lines reflected from them, if produced they meet within the Circle, will make an angle double to that which is made by two straight lines drawn from the Center to the points of Incidence.

Let the two straight parallels AB and DC (in the 3d figure) fall upon the Circumference BC at the points B and C; and let the Center of the Circle be E; and let AB reflected be BF, and DC reflected be CG; and let the lines FB and GC produced meet within the Circle in H; and let EB and EC be connected. I say the angle FHG is double to the angle BEC.

For seeing AB and DC are parallels, and EB cuts AB in B, the same EB produced will cut DC somewhere; let it cut it in D, & let DC be produced howsoever to I, and let the intersection of DC & BF be at K. The angle therefore ICH (being external to the triangle CKH,) will be equal to the two opposite angles CKH and CHK. Again, ICE (being external to the triangle CDE) is equal to the two angles at D and E. Wherefore the angle ICH, being double to the angle ICE, is equal to the angles at D and E twice taken; and therefore the two angles CKH and CHK are equal to the two angles at D and E twice taken. But the angle CKH is equal to the angles D and ABD, that is, D twice taken, (for AB and DC being parallels, the altern angles D, and ABD are equal). Wherefore CHK, that is the angle, FHG is also equal to the angle at E twice taken; which was to be proved.

Corollary. If from two points taken within a circle, two straight parallels fall upon the circumference, the lines reflected from them shall meet in an angle, double to that which is made by two straight lines drawn from the

center to the points of Incidence. For the parallels LB and IC falling upon the points B and C, are reflected in the lines BH and CH, and make the angle at H double to the angle at E, as was but now demonstrated-

4 If two straight lines drawn from the same point without a circle, fall upon the circumference, and the lines reflected from them being produced meet within the circle, they will make an angle equal to twice that angle which is made by two straight lines drawn from the center to the points of Incidence together with the angle which the incident lines themselves make.

Let the two straight lines AB and AC (in the 4th figure) be drawn from the point A to the circumference of the circle, whose center is D; and let the lines reflected from them be BE and CG, and being produced make within the circle the angle H; also let the two straight lines DB and DC be drawn from the center D to the points of Incidence B and C. I say the angle H is equal to twice the angle at D together with the angle at A.

For let AC be produced howsoever to I. Therefore the angle CH (which is external to the triangle CKH) will be equal to the two angles GKH and CHK. Again, the angle ICD (which is external to the triangle CLD) wil be equal to the two angles CLD and CDL. But the angle ICH is double to the angle ICD, and is therefore equal to the angles CLD and CDL twice taken. Wherefore the angles CKH and CHK are equal to the angles CLD and CDL twice taken. But the angle CLD (being external to the triangle ALB) is equal to the two angles LAB & LBA; & consequently CLD twice taken is equal to LAB & LAB twice taken. Wherefore CKH & CHK are equal to the angle CDL together with LAB and LBA twice taken. Also the angle CKH is equal to the angle LAB once, and ABK, that is, LBA twice taken. Wherefore the Angle CHK is equal to the remaining angle CDL (that is, to the angle at D) twice taken, and the angle LAB (that is, the angle at A) once taken; which was to be proved.

Corollary. If two straight converging lines, as IC and MB fall upon the concave circumference of a circle, their reflected lines, as CH and BH, will meet in the angle H, equal to twice the angle D, together with the angle at A made by the ncident lines produced. Or, if the Incident lines be HB and IC, whose reflected lines CH and BM meet in the point N, the angle CNB will be equal to twice the angle D, together with the angle CKH made by the lines of Incidence. For the angle CNB is equal to the angle H (that is, to twice the angle D) together with the two angles A and NBH (that is KBA). But the angles KBA and A are equal to the angle CKH. Wherefore the angle CNB is equal to twice the angle D, together with the angle CKH made by the lines of Incidence IC and HB produced to K.

5 If two straight lines drawn from one point, fall upon the concave circumference of a circle, and the angle they make be lesse then twice the angle at the center; the lines reflected from them, and meeting within the circle, will make an angle, which being added to the angle of the incident lines, will be equal to twice the angle at the center.

Let the two Lines AB and AC (in the 5th figure) drawn from the point A, fall upon the concave circumference of the circle whose center is D; & let their reflected Lines BE and CE meet in the point E; also let the angle A be less then twice the angle D. I say the angles A and E together taken are equal to twice the angle D.

For let the straight Lines AB and EC cut the straight Lines DC and DB in the points G and H; and the angle BHC will be equal to the two angles EBH and E; also the same angle BHC will be equal to the two angles D and DCH; and in like manner the angle BGC will be equal to the two angles ACD & A, & the same angle BGC will be also equal to the two angles DBG and D. Wherefore the four angles EBH, E, ACD and A are equal to the four angles D, DCH, DBG and D. If therefore equals be taken away on both sides, namely, on one side ACD and EBH, and on the other side DCH

and DBG (for the angle EBH is equal to the angle DBG, and the angle ACD equal to the angle DCH) the remainders on both sides will be equal, namely, on one side the angles A and E, and on the other the angle D twice taken. Wherefore the angles A and E are equal to twice the angle D.

Corollary. If the angle A be greater then twice the angle D, their reflected ines will diverge. For, by the Corollary of the third Proposition, if the angle A be equal to twice the angle D, the reflected Lines BE and CE will be parallel; and if it be lesse, they will concurre, as has now been demonstrated; and therefore if it be greater, the reflected Lines BE and CE will diverge, and consequently, if they be produced the other way, they will concurre, and make an angle equal to the excesse of the angle A above twice the angle D; as is evident by the fourth Article.

6 If through any one point, two unequal chords be drawn, cutting one another, either within the circle, or (if they be produced) without it, and the center of the circle be not placed between them, and the Lines reflected from them concurre wheresoever; there cannot through the point through which the former Lines were drawn, be drawn another straight Line, whose reflected Line shall passe through the point where the two former reflected Lines concurre.

Let any two unequal chords, as BK and CH (in the 6th Figure) be drawn through the point A in the circle BC; and let their reflected Lines BD and CE meet in F; and let the center not be between AB and AC; and from the point A let any other straight Line as AG be drawn to the circumference between B and C. I say GN, which passes through the point F, where the reflected Lines BD and CE meet, will not be the reflected Line of AG.

For let the arch BL be taken equal to the arch BG, and the straight Line BM equal to the straight Line BA; and LM being drawn, let it be produced to the circu¯mference in O. Seeing therefore BA and BM are equal, and the arch BL equal to the arch BG, and the angle MBL equal to the angle ABG,

AG and ML will also be equal, and (producing GA to the circumference in I) the whole lines LO and GI will in like manner be equal. But LO is greater then GFN (as shall presently be demonstrated) and therefore also GI is greater then GN. Wherefore the angles NGC and IGB are not equal. Wherefore the Line GFN is not reflected from the Line of Incidence AG, and consequently no other straight Line (besides AB and AC) which is drawn through the point A, and fals upon the circumference BC, can be reflected to the point F, which was to be demonstrated.

It remains that I prove LO to be greater then GN; which I shall do in this manner. LO and GN cut one another in P; and PL is greater then PG. Seeing now LP. PG :: PN. PO are proportionals, therefore the two Extremes LP and PO together taken, (that is LO), are greater then PG and PN together taken, (that is, GN,) which remained to be proved.

7 But if two equal chords be drawn through one point within a circle, and the Lines reflected from them meet in another point, then another straight Line may be drawn between them through the former point, whose reflected Line shall pass through the later point.

Let the two equal chords BC and ED (in the 7th figure) cut one another in the point A within the circle BCD; and let their reflected Lines CH and DI meet in the point F. Then dividing the arch CD equally in G, let the two chords GK and GL be drawn through the points A and F. I say GL will be the Line reflected from the chord KG. For the four chords BC, CH, ED and DI, are by supposition all equal to one another; and therefore the arch BCH is equal to the arch EDI; as also the angle BCH to the angle EDI; & the angle AMC to its vertical angle FMD; and the straight Line DM to the straight Line CM; and in like manner, the straight Line AC to the straight Line FD; and the chords CG and GD being drawn, will also be equal; as also the angles FDG and ACG, in the equal Segments GDI and GCB. Wherefore the straight Lines FG and AG are equal; and therefore the angle

FGD is equal to the angle AGC, that is, the angle of Incidence equal to the angle of Reflection. Wherefore the line GL is reflected from the incident Line KG; which was to be proved.

Corollary. By the very sight of the figure, it is manifest, that if G be not the middle point between C and D, the reflected Line GL will not pass through the point F.

8 Two points in the circumference of a circle being given, to draw two straight Lines to them, so as that their reflected Lines may be parallel, or contain any angle given.

In the circumference of the circle whose center is A (in the 8th. figure) let the two points B and C be given; and let it be required to draw to them from two points taken without the circle, two incident Lines, so, that their reflected Lines may (first) be parallel.

Let AB and AC be drawn; as also any incident Line DC, with its reflected Line CF; and let the angle ECD be made double to the angle A; and let HB be drawn parallel to EC, and produced till it meet with DC produced in I. Lastly, producing AB indefinitely to K, let GB be drawn, so, that the angle GBK may be equal to the angle HBK, and then GB will be the reflected Line of the incident Line HB. I say DC and HB are two incident Lines, whose reflected Lines CF and BG are parallel.

For seeing the angle ECD is double to the angle BAC, the angle HIC is also (by reason of the parallels EC and HI) double to the same BAC; Therefore also FC and GB (namely the lines reflected from the incident lines DC and HB are parallel. Wherefore the first thing required, is done.

Secondly, let it be required to draw to the points B & C two straight lines of Incidence, so, that the lines reflected from them may contain the given angle Z.

To the angle ECD made at the point C, let there be added on one side the angle DCL equal to half Z, and on the other side the angle ECM equal to

the angle DCL; and let the straight Line BN be drawn parallel to the straight line CM; and let the angle KBO be made equal to the angle NBK; which being done, BO will be the Line of Reflection from the Line of Incidence NB. Lastly, from the incident Line LC, let the reflected Line CO be drawn, cutting BO at O, and making the angle COB. I say the angle COB is equal to the angle Z.

Let NB be produced till it meet with the straight line LC produced in P. Seeing therefore the angle LCM is by construction equal to twice the angle BAC together with the angle Z; the angle NPL (which is equal to LCM by reason of the parallels NP and MC) will also be equal to twice the same angle BAC together with the angle Z. And seeing the two straight lines OC and OB fall from the point O upon the points C and B; and their reflected lines LC and NB meet in the point P; the angle NPL will be equal to twice the angle BAC together with the angle COP. But I have already proved the angle NPL to be equal to twice the angle BAC together with the angle Z. Therefore the angle COP is equal to the angle Z; Wherefore, Two points in the circumference of a Circle being given, I have drawn, &c. which was to be done.

But if it be required to draw the incident Lines from a point within the circle, so, that the Lines reflected from them may contain an angle equal to the angle Z, the same method is to be used, saving that in this case the angle Z is not to be added to twice the angle BAC, but to be taken from it.

9 If a straight line falling upon the circumference of a circle, be produced till it reach the Semidiameter, and that part of it which is intercepted between the circumference and the Semidiameter, be equal to that part of the Semidiameter which is between the point of concourse and the center, the reflected Line will be parallel to the Semidiameter.

Let any Line AB (in the 9th figure) be the Semidiameter of the circle whose center is A; and upon the circumference BD let the straight Line CD

fall, and be produced till it cut AB in E, so, that ED and EA may be equal; & from the incident Line CD let the Line DF be reflected. I say AB and DF will be parallel.

Let AG be drawn through the point D. Seeing therefore ED and EA are equal, the angles EDA and EAD will also be equal. But the angles FDG and EDA are equal (for each of them is half the angle EDH or FDC.) Wherefore the angles FDG and EAD are equal; and consequently DF and AB are parallel; which was to be proved.

Corollahy. If EA be greater then ED, then DF and AB being produced will concurre; but if EA be less then ED, then BA and DH being produced will concurre.

10 If from a point within a circle, two straight Lines be drawn to the Circumference, and their reflected Lines meet in the Circumference of the same circle, the angle made by the Lines of Reflection, will be a third part of the angle made by the Lines of Incidence.

From the point B (in the 10th figure) taken within the circle whose center is A, let the two straight lines BC and BD be drawn to the circumference; and let their reflected Lines CE and DE meet in the circumference of the same circle at the point E. I say the angle CED will be a third part of the angle CBD.

Let AC and AD be drawn. Seeing therefore the angles CED and CBD together taken, are equal to twice the angle CAD (as has been demonstrated in the 5th article); and the angle CAD twice taken is quadruple to the angle CED; the angles CED and CBD together taken, will also be equal to the angle CED four times taken; and therefore if the angle CED be taken away on both sides, there will remain the angle CBD on one side, equal to the angle CED thrice taken on the other side; which was to be demonstrated.

Coroll. Therefore a point being given within a Circle, there may be drawn two Lines from it to the Circumference, so as their reflected Lines

may meet in the Circumference. For it is but trisecting the Angle CBD; which how it may be done, shall be shewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XX. OF THE DIMENSION OF A CIRCLE, AND THE DIVISION OF ANGLES OR ARCHES.

1 THE DIMENSION of a Circle neer determined in Numbers by Archimedes and others.

2 The first attempt for the finding out of the Dimension of a Circle by Lines.

3 The second attempt for the finding out of the Dimension of a Circle from the consideration of the nature of Crookedness.

4 The third attempt; and some things propounded to be further searched into.

5 The Equation of the Spiral of Archimedes with a straight Line.

6 Of the Analysis of Geometricians by the Powers of Lines.

1 IN the comparing of an Arch of a Circle with a Straight Line, many and great Geometricians, even from the most ancient times, have exercised their wits; and more had done the same, if they had not seen their pains, though undertaken for the common good, if not brought to perfection, vilified by those that envy the prayses of other men. Amongst those Ancient Writers whose Works are come to our hands, Archimedes was the first that brought the Length of the Perimeter of a Circle within the limits of Numbers very litle differing from the truth; demonstrating the same to be less then three Diameters and a seventh part, but greater then three Diameters and ten seventy one parts of the Diameter. So that supposing the Radius to consist of 10000000 equal parts, the Arch of a Quadrant will be between 15714285 and 15 04225 of the same parts. In our times Ludovicus

Van Cullen & Willebrordus Snellius with joint endeavour have come yet neerer to the truth; and pronounced from true Principles, that the Arch of a Quadrant (putting, as before 10000000 for Radius) differs not one whole Unity from the number 15707963; which, if they had exhibited their arithmetical operations (and no man had discovered any errour in that long work of theirs) had been demonstrated by them. This is the furthest progress that has been made by the way of Numbers; and they that have proceeded thus far deserve the praise of Industry. Nevertheless, if we consider the benefit (which is the scope at which all Speculation should aime) the improvement they have made has been little, or none. For any ordinary man may much sooner, & more accurately find a Straight Line equal to the Perimeter of a Circle, and consequently square the Circle, by winding a small thred about a given Cylinder, then any Geometrician shall do the same by dividing the Radius into 10000000 equal parts. But though the length of the Circumference were exactly set out, either by Numbers, or mechanically, or onely by chance, yet this would contribute no help at all towards the Section of Angles, unless happily these two Problemes, To divide a given Angle according to any proportion assigned, and To finde a Straight Line equal to the Arch of a Circle, were reciprocal, and followed one another. Seeing therefore the benefit proceeding from the knowledge of the Length of the Arch of a Quadrant, consists in this, that we may there by divide an Angle according to any proportion, either accurately, or at least accurately enough for common use; and seeing this cannot be done by Arithmetick, I thought fit to attempt the same by Geometry; and in this Chapter to make trial whether it might not be performed by the drawing of Straight and Circular Lines.

2 Let the Square A B C D (in the first figure) be described; and with the Radii A B, B C and D C the three Arches B D, C A and A C; of which let the two B D and C A cut one another in E, and the two B D and A C in F.

The Diagonals therefore B D and A C being drawn will cut one another in the center of the Square G, and the two Arches B D and C A into two equal parts in H and Y; and the Arch B H D will be trisected in F and E. Through the Center G let the two Straight Lines K G L and M G N be drawn parallel and equal to the sides of the Square A B and A D, cutting the four sides of the same Square in the points K, L, M and N; which being done, K L will pass through F, and M N through E. Then let O P be drawn parallel and equal to the side B C, cutting the Arch B F D in F, and the sides A B and D C in O and P. Therefore O F will be the Sine of the arch B F, which is an arch of 30 degrees; and the same O F will be equal to half the Radius. Lastly, dividing the arch B F in the middle in Q, let R Q the Sine of the arch B Q be drawn and produced to S so that Q S be equal to R Q, and consequently R S be equal to the chord of the arch B F; and let F S be drawn and produced to T in the side B C. I say, the Straight Line B T is equal to the Arch B F; and consequently that B V the triple of B T is equal to the Arch of the Quadrant B F E D.

Let T F be produced till it meet the side B A produced in X; and dividing O F in the middle in Z, let. Q Z be drawn and produced till it meet with the side B A produced. Seeing therefore the Straight Lines R S and O F are parallel, and divided in the midst in Q and Z, Q Z produced will fall upon X, and X Z Q produced to the side B C will cut B T in the midst in α.

Upon the Straight line F Z the fourth part of the Radius A B let the equilateral triangle a Z F be constituted; & upon the center a, with the Radius a Z let the arch Z F be drawn; which arch Z F will therefore be equal to the arch Q F the half of the arch B F. Again, let the straight line Z O be cut in the midst in b, and the straight line b O in the midst in c; and let the bisection be continued in this manner till the last part O c be the least that can possibly be taken; and upon it, and all the rest of the parts equal to it into which the straight line O F may be cut, let so many equilateral triangles

be understood to be constituted; of which let the last be d O c. If therefore upon the center d, with the Radius d O be drawn the arch O c, and upon the rest of the equal parts of the straight line O F be drawn in like manner so many equal arches, all those arches together taken will be equal to the whole arch B F; & the half of them, namely, those that are comprehended between O & Z, or between Z & F will be equal to the arch B Q or Q F and in summe, what part soever the straight line O c be of the straight line O F, the same part will the arch O c be of the arch O F, though both the arch and the chord be infinitely bisected. Now seeing the arch O c is more crooked then that part of the arch B F which is equal to it; and seeing also that the more the straight line X c is produced the more it diverges from the straight line X O, if the points O and c be understood to be moved forwards with straight motion in X O and X c, the arch O will thereby be extended by little and little, till at the last it come some-where o have the same crookedness with that part of the arch B F which is equal to it. In like manner, if the straight line X b be drawn, and the point b be understood to be moved forwards at the same time, the arch c b will also by little and little be extended, till its crookedness come to be equal to the crookedness of that part of the arch B F which is equal to it. And the same will happen in all those smal equal arches which are described upon so many equal parts of the straight line O F. It is also manifest, that by straight motion in X O and X Z all those small arches will lie in the arch B F in the points B, Q and F. And though the same small equall arches should not be coincident with the equall parts of the arch B F in all the other points thereof, yet certainly they will constitute two crooked lines, not onely equall to the two arches B Q and Q F and equally crooked, but also having their cavity towards the same parts; which how it should be, unlesse all those small arches should be coincident with the arch B F in all its points, is not imaginable. They are therefore coincident, and all the straight lines drawne from X & passing

through the points of division of the straight line O F, will also divide the arch B F into the same proportions into which O F is divided.

Now seeing X b cuts off from the point B the fourth part of the arch B F, let that fourth part be B e; and let the Sine thereof f e be produced to F T in g, for so f e will be the fourth part of the straight line f g, because as O b is to O F, so is f e to f g. But B T is greater then f g; and therefore the same B T is greater then four Sines of the fourth part of the arch B F. And in like mnner, if the arch B F be subdivided into any number of equal par whatsoever, it may be proved that the straight line B T is greater then the Sine of one of those small arches so many times as here be parts made of the whole arch B F. Wherefore the traight line B T is not lesse then the Arch B F. But neither can it be greater, because if any straight line whatsoever, lesse then B T, be draw below B T parallel to it and terminated in the straight line X B and X T, it would cut the arch B F; and so the Sine of some one of the parts of the arch B F taken so often as that small arch is found in the whole arch B F, would be greater then so many of the same arches; which is absurd. Wherefore the Straight line B T is equal to the Arch B F; & the Straight line B V equal to the Arch of the Quadrant B F D; and B V four times taken, equal to the Perimeter of the Circle described with the Radius A B. Also the Arch B F and the Straight line B T are every where divided into the same proportions; and consequently any given Angle, whether greater or less then B A F may be divided into any proportion given.

But the straight line B V (though its magnitude fall within the terms assigned by Archimedes) is found, if computed by the Canon of Sines, to be somwhat greater then that w^{ch} is exhibited by the Ludolphine numbers. Nevertheless, if in the place of B T, another straight line, though never so little less, be substituted, the division of Angles is immediatly lost, as may by any man be demonstrated by this very Scheme.

Howsoever, if any man think this my Straight line B V to be too great, yet, seeing the Arch and all the Parallels are every where so exactly divided, and B V comes so neer to the truth, I desire he would seach out the reason, Why (granting B V to be precisely true) the Arches cut off should not be equal.

But some man may yet ask the reason why the straight lines drawn from X through the equal parts of the arch B F should cut off in the Tangent B V so many straight lines equal to them, seeing the connected straight line X V passes not through the point D, but cuts the straight line A D produced in l; and consequently require some determination of this Probleme. Concerning which, I will say what I think to be the reason, namely, that whilest the magnitude of the Arch doth not exceed the magnitude of the Radius, that is, the magnitude of the Tangent B C, both the Arch and the Tangent are cut alike by the straight lines drawn from X; otherwise not. For A V being connected, cutting the arch B H D in I, if X C being drawn should cut the same arch in the same point I, it would be as true that the Arch B I is equal to the Radius B C, as it is true that the Arch B F is equal to the straight line B T, and drawing X K it would cut the arch B I in the midst in i; Also drawing A i and producing it to the Tangent B C in k, the straight line B k will be the Tangent of the arch B i, (which arch is equal to half the Radius) and the same straight line B k will be equal to the straight line k I. I say all this is true, if the preceding demonstration be true; and consequently the proportional section of the Arch and its Tangent proceeds hitherto. But it is manifest by the Golden Rule, that taking B h double to B T, the line X h shall not cut off the arch B E which is double to the arch B F, but a much greater. For the magnitude of the straight lines X M, X B and M E being known (in numbers) the magnitude of the straight line cut off in the Tangent by the straight line X E produced to the Tangent may also be known; and it will be found to be less then B h; Wherfore the straight line Xh being drawn

will cut off a part of the arch of the Quadrant greater then the arch B E. But I shall speak more fully in the next Article concerning the magnitude of the arch B I.

And let this be the first attempt for the finding out of the dimension of a Circle by the Section of the arch B F.

3 I shall now attempt the same by arguments drawn from the nature of the Crookedness of the Circle it self; but I shall first set down some Premisses necessary for this speculation; and

First, If a Straight line be bowed into an Arch of a Circle equal to it, as when a stretched thred which toucheth a Right Cylinder, is so bowed in every point, that it be every where coincident with the Perimeter of the base of the Cylinder, the Flexion of that line will be equal, in all its points; and consequently the Crookedness of the Arch of a Circle is every where Uniform; which needs no other demonstration then this, That the Perimeter of a Circle is an Uniform line.

Secondly, and consequently, If two unequal Arches of the same Circle be made by the bowing of two straight lines equal to them, the Flexion of the longer line (whilest it is bowed into the greater Arch) is greater then the Flexion of the shorter line (whilest it is bowed into the lesser Arch) according to the proportion of the Arches themselves; and consequently, the Crookedness of the greater Arch is to the Crookedness of the lesser Arch; as the greater Arch is to the lesser Arch.

Thirdly, If two unequal Circles and a straight line touch one another in the same point, the Crookedness of any Arch taken in the lesser Circle, will be greater then the Crookedness of an Arch equal to it taken in the greater Circle, in reciprocal proportion to that of the Radii with which the Circles are described; or, which is all one, any straight line being drawn from the point of Contact till it cut both the circumferences, as the part of that

straight line cut off by the circumference of the greater Circle to that part which is cut off by the circumference of the lesser Circle.

For let A B and A C (in the second figure) be two Circles, touching one another and the straight line A D in the point A; and let their Centers be E and F; and let it be supposed, that as A E is to A F, so is the Arch A B to the Arch A H. I say the Crookedness of the Arch A C is to the Crookedness of the Arch A H, as A E is to A F. For let the straight line A D be supposed to be equal to the Arch A B, and the straight line A G to the Arch A C; and let A D (for example) be double to A G. Therefore by reason of the likeness of the Arches A B and A C, the straight line A B will be double to the straight line A C, and the Radius A E double to the Radius A F, and the Arch A B double to the Arch A H. And because the straight line A D is so bowed to be coincident with the Arch A B equal to it, as the straight line A G is bowed to be coincident with the Arch A C equal also to it, the Flexion of the straight line A G into the Crooked line A C will be equal to the Flexion of the straight Line A D into the Crooked line A B. But the Flexion of the straight line A D into the Crooked line A B is double to the the Flexion of the straight line A G into the Crooked line A H; and therefore the Flexion of the straight line A G into the Crooked line A C is double to the Flexion of the same straight line A G into the Crooked line A H. Wherefore, as the Arch A B is to the Arch A C or A H; or as the Radius A E is to the Radius A F; or as the Chord A B is to the Chord A C; so reciprocally is the Flexion or Uniform Crookedness of the Arch A C, to the Flexion or Uniform Crookedness of the Arch A H, namely, here double. And this may by the same method be demonstrated in Circles whose Perimeters are to one another triple, quadruple, or in whatsoever given proportion. The Crookedness therefore of two equal Arches taken in several Circles are in proportion reciprocall to that of their Radii, or like Arches, or like Chords; which was to be demonstrated.

Let the Square A B C D be again described (in the third Figure,) and in it the Quadrants A B D, B C A and D A C; and dividing each side of the Square A B C D in the midst in E, F, G and H, let E G and F H be connected, which will cut one another in the center of the Square at I, and divide the arch of the Quadrant A B D into three equal parts in K and L. Also the Diagonals A C and B D being drawn will cut one another in I, and divide the arches B K D and C L A into two equal parts in M and N. Then with the Radius B F let the arch F E be drawn, cutting the Diagonal B D in O; and dividing the arch B M in the midst in P, let the straight line E a equal to the chord B P be set off from the point E in the arch E F, and let the arch a b be taken equal to the arch O a, and let B a and B b be drawn and produced to the arch A N in c and d; and lastly, let the straight line A d be drawn. I say the Straight line A d is equal to the Arch A N or B M.

I have proved in the preceding article, that the arch E O is twice as crooked as the arch B P, that is to say, that the arch E O is so much more crooked then the arch B P, as the arch B P is more crooked then the straight line E a. The crookedness therefore of the chord E a, of the arch B P, and of the arch E O are as 0, 1, 2. Also the difference between the arches E O and E O, the difference between the arches E O and E a, and the difference between the arches E O and E b are as 0, 1, 2. So also the difference between the arches A N and A N, the difference between the arches A N and A c, and the difference between the arches A N and A d are as 0, 1, 2; and the straight line A c is double to the chord B P or E a, and the straight line A d double to the chord E b.

Again, let the straight line B F be divided in the midst in Q, and the arch B P in the midst in R; and describing the Quadrant B Q S (whose arch Q S is a fourth part of the arch of the Quadrant B M D, as the arch B R is a fourth part of the arch B M which is the arch of the Semiquadrant A B M) let the chord S e equal to the chord B R be set off from the point S in the

arch S Q; and let B e be drawn and produced to the arch A N in f; which being done, the straight line A f will be quadruple to the chord B R or S e. And seeing the crookedness of the arch S e or of the arch A c is double to the crookedness of the arch B R, the excess of the crookedness of the arch A f above the crookedness of the arch A c will be subduple to the excess of the crookedness of the arch A c above the crookedness of the arch A N; and therefore the arch N c will be double to the arch c f. Wherefore the arch c d is divided in the midst in f, and the arch N f is ¾ of the arch N d. And in like manner if the arch B R be bisected in V, and the straight Line B Q in X, and the quadrant B X Y be described, and the straight Line Y g equal to the chord B V be set off from the point Y in the arch Y X, it may be demonstrated that the straight Line B g being drawn and produced to the arch A N will cut the arch f d into two equal parts, and that a straight Line drawn from A to the point of that Section, will be equal to eight chords of the arch B V, and so on perpetually; and consequently, that the straight Line A d is equal to so many equal chords of equal parts of the arch B M, as may be made by infinite bisections. Wherefore the Straight Line A d is equal to the Arch B M or A N, that is, to half the Arch of the Quadrant A B D or B C A.

Corollary. An Arch being given not greater then the arch of a Quadrant (for being made greater it comes again towards the Radius B A produced, from which it receded before) if a straight Line double to the chord of half the given arch be adapted from the beginning of the arch, and by how much the arch that is subtended by it is greater then the given arch, by so much a greater arch be subtended by another straight Line, this Straight Line shall be equal to the first given Arch.

Supposing the Straight Line B V (in the first Figure) be equal to the arch of the Quadrant B H D, and A V be connected cutting the arch B H D in I, it may be asked what proportion the arch B I has to the arch I D. Let therefore

the arch A Y be divided in the midst in o, and in the straight line A D let A p be taken equal, and A q double to the drawn chord A o. Then upon the center A, with the Radius A q let an arch of a circle be drawne cutting the arch A Y in r, and let the arch Y r be doubled at t; which being done, the drawne straight line A t (by what has been last demonstrated) will be equall to the arch A Y. Again, upon the Center A with the Radius A t let the arch tu be drawne cutting AD in u; and the straight line A u will be equall to the arch AY. From the point u let the straight line us be drawn equal and parallell to the straight line AB, cutting MN in x, and bisected by MN in the same point x. Therefore the straight line A x being drawn and produced till it meet with BC produced in V, it will cut off BV double to B s, that is, equal to the arch BHD. Now let the point where the straight line AV cuts the arch BHD, be I; and let the arch DI be divided in the midst in y; and in the straight line DC, let D z be taken equal, and D δ double to the drawn chord D y; and upon the center D with the Radius D δ let an arch of a circle be drawn cutting the arch BHD in the point n; and let the arch nm be taken equal to the arch I n; which being done, the straight line D m will (by the last foregoing Corollary) be equal to the arch DI. If now the straight lines D m and CV be equal, the arch BI will be equal to the Radius AB or BC; and consequently XC being drawn will pass through the point I. Moreover, if the semicircle BHD β being completed, the straight lines β I and BI be drawn making a right angle (in the Semicircle) at I, and the arch BI be divided in the midst at i, it will follow that A i being connected will be parallel to the straight line β I, and being produced to BC in k, will cut off the straight line B k equal to the straight line k I, and equal also to the straight line Aγ cut off in AD by the straight line β I. All which is manifest, supposing the arch BI and the Radius BC to be equal.

But that the arch BI and the Radius BC are precisely equal, cannot (how true soever it he) be demonstrated, unless that be first proved w^{ch} is

contained in the first article, namely, that the straight lines drawn from X through the equal parts of OF (produced to a certain length) cut off so many parts also in the Tangent BC severally equal to the several arches cut off; which they do most exactly as far as BC in the Tangent, and BI in the arch BE; in so much that no inequality between the arch BI and the Radius BC can be discovered either by the hand or by ratiocination. It is therefore to be further enquired, whether the straight line AV cut the arch of the Quadrant in I in the same proportion as the point C divides the straight line BV which is equal to the arch of the Quadrant. But however this be, it has been demonstrated that the straight line BV is equal to the arch BHD.

4 I shall now attempt the same dimension of a Circle another way, assuming the two following Lemma's.

Lemma 1. If to the Arch of a Quadrant, and the Radius, there be taken in continual proportion a third Line Z; then the Arch of the Semiquadrant, Half the chord of the Quadrant, and Z will also be in continual proportion.

For seeing the Radius is a mean proportional between the Chord of a Quadrant and its Semichord, and the same Radius a mean proportional between the Arch of the Quadrant and Z, the Square of the Radius will be equal as well to the Rectangle made of the Chord and Semichord of the Quadrant, as to the Rectangle made of the Arch of the Quadrant and Z; and these two Rectangles will be equal to one another. Wherfore, as the Arch of a Quadrant is to its Chord, so reciprocally is half the Chord of the Quadrant to Z. But as the Arch of the Quadrant is to its Chord, so is half the Arch of the Quadrant to half the Chord of the Quadrant. Wherefore, as half the arch of the Quadrant is to half the Chord of the Quadrant (or to the Sine of 45 degrees) so is half the Chord of the Quadrant to Z; which was to be proved.

Lemma 2. The Radius, the Arch of the Semiquadrant, the Sine of 45 degrees, and the Semiradius are proportional.

For seeing the Sine of 45 degrees is a mean proportional between the Radius and the Semiradius; and the same Sine of 45 degrees is also a mean proportional (by the precedent Lemma) between the Arch of 45 degrees and Z; the Square of the Sine of 45 degrees will be equal as well to the Rectangle made of the Radius and Semiradius, as to the Rectangle made of the Arch of 45 degrees and Z. Wherefore, as the Radius is to the Arch of 45 degrees, so reciprocally is Z to the Semiradius; which was to be demonstrated.

Let now ABCD (in the fourth Figure) be a Square; and with the Radii AB, BC and DA let the three Quadrants ABD, BCA and DAC be described; and let the straight lines EF and GH drawn parallel to the Sides BC & AB, divide the Square ABCD into foure equal Squares. They will therefore cut the arch of the Quadrant ABD into three equal parts in I and K, and the arch of the Quadrant BCA into three equal parts in K and L. Also let the Diagonals AC and BD be drawn, cutting the arches BID and ALC in M and N. Then upon the center H with the Radius HF equal to half the Chord of the arch BMD, or to the Sine of 45 degrees, let the arch FO be drawn cutting the arc CK in O; and let AO be drawn and produced till it meet with BC produced in P; also let it cut the arch BMD in Q, and the straight line DC in R. If now the straight line H Q be equal to the straight line DR, and being produced to DC in S cut off DS equal to half the straight line BP; I say then the Straight Line BP will be equal to the Arch BMD.

For seeing PBA and ADR are like triangles, it will be as PB to the Radius BA or AD, so AD to DR; and therefore as well PB, AD and DR, as PB, AD (or A Q) and Q H are in continuall proportion; and producing HO to DC in T, DT will be equal to the Sine of 45 degrees, as shall by and by be demonstrated. Now DS, DT and DR are in continual porportion by the first Lemma; and by the second Lemma DC. DS:: DR. DF are proportionals. And thus it will be, whether BP be equal or not equal to the arch of the

Quadrant BMD. But if they be equal, it will then be, as that part of the arch BMD which is equal to the Radius, is to the remainder of the same arch BMD; so A Q to H Q, or so BC to CP. And then will BP and the arch BMD be equal. But it is not demonstrated that the Straight Lines H Q and DR are equal; though if from the point B there be drawn (by the construction of the first figure) a Straight Line equal to the arch BMD, then DR to H Q, and also the half of the Straight Line BP to DS, will always be so equal, that no inequality can be discovered between them. I will therefore leave this to be further searched into. For though it be almost out of doubt, that the Straight Line BP and the arch BMD are equal, yet that may not be received without demonstration; and means of Demonstration the Circular Line admitteth none that is not grounded upon the nature of Flexion, or of Angles. But by that way I have already exhibited a Straight Line equal to the Arch of a Quadrant in the First and Second aggression.

It remains that I prove DT to be equal to the Sine of 45 degrees.

In BA produced let AV he taken equal to the Sine of 45 degrees; and drawing and producing VH, it will cut the arch of the Quadrant CNA in the midst in N, and the same arch again in O, and the Straight line DC in T, so, that DT will be equal to the Sine of 45 degrees, or to the straight line AV; also the Straight line VH will be equal to the straight line HI or the Sine of 60 degrees.

For the square of AV is equal to two squares of the Semiradius; and consequently the square of VH is equal to three Squares of the Semiradius. But HI is a mean proportional between the Semiradius and three Semiradii; and therefore the square of HI is equal to three Squares of the Semiradius. Wherefore HI is eqval to HV. But because AD is cut in the midst in H, therefore VH and HT are equal; and therefore also DT is equal to the Sine of 45 degrees. In the Radius BA let BX be taken equal to the Sine of 45 degrees; for so VX will be equal to the Radius; and it will be as VA to AH

the Semiradius, so VX the Radius to XN the Sine of 45 degrees. Wherefore VH produced passes through N. Lastly, upon the center V with the Radius VA let the arch of a circle be drawn cutting VH in Y; which being done, VY will be equal to HO (for HO is by construction equal to the Sine of 45 degrees) and YH will be equal to OT; & therefore VT passes through O. All which was to be demonstrated.

I will here add certain Problemes, of which if any Analyst can make the construction, he will thereby be able to judge clearly of what I have now said concerning the dimension of a Circle. Now these Problems are nothing else (at least to sense) but certain symptomes accompanying the construction of the first and third figure of this Chapter.

Describing therefore again the Square ABCD (in the fifth figure) and the three Quadrants ABD, BCA and DAC, let the Diagonals AC & BD be drawn, cutting the arches BHD & CIA in the middle in H and I; & the straight lines EF and GL, dividing the square ABCD into four equal squares, and trisecting the arches BHD and CIA, namely, BHD in K and M, and CIA in M and O. Then dividing the arch BK in the midst in P, let QP the Sine of the arch BP be drawn and produced to R, so that QR be double to QP; and connecting KR, let it be produced one way to BC in S, and the other way to BA produced in T. Also let BV be made triple to BS, and consequently (by the second article of this Chapter) equall to the arch BD. This construction is the same with that of the first figure, which I thought fit to renew discharged of all lines but such as are necessary for my present purpose.

In the first place therefore, if AV be drawn, cutting the arch BHD in X, and the side DC in Z, I desire some Analyst would (if he can) give a reason, Why the straight lines TE and TC should cut the arch BD the one in Y, the other in X, so as to make the arch BY equal to the arch YX; or if they be not equal, that he would determine their difference.

Secondly, if in the side DA, the straight line Da be taken equal to DZ, and Va be drawn; Why Va and VB should be equal; or if they be not equal, What is the difference.

Thirdly, drawing Zb parallel and equal to the side CB, cutting the arch BHD in c, and drawing the straight line Ac, and producing it to BV in d; Why Ad should be equal and parallel to the straight line aV, and consequently equal also to the arch BD.

Fourthly, drawing eK the Sine of the arch BK, & taking (in eA produced) ef equal to the Diagonal AC, and connecting fC; Why fC should pass through a (which point being given, the length of the arch BHD is also given) and c; and why fe and fc should be equal; or if not, why unequal.

Fifthly, drawing fZ, I desire he would shew, Why it is equal to BV, or to the arch BD; or if they be not equal, What is their difference.

Sixtly, granting fZ to be equal to the arch BD, I desire he would determine whether it fall all without the arch BCA, or cut the same; or touch it, and in what point.

Seventhly, the Semicircle BDG being completed; Why gI being drawn and produced, should pass through X (by which point X the length of the arch BD is determined). And the same gI being yet further produced to DC in h; Why Ad (which is equal to the arch BD) should pass through that point h.

Eighthly, upon the Center of the square ABCD, which let be k, the arch of the quadrant EiL being drawn, cutting eK produced in i; Why the drawn straight line iX should be parallel to the side CD.

Ninthly, in the sides BA and BC taking Bl and Bm severally equal to half BV, or to the arch BH, and drawing mn parallel and equal to the side BA, cutting the arch BD in o; Why the straight line wich connects Vl should pass through the point o,

Tenthly, I would know of him, Why the straight line which connects aH should be equal to Bm; or if not, how much it differs from it.

The Analyst that can solve these Problemes without knowing first the length of the arch BD, or using any other known Method then that which proceeds by perpetual bisection of an angle, or is drawn from the consideration of the nature of Flexion, shall do more then ordinary Geometry is able to perform. But if the Dimension of a Circle cannot be found by any other Method; then I have either found it, or it is not at all to be found.

From the known Length of the Arch of a Quadrant, and from the proportional Division of the Arch and of the Tangent BC, may be deduced the Section of an Angle into any given proportion; as also the Squaring of the Circle, the Squaring of a given Sector, and many the like propositions, which it is not necessary here to demonstrate. I will therefore onely exhibit a Straight line equal to the Spiral of Archimedes, and so dismiss this speculation.

5 The length of the Perimeter of a Circle being found, that Straight line is also found, which touches a Spiral at the end of its first conversion. For upon the center A (in the sixth figure) let the circle BCDE be described; and in it let Archimedes his Spiral AFGHB be drawn, beginning at A and ending at B. Through the center A let the straight line CE be drawn, cutting the Diameter BD at right angles; and let it be produced to I, so, that AI be equal to the Perimeter BCDEB. Therefore IB being drawn will touch the Spiral AFGHB in B; which is demonstrated by Archimedes in his book de Spiralibus.

And for a Straight Line equal to the given Spiral AFGHB, it may be found thus.

Let the straight line AI (which is equal to the Perimeter BCDE) be bisected in K; and taking KL equal to the Radius AB, let the rectangle IL be

completed. Let ML be understood to be the axis, and KL the base of a Parabola, and let MK be the crooked line thereof. Now if the point M be conceived to be so moved by the concourse of two movents, the one fro¯ IM to KL with velocity encreasing continually in the same proportion with the Times, the other from ML to IK uniformly, that both those motions begin together in M and end in K; Galilaeus has demonstrated that by such motion of the point M, the crooked line of a Parabola will be described. Again, if the point A be conceived to be moved uniformly in the straight line AB, and in the same time to be carried round upon the center A by the circular motion of all the points between A and B; Archimedes has demonstrated that by such motion will be described a Spiral line. And seeing the circles of all these motions are concentrick in A; and the interiour circle is alwayes lesse then the exteriour in the proportion of the times in which AB is passed over with uniform motion; the velocity also of the circular motion of the point A, will continually encrease proportionally to the times. And thus far the generations of the Parabolical line MK, and of the Spiral line AFGHB, are like. But the Uniform motion in AB concurring with circular motion in the Perimeters of all the concentrick circles, describes that circle, whose center is A, and Perimeter BCDE; and therefore that circle is (by the Coroll. of the first article of the 16 Chapter) the aggregate of all the Velocities together taken of the point A whilst it describes the Spiral AFGHB. Also the rectangle IKLM is the aggregate of all the Velocities together taken of the point M, whilest it describes the crooked line MK. And therefore the whole velocity, by which the Parabolicall line MK is described is to the whole velocity with which the Spiral line AFGHB is described in the same time, as the rectangle IKLM, is to the Circle BCDE, that is to the triangle AIB. But because AI is bisected in K & the straight lines IM & AB are equal, therefore the rectangle IKLM and the triangle AIB are also equal. Wherefore the Spiral line AFGHB, and

the Parabolical line MK, being described with equal velocity and in equal times, are equal to one another. Now in the first article of the 18 Chapter a straight line is found out equal to any Parabolical line. Wherefore also a Straight line is found out, equal to a given Spiral line of the first revolution described by Archimedes; which was to be done.

6 In the sixth Chapter, which is of Method, that which I should there have spoken of the Analyticks of Geometricians, I thought fit to deferre, because I could not there have been understood, as not having then so much as named Lines, Superficies, Solids, Equal and Unequal &c. Wherefore I will in this place set down my thoughts concerning it.

Analysis, is continual Reasoning from the Definitions of the terms of a proposition we suppose true, and again from the Definitions of the terms of those Definitions, and so on, till we come to some things known, the Composition whereof is the demonstration of the truth or falsity of the first supposition; and this Composition or Demonstration is that we call Synthesis. Analytica therefore is that art, by which our reason proceeds from something supposed, to Principles, that is, to prime Propositions, or to such as are known by these, till we have so many known Propositions as are sufficient for the demonstration of the truth or falsity of the thing supposed. Synthetica is the art it self of Demonstration. Synthesis therefore and Analysis differ in nothing, but in proceeding forwards or backwards; and Logistica comprehends both. So that in the Analysis or Synthesis of any question, that is to say, of any Probleme, the Terms of all the Propositions ought to be convertible; or if they be enunciated Hypothetically, the truth of the Consequent ought not onely to follow out of the truth of its Antecedent, but contrarily also the truth of the Antecedent must necessarily be inferred from the truth of the Consequent. For otherwise, when by Resolution we are arrived at Principles, we cannot by Composition return directly back to the thing sought for. For those Terms which are the first in Analysis, will be the

last in Synthesis; as for example, when in Resoling, we say, these two Rectangles are equal and therefore their sides are reciprocally proportional, we must necessarily in Compounding say, the sides of these Rectangles are reciprocally proportional and therefore the Rectangles themselves are equal; Which we could not say, …ss Rectangles have their sides reciprocally proportional, and Rectangles are equal, were Terms convertible.

Now in every Analysis, that which is sought, is the Proportion of two quantities; by which proportion (a figure being described) the quantity sought for may be exposed to Sense. And this Exposition is the end and Solution of the question, or the construction of the Probleme.

And seeing Analysis is reasoning from something supposed, till we come to Principles, that is, to Definitions, or to Theoremes formerly known; and seeing the same reasoning tends in the last place to some Equation; we can therefore make no end of Resolving, till we come at last to the causes themselves of Equality and Inequality, or to Theoremes formerly demonstrated from those causes; and so have a sufficient number of those Theoremes for the demonstration of the thing sought for.

And seeing also, that the end of the Analyticks, is either the construction of such a Probleme as is possible, or the detection of the impossibility thereof; whensoever the Probleme may be solved, the Analyst must not stay, till he come to those things which contain the efficient cause of that whereof he is to make construction. But he must of necessity stay when he comes to prime Propositions; and these are Definitions. These Definitions therefore must contain the efficient cause of his Construction; I say of his Construction, not of the Conclusion which he demonstrates; for the cause of the Conclusion is contained in the premised propositions; that is to say, the truth of the proposition he proves, is drawn from the propositions which prove the same. But the cause of his construction is in the things themselves, and consists in motion, or in the concourse of motions.

Wherefore those propositions in which Analysis ends, are Definitions, but such, as signifie in what manner the construction, or generation of the thing proceeds. For otherwise, when he goes back by Synthesis to the proofe of his Probleme, he will come to no Demonstration at all; there being no true Demonstration but such as is scientificall; and no Demonstration is scientifical but that which proceeds from the knowledge of the causes from which the construction of the Probleme is drawne. To collect therefore what has been said into few words; ANALYSIS is Ratiocination from the supposed construction or generation of a thing to the efficient cause, or coefficient causes of that which is constructed or generated. And SYNTHESIS is Ratiocination from the first causesof the Construction, continued through all the middle causes till we come to the thing it selfe which is constructed or generated.

But because there are many means by which the same thing may be generated, or the same Probleme be constructed, therefore neither do all Geometricians, nor doth the same Geometrician alwayes use one and the same Method. For if to a certain quantity given, it be required to construct another quantity equal, there may be some that will enquire whether this may not be done by means of some motion. For there are quantities, whose equality and inequality may be argued from Motion and Time, as well as from Congruence; and there is motion, by which two quantities, whether Lines or Superficies, though one of them be crooked, the other straight, may be made congruous or coincident. And this method Archimedes made use of in his Book de Spiralibus. Also the equality or inequality of two quantities may be found out and demonstrated from the consideration of Waight, as the same Archimedes did in his Quadrature of the Parabola. Besides, equality and equality are found out often by the division of the two quantityes into parts which are considered as undivisible; as Cavallerius Bonaventura has done in our time, and Archimedes often. Lastly, the same

is performed by the consideration of the Powers of lines, or the roots of those Powers, and by the multiplication, division, addition and substraction, as also by the extraction of the roots of those Powers, or by finding where straight lines of the same proportion terminate. For example, when any number of straight lines, how many soever, are drawne from a straight line, and passe all through the same point, looke what proportion they have, and if their parts continued from the point retaine every where the same proportion, they shall all terminate in a straight line. And the same happens if the point be taken between two Circles. So that the places of all their points of termination make either straight lines, or circumferences of Circles, and are called Plain Places. So also when straight parallel lines are applyed to one straight line, if the parts of the straight line to which they are applyed be to one another in proportion duplicate to that of the contiguous applyed lines, they will all terminate in a Conical Section; which Section being the place of their termination, is called a Solid Place, because it serves for the finding out of the quantity of any Equation which consists of three dimensions. There are therfore three ways of finding out the cause of Equality or Inequality between two given quantities; namely, First by the Computation of Motions (for by equal Motion, & equal Time equal Spaces are described,) and Ponderation is motion. Secondly By Indivisibles; because all the parts together taken are equal to the whole. And thirdly by the Powers; for when they are equall, their roots also are equall; and contrarily, the Powers are equall, when their roots are equal. But if the question be much complicated, there cannot by any of these wayes be constituted a certaine Rule, from the supposition of which of the unknown quantities the Analysis may best begin; nor out of the variety of Equations that at first appeare, which we were best to choose; but the successe will depend upon dexterity, upon formerly acquired Science, and many times upon fortune.

For no man can ever be a good Analyst without being first a good Geometrician; nor do the rules of Analysis make a Geometrician, as Synthesis doth; which begins at the very Elements, and proceeds by a Logical Use of the same. For the true teaching of Geometry is by Synthesis, according to Euclides method; and he that hath Euclide for his Master, may be a Geometrician without Vieta (though Vieta was a most admirable Geometrician); but he that has Vieta for his master, not so, without Euclide.

And as for that part of Analysis which works by the Powers, though it be esteemed by some Geometricians (not the chiefest) to be the best way of solving all Problemes, yet it is a thing of no great extent; it being all contained in the doctrine of rectangles, and rectangled Solids. So that although they come to an Equation which determines the quantity sought, yet they cannot sometimes by art exhibit that quantity in a Plain, but in some Conique Section; that is, as Geometricians say, not Geometrically, but mechanically. Now such Problemes as these, they call Solid; and when they cannot exhibit the quantity sought for with the helpe of a conique Section, they call it a Lineary Probleme. And therefore in the quantities of angles, and of the arches of Circles, there is no use at all of the Analyticks which proceed by the Powers; so that the Antients pronounced it impossible, to exhibit in a plaine the Division of Angles, except bisection, and the bisection of the bisected parts, otherwise then mechanically. For Pappus, (before the 31 proposition of his fourth Book) distinguishing and defining the several kinds of Problemes, says that some are Plain, others Solid, and others Lineary. Those therefore which may be solved by straight lines and the circumferences of Circles (that is, which may be described with the Rule and Compass, without any other Instrument) are fitly called Plain; for the lines by which such Problemes are found out, have their generation in a Plain. But those which are solved by the using of some one or more Conique Sections in their construction, are called Solid, because their

construction cannot be made without using the superficies of solid figures, namely of Cones. There remains the third kinde, which is called Lineary, because other lines besides those already mentioned are made use of in their construction, &c. And a little after he sayes, Of this kinde are the Spiral lines, the Quadratrices, the Conchoeides, and the Cissoeides. And Geometricians think it no small fault, when for the finding out of a Plain Probleme any man makes use of Coniques, or new Lines. Now he ranks the Trisection of an angle among Solid Problemes, and the Quinquesection among Lineary. But what! are the ancient Geometricians to be blamed, who made use of the Quadratrix for the finding out of a straight line equal to the arch of a Circle? and Pappus himself, was he faulty when he found out the trisection of an Angle by the help of an Hyperbole? Or am I in the wrong, who think I have found out the construction of both these Problemes by the Rule and Compass onely? Neither they, nor I. For the Ancients made use of this Analysis which proceeds by the Powers; and with them it was a fault to do that by a more remote Power, which might be done by a neerer; as being an argument that they did not sufficiently understand the nature of the thing. The virtue of this kind of Analysis consists in the changing and turning and tossing of Rectangles and Analogismes; and the skill of Analysts is meer Logick, by which they are able methodically to find out whatsoever lies hid either in the Subject or Predicate of the Conclusio¯ sought for. But this doth not properly belong to Algebra, or the Analyticks Specious, Symbolical or Cossick; which are, as I may say, the Brachygraphy of the Analyticks, and an art, neither of teaching nor learning Geometry, but of registring with brevity and celerity, the inventions of Geometricians. For though it be easie to discourse by Symbols of very remote propositions; yet whether such discourse deserve to be thought very profitable, when it is made without any Ideas of the things themselves, I know not.

CHAP. XXI. OF CIRCULAR MOTION.

1 IN SIMPLE Motion, every Straight Line taken in the Body moved, is so carried, that it is always parallel to the places in which it formerly was.

2 If Circular Motion be made about a resting Center, and in that Circle there be an Epicyle, whose revolution is made the contrary way, in such manner, that in equal times it make equal angles, every Straight Line taken in that Epicycle will be so carried, that it will alwayes be parallel to the places in which it formerly was.

3 The properties of Simple Motion.

4 If a fluid Body be moved with simple Circular Motion, all the points taken in it will describe their Circles in times proportional to the distances from the Center.

5 Simple Motion dissipates Heterogeneous and congregates Homogeneous Bodies.

6 If a Circle made by a Movent moved with Simple Motion, be commensurable to another Circle made by a point which is carried about by the same Movent, all the points of both the Circles will at some time return to the same situation.

7 If a Sphere have Simple Motion, its Motion will more dissipate Heterogeneous Bodies by how much it is more remote from the Poles.

8 If the Simple Circular Motion of a fluid Body, be hindered by a Body which is not fluid, the fluid Body will spread it self upon the Superficies of that Body.

9 Circular Motion about a fixed Center, casteth off by the Tangent such things as lie upon the Circumference and stick not to it.

10 Such things as are moved with Simple Circular Motition, beget Simple Circular Motion.

11 If that which is so moved have one side hard, and the other side fluid, its Motion will not be perfectly Circular.

1 I Have already defined Simple Motion to be that, in which the several points taken in a moved Body, do in several equal times describe several equal arches. And therefore in Simple Circular Motion it is necessary that every Straight Line taken in the Moved Body be alwayes carried parallel to itself; which I thus demonstrate.

First, let A B (in the first figure) be any Straight Line taken in any Solid Body; and let AD be any arch drawn upon any Center C and Radius CA. Let the point B be understood to describe towards the same parts the arch BE, like and equall to the arch AD. Now in the same time in which the point A transmits the arch AD, the point B (which by reason of its simple motion is supposed to be carried with velocity equall to that of A) will transmit the arch BE; and at the end of the same time the whole AB will be in DE; and therefore AB and DE are equall. And seeing the arches AD and BE are like and equall, their subtending straight lines AD and BE will also be equall; and therefore the four sided figure ABDE will be a parallelogram. Wherefore AB is carried parallel to it selfe. And the same may be proved by the same method, if any other straight line be taken in the same moved Body in which the straight line AB was taken. So that all straight lines taken in a Body moved with Simple Cicular Motion will be carried parallel to themselves.

- Coroll. 1 It is manifest that the same will also happen in any Body which hath Simple Motion, though not Circular. For all the points of any straight line whatsoever, will describe lines though not Circular, yet equall; so that though the crooked lines AD and BE were not arches of Circles, but of Parabolas,

Ellipses, or of any other figures; yet both they, and their Subtenses, and the straight lines which joyne them, would be equal and parallel.

- Coroll. 2 It is also manifest, that the Radii of the equall circles AD and BE, or the Axis of a Sphere, will be so carried, as to be allwayes parallel to the places in which they formerly were. For the straight line BF drawn to the center of the arch BE being equall to the Radius AC, will also be equall to the straight line FE or CD; and the angle BFE will be equall to the angle ACD. Now the intersection of the straight lines CA and BE, being at G, the angle CGE (seeing BE and AD are parallel) will be equal to the angle DAC. But the angle EBF is equal to the same angle DAC; and therefore the angles CGE and EBF are also equal. Wherefore AC and BF are parallel; which was to be demonstrated.

2 Let there be a Circle given (in the second figure), whose center is A, and Radius AB; and upon the center B and any Radius BC let the Epicycle CDE be described. Let the center B be understood to be carried about the center A, and the whole Epicycle with it till it be coincident with the Circle FGH, whose center is I; and let BAI be any angle given. But in the time that the center B is moved to I, let the Epicycle CDE have a contrary revolution upon its own center, namely from E by D to C according to the same proportions; that is, in such manner, that in both the Circles, equal angles be made in equal times. I say EC the Axis of the Epicycle will be alwayes carried parallel to it self. Let the angle FIG be made equal to the angle BAI; IF and AB will therefore be parallel; and how much the Axis AG has departed from its former place AC (the measure of which progression is the angle CAG, or CBD which I suppose equal to it), so much in the same time has the Axis IG (the same with BC) departed from its own former situation.

Wherefore, in what time BC comes to IG by the motion from B to I upon the center A, in the same time G will come to F by the contrary motion of the Epicycle; that is, it will be turned backwards to F, & IG will lie in IF. But the angles FIG and GAC are equal; and therefore AC, that is, BC), and IG, (that is the Axis, though in different places) will be parallel. Wherefore, the Axis of the Epicycle EDC will be carried alwayes parallel to it self; which was to be proved.

Coroll. From hence it is manifest, that those two annual Motions which Copernicus ascribes to the Earth, are reducible to this one Circular Simple Motion, by which all the points of the moved Body are carried always with equal velocity, that is, in equal times they make equal revolutions uniformly.

This, as it is the most simple, so it is the most frequent of all Circular Motions; being the same which is used by all men when they turn any thing round with their arms, as they do in grinding or sifting. For all the points of the thing moved, describe lines which are like and equal to one another. So that if a man had a Ruler, in which many Pens points of equal length were fastned, he might with this one Motion write many lines at once.

3 Having shewed what Simple Motion is, I will here also set down some properties of the same.

First, when a Body is moved with Simple Motion in a fluid Medium which hath no vacuity, it changes the situation of all the parts of the fluid ambient which resist its motion; I say there are no parts so small of the fluid ambient, how farre soever it be continued, but do change their situation, in such manner, as that they leave their places continually to other small parts that come into the same.

For (in the same second figure) let any Body, as KLMN, be understood to be moved with Simple Circular Motion; and let the Circle which every point thereof describes have any determined quantity, suppose that of the

same KLMN. Wherefore the Center A, and every other point, and consequently the moved Body it self, will be carried sometimes towards the side where is K, and sometimes towards the other side where is M. When therefore it is carried to K, the parts of the fluid Medium on that side will go back; and (supposing all space to be full) others on the other side will succeed. And so it will be when the Body is carried to the side M, and to N, and every way. Now when the neerest parts of the fluid Medium go back, it is necessary that the parts next to those neerest parts go back also; and (supposing still all space to be full) other parts will come into their places with succession perpetual and infinite. Wherefore all, even the least parts of the fluid Medium change their places, &c. which was to be proved.

It is evident from hence, that Simple Motion, whether Circular, or not Circular, of Bodies which make perpetual returns to their former places, hath greater or less force to dissipate the parts of resisting Bodies, as it is more or less swift, and as the lines described have greater or less magnitude. Now the greatest Velocity that can be, may be understood to be in the least circuit, and the least in the greatest; and may be so supposed when there is need.

4 Secondly, supposing the same Simple Motion in the Aire, Water, or other fluid Medium; the parts of the Medium which adhere to the Moved Body will be carried about with the same Motion and Velocity, so that in what time soever any point of the Movent finishes its Circle, in the same time every part of the Medium which adheres to the Movent, shall also describe such a part of its Circle, as is equal to the whole Circle of the Movent; I say it shall describe a part, and not the whole Circle, because all its parts receive their motion from an interiour concentrique Movent, and of Concentrique Circles the exteriour are alwayes greater then the interiour; nor can the motion imprinted by any Movent be of greater Velocity then that of the Movent it self. From whence it follows, that the more remote

parts of the fluid ambient, shall finish their Circles in times which have to one another the same proportion with their distances from the Movent. For every point of the fluid ambient, as long as it toucheth the Body which carries it about, is carried about with it, and would make the same Circle, but that it is left behind so much as the exteriour Circle exceeds the interiour. So that if we suppose some thing which is not fluid to float in that part of the fluid ambient which is neerest to the Movent, it will together with the Movent be carried about. Now that part of the fluid ambient which is not the neerest but almost the neerest, receiving its degree of velocity from the neerest, (which degree cannot be greater then it was in the giver) doth therefore in the same time make a Circular Line, not a whole Circle, yet equal to the whole Circle of the neerest. Therefore in the same time that the Movent describes its Circle, that which doth not touch it shall not describe its Circle; yet it shall describe such a part of it, as is equal to the whole Circle of the Movent. And after the same manner, the more remote parts of the ambient will describe in the same time such parts of their Circles as shall be severally equal to the whole Circle of the Movent; and by consequent they shall finish their whole Circles in times proportional to their distances from the Movent; which was to be proved.

5 Thirdly, The same Simple Motion of a Body placed in a fluid Medium, congregates, or gathers into one place such things as naturally float in that Medium, if they be Homogeneous; and if they be Heterogeneous, it separates and dissipates them. But if such things as be Heterogeneous do not float, but settle, then the same Motion stirs and mingles them disorderly together. For seeing Bodies which are unlike to one another, that is, Heterogeneous Bodies, are not unlike in that they are Bodies (for Bodies, as Bodies, have no difference) but onely from some special Cause, that is, from some internal Motion, or Motions of their smallest parts (for I have shewn in the 9th Chapter and 9th Article, that all Mutation is such Motion),

it remains that Heterogeneous Bodies have their unlikeness or difference from one another from their internal or specifical Motions. Now Bodies w^{ch} have such difference, receive unlike & different Motions from the same external common Movent; and therefore they will not be moved together, that is to say, they will be dissipated. And being dissipated they will necessarily at some time or other meet with Bodies like themselves, and be moved alike and together with them; and afterwards meeting with more Bodies like themselves, they will unite and become greater Bodies. Wherefore Homogeneous Bodies are congregated, and Heterogenous dissipated by Simple Motion in a Medium where they naturally float. Again, such as being in a fluid Medium, do not float, but sink, if the Motion of the fluid Medium be strong enough, will be stirred up and carried away by that Motion, and consequently they will be hindred from returning to that place to which they sink naturally, and in which onely they would unite, and out of which they are promiscuously carried; that is, they are disorderly mingled.

Now this Motion by which Homogeneous Bodies are congregated, and Heterogeneous are scattered, is that which is commonly called Fermentation, from the Latine Fervere; as the Greeks have their (which signifies the same) from Ferveo. For Seething makes all the parts of the Water change their places; and the parts of any thing that is thrown into it, will go several wayes according to their several natures. And yet all Fervor or Seething is not caused by Fire; for New Wine and many other things have also their Fermentation and Fervor, to which Fire contributes little, and some times nothing. But when in Fermentation we find Heat, it is made by the Fermentation.

6 Fourthly, in what time soever the Movent whose Center is A (in the 2d figure) moved in KLN shall by any number of revolutions (that is, when the Perimeters BI and KLN be commensurable) have described a Line equal to

the Circle which passes through the points B and I; in the same time all the points of the floating Body whose Center is B, shall return to have the same situation in respect of the Movent, from which they departed. For seeing it is as the distance BA, that is, as the Radius of the Circle which passes through BI, is to the Perimeter it self BI, so the Radius of the Circle KLN is to the Perimeter KLN; and seeing the velocities of the points B and K are equal, the time also of the revolution in IB to the time of one revolution in KLN, will be as the Perimeter BI to the Perimeter KLN; and therefore so many revolutions in KLN as together taken are equal to the Perimeter BI, will be finished in the same time in which the whole Perimeter BI is finished; & therefore also the points L, N, F & H, or any of the rest, will in the same time return to the same situation from which they departed; and this may be demonstrated whatsoever be the points considered. Wherefore all the points shall in that time return to the same situation; which was to be proved.

From hence it follows, that if the Perimeters BI and LKN be not commensurable, then all the points wil never return to have the same situation or configuration in respect of one another.

7 In Simple Motion, if the Body moved be of a Spherical figure, it hath less force towards its Poles then towards its middle, to dissipate Heterogeneous, or to congregate Homogeneous Bodies.

Let there be a Sphere (as in the third figure) whose Center is A and Diameter BC; & let it be conceived to be moved with Simple Circular Motion; of which Motion let the Axis be the Straight Line DE, cutting the Diameter BC at right angles in A. Let now the Circle which is described by any point B of the Sphere, have BF for its Diameter; and taking FG equal to BC, and dividing it in the middle in H, the Center of the Sphere A, will when half a revolution is finished, lie in H. And seeing HF and AB are equal, a Circle described upon the Center H with the Radius HF or HG, will

be equal to the Circle whose Center is A and Radius AB. And if the same Motion be continued, the point B will at the end of another half revolution return to the place from whence it began to be moved; and therefore at the end of half a revolution, the point B will be carried to F, and the whole Hemisphere DBE into that Hemisphere in which are the points L, K and F. Wherfore that part of the fluid Medium which is co¯tiguous to the point F, will in the same time go back the length of the Straight Line BF; and in the return of the point F to B, that is, of G to C, the fluid Medium wil go back as much in a Straight Line from the point C. And this is the effect of Simple Motion in the middle of the Sphere, where the distance from the Poles is greatest. Let now the point I be taken in the same Sphere neerer to the Pole E, and through it let the Straight Line IK be drawn parallel to the Straight Line BF, cutting the arch FL in K, & the Axis HL in M; then connecting HK, upon HF let the perpendicular KN be drawn. In the same time therefore that B comes to F, the point I will come to K, BF and IK being equal, and described with the same velocity. Now the Motion in IK to the fluid Medium upon which it works, namely to that part of the Medium which is contiguous to the point K, is oblique, whereas if it proceeded in the Straight Line HK, it would be perpendicular; and therefore the Motion which proceeds in IK has less power, then that which proceeds in HK with the same velocity. But the Motions in HK and HF do equally thrust back the Medium; and therefore the part of the Sphere at K, moves the Medium less, then the part at F; namely so much less, as KN is less then HF. Wherefore also the same Motion hath less power to disperse Heterogeneous, and to congregate Homogeneous Bodies, when it is neerer, then when it is more remote from the Poles; which was to be proved.

Corollary. It is also necessary, that in Plains which are perpendicular to the Axis, and more remote then the Pole it self from the middle of the Sphere, this Simple Motion have no effect. For the Axis DE with Simple

Motion describes the Superficies of a Cylinder; and towards the Bases of the Cylinder there is in this Motion no endeavour at all.

8 If in a fluid Medium, moved about (as hath been said) with Simple Motion, there be conceived to float some other Spherical Body which is not fluid, the parts of the Medium which are stopped by that Body, will endeavour to spread themselves every way upon the Superficies of it. And this is manifest enough by experience, namely by the spreading of water poured out upon a pavement. But the reason of it may be this. Seeing the Sphere A (in the 3d figure) is moved towards B, the Medium also in which it is moved, will have the same Motion. But because in this Motion it falls upon a Body not liquid, as G, so that it cannot go on; and seeing the small parts of the Medium can not go forwards, nor can they go directly backwards; against the force of the Movent; it remayns therefore that they diffuse themselves upon the Superficies of that Body, as towards O and P, Which was to be proved.

9 Compounded Circular Motion (in which all the parts of the moved Body do at once describe Circumferences, some greater, others less, according to the proportion of their several distances from the common Center) carries about with it such Bodies, as being not fluid, adhere to the Body so moved; and such as do not adhere, it casteth forwards in a Straight Line which is a Tangent to the point from which they are cast off.

For let there be a Circle whose Radius is AB (in the fourth figure); and let a Body be placed in the Circumference in B, which if it be fixed there, will necessarily be carried about with it, as is manifest of it self. But whilest the motion proceeds, let us suppose that Body to be unfixed in B. I say the Body wil co¯tinue its motion in the Tangent BC. For let both the Radius AB, and the Sphere B, be conceived to consist of hard matter; and let us suppose the Radius AB to be stricken in the point B by some other Body which falls upon it in the Tangent DB. Now therefore there will be a motion

made by the concourse of two things, the one, Endeavour towards C in the Straight Line DB produced, (in which the Body B would proceed, if it were not retained by the Radius AB); the other, the Retention it self. But the Retention alone causeth no endeavour towards the Center; and therefore the Retention being taken away, (which is done by the unfixing of B) there will remain but one Endeavour in B, namely, that in the Tangent BC. Wherefore the Motion of the Body B unfixed, will proceed in the Tangent BC; which was to be proved.

By this demonstration it is manifest, that Circular Motion about an unmoved Axis, shakes off, and puts further from the Center of its motion such things as touch, but do not stick fast to its Superficies; and the more, by how much the distance is greater from the Poles of the Circular Motion; and so much the more also, by how much the things that are shaken off, are less driven towards the Center by the fluid ambient, for other Causes.

10 If in a fluid Medium a Spherical Body be moved with simple Circular Motion; and in the same Medium there float another Sphere whose matter is not fluid; this Sphere also shall be moved with simple Circular Motion.

Let BCD (in the 5th figure) be a Circle, whose Center is A, and in whose Circumference there is a Sphere so moved that it describes with Simple Motion the Perimeter BCD. Let also EFG be another Sphere of Consistent matter, whose Semidiameter is EH, and Center H; and with the Radius AH let the Circle HI be described. I say the Sphere EFG will (by the Motion of the Body in BCD) be moved in the Circumference HI with Simple Motion.

For seeing the Motion in BCD (by the 4th Article of this Chapter) makes all the points of the fluid Medium describe in the same time Circular Lines equal to one another, the points E, H and G of the Straight Line EHG will in the same time describe with equal Radii equal Circles. Let EB be drawn equal and parallel to the Straight Line AH; and let AB be connected, which will therefore be equal and parallel to EH; and therefore also, if upon the

Center B and Radius BE the arch EK be drawn equal to the arch HI, and the straight Lines AI, BK and IK be drawn, BK and AI will be equal; and they will also be parallel, because the two arches EK and HI, that is, the two angles KBE and IAH are equal; and consequently the Straight Lines AB and KI which connect them will also be equal and parallel. Wherefore KI and EH are parallel. Seeing therefore E and H are carried in the same time to K and I, the whole Straight Line IK will be parallel to EH, from whence it departed. And therefore, (seeing the Sphere EFG is supposed to be of consistent matter, so as all its points keep alwayes the same situation) it is necessary that every other Straight Line taken in the same Sphere, be carried alwayes parallel to the places in which it formerly was. Wherefore the Sphere EFG is moved with simple Circular Motion; which was to be demonstrated.

11 If in a fluid Medium, whose parts are stirred by a Body moved with Simple Motion, there float annother Body, which hath its Superficies either wholly hard, or wholly fluid; the parts of this Body shall approach the Center equally on all sides, that is to say, the motion of the Body shall be Circular, and Concentrique with the motion of the Movent. But if it have one side hard, and the other side fluid, then both those Motions shall not have the same center, nor shall the floating Body be moved in the Circumference of a perfect Circle.

Let a Body be moved in the Circumference of the Circle KL MN (in the 2d figure) whose center is A. And let there be another Body at I, whose Superficies is either all hard, or all fluid. Also let the Medium in which both the Bodies are placed, be fluid. I say the Body at I will be moved in the Circle IB about the Center A. For this has been demonstrated in the last Article.

Wherefore let the Superficies of the Body at I, be fluid on one side, and hard on the other. And first, let the fluid side be towards the Center. Seeing

therefore the Motion of the Medium is such, as that its parts do continually change their places, (as hath been shewn in the 5th Article); if this change of place be considered in those parts of the Medium which are contiguous to the fluid Superficies, it must needs be, that the small parts of that Superficies enter into the places of the small parts of the Medium which are contiguous to them; And the like change of place will be made with the next contiguous parts towards A. And if the fluid parts of the Body at I, have any degree at all of tenacity (for there are degrees of tenacity, as in the Aire and Water) the whole fluid side will be lifted up a little; but so much the less, as its parts have less tenacity; whereas the hard part of the Superficies which is contiguous to the fluid part, has no cause at all of elevation, that is to say, no endeavour towards A.

Secondly, let the hard Superficies of the Body at I, be towards A. By reason therefore of the said change of place of the parts which are contiguous to it, the hard Superficies must of necessity (seeing by Supposition there is no empty Space) either come neerer to A, or else its smallest parts must supply the contiguous places of the Medium, which otherwise would be empty. But this cannot be by reason of the supposed hardness; and therefore the other must needs be, namely, that the Body come neerer to A. Wherefore the Body at I, has greater endeavour towards the center A, when its hard side is next it, then when it is averted from it. But the Body in I, while it is moving in the circumference of the Circle IB, has sometimes one side, sometimes another turned towards the center; and therefore it is sometimes neerer, sometimes further off from the center A. Wherefore the Body at I, is not carried in the circumference of a perfect Circle; which was to be demonstrated.

CHAP. XXII. OF OTHER VARIETY OF MOTION.

1 ENDEAVOUR AND Pressure how they differ.

2 Two kinds of Mediums in which Bodies are moved.

3 Propagation of Motion what it is

4 What motion Bodies have when they press one another.

5 Fluid Bodies, when they are pressed together, penetrate one another.

6 When one Body presseth another, and doth not penetrate it, the action of the pressing Body is perpendicular to the Superficies of the Body pressed.

7 When a hard Body, pressing another Body, penetrates the same, it doth not penetrate it perpendicularly, unless it fall perpendicularly upon it.

8 Motion sometimes opposite to that of the Movent.

9 In a full Medium, Motion is propagated to any distance.

10 Dilatation and Contraction what they are.

11 Dilatation and Contraction suppose Mutation of the smallest parts in respect of their situation.

12 All Traction is Pulsion.

13 Such things as being pressed, or bent, restore themselves, have motion in their internal parts.

14 Though that which carrieth another be stopped, the Body carried will proceed.

15, 16 The effects of Percussion not to be compared with those of Waight.

17, 18 Motion cannot begin first in the internal parts of a Body.

19 Action and Reaction proceed in the same Line.

20 Habit what it is.

1 I Have already (in the 15th Chap. at the 2d Article) defined Endeavour to be Motion through some Length, though not considered as Length, but as a Point. Whether therefore there be resistance or no resistance, the Endeavour will still be the same. For simply to Endeavour, is to Go. But when two Bodies having opposite Endeavours press one another, then the Endeavour of either of them is that which we call Pressure, and is mutual when their pressures are opposite.

2. Bodies moved, and also the Mediums in which they are moved, are of two kinds. For either they have their parts coherent in such manner, as no part of the Moved Body will easily yeild to the Mouent, except the whole Body yeild also, and such are the things we call Hard; Or else their parts, while the whole remains unmoved, will easily yeild to the Movent; and these we call Fluid or Soft Bodies. For the words Fluid, Soft, Tough and Hard (in the same manner as Great and Little) are used onely comparatively; and are not different kinds, but different degrees of Quality.

3 To Do, and to Suffer is to Move and to be moved; and nothing is moved, but by that which toucheth it, and is also moved, (as has been formerly shewn). And how great sover the distance be, we say the first Movent moveth the last moved Body; but mediately; namely so, as that the first moveth the second, the second the third, and so on, till the last of all be touched. When therefore one Body having opposite Endeavour to another

Body, moveth the same, and that moveth a third, and so on, I call that action Propagation of Motion.

4 When two fluid Bodies which are in a free and open Space, press one another, their parts will endeavour, or be moved towards the sides, not onely those parts which are there where the mutual contact is, but all the other parts. For in the first contact, the parts which are pressed by both the endeavouring Bodies, have no place either forwards or backwards in which they can be moved; and therefore they are pressed out towards the sides. And this expressure, when the forces are equal, is in a line perpendicular to the Bodies pressing. But whensoever the formost parts of both the Bodies are pressed, the hindermost also must be pressed at the same time; for the motion of the hindermost parts cannot in an instant be stopped by the resistance of the formost parts, but proceeds for some time; and therefore seeing they must have some place in which they may be moved, and that there is no place at all for them forwards, it is necessary that they be moved into the places which are towards the sides every way. And this effect followes of necessity, not onely in Fluid, but in Consistent and Hard Bodies, though it be not alwayes manifest to sense. For though from the compression of two stones we cannot with our eyes discerne any swelling outwards towards the sides, (as we perceive in two Bodies of wax;) yet we know well enough by reason, that some tumor must needs be there, though it be but little.

5 But when the Space is enclosed, and both the Bodies be fluid, they will (if they be pressed together) penetrate one anoteer, though differently according to their different endeavours. For suppose a hollow Cylinder of hard matter, well stopped at both ends, but filled first, below with some heavy fluid Body, as Quicksilver; and above with Water or Aire. If now the bottome of the Cylinder be turned upwards, the heaviest fluid Body which is now at the top, having the greatest endeavour downwards, and being by

the hard sides of the vessel hindered from extending it selfe sidewayes, must of necessity either be received by the lighter Body, that it may sink through it, or else it must open a passage through it selfe, by which the lighter Body may ascend. For of the two Bodies, that whose parts are most easily separated, will the first be divided; which being done, it is not necessary that the parts of the other, suffer any separation at all. And therefore when two Liquours which are enclosed in the same vessel, change their places, there is no need that their smallest parts should be mingled with one another; for a way being opened through one of them, the parts of the other need not be separated.

Now if a fluid Body which is not enclosed press a hard Body, its endeavour will indeed be towards the internal parts of that hard Body; but (being excluded by the resistance of it) the parts of the fluid Body will be moved every way according to the Superficies of the hard Body, and that equally, if the pressure be perpendicular; for when all the parts of the Cause are equal, the Effects will be equal also. But if the pressure be not perpendicular, then the angles of Incidence being unequal, the expansion also will be unequal, namely, greater on that side where the angle is greater, because that motion is most direct which proceeds by the directest Line.

6 If a Body, pressing another Body do not penetrate it, it will nevertheless give to the part it presseth, an endeavour to yeild and recede in a straight line perpendicular to its Superficies in that point in which it is pressed.

Let ABCD (in the first figure) be a hard Body; and let another Body, falling upon it in the straight line EA, with any inclination, or without inclination, press it in the point A. I say the Body so pressing, & not penetrating it, will give to the part A an endeavour to yeild or recede in a straight Line perpendicular to the line AD.

For let AB be perpendicular to AD; and let BA be produced to F. If therefore AF be coincident with AE, it is of it self manifest that the motion in EA will make A to endeavour in the line AB. Let now EA be oblique to AD; and from the point E let the straight line EC be drawn, cutting AD at right angles in D; and let the rectangles ABCD and ADEF be completed. I have shewn (in the 8th Article of the 16th Chapter) that the Body will be carried from E to A by the concourse of two Uniform Motions, the one in EF and its parallels, the other in ED and its parallels. But the motion in EF and its parallels (whereof DA is one) contributes nothing to the Body in A, to make it endeavour or press towards B; and therefore the whole endeavour which the Body hath in the inclined line EA, to pass, or press the Straight line AD, it hath it all from the perpendicular motion or endeavour in FA. Wherefore the Body E after it is in A, will have onely that perpendicular endeavour which proceeds from the motion in FA, that is, in AB; which was to be proved.

7 If a hard Body falling upon, or pressing another Body, penetrate the same, its endeavour after its first penetration will be neither in the inclined line produced, nor in the perpendicular, but sometimes betwixt both, sometimes without them.

Let EAG (in the same figure) be the inclined line produced; and First, let the passage through the Medium in which EA is, be easier then the passage through the Medium in which AG is. As soon therefore as the Body is within the Medium in which is AG, it will finde greater resistance to its motion in DA and its parallels, then it did whilest it was above AD; and therefore below AD it will proceed with slower motion in the parallels of DA, then above it. Wherefore the motion which is compounded of the two motions in EF and ED will be slower below AD, then above it; and therefore also, the Body will not proceed from A in EA produced, but below it. Seeing therefore the endeavour in AB is generated by the

endeavour in FA; if to the endeavour in FA there be added the endeavour in DA, (which is not all taken away by the immersion of the point A into the lower Medium) the Body will not proceed from A in the perpendicular AB, but beyond it, namely, in some straight line between AB and AG, as in the line AH.

Secondly, let the passage through the Medium EA, be less easie then that through AG. The motion therefore which is made by the concourse of the motions in EF and FB, is slower above AD then below it; and consequently, the endeavour will not proceed from A in EA produced, but beyond it, as in AI. Wherefore, If a hard Body falling, &c; which was to be proved.

This Divergency of the Straight line AH from the straight line AG, is that which the Writers of Opticks commonly call Refraction; which, when the passage is eaier in the first then in the second Medium, is made by diverging from the line of Inclination towards the perpendicular; and contrarily, when the passage is not so easie in the first Medium, by departing farther from the perpendicular.

8 By the 6th Theoreme it is manifest, that the force of the Movent may be so placed, as that the Body moved by it, may proceed in a way almost directly contrary to that of the Movent; as we see in the motion of Ships.

For let AB (in the 2d figure) represent a Ship, whose length from the prow to the poop is AB; and let the winde lie upon it in the straight parallel lines CB, DE and FG; and let DE and FG be cut in E and G by a straight Line drawn from B perpendicular to AB; also let BE and EG be equal, and the angle ABC any angle how small soever. Then between BC and BA let the straight line BI be drawn; and let the Sail be conceived to be spred in the same line BI, and the winde to fall upon it in the points L, M and B; from which points, perpendicular to BI, let BK, MQ and LP be drawn. Lastly, let EN and GO be drawn perpendicular to BG, and cutting BK in H and K; and let HN and KO be made equal to one another, and severally equal to BA. I

say the Ship BA by the winde falling upon it in CB, DE, FG, and other lines parallel to them, will be carried forwards almost opposite to the winde, that is to say, in a way almost contrary to the way of the Movent.

For the Winde that blowes in the Line CB, will (as hath been shewn in the 6th Article) give to the point B an endeavour to proceed in a straight line perpendicular to the straight line BI, that is, in the straight line BK; and to the points M and L an endeavour to proceed in the straight lines MQ and LP, which are parallel to BK. Let now the measure of the time be BG, which is divided in the middle in E; & let the point B be carried to H in the time BE. In the same time therefore by the wind blowing in DM & FL (and as many other lines as may be drawn parallel to them) the whole Ship will be applyed to the straight line HN. Also at the end of the second time EG, it will be applyed to the straight line KO. Wherefore the Ship will always go forwards; and the angle it makes with the winde will be equal to the angle ABC, how small soever that angle be; and the way it makes will in every time be equal to the straight line EH. I say thus it would be, if the Ship might be moved with as great celerity sidewayes from BA towards KO, as it may be moved forwards in the line BA. But this is impossible, by reason of the resistance made by the great quantity of water which presseth the side, much exceeding the resistance made by the much smaller quantity which presseth the prow of the Ship; so that the way the Ship makes sidewayes is scarce sensible; and therefore the point B will proceed almost in the very line BA, making with the winde the angle ABC, how acute soever, that is to say, it will proceed almost in the straight line BC, that is, in a way almost contrary to the way of the Movent; which was to be demonstrated.

But the Sayl in BI must be so stretched, as that there be left in it no boome at all; for otherwise the straight lines LP, MQ & BK will not be perpendicular to the plain of the Sayl, but falling below P, Q and K will drive the Ship backwards. But by making use of a small Board for a Sayl, a

little Waggon with wheels for the Ship, and of a smooth Pavement for the Sea, I have by experience found this to be so true, that I could scarce oppose the board to the winde in any obliquity though never so small, but the Waggon was carried forwards by it.

By the same 6th. Theoreme, it may be found, how much a stroke which falls obliquely, is weaker then a stroke falling perpendicularly, they being like and equal in all other respects.

Let a stroke fall upon the Wall AB obliquely, as (for example) in the straight line CA (in the 3d figure). Let CE be drawn parallel to AB, & DA perpendicular to the same AB & equal to CA; & let both the velocity & time of the motion in CA be equal to the velocity & time of the motion in DA. I say the stroke in CA will be weaker then that in DA in the proportion of EA to DA. For producing DA howsoever to F, the endeavour of both the strokes will (by the 6th Art.) proceed from A in the perpendicular AF. But the stroke in CA is made by the concourse of two motions in CE and EA; of which that in CE contributes nothing to the stroke in A, because CE and BA are parallels; and therefore the stroke in CA is made by the motion which is in EA onely. But the velocity or force of the perpendicular stroke in EA, to the velocity or force of the stroke in DA, is as EA to DA. Wherefore the oblique stroke in CA is weaker then the perpendicular stroke in DA, in the proportion of EA to DA or CA; Which was to be proved.

9 In a full Medium, all Endeavour proceeds as far as the Medium it self reacheth; that is to say, if the Medium be infinite, the Endeavour will proceed infinitely.

For whatsoever Endeavoureth, is Moved, and therefore whatsoever standeth in its way, it maketh it yeild, at least a little, namely so far as the Movent it self is moved forwards. But that which yeildeth is also moved, and consequently maketh that to yeild which is in its way, and so on

successively as long as the Medium is full; that is to say, infinitely, if the full Medium be infinite, which was to be proved.

Now although Endeavour thus perpetually propagated, do not alwayes appear to the Senses as Motion; yet it appears as Action, or as the efficient cause of some Mutation. For if there be placed before our Eyes some very little object, as (for example) a small grain of sand, which at a certain distance is visible; it is manifest that it may be removed to such a distance as not to be any longer seen, though by its action it still work upon the organs of sight, as is manifest from that (which was last proved) that all Endeavour proceeds infinitely. Let it be conceived therefore to be removed from our Eyes to any distance how great soever, and a sufficient number of other grains of sand of the same bigness added to it; it is evident that the aggregate of all those sands will be visible; and though none of them can be seen when it is single and severed from the rest, yet the whole heap or hill which they make wil manifestly appear to the sight; which would be impossible if some action did not proceed from each several part of the whole heap.

10 Between the degrees of Hard and Soft, are those things which we call Tough, Tough being that, which may be bended without being altered from what it was; and the Bending of a Line, is either the adduction or diduction of the extreme parts, that is, a morion from Straightness to Crookedness, or contrarily, whilest the line remains still the same it was; for by drawing out the extreme points of a line to their greatest distance, the line is made straight, which otherwise is Crooked. So also the Bending of a Superficies, is the diduction or adduction of its extreme lines, that is, their Dilatation and Contraction.

11 Dilatation and Contraction, as also all Flexion supposes necessarily that the internal parts of the Body bowed do either come neerer to the external parts, or go further from them. For though Flexion be considered

onely in the length of a Body, yet when that Body is bowed, the line which is made on one side will be convex, and the line on the other side will be concave; of which the concave being the interiour line, will (unless something be taken from it and added to the convex line) be the more crooked, that is, the greater of the two. But they are equal; and therefore in Flexion there is an accession made from the interiour to the exteriour parts; and on the contrary, in Tension, from the exteriour to the interiour parts. And as for those things which do not easily suffer such transposition of their parts, they are called Brittle; and the great force they require to make them yield, makes them also with sudden motion to leap asunder, and break in pieces.

12 Also Motion is distinguished into Pulsion and Traction. And Pulsion, as I have already defined it, is when that which is moved, goes before that which moveth it. But contrarily, in Traction the Movent goes before that which is moved. Nevertheless, considering it with greater attention, it seemeth to be the same with Pulsion. For of two parts of a hard Body, when that which is foremost drives before it the Medium in which the motion is made, at the same time that which is thrust forwards, thrusteth the next, and this again the next, and so on successively. In which action, if we suppose that there is no place void, it must needs be, that by continual Pulsion, namely, when that action has gone round, the Movent will be behind that part which at the first seemed not to be thrust forwards, but to be drawn; so that now the Body which was drawn, goes before the Body which gives it motion; and its motion is no longer Traction, but Pulsion.

13 Such things as are removed from their places by forcible Compression or Extension, and as soon as the force is taken away, doe presently return and restore themselves to their former situation, have the beginning of their restitution within themselves, namely, a certain motion in their internal parts, which was there, when, before the taking away of the

force, they were compressed, or extended. For that Restitution is motion, and that which is at rest cannot be moved, but by a moved and a Contiguous Movent. Nor doth the cause of their Restitution proceed from the taking away of the force by which they were compressed or extended; for the removing of impediments hath not the efficacy of a cause (as has been shewn at the end of the 3d Article of the 15th Chapter). The Cause therefore of their Restitution, is some motion either of the parts of the Ambient; or of the parts of the Body compressed or extended. But the parts of the Ambient have no endeavour which contributes to their Compression or Extension, nor to the setting of them at liberty, or Restitution. It remayns therefore that from the time of their Compression or Extension there be left some endeavour (or motion) by which, the impediment being removed, every part resumes its former place; that is to say, the whole Restores it self.

14 In the Carriage of Bodies if that Body which carries another, hit upon any obstacle, or be by any means suddenly stopped, and that which is carried be not stopped, it will go on, till its motion be by some external impediment taken away.

For I have demonstrated in the 8th Chapter at the 19th Article, that Motion, unless it be hindred by some external resistance, will be continued eternally with the same celerity; and in the 7th Article of the 9th Chap. that the action of an external Agent is of no effect without contact. When therefore that which carrieth another thing, is stopped, that stop doth not presently take away the motion of that which is carried. It will therefore proceed, till its motion be by little and little extinguished by some external resistance; Which was to be proved; Though experience alone had been sufficient to prove this.

In like manner, if that Body which carrieth another be put from rest into sudden motion; that which is carried will not be moved forwards together with it, but will be left behind. For the contiguous part of the Body carried,

hath almost the same motion with the Body which carries it; and the remote parts will receive different Velocities according to their different distances from the Body that carries them; namely, the more remote the parts are, the less will be their degrees of Velocity. It is necessary therefore that the Body which is carried, be left accordingly more or less behind. And this also is manifest by experience, when at the starting forward of the Horse, the Rider falleth backwards.

15 In Percussion therefore, when one hard Body is in some small art of it stricken by another with great force, it is not necessary that the whole Body should yeild to the stroke with the same celerity with which the stricken part yeilds. For the rest of the parts receive their motion from the motion of the part stricken and yeilding, which motion is less propagated every way towards the sides then it is directly forwards. And hence it is, that sometimes very hard Bodies, which being erected can hardly be made to stand, are more easily broken, then thrown down by a violent stroke; when nevertheless, if all their parts together were by any weak motion thrust forwards they would easily be cast down.

16 Though the difference between Trusion and Percussion consist onely in this, that in Trusion the motion both of the Movent and Moved Body begin both together in their very contact; and in Percussion the striking Body is first moved, and afterwards the Body stricken; Yet their Effects are so different, that it seems scarce possible to compare their forces with one another. I say, any effect of Percussion being propounded, as for example the stroke of a Beetle of any weight assigned, by which a Pile of any given length, is to be driven into earth of any tenacity given, it seems to me very hard if not impossible to define, with what weight, or with what stroke, and in what time, the same pile may be driven a depth assigned into the same earth. The cause of which difficulty is this, that the velocity of the Percutient is to be compared with the magnitude of the Ponderant. Now

Velocity, seeing it is computed by the length of space transmitted, is to be accounted but as one Dimension; but Waight, is as a solid thing, being measured by the dimension of the whole Body. And there is no comparison to be made of a Solid Body with a Length, that is, with a Line.

17 If the internal parts of a Body be at rest, or retain the same situation with one another for any time how little soever, there cannot in those parts be generated any new motion, or endeavour, whereof the efficient cause is not without the Body of which they are parts. For if any small part which is comprehended within the Superficies of the whole Body, be supposed to be now at rest, and by and by to be moved, that part must of necessity receive its motion from some moved and contiguous Body. But (by supposition) there is no such moved and contiguous part within the Body. Wherefore, if there be any Endeavour or Motion, or change of situation, in the internal parts of that Body, it must needs arise from some efficient cause that is without the Body which contains them; Which was to be proved.

18 In hard Bodies therefore which are compressed or extended, if that which compresseth or extendeth them being taken away, they restore themselves to their former place or situation, it must needs be, that that Endeavour (or Motion) of their internal parts, by which they were able to recover their former places or situations, was not extinguished when the force by which they were compressed or extended was taken away. Therefore when the Lath of a Cross-bow bent, doth, as soon as it is at liberty, restore it self, though to him that judges by Sense, both it and all its parts seem to be at rest; yet he that judging by Reason, doth not account the taking away of impediment for an efficient cause, nor conceives that without an efficient cause any thing can pass from Rest to Motion, will conclude, that the parts were already in motion before they began to restore themselves.

19 Action and Reaction proceed in the same Line, but from opposite Terms. For seeing Reaction is nothing but Endeavour in the Patient to restore it self to that situation from which it was forced by the Agent; the endeavour or motion both of the Agent and Patient (or Reagent) will be propagated between the same terms, (yet so, as that in Action the Term from which, is in Reaction the Term to which). And seeing all Action proceeds in this manner, not onely between the opposite Terms of the whole line in which it is propagated, but also in all the parts of that line, the Terms from which and to which, both of the Action and Reaction, will be in the same line. Wherefore Action and Reaction proceed in the same line, &c.

20 To what has been said of Motion, I will add what I have to say concerning Habit. Habit therefore is a generation of Motion, not of Motion simply, but an easie conducting of the moved Body in a certain and designed way. And seeing it is attained by the weakning of such endeavours as divert its motion, therefore such endeavours are to be weakned by little and little. But this cannot be done but by the long continuance of action, or by actions often repeated; and therefore Custome begets that Facicility, which is commonly and rightly called Habit; and it may be defined thus; HABIT is Motion made more easie and ready by Custome; that is to say, by perpetual endeavour, or by iterated endevours in a way differing from that in which the Motion proceeded from the beginning, and opposing such endeavours as resist. And to make this more perspicuous by example, We may observe, that when one that has no skill in Musique, first, puts his hand to an Instrument, he cannot after the first stroke carry to his hand to the place where he would make the second stroke, without taking it back by a new endeavour, and as it were beginning again, pass from the first to the second. Nor will he be able to go on to the third place without another new endeavour, but he will be forced to draw back his hand again, and so successively, by renewing his endeavour at every stroke, till at the last by

doing this often, and by compounding many interrupted motions or endeavours into one equal endeavour, he be able to make his hand go readily on from stroke to stroke in that order and way which was at the first designed. Nor are Habits to be observed in living creatures only, but also in Bodies inanimate. For we find, that when the Lath of a Crossbow is strongly bent, and would if the impediment were removed return again with great force, if it remain a long time bent, it will get such a Habit, that when it is loosed and left to its own freedome, it will not onely not restore it self, but will require as much force for the bringing of it back to its first posture, as it did for the bending of it at the first.

CHAP. XXIII. OF THE CENTER OF EQUIPONDERATION OF BODIES PRESSING DOWNWARDS IN STRAIGHT PARALLEL LINES.

1 DEFINITIONS AND Suppositions.

2 Two Plains of Equiponderation are n parallel.

3 The Center of Equiponderation is in every Plain of Equiponderation.

4 The Moments of equal Ponderants are to one another as their distances from the center of the Scale.

5,6. The Moments of unequal Ponderants have their proportion to one another compounded of the proportions of their Waights and distances from the center of the Scale reciprocally taken.

7. If two Ponderants have their Moments and Distances from the Center of the Scale in reciprocal proportion; they are equally poised; and contrarily.

8 If the parts of any Ponderant press the Beam of the Scale every where equally, all the parts cut out off reckoned from the Center of the Scale will have their Moments in the same proportion with that of the parts of a Triangle cut off from the Vertex by straight Lines parallel to the base.

9 The Diameter of Equiponderation of Figures which are deficient according to commensurable proportions of their altitudes and bases, divides the Axis, so, that the part taken next the vertex is to the other part as the complete figure to the deficient figure.

10 The diameter of Equiponderation of the Complement of the half of any of the said deficient figures, divides that line which is drawn through the vertex parallel to the base, so, that the part next the vertex is to the other part as the complete figure to the Complement.

11 The Center of Equiponderation of the half of any of the desicient figures in the first row of the Table of the 3d. Article of the 17th Chapter, may be found out by the numbers of the second row.

12 The center of Equiponderation of the half of any of the figures in the second row of the same Table, may be found out by the numbers of the fourth row.

13 The Center of Equiponderation of the half of any of the figures in the same Table, being known, the Center of the Excess of the same figure above a Triangle of the same altitude and base is also known.

14 The Center of Equiponderation of a solid Sector, is in the Axis, so divided, that the part next the Vertex be to the whole Axis want half the Axis of the portion of the Sphere, as 3 to 4.

DEFINITIONS.

1 A SCALE, is a straight line, whose middle point is immoveable, all the rest of its points being at liberty; and that part of the Scale which reaches from the center to either of the waights, is called the Beam.

2 Equiponderation is, when the endeavour of one Body which presses one of the Beams, resists the endeavour of another Body pressing the other Beam, so, that neither of them is moved; and the Bodies when neither of them is moved, are said to be Equally poised.

3 Waight, is the aggregate of all the Endeavours, by which all the points of that Body which presses the Beam, tend downwards in lines parallel to one another; and the Body which presses, is called the Ponderant.

4 Moment, is the Power which the Ponderant has to move the Beam, by reason of a determined situation.

5 The plain of Equiponderation, is that, by which the Ponderant is so divided, that the Moments on both sides remain equal.

6 The Diameter of Equiponderation, is the common Section of the two Plains of Equiponderation; and is in the straight line by which the waight is hanged.

7 The Center of Equiponderation, is the common point of the two Diameters of Equiponderation.

SUPPOSITIONS

1 WHEN TWO Bodies are equally pois'd, if waight be added to one of them, and not to the other, their Equiponderation ceases.

2 When two Ponderants of equal magnitude, and of the same Species or matter, press the Beam on both sides at equal distances from the center of the Scale, their Moments are equal. Also when two Bodies endeavour at equal distances from the center of the Scale, if they be of equal magnitude and of the same Species, their Moments are equal.

2 No two Plains of Equiponderation are parallel.

Let A B C D (in the first figure) be any Ponderant whatsoever; and in it let E F be a Plain of Equiponderation; parallel to which, let any other Plain be drawn, as G H. I say G H is not a Plain of Equiponderation. For seeing the parts A E F D and E B C F of the Ponderant A B C D, are equally pois'd; and the weight E G H F is added to the part A E F D, and nothing is added to the part E B C F, but the weight E G H F is taken from it; therefore (by the first Supposition) the parts A G H D and G B C H will not be equally pois'd; and consequently G H is not a Plain of Equiponderation. Wherefore, No two Plains of Equiponderation, &c. Which was to be proved.

3 The Center of Equiponderation is in every Plain of Equiponderation.

For if another Plain of Equiponderation be taken, it will not (by the last Article) be parallel to the former Plain; and therefore both those Plains will cut one another. Now that Section (by the 6th Definition) is the Diameter of Equiponderation. Again, if another Diameter of Equiponderation be taken, it will cut that former Diameter; and in that Section (by the 7th Definition)

is the Center of Equiponderation. Wherefore the Center of Equiponderation is in that Diameter which lies in the said Plain of Equiponderation.

4 The Moment of any Ponderant applyed to one point of the Beam, to the Moment of the same, or an equal Ponderant applyed to any other point of the Beam, is as the distance of the former point from the Center of the Scale, to the distance of the later point from the same Center. Or thus, Those Moments are to one another, as the Arches of Circles which are made upon the Center of the Scale through those points, in the same time. Or lastly thus; They are, as the parallel bases of two Triangles, which have a common angle at the Center of the Scale.

Let A (in the 2d figure) be the Center of the Scale; and let the equal Poderants D and E press the Beam A B in the points B and C; also let the straight lines B D and C E be Diameters of Equiponderation; and the points D and E in the Ponderants D and E be their Centers of Equiponderation. Let A G F be drawn howsoever, cutting D B produced in F, and E C in G; and lastly, upon the common Center A, let the two arches B H and C I be described, cutting A G F in H and I. I say the Moment of the Ponderant D to the Moment of the Ponderant E, is as A B to A C, or as B H to C I, or as B F to C G. For the effect of the Ponderant D in the point B, is circular motion in the arch B H; and the effect of the Ponderant E in the point C, circular motion in the arch C I; and by reason of the equality of the Ponderants D and E, these motions are to one another as the Quicknesses or Velocities with which the points B and C describe the arches B H and C I, that is, as the arches themselves B H and C I, or as the straight parallels B F and C G, or as the parts of the Beam A B and A C; for A B. A C :: B F. C G :: B H. C I. are proportionals; and therefore the effects, that is, (by the 4th Definition) the Moments of the equal Ponderants applyed to several points of the Beam, are to one another, as A B and A C; or as the distances of those points from the center of the Scale; or as the parallel bases of the Triangles which have a

common angle at A; or as the concentrick arches B H and C I; which was to be demonstrated.

5 Unequal Ponderants, when they are applyed to several points of the Beam, and hang at liberty (that is, so as the line by which they hang be the Diameter of Equiponderation, whatsoever be the figure of the Ponderant), have their Moments to one another in proportion compounded of the proportions of their distances from the center of the Scale, and of their Waights.

Let A (in the 3d figure) be the center of the Scale, and A B the Beam; to which let the two Ponderants C & D be applied at the points B and E. I say the proportion of the Moment of the Ponderant C, to the Moment of the Ponderant D, is compounded of the proportions of A B to A E and of the Waight C to the Waight D; or (if C and D be of the same species) of the magnitude C to the magnitude D.

Let either of them, as C, be supposed to be bigger then the other D. If therefore by the addition of F, F and D together be as one Body equal to C, the Moment of C to the Moment of F + D will be (by the last article) as B G is to E H. Now as F + D is to D, so let E H be to another E I; and the moment of F + D, that is of C, to the moment of D, will be as B G to E I. But the proportion of B G to E I is compounded of the proportions (of B G to E H that is) of A B to A E, and (of E H to E I, that is) of the waight C to the waight D. Wherefore unequal Ponderants, when they are applied, &c. which was to be proved.

6 The same figure remaining, if I K be drawn parallel to the Beame A B, and cutting A G in K; and K L be drawn parallel to to B G, cutting A B in L, the distances A B and A L from the center, will be proportional to the moments of C and D. For the moment of C is B G, and the moment of D is E I, to which K L is equal. But as the distance A B from the center, is to the

distance A L from the center, so is B G the moment of the Ponderant C, to L K, or E I the moment of the Ponderant D.

7 If two Ponderants have their waights and distances from the center in reciprocal proportion, and the center of the Scale be between the points to which the Ponderants are applied, they will be equally poised. And contrarily, if they be equally poised, their waights and distances from the center of the Scale will be in reciprocall proportion.

Let the center of the Scale (in the same 3d figure) be A, the Beam A B; and let any Ponderant C, having B G for its moment, be applied to the point B; also let any other Ponderant D, whose moment is E I, be applied to the point E. Through the point I, let I K be drawn parallel to the Beam A B, cutting A G in K; also let K L be drawn parallel to B G. K L will then be the Moment of the Ponderant D; and (by the last Article) it will be as B G the Moment of the Ponderant C in the point B, to L K the Moment of the Ponderant D in the point E so A B to A L. On the other side of the center of the Scale, let A N be taken equal to A L; and to the point N let there be applyed the Ponderant O, having to the Ponderant C the proportion of A B to A N. I say the Ponderants in B and N will be equally poised. For the proportion of the Moment of the Ponderant O in the point N, to the Moment of the Ponderant C in the point B, is (by the 5th Article) co¯pounded of the proportions of the waight O to the waight B, & of the distance (from the center of the Scale) A N or A L to the dista¯ce (fro¯ the center of the Scale) A B. But seeing we have supposed, that the distance A B to the distance A N, is in reciprocal proportion of the Waight O to the waight C, the proportion of the Moment of the Ponderant O in the point N, to the Moment of the Ponderant C in the point B, will be compounded of the proportions of A B to A N, and of A N to A B. Wherefore, setting in order A B, A N, A B, the Moment of O to the Moment of C will be as the first to the last, that is, as A B to A B. Their Moments therefore are equal; and consequently the

Plain which passes through A, will (by the fifth Definition) be a Plain of Equiponderation. Wherefore they will be equally poised; as was to be proved.

Now the converse of this is manifest. For if there be Equiponderation, and the proportion of the Waights and Distances be not reciprocal, then both the Waights will alwayes have the same Moments, although one of them have more waight added to it, or its distance changed.

Corollary. When Ponderants are of the same Species, and their Moments be equal; their Magnitudes and Distances from the center of the Scale will be reciprocally proportional. For in Homogeneous Bodies, it is as Waight to Waight, so Magnitude to Magaltude.

8 If to the whole length of the Beam there be applyed a Parallelogram, or a Parallelopipedum, or a Prisma, or a Cylinder, or the Superficies of a Cylinder, ot of a Sphere, or of any portion of a Sphere or Prisma; the parts of any of them cut off with plains parallel to the base, will have their Moments in the same proportion with the parts of a Triangle which has its Vertex in the center of the Scale, and for one of its sides the Beam it self, which parts are cut off by Plains parallel to the base.

First, let the rectangled Parallelogram A B C D (in the 4th figure) be applyed to the whole length of the Beam A B; and producing C B howsoever to E, let the Triangle A B E be described. Let now any part of the Parallelogram, as A F, be cut off by the plain F G, parallel to the base C B; and let F G be produced to A E in the point H. I say the Moment of the whole A B C D to the Moment of its part A F, is as the Triangle A B E to the Triangle A G H, that is, in proportion duplicate to that of the distances from the center of the Scale.

For, the Parallelogram A B C D being divided into equal parts infinite in number, by straight lines drawn parallel to the base; and supposing the Moment of the straight line C B to be B E; the Moment of the straight line F

G, will (by the 7th Article) be G H; and the Moments of all the straight lines of that Parallelogram, will be so many straight lines in the Triangle A B E drawn parallel to the base B E; all which parallels together taken are the Moment of the whole Parallelogram A B C D; and the same parallels do also constitute the superficies of the Triangle A B E. Wherefore the Moment of the Parallelogram A B C D, is the Triangle A B E; and for the same reason, the Moment of the Parallelogram A F, is the Triangle A G H; and therefore the Moment of the whole Parallelogram, to the Moment of a Parallelogram which is part of the same, is as the Triangle A B E, to the Triangle A G H, or in proportion duplicate to that of the Beams to which they are applyed. And what is here demonstrated in the case of a Parallelogram, may be understood to serve for that of a Cylinder, and of a Prisma, and their Superficies; as also for the Superficies of a Sphere, of an Hemisphere, or any portion of a Sphere, (for the parts of the Superficies of a Sphere, have the same proportion with that of the parts of the Axis cut off by the same parallels by which the parts of the Superficies are cut off, as Archimedes has demonstrated); and therefore when the parts of any of these figures are equal and at equal distances from the Center of the Scale, their Moments also are equal, in the same manner as they are in Parallelograms.

Secondly, let the Parallelogram A K I B not be rectangled; the straight line I B wil nevertheless press the point B perpendicularly in the straight line B E; & the straight line L G wil press the point G perpendicularly in the straight line G H; and all the rest of the straight lines which are parallel to I B will do the like. Whatsoever therefore the Moment be which is assigned to the straight line I B, as here (for example) it is supposed to be B E, if A E be drawn, the Moment of the whole Parallelogram A I will be the Triangle A B E; and the Moment of the part A L will be the Triangle A G H. Wherefore the Moment of any Ponderant, which has its sides equally applyed to the Beam, (whether they be applyed perpendicularly or

obliquely) will be always to the Moment of a part of the same, in such proportion, as the whole Triangle has to a part of the same cut off by a plain which is parallel to the base.

9 The Center of Equiponderation of any figure which is deficient according to commensurable proportions of the altitude and base diminished, and whose complete figure is either a Parallelogram, or a Cylinder, or a Parallelopipedum, divides the Axis, so, that the part next the Vertex, to the other part, is as the complete figure to the deficient figure.

For let C I A P E (in the 5th figure) be a deficient figure, whose Axis is A B, and whose complete figure is C D F E; and let the Axis A B be so divided in Z, that A Z be to Z B as C D F E is to C I A P E. I say the center of Equiponderation of the figure C I A P E will be in the point Z.

First, that the Center of Equiponderation of the figure C I AP E is somewhere in the Axis A B, is manifest of it self; and therefore A B is a Diameter of Equiponderation. Let A E be drawn, and let B E be put for the Moment of the straight line C E; the Triangle A B E will therefore (by the 3d Article) be the Moment of the complete figure C D F E. Let the Axis A B be equally divided in L, and let G L H be drawn parallel and equal to the straight line C E, cutting the crooked line C I A P E in I and P, and the straight lines A C and A E in K and M. Moreover, let Z O be drawn parallel to the same C E; and let it be, as L G to L I, so L M to another L N; and let the same be done in all the rest of the straight lines possible, parallel to the base; and through all the points N, let the line A N E be drawn; the three-sided figure A N E B will therefore be the Moment of the figure C I A P E. Now the Triangle A B E is (by the 9th Article of the 17th Chapter) to the three-sided figure A N E B, as A B C D + A I C B is to A I C B twice taken, that is, as C D F E + C I A P E is to C I A P E twice taken. But as C I A P E is to C D F E, that is, as the waight of the deficient figure, is to the waight of the complete figure, so is C I A P E twice taken, to C D F E twice taken.

Wherefore, setting in order C D F E + C I A P E. 2 C I A P E. 2 C D F E; the proportion of C D F E + C I A P E to C D F E twice taken, will be compounded of the proportion of C D F E + C I A P E to C I A P E twice taken, that is, of the proportion of the Triangle A B E to the threesided figure A N E B, that is, of the Moment of the complete figure to the Moment of the deficient figure, and of the proportion of C I A P E twice taken, to C D F E twice taken, that is, to the proportion reciprocally taken of the waight of the deficient figure to the waight of the complete figure.

Again, seeing by supposition A Z. Z B :: C D F E. C I A P E are proportionals; A B. A Z :: C D F E + C I A P E. C D F E will also (by co¯pounding) be proportionals. And seeing A L is the half of A B, A L. A Z :: C D F E + C I A P E. 2 C D F E will also be proportionals. But the proportion of C D F E + C I A P E to 2 C D F E is compounded (as was but now shewn) of the proportions of Moment to Moment &c. and therefore the proportion of A L to A Z is compounded of the proportion of the Moment of the complete figure C D F E to the Moment of the deficient figure C I A P E, and of the proportion of the waight of the deficient figure C I AP E, to the waight of the complete figure C D F E; But the proportion of A L to A Z is compounded of the proportions of A L to B Z and of B Z to A Z. Now the proportion of B Z to A Z is the proportion of the Waights reciprocally taken, that is to say, of the waight C I A P F to the waight C D F E. Therefore the remayning proportion of A L to B Z, that is, of L B to B Z is the proportion of the Moment of the waight C D F E to the Moment of the waight C I A P E. But the proportion of A L to B Z is compounded of the proportions of A L to A Z and of A Z to Z B; of which proportions that of A Z to Z B is the proportion of the waight C D F E to the waight C I A P E. Wherefore (by the 5th Article of this Chapter) the remayning proportion of A L to A Z is the proportion of the distances of the points Z and L from the center of the Scale, which is A. And therefore (by the 6th Article) the waight C I A P E

shall hang from O in the straight line O Z. So that O Z is one Diameter of Equiponderation of the waight C I A P E. But the straight line A B is the other Diameter of Equiponderation of the same waight C I A P E. Wherefore (by the 7th Definition) the point Z is the center of the same Equiponderation; which point (by construction) divides the axis so, that the part A Z which is the part next the vertex, is to the other part Z B, as the complete figure C D F E is to the deficient figure C I A P E; which is that which was to be demonstrated.

- Corollary. The Center of Equiponderation of any of those plain three-sided figures, which are compared with their complete figures in the Table of the third Article of the 17th Chapter, is to be found in the same Table, by taking the Denominator of the fraction for the part of the axis cut off next the vertex, and the Numerator for the other part next the base. For example, if it be required to find the Center of Equiponderation of the second threesided figure of foure Meanes, there is in the concourse of the second columne with the row of three-sided figures of four Meanes this fraction /7, which signifies that that figure is to its parallelogra¯ or compleat figure as 5/7 to Unity, that is, as 5/7 to 7/7, or as 5 to 7; and therefore the Center of Equiponderation of that figure, divides the axis, so, that the part next the vertex is to the other part as 7 to 5.
- 2 Corallary. The Center of Equiponderation of any of the Solids of those figures which are contained in the Table of the 8th Article of the same 17th Chapter, is exhibited in the same Table. For example, if the Center of Equiponderation of a Cone be sought for; the Cone will be found to be ⅓ of its Cylinder; and therefore the Center of its Equiponderation will so divide

the axis, that the part next the vertex, to the other part, will be as 3 to 1. Also the Solid of a three-sided figure of one Meane, that is, a parabolical Solid, seeing it is 2/4, that is ½ of its Cylinder, will have its Center of Equiponderation in that point, which divides the axis, so, that the part towards the vertex be double to the part towards the base.

10 The Diameter of Equiponderation of the Complement of the half of any of those figues which are contained in the Table of the 3d article of the 17th Chapter, divides that line which is drawne through the Vertex parallel and equall to the base, so, that the part next the Vertex, will be to the other part, as the Complete figure to the Complement.

For let A I C B (in the same 5 fig.) be the halfe of a Parabola, or of any other of those three-sided figures which are in the Table of the 3d article of the 17th Chap whose Axis is A B, and base B C; having A D drawn from the Vertex, equall and parallel to the base B C; and whose complete figure is the parallelogramme A B C D. Let I Q be drawne, at any distance from the side C D, but parallel to it; and let A D be the altitude of the Complement A I C D, and Q I a line ordinately applyed in it. Wherefore the altitude A L in the deficient figure A I C B, is equal to Q I the line ordinately applyed in its Complement; and contrarily, L I the line ordinately applyed in the figure A I C B, is equall to the altitude A Q in its Complement; and so in all the rest of the ordinate lines and altitudes, the mutation is such, that that line which is ordinately applyed in the figure, is the altitude of its Complement. And therefore the proportion of the altitudes decreasing, to that of the ordinate lines decreasing, being multiplicate according to any number in the deficient figure, is submultiplicate according to the same number in its Complement. For example, if A I C B be a Parabola, seeing the proportion of A B to A L is duplicate to that of B C to L I, the proportion of A D to A Q in the Complement A I C D (which

is the same with that of B C to L I) will be subduplicate to that of C D to Q I (which is the same with that of A B to A L); and consequently, in a Parabola, the Complement will be to the Parallelogramme as 1 to 3; in a three-sided figure of two Meanes, as 1 to 4; in a three-sided figure of three Meanes, as 1 to 5, &c. But all the ordinate lines together in A I C D are its moment; and all the ordinate lines in A I C B are its moment. Wherefore the moments of the Complements of the halves of Deficient figures in the Table of the 3d article of the 17th Chap. being compared, are as the Deficient figures themselves; and therefore the Diameter of Equiponderation will divide the straight line A D in such proportion, that the part next the Vertex be to the other part, as the complete figure A B C D is to the Complement A I C D.

Coroll. The diameter of Equiponderation of these halves, may be found by the Table of the d article of the 17th Chapter in this manner. Let there be propounded any deficient figure, namely the second three-sided figure of two Meanes. This figure is to the complete figure as ⅗ to 1, that is as 3 to 5. Wherefore the Complement to the same complete figure is as 2 to 5; and therefore the diameter of Equiponderation of this Complement will cut the straight line drawne from the Vertex parallel to the base, so, that the part next the Vertex will be to the other part as 5 to 2. And in like manner, any other of the said three-sided figures being propounded, if the numerator of its fraction (found out in the Table) be taken from the denominator, the straight line drawn from the Vertex is to be divided, so, that the part next the Vertex be to the other part, as the denominator is to the remainder which that substraction leaves.

11 The center of Equiponderation of the halfe of any of those crooked-lined figures which are in the first row of the Table of the 3d article of the 17th chapter, is in that straight line, which being parallel to the Axis, divides the base according to the numbers of the fraction next below it in

the second row, so, that the Numerator be answerable to that part which is towards the Axis.

For example, let the first figure of three Means be taken, whose half is A B C D (in the 6th figure), and let the rectangle A B E D be completed. The Complement therefore will be B C D E. And seeing A B E D is to the figure A B C D (by the Table) as 5 to 4, the same A B E D will be to the Complement B C D E as 5 to 1. Wherefore if F G be drawn parallel to the base D A, cutting the axis, so, that A G be to G B as 4 to 5, the center of Equiponderation of the figure A B C D, will (by the precedent article) be somewhere in the same F G. Again, seeing (by the same article) the complete figure A B E D, is to the Complement B C D E as 5 to 1, therefore if B E and A D be divided in H and I as 5 to 1, the center of Equiponderation of the Complement B C D E will be somewhere in the straight line which connects H and I. Let now the straight line L K be drawn through M the center of the complete figure, parallel to the base; and the straight line N O, through the same center M, perpendicular to it; and let the straight lines L K and F G cut the straight line H I in P and Q. Let P R be taken quadruple to P Q; and let R M be drawn and produced to F G in S. R M therefore will be to M S as 4 to 1, that is, as the figure A B C D to its Complement B C D E. Wherefore seeing M is the center of the Complete figure A B E D, and the distances of R and S from the center M be in proportion reciprocall to that of the waight of the Complement B C D E to the waight of the figure A B C D, R and S will either be the centers of Equiponderation of their own figures, or those centers will be in some other points of the diameters of Equiponderation H I and F G. But this last is impossible. For no other straight line can be drawn through the point M terminating in the straight lines H I and F G, and retaining the proportion of M R to M S, that is, of the figure A B C D to its complement B C D E. The center therefore of Equiponderation of the figure A B C D is in the point S.

Now seeing P M hath the same proportion to Q S which R P hath to R Q, Q S will be 5 of those parts of which P M is 4, that is, of which I N is 4. But I N or P M is 2 of those parts of which E B or F G is 6; and therefore if it be, as 4 to 5, so 2 to a fourth, that fourth will be 2½. Wherefore Q S is 2½ of those parts of which F G is 6. But F Q is 1; and therefore F S is 3½. Wherefore the remayning part G S is 2½. So that F G is so divided in S, that the part towards the Axis, is in proportion to the other part as 2½ to 3½, that is, as 5 to 7; which answereth to the fraction 5/7 in the second row, next under the fraction ⁴⁄₅ in the first row. Wherefore drawing S T parallel to the Axis, the base wil be divided in like manner.

By this Method it is manifest, that the base of a Semiparabola will be divided into 3 and 5; and the base of the first three-sided figure of two Means, into 4 and 6; and of the first three-sided figure of four Means, into 6 and 8. The fractions therefore of the second row denote the proportions into which the bases of the figures of the first row are divided by the diameters of Equiponderation. But the first row begins one place higher then the second row.

12 The center of Equiponderation of the half of any of the figures in the second row of the same Table of the 3d article of the 17th Chapter, is in a straight line parallel to the Axis, and dividing the base according to the nu¯bers of the fraction in the fourth row, two places lower, so, as that the Numerator be answerable to that part which is next the Axis.

Let the half of the second three-sided figure of two Means be taken; and let it be A B C D (in the 7th Figure); whose complement is B C D E, and the rectangle completed A B E D. Let this rectangle be divided by the two straight lines L K & N O, cutting one another in the center M at right angles; and because A B E D is to A B C D as 5 to 3, let A B be divided in G, so, that A G to B G be as 3 to 5; and let F G be drawn parallel to the base. Also because A B E D is (by the 9th article) to B C D E as 5 to 2, let

B E be divided in the point I, so, that B I be to I E as 5 to 2; and let I H be drawn parallel to the Axis, cutting L K and F G in P and Q. Let now P R be so taken, that it be to P Q as 3 to 2, and let R M be drawn and produced to F G in S. Seeing therefore R P is to R Q, that is, R M to M S, as A B C D is to its complement B C D E, and the centers of Equiponderation of A B C D and B C D E are in the straight lines F G and H I, and the center of Equiponderation of them both together in the point M; R will be the center of the Complement B C D E, and S the center of the Figure A B C D. And seeing P M, that is I N, is to Q S, as R P is to R Q; and I N, or P M is 3 of those parts, of which B E, that is, F G is 14; therefore Q S is 5 of the same parts; and E I, that is F Q, 4; and F S, 9; and G S, 5. Wherefore the straight line S T being drawn parallel to the Axis, will divide the base A D into 5 and 9. But the fraction 5/9 is found in the fourth row of the Table, two places below the fraction 9/5 in the second row.

By the same method, if in the same second row, there be taken the second three-sided Figure of three Meanes, the center of Equiponderation of the half of it, will be found to be in a straight line parallel to the Axis, dividing the base according to the numbers of the fraction 6/10, two places below in the fourth row. And the same way serves for all the rest of the Figures in the second row. In like manner, the center of Equiponderation of the third three-sided Figure of three Means, will be found to be in a straight line parallel to the Axis, dividing the base, so, that the part next the Axis, be to the other part, as 7 to 13, &c.

Coroll. The Centers of Equiponderation of the halves of the said Figures are known, seeing they are in the intersection of the straight lines S T and F G, which are both known.

13 The center of Equiponderation of the half of any of the Figures, which (in the Table of the 3d Article of the 17th Chap.) are compared with

their Parallelograms, being known; the center of Equiponderation of the excess of the same Figure above its triangle, is also known.

For example, let the Semiparabola A B C D (in the 8th Fig.) be taken; whose Axis is A B; whose complete Figure is A B E D; and whose excess above its triangle is B C D B. Its center of Equiponderation may be found out in this manner. Let F G be drawn parallel to the base, so, that A F be a third part of the Axis; and let H I be drawn parallel to the Axis, so, that A H be a third part of the base. This being done, the center of Equiponderation of the triangle A B D, will be I. Again, let K L be drawn parallel to the base, so, that A K be to A B as 2 to 5; and M N parallel to the Axis, so, that A M be to A D as 3 to 8; and let M N terminate in the straight line K L. The center therefore of Equiponderation of the Parabola A B C D is N; and therefore we have the centers of Equiponderation of the Semiparabola A B C D, and of its part the triangle A B D. That we may now finde the Center of Equiponderation of the remayning part B C D B, let I N be drawn and produced to O, so, that N O be triple to I N; and O will be the center sought for. For seeing the waight of A B D, to the waight of B C D B is in proportion reciprocall to that of the straight line N O to the straight line I N; and N is the center of the whole, and I the center of the triangle A B D; O will be the center of the remaining part, namely, of the figure B D C B; which was to be found.

Coroll. The Center of Equiponderation of the figure B D C B, is in the concourse of two straight lines, whereof one is parallel to the base, and divides the Axis, so, that the part next the base be ⅖ or 6/15 of the whole Axis; the other is parallel to the Axis, and so divides the base, that the part towards the Axis be ½ or 12/24 of the whole base. For drawing O P parallel to the base, it will be as I N to N O, so F K to K P, that is, so 1 to 3, or 5 to 15. But A F is 5/15 or ⅓ of the whole A B; and A K is 6/15 or ⅖; and F K /15; and K P 3/15; and therefore A P is 9/15 of the Axis A B. Also A H is ⅓

or 8/24; and A M ⅜ or 9/24 of the whole base; and therefore O Q being drawn parallel to the Axis, M Q (which is triple to H M) will be 3/24. Wherefore A Q is 12/24 or ½ of the base A D.

The excesses of the rest of the three-sided figures in the first row of the Table of the 3d article of the 17th Chapter, have their centers of Equiponderation in two straight lines which divide the Axis and base according to those fractions, which adde 4 to the numerators of the fractions of a Parabola 9/15 and 12/24; and 6 to the denominators, in this manner,

- In a Parabola, The Axis 9/15, The Base 12/24
- In the first three-sided figure, The Axis 13/21, The Base 16/30
- In the second three-sided figure, The Axis 17/27, The Base 20/36 &c.

And by the same method, any man (if it be worth the paines) may find out the centers of Equiponderation of the excesses above their triangles of the rest of the figures in the second & third row, &c.

14 The center of Equiponderation of the Sector of a Sphere (that is, of a figure compounded of a right Cone whose Vertex is the center of the Sphere, and the portion of the Sphere whose base is the same with that of the Cone), divides the straight line which is made of the Axis of the Cone and halfe the Axis of the portion together taken, so, that the part next the Vertex be triple to the other part, or to the whole straight line, as 3 to 4.

For let A B C (in the 9th fig.) be the Sector of a Sphere, whose Vertex is the ceter of the Sphere A; whose Axis is A D; and the circle upon B C is the common base of the portion of the Sphere and of the Cone whose Vertex is A; the Axis of which portion is E D, and the halfe thereof F D; and the Axis of the Cone, A E. Lastly let A G be ¾ of the straight line A F. I say G is the center of Equiponderation of the Sector A B C.

Let the straight line F H be drawne of any length, making right angles with A F at F; and drawing the straight line A H, let the triangle A F H be

made. Then upon the same center A let any arch I K be drawne, cutting A D in L; and its chord, cutting A D in M; and dividing M L equally in N, let N O be drawne parallel to the straight line F H, and meeting with the straight line A H in O.

Seeing now B D C is the Spherical Superficies of the portion cut off with a plain passing through B C, and cutting the Axis at right angles; and seeing F H divides E D the Axis of the portion into two equal parts in F; the center of Equiponderation of the Superficies B D C will be in F (by the 8th article); and for the same reason the center of Equiponderation of the Superficies I L K (K being in the straight line A C) will be in N. And in like manner, if there were drawne between the center of the Sphere A and the outermost Spherical Superficies of the Sector, arches infinite in number, the centers of Equiponderation of the Sphericall Superficies in which those arches are,, would be found to be in that part of the Axis, which is intercepted between the Superficies it selfe and a plaine passing along by the chord of the arch, and cutting the Axis in the middle at right angles.

Let it now be supposed that the moment of the outermost sphericall Superficies B D C is F H. Seeing therefore the Superficies B D C is to the Superficies I L K in proportion duplicate to that of the arch B D C to the arch I L K, that is, of B E to I M, that is, of F H to N O; let it be as F H to N O, so N O to another N P; and again, as N O to N P, so N P to another N Q; and let this be done in all the straight lines parallel to the base F H that can possibly be drawn between the base and the vertex of the triangle A F H. If then through all the points Q there be drawn the crooked line A Q H, the figure A F H Q A will be the complement of the first three-sied figure of two Meanes; and the same will also be the moment of all the Sphericall Superficies of which the Solid Sector A B C D is compounded; and by consequent, the moment of the Sector it selfe. Let now F H be understood to be the semidiameter of the base of a right Cone, whose side is A H, and

Axis A F. Wherfore seeing the bases of the Cones which passe through F and N and the rest of the points of the Axis, are in proportion duplicate to that of the straight lines F H and N O, &c. the moment of all the bases together, that is, of the whole Cone, will be the figure it self A F H Q A; and therefore the center of Equiponderation of the Cone A F H is the same with that of the solid Sector. Wherefore seeing A G is ¾ of the Axis A F, the center of Equiponderation of the Cone A F H is in G; and therefore the center of the solid Sector is in G also, and divides the part A F of the Axis, so, that A G is triple to G F; that is, A G is to A F as 3 to 4; which was to be demonstrated.

Note, that when the Sector is a Hemisphere, the Axis of the Cone vanisheth into that point which is the center of the Sphere; and therefore it addeth nothing to half the Axis of the portion. Wherefore, if in the Axis of the Hemisphere, there be taken from the center, ¾ of halfe the Axis, that is, 3/ of the Semidiameter of the Sphere, there will be the center of Equiponderation of the Hemisphere.

CHAP. XXIV. OF REFRACTION AND REFLECTION.

1 DEFINITIONS.

2 In perpendicular Motion there is no Refraction.

3 Things thrown out of a thinner into a thicker Medium, are so refracted, that the Angle Refracted is greater then the Angle of Inclination.

4 Endeavour which from one point tendeth every way, will be so Refracted, at that the sine of the Angle Refracted, will be to the sine of the Angle of Inclination, as the Density of the first Medium is to the Density of the second Medium, reciprocally taken.

5 The sine of the Refracted Angle in one Inclination is to the sine of the Refracted Angle in another Inclination, as the sine of the Angle of that Inclination is to the sine of the Angle of this Inclination.

6 If two lines of Incidence, having equal Inclination, be the one in a thinner, the other in a thicker Medium, the sine of the angle of Inclination will be a Mean proportional between the two sines of the Refracted angles.

7 If the angle of Inclination be semirect, and the line of Inclination be in the thicker Medium, and the proportion of their Densities be the same with that of the Diagonal to the side of a Square, and the separating Superficies be plain, the Refracted line will be in the separating Superficies.

8 If a Body be carried in a straight line upon another Body, and do not penetrate the same, but be reflected from it, the angle of Reflexion will be equal to the Angle of Incidence.

9 The same happens in the generation of Motion in the line of Incidence.

DEFINITIONS.

1 REFRACTION, IS the breaking of that straight Line, in which a Body is moved, or its Action would proceed in one and the same Medium, into two straight lines, by reason of the different natures of the two Mediums.

2 The former of these is called the Line of Incidence; the later the Refracted Line.

3 The Point of Refraction, is the common point of the Line of Incidence and of the Refracted Line.

4 The Refracting Superficies, which also is the Separating Superficies of the two Mediums, is that in which is the point of Refraction.

5 The Angle Refracted, is that which the Refracted Line makes in the point of Refraction, with that Line which from the same point is drawn perpendicular to the separating Superficies in a different Medium.

6 The Angle of Refraction, is that which the Refracted line makes with the Line of Incidence produced.

7 The Angle of Inclination, is that which the Line of Incidence makes with that Line which from the point of Refraction is drawn perpendicular to the separating Superficies.

8 The Angle of Incidence, is the Complement to a right Angle of the Angle of Inclination.

And so, (in the first Figure) the Refraction is made in A B F. The Refracted Line is B F. The Line of Incidence is A B. The Point of Incidence, and of Refraction is B. The Refracting or Separating Superficies is D B E. The Line of Incidence produced directly is A B C The

Perpendicular to the separating Superficies is B H. The Angle of Refraction is C B F. The Angle Refracted is H B F. The Angle of Inclination is A B G or H B C. The Angle of Incidence is A B D.

9 Moreover the Thinner Medium, is understood to be that in which there is less resistance to Motion or to the generation of Motion; & the Thicker, that wherin there is greater resistance.

10 And that Medium in which there is equal resistance every where, is a Homogeneous Medium. All other Mediums are Heterogeneous.

2 If a Body pass, or there be generation of Motion, from one Medium to another of different Density, in a line perpendicular to the Separating Superficies; there will be no Refraction.

For seeing on every side of the perdendicular all things in the Mediums are supposed to be like and equal; if the Motion it self be supposed to be perpendicular, the Inclinations also will be equal, or rather none at all; and therefore there can be no cause, from which Refraction may be inferred to be on one side of the perpendicular, which wil not co¯clude the same Refraction to be on the other side. Which being so, Refraction on one side will destroy Refraction on the other side; and consequently, either the Refracted line will be every where, (which is absurd), or there will be no Refracted line at all; which was to be demonstrated.

Corol. It is manifest from hence, that the cause of Refraction consisteth onely in the obliquity of the line of Incidence, whether the Incident Body penetrate both the Mediums, or without penetrating, propagate motion by Pressure onely.

3 If a Body, without any change of situation of its internal parts, as a stone, be moved obliquely out of the thinner Medium, and proceed penetrating the thicker Medium; and the thicker Medium be such, as that its

internal parts being moved, restore themselves to their former situation; the angle Refracted will be greater then the angle of Inclination.

For let D B E (in the same first figure) be the separating Superficies of two Mediums; and let a Body, as a stone thrown, be understood to be moved as is supposed in the straight line A B C; and let A B be in the thinner Medium, as in the Aire; and B C in the thicker, as in the Water. I say the stone, w^{ch} being thrown, is moved in the line A B, will not proceed in the line B C, but in some other line, namely that, with which the perpendicular B H makes the Refracted angle H B F greater then the angle of Inclination H B C.

For seeing the stone coming from A, and falling upon B, makes that which is at B proceed towards H, and that the like is done in all the straight lines which are parallel to B H; and seeing the parts moved restore themselves by contrary motion in the same line; there will be contrary motion generated in H B, and in all the straight lines which are parallel to it. Wherefore the motion of the stone will be made by the concourse of the motions in A G, that is, in D B, and in G B, that is, in B H, and lastly, in H B, that is, by the concourse of three motions. But by the concourse of the motions in A G and B H, the stone will be carried to C; and therefore by adding the motion in H B, it will be carried higher in some other line, as in B F, and make the angle H B F greater then the angle H B C.

And from hence may be derived the cause, why Bodies which are thrown in a very oblique line, if either they be any thing flat, or be thrown with great force, will when they fall upon the water, be cast up again from the water into the aire.

For let A B (in the 2d figure) be the superficies of the water; into which from the point C, let a stone be thrown in the straight line C A, making with the line B A produced a very little angle C A D; and producing B A indefinitely to D, let C D be drawn perpendicular to it, and A E parallel to C

D. The stone therefore will be moved in C A by the concourse of two motions in C D and D A, whose velocities are as the lines themselves C D and D A. And from the motion in C D and all its parallels downwards, as soon as the stone falls upon A, there will be Reaction upwards, because the water restores it self to its former situation. If now the stone be thrown with sufficient obliquity, that is, if the straight line C D be short enough, that is, if the endeavour of the stone downwards be less then the Reaction of the water upwards, that is, less then the endeavour it hath from its own gravity, (for that may be), the stone will (by reason of the excess of the endeavour which the water hath to restore it self, above that which the stone hath downwards) be raised again above the Superficies A B, and be carried higher, being reflected in a line which goes higher, as the line A G.

4 If from a point, whatsoever the Medium be, Endeavour be propagated every way into all the parts of that Medium; and to the same Endeavour there be obliquely opposed another Medium of a different nature, that is, either thinner or thicker; that Endeavour will be so refracted, that the sine of the angle Refracted, to the sine of the angle of Inclination, will be as the density of the first Medium to the density of the second Medium, reciprocally taken.

First, let a Body be in the thinner Medium in A (Figure 3d.); and let it be understood to have endeavour every way, and consequently that its endeavour proceed in the lines A B and A b; to which let B b the superficies of the thicker Medium be obliquely opposed in B and b, so that A B and A b be equal; and let the straight line B b be produced both wayes. From the points B and b let the perpendiculars B C and b c be drawn; and upon the centers B and b, and at the equal distances B A and b A, let the Circles A C and A c be described, cutting B C and b c in C and c, and the same C B and c b produced in D and d, as also A B and A b produced in E and e. Then from the point A to the straight lines B C and b c let the perpendiculars A F

and A f be drawn. A F therefore will be the sine of the angle of Inclination of the straight line A B, and A f the sine of the angle of Inclination of the straight line A h, which two Inclinations are by construction made equal. I say, as the density of the Medium in which are B C and b c, is to the density of the Medium in which are B D and b d, so is the sine of the angle Refracted, to the sine of the angle of Inclination.

Let the straight line F G be drawn parallel to the straight line A B, meeting with the straight line b B produced in G.

Seeing therefore A F and B G are also parallels, they will be equal; and consequently, the endeavour in A F is propagated in the same time, in which the endeavour in B G would be propagated if the Medium were of the same density. But because B G is in a thicker Medium, that is, in a Medium which resists the endeavour more then the Medium in which A F is, the endeavour will be propagated less in B G then in A F, according to the proportion which the density of the Medium in which A F is, hath to the density of the Medium in which B G is. Let therefore the density of the Medium in which B G is, be to the density of the Medium in which A F is, as B G is to B H; and let the measure of the time be the Radius of the Circle. Let H I be drawn parallel to B D, meeting with the circumference in I; and from the point I let I K be drawn perpendicular to B D; which being done, B H and I K will be equal; and I K will be to A F, as the density of the Medium in which is A F, is to the density of the Medium in which is I K. Seeing therefore in the time A B (which is the Radius of the Circle) the endeavour is propagated in A F in the thinner Medium, it will be propagated in the same time, that is, in the time B I in the thicker Medium from K to I. Therefore B I is the Refracted line of the line of Incidence A B; and I K is the sine of the angle Refracted; and A F, the sine of the angle of Inclination. Wherefore seeing I K is to A F, as the density of the Medium in which is A F to the density of the Medium in which is I K; it will be as the density of

the Medium in which is A F, (or B C) to the density of the Medium in which is I K (or B D), so the sine of the angle Refracted to the sine of the angle of Inclination. And by the same reason it may be shewn, that as the density of the thinner Medium is to the density of the thicker Medium, so will K I the sine of the angle Refracted be to A F the sine of the Angle of Inclination.

Secondly, let the Body which endeavoureth every way, be in the thicker Medium at I. If therefore both the Mediums were of the same density, the endeavour of the Body in I B would tend directly to L; and the sine of the angle of Inclination L M would be equal to I K or B H. But because the density of the Medium in which is IK, to the density of the Medium in which is L M, is as BH to B G, that is, to A F, the endeavour will be propagated further in the Medium in which L M is, then in the Medium in which I K is, in the proportion of density to density, that is, of M L to A F. Wherefore B A being drawn, the angle Refracted will be C B A, and its sine A F. But L M is the sine of the angle of Inclination; and therefore again, as the density of one Medium is to the density of the different Medium, so reciprocally is the sine of the angle Refracted to the sine of the angle of Inclination, which was to be demonstrated.

In this Demonstration, I have made the separating Superficies B b plain by construction. But though it were concave or convex, the Theoreme would nevertheless be true. For the Refraction being made in the point B of the plain separating Superficies, if a crooked line, as P Q be drawn, touching the separating line in the point B; neither the Refracted line B I, nor the perpendicular B D will be altered; and the Refracted angle K B I, as also its sine K I will be still the same they were.

5 The sine of the angle Refracted in one Inclination, is to the sine of the angle Refracted in another Inclination, as the sine of the angle of that Inclination to the sine of the angle of this Inclination.

For seeing the sine of the Refracted angle is to the sine of the angle of Inclination, (whatsoever that Inclination be) as the density of one Medium, to the density of the other Medium; the proportion of the sine of the Refracted angle, to the sine of the angle of Inclination, will be compounded of the proportions of density to density, and of the sine of the angle of one Inclination to the sine of the angle of the other Inclination. But the proportions of the densities in the same Homogeneous Body, are supposed to be the same. Wherefore Refracted angles in different Inclinations, are as the sines of the angles of those Inclinations; which was to be demonstrated.

6 If two lines of Incidence having equal inclination, be the one in a thinner, the other in a thicker Medium; the sine of the angle of their Inclination, will be a mean proportional between the two sines of their angles Refracted.

For let the straight line AB (in the same 3d figure) have its Inclination in the thinner Medium, and be refracted in the thicker Medium in B I; and let E B have as much Inclination in the thicker Medium, and be refracted in the thinner Medium in B S; and let R S the sine of the angle Refracted be drawn. I say the straight lines R S, A F and I K are in continual proportion. For it is, as the density of the thicker Medium to the density of the thinner Medium, so R S to A F. But it is also, as the density of the same thicker Medium, to that of the same thinner Medium, so AF to IK. Wherefore R S. A F : : A F. I K are propoortionals; that is, R S, A F and I K are in continual proportion, and A F is the Mean proportional; which was to be proved.

7 If the angle of Inclination be semirect, and the line of Inclination be in the thicker Medium, and the proportion of the Densities be as that of a Diagonal to the side of its Square, and the separating Superficies be plain, the Refracted line will be in that separating Superficies.

For in the Circle A C (in the 4th figure) let the angle of Inclination A B C be an angle of 45 degrees. Let C B be produced to the Circumference in

D; & let C E (the sine of the angle B C) be drawn to which, let B F be taken equal in the separating line B G. B C E F will therefore be a Parallelogram, & F E & B C, that is, F E and B G equal. Let AG be drawn, namely, the Diagonal of the Square whose side is B G; and it will be, as A G to E F, so B G to B F; & so (by supposition) the density of the Medium in which C is, to the density of the Medium in which D is; and so also the sine of the angle Refracted to the sine of the angle of Inclination. Drawing therefore F D, & from D the line D H perpendicular to A B produced, DH will be the sine of the angle of Inclination. And seeing the sine of the angle Refracted is to the sine of the angle of Inclination, as the density of the Medium in which is C, is to the density of the Medium in which is D, that is, (by supposition) as A G is to F E, that is, as D H is to B G; and seeing D H is the sine of the angle of Inclination, B G will therefore be the sine of the angle Refracted. Wherefore B G will be the Refracted line, and lye in the plain separating Superficies; which was to be demonstrated.

Coroll. It is therefore manifest, that when the Inclination is greater then 45 degrees, as also when it is less, provided the density be greater, it may happen that the Refraction will not enter the thinner Medium at all.

8 If a Body fall in a straight line upon another Body, and do not penetrate it, but be reflected from it, the angle of Reflexion will be equal to the angle of Incidence.

Let there be a Body at A (in the 5th figure), which falling with straight motion in the line A C upon another Body at C, passeth no further, but is reflected; and let the angle of Incidence be any angle, as A C D. Let the straight line C E be drawn, making with D C produced the angle E C F equall to the angle A C D; and let A D be drawn perpendicular to the straight line D F. Also in the same straight line D F let C G be taken equall to C D; and let the perpendicular G E be raised, cutting C E in E. This being done, the triangles A C D and E C G will be equall and like. Let C H be

drawn equal and parallel to the straight line A D; and let H C be produced indefinitely to I. Lastly let E A be drawn, which will passe through H, and be parallel and equall to G D. I say the motion from A to C in the straight line of Incidence AC, will be reflected in the straight line C E.

For the motion from A to C is made by two coefficient or concurrent motions, the one in A H parallel to D G, the other in A D perpendicular to the same D G; of which two motions, that in A H workes nothing upon the Body A after it has been moved as farre as C, because (by supposition) it doth not passe the straight line D G; whereas the endeavour in A D, that is in H C, worketh further towards I. But seeing it doth onely presse and not penetrate, there will be reaction in H, which causeth motion from C towards H; and in the mean time the motion in H E remaines the same it was in A H; and therefore the Body will now be moved by the concourse of two motions in C H and H E, which are equall to the two motions it had formerly in A H and H C. Wherefore it will be carried on in C E. The angle therefore of Reflection will be E C G, equall (by construction) to the angle A C D; which was to be demonstrated.

Now when the Body is considered but as a point, it is all one, whether the Superficies or line in which the Reflection is made, be straight or crooked; for the point of Incidence and Reflexion C, is as well in the crooked line which toucheth D G in C, as in D G it selfe.

9 But if we suppose that not a Body be moved, but some Endeavour onely be propagated from A to C, the Demonstration will neverthelesse be the same. For all Endeavour is motion; and when it hath reached the Solid Body in C, it presseth it, and endeavoureth further in C I. Wherefore the reaction will proceed in C H; and the endeavour in C H concurring with the endeavour in H E, will generate the endeavour in C E, in the same manner as in the repercussion of Bodies moved.

If therefore Endeavour be propagated from any point to the concave Superficies of a Spherical Body, the Reflected line with the circumference of a great circle in the same Sphere, will make an angle equall to the angle of Incidence.

For if Endeavour be propagated from A (in the 6 fig.) to the circumference in B, and the center of the Sphere be C, and the line C B be drawne, as also the Tangent D B E; and lastly if the angle F B D be made equall to the angle A B E, the Reflexion will be made in the line B F, as hath been newly shewn. Wherefore the angles which the straight lines A B and F B make with the circumference, will also be equall. But it is here to be noted that if C B be produced howsoever to G, the endeavour in the line G B C will proceed onely from the perpendicular reaction in G B; and that therefore there will be no other endeavour in the point B towards the parts which are within the Sphere, besides that which tends towards the center.

And here I put an end to the third part of this Discourse; in which I have considered Motion and Magnitude by themselves in the abstract. The fourth and last part, concerning the Phaenomena of Nature, that is to say, concerning the Motions and Magnitudes of the Bodies which are parts of the World, reall and existent, is that which followes.

THE FOURTH PART, OF PHYSIQUES, OR THE PHAENOMENA OF NATURE.

CHAP. XXV. OF SENSE AND ANIMAL MOTION.

1 THE CONNEXION of what hath been said with that which followeth.

2 The investigation of the nature of Sense, and the Definition of Sense.

3 The Subject and Object of Sense.

4 The Organ of Sense.

5 All Bodies are not indued with Sense.

6 But one Phantasme at one and the same time.

7 Imagination, the Remayns of past Sense, (which also is Memory). Of Sleep.

8 How Phantasmes succeed one another.

9 Dreames, whence they proceed.

10 Of the Senses, their kindes, their Organs, and Phantasmes proper and common.

11 The Magnitude of Images, how and by what it is determined.

12 Pleasure, Pain, Appetite, and Aversion, what they are.

13 Deliberation and Will, what.

1 I Have (in the first Chapter) defined Philosophy to be Knowledge of Effects acquired by true Ratiocination, from knowledge first had of their

Causes and Generation; and of such Causes or Generations as may be, from former knowledge of their Effects or Appearances. There are therefore two Methods of Philosophy, One from the Generation of things to their possible Effects, and the other from their Effects or Appearances to some possible Generation of the same. In the former of these, the Truth of the first Principles of our ratiocination (namely Definitions) is made and constituted by our selves, whilest we consent and agree about the Appellations of things. And this part I have finished in the foregoing Chapters; in which (if I am not deceived) I have affirmed nothing (saving the Definitions themselves) which hath not good coherence with the Definitions I have given; that is to say, which is not sufficiently demonstrated to all those that agree with me in the use of Words and Appellations; for whose sake onely I have written the same. I now enter upon the other part; which is the finding out by the Appearances or Effects of Nature which we know by Sense, some wayes and means by which they may be (I do not say, they are) generated. The Principles therefore, upon which the following discourse depends, are not such as we our selves make and pronounce in general terms, as Definitions; but such, as being placed in the things themselves by the Authour of Nature, are by us observed in them; and we make use of them in single and particular, not universal propositions. Nor do they impose upon us any necessity of constituting Theoremes; their use being onely (though not without such general Propositions as have been already demonstrated) to shew us the possibility of some production or generation. Seeing therefore the Science which is here taught, hath its Principles in the Appearances of Nature, and endeth in the attayning of some knowledge of Natural causes, I have given to this Part, the title of PHYSIQUES, or the PHAENOMENA of NATURE. Now such things as appear, or are shewn to us by Nature, we call Phaenomena or Appearances.

Of all the Phaenomena, or Appearances which are neer us, the most admirable is Apparition it self, ; namely, that some Natural Bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others of none at all. So that if the Appearances be the Principles by which we know all other things, we must needs acknowledge Sense to be the Principle by which we know those Principles; & that all the knowledge we have is derived from it. And as for the causes of Sense, we cannot begin our search of them from any other Phaenomenon then that of Sense it self. But you will say, by what Sense shall we take notice of Sense? I answer, by Sense it self, namely, by the Memory which for some time remains in us of things sensible, though they themselves pass away. For he that perceiues that he hath perceived, remembers.

In the first place therefore the causes of our Perception, that is, the causes of those Ideas and Phantasmes which are perpetually generated within us whilest we make use of our Senses, are to be enquired into; and in what manner their generation proceeds. To help which Inquisition, we may observe first of all, that our Phantasmes or Ideas are not alwayes the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old ones vanish, according as we apply our Organs of Sense, now to one Object, now to another. Wherefore they are generated, and perish. And from hence it is manifest, that they are some change or mutation in the Sentient.

2 Now that all Mutation or Alteration is Motion, or Endeavour (and Endeavour also is Motion) in the internal parts of the thing that is altered, hath been proved (in the 9th Article of the 8th Chapter) from this, that whilest even the least parts of any Body remain in the same situation in respect of one another, it cannot be said that any alteration (unless perhaps that the whole Body together hath been moved) hath hapned to it; but that it both appeareth and is the same it appeared & was before. Sense therefore in the Sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of

the Sentient; and the parts so moved, are parts of the Organs of Sense. For the parts of our Body by which we perceive any thing, are those we commonly call the Organs of Sense. And so we find what is the Subject of our Sense, namely, that in which are the Phantasmes; and partly also we have discovered the nature of Sense, namely, that it is some internal Motion in the Sentient.

I have shewn besides (in the 8th Chap. at the 7th Article) that no Motion is generated but by a Body contiguous and Moved. From whence it is manifest, that the immediate cause of Sense or Perception consists in this, that the first Organ of Sense is touched and pressed. For when the uttermost part of the Organ is pressed, it no sooner yeilds, but the part next within it, is pressed also; and in this manner, the pressure or Motion is propagated through all the parts of the Organ to the innermost. And thus also the pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of some more remote Body, and so continually, till we come to that from which, as from its fountain we derive the Phantasme or Idea that is made in us by our Sense. And this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call the Object. Sense therefore is some internal Motion in the Sentient, generated by some internal Motion of the parts of the Object, and propagated through all the Media to the innermost part of the Organ. By which words I have almost defined what Sense is.

Moreover, I have shewn (in the 2d Article of the 15 Chapter) that all Resistance is Endeavour opposite to another Endeavour, that is to say, Reaction. Seeing therefore there is in the whole Organ by reason of its own internal natural Motion; some Resistance or Reaction against the Motion which is propagated from the Object to the innermost part of the Organ, there is also in the same Organ an Endeavour opposite to the Endeavour which proceeds from the Object; so that when that Endeavour inwards is the last action in the act of Sense, then from the Reaction, how little soever the

duration of it be, a Phantasme or Idea hath its being; which by reason the Endeavour is now outwards, doth alwayes appear as something situate without the Organ. So that now I shall give you the whole Definition of Sense, as it is drawn from the explication of the causes thereof, and the order of its generation, thus; SENSE is a Phantasme, made by the Reaction and endeavour outwards in the Organ of Sense, caused by an Endeavour inwards from the Object, remayning for some time more or less.

3 The Subject of Sense, is the Sentient it self, namely, some living Creature; and we speak more correctly, when we say a Living Creature seeth, then when we say the Eye seeth. The Object, is the thing Perceived; and it is more accurately said, that we see the Sun, then that we see the Light. For Light & Colour & Heat & Sound, and other qualities which are commonly called Sensible, are not Objects, but Phantasms in the Sentients. For a Phantasm is the act of Sense, and differs no otherwise from Sense then fieri (that is, Being a doing) differs from Factum esse, (that is, Being done;) which difference, in things that are done in an Instant, is none at all; and a Phantasme is made in an Instant. For in all Motion which proceeds by perpetual propagation, the first part being moved moves the second, the second the third, and so on to the last, and that to any distance how great soever. And in what point of time the first or formost part proceeded to the place of the second, which is thrust on; in the same point of time the last save one proceeded into the place of the last yeilding part; which by reaction, in the same instant, if the reaction be strong enough, makes a Phantasme; and a Phantasme being made, Perception is made together with it,

4 The Organs of Sense, which are in the Sentient, are such parts thereof, that if they be hurt, the very generation of Phantasmes is thereby destroyed, though all the rest of the parts remain intire. Now these parts in the most of Living Creatures are found to be certain Spirits and Membranes, which

proceeding from the Pia Mater, involve the Brain and all the Nerves; also the Brain it self, and the Arteries which are in the Brain; and such other parts, as being stirred, the Hart also, which is the fountain of all Sense is stirred together with them. For whensoever the action of the Object reacheth the Body of the Sentient, that action is by some Nerve propagated to the Brain; and if the Nerve leading thither be so hurt or obstructed, that the Motion can be propagated no further, no Sense follows. Also if the motion be intercepted between the Brain and the Heart by the defect of the Organ by which the action is propagated, there will be no perception of the Object.

5 But though all Sense, as I have said, be made by Reaction, nevertheless it is not necessary that every thing that Reacteth should have Sense. I know there have been Philosophers, & those learned men, who have maintained that all Bodies are endued with Sense. Nor do I see how they can be refuted, if the nature of Sense be placed in Reaction onely. And, though by the Reaction of Bodies inanimate a Phantasme might be made, it would nevertheless cease, as soon as ever the Object were removed. For unless those Bodies had Organs, (as living Creatures have) fit for the retaining of such Motion as is made in them, their Sense would be such, as that they should never reme¯ber the same. And therefore this hath nothing to do with that Sense which is the subject of my discourse. For by Sense we commonly understand the judgement we make of Objects by their Phantasmes; namely, by comparing and distinguishing those Phantasmes; which we could never do, if that motion in the Organ, by which the Phantasme is made, did not remain there for some time, and make the same Phantasme return. Wherefore Sense, as I here understand it, and which is commonly so called, hath necessarily some memory adhering to it, by which former and later Phantasmes may be compared together, and distinguished from one another.

Sense therefore properly so called, must necessarily have in it a perpetual variety of Phantasmes, that they may be discerned one from

another. For if we should suppose a man to be made with cleer Eyes, and all the rest of his Organs of Sight well disposed, but endued with no other Sense; and that he should look onely upon one thing, which is alwayes of the same colour and figure without the least appearance of variety, he would seem to me, whatsoever others may say, to see, no more then I seem to my self to feel the Bones of my own Limbs by my Organs of Feeling; and yet those Bones are alwayes, and on all sides touched by a most sensible Membrane. I might perhaps say he were astonished, and looked upon it; but I should not say he saw it; it being almost all one for a man to be alwayes sensible of one and the same thing, and not to be sensible at all of any thing.

6 And yet such is the nature of Sense, that it does not permit a man to discern many things at once. For seeing the nature of Sense consists in Motion; as long as the Organs are employed about one Object, they cannot be so Moved by another at the same time, as to make by both their Motions one sincere Phantasme of each of them at once. And therefore two several Phantasmes will not be made by two Objects working together, but onely one Phantasme compounded from the action of both.

Besides, as when we divide a Body, we divide its place; and when we reckon many Bodies, we must necessarily reckon as many places; and contrarily, as I have shewn in the first Article of the 7th Chapter; so what number soever we say there be of Times, we must understand the same number of Motions also; and as oft as we count many Motions, so oft we reckon many times. For though the object we looke upon be of diverse colours, yet with those diverse colours it is but one varied Object, and not variety of Objects.

Moreover, whilest those Organs which are common to all the Senses (such as are those parts of every Organ which proceed (in Men) from the root of the Nerves, to the Hart) are vehemently stirred by a strong action from some one Object, they are (by reaof the contumacy which the motion

they have already gives them against the reception of all other motion) made the lesse fit to receive any other impression from whatsoever other Objects, to what sense soever those Objects belong. And hence it is, that an earnest studying of one Object, takes away the Sense of all other Objects for the present. For Study is nothing else but a possession of the mind, that is to say, a vehement motion made by some one Object in the Organs of Sense, which are stupid to all other motions as long as this lasteth; according to what was said by Terence, Populus studio stupidus in funambulo animum occuparat. For what is Stupor but that which the Greekes call , that is, a cessation from the Sense of other things? Wherefore at one and the same time, we cannot by Sense perceive more then one single Object; as in reading, we see the letters successively one by one, and not all together, though the whole Page be presented to our eye; and though every severall letter be distinctly written there, yet when we looke upon the whole page at once, we read nothing.

From hence it is manifest, that every endeavour of the Organ utwards, is not to be called Sense, but that onely which at severall times is by Vehemence made stronger and more praedominant than the rest; which deprives us of the Sense of other Phantasmes, no otherwise then the Sun deprives the rest of the starres of light, not by hindering their action, but by obscuring and hiding them with his excesse of brightnesse.

7. But the motion of the Organ, by which a Phantasme is made, is not commonly called Sense, except the Object be present. And the Phantasme remaining after the Object is removed or past by, is called Fancy, and in latine Imaginatio; which word (because all Phantasmes are not Images) doth not fully answer the signification of the word Fancy in its generall acceptation. Neverthelesse I may use it safely enough, by understanding it for the Greek .

IMAGINATION therefore is nothing else but Sense decaying, or weakned, by the absence of the Object. But what may be the cause of this decay or weakning? Is the Motion the weaker because the Object is taken away? If it were, then Phantasmes would alwayes and necessarily be less cleare in the Imagination, then they are in Sense; which is not true. For in Dreams (which are the Imaginations of those that sleep) they are no less clear then in Sense it self. But the reason why in men Waking the Phantasms of things past are more obscure then those of things present, is this, that their Organs being at the same time moved by other present Objects, those Phantasmes are the lesse praedominant. Whereas in Sleep, the passages being shut up, externall action doth not at all disturbe or hinder internall motion.

If this be true, the next thing to be considered, will be, whether any cause may be found out, from the supposition whereof it will follow, that the passage is shut up from the externall Objects of Sense to the internall Organ. I suppose therefore, that by the continuall action of Objects, (to which a Reaction of the Organ, and more esqecially of the Spirits, is necessarily consequent) the Organ is wearied, that is, its parts are no longer moved by the Spirits without some pain; and consequently the Nerves being abandoned and grown slack, they retire to their fountain which is the cavity either of the Brain or of the Heart; by which means the action which proceeded by the Nerves is necessarily intercepted For Action, upon a Patient that retires from it, makes but little Impression at the first; and at last, when the Nerves are by little and little slacked, none at all. And therefore there is no more Reaction, that is, no more Sense, till the Organ being refreshed by Rest, and by a supply of new Spirits recovering strength and motion, the Sentient awaketh. And thus it seems to be alwayes, unless some other praeternatural cause intervene; as Heat in the internal parts from

lassitude, or from some disease stirring the Spirits and other parts of the Organ in some extraordinary manner.

8 Now it is not without cause, nor so casual a thing as many perhaps think it, that Phantasmes in this their great variety, proceed from one another; and that the same Phantasmes sometimes bring into the mind other Phantasmes like themselves, and at other times extreamly unlike. For in the motion of any continued Body, one part followes another by cohaesion; and therefore, whilst we turne our Eies and other Organs successively to many Objects, the motion which was made by every one of them remayning, the Phantasmes are renewed as often as any of those motions comes to be praedominant above the rest; and they become praedominant in the same order, in which at any time formerly they were generated by Sense. So that when by length of time very many Phantasmes have been generated within us by Sense, then allmost any thought may arise from any other thought; in so much that it may seeme to be a thing indifferent and casuall, which thought shall follow which. But for the most part this is not so uncertain a thing to waking as to sleeping men. For the thought or Phantasme of the desired End, brings in all the Phantasmes that are meanes conducing to that end, and that in order backewards from the last to the first, and againe forwards from the beginning to the End: But this supposes both Appetite, and Judgement to discerne what meanes conduce to the end; which is gotten by Experience; and Experience is store of Phantasmes, arising from the sense of very many things. For and Meminisse, Fancy and Memory differ onely in this, that Memory supposeth the time past, which Fancy doth not. In Memory, the Phantasmes we consider are as if they were worne out with time; but in our Fancy we consider them as they are; which distinction is not of the things themselves, but of the considerations of the Sentient. For there is in Memory, something like that which happens in looking upon things at a great distance; in which, as the small parts of the Object are not

discerned by reason of their remotenesse; so in Memory, many accidents and places and parts of things, which were formerly perceived by Sense, are by length of time decayed and lost.

The perpetuall arising of Phantasmes, both in Sense and Imagination, is that which we commonly call Discourse of the Mind, and is common to men with other living Creatures. For he thta thinketh, compareth the Phantasmes that passe, that is, taketh notice of their likenesse or unlikenesse to one another. And as he that observes readily the likenesses of things of different natures, or that are very remote from one another, is said to have a good Fancy; so he is said to have a good Judgement, that finds out the unlikenesses or differences of things that are like one another. Now this observation of differences, is not perception made by a common Organ of Sense, distinct from Sense or Perception properly so called; but is Memory of the differences of particular Phantasmes remaining for some time; as the distinction between Hot and Lucid, is nothing else but the Memory both of a Heating, and of an Enlightning Object.

9 The Phantasmes of men that sleep, are DREAMS. Concerning which we are taught by experience these five things. First, that for the most part there is neither order nor coherence in them. Secondly, that we dream of nothing but what is compounded and made up of the Phantasmes of Sense past. Thirdly, that somtimes they proceed (as in those that are drowsy) from the interruption of their Phantasmes by little and little broken and altered through sleepiness; and sometimes also they begin in the midst of sleep. Fourthly, that they are clearer then the Imaginations of waking men, except such as are made by Sense itself, to which they are equal in clearness. Fifthly, that when we dream, we admire neither the places nor the looks of the things that appear to us. Now from what hath been said, it is not hard to shew what may be the causes of these Phaenomena. For as for the first, seeing all Order and Coherence proceeds from frequent looking back to the

End, that is, from Consultation; it must needs be, that seeing in sleep we lose all thought of the End, our Phantasmes succeed one another, not in that order which tends to any End, but as it hapneth, and in such manner, as Objects present themselves to our Eyes when we look indifferently upon all things before us, and see them, not because we would see them, but because we do not shut our Eyes; for then they appear to us without any order at all. The second proceeds from this, that in the silence of Sense, there is no new motion from the Objects, and therefore no new Phantasme, unless we call that new, which is compounded of old ones, as a Chimaera, a golden Mountain, and the like. As for the third, why a Dream is sometimes as it were the continuation of Sense, made up of broken Phantasmes, as in men distempered with sickness, the reason is manifestly this, that in some of the Organs Sense remains, and in others it faileth. But how some Phantasmes may be revived, when all the exteriour Organs are benummed with sleep, is not so easily shewn. Nevertheless, that which hath already been said, contains the reason of this also. For whatsoever strikes the Pia Mater, reviveth some of those Phantasmes that are still in motion in the Brain; and when any internal motion of the Heart reacheth that Membrane, then the praedominant motion in the Brain makes the Phantasme. Now the Motions of the Heart are Appetites and Aversions, of which I shall presently speak further. And as Appetites and Aversions are generated by Phantasmes, so reciprocally Phantasmes are generated by Appetites and Aversions. For example, Heat in the Heart proceeds from Anger and Fighting; and again from Heat in the Heart, (whatsoever be the cause of it) is generated Anger, and the Image of an Enemy in Sleep. And as Love and Beauty stirre up heat in certain Organs; so Heat in the same Organs, from whatsoever it proceeds, often causeth Desire, and the Image of an unresisting Beauty. Lastly, Cold doth in the same manner generate Feare in those that sleep, and causeth them to dream of Ghosts, and to have Phantasmes of horrour and danger; as

Fear also causeth Cold in those that wake; so reciprocal are the motions of the Heart and Brain. The fourth, namely, that the things we seem to see and feel in sleep, are as clear as in sense it self, proceeds from two causes; one, that having then no sense of things without us, that internal motion which makes the Phantasme, in the absence of all other impressions, is praedominant; and the other, that the parts of our Phantasms which are decayed and worn out by time, are made up with other fictitious parts. To conclude, when we dream, we do not wonder at strange places, and the appearances of things unknown to us, because Admiration requires that the things appearing be new and unusual, which can happen to none but those that remember former appearances; whereas in sleep, all things appear as present.

But it is here to be observed, that certain Dreams, especially such as some men have when they are between sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledge of the nature of Dreams, and are with all superstitious, were not heretofore, nor are now accounted Dreams. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the Voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believed to be Phantasmes, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places, Feare alone, helped a little with the stories of such Apparitions, hath raised in their minds terrible Phantasmes, which have been, and are still deceiptfully received for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

10 In most living Creatures there are observed five kinds of Senses, which are distinguished by their Organs, and by their different kinds of Phantasmes; namely, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast and Touch; and these have their Organs partly peculiar to each of them severally, and partly common to them all. The Organ of Sight is partly animate, and partly inanimate. The

inanimate parts, are the three Humours; namely, the Watry Humour, which by the interposition of the Membrane called Uea, (the perforation whereof is called the Apple of the Eye) is contained on one side by the first concave superficies of the Eye, and on the other side by the Ciliary processes and the Coat of the Cristalline humour; the Cristalline, which (hanging in the midst between the Ciliary processes, and being almost of Spherical figure, and of a thick consistence) is inclosed on all sides with its own transparent Coat; and the Vitreous or Glassie Humour, which filleth all the rest of the Cavity of the Eye, and is somewhat thicker then the Watry Humour, but thinner then the Cristalline. The animate part of the Organ is, first, the Membrane Choroeides, which is a part of the Pia Mater, saving that it is covered with a Coat derived from the marrow of the Optique Nerve, which is called the Retina; and this Choroeides, seeing it is part of the Pia Mater, is continued to the beginning of the Medulla Spinalis within the Scull, in which all the Nerves which are within the Head have their roots. Wherefore all the Animal Spirits that the Nerves receive, enter into them there, for it is not imaginable that they can enter into them any where else. Seeing therefore Sense is nothing else but the action of Objects propagated to the furthest part of the Organ; and seeing also that Animal Spirits are nothing but Vital Spirits purified by the Hart and carried from it by the Arteries; it follows necessarily, that the action is derived from the Heart by some of the Arteries to the roots of the Nerves which are in the Head, whether those Arteries be the Plexus Retiformis, or whether they be other Arteries which are inserted into the substance of the Brain. And therefore those Arteries are the Complement, or the remaying part of the whole Organ of Sight. And this last part is a common Organ to all the Senses; wheras that which reacheth from the Eie to the roots of the Nerves is proper onely to Sight. The proper Organ of Hearing is the Tympanum of the Eare, and its own Nerve; from which to the Heart the Organ is Common. So the proper Organs of Smel &

Tast are Nervous Membranes, in the Palate and Tongue for the Taste, and in the Nostrils for the Smell; and from the roots of those Nerves to the Heart all is common. Lastly, he proper Organ of Touch are Nerves and Membranes dispersed through the whole Body; which Membranes are derived from the root of the Nerves. And all things else belonging alike to all the Senses seem to be administred by the Arteries, and not by the Nerves.

The proper Phantasme of Sight is Light; and under this name of Light, Colour also (which is nothing but perturbed Light) is comprehended. Wherefore the Phantasme of a Lucid Body, is Light; and of a coloured Body, Colour. But the Object of Sight, properly so called is neither Light nor Colour, but the Body itself which is lucid, or enlightned, or coloured. For Light and Colour being Phantasmes of the Sentient, cannot be Accidents of the Object. Which is manifest enough from this, that Visible things appear oftentimes in places, in which we know assuredly they are not, and that in different places they are of different colours, and may at one and the same time appear in divers places. Motion, Rest, Magnitude and Figure are common both to the Sight and Touch; and the whole appearance together of Figure, and Light or Colour, is by the Greeks commonly called and by the Latines, Species and Imago; all which names signifie no more but Appearance.

The phantasme which is made by Hearing, is Sound; by Smell, Odour; by Tast, Savour; and by Touch, Hardness and Softness, Heat and Cold, Wetness, Oiliness, and many more, which are easier to be distinguished by sense then words. Smoothness, Roughness, Rarity and Density refer to Figure, and are therefore common both to Touch and Sight. And as for the Objects of Hearing, Smel, Tast, and Touch, they are not Sound, Odour, Savour, Hardness, &c. but the Bodies themselves from which Sound,

Odour, Savour, Hardness, &c. proceed; Of the causes of which, and of the manner how they are produced, I shall speak hereafter.

But these Phantasmes, though they be effects in the Sentient, (as Subject) produced by Objects working upon the Organs; yet there are also other effects besides these, produced by the same Objects, in the same Organs; namely, certain Motions proceeding from Sense, which are called Animal Motions. For seeing in all Sense of external things, there is mutual Action and Reaction, that is, two Endeavours opposing one another, it is manifest, that the motion of both of them together will be continued every way, especially to the confines of both the Bodies. And when this happens in the internal Organ, the Endeavour outwards will proceed in a solid Angle, which will be greater, and consequently the Idea greater, then it would have been if the impression had been weaker.

11 From hence the Natural cause is manifest, First, why those things seem to be greater, which (caeteris paribus) are seen in a greater Angle. Secondly, why in a serene cold night when the Moon doth not shine, more of the fixed Stars appear, then at another time. For their action is less hindred by the serenity of the Aire, and not obscured by the greater Light of the Moon, which is then absent; and the Cold making the Air more pressing, helpeth or strengtheneth the action of the Stars upon our Eies, in so much as Stars may then be seen which are seen at no other time. And this may suffice to be said in general concerning Sense made by the Reaction of the Organ. For, as for the place of the Image, the deceptions of Sight, and other things of which we have experience in our selves by Sense, being they depend for the most part upon the Fabrick it self of the Eie of Man, I shall speak of them then when I come to speak of Man.

12 But, there is another kind of Sense, of which I will say somthing in this place, namely, the Sense of Pleasure and Pain, proceeding, not from the Reaction of the Heart outwards, but from continual action from the

outermost part of the Organ towards the Heart. For the original of Life being in the Heart, that motion in the Sentient which is propagated to the Heart, must necessarily make some alteration or diversion of Vital Motion, namely, by quickning or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now when it helpeth, it is Pleasure, and when it hindereth, it is Pain, Trouble, Grief, &c. And as Phantasmes seem to be without, by reason of the Endeavour outwards; so Pleasure and Pain by reason of the Endeavour of the Organ inwards seem to be within, namely, there where the first Cause of the Pleasure or Pain is; as when the Pain proceeds from a Wound, we think the Pain and the Wound are both in the same place.

Now Vital Motion, is the Motion of the Bloud, perpetually circulating (as hath been shewn from many infallible signes and marks by Doctor Harvey, the first Observer of it) in the Veins and Arteries. Which Motion, when it is hindered by some other Motion made by the action of sensible Objects, may be restored again either by bending or setting straight the parts of the Body; which is done when the Spirits are carried now into these, now into other Nerves, till the Pain (as farre as is possible) be quite taken away. But if Vital Motion be helped by Motion made by Sense, then the parts of the Organ will be disposed to guide the Spirits in such manner, as conduceth most to the preservation and augmentation of that motion by the help of the Nerves. And in animal motion this is the very first Endeavour, and found even in the Embrio; which while it is in the wombe, moveth its limbes with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it, or for the pursuing of what pleaseth it. And this first Endeavour, when it tends towards such things as are known by experience to be pleasant, is called APPETITE, (that is, an Approaching;) and when it shuns what is troublesome, AVERSION, or Flying from it. And little Infants, at the beginning, and as soon as they are born, have appetite to very few things, as also they avoid very few, by reason of their want of Experience and Memory; & therefore they have not

so great a variety of animal Motion as we see in those that are more grown. For it is not possible, without such knowledge as is derived from Sense, that is, without Experience and Memory, to know what will prove pleasant, or hurtful; onely there is some place for conjecture from the looks or aspects of things. And hence it is, that though they do not know what may do them good or harm, yet sometimes they approach, and sometimes retire from the same thing as their doubt prompts them. But afterwards by accustoming themselves by little and little, they come to know readily what is to be pursued, and what to be avoided; and also to have a ready use of their Nerves and other Organs in the pursuing and avoiding of good and bad. Wherefore Appetite and Aversion are the first Endeavours of Animal Motion.

Consequent to this first Endeavour, is the Impulsion into the Nerves, and Retraction again of Animal Spirits, of which it is necessary there be some Receptacle on place neer the original of the Nerves; and this Motion or Endeavour is followed by a swelling and Relaxation of the Muscles; and lastly, these are followed by Contraction and Extension of the limbes, which is Animal Motion.

13 The Considerations of Appetites and Aversions are divers. For seeing Living Creatures have sometimes Appetite, and sometimes Aversion to the same thing, as they think it will either be for their good or their hurt, while that vicissitude of Appetites and Aversions remains in them they have that series of Thoughts which is called DELIBERATION; which lasteth as long as they have it in their power to obtain that which pleaseth, or to avoid that which displeaseth them. Appetite therefore and Aversion are simply so called as long as they follow not Deliberation. But if Deliberation have gone before, then the last act of it, if it be Appetite, is called WILL; if Aversion, UNWILLINGNESSE; so that the same thing is called both Will and Appetite; but the consideration of them (namely, before and after

Deliberation) is divers. Nor is that which is done within a Man whilest he Willeth any thing, different from that which is done in other living Creatures, whilest (Deliberation having preceded) they have Appetite.

Neither is the freedome of Willing, or not willing, greater in Man, then in other living Creatures. For where there is Appetite, the entire cause of Appetite hath preceded; and consequently the act of Appetite could not choose but follow, that is, hath of necessity followed, (as is shewn Chapt. 9th Article 5.) And therefore such a Liberty as is free from Necessity, is not to be found in the Will either of Men or Beasts. But if by Liberty we understand the faculty or power, not of Willing, but of Doing what they Will, then certainly that Liberty is to be allowed to both; and both may equally have it, whensover it is to be had.

Again, when Appetite and Aversion do with celerity succeed one another, the whole series made by them, hath its name sometimes from one, sometimes from the other. For the same Deliberation (whilest it inclines sometimes to one, sometimes to the other) is from Appetite called HOPE, and from Aversion FEAR. For where there is no Hope, it is not to be called Fear, but HATE; and where no Fear, not Hope, but DESIRE. To conclude, all the Passions, called Passions of the Minde, consist of Appetite and Aversion (except pure Pleasure and Pain, which are a certain Fruition of good or Evil;) as Anger, is Aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joyned with Appetite of avoiding that evil by force. But because the Passions and Perturbations of the Minde are innumerable; and many of them not to be discerned in any Creatures besides Men; I will speak of them more at large in that Section which is concerning Man. As for those Objects (if there be any such) which do not at all stir the Mind, we are said to Contemn them.

And thus much of Sense in general. In the next place I shall speak of Sensible Objects.

CHAP. XXVI. OF THE WORLD, AND OF THE STARRES.

1 THE MAGNITUDE and Duration of the World, inscrutable.

2 No place in the World Empty.

3 The arguments of Lucretius for Vacuum, invalid.

4 Other arguments for the establishing of Vacuum, invalid.

5 Six suppositions for the salving of the Phaenomena of Nature.

6 Possible causes of the Motions Annual and Diurnal; and of the apparent Direction, Station and Retrogradation of the Planets.

7 The supposition of Simple Motion, why likely.

8 The cause of the Excentricity of the annual motion of the Earth.

9 The cause why the Moon hath alwayes one and the same face turned towards the Earth.

10 The cause of the Tides of the Ocean.

11 The cause of the Praecession of the Equinoxes.

1 CONSEQUENT to the Contemplation of Sense is the contemplation of Bodies, which are the efficient causes or Objects of Sense. Now every Object is either a part of the whole World, or an Aggregate of parts. The greatest of all Bodies, or sensible Objects, is the World it self, which we behold when we look round about us from this point of the same which we

call the Earth. Concerning the World, as it is one Aggregate of many parts, the things that fall under inquiry are but few; and those we can determine, none. Of the whole World we may inquire what is its Magnitude, what its Duration, and how many there be; but nothing else. For as for Place and Time, that is to say, Magnitude and Duration, they are only our own fancies of a Body simply so called, that is to say of a Body indefinitely taken, as I have shewne before in the 7 chapter. All other Phantasmes, are of Bodies or Objects as they are distinguished from one another; as Colour, the Phantasme of coloured Bodies; Sound, of Bodies that move the Sense of Hearing, &c. The questions concerning the Magnitude of the World, are, whether it be Finite or Infinite, Full or not Full; Concerning its Duration, whether it had a Beginning, or be Eternall; and concerning the number, whether there be One or Many (though as concerning the Number, if it were of infinite Magnitude, there could be no controversy at all.) Also if it had a beginning, then by what Cause and of what Matter it was made; and againe, from whence that Cause and that Matter had their being, will be new questions; till at last we come to one or many eternall Cause or Causes. And the determination of all these things belongeth to him that professeth the universal doctrine of Philosophy, in case as much could be known as can be sought. But the knowledge of what is Infinite can never be attained by a finite Inquirer. Whatsoever we know that are Men, we learn it from our Phantasmes; and of Infinite (whether Magnitude or Time) there is no Phantasme at all; so that it is impossible either for a man, or any other creature to have any conception of Infinite. And though a man may from some Effect proceed to the immediate Cause thereof, & fro¯ that to a more remote Cause, and so ascend continually by right ratiocination from Cause to Cause; yet he will not be able to proceed eternally; but wearied, will at last give over, without knowing whether it were possible for him to proceed to an end, or not. But whether we suppose the World to be Finite, or

Infinite, no absurdity will follow. For the same things which now appear, might appear, whether the Creator had pleased it should be Finite or Infinite. Besides, though from this, that nothing can move it self, it may rightly be inferred that there was some first eternal Movent; yet it can never be inferred (though some use to make such inference) that that Movent was eternally Immoveable, but rather eternally Moved. For as it is true, that nothing is moved by it self; so it is true also that nothing is moved but by that which is already moved. The questions therefore about the Magnitude and Beginning of the World, are not to be determined by Philosophers, but by those that are lawfully authorised to order the Worship of God. For as Almighty God, when he had brought his People into Judaea, allowed the Priests the first fruits reserved to himself; so when he had delivered up the World to the disputations of Men, it was his pleasure, that all Opinions concerning the nature of Infinite and Eternal, known onely to himself, should (as the first-fruits of Wisdom) be judged by those whose Ministery he meant to use in the ordering of Religion. I cannot therefore commend those that boast they have demonstrated by reasons drawn from natural things, that the World had a Beginning. They are contemned by Idiots, because they understand them not; and by the Learned, because they understand them; by both deservedly. For who can commend him that demonstrates thus? If the World be Eternal, then an infinite number of dayes (or other measures of Time) preceded the birth of Abraham. But the birth of Abraham preceded the birth of Isaac; and therefore one Infinite is greater then another Infinite, or one Eternal then another Eternal; which (he sayes) is absurd. This Demonstration is like his, who from this, that the number of even Numbers is infinite, would conclude, that there are as many even Numbers, as there are Numbers simply, that is to say, the even Numbers are as many, as all the even and od together. They which in this manner take away Eternity from the World, do they not by the same means take away

Eternity from the Creator of the Wold? From this absurdity therefore they run into another, being forced to call Eternity Nunc stans, a standing still of the present Time, or an abiding Now; and (which is much more absurd) to give to the infinite number of Numbers, the name of Unity. But why should Eternity be called an Abiding Now, rather then an Abiding Then? Wherefore there must either be many Eternities, or Now and Then must signifie the same. With such Demonstrators as these, that speak in another language, it is impossible to enter into disputation. And the men that reason thus absurdly, are not Idiots, but (which makes the absurdity unpardonable) Geometricians, and such as take upon them to be Judges (impertinent, but severe Judges) of other mens Demonstrations. The reason is this, that as soon as they are entangled in the Words Infinite and Eternal, (of which we have in our mind no Idea, but that of our own insufficiency to comprehend them) they are forced either to speak something absurd, or (which they love worse) to hold their peace. For Geometry hath in it somewhat like Wine; which when new, is windy; but afterwards though less pleasant, yet more wholsome. Whatsoever therefore is true, young Geometricians think Demonstrable; but elder not. Wherefore I purposely pass over the Questions of Infinite and Eternal; contenting my self with that Doctrine concerning the Beginning and Magnitude of the World, which I have been perswaded to by the holy Scriptures, and fame of the Miracles which confirm them; and by the Custome of my Country, and reverence due to the Laws. And so I pass on to such things as it is not unlawful to dispute of.

2 Concerning the World it is further questioned, whether the parts thereof be contiguous to one another, in such manner, as not to admit of the least empty space between; and the disputation both for & against it, is carried on with probability enough. For the taking away of Vacuum, I will instance in onely one experiment, a common one, but (I think) unanswerable.

Let AB (in the first fig.) represent a vessel (such as Gardiners use to water their Gardens withal;) whose bottom B is ful of litle holes; & whose mouth A may be stopt with ones finger when there shall be need. If now this vessel be filled with water, the hole at the top A being stopt, the water will not flow out at any of the holes in the bottom B. But if the finger be removed to let in the air above, it will run out at them all; and as soon as the finger is applyed to it again, the water wil suddenly & totally be stayed again from running out. The cause whereof seems to be no other but this, that the Water cannot by its natural endeavour to descend, drive down the aire below it, because there is no place for it to go into, unless either by thrusting away the next contiguous aire it proceed by continual endeavour to the hole A, where it may enter and succeed into the place of the water that floweth out; or else by resisting the endeavour of the water Downwards, penetrate the same, and pass up through it. By the first of these wayes (while the hole at A remains stopped) there is no possible passage; nor by the second, unless the holes be so great, that the water flowing out at them, can by its own waight force the Air at the same time to ascend into the vessel by the same holes; as we see it does in a vessel whose mouth is wide enough, when we turn suddenly the bottom upwards to poure out the water; for then the Aire being forced by the waight of the water, enters (as is evident by the sobbing and resistance of the water) at the sides or circumference of the orifice. And this I take for a sign that all Space is full; for without this the naturall motion of the water (which is a heavy Body) downwards, would not be hindered.

3 On the contrary, for the establishing of Vacuum, many & specious arguments and experiments have been brought. Neverthelesse there seemes to be something wanting in all of them to conclude it firmely. These arguments for Vacuum are partly made by the followers of the doctrine of Epicurus; who taught that the World consists of very small Spaces not filled

by any Bodie, and of very small Bodies that have within them no empty Space, (which by reason of their hardnesse he calls Atomes); and that these small Bodies and Spaces are every where intermingled. Their arguments are thus delivered by Lucretius.

And first he sayes that unlesse it were so, there could be no motion; For the office and property of Bodies is to withstand and hinder motion. If therfore the Universe were filled with Body, motion would every where be hindered, so, as to have no beginning any where; & consequently there would be no motion at all. It is true that in whatsoever is full, and at rest in all its parts, it is not possible motion should have beginning. But nothing is drawn from hence for the proving of Vacuum. For though it should be granted that there is Vacuum; yet if the Bodies which are intermingled with it, should all at once and together be at rest, they would never be moved again. For it has been demonstrated above (in the 9th Chapter 7th Article) that nothing can be moved but by that which is contiguous and already moved. But supposing that all things are at rest together, there can be nothing contiguous and moved; and therefore no beginning of motion. Now the denying of the beginning of motion, doth not take away present motion, unless beginning be taken away from Body also. For motion may be either coeternal, or concreated with Body. Nor doth it seem more necessary that Bodies were first at rest, and afterwards moved, then that they were first moved, and rested (if ever they rested at all) afterwards. Neither doth there appear any cause, why the matter of the World should for the admission of motion, be intermingled with empty spaces, rather then full; I say full, but withall fluid. Nor lastly, is there any reason why those hard Atomes may not also by the motion of intermingled fluid matter be congregated & brought together into compounded Bodies of such bigness as we see. Wherefore nothing can by this argument be concluded, but that motion was either coeternal, or of the same duration with that which is moved; neither of

which conclusions consisteth with the doctrine of Epicurus, who allows neither to the World nor to Motion any Beginning at all. The necessity therefore of Vacuum is not hitherto demonstrated. And the cause (as far as I understand from them that have discoursed with me of Vacuum) is this, that whilest they contemplate the nature of Fluid, they conceive it to consist as it were of small grains of hard matter, in such manner as meal is fluid, made so by grinding of the Corn; when nevertheless it is possible to conceive Fluid to be of its own nature as homogeneous, as either an Atome, or as Vacuum, it self.

The second of their arguments is taken from waight, and is contained in these Verses of Lucretius,

Corporis officium est quoniam premere omnia deorsum;
Contrà autem natura manet sine Pondere Inanis;
Ergo quod magnum est aeque, Leviusque videtur,
Nimirum plus esse sibi declarat Inanis.

That is to say, Seeing the office and property of Body is to press all things downwards; and on the contrary, seeing the nature of Vacuum is to have no waight at all; Therefore when of two Bodies of equal magnitude, one is lighter then the other, it is manifest that the lighter Body hath in it more Vacuum then the other.

To say nothing of the Assumption concerning the endeavour of Bodies downwards, which is not rightly assumed, because the World hath nothing to do with Downwards, which is a mere fiction of ours; Nor of this, that if al things tended to the same lowest part of the World, either there would be no coalescence at all of Bodies, or they would all be gathered together into the same place. This onely is sufficient to take away the force of the argument, that Aire intermingled with those his Atomes, had served as well for his purpose, as his intermingled Vacuum.

The third argument is drawn from this, That Lightning, Sound, Heat and Cold do penetrate all Bodies (except Atomes) how solid soever they be. But this reason, except it be first demonstrated that the same things cannot happen (without Vacuum) by perpetual generation of Motion, is altogether invalid. But that all the same things may so happen, shall in due place be demonstrated.

Lastly, the fourth argument is set down by the same Lucretius in these Verses.

Duo de concursu corpora lata
Si citò dissiliant, nempe aer omne necesse est
Inter corpora quod fuerat, possidat Inane.
Is porro quamvis circum celerantibus auris
Confluat, haud poterit tamen uno tempore totum
Compleri spatium; nam primum quemque necesse est
Occupet ille locum, deinde omnia possideantur.

That is, If two flat Bodies be suddenly pulled asunder, of necessity the Air must come between them to fill all the space they left empty. But with what celerity soever the Air flow in, yet it cannot in one instant of time fill the whole space, but first one part of it, then successively all.

Which nevertheless is more repugnant to the opinion of Epicurus, then of those that deny Vacuum. For though it be true, that if two Bodies were of infinite hardness, and were joyned together by their Superficies which were most exactly plain, it would be impossible to pull them asunder, in regard it could not be done but by Motion in an instant; yet, if as the greatest of all Magnitudes cannot be given, nor the swiftest of all Motions, so neither the hardest of all hard Bodies; it might be, that by the application of very great force, there might be place made for a successive flowing in of the Aire, namely by separating the parts of the joyned Bodies by succession, beginning at the outermost and ending at the innermost part. He ought

therefore first to have proved, that there are some Bodies extreamly hard, not relatively, as compared with softer Bodies, but absolutely, that is to say, infinitely hard; which is not true. But if we suppose (as Epicurus doth) that Atomes are indivisible, and yet have small superficies of their own; then if two Bodies should be joyned together by many, or but one onely small superficies of either of them, then I say this argument of Lucretius would be a firme demonstration, that no two Bodies made up of Atomes (as he supposes) could ever possibly be pulled asunder by any force whatsoever. But this is repugnant to daily experience.

And thus much of the arguments of Lucretius. Let us now consider the arguments which are drawn from the experiments of later Writers.

4 The first experiment is this, That if a hollow vessel be thrust into water with the bottom upwards, the water will ascend into it; which they say it could not do, unless the Aire within were thrust together into a narrower place; and that this were also impossible except there were little empty places in the Aire. Also that when the Aire is compressed to a certain degree, it can receive no further compression, its small particles not suffering themselves to be pent into less room. This reason, if the Aire could not pass through the Water as it ascends within the vessel, might seem valid. But it is sufficiently known, that Aire will penetrate Water by the application of a force equal to the gravity of the Water. If therefore the force by which the Vessel is thrust down, be greater, or equal to the endeavour by which the water naturally tendeth downwards, the Aire will go out that way where the resistance is made, namely, towards the edges of the Vessel. For, by how much the deeper is the water which is to be penetrated, so much greater must be the depressing force. But after the Vessel is quite under water, the force by which it is depressed, that is to say, the force by which the water riseth up, is no longer encreased. There is therefore such an equilibration between them, as that the natural endeavour of the water

downwards, is equal to the endeavour by which the same water is to be penetrated to the encreased depth.

The second experiment is, That if a concave Cylinder of sufficient length (made of Glass, that the experiment may be the better seen) having one end open, and the other close shut, be filled with Quicksilver, and the open end being stopped with ones finger, be together with the finger dipped into a dish or other vessel in which also there is Quicksilver, and the Cylinder be set upright, we shall, the finger being taken away (to make way for the descent of the Quicksilver) see it descend into the Vessel under it, till there be onely so much remayning within the Cylinder as may fill about 26 Inches of the same; and thus it will alwayes happen whatsoever be the Cylinder, provided that the length be not less then 26 Inches. From whence they conclude that the cavity of the Cylinder above the Quicksilver remayns empty of all Body. But in this experiment I finde no necessity at all of Vacuum. For when the Quicksilver which is in the Cylinder descends, the Vessel under it must needs be filled to a greater height, and consequently so much of the contiguous Air must be thrust away as may make place for the Quicksilver which is descended. Now if it be asked whether that Aire goes, what can be answered but this, that it thrusteth away the next Aire, & that the next, & so successively, till there be a return to the place where the propulsion first began? and there, the last Aire thus thrust on will press the Quicksilver in the Vessel with the same force with which the first Aire was thrust away; and if the force with which the Quicksilver descends be great enough (which is greater or less, as it descends from a place of greater or less height) it will make the Aire penetrate the Quicksilver in the vessel, and go up into the Cylinder to fill the place which they thought was left empty. But because the Quicksilver hath not in every degree of height force enough to cause such penetration, therefore in descending it must of necessity stay somewhere, namely there, where its endeavour downwards, and the

resistance of the same to the penetration of the Aire come to an aequilibrium. And by this experiment it is manifest, that this aequilibrium will be at the height of 26 Inches, or thereabouts.

The third experiment is, That when a Vessel hath as much Air in it as it can naturally contain, there may nevertheless be forced into it as much water as will fill three quarters of the same Vessel. And the experiment is made in this manner. Into the glass bottle, represented (in the 2d figure) by the Sphere F G, whose center is A, let the pipe B A C be so fitted, that it may precisely fill the mouth of the bottle; and let the end B, be so neer the bottom, that there may be onely space enough left for the free passage of the water which is thrust in above. Let the upper end of this pipe have a Cover at D, with a spout at E, by which the water (when it ascends in the pipe) may run out. Also let H C be a Cock, for the opening or shutting of the passage of the water between B and D, as there shall be occasion. Let the Cover D E be taken off; and the Cock H C being opened, let a Syringe fall of water be forced in; and before the Syringe be taken away, let the Cock be turned to hinder the going out of the Aire. And in this manner let the injection of water be repeated as often as it shall be requisite, till the water rise within the bottle, for example, to G F. Lastly, the Cover being fastened on again, and the Cock H C opened, the water will run swiftly out at E, and sink by little and little from G F to the bottom of the pipe B.

From this Phaenomenon they argue for the necessity of Vacuum in this manner. The Bottle from the beginning was full of Aire; which Aire could neither go out by penetrating so great a length of water as was injected by the pipe, nor by any other way. Of necessity therefore all the water as high as F G, as also all the Aire that was in the bottle before the water was forced in, must now be in the same place, which at first was filled by the Aire alone; which were impossible, if all the space within the bottle were formerly filled with Aire precisely, that is, without any Vacuum. Besides,

though some man perhaps may think the Air, being a thinne Body, may pass through the Body of the water contained in the pipe, yet from that other Phaenomenon, (namely, that all the water which is in the space B F G, is cast out again by the spout at E, for which it seems impossible that any other reason can be given besides the force by which the Aire frees it self from compression) it follows, that either there was in the bottle some space empty, or that many Bodies may be together in the same place. But this last is absurd; and therefore the former is true, namely, that there was Vacuum.

This argument is infirm in two places. For first that is assumed which is not to be granted; and in the second place an experiment is brought, which I think is repugnant to Vacuum. That which is assumed is, that the Aire can have no passage out through the pipe. Nevertheless we see daily that Aire easily ascends from the bottom to the Superficies of a River (as is manifest by the bubbles that rise); nor doth it need any other cause to give it this motion, then the natural endeavour downwards of the Water. Why therefore may not the endeavour upwards of the same Water acquired by the injection (which endeavour upwards is greater then the natural endeavour of the water downwards) cause the aire in the bottle to penetrate in like manner the water that presseth it downwards; especially seeing the water as it riseth in the bottle, doth so press the Aire that is above it, as that it generateth in every part thereof an endeavour towards the external superficies of the pipe, and consequently maketh all the parts of the enclosed aire to tend directly towards the passage at B? I say this is no less manifest, then that he aire which riseth up from the bottom of a River should penetrate the water, how deep soever it be. Werefore I do not yet see any cause why the force by which the water is injected, should not at the same time eject the aire.

And as for their arguing the necessity of Vacuum from the rejection of the water; In the first place, supposing there is Vacuum, I demand by what principle of motion that ejection is made. Certainly, seeing this motion is

from within outwards, it must needs be caused by some Agent within the bottle; that is to say, by the aire it self. Now the motion of that aire, being caused by the rising of the water, begins at the bottom, and tends upwards; whereas the motion by which it ejecteth the water ought to begin above, and tend downwards. From whence therefore hath the enclosed aire this endeavour towards the bottom. To this question I know not what answer can be given, unless it be said, that the aire descends of its own accord to expel the water. Which because it is absurd, and that the aire after the water is forced in, hath as much room as its magnitude requires, there will remain no cause at all why the water should be forced out. Wherefore the assertion of Vacuum is repugnant to the very experiment which is here brought to establish it,

Many other Phaenomena are usually brought for Vacuum, as those of Weather-glasses, Aeolipiles, Wind-guns, &c. Which would all be very hard to be salved, unless water be penetrable by aire, without the intermixture of empty space. But now, seeing aire may with no great endeavour pass through, not onely water, but any other fluid Body, though never so stubborn, as Quicksilver, these Phaenomena prove nothing. Nevertheless, it might in reason be expected, that he that would take away Vacuum, should without Vacuum shew us such causes of these Phaenomena, as should be at least of equal, if not greater probability. This therefore shall be done in the following discourse, when I come to speak of these Phaenomena in their proper places. But first the most general Hypotheses of natural Philosophy are to be premised.

And seeing that Suppositions are put for the true Causes of apparent Effects, every Supposition, except such as be absurd, must of necessity consist of some supposed possible Motion (for Rest can never be the Essicient Cause of any thing), & Motion supposeth Bodies Moveable; of which there are three kinds, Fluid, Consistent, and mixt of both. Fluid are

those, whose parts may by very weak endeavonr be separated from one another; and Consistent those, for the separation of whose parts greater force is to be applyed. There are therefore degrees of Consistency; which degrees, by comparison with more or less Consistent, have the names of Hardness, or Softness. Wherefore a Fluid Body is alwayes divisible into Bodies equally Fluid, as Quantity into Quantities; and Soft Bodies, of whatsoever degree of Softness, into Soft Bodies of the same degree. And though many men seem to conceive no other difference of Fluidity, but such as ariseth from the different magnitudes of the parts (in which Sense, Dust, though of Diamonds, may be called Fluid); Yet I understand by Fluidity, that which is made such by Nature equally in every part of the Fluid Body; not as Dust is Fluid, for so a House which is falling in pieces may be called Fluid; but in such manner as Water seems Fluid, and to divide it self into parts perpetually Fluid. And this being well understood, I come to my Suppositions.

5 First, therefore I suppose, That the Immense Space which we call the World, is the Aggregate of all Bodies; which are either Consistent & Visible, as the Earth and the Starres; or Invisible, as the small Atomes which are disseminated through the whole space between the Earth and the Stars; and lastly, that most Fluid Aether, which so fils all the rest of the Universe, as that it leaves in it no empty place at all.

Secondly, I suppose with Copernicus, That the greater Bodies of the World, which are both consistent and permanent, have such order amongst themselves, as that the Sunne hath the first place, Mercury the second, Venus the third, The Earth (with the Moon going about it) the fourth, Mars the fifth, Jupiter (with his Attendants) the sixth, Saturne the seventh, and after these the Fixed Starres have their several distances from the Sunne.

Thirdly, I suppose, That in the Sunne & the rest of the Planets, there is and alwayes has been a Simple Circular Motion.

Fourthly, I suppose, That in the Body of the Aire there are certain other Bodies intermingled, which are not Fluid; but withal that they are so small, that they are not preceptible by Sense, and that these also have their proper Simple Motion; and are some of them more, some less hard or consistent.

Fifthly, I suppose with Kepler, That as the distance between the Sunne and the Earth, is to the distance between the Moon and the Earth; so the distance between the Moon and the Earth, is to the Semidiameter of the Earth.

As for the Magnitude of the Circles, and the Times in which they are described by the Bodies which are in them, I will suppose them to be such as shall seem most agreeable to the Phaenomena in question,

6 The causes of the different Seasons of the Year, and of the several variations of Dayes and Nights in all the parts of the superficies of the Earth, have been demonstrated first by Copernicus, and since by Kepler, Galilaeus and others, from the supposition of the Earths diurnal revolution about its own Axis, together with its Annual motion about the Sunne, in the Ecliptick according to the order of the Signes; and thirdly, by the annual revolution of the same Earth about its own center contrary to the order of the Signs. I suppose with Copernicus, That the diurnal revolution is from the motion of the Earth, by which the Aequinoctial Circle is described about it. And as for the other two annual motions, they are the efficient cause of the Earths being carried about in the Ecliptick in such manner, as that its Axis is alwayes kept parallel to it self. Which parallelisme was for this reason introduced, lest by the Earths annual revolution, its Poles should seem to be necessarily carried about the Sunne, contrary to experience. I have (in the 10th Artic. of the th Chap.) demonstrated from the supposition of Simple Circular Motion in the Sun, that the Earth is so carried about the Sunne, as that its Axis is thereby kept always parallel to it self. Wherefore, from these two supposed motions in the Sunne, the one Simple Circular

Motion; the other Circular Motion about its owns Center, it may be demonstrated, that the Year hath both the same variations of Dayes and Nights, as have been demonstrated by Copernicus.

For if the Circle abcd (in the 3d Figure) be the Ecliptick, whose Center is e, and Diameter aec; and the Earth be placed in a, & the Sunne be moved in the little Circle fghi, namely, according to the order f, g, h & i, it hath been demonstrated, that a Body placed in a, will be moved in the same order through the points of the Ecliptick a, b, c & d, and will alwayes keep its Axis parallel to its self.

But if (as I have supposed) the Earth also be moved with Simple Circular Motion in a plain that passeth through a, cutting the plain of the Ecliptick so, as that the common section of both the plains be in ac, thus also the Axis of the Earth will be kept alwayes parallel to it self. For let the Center of the Earth be moved about in the Circumference of the Epicycle whose Diameter is lak, which is a part of the straight line lac. Therefore lak the Diameter of the Epicycle, passing through the Center of the Earth, will be in the plain of the Ecliptick. Wherefore seeing that by reason of the Earths Simple Motion both in the Ecliptick and in its Epicycle, the straight line lak is kept alwayes parallel to it self, every other straight line also taken in the Body of the Earth, and consequently its Axis, will in like manner be kept alwayes parallel to it self; so that in what part soever of the Ecliptick the Center of the Epicycle be found, and in what part soever of the Epicycle the Center of the Earth be found at the same time, the Axis of the Earth will be parallel to the place where the same Axis would have been, if the Center of the Earth had never gone out of the Ecliptick.

Now as I have demonstrated the simple annual motion of the Earth from the supposition of Simple Motion in the Sunne; so from the supposition of Simple Motion in the Earth may be demonstrated the monethly Simple

Motion of the Moon. For if the names be but changed the Demonstration will be the same, and therefore need not be repeated.

7 That which makes this supposition of the Sunnes Simple Motion in the Epicycle fghi probable, is First, that the Periods of all the Planets are not onely described about the Sunne, but so described, as that they are al contained within the Zodiack, that is to say, within the latitude of about 16 degrees; for the cause of this seems to depend upon some power in the Sunne, especially in that part of the Sunne which respects the Zodiack. Secondly, that in the whole copasse of the heavens there appears no other Body, from which the cause of this Phaenomenon can in probability be derived. Besides, I could not imagine, that so many and such various motions of the Planets should have no dependance at all upon one another. But by supposing motive power in the Sunne, we suppose motion also; for power to move, without motion, is no power at all. I have therefore supposed that there is in the Sunne for the governing of the primary Planets, and in the Earth for the governing of the Moon, such motion, as being received by the primary Planets and by the Moon, makes them necessarily appear to us in such manner as we see them; Whereas, that circular motion (which is commonly attributed to them) about a fixed Axis, (which is called Conversion) being a motion of their parts onely, and not of their whole Bodies, is insufficient to salve their Appearances. For seeing whatsoever is so moved, hath no endeavour at all towards those parts which are without the circle, they have no power to propagate any endeavour to such Bodies as are placed without it. And as for them that suppose this may be done by Magnetical Virtue, or by incorporeall and immateriall Species, they suppose no naturall cause; nay no cause at all. For there is no such thing as an Incorporeal Movent; and Magnetical Virtue is a thing altogether unknown; and whensoever it shall be known, it will be found to be a motion of Body. It remaines therefore, that if the primary Planets be carried about by the

Sunne, and the Moon by the Earth, they have the simple circular motions of the Sunne and the Earth for the causes of their circulations. Otherwise, if they be not carried about by the Sunne and the Earth, but that every Planet hath been moved as it is now moved ever since it was made, there will be of their motions no cause naturall. For either these motions were concreated with their Bodies, and their cause is supernatural; or they are coeternal with them, and so they have no cause at all. For whatsoever is Eternall was never generated.

I may add besides, to confirme the probability of this simple motion, that allmost all learned men are now of the same opinion with Copernicus concerning the parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth, it seemed to me to be more agreeable to truth, or at least more handsome, that it should be caused by simple Circular Motion alone, than by two motions, one in the Ecliptick, and the other about the Earths own Axis the contrary way, neither of them Simple, nor either of them such as might be produced by any motion of the Sunne. I thought best therefore to retain this Hypothesis of Simple Motion; and from it to derive the causes of as many of the Phaenomena as I could, and to let such alone as I could not deduce frm thence.

It will perhaps be objected, that although by this supposition the reason may be given of the Parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth, and of many other Appearances; nevertheless, seeing it is done by placing the Body of the Sunne in the Center of that Orbe which the Earth describes with its annual motion, the supposition it self is false, because this annual Orbe is excentrique to the Sunne. In the first place therefore let us examine what that Excentricity is, and whence it proceeds.

8 Let the annual Circle of the Earth abcd (in the same 3d figure) be divided into four equal parts by the straight lines ac & bd, cutting one another in the Center e; and let a be the beginning of Libra, b of Capricorn, c of Aries, and d of Cancer; and let the whole Orbe abcd be understood

(according to Copernicus) to have every way so great distance from the Zodiack of the fixed Starres, that it be in comparison with it but as a point. Let the Earth be now supposed to be in the beginning of Libra at a. The Sunne therefore will appear in the beginning of Aries at c. Wherefore if the Earth be moved from a to b, the apparent motion of the Sunne will be from c to the beginning of Cancer in d; and the Earth being moved forwards from b to c, the Sunne also will appear to be moved forwards to the beginning of Libra in a; Wherefore cda will be the Summer Arch, and the Winter Arch will be abc. Now in the time of the Suns apparent motion in the Summer Arch, there are numbred 186¾ dayes; and consequently the Earth makes in the same time the same number of diurnal conversions in the Arch abc; and therefore the Earth in its motion through the Arch cda will make onely 178½ diurnal conversions, Wherefore the Arch a b c ought to be greater then the Arch c d a by 8¼ dayes, that is to say, by almost so many degrees. Let the Arch a r, as also c s, be each of them an Arch of two degrees and 1/16. Wherefore the Arch r b s will be greater then the Semicircle a b c by 4 degrees and ⅛, and greater then the Arch s d r by 8 degrees and ¼. The Equinoxes therefore will be in the points r & s; and therefore also when the Earth is in r, the Sunne will appear in s. Wherefore the true place of the Sunne will be in t, that is to say, without the Center of the Earths annual motion by the quantity of the Sine of the Arch a r, or the Sine of two degrees and 16 minutes. Now this Sine, putting 100000 for the Radius, will be neer 3580 parts thereof. And so munh is the Excentricity of the Earths annual motion, provided that that motion be in a perfect circle; and s & r are the Equinoctial points; and the straight lines s r & c a produced both wayes till they reach the Zodiack of the fixed Starres, wil fall stil upon the same fixed Starres, because the whole Orbe a b c d is supposed to have no magnitude at all in respect of the great distance of the fixed Starres.

Supposing now the Sun to be in c, it remains that I shew the cause why the Earth is neerer to the Sunne, when in its annual motion it is found to be in d, then when it is in b. And I take the cause to be this. When the Earth is in the beginning of Capricorn at b, the Sunne appears in the beginning of Cancer at d; & then is the midst of Summer. But in the midst of Summer, the Northern parts of the Earth are towards the Sunne, which is almost all dry land, containing all Europe, and much the greatest part of Asia and America. But when the Earth is in the beginning of Cancer at d, it is the midst of Winter, and that part of the Earth is towards the Sunne, which contains those great Seas called the South Sea and the Indian Sea, which are of farre greater extent then all the dry Land in that Hemisphere. Wherefore (by the last Article of the 21 Chapter) when the Earth is in d, it will come neerer to its first Movent, that is, to the Sunne which is in t; that is to say, the Earth is neerer to the Sunne in the midst of Winter when it is in d, then in the midst of Summer when it is b; and therefore during the Winter the Sunne is in its Perigaeum, and in its Apogaeum during the Summer. And thus I have shewn a possible cause of the Excentricity of the Earth; which was to be done.

I am therefore of Keplers opinion, in this, that he attributes the Excentricity of the Earth to the difference of the parts thereof, and supposes one part to be affected, and another disaffected to the Sunne. And I dissent from him in this, that he thinks it to be by Magnetick virtue, and that this Magnetick virtue, or attraction and thrusting back of the Earth is wrought by immateriate Species; which cannot be; because nothing can give motion, but a Body moved and contiguous. For if those Bodies be not moved which are contiguous to a Body unmoved, how this Body should begin to be moved is not imaginable; as has been demonstrated in the 7th Article of the 9th Chapter, and often inculcated in other places, to the end that Philosophers might at last abstain from the use of such unconceiveable

connexions of words. I dissent also from him in this, that he says the similitude of Bodies is the cause of their mutual attraction, For if it were so, I see no reason why one Egg should not be attracted by another. If therefore one part of the Earth be more affected by the Sunne, then another part, it proceeds from this, that one part hath more water, the other more dry land. And from hence it is, (as I shewed above) that the Earth comes neerer to the Sunne when it shines upon that part where there is more water, then when it shines upon that where there is more dry Land.

9 This Excentricity of the Earth is the cause why the way of its annual motion is not a perfect Circle, but either an Elliptical, or almost an Elliptical line; as also why the Axis of the Earth is not kept exactly parallel to it self in all places, but onely in the Equinoctial points.

Now seeing I have said that the Moon is carried about by the Earth, in the same manner that the Earth is by the Sunne; and that the Earth goeth about the Sunne in such manner as that it shews sometimes one Hemisphere, sometimes the other to the Sunne; it remains to be enquired, why the Moon has alwayes one and the same face turned towards the Earth.

Suppose therefore the Sunne to be moved with Simple Motion in the little Circle f g h i, (in the fourth figure) whose Center is t; and let ♈ ♋ ♎ ♑ be the annuall Circle of the Earth; and a the beginning, of Libra. About the point a let the little Circle l k be described; and in it let the Center of the Earth be understood to be moved with Simple motion; and both the Sunne & the Earth to be moved according to the order of the Signes. Upon the Center a let the way of the Moon m n o p be described; and let q r be the Diameter of a Circle cutting the Globe of the Moon into two Hemispheres, whereof one is seen by us when the Moon is at the full, and the other is turned from us.

The Diameter therefore of the Moon q o r will be perpendicular to the Straight Line t a. Wherefore the Moon is carried by reason of the Motion of

the Earth from o towards p. But by reason of the motion of the Sunne, if it were in p it would at the same time be carried from p towards o; and by these two contrary Movents the straight line q r will be turned about; and in a Quadrant of the Circle m n o p it will be turned so much as makes the fourth part of its whole conversion. Wherefore when the Moon is in p, q r will be parallel to the straight line m o. Secondly, when the Moon is in m, the straight line q r will by reason of the motion of the Earth be in m o. But by the working of the Suns motion upon it in the quadrant p m, to same q r will be turned so much as makes another quarter of its whole conversion. When therefore the Moon is in m, q r will be perpendicular to the straight line o m. By the same reason, when the Moon is in n, q r will be parallel to the straight line m o; and the Moon returning to o, the same q r will return to its first place; and the Body of the Moon will in one entire period make also one entire conversion upon her own Axis. In the making of which, it is manifest, that one and the same face of the Moon is always turned towards the Earth. And if any Diameter were taken in that little Circle, in which the Moon were supposed to be carried about with simple motion, the same effect would follow; for if there were no action from the Sun, every Diameter of the Moon would be carried about always parallel to it self. Wherefore I have given a possible cause, why one and the same face of the Moon is alwayes turned towards the Earth.

But it is to be noted, that when the Moon is without the Ecliptick, we do not alwayes see the same face precisely. For we see onely that part which is illuminated. But when the Moon is without the Ecliptick, that part which is towards us, is not exactly the same with that which is illuminated.

10 To these three simple motions, one of the Sunne, another of the Moon, and the third of the Earth, in their own little Circles f g h i, l k, & q r, together with the Diurnal conversion of the Earth (by which conversion all things that adhere to its superficies are necessarily carried about with it)

may be referred the three Phaenomena concerning the Tides of the Ocean. Whereof the first, is the alternate elevation and depression of the Water at the Shores, twice in the space of 24 houres and neer upon 52 minutes; for so it has constantly continued in all ages. The second, that at the New and Full Moons the elevations of the Water are greater, then at other times between. And the third, that when the Sunne is in the Equinoctial, they are yet greater then at any other time. For the salving of which Phaenomena, we have already the foure abovementioned Motions; to which I assume also this, that the part of the Earth which is called America, being higher then the Water, and extended almost the space of a whole Semicircle from North to South, gives a stop to the motion of the Water. This being granted,

In the same 4th figure, where l b k c is supposed to be in the plain of the Moons monethly motion, let the little Circle l d k e be described about the same Center a in the plain of the Equinoctial. This Circle therefore will decline from the Circle l b k c in an angle of almost 28 degrees and ½ (for the greatest declination of the Ecliptick is 23½, to which adding 5 for the greatest declination of the Moon from the Ecliptick, the summe wil be 28 degrees and ½). Seeing now the Waters which are under the Circle of the Moons course, are (by reason of the Earths Simple Motion in the plain of the same Circle) moved together with the Earth, (that is to say, together with their own bottoms) neither out-going nor out-gone; if we add the Diurnal motion, by which the other Waters which are under the Equinoctial are moved in the same order; and consider withall that the Circles of the Moon and of the Equinoctial intersect one another; it will be manifest, that both those Waters, which are under the Circle of the Moon, and under the Equinoctiall, will runne together under the Equinoctial; and consequently, that their Motion will not onely be swifter then the ground that carries them; but also that the waters themselves will have greater elevation whensoever

the Earth is in the Equinoctial. Wherefore, whatsoever the cause of the Tides may be, this may be the cause of their augmentation at that time.

Againe, seeing I have supposed the Moon to be carried about by the simple motion of the Earth in the little circle lbkc; and demonstrated (at the 4 article of the 21 chapter) that whatsoever is moved by a Movent that hath simple motion, will be moved allwayes with the same velocity; it follows, that the center of the Earth will be carried in the circumference lbkc with the same velocity, with which the Moon is carried in the circumference mnop. Wherefore the time in which the Moon is carried about in mnop, is to the time in which the Earth is carried about in lbkc, as one circumference to the other, that is, as ao to ak. But ao is observed to be to the Semidiameter of the Earth as 59 to 1; and therefore the Earth (if ak be put for its Semidiameter) will make 59 revolutions in lbkc, in the time that the Moon makes one monthly circuit in mnop. But the Moon makes her monthly circuit in little more then 29 dayes. Wherefore the Earth shal make its circuit in the circumference lbkc in 12 hours and a little more, namely about 26 minutes more; that is to say, it shall make two circuits in 24 hours and allmost 52 minutes; which is observed to be the time between the high water of one day and the high water of the day following. Now the course of the waters being hindered by the southern part of America, their motion will be interrupted there; and consequently, they will be elevated in those places, and sink down again by their own waight, twice in the space of 24 hours and 52 minutes. And thus I have given a possible cause of the diurnall reciprocation of the Ocean.

Now from this swelling of the Ocean in those parts of the Earth, proceed the Flowings and Ebbings in the Atlantick, Spanish, Brittish and German Seas; which though they have their set times, yet upon severall Shores they happen at severall hours of the day; and they receive some augmentation from the North, by reason that the shores of China and Tartaria, hindering

the generall course of the waters, makes them swell there and discharge themselves in part through the straight of Anian into the Northern Ocean, and so into the German Sea.

As for the Spring Tides which happen at the time of the New & Full Moons, they are caused by that simple motion which at the beginning I supposed to be allwayes in the Moone. For as, when I shewed the cause of the Excentricity of the Earth, I derived the elevation of the waters from the simple motion of the Sunne; so the same may here be derived from the simple motion of the Moon. For though from the generation of Clouds, there appeare in the Sunne a more manifest power of elevating the waters, then in the Moon; yet the power of encreasing moisture in Vegetables and living creatures appears more manifestly in the Moon then in the Sunne; which may perhaps proceed from this, that the Sunne raiseth up greater, and the Moon lesser drops of water. Neverthelesse, it is more likely, and more agreeable to common observation, that Raine is raised not only by the Sunne but also by the Moon; for allmost all men expect change of weather at the time of the Conjunctions of the Sunne and Moon with one another, and with the Earth, more then in the time of their Quarters.

In the last place, the cause why the Spring Tides are greater at the time of the Aequinoxes, hath been already sufficiently declared in this Article, where I have demonstrated, that the two Motions of the Earth, namely, its Simple Motion in the little Circle lbkc, and its Diurnal motion in ldke, cause necessarily a greater elevation of Waters when the Sunne is about the Aequinoxes, then when he is in other places. I have therefore given possible causes of the Phaenomenon of the Flowing and Ebbing of the Ocean.

11 As for the explication of the yearly Praecession of the Aequinoctial points, we must remember, that (as I have already shewn) the annual motion of the Earth is not in the Circumference of a Circle, but of an Ellipsis, or a

line not considerably different from that of an Ellipsis. In the first place therefore this Elliptical line is to be described.

Let the Ecliptick ♎ ♑ ♈ ♋ (in the 5th figure) be divided into four equal parts by the two straight lines ab and ♑ ♋, cutting one another at right angles in the Center c; and taking the Arch bd of 2 degrees and 16 minutes, let the straight line de be drawn parallel to ab and cutting ♑ ♋ in f; which being done, the Excentricity of the Earth will be cf. Seeing therefore the annual motion of the Earth is in the Circumference of an Ellipsis, of which ♑ ♋ is the greater Axis, ab cannot be the lesser Axis; for ab and ♑ ♋ are equal. Wherefore the Earth passing through a & b, will either pass above ♑, as through g, or passing through ♑, will fall between c and a; it is no matter which. Let it pass therefore through g; and let gl be taken equal to the straight line ♑ ♋; and dividing gl equally in i, gi will be equal to ♑ ♋, & il equal to f ♋; and consequently the point i will cut the Excentricity cf into two equal parts; and taking ih equal to if, hi will be the whole Excentricity. If now a straight line (namely, the line ♎ i ♈) be drawn through i parallel to the straight lines ab and ed, the way of the Sunne in Summer (namely, the Arch ♎ g ♈) will be greater then his way in Winter by 8 degrees and ¼. Wherefore the true Aequinoxes wil be in the straight line ♎ i ♈; and therefore the Ellipsis of the Earths annual motion will not pass through a, g, b & l; but through ♎, g, ♈ & l. Wherfore the annual motion of the Earth is in the Ellipsis ♎ g ♈ l, and cannot be (the Excentricity being salved) in any other line. And this perhaps is the reason, why Kepler, against the opinion of all the Astronomers of former time, thought fit to bisect the Excentricity of the Earth, or (according to the Ancients) of the Sunne, not by diminishing the quantity of the same Excentricity, because the true measure of that quantity, is the difference by which the Summer Arch exceeds the Winter Arch, but by taking for the Center of the Ecliptick of the great Orbe the point c neerer to f, & so

placing the whole great Orbe as much neerer to the Ecliptick of the fixed Stars towards ♋, as is the distance between c & i. For seeing the whole great Orbe is but as a point in respect of the immense distance of the fixed Starres, the two straight lines ♎ ♈ and ab being produced both wayes to the beginnings of Aries and Libra, will fall upon the same points of the Sphere of the fixed Stars. Let therefore the Diameter of the Earth mn be in the plain of the Earths annual motion. If now the Earth be moved by the Sunnes simple motion in the Circumference of the Ecliptick about the Center i, this Diameter will bee kept alwayes parallel to itself and to the straight line gl. But seeing the Earth is moved in the Circumference of an Ellipsis without the Ecliptick, the point n, whilst it passeth through ♎ ♑ ♈ will go in a lesser Circumference then the point m; and consequently as soon as ever it begins to be moved, it will lose its parallelisme with the straight line ♑ ♋ so that mn produced will at last cut the straight line gl produced. And contrarily, as soon as mn is past ♈, (the Earth making its way in the internal Ellipticall line ♈ l ♎) the same mn produced towards m, will cut lg produced. And when the Earth hath allmost finished its whole circumference, the same mn shall againe make a right angle with a line drawn from the center i, a little short of the point from which the Earth began its motion. And there the next yeare shall be one of the Aequinoctial points, namely, neer the end of ♍; the other shall be opposite to it neer the end of ♓. And thus the points in which the Days and Nights are made equall, doe every year fall back; but with so slow a motion, that in a whole year, it makes but 51 first minutes. And this relapse being contrary to the order of the Signes, is commonly called the Praecession of the Aequinoxes. Of which I have from my former Suppositions deduced a possible cause; which was to be done.

According to what I have said concerning the cause of the Excentricity of the Earth; and according to Kepler, who for the cause thereof supposeth

one part of the Earth to be affected to the Sunne the other part to be disaffected, the Apogaeum & Perigaeum of the Sunne should be moved every year in the same order, and with the same velocity, with which the Aequinoctiall points are moved; and their distance from them should allwayes be the quadrant of a circle; which seems to be otherwise. For Astronomers say, that the Aequinoxes are now, the one about 28 degrees gone back from the first Star of Aries, the other as much from the beginning of Libra. So that the Apogaeum of the Sunne, or the Aphelium of the Earth ought to be about the 28th degree of Cancer; but it is reckoned to be in the 7th degree. Seeing therefore we have not sufficient evidence of the (that so it is), it is in vaine to seek for the (why it is so). Wherefore, as long as the motion of the Apogaeum is not observable by reason of the slownesse thereof; and as long as it remaiues doubtful whether their distance from the Aequinoctiall points be more or lesse then a quadrant precisely; so long it may be lawfull for me to thinke they proceed both of them with equall velocity.

Also, I doe not at all meddle with the causes of the Excentricities of Saturne, Jupiter, Mars, and Mercury. Neverthelesse, seeing the Excentricity of the Earth may (as I have shewne) be caused by the unlike constitution of the several parts of the Earth which are alternately turned towards the Sunne, it is credible also that like effects may be produced in these other Planets from their having their Superficies of unlike parts.

And this is all I shall say concerning Sidereal Philosophy. And though the causes I have here supposed be not the true causes of these Phaenomena, yet I have demonstrated that they are sufficient to produce them, according to what I at first propounded.

CHAP. XXVII. OF LIGHT, HEAT, AND OF COLOURS.

1 OF THE immense Magnitude of some Bodies, and the unspeakable Littleness of others.

2 Of the cause of the Light of the Sun.

3 How Light heateth.

4 The generation of Fire from the Sunne.

5 The generation of Fire from Collision.

6 The cause of Light in Glow-wormes, Rotten Wood, and the Bolonian Stone.

7 The cause of Light in the concussion of Sea-water.

8 The cause of Flame, Sparks, and Colliquation.

9 The cause why wet Hay sometimes burns of its own accord. Also the cause of Lightning.

10 The cause of the force of Gunpowder; and what is to be ascribed to the Coals, what to the Brimstone, and what to the Nitre.

11 How Heat is caused by Attrition.

12 The distinction of Light into First, Second, &c.

13 The causes of the Colours we see in looking through a Prisma of Glass, namely, of Red, Yellow, Blue and Violet Colour.

14 Why the Moon and the Starres appear redder in the Horizon then in the midst of the Heaven.

15 The cause of Whiteness.

16 The cause of Blackness.

1 BESIDES the Starres (of which I have spoken in the last Chapt.), whatsoever other Bodies there be in the World, they may be all comprehended under the name of Intersidereal Bodies. And these I have already supposed to be either the most fluid Aether, or such Bodies whose parts have some degree of cohaesion. Now these differ from one another in their several Consistencies, Magnitudes, Motions and Figures. In Consistency I suppose some Bodies to be Harder, others Softer through all the several degrees of Tenacity. In Magnitude, some to be Greater, others Less, and many unspeakably Little. For we must remember that by the Understanding, Quantity is divisible into divisibles perpetually. And therefore if a man could do as much with his hands as he can with his Understanding, he would be able to take from any given magnitude, a part which should be less then any other magnitude given. But the Omnipotent Creator of the World can actually from a part of any thing take another par, as farre as we by our Understanding can conceive the same to be divisible. Wherefore there is no impossible Smalness of Bodies. And what hinders but that we may think this likely? For we know there are some living Creatures so small that we can scarce see their whole Bodies. Yet even these have their young ones, their little Veins, and other Vessels, and their Eyes so smal, as that no Microscope can make them visible. So that we cannot suppose any magnitude so little, but that our very supposition is actually exceeded by Nature. Besides, there are now such Microscopes commonly made, that the things we see with them appear a hundred thousand times bigger, then they would do if we looked upon them with our bare Eyes. Nor

is there any doubt but that by augmenting the power of these Microscopes (for it may be augmented as long as neither Matter nor the hands of Workmen are wanting) every one of those hundred thousandth parts might yet appear a hundred thousand times geater then they did before. Neither is the Smalness of some Bodies to be more admired, then the vast Greatness of others. For it belongs to the same infinite Power, as well to augment infinitely, as infinitely to diminish; To make the great Orbe, (namely, that whose Radius reacheth from the Earth to the Sunne) but as a point in respect of the distance between the Sunne and the fixed Starres; and on the contrary, to make a Body so little, as to be in the same proportion less then any other visible Body, proceeds equally from one and the same Authour of Nature. But this of the immense distance of the fixed Starres (which for a long time was accounted an incredible thing) is now believed by almost all the Learned. Why then should not that other of the smalness of some Bodies, become credible at some time or other? For the Majesty of God appears no less in small things then in great; and as it exceedeth humane sense in the immense greatness of the Universe; so also it doth in the smalness of the parts thereof. Nor are the first Elements of Compositions, nor the first Beginnings of Actions, nor the first Moments of Times more credible, then that which is now believed of the vast distance of the fixed Starres.

Some things are acknowledged by mortal men to be very Great, though Finite, as seeing them to be such. They acknowledge also, that some things which they do not see, may be of infinite magnitude. But they are not presently, nor without great study perswaded that there is any Mean between Infinite & the Greatest of those things which either they see or imagine. Nevertheless, when after meditation & contemplation, many things which we wondred at before are now grown more familiar to us, we then believe them, and transferre our admiration from the Creatures to the

Creator. But how little soever some Bodies may be; yet I will not suppose their quantity to be less, then is requisite for the salving of the Phaenomena. And in like manner I shall suppose their motion, namely, their Velocity and Slowness, and the Variety of their Figures, to be onely such as the explication of their natural causes requires. And lastly, I suppose, that the parts of the pure Aether (as if it were the First Matter) have no motion at all, but what they receive from Bodies which float in them, and are not themselves fluid.

2 Having laid these Grounds, let us come to speake of Causes, and in the first place let us inquire what may be the cause of the Light of the Sunne. Seeing therefore the Body of the Sunne doth by its simple circular motion thrust away the ambient aethereall substance sometimes one way sometimes another, so that those parts which are next the Sunne being moved by it, doe propagate that motion to the next remote parts, and these to the next, and so on continually; it must needs be, that notwithstanding any distance, the foremost part of the Eie will at last be pressed; and by the pressure of that part, the motion will be propagated to the innermost part of the Organ of Sight, namely to the Heart; and from the reaction of the Heart, there will proceed an endeavour back by the same way, ending in the endeavour outwards of the Coat of the Eie called the Retina. But this endeavour outwards (as has been defined in the 25 chapter) is the thing which is called Light, or the Phantasme of a Lucid Body. For it is by reason of this Phantasme that an Object is called Lucid. Wherefore we have a possible cause of the Light of the Sunne; which I undertook to find.

3 The generation of the Light of the Sunne is accompanied with the generation of Heat. Now every man knowes what Heat is in himselfe, by feeling it when he growes Hot; but what it is in other things he knowes onely by ratiocination. For it is one thing to grow Hot, and another thing to Heat, or make Hot. And therefore though we perceive that the Fire or the

Sunne Heateth, yet we doe not perceive that it is it selfe Hot. That other living creatures whilest they make other things Hot, are Hot themselves, we inferre by reasoning from the like sense in our selves. But this is not a necessary inference. For though it may truly be said of living Creatures, that They Heat, therefore they are themselves Hot; yet it cannot from hence be truly inferred, that Fire Heateth, therefore it is it selfe Hot; no more then this, Fire causeth Pain, therefore it is it self in Pain. Wherefore that is onely and properly called Hot, which when we feel, we are necessarily Hot.

Now when we grow Hot, we find that our Spirits and Blood, and whatsoever is fluid within us, is called out from the internall to the externall parts of our Bodies, more or lesse, according to the degree of the Heat; and that our Skin swelleth. He therefore that can give a possible cause of this Evocation and Swelling, and such as agreeth with the rest of the Phaenomena of Heat; may be thought to have given the cause of the Heat of the Sunne.

It hath been shewn (in the 5 article of the 21 chapter) that the fluid Medium which we call the Aire, is so moved by the simple circular motion of the Sunne, as that all its parts, even the least, do perpetually change places with one another; which change of places is that which there I called Fermentation. From this Fermentation of the Aire, I have (in the 8 article of the last chapter) demonstrated, that the water may be drawn up into the clouds.

And I shall now shew, that the fluid parts may in like manner by the same Fermentation be drawn out from the internall to the externall parts of our Bodies. For seeing that wheresoever the fluid Medium is contiguous to the Body of any living creature, there the parts of that Medium are by perpetuall change of place separated from one another; the contiguous parts of the living creature must of necessity endeavour to enter into the spaces of the separated parts. For otherwise those parts (supposing there is no

Vacuum) would have no place to go into. And therefore that which is most fluid and separable in the parts of the living creature which are contiguous to the Medium, will go first out; and into the place thereof will succeed such other parts as can most easily transpire through the poes of the skin. And from hence it is necessary, that the rest of the parts which are not separated, must all together be moved outwards, for the keeping of all places full. But this motion outwards of all parts together must of necessity press those parts of the ambient Aire which are ready to leave their places; and therefore all the parts of the Body endeavouring at once that way, makes the Body swell. Wherefore a possible cause is given of Heat from the Sunne; which was to be done.

4 We have now seen how Light and Heat are generated; Heat by the simple motion of the Medium, making the parts perpetually change places with one another; and Light by this, that by the same simple motion Action is propagated in a straight line. But when a Body hath its parts so moved, that it sensibly both Heats and Shines at the same time, then it is, that we say Fire is generated.

Now by Fire I do not understand a Body distinct from matter combustible or glowing, as Wood or Iron, but the matter it self, not simply and always, but then onely when it shineth and heateth. He therefore that renders a cause possible, and agreeable to the rest of the Phaenomena, namely, whence and from what action both the Shining and Heating proceed, may be thought to have given a possible cause of the generation of Fire.

Let therefore ABC (in the first Figure) be a Sphere, or the portion of a Sphere, whose Center is D; and let it be transparent and homogeneous, as Cristal, Glass, or Water, and objected to the Sunne. Wherefore the foremost part ABC, will by the simple motion of the Sunne, by which it thrusts forwards the Medium be wrought upon by the Sun-beams in the straight

lines EA, FB and GC; which straight lines may in respect of the great distance of the Sunne be taken for parallels. And seeing the Medium within the Sphere is thicker then the Medium without it, those Beams will be refracted towards their perpendiculars. Let the straight lines EA and GC be produced till they cut the Sphere in H and I; and drawing the perpendiculars AD and CD, the refracted Beams EA and GC will of necessity fall, the one between AH and AD, the other between CI and CD. Let those refracted Beams be AK and CL. And again, let the lines DKM & DLN be drawn perendicular to the Sphere; and let AK and CL be produced till they meet with the straight line BD produced in O. Seeing therefore the Medium within the Sphere is thicker then that without it, the refracted line AK will recede further from the perpendicular KM, then KO will recede from the same. Wherefore KO will fall between the refracted line and the perpendicular. Let therefore the refracted line be KP, cutting FO in P, and for the same reason the straight line LP will be the refracted line of the straight line CL. Wherfore, seeing the Beams are nothing else but the Wayes in which the motion is propagated, the motion about P will be so much more vehement then the motion about ABC, by how much the base of the portion ABC is greater then the base of a like portion in the Sphere whose Center is P, and whose magnitude is equal to that of the little Circle about P, which comprehendeth all the Beams that are propagated from ABC; and this Sphere being much less then the Sphere ABC, the parts of the Medium, that is, of the Aire about P, will change places with one another with much greater celerity, then those about ABC. If therefore any matter Combustible, that is to say, such as may be easily dissipated, be placed in P, the parts of that matter (if the proportion be great enough between AC and a like portion of the little circle about P) wil be freed from their mutual cohaesion, and being separated will acquire simple motion. But vehement simple motion generates in the beholder a Phantasm of Lucid and

Hot, as I have before deonstrated of the simple motion of the Sunne; and therefore the combustible matter which is placed in P will be made Lucid and Hot, that is to say, will be Fire. Wherefore I have rendered a possible cause of Fire; which was to be done.

5 From the manner by which the Sunne generateth Fire, it is easy to explaine the manner by which Fire may be generated by the collision of two Flints. For by that Collision, some of those particles of which the stone is compacted, are violently separated and thrown off; and being withall swiftly turned round, the Eie is moved by them, as it is in the generation of Light by the Sunne. Wherefore they shine; and falling upon matter which is already halfe dissipated, such as is Tinder, they throughly dissipate the parts thereof, and make them turn round. From whence (as I have newly shewn) Light and Heat, that is to say, Fire is generated.

6 The shining of Glow-worms, some kinds of Rotten Wood, and of a kinde of stone made at Bolognia, may have one common cause, namely the exposing of them to the hot Sunne. We finde by experience that the Bolonian stone shines not unless it be so exposed; and after it has been exposed it shines but for a little time, namely, as long as it retains a certain degree of heat. And the cause may be, that the parts of which it is made, may together with heat have Simple Motion imprinted in them by the Sunne. Which if it be so, it is necessary, that it shine in the dark, as long as there is sufficient heat in it; but this ceasing, it will shine no longer. Also we find by experience, that in the Glow-worm there is a certain thick humour, like the Cristalline humour of the Eie; which if it be taken out, and held long enough in ones fingers, and then be carried into the dark, it will shine by reason of the warmth it received from the fingers; but as soon as it is cold, it will cease shining. From whence therefore can these creatures have their Light, but from lying all day in the Sun-shine, in the hottest time of Summer? In the same manner, Rotten Wood, except it grow rotten in the

Sunshine, or be afterwards long enough exposed to the Sunne, will not shine. That this doth not happen in every Worm, nor in all kinds of Rotten Wood, nor in all Calcined Stones, the cause may be, that the parts of which those Bodies are made, are different both in motion and figure from the parts of Bodies of other kinds.

7 Also the Sea-water shineth when it is either dashed with the strokes of Oares, or when a Ship in its course breaks strongly through it; but more or less according as the Winde blows from different points. The cause whereof may be this, that the particles of salt (though they never shine in the Salt-pits, where they are but slowly drawn up by the Sunne) being here beaten up into the aire in greater quantities, and with more force, are withall made to turn round, and consequently to shine, though weakly. I have therefore given a possible cause of this Phaenomenon.

8 If such matter as is compounded of hard little Bodies, be set on fire, it must needs be, that as they flye out in greater or lesse quantities, the Flame which is made by them, will be greater or less. And if the aethereal or fluid part of that matter fly out together with them, their motion will be the Swifter, as it is in Wood, and other things which flame with a manifest mixture of Winde. When therefore these hard particles by their flying out, move the Eye strongly, they shine bright; and a great quantity of them flying out together, they make a great shining Body. For Flame being nothing but an aggregate of shining particles, the greater the aggregate is, the greater and more manifest will be the Flame. I have therefore shewn a possible cause of Flame. And from hence the cause appears evidently, why Glass is so easily and quickly melted by the small Flame of a candle blown, which will not be melted without blowing, but by a very strong Fire.

Now if from the same matter, there be a part broken off (namely such a part as consisteth of many of the small particles), of this is made a Spark. For from the breaking off, it hath a violent turning round; and from hence it

shines. But though from this matter, there fly neither Flame nor Sparks; yet some of the smallest parts of it may be carried out as farre as to the Superficies, and remain there, as Ashes; the parts whereof are so extremely small, that it cannot any longer be doubted how farre Nature may proceed in Dividing.

Lastly, though by the application of fire to this matter, there fly little or nothing from it, yet there will be in the parts an endeavour to Simple motion; by which the whole Body will either be Melted, or (which is a degree of Melting) Softned. For all Motion has some effect upon all Matter whatsoever (as has been shewn at the 3d Article of the 16th Chapter). Now if it be softned to such a degree, as that the stubborness of the parts be exceeded by their gravity, then we say it is Melted; otherwise, Softned, and made Pliant and Ductile.

Again, the matter having in it some particles hard, others aethereal or watery, if by the application of fire these later be called out, the former will thereby come to a more full contact with one another; and consequently will not be so easily separated; that is to say, the whole Body will be made Harder. And this may be the cause why the same Fire makes some things Soft, others Hard.

9 It is known by experience, that if Hay be laid wet together in a heap, it will after a time begin to smoke, and then burn as it were of it self. The cause whereof seems to be this, that in the Aire which is enclosed within the Hay, there are those little Bodies, which (as I have supposed) are moved freely with simple Motion. But this Motion being by degrees hindred more and more by the descending moisture, which at the last fils and stops all the passages, the thinner parts of the Aire ascend by penetrating the water; and those hard little Bod being so thrust together that they touch and press one another, acquire stronger motion, till at last by the increased strength of this motion the watery parts are first driven outwards, from whence appears

Vapour; and by the continued increase of this motion, the smallest particles of the dryed Hay are forced out, and recovering their natural simple Motion, they grow Hot and Shine, that is to say, they are set on Fire.

The same also may be the cause of Lightning; which happens in the hottest time of the yeare, when the water is raised up in greatest quantity, and carried highest. For after the first Clouds are raised, others after others follow them; and being congeled above, they happen (whilest some of them ascend and others descend) to fall upon another in such manner, as that in some places all their parts are joyned together, in others they leave hollow Spaces between them; aud into these spaces (the aethereall parts being forced out by the compressure of the Clouds) many of the harder little Bodies are so pent together, as that they have not the liberty of such motion as is naturall to the Aire. Wherefore their endeavour growes more vehement, till at last they force their way through the Clouds, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another; and breaking through with great noise, they move the aire violently, & striking our Eies generate Light, that is to say, they Shine. And this Shining is that we call Lightning.

10 The most common Phaenomenon proceeding from Fire, and yet the most admirable of all others, is the force of Gunpowder fired; which being compounded of Niter, Brimstone and Coles beaten small, hath from the Coles its first taking fire; from the Brimstone its nourishment and flame, that is to say, Light and motion; and from the Niter the vehemence of both. Now if a piece of Niter, (before it is beaten) be laid upon a burning Cole, first it melts, and like water quencheth that part of the Cole it toucheth. Then Vapor or Aire flying out where the Cole and Niter joyne, bloweth the Cole with great swiftnesse and vehemence on all sides. And from hence it comes to passe, that by two contrary motions (the one, of the particles which go out of the burning Cole, the other, of those of the aethereall and watery substance of the Niter) is generated that vehement Motion and

Inflammation. And lastly, when there is no more action from the Niter (that is to say, when the volatile parts of the Niter are flown out) there is found about the sides a certain white substance, which being thrown again into the fire, will grow red hot again, but will not be dissipated, at least, unlesse the fire be augmented. If now a possible cause of this be found out, the same will also be a possible cause why a grain of Gunpowder set on fire doth expand it selfe with such vehement motion, and Shine. And it may be caused in this manner.

Let the particles of which Niter consisteth, be supposed to be some of them hard, others watery, and the rest aethereall. Also let the hard particles be supposed to be spherically hollow, like small bubbles, so that many of them growing together may constitute a Body whose little cavernes are filled with a substance which is either watery, or aethereal, or both. As soon therefore as the hard particles are dissipated, the watery and aethereal particles will necessarily fly out; and as they fly, of necessity blow strongly the burning Coles and Brimstone which are mingled together; whereupon there will follow a great expansion of Light, with vehement flame, and a violent dissipation of the particles of the Niter, the Brimstone and the Coles. Wherefore I have given a possible cause of the force of fired Gunpowder.

It is manifest from hence, that for the rendering of the cause why a bullet of lead or iron shot from a peece of Ordnance flies with so great velocity, there is no necessity to introduce such Rarefaction, as (by the common definition of it) makes the same Matter to have sometimes more, sometimes lesse Quantity; which is unconceiveable. For every thing is said to be greater or lesse, as it hath more or lesse Quantity. The violence with which a bullet is thrust out of a Gun, proceeds from the swiftnesse of the small particles of the fired Powder; at least it may proceed from that cause without the supposition of any Empty Space.

11 Besides, by the attrition or rubbing of one Body against another, as of Wood against Wood, we find that not only a certaine degree of Heat, but Fire it selfe is sometimes generated. For such motion, is the reciprocation of pressure, sometimes one way sometimes the other; and by this reciprocation, whatsoever is fluid in both the peeces of Wood, is forced hither and thither; and consequently, to an endeavour of getting out; and at last by breaking out makes Fire.

12 Now Light is distinguished into, First, Second, Third, and so on infinitely. And we call that First Light, which is in the first Lucid Bodie; as the Sunne, Fire, &c. Second, that which is in such Bodies as being not transparent are illuminated by the Sunne; as the Moon, a Wall, &c. and Third, that which is in Bodies not transparent but illuminated by Second Light, &c.

13 Colour is Light, but troubled Light; namely, such as is generated by perturbed motion; as shall be made manifest by the Red, Yellow, Blew and Purple which are generated by the interposition of a Diaphanous Prisma (whose opposite bases are triangular) between the Light and that which is enlightened.

For let there be a Prisma of Glasse, or of any other transparent matter which is of greater density then Aire; and let the triangle ABC be the base of this Prisma. Also let the straight line DE be the diameter of the Sunnes Body, having oblique position to the straight line AB; and let the Sunne-beames passe in the lines DA and EBC. And lastly let the straight lines DA and EC be produced indefinitely to F and G. Seeing therefore the straight line DA, by reason of the density of the Glasse is refracted towards the perpendicular; let the line refracted at the point A be the straight line AH. And againe, seeing the Medium below AC is thinner then that above it, the other refraction which will be made there, will diverge from the perpendicular. Let therefore this second refracted line be AI. Also let the

same be done at the point C, by making the first refracted line to be CK, and the second CL. Seeing therefore the cause of the refraction in the point A of the straight line of AB, is the excess of the resistance of the Medium in AB above the resistance of the Aire, there must of necessity be reaction from the point A towards the point B; and consequently the Medium at A within the triangle ABC, will have its motion troubled; that is to say, the straight motion in AF and AH, will be mixed with the transverse motion between the same AF and AH, represented by the short transverse lines in the triangle AFH. Againe, seeing at the point A of the straight line AC, there is a second refraction from AH in AI, the motion of the Medium will againe be perturbed by reason of the transverse reaction from A towards C, represented likewise by the short transverse lines in the triangle AHI. And in the same manner there is a double perturbation represented by the transverse lines in the triangles CGK and CKL. But as for the light between AI and CG, it will not be perturbed; because if there were in all the points of the straight lines AB and AC, the same action which is in the points A and C, then the plaine of the triangle CGK would be every where coincident with the plaine of the triangle AFH; by which meanes all would appear alike between A and C. Besides, it is to be observed, that all the reaction at A, tends towards the illuminated parts which are between A and C, and consequently perturbeth the First Light. And on the contrary, that all the reaction at C tends towards the parts without the triangle, or without the Prisma ABC, where there is none but Second Light; and that the triangle AFH shewes that perturbation of Light which is made in the Glasse it selfe; as the triangle AHI shewes that perturbation of Light which is made below the Glasse. In like manner, that CGK shewes the perturbation of Light within the Glasse; and CKL that which is below the Glasse. From whence there are four divers motions, or four different illuminations or Colours; whose differences appear most manifestly to the Sense in a Prisma (whose

base is an equilaterall triangle) when the Sunne-beames that passe through it are received upon a white paper. For the triangle AFH appears Red to the Sense; the triangle AHI Yellow; the triangle CGK Green, and approaching to Blew; and lastly the triangle CKL appears Purple. It is therefore evident, that when weak but First Light passeth through a more resisting diaphanous Body, as Glasse, the beames which fall upon it tranversly, make Rednesse; and when the same First Light is stronger, as it is in the thinner Medium below the straight line AC, the transverse beames make Yellownesse. Also when Second Light is strong, as it is in the triangle CGK (which is neerest to the First Light) the transverse beames make Greenesse; and when the same Second Light is weaker, as in the triangle CKL, they make a Purple colour.

14 From hence may be deduced a cause why the Moon and Starres appear bigger and redder neer the Horizon then in the Mid-heaven. For between the Eie and the apparent Horizon, there is more impure aire, such as is mingled with Watery and Earthy little Bodies, then is between the same Eie and the more elevated part of Heaven. But Vision is made by Beames which constitute a Cone, whose base, if we look upon the Moon, is the Moons Face, and whose vertex is in the Eie; and therefore many beams from the Moon must needs fall upon little Bodies that are without the Visual Cone, and be by them reflected to the Eie. But these reflected beams tend all in lines which are transverse to the Visual Cone, and make at the Eie an angle which is greater then the angle of the Cone. Wherefore the Moon appeares greater in the Horizon, then when she is more elevated. And because those reflected beames go transversely, there will be generated (by the last article) Rednesse. A possible cause therefore is shewne, why the Moon, as also the Starres appear Greater and Redder in the Horizon, then in the midst of heaven. The same also may be the cause why the Sunne appears in the Horizon, Greater, and of a colour more degenerating to

Yellow, then when he is higher elevated. For the reflection from the little Bodies between, and the transverse motion of the Medium are still the same. But the Light of the Sunne is much stronger then that of the Moon; and therefore (by the last article) his Splendor must needs by this perturbation degenerate into Yellownesse.

But for the generation of these four colours, it is not necessary that the figure of the Glass be a Prisma; for if it were Spherical it would doe the same. For in a Sphere the Sunne-beames are twice refracted and twice reflected. And this being observed by Des Cartes; and with all that a Rainebow never appeares but when it rains; as also, that the drops of raine have their figures almost Spherical; he hath shewne from thence the cause of the colours in the Rainbow; which therefore need not be repeated.

15 Whiteness is Light; but Light perturbed by the reflexions of many beams of Light comming to the Eye together within a little space. For if Glass, or any other Diaphanous Body be reduced to very small parts by contusion or concussion; every one of those parts (if the Beams of a lucid Body be from any one point of the same reflected to the Eye) will represent to the beholder an Idea or Image of the whole lucid Body, that is to say, a Phantasme of White. For the strongest Light is the most White; and therefore many such parts will make many such Images. Wherefore if those parts lie thick and close together, those many Images will appear confusedly, and will by reason of the confused Light represent a White Colour. So that from hence may be deduced a possible cause, why Glass beaten, that is, reduced to powder, looks White. Also why Water and Snow are White; they being nothing but a heap of very small Diaphanous Bodies, namely, of little Bubbles, from whose several convex Superficies, there are by reflexion made several confused Phantasmes of the whole lucid Body; that is to say, Whiteness. For the same reason, Salt and Nitre are White; as consisting of small Bubbles which contain within them Water and Aire; as

is manifest in Nitre, from this, that being thrown into the fire, it violently blowes the same; which Salt also doth, but with less violence. But if a White Body be exposed, not to the Light of the Day, but to that of the Fire, or of a Candle, it will not at the first sight be easily judged whether it be White or Yellow; the cause whereof may be this, that the light of those things which burn and flame, is almost of a middle Colour between Whiteness and Yellowness.

16 As Whiteness is Light, so Blackness is the privation of Light, or Darkness. And from hence it is; First, that all Holes, from which no light can be reflected to the Eie, appear Black. Secondly, that when a Body hath little eminent particles erected straight up from the Superficies (so that the Beams of Light which fall upon them are reflected, not to the Eie, but to the Body it self) that Superficies appears Black, in the same manner as the Sea appears Black, when ruffled by the Wind. Thirdly, that any combustible matter is by the fire made to look Black before it shines. For the endeavour of the fire being to dissipate the smallest parts of such Bodies as are thrown into it, it must first raise and erect those parts, before it can work their dissipation. If therefore the fire be put out before the parts be totally dissipated, the Cole will appear Black; for the parts being onely erected, the Beams of Light falling upon them will not be reflected to the Eie, but to the Cole it self. Fourthly, that Burning Glasses do more easily burn Black things then White. For in a White Superficies, the eminent parts are convex, like little bubbles; and therefore the Beams of Light which fall upon them are reflected every way from the reflecting Body. But in a Black Superficies, where the eminent particles are more erected, the Beams of Light falling upon them, are all necessarily reflected towards the Body it self; and therefore Bodies that are Black are more easily set on fire by the Sun-beams, then those that are White. Fifthly, that all Colours that are made of the mixture of White and Black, proceed from the different position of

the particles that rise above the Superficies, and their different forms of asperity. For according to these differences, more or fewer Beams of Light are reflected from several Bodies to the Eie. But in regard those differences are innumerable, and the Bodies themselves so small, that we cannot perceive them, the explication and precise determination of the Causes of all Colours is a thing of so great difficulty, that I dare not undertake it.

CHAP. XXVIII. OF COLD, WIND, HARD, ICE, RESTITUTION OF BODIES BENT, DIAPHANOUS, LIGHTNING AND THUNDER; AND OF THE HEADS OF RIVERS.

1 WHY BREATH from the same mouth sometimes heats, and sometimes cools.

2 Wind, and the Inconstancy of Winds, whence.

3 Why there is a constant, though not a great Wind from East to West neer the Equator.

4 What is the effect of Aire pent in between the Clouds.

5 No change from Soft to Hard, but by motion.

6 What is the cause of Cold neer the Poles.

7 The cause of Ice; and why the Cold is more remiss in rainy then in clear weather. Why water doth not freeze in deep Wells, as it doth neer the Superficies of the Earth. Why Ice is not so heavy as Water; and why Wine is not so easily frozen as Water.

8 Another cause of Hardness from the fuller contact of Atomes. Also how Hard things are broken.

9 A third cause of Hardness from Heat.

10 A fourth cause of Hardness from the motion of Atomes enclosed in a narrow space.

11 How Hard things are Softned.

12 Whence proceeds the spontaneous Restitution of things Bent.

13 Diaphanous, and Opacous, what they are, and whence.

14 The cause of Lightning and Thunder.

15 Whence it proceeds that Clouds can fall again, after they are once elevated and frozen.

16 How it could be that the Moon was eclipsed, when she was not diametrally opposite to the Sunne.

17 By what means many Sunnes may appear at once.

18 Of the Heads of Rivers.

1 AS, when the motion of the ambient aethereal substance makes the Spirits and fluid parts of our Bodies tend outwards, we acknowledge Heat; so, by the endeavour inwards of the same spirits and humours, we feel Cold. So that to Cool, is to make the exterior parts of the Body endeavour inwards, by a motion contrary to that of Calefaction, by which the internal parts are called outwards. He therefore that would know the cause of Cold must find by what motion or motions, the exterior parts of any Body endeavour to retire inwards. To begin with those Phaenomena which are the most familiar; There is almost no man but knows, that breath blown strongly, and which comes from the mouth with violence, that is to say, the passage being straight, will Cool the hand; and that the same breath blown gently, that is to say, through a greater aperture, wil warm the same The cause of which Phaenomenon may be this. The breath going out, hath two motio¯s; the one, of the whole and direct, by which the formost parts of the hand are driven inwards, the other, simple motion of the small particles of the same breath, which (as I have shewn in the 3d Article of the last Chapter) causeth Heat. According therefore as either of these Motions is predominant, so there is the sense sometimes of Cold, sometimes of Heat. Wherefore, when the breath is softly breathed out at a large passage, that

simple Motion which causeth Heat prevaileth, and consequently Heat is felt; and when by compressing the lips the breath is more strongly blown out, then is the direct motion prevalent, which makes us feel Cold. For the direct motion of the breath or aire, is Wind; and all Wind Cools, or diminisheth former heat.

2 And seeing not onely great Wind, but almost any Ventilation and stirring of the Aire, doth refrigerate; the reason of many experiments concerning Cold cannot well be given, without finding first what are the causes of Wind. Now Wind is nothing else but the direct motion of the Aire thrust forwards; which nevertheless, when many Winds concurre may be circular, or otherwise indirect, as it is in Whirle-winds. Wherefore in the first place we are to enquire into the Causes of Winds. Wind is Aire moved in a considerable quantity, and that either in the manner of Waves, which is both forwards & also up & down; or else forwards onely.

Supposing therefore the Aire both cleer and calm, for any time how little soever; yet the greater Bodies of the World, being so disposed and ordered as has been said, it will be necessary that a Wind presently arise some where. For seeing that motion of the parts of the Aire which is made by the Simple Motion of the Sunne in his own Epicycle, causeth an exhalation of the particles of water from the Seas and all other moist Bodies, and those particles make Clouds; it must needs follow, that whilest the particles of water pass upwards, the particles of Aire (for the keeping of all Spaces full) be justled out on every side, and urge the next particles, and these the next, till having made their circuit, there comes continually so much Aire to the hinder parts of the Earth, as there went water from before it. Wherefore the ascending Vapours move the Aire towards the sides every way; and all direct motion of the Aire being Wind, they make a Wind. And if this Wind meet often with other Vapours which arise in other places, it is manifest that the force thereof will be augmented, & the way or course of it changed.

Besides, according as the Earth by its diurnal motion turns sometimes the drier, sometimes the moister part towards the Sunne, so sometimes a greater, sometimes a less quantity of Vapours will be raised, that is to say, sometimes there will be a less, sometimes a greater Wind. Wherefore I have rendred a possible cause of such Winds, as are generated by Vapours; and also of their Inconstancy.

From hence it follows, that these Winds cannot be made in any place which is higher then that to which Vapours may ascend. Nor is that incredible which is reported of the highest Mountains, as the Pique of Tenariffe and the Andes of Peru, namely, that they are not at all troubled with these inconstant Winds. And if it were certain, that neither Rain nor Snow were ever seen in the highest tops of those Mountains, it could not be doubted but that they are higher then any place to which Vapours use to ascend.

3 Nevertheless, there may be Wind there, though not that which is made by the ascent of Vapours, yet a less & more constant Wind (like the continued blast of a pair of bellows) blowing from the East. And this may have a double cause; the one, the diurnal mo tion of the Earth; the other, its simple motion in its own Epicycle. For these Mountains being (by reason of their height) more eminent then all the rest of the parts of the Earth, do by both these Motions drive the Aire from the West Eastwards. To which though the diurnal Motion contribute but little; yet seeing I have supposed that the simple Motion of the Earth in its own Epicycle, makes two revolutions in the same time in which the diurnal Motion makes but one; and that the Semidiameter of the Epicycle is double to the Semidiameter of the diurnal Conversion, the Motion of every point of the Earth in its own Epicycle will have its velocity quadruple to that of the diurnal Motion; so that by both these Motions together, the tops of those Hils will sensibly be moved against the Aire; and consequently a Wind will be felt. For whether

the Air strike the Sentient, or the Sentient the Air, the perception of Motion will be the same. But this Wind, seeing it is not caused by the ascent of Vapours, must necessarily be very Constant.

4 When one Cloud is already ascended into the Aire, if another Cloud ascend towards it, that part of the Aire which is intercepted between them both, must of necessity be pressed out every way. Also when both of them, whilest the one ascends, and the other either stayes, or descends, come to be joyned in such manner as that the aethereal substance be shut within them on every side, it will by this compression also go out by penetrating the Water. But in the mean time, the hard particles which are mingled with the Aire, and are agitated (as I have supposed) with Simple Motion, wil not pass through the water of the clouds, but be more straightly compressed within their cavities. And this I have demonstrated at the 4th and 5th Articles of the 22th Chapter. Besides, seeing the Globe of the Earth floateth in the Aire which is agitated by the Sunnes Motion, the parts of the Aire resisted by the Earth, will spread themselves every way upon the Earths Superficies; as I have shewn at the 8th Article of the 21th Chapter.

5 We perceive a Body to be Hard, from this, that when touching it we would thrust forwards that part of the same which we touch, we cannot do it otherwise then by thrusting forwards the whole Body. We may indeed easily and sensibly thrust forwards any particle of the Aire or Water which we touch, whilst yet the rest of its parts remain (to sense) unmoved. But we cannot do so to any part of a stone. Wherfore I define a Hard Body to be that, whereof no part can be sensibly moved, unless the whole be moved. Whatsoever therefore is Soft or Fluid, the same can never be made Hard but by such motion, as makes many of the parts together stop the motion of some one part, by resisting the same.

6 These things premised, I shall shew a possible cause why there is greater Cold neer the Poles of the Earth, then further from them. The

motion of the Sunne between the Tropicks, driving the Aire towards that part of the Earths Superficies which is perpendicularly under it, makes it spread it self every way; and the velocity of this expansion of the Aire grows greater and greater, as the Superficies of the Earth comes to be more and more straightned, that is to say, as the Circles which are parallel to the Aequator come to be less and less. Wherefore this expansive motion of the Aire, drives before it the parts of the Aire which are in its way continually towards the Poles more and more strongly, as its force comes to be more and more united, that is to say, as the Circles which are parallel to the Aequator are less and less; that is, so much the more, by how much they are neerer to the Poles of the Earth. In those places therefore which are neerer to the Poles, there is greater Cold, then in those which are more remote from them. Now this expansion of the Aire upon the Superficies of the Earth from East to West, doth by reason of the Sunnes perpetual accession to the places which are successively under it, make it Cold at the time of the Sunnes Rising and Setting; but as the Sunne comes to be continually more and more perpendicular to those cooled places, so by the Heat which is generated by the supervening Simple Motion of the Sunn, that Cold is again remitted; and can never be great, because the action by the which it was generated, is not permanent. Wherefore I have rendred a possible cause of Cold in those places that are neer the Poles, or where the obliquity of the Sunne is great.

7 How Water may be congeled by Cold, may be explained in this manner. Let A (in the first figure) represent the Sunne, and B the Earth. A will therefore be much greater then B. Let EF be in the plain of the Equinoctial; to which let GH, IK and LC be parallel. Lastly, let C and D be the Poles of the Earth. The Aire therefore by its action in those parallels will rake the Superficies of the Earth; and that with motion so much the stronger, by how much the parallel Circles towards the Poles grow less and

less. From whence must arise a Wind, which will force together the uppermost parts of the water, and withal raise them a little, weakning their endeavour towards the Center of the Earth. And from their endeavour towards the center of the Earth, joyned with the endeavour of the said Wind, the uppermost parts of the water will be pressed together, and coagulated, that is to say, the top of the water will be skinned over and hardned. And so againe the Water next the top will be hardned in the same manner, till at length the Ice be thick. And this Ice being now compacted of little hard Bodies, must also containe many particles of ayre received into it.

As Rivers and Seas, so also in the same manner may the Clouds be frozen. For when by the ascending and descending of severall Clouds at the same time, the Air intercepted between them is by compression forced out, it rakes, & by little & little hardens them. And though those smal drops (which usually make Clouds) be not yet united into greater Bodies, yet the same Wind will be made; & by it, as water is congeled into Ice, so will Vapours in the same manner be congeled into Snow. From the same cause it is that Ice may be made by art, and that not farre from the fire. For it is done by the mingling of Snow and Salt together, and by burying in it a small vessell full of Water. Now while the Snow and Salt (which have in them a great deale of aire) are melting, the aire which is pressed out every way in Wind, rakes the sides of the Vessel; and as the Wind by its motion rakes the Vessell, so the Vessell by the same motion and action congeles the Water within it.

We find by experience, that Cold is allwayes more Remisse in places where it raynes, or where the weather is cloudy (things being alike in all other respects) then where the aire is cleare. And this agreeth very well with what I have sayd before. For in cleare weather, the course of the Wind which (as I sayd even now) rakes the Superficies of the Earth, as it is free from all interruption, so also it is very strong. But when small drops of

water are either rising or falling, that Wind is repelled, broken and dissipated by them; and the lesse the Wind is, the lesse is the Cold.

We find also by experience, that in deep Wells the Water freezeth not so much, as it doth upon the Superficies of the Earth. For the Wind by which Ice is made, entring into the Earth (by reason of the laxity of its parts) more or lesse, loseth some of its force, though not much. So that if the Well be not deep, it will freeze; whereas if it be so deep, as that the Wind which causeth cold cannot reach it, it will not freeze.

We find moreover by experience, that Ice is lighter then Water. The cause whereof is manifest from that which I have already shewn, namely, that Aire is received in and mingled with the particles of the Water whilest it is in congeling.

8 We have seen one way of making things Hard, namely, by Congelation. Another way is thus. Having already supposed, that innumerable Atomes, some harder then others, and that have several simple motions of their own, are intermingled with the aethereal substance; it follows necessarily from hence, that by reason of the fermentation of the whole Aire (of which I have spoken in the 21 Chap.) some of those Atomes meeting with others, will cleave together, by applying themselvs to one another in such manner as is agreeable to their motions and mutual contacts; and (seeing there is no Vacuum) cannot be pulled asunder, but by so much force as is sufficient to overcome their Hardness.

Now there are innumerable degrees of Hardness. As (for example) there is a degree of it in Water, as is manifest from this, that upon a plain it may be drawn any way at pleasure by ones finger. There is a greater degree of it in clammy liquors; which when they are poured out, doe in falling downwards dispose themselves into one continued thred; which thred before it be broken will by little and little diminish its thickness, till at last it be so small, as that it seems to break onely in a point; and in their separation

the external parts break first from one another, and then the more internal parts successively one after another. In Wax there is yet a greater degree of Hardness. For when we would pull one part of it from another, we first make the whole mass slenderer, before we can pull it asunder. And how much the harder anything is which we would break, so much the more force we must apply to it. Wherefore, if we go on to harder things, as Ropes, Wood, Metals, Stones, &c. reason prompteth us to believe that the same (though not alwayes sensibly) will necessarily happen; and that even the hardest things are broken asunder in the same manner, namely, by Solution of their continuity, begun in the outermost Superficies, and proceeding successively to the innermost parts. In like manner, when the parts of Bodies are to be separated, not by pulling them asunder, but by breaking them, the first separation will necessarily be in the convex Superficies of the bowed part of the Body, and afterwards in the concave Superficies. For in all bowing, there is in the convex Superficies an endeavour in the parts to go one from another, and in the concave Superficies to penetrate one another.

This being well understood, a reason may be given, how two Bodies which are contiguous in one common Superficies, may by force be separated without the introduction of Vacuum; though Lucretius thought otherwise, believing that such separation was a strong establishment of Vacuum. For a Marble Pillar being made to hang by one of its bases, if it be long enough it will by its own weight be broken asunder, and yet it will not necessarily follow that there should be Vacuum, seeing the solution of its continuity may begin in the Circumference, and proceed successively to the midst thereof.

Lastly, Wine is not so easily congeled as Water, because in Wine there are particles which being not fluid, are moved very swiftly, and by their motion congelation is retarded; but if the Cold prevail against this motion,

then the outermost parts of the Wine will be first frozen, and afterwards the inner parts; whereof this is a signe, that the Wine which remains unfrozen in the midst will be very strong.

9 Another cause of Hardness in some things may be in this manner. If a soft Body consist of many hard particles, which by the intermixture of many other fluid particles cohaere but loosely together, those fluid parts (as hath been shewn in the last Article of the 21 Chapter) will be exhaled; by which means each hard particle will apply it self to the next to it according to a greater Superficies; and consequently they will cohaere more closely to one another; that is to say, the whole mass will be made Harder.

10 Again, in some things Hardness may be made to a certain degree, in this manner. When any fluid substance hath in it certain very small Bodies intermingled, which being moved with simple motion of their own, contribute like motion to the parts of the fluid substance, and this be done in a small enclosed space (as in the hollow of a little Sphere, or a very slender Pipe) if the motion be vehement, and there be a great number of these small enclosed Bodies, two things will happen; the one, that the fluid substance will have an endeavour of dilating it self at once every way; the other, that if those smal Bodies can no where get out, then from their reflexion it will follow, that the motion of the parts of the enclosed fluid substance, which was vehement before, will now be much more vehement. Wherefore if any one particle of that fluid substance should be touched & pressed by some external Movent, it could not yeild but by the application of very sensible force. Wherefore the fluid substance which is enclosed, and so moved, hath some degree of Hardness. Now greater and less degree of Hardness depends upon the quantity and velocity of those small Bodies and upon the narrowness of the place both together.

11 Such things as are made Hard by sudden heat, namely, such as are hardned by fire, are commonly reduced to their former soft form by

Maceration. For fire hardens by Evaporation, and therefore if the evaporated moisture be restored again, the former nature and form is restored together with it. And such things as are frozen with Cold, if the Wind by which they were frozen change into the opposite quarter, they will be unfrozen again (unless they have gotten a habit of new motion or endeavour by long continuance in that hardness). Nor is it enough to cause thawing, that there be a cessation of the freezing Wind (for the taking away of the Cause doth not destroy a produced effect); but the thawing also must have its proper cause, namely, a contrary Wind, or at least a Wind opposite in some degree. And this we finde to be true by experience. For if Ice be laid in a place so well enclosed that the motion of the Aire cannot get to it, that Ice will remain unchanged, though the place be not sensibly cold.

12 Of Hard Bodies, some may manifestly be bowed; others not, but are broken in the very first moment of their bending. And of such Bodies as may manifestly be bended, some being bent, do as soon as ever they are set at liberty, Restore themselves to their former posture, others remain still bent. Now if the cause of this Restitution be asked, I say it may be in this manner; namely, that the particles of the bended Body, whilest it is held bent, do nevertheless retain their motion; and by this motion they restore it as soon as the force is removed by which it was bent. For when any thing is bent (as a plate of steel), and as soon as the force is removed restores it self again, it is evident that the cause of its restitution cannot be referred to the ambient aire; nor can it be referred to the removal of the force by which it was bent; for in things that are at rest, the taking away of impediments, is not a sufficient cause of their future Motion; there being no other cause of Motion, but Motion. The cause therefore of such Restitution is in the parts of the Steel it self. Wherefore whilest it remains bent, there is in the parts of which it consisteth, some motion, though invisible, that is to say, some endeavour at least that way by which the restitution is to be made; and

therefore this endeavour of all the parts together is the first beginning of Restitution; so that the impediment being removed, that is to say, the force by which it was held bent, it will be restored again. Now the motion of the parts by which this is done, is that which I called Simple Motion, or Motion returning into it self. When therefore in the bending of a plate, the ends are drawn together, there is on one side a mutual compression of the parts; which compression is one endeavour opposite to another endeavour; and on the other side a divulsion of the parts. The endeavour therefore of the parts on one side tends to the restitution of the plate from the middle towards the ends; and on the other side, from the ends towards the middle. Wherefore the impediment being taken away, this endeavour (which is the beginning of restitution) will restore the plate to its former posture. And thus I have given a possible cause why some Bodies when they are bent Restore themselves again; which was to be done.

As for Stones, seeing they are made by the accretion of many very hard particles within the Earth; which particles have no great coherence, that is to say, touch one another in small latitude, and consequently admit many particles of aire, it must needs be that in bending of them, their internal parts will not easily be compressed by reason of their hardness. And because their coherence is not firm, as soon as the external hard particles are disjoyned, the aethereal parts will necessarily break out, and so the Body will suddenly be broken.

13 Those Bodies are called Diaphanous, upon which whilest the Beams of a lucid Body do work, the action of every one of those Beams is propagated in them in such manner as that they still retain the same order amongst themselves, or the inversion of that order; and therefore Bodies which are perfectly Diaphanous, are also perfectly homogeneous. On the contrary, an Opacous Body is that, which by reason of its heterogeneous nature, doth by innumerable reflexions and refractions in particles of

different figures and unequal hardness, weaken the Beams that fall upon it before they reach the Eie. And of Diaphanous Bodies, some are made such by Nature from the beginning; as the substance of the Aire, and of the Water, and perhaps also some parts of Stones, unless these also be Water that has been long congeled. Others are made so by the power of Heat, which congregates homogeneons Bodies. But such as are made Diaphanous in this manner, consist of parts which were formerly Diaphanous.

14 In what manner Clouds are made by the motion of the Sunne, elevating the particles of Water from the Sea and other moist places, hath been explained in the 26th Chapter. Also how Clouds come to be frozen, hath been shewn above at the 7th Article. Now from this, that Aire may be enclosed, as it were in Caverns, and pent together more and more by the meeting of ascending and descending Clouds, may be deduced a possible Cause of Thunder and Lightening. For seeing the Aire consists of two parts, the one Aethereal, which has no proper motion of its own, as being a thing divisible into the least parts; the other Hard, namely, consisting of many hard Atomes which have every one of them a very swift simple motion of its own; whilest the Clouds by their meeting do more and more straighten such Cavities as they intercept, the Aethereal parts will penetrate and pass through their watry substance; but the hard parts will in the mean time be the more thrust together, and press one another; and consequently (by reason of their vehement motions) they will have an endeavour to rebound from each other. Whensoever therefore the compression is great enough, and the concave parts of the Clouds are (for the cause I have already given) congeled into Ice, the Cloud wil necessarily be broken; & this breaking of the Cloud produceth the first clap of Thunder. Afterwards, the Aire which was pent in, having now broken through, makes a concussion of the Aire without; and from hence proceeds the roaring and murmur which follows; and both the first Clap and the Murmur that follows it, make that noise

which is called Thunder. Also from the same Aire breaking through the Clouds, and with concussion falling upon the Eie, proceeds that action upon our Eie, which causeth in us a perception of that Light which we call Lightening. Wherefore I have given a possible cause of Thunder and Lightening.

15 But if the Vapours which are raised into Clouds, do run together again into Water, or be congeled into Ice, from whence is it (seeing both Ice and Water are heavy) that they are sustained in the Aire? Or rather, what may the cause be, that being once elevated, they fall down again? For there is no doubt but the same force which could carry up that Water, could also sustain it there. Why therefore being once carried up, doth it fall again? I say it proceeds from the same Simple Motion of the Sunne, both that Vapours are forced to ascend, and that Water gathered into Clouds is forced to descend. For in the 21th Chapter and 11th Article I have shewn how Vapours are elevated; and in the same Chapter and 5th Article I have also shewn how by the same motion Homogeneous Bodies are congregated, & Heterogeneous dissipated; that is to say, how such things as have a like nature to that of the Earth, are driven towards the Earth; that is to say, what is the cause of the descent of Heavy Bodies. Now if the action of the Sun be hindered in the raising of vapours, and be not at all hindered in the casting of them down, the Water will descend. But a Cloud cannot hinder the action of the Sunne in making things of an earthly nature descend to the Earth, though it may hinder it in making Vapours ascend For the lower part of a thick Cloud is so covered by its upper part, as that it cannot receive that action of the Sunne by which Vapours are carried up, because Vapours are raised by the perpetual fermentation of the Aire, or by the separating of its smallest parts from one another, which is much weaker when a thick Cloud is interposed, then when the Skie is cleere. And therefore whensoever a Cloud is made thick enough, the water which would not descend before, will then descend,

unless it be kept up by the agitation of the Winde. Wherefore I have rendred a possible cause, both why the Clouds may be sustained in the Aire, and also why they may fall down again to the Earth; which was propounded to be done.

16 Granting that the Clouds may be frozen, it is no wonder if the Moon have been seen eclipsed at such time as she hath been almost two degrees above the Horizon, the Sunne at the same time appearing in the Horizon; for such an Eclipse was observed by Mestline at Tubing in the year 1590. For it might happen that a frozen Cloud was then interposed between the Sunne and the Eie of the Observer. And if it were so, the Sunne which was then almost two Degrees below the Horizon, might appear to be in it, by reason of the passing of his Beams through the Ice. And it is to be noted, that those that attribute such refractions to the Atmosphere, cannot attribute to it so great a refraction as this. Wherefore not the Atmosphere, but either Water in a continued Body, or else Ice must be the cause of that refraction.

17 Again, granting that there may be Ice in the Clouds, it will be no longer a wonder that many Sunnes have sometimes appeared at once. For Looking-glasses may be so placed, as by reflections to shew the same object in many places. And may not so many frozen Clouds serve for so many Looking-glasses? and may they not be fitly disposed for that purpose? Besides, the number of Appearances may be encreased by refractions also; and therefore it would be a greater wonder to me, if such Phaenomena as these should never happen.

And were it not for that one Phaenomenon of the new Starre which was seen in Cassiopaea, I should think Comets were made in the same manner, namely, by Vapours drawn not onely from the Earth, but from the rest of the Planets also, and congeled into one continued Body. For I could very well from hence give a reason both of their Haire, and of their motions. But seeing that Starre remained sixteen whole moneths in the same place

amongst the fixed Starres, I cannot believe the matter of it was Ice. Wherefore I leave to others, the disquisition of the cause of Comets; concerning which, nothing that hath hitherto been published, (the bare Histories of them) is worth considering.

18 The Heads of Rivers may be deduced from Rain-water, or from melted Snowes, very easily; but from other causes, very hardly, or not at all. For both Rain-water, and melted Snowes run down the descents of Mountains; and if they descend onely by the outward Superficies, the Showres or Snowes themselves may be accounted the Springs or Fountains; but if they enter the Earth & descend within it, then wheresoever they break out, there are their Springs. And as these Spings make small streams, so, many small streams running together make Rivers. Now there was never any Spring fou¯d, but where the Water w^{ch} flowed to it, was either further, or at least as farre from the center of the Earth, as the Spring it self. And whereas it has bin objected by a great Philosopher, that in the top of Mount-Cenis (which parts Savoy from Piemont) there Springs a River which runs down by Susa; it is not true. For there are above that River, for two miles length, very high hils on both sides, which are almost perpetually covered with Snow; from which, innumerable little streams running down do manifestly supply that River with water sufficient for its magnitude.

CHAP. XXIX. OF SOUND, ODOUR, SAVOUR, AND TOUCH

1 THE DEFINITION of Sound, and the distinctions of Sounds.

2 The cause of the degrees of Sounds.

3 The difference between Sounds Acute and Grave.

4 The difference between Clear and Hoarse Sounds, whence.

5 The Sound of Thunder and of a Gunne, whence it proceeds.

6 Whence it is, that Pipes by blowing into them have a clear Sound.

7 Of Reflected Sound.

8 From whence it is that Sound is Uniform and Lasting.

9 How Sound may be helped aud hindered by the Wind.

10 Not onely Aire, but other Bodies how hard soever they be, conveigh Sound.

11 The causes of Grave and Acute Sounds, and of Concent.

12 Phaenomena for Smelling.

13 The first Organ and the generation of Smelling.

14 How it is helped by Heat and by Wind.

15 Why such Bodies are least smelt, which have least intermixture of Aire in them.

16 Why Odorous things become more Odorous by being bruised.

17 The first Organ of Tasting; and why some Savours cause Nauseousness.

18 The first Organ of Feeling; and how we come to the knowledge of such Objects as are common to the Touch and other Senses.

SOUND is Sense generated by the action of the Medium, when its motion reacheth the Eare and the rest of the Organs of Sense. Now the motion of the Medium is not the Sound it self, but the cause of it. For the Phantasme which is made in us, that is to say, the Reaction of the Organ is properly that which we call Sound.

The principal distinctions of Sounds are these; First, that one Sound is stronger, another Weaker. Secondly, that one is more Grave, another more Acute. Thirdly, that one is Clear, another Hoarse. Fourthly, that one is Primary, another Derivative. Fifthly, that one is Uniform, another not. Sixthly, that one is more Durable, another less Durable. Of all which distinctions the members may be subdistinguished into parts distinguishable almost infinitely. For the variety of Sounds seems to be not much less then that of Colours.

As Vision, so Hearing is generated by the motion of the Medium, but not in the same manner. For Sight is from Pressure, that is, from an Endeavour; in which there is no perceptible progression of any of the parts of the Medium; but one part urging or thrusting on an other, propagateth that action successively to any distance whatsoever; whereas the motion of the Medium by which Sound is made, is a Stroke. For when we Hear, the Drumme of the Eare (which is the first Organ of Hearing) is stricken; and the Drumme being stricken, the Pia Mater is also shaken, and with it the Arteries which are inserted into it; by which the action being propagated to the Heart it self, by the reaction of the Heart a Phantasm is made which we

call Sound; and (because the reaction tendeth outwards) we think it is without.

2 And seeing the effects produced by Motion, are greater or lesse, not onely when the Velocity is greater or less, but also when the Body hath greater or less Magnitude though the Velocity be the same; a Sound may be greater or lesse both these wayes. And because neither the greatest nor the least Magnitude or Velocity can be given, it may happen, that either the motion may be of so small velocity, or the Body it self of so small magnitude, as to produce no Sound at all; or either of them may be so great, as to take away the Faculty of Sense by hurting the Organ.

From hence may be deduced possible causes of the strength and weakness of Sounds in the following Phaenomena.

The first whereof is this, That if a man speak through a Trunk which hath on end applyed to the mouth of the Speaker, and the other to the eare of the Hearer, the Sound will come stronger then it would do through the open Aire. And the cause (not onley the possible, but the certain and manifest cause) is this, that the Aire which is moved by the first breath, and carried forwards in the Trunk, is not diffused, as it would be in the open Aire, and is consequently brought to the eare almost with the same velocity with which it was first breathed out; Whereas in the open Aire, the first motion diffuseth it self every way into Circles, such as are made by the throwing of a Stone into a standing water, where the velocity grows less and less as the Undulation proceeds further and further from the beginning of its motion.

The second is this, That if the Trunk be short, and the end which is applyed to the mouth be wider then that which is applyed to the eare, thus also the Sound will be stronger then if it were made in the open aire. And the cause is the same, namely, that by how much the wider end of the Trunk is less distant from the beginning of the Sound, by so much the less is the diffusion.

The third, That it is easier for one that is within a Chamber, to heare what is spoken without, then for him that stands without, to hear what is spoken within. For the Windows and other inlets of the moved Aire, are as the wide end of the Trunk. And for this reason some creatures seem to hear the better, because Nature has bestowed upon them wide and capacious Ears.

The fourth is this, That though he which standeth upon the Sea shore, cannot heare the Collision of the two neerest waves, yet neverthess he hears the roaring of the whole Sea. And the cause seems to be this, that though the several collisions move the Organ, yet they are not severally great enough to cause Sense; whereas nothing hinders but that all of them together may make Sound.

3 That Bodies when they are stricken do yeild some a more Grave, others a more Acute Sound, the cause may consist in the difference of the times in which the parts stricken and forced out of their places, return to the same places again. For in some Bodies, the restitution of the moved parts is quick, in others slow. And this also may be the cause why the parts of the Organ which are moved by the Medium, return to their rest again, sometimes sooner, sometimes later. Now by how much the Vibrations, or the reciprocal motions of the parts are more frequent, by so much doth the whole Sound made (at the same time) by one stroke, consist of more, and consequently of smaller parts. For what is Acute in Sound, the same is Subtle in Matter; and both of them, namely, Acute Sound, and Subtle Matter consist of very small parts, that of Time, and this of the Matter it self.

The third distinction of Sounds cannot be conceived clearly enough by the names I have used of Clear and Hoarse, nor by any other that I know; and therefore it is needful to explain them by examples. When I say Hoarse, I understand Whispering and Hissing, and whatsoever is like to these, by

what appellation soever it be expressed. And Sounds of this kind seem to be made by the force of some strong Wind, raking rather then striking such hard Bodies, as it falls upon. On the contrary, when I use the word Clear, I do not understand such a Sound as may be easily and distinctly heard, for so Whispers would be Clear, but such as is made by somewhat that is Broken; and such as is Clamor, Tinkling, the Sound of a Trumpet, &c. and (to express it significantly in one word), Noise. And seeing no Sound is made but by the concourse of two Bodies at the least, by which concourse it is necessary that there be as well Reaction as Action, that is to say, one motion opposite to another; it follows, that according as the proportion between those two opposite motions is diversified, so the Sounds which are made will be different from one another. And whensoever the proportion between them is so great, as that the motion of one of the Bodies be insensible if compared with the motion of the other, then the Sound will not be of the same kind; as when the Wind falls very obliquely upon a hard Body, or when a hard Body is carried swiftly through the Aire; for then there is made that Sound which I call a Hoarse Sound, in Greek . Therefore the breath blown with violence from the mouth makes a Hissing, because in going out it rakes the Superficies of the Lips, whose reaction against the force of the breath is not Sensible. And this is the cause why the Winds have that Hoarse Sound. Also if two Bodies how hard soever, be rubbed together with no great pressure, they make a Hoarse Sound. And this Hoarse Sound when it is made (as I have said) by the Aire raking the Superficies of a hard Body, seemeth to be nothing but the dividing of the Aire into innumerable and very small Files. For the asperity of the Superficies doth by the eminencies of its innumerable parts divide or cut in pieces the Aire that slides upon it.

4 Noise, or that which I call Clear Sound, is made two wayes; one, by two Hoarse Sounds, made by opposite motions; the other, by Collision, or by the suddain pulling asunder of two Bodies, whereby their small particles

are put into commotion, or being already in commotion, suddenly restore themselves again; which motion making impression upon the Medium, is propagated to the Organ of Hearing. And seeing there is in this Collision, or divulsion, an endeavour in the particles of one Body, opposite to the endeavour of the particles of the other Body, there will also be made in the Organ of Hearing a like opposition of endeavours, that is to say, of motions; and consequently the Sound arising from thence, will be made by two opposite motions, that is to say, by two opposite Hoarse Sounds in one and the same part of the Organ. For (as I have already said) a Hoarse Sound supposeth the sensible motion of but one of the Bodies. And this opposition of motions in the Organ is the cause why two Bodies make a Noyse, when they are either suddenly stricken against one another, or suddenly broken asunder.

5 This being granted; and seeing withall, that Thunder is made by the vehement eruption of the Aire out of the cavities of congeled Clouds; the cause of the great Noyse or Clap, may be the suddain breaking asunder of the Ice. For in this action it is necessary, that there be not onely a great concussion of the small particles of the broken parts, but also that this Concussion (by being communicated to the Aire) be carried to the Organ of Hearing, & make impression upon it. And then, from the first reaction of the Organ proceeds that first and greatest Sound, which is made by the collision of the parts whilst they restore themselves. And seeing there is in all Concussion a reciprocation of Motion forwards and backwards in the parts stricken, (for opposite motions cannot extinguish one another in an instant, as I have shewn in the 11th Art. of the 8th Chap.) it follows necessarily, that the Sound will both continue, and grow weaker and weaker, till at last the action of the reciprocating aire grow so weak, as to be unperceptible. Wherefore a possible cause is given both of the first fierce Noyse of the Thunder; and also of the Murmur that follows it.

The cause of the great Sound from a discharged piece of Ordnance, is like that of a Clap of Thunder. For the Gunpowder being fired, doth in its endeavour to go out, attempt every way the sides of the metal in such manner, as that it enlargeth the Circumference all along, and withall shortneth the axis; so that whilest the peece of Ordnance is in discharging, it is made both wider and shorter then it was before; and therefore also presently after it is discharged its wideness will be diminished, and its length encreased again by the restitution of all the particles of the matter of which it consisteth to their former position. And this is done with such motion of the parts, as are not onely very vehement, but also opposite to one another; which motions being communicated to the Aire, make impression upon the Organ, and by the reaction of the Organ create a Sound; which lasteth for some time, as I have already shewn in this Article.

I note by the way (as not belonging to this place) that the possible cause why a Gun recoyles when it is shot off, may be this; That being first swoln by the force of the fire, and afterwards restoring it self; from this restitution there proceeds an endeavour from all the sides towards the cavity; and consequently this endeavour is in those parts which are next the breech; which being not hollow, but solid, the effect of the restitution is by it hindered and diverted into the length; and by this means both the breech and the whole Gun is thrust backwards; and the more forcibly by how much the force is greater by which the part next the breech is restored to its former posture; that is to say, by how much the thiner is that part. The cause therefore why Gunnes recoyle, some more, some less, is the difference of their thickness towards the breech; & the greater that thickness is, the less they recoyl; and contrarily.

6 Also the cause why the Sound of a Pipe, which is made by blowing into it, is nevertheless Clear, is the same with that of the Sound which is made by collision. For if the breath when it is blown into a Pipe doe onely

rake its concave Superficies, or fall upon it with a very sharp angle of incidence, the Sound will not be Clear, but Hoarse. But if the angle be great enough, the percussion which is made against one of the hollow sides, will be reverberated to the opposite side; and so successive repercussions will be made from side to side, till at last the whole concave Superficies of the Pipe be put into motion; which motion will be reciprocated, as it is in Collision; and this reciprocation being propagated to the Organ, from the reaction of the Organ will arise a Cleare Sound, such as is made by Collision, or by breaking asunder of hard Bodies.

In the same manner it is with the Sound of a Mans voice. For when the breath passeth out, without interruption, and doth but lightly touch the cavities through which it is sent, the Sound it maketh is a Hoarse Sound. But if in going out it strike strongly upon the Larinx, then a Clear Sound is made, as in a Pipe. And the same breath, as it comes in divers manners to the Palate, the Tongue, the Lips, the Teeth, and other Organs of Speech, so the Sounds into which it is articulated become different from one another.

7 I call that Primary Sound, which is generated by motion from the sounding Body to the Organ in a straight line without reflexion; and I call that Reflected Sound, which is generated by one or more reflexions; being the same with that we call Echo; and is iterated as often as there are reflexions made from the Object to the Eare. And these reflexions are made by Hils, Wals, and other resisting Bodies, so placed, as that they make more or fewer reflexions of the motion, according as they are themselves more or fewer in number; and they make them more or less frequently, according as they are more or less distant from one another. Now the cause of both these things is to be sought for in the situation of the reflecting Bodies, as is usually done in Sight. For the Lawes of Reflexion are the same in both, namely, that the Angles of Incidence and Reflexion be equal to one another. If therefore in a hollow Elliptique Body whose inside is well polished, or in

two right Parabolical Solids which are joyned together by one common base, there be placed a Sounding Body in one of the Burning Points, & the Ear in the other, there will be heard a Sound by many degrees greater then in the open Aire; and both this, and the burning of such combustible things, as being put in the same places are set on fire by the Sun-beams, are effects of one and the same cause. But as when the visible Object is placed in one of the Burning Points, it is not distinctly seen in the other, because every part of the Object being seen in every line which is reflected from the Concave Superficies to the Eie, makes a confusion in the Sight; so neither is Sound heard articulately and distinctly when it comes to the Eare in all those reflected lines. And this may be the reason, why in Churches which have arched rooffs, though they be neither Elliptical nor Parabolical; yet because their figure is not much different from these, the voice from the Pulpit will not be heard so articulately as it would be if there were no vaulting at all.

8 Concerning the Uniformity and Duration of Sounds, both which have one common cause, we may observe, that such Bodies as being stricken yeild an unequal or harsh Sound, are very heterogeous, that is to say, they consist of parts which are very unlike both in figure and hardness, such as are Wood, Stones, and others not a few. When these are stricken, there follows a concussion of their internal particles, and a restitution of them again. But they are neither moved alike, nor have they the same action upon one another; some of them recoyling from the stroke whilest others which have already finished their recoylings are now returning; by which means they hinder and stop on another. And from hence it is that their motions are not only unequal and harsh, but also that their reciprocations come to be quickly extinguished. Whensoever therfore this motion is propagated to the Eare, the Sound it makes is Unequal and of small Duration. On the contrary, if a Body that is stricken, be not onely sufficiently hard, but have also the

particles of which it consisteth like to one another both in hardness and figure, (such as are the particles of Glass and Metals, which being first melted do afterwards settle and harden) the Sound it yeildeth, will (because the motions of its parts and their reciprocations are like and Uniform) be Uniform and pleasant, and be more or less Lasting according as the Body stricken hath gteater or less magnitude. The possible cause therefore of Sounds Uniform, and Harsh, and of their longer or shorter Duration, may be one and the same likeness and unlikeness of the internal parts of the Sounding Body, in respect both of their figure and hardness.

Besides, if two plain Bodies of the same matter, and of equal thickness, do both yeild an Uniform Sound, the Sound of that Body which hath the greatest extent of length will be the longest heard. For the motion which in both of them hath its beginning from the point of percussion, is to be propagated in the greater Body through a greater Space, and consequently that propagation will require more time; and therefore also the parts which are moved will require more time for their return. Wherefore all the reciprocations cannot be finished but in longer time; and being carried to the Eare, will make the Sound last the longer. And from hence it is manifest, that of hard Bodies which yeild an Uniform Sound, the Sound lasteth longer which comes from those that are round and hollow, then from those that are plain, if they be like in all other respects. For in circular lines the action which begins at any point, hath not fro¯ the figure any end of its propagation, because the line in which it is propagated returns again to its beginning; so that the figure hinders not but that the motion may have infinite progression; whereas in a plain, every line hath its magnitude finite, beyond which the action cannot proceed. If therefore the matter be the same, the motion of the parts of that Body whose figure is round and hollow, wil last longer, then of that which is plain.

Also, if a string which is stretched, be fastned at both ends to a hollow Body, and be stricken, the Sound will last longer then if it were not so fastned; because the trembling or reciprocation which it receives from the stroke, is by reason of the connexion communicated to the hollow Body; and this trembling, if the hollow Body be great, will last the longer by reason of that greatness. Wherefore also (for the reason above mentioned) the Sound will last the longer.

9 In Hearing, it happens (otherwise then in Seeing) that the action of the Medium is made stronger by the Wind when it blows the same way, and weaker when it blows the contrary way. The cause whereof cannot proceed from any thing but the different generation of Sound and Light. For in the generation of Light, none of the parts of the Medium between the object and the Eie are moved from their own places to other places sensibly distant; but the action is propagated in spaces imperceptible; so that no contrary Wind can diminish, nor favourable Winde encrease the Light, unless it be so strong as to remove the Object further off, or bring it nearer to the Eie. For the Wind, that is to say, the aire moved, doth not by its interposition between the object and the eie, worke otherwise then it would doe if it were stil and calme. For where the pressure is perpetuall, one part of the aire is no sooner carried away, but another by succeeding it receives the same impression which the part carried away had received before. But in the generation of Sound, the first collision or breaking asunder, beateth away & driveth out of its place the nearest part of the aire, and that to a considerable distance, and with considerable velocity; and as the circles grow (by their remotenesse) wider and wider, so the aire being more & more dissipated, hath also its motion more & more weakned. Whensoever therfore the air is so stricken as to cause Sound, if the Wind fall upon it, it will move it all, neerer to the Eare if it blow that way, and further from it if it blow the contrary way; so that according as it blowes from or towards the Object, so

the Sound which is heard will seeme to come from a neerer or remoter place; and the action by reason of the unequall distances be strengthened or debilitated.

From hence may be understood the reason, why the voice of such as are said to speake in their bellies, though it be uttered neer hand, is neverthelesse heard by those that suspect nothing, as if it were a great way off. For having no former thought of any determined place from which the voice should proceed, and judging according to the greatesse, if it be weake they thinke it a great way off, if strong neer. These Ventriloqui therefore by forming their voice, not (as others) by the emission of their breath, but by drawing it inwards, doe make the same appear small and weake; which weaknesse of the voice deceives those that neither suspect the artifice, nor observe the endeavour which they use in speaking; and so instead of thinking it weake they thinke it farre off.

10 As for the Medium which conveighs Sound, it is not Aire onely. For Water, or any other Body how hard soever may be that Medium. For the Motion may be propagated perpetually in any hard continuous Body; but by reason of the difficulty with which the parts of hard Bodies are moved, the motion in going out of hard matter makes but a weak impression upon the Aire. Nevertheless if one end of a very long and hard beam be stricken, & the eare be applyed at the same time to the other end, so that when the action goeth out of the beam, the aire which it striketh may immediately be received by the eare, and be carried to the Tympanum, the Sound will be considerably strong.

In like manner, if in the night (when all other noyse, which may hinder Sound, ceaseth) a man lay his eare to the ground, he will hear the Sound of the steps of Passengers, though at a great distance; because the motion which by their treading they communicate to the earth, is propagated to the eare by the uppermost parts of the earth which receiveth it from their feet.

11 I have shewn above, that the difference between Grave and Acute Sounds consisteth in this, that by how much the shorter the time is, in which the reciprocations of the parts of a Body stricken are made, by so much the more Acute will be the Sound. Now by how much a Body of the same bigness, is either more heavy, or less stretched, by so much the longer will the reciprocations last; and therefore heavier, and less stretched Bodies (if they be like in all other respects) will yeild a Graver Sound then such as be lighter and more stretched.

As for the Concent of Sounds, it is to be considered, that the reciprocation or Vibration of the Aire (by which Sound is made) after it hath reached the Drumme of the eare, imprinteth a like Vibration upon the air that is enclosed within it; by which means the sides of the Drumme within, are stricken alternately. Now the Concent of two Sounds consists in this, that the Tympanum receive its stroke from both the Sounding Bodies in equal, & equally freque¯t spaces of time; So that when two strings make their Vibrations in the same times, the Concent they produce, is the most exquisite of all other. For the sides of the Tympanum, (that is to say, of the Organ of Hearing) will be stricken by both those Vibrations together at once, on one side or other. For example, if the two equal strings A B and C D be stricken together, and the latitudes of their Vibrations E F and G H be also equal, and the points E, G, F & H be in the concave superficies of the Tympanum, so that it receive strokes from both the strings together in E and G, and again together in F and H, the Sound which is made by the Vibrations of each string, will be so like, that it may be taken for the same Sound, and is called Unison; which is the greatest Concord. Again, the string A B retaining still its former Vibration E F, let the string C D be stretched, till its Vibration have double the swiftness it had before, and let E F be divided equally in I. In what time therefore the string C D makes one part of its Vibration from G to H, in the same time the string A B will make

one part of its Vibration from E to I; and in what time the string C D hath made the other part of its Vibration back from

H to G, in the same time another part of the Vibration of the string A B will be made from I to F. But the points F and G are both in the sides of the Organ, and therefore they will strike the Organ both together, not at every stroke, but at every other storke. And this is the neerest Concord to Unison, and makes that Sound which is called an Eighth. Again, the Vibration of the string A B remayning still the same it was, let C D be stretched till its Vibration be swifter then that of the string A B, in the proportion of 3 to , and let E F be divided into three equal parts in K and L. In what time therefore the string C D makes one third part of its Vibration, which third part is from G to H, the string A B will make one third part of its Vibration, that is to say, two thirds of E F, namely, E L. And in what time the string C D makes another third part of its Vibration, namely H G, the string A B will make another third part of its Vibration, namely, from L to F, and back again from F to L. Lastly, whilest the string C D makes the last third part of its Vibration, that is, from G to H, the string A B will make the last third part of its Vibration from L to E. But the points E and H are both in the sides of the Organ. Wherefore at every third time the Organ will be stricken by the Vibration of both the strings together, and make that Concord which is called a Fifth.

12 For the finding out of the cause of Smels, I shall make use of the evidence of these following Phaenomena. First, that Smelling is hindred by Cold, and helped by Heat. Secondly, that when the Wind bloweth from the Object, the Smel is the stronger; and contrarily when it bloweth from the Sentient towards the Object, the weaker; both which Phaenomena are by experience manifestly found to be true in Doggs which follow the track of Beasts by the Sent. Thirdly, that such Bodies as are less pervious to the fluid Medium, yeild less Smell then such as are more pervious; as may be seen in

Stones and Metals, which compared with Plants and Living Creatures, and their Parts, Fruits and Excretions, have very little or no Smell at all. Fourthly, that such Bodies as are of their own nature Odorous, become yet more Odorous when they are bruised. Fifthly, that when the breath is stopped (at least in Men) nothing can be Smelt. Sixthly, that the sense of Smelling is also taken away by the stopping of the Nostrils, though the mouth be left open.

13 By the fourth and fifth Phaenomenon it is manifest, that the first and immediate Organ of Smelling is the innermost cuticle of the Nostrils, and that part of it which is below the passage common to the Nostrils and the Palate. For when we draw breath by the Nostrils, we draw it into the Lungs. That breath therefore which conveighs Smels, is in the way which passeth to the Lungs, that is to say, in that part of the Nostrils which is below the passage through which the breath goeth. For nothing is Smelt, neither beyond the passage of the breath within, nor at all without the Nostrils.

And seeing that from different Smels there must necessarily proceed some mutation in the Organ, and all mutation is motion; it is therefore also necessary that in Smelling, the parts of the Organ, that is to say, of that internal cuticle, and the nerves that are inserted into it, must be diversly moved by different Smels. And seeing also that it hath been demonstrated, that nothing can be moved but by a Body that is already moved and contiguous; and that there is no other Body contiguous to the internal membrane of the nostrils, but breath, that is to say, attracted aire, and such little solid invisible Bodies (if there be any such) as are intermingled with the aire; it follows necessarily, that the cause of Smelling is either the motion of that pure aire or aethereal Substance, or the motion of those small Bodies. But this motion is an effect proceding from the Object of Smell, and therefore either the whole Object it self, or its several parts must necessarily be moved. Now we know, that Odorous Bodies make Odour though their

whole bulk be not moved. Wherefore the cause of Odour is the motion of the invisible parts of the Odorous Body. And these invisible parts do either go out of the Object, or else retaining their former situation with the rest of the parts, are moved together with them, that is to say, they have simple and invisible motion. They that say there goes something out of the Odorous Body, call it an Effluvium; which Effluvium is either of the aethereal substance, or of the small Bodies, that are intermingled with it. But that all variety of Odours should proceed from the Effluviums of those small Bodies that are intermingled with the aethereal substance, is altogether incredible, for these considerations; First, that certain Unguents, though very little in quantity, do nevertheless send forth very strong Odours, not onely to a great distance of place, but also to a great continuance of time, and are to be Smelt in every point both of that place and time; so that the parts issued out are sufficient to fil ten thousand times more space, then the whole Odorous Body is able to fill; which is impossible. Secondly, that whether that issuing out be with straight or with crooked motion, if the same quantity should flow from any other Odorous Body with the same motion, it would follow, that all Odorous Bodies would yeild the same Smell. Thirdly, that seeing those Effluviums have great Velocity of motion (as is manifest from this, that noysome Odours proceeding from caverns are presently Smelt at a great distance) it would follow, that by reason there is nothing to hinder the passage of those Effluviums to the Organ, such motion alone were sufficient to cause Smelling. Which is not so; for we cannot Smell at all unless we draw in our breath through our Nostrils. Smelling therefore is not caused by the Effluvium of Atomes; nor, for the same reason is it caused by the Effluvium of aethereal substance; for so also we should Smell without the drawing in of our breath. Besides the aethereal substance being the same in all Odorous Bodies, they would always affect

the Organ in the same manner, and consequently the Odours of all things would be like.

It remains therefore, that the cause of Smelling must consist in the Simple motion of the parts of Odorous Bodies, without any efflux or diminution of their whole substance. And by this motion, there is propagated to the Organ by the intermediate aire, the like motion, but not strong enough to excite Sense of it self without the attraction of aire by respiration. And this is a possible cause of Smelling.

14 The cause why Smelling is hindred by Cold, and helped by Heat, may be this, that Heat (as hath been shewn in the 21 Chapter) generateth Simple motion; and therefore also wheresoever it is already, there it will encrease it; and the cause of Smelling being encreased the Smell it self will also be encreased. As for the cause why the Wind blowing from the Object makes the Smell the stronger, it is all one with that for which the attraction of aire in respiration doth the same. For he that draws in the aire next to him, draws with it by succession that aire in which is the Object. Now this motion of the aire is Wind, and when another Wind bloweth from the Object, will be encreased by it.

15 That Bodies which co¯tain the least quantity of air, as Stones and Metals, yeild less Smell then Plants and Living Creatures, the cause may be, that the motion which causeth Smelling, is a motion of the fluid parts onely; which parts, if they have any motion from the hard parts in which they are contained, they communicate the same to the open aire, by which it is propagated to the Organ. Where therefore there are no fluid parts, as in Metals; or where the fluid parts receive no motion from the hard parts, as in Stones, which are made hard by accretion, there can be no Smell. And therefore also the Water, whose parts have little or no motion, yeildeth no Smell. But if the same Water, by Seeds, and the heat of the Sunne, be together with particles of Earth raised into a Plant, and be afterwards

pressed out again, it will be Odorous, as Wine from the Vine. And as Water passing through plants is by the motion of the parts of those plants made an Odorous liquour; so also of aire passing through the same plants whilest they are growing, are made Odorous aires. And thus also it is with the Juices and Spirits which are bred in Living Creatures.

16 That Odorous Bodies may be made more Odorous by Contrition, proceeds from this, that being broken into many parts which are all Odorous, the aire which by respiration is drawn from the Object towards the Organ, doth in its passage touch upon all those parts, and receives their motion. Now the aire toucheth the superficies onely; and a Body having less superficies whilest it is whole, then all its parts together have after it is reduced to powder, it follows that the same Odorous Body yeildeth less Smell whilest it is whole, then it will do after it is broken into smaller parts. And thus much of Smels.

17 The Tast follows; whose generation hath this difference from that of the Sight, Hearing and Smelling, that by these we have Sense of remote Objects; whereas we Tast nothing but what is contiguous, and doth immediately touch either the Tongue or Palate, or both. From whence it is evident, that the cuticles of the Tongue and Palate, and the Nerves inserted into them are the first Organ of Tast; and (because from the concussion of the parts of these, there followeth necessarily a concussion of the Pia Mater) that the action communicated to these, is propagated to the Brain, and from thence to the farthest Organ, namely, the Heart; in whose reaction consisteth the nature of Sense.

Now that Savours (as well as Odours) doe not onely move the Brain, but the Stomack also, as is manifest by the loathings that are caused by them both, they that consider the Organ of both these Senses will not wonder at all; seeing the Tongue, the Palate & the Nostrils have one and the same continued cuticle, derived from the Dura Mater.

And that Effluviums have nothing to doe in the Sense of Tasting, is manifest from this, that there is no Tast where the Organ and the Object are not contiguous.

By what variety of motions the different kinds of Tasts (which are innumerable) may be distinguished, I know not. I might (with others) derive them from the divers figures of those Atomes, of which whatsoever may be Tasted consisteth; or from the diverse motions which I might (by way of Supposition) attribute to those Atomes; conjecturing (not without some likelyhood of truth) that such things as tast Sweet, have their particles moved with slow circular motion, and their figures Spherical, which makes them smooth and pleasing to the Organ; that Bitter things have circular motion, but vehement, and their figures full of Angles, by which they trouble the Organ; and that Sowre things have straight and reciprocal motion, and their figures long and small, so that they cut and wound the Organ. And in like manner I might assigne for the causes of other Tasts such several motions and figures of Atomes as might in probability seem to be the true causes. But this would be to revolt from Philosophy to Divination.

18 By the Touch, we feel what Bodies are Cold or Hot, though they be distant from us. Others, as Hard, Soft, Rough and Smooth, we cannot feel, unless they be contiguous. The Organ of Touch, is every one of those membranes, which being continued from the Pia Mater, are so diffused throughout the whole Body, as that no part of it can be pressed, but the Pia Mater is pressed together with it. Whatsoever therefore presseth it, is felt as Hard or Soft, that is to say, as more or less Hard. And as for the Sense of Rough, it is nothing else but innumerable perceptions of Hard and Hard succeeding one another by short intervals both of time and place. For we take notice of Rough and Smooth, as also of Magnitude and Figure, not onely by the Touch, but also by Memory. For though some things are

touched in one Point; yet Rough and Smooth, like Quantity and Figure, are not perceived but by the Flux of a Point, that is to say, we have no Sense of them without Time; and we can have no Sense of Time, without Memory.

CHAP. XXX. OF GRAVITY.

1 A THICK Body doth not contain more Matter (unless also more Place) then a Thinne.

2 That the Descent of Heavy Bodies proceeds not from their own Appetite; but from some Power of the Earth.

3 The difference of Gravities proceedeth from the difference of the Impetus with which the Elements whereof Heavy Bodies are made do fall vpon the Earth.

4 The cause of the Descent of Heavy Bodies.

5 In what proportion the Descent of Heavy Bodies is accelerated.

6 Why those that Dive do not when they are under Water, feel the waight of the Water above them.

7 The Waight of a Body that floateth, is equal to the Waight of so much Water as would fill the space which the immersed part of the Body takes up within the Water.

8 If a Body be Lighter then Water, then how big soever that Body be, it will float upon any quantity of Water, how little soever.

9 How Water may be lifted up and forced out of a Vessel by Air.

10 Why a Bladder is Heavier when blown full of aire, then when it is empty.

11 The cause of the ejection upwards of Heavy Bodies from a Wind-Gun.

12 The cause of the ascent of Water in a Weather-glass.

13 The cause of motion upwards in Living Creatures.

14 That there is in Nature a kind of Body Heavier then Aire, which nevertheless is not by Sense distinguishable from it.

15 Of the cause of Magnetical vertue.

1 IN the 21 Chapter I have defined Thick and Thinne (as that place required) so, as that by Thick was signified a more Resisting Body, and by Thinne a Body less Resisting; following the custome of those that have before me discoursed of Refraction. Now if we consider the true and vulgar signification of those words, we shall find them to be Names Collective, that is to say, Names of Multitude; as Thick to be that which takes up more parts of a space given, & Thinne that which contains fewer parts of the same magnitude, in the same space, or in a space equal to it. Thick therefore is the same with Frequent, as a Thick Troop; And Thinne the same with Unfrequent, as a Thinne Rank, Thinne of Houses; not that there is more matter in one place then in another equal place, but a greater quantity of some named Body. For there is not less matter or Body indefinitely taken, in a Desert, then there is in a City; but fewer Houses, or fewer Men. Nor is there in a Thick Rank a greater quantity of Body, but a greater number of Souldiers, then in a Thinne. Wherefore the multitude & paucity of the parts contained within the same space, do constitute Density and Rarity, whether those parts be separated by Vacuum, or by Aire. But the consideration of this is not of any great moment in Philosophy; and therefore I let it alone, and pass on to the search of the causes of Gravity.

2 Now we call those Bodies Heavy, which (unless they be hindred by some force) are carried towards the center of the Earth, and that by their own accord, for ought we can by Sense perceive to the contrary. Some Philosophers therefore have been of opinion, that the Descent of Heavy

Bodies proceeded from some internal Appetite, by which when they were cast upwards, they descended again, as moved by themselves, to such place as was agreeable to their nature. Others thought they were attracted by the Earth. To the former I cannot assent, because I think I have already clearly enough demonstrated, that there can be no beginning of motion, but from an external & moved Body; and consequently, that whatsoever hath motion or endeavour towards any place, will alwayes move or endeavour towards that same place, unless it be hindered by the reaction of some external Body. Heavy Bodies therefore being once cast upwards, cannot be cast down again but by external motion. Besides, seeing inanimate Bodies have no Appetite at all, it is ridiculous to think that by their own innate Appetite they should to preserve themselves (not understanding what preserves them) forsake the place they are in, and transferre themselves to another place; whereas Man (who hath both Appetite and understanding) cannot for the preservation of his own life, raise himselfe by leaping above three or four feet from the ground. Lastly, to attribute to created Bodies the power to move themselves, what is it else then to say that there be creatures which have no dependance upon the Creator? To the later, who attribute the Descent of Heavy Bodies to the attraction of the Earth, I assent. But by what motion this is done, hath not as yet been explained by any man. I shall therefore in this place say somewhat of the manner, and of the way by which the Earth by its action attracteth Heavy Bodies.

3 That by the supposition of simple motion in the Sunne, homogeneous Bodies are congregated, and heterogeneous dissipated, has already been demonstrated in the 5th Article of the 21 Chapter. I have also supposed, that there are intermingled with the pure Air, certain little Bodies, or (as others call them) Atomes, which by reason of their extreme smalness are invisible, and differing from one another in Consistence, Figure, Motion & Magnitude; from whence it comes to pass, that some of them are

congregated to the Earth, others to other Planets, and others are carried up and down in the spaces between. And seeing those which are carried to the Earth, differ from one another in Figure, Motion and Magnitude, they will fall upon the Earth, some with greater, others with less Impetus. And seeing also that we compute the several degrees of Gravity no otherwise then by this their falling upon the Earth with greater or less Impetus; it follows, that we conclude those to be the more Heavy that have the greater Impetus, and those to be less Heavy that have the less Impetus. Our enquiry therefore must be, by what means it may come to pass, that of Bodies which descend from above to the Earth, some are carried with greater, others with less Impetus; that is to say, some are more Heavy then others. We must also enquire, by what means such Bodies as settle upon the Earth, may by the Earth it self be forced to ascend.

4 Let the Circle made upon the center C (in the 2d figure) be a great Circle in the Superficies of the Earth, passing through the points A and B. Also let any Heavy Body, as the stone A D be placed any where in the plain of the Aequator; and let it be conceived to be cast up from A D perpendicularly, or to be carried in any other line to E, and supposed to rest there. Therefore how much space soever the stone took up in A D, so much space it takes up now in E. And because all place is supposed to be full, the space A D will be filled by the aire which flows into it first from the neerest places of the Earth, and afterwards successively from more remote places. Upon the center C let a Circle be understood to be drawn through E; and let the plain space which is between the Superficies of the Earth and that Circle, be divided into plain Orbs equal and concentrique; of which, let that be the first which is contained by the two perimeters that pass through A & D. Whilst therefore the aire which is in the first Orbe, filleth the place A D, the Orbe it self is made so much less, and consequently its latitude is less then the straight line A D. Wherefore there will necessarily descend so

much aire from the Orbe next abvoe. In like manner, for the same cause, there will also be a descent of aire from the Orbe next above that; and so by Succession from the Orbe in which the Stone is at rest in E. Either therefore the Stone it self, or so much aire will descend. And seeing aire is by the diurnal revolution of the Earth more easily thrust away, then the Stone, the aire which is in the Orbe that contains the Stone will be forced further upwards then the Stone. But this, without the admission of Vacuum, cannot be, unless so much aire descend to E from the place next above; which being done, the Stone will be thrust downwards. By this means therefore the Stone now receives the beginning of its Descent, that is to say, of its Gravity. Furthermore, whatsoever is once moved, will be moved continually (as hath been shewn in the 19th Article of the 8th Chapter) in the same way, and with the same celerity, except it be retarded or accelerated by some external Movent. Now the aire (which is the onely Body that is interposed between the Earth A and the stone above it E) will have the same action in every point of the straight line E A, which it hath in E. But it depressed the stone in E; and therefore also it will depress it equally in every point of the straight line E A. Wherefore the stone will descend from E to A with accelerated motion. The possible cause therefore of the Descent of Heavy Bodies under the Aequator, is the Diurnal motion of the Earth. And the same demonstration will serve, if the stone be placed in the plain of any other Circle parallel to the Aequator. But because this motion hath by reason of its greater slowness, less force to thrust off the aire in the parallel Circles then in the Aequator, and no force at all at the Poles, it may well be thought (for it is a certain consequent) that Heavy Bodies descend with less and less velocity, as they are more & more remote from the Aequator; & that at the Poles themselves they wil either not descend at all, or not descend by the Axis; which whether it be true or false, Experience must determine. But it is hard to make the experiment, both because the times of

their descents cannot be easily measured with sufficient exactness, and also because the places neer the Poles are inaccessible. Nevertheless, this we know, that by how much the neerer we come to the Poles, by so much the greater are the Flakes of the Snow that falls; and by how much the more swiftly such Bodies descend as are fluid and dissipable, by so much the smaller are the particles into which they are dissipated.

5 Supposing therefore this to be the cause of the Descent of Heavy Bodies; it will follow, that their motion will be accelerated in such manner, as that the spaces which are transmitted by them in the several times, will have to one another the same proportion which the odd numbers have in succession from Unity. For if the straight line EA be divided into any number of equal parts, the Heavy Body descending, will (by reason of the perpetual action of the Diurnal motion) receive from the aire in every one of those times, in every several point of the streight line EA, a several new and equal impulsion; and therefore also in every one of those times it will acquire a several and equal degree of celerity. And from hence it follows, by that which Galilaeus hath in his Dialogues of Motion demonstrated, that Heavy Bodies descend in the several times with such differences of transmitted spaces as are equal to the differences of the square numbers that succeed one another from Unity; which square numbers being 1, 4, 9, 16, &c. their differences are 3, 5, 7, &c; that is to say, the odd numbers which succeed another from Unity. Against this cause of Gravity which I have given, it will perhaps be objected, that if a Heavy Body be placed in the bottom of some hollow Cylinder of Iron or Adamant, and the bottom be turned upwards, the Body will descend, though the aire above cannot depress it, much less accelerate its motion. But it is to be considered, that there can be no Cylinder or Cavern, but such as is supported by the Earth, and being so supported, is together with the Earth carried about by its diurnal Motion. For by this means the bottom of the Cylinder will be as the

Superficies of the Earth; and by thrusting off the next and lowest aire, will make the uppermost aire depress the Heavy Body which is at the top of the Cylinder, in such manner as is above explicated.

6 The Gravity of Water being so great as by experience wee find it is, the reason is demanded by many, why those that Dive, how deep soever they go under water, do not at all feel the weight of the water which lyes upon them. And the cause seems to be this, that all Bodies by how much the Heavier they are, by so much the greater is the endeavour by which they tend downwards. But the Body of a Man is Heavier then so much water as is equal to it in magnitude, and therefore the endeavour downwards of a Mans Body is greater then that of water. And seeing all endeavour is motion, the Body also of a Man will be carried towards the bottom with greater Velocity then so much water. Wherefore there is greater Reaction from the bottom; and the Endeavour upwards is equal to the endeavour downwards, whether the water be pressed by water, or by another Body which is Heavier then water. And therefore by these two opposite equal endeavours, the endeavour both ways in the water is taken away; and consequently, those that Dive are not at all pressed by it.

Coroll. From hence also it is manifest, that water in water hath no Waight at all, because all the parts of water (both the parts above, and the parts that are directly under) tend towards the bottom with equal endeavour and in the same straight lines.

7 If a Body float upon the water, the waight of that Body is equal to the waight of so much water as would fill the place which the immersed part of the Body takes up within the water.

Let EF (in the 3d figure) be a Body floating in the water ABCD; and let the part E be above, and the other part F under the water. I say the waight of the whole Body EF is equal to the waight of so much water as the Space F will receive. For seeing the waight of the Body EF forceth the water out of

the space F, and placeth it upon the Superficies AB, where it presseth downwards; it follows, that from the resistance of the bottom there will also be an endeavour upwards. And seeing again that by this endeavour of the water upwards, the Body EF is lifted up; it follows, that if the endeavour of the Body downwards be not equal to the endeavour of the water upwards, either the whole Body EF will (by reason of that inequality of their endeavours or moments) be raised out of the water, or else it will descend to the bottom. But it is supposed to stand so, as neither to ascend nor descend. Wherefore there is an Aequilibrium between the two endeavours; that is to say, the waight of the Body EF is equal to the waight of so much water as the Space F will receive; Which was to be proved.

8 From hence it follows, that any Body of how great magnitude soever, provided it consist of matter less Heavy then water, may nevertheless float upon any quantity of water how little soever.

Let ABCD (in the 4th figure) be a vessel; and in it let EFGH be a Body consisting of matter which is less Heavy then water; and let the space AGCF be filled with water. I say the Body EFGH will not sink to the bottom DC. For seeing the matter of the Body EFGH is less Heavy then Water, if the whole space without ABCD were full of Water, yet some part of the Body EFGH, as EFIK would be above the Water; and the waight of so much water as would fill the space IGHK would be equal to the waight of the whole Body EFGH; and consequently GH would not touch the bottom DC. As for the sides of the vessel, it is no matter whether they be hard, or fluid; for they serve onely to terminate the Water; which may be done as well by water as by any other matter how hard soever; and the water without the Vessel is terminated somewhere, so as that it can spread no further. The part therefore EFIG will be extant above the water AGCF which is contained in the vessel. Wherefore the Body EFGH will also float

upon the water AGCF, how little soever that water be; which was to be demonstrated.

9 In the 4th Article of the 26th Chapter, there is brought for the proving of Vacuum, the experiment of water enclosed in a vessel; which water, the Orifice above being opened, is ejected upwards by the impulsion of the aire. It is therefore demanded (seeing water is Heavier then aire) how that can be done. Let the 2d. figure of the same 26th Chap. be considered, where the water is with great force injected by a Syringe into the space FGB. In that injection, the aire (but pure aire) goeth with the same force out of the vessel through the injected water. But as for those small Bodies which formerly I supposed to be intermingled with aire, & to be moved with simple motion, they can not together with the oure air penetrate the water; but remayning behind are necessarily thrust together into a narrower place, namely into the space which is above the water FG. The motions therefore of those small Bodies will be less and less free, by how much the quantity of the injected water is greater and greater; so that by their motions falling upon one another the same small Bodies will mutually compress each other, and have a perpetual endeavour of regayning their liberty, and of depressing the water that hinders them. Wherefore, as soone as the orifice above is opened, the water which is next it will have an endeavour to ascend; and will therefore necessarily go out. But it cannot go out, unless at the same time there enter in as much aire; and therefore both the water will go out, and the aire enter in, till those small Bodies which were left within the vessel have recovered their former liberty of motion; that is to say, till the vessel be again filled with aire, and no water be left of sufficient height to stop the passage at B. Wherefore I have shewn a possible cause of this Phaenomenon; namely, the same with that of Thunder. For as in the generation of Thunder, the small Bodies enclosed within the Clouds by being too closely pent together, do by their motion break the Clouds, and restore themselves to their natural

liberty; so here also the small Bodies enclosed within the space which is above the straight line FG, do by their own motion expel the water as soon as the passage is opened above. And if the passage be kept stopped, and these small Bodies be more vehemently compressed by the perpetual forcing in of more water, they will at last break the vessel it self with great noise.

10 If Aire be blown into a hollow Cylinder, or into a Bladder, it will encrease the waight of either of them a little, as many have found by experience, who with great accurateness have tried the same. And it is no wonder, seeing (as I have supposed) there are intermingled with the common aire a great number of small hard Bodies which are Heavier then the pure aire. For the aethereal substance, being on all sides equally agitated by the motion of the Sunne, hath an equal endeavour towards all the parts of the Universe; and therefore it hath no Gravity at all.

11 We find also by experience, that by the force of air enclosed in a hollow Canon, a bullet of lead may with considerable violence be shot out of a Gunne of late invention, called the Wind-Gun. In the end of this Canon there are two holes with their Valves on the inside, to shut them close; one of them serving for the admission of aire, and the other for the letting of it out. Also to that end which serves for the receiving in of aire, there is joyned another Canon of the same metal and bigness, in which there is fitted a Rammer, which is perforated, and hath also a Valve opening towards the former Canon. By the help of this Valve the Rammer is easily drawn back, and letteth in aire from without; and being often drawn back and returned again with violent strokes, it forceth some part of that aire into the former Canon, so long, till at last the resistance of the enclosed aire is greater then the force of the stroke. And by this means men think there is now a greater quantity of aire in the Canon then there was formerly, though it were full before. Also the aire thus forced in, how much soever it be, is

hindered from getting out again by the foresaid Valves, which the very endeavour of the aire to get out doth necessarily shut. Lastly, that Valve being opened which was made for the letting out of the aire, it presently breaketh out with violence, & driveth the bullet before it with great force and velocity.

As for the cause of this, I could easily attribute it (as most men do) to Condensation, and think that the aire, which had at the first but its ordinary degree of Rarity, was afterwards by the forcing in of more aire condensed, and last of all rarified again by being let out and restored to its natural liberty. But I cannot imagine how the same place can be alwayes full, and nevertheless contain sometimes a greater, sometimes a less quantity of matter; that is to say, that it can be fuller then full. Nor can I conceive, how Fulness can of it self be an efficient cause of motion. For both hese are impossible. Wherefore we must seek out some other possible cause of this Phaenomenon. Whilst therefore the Valve w^{ch} serves for the letting in of aire is opened by the first stroke of the Rammer, the aire within doth with equal force resist the entering of the aire from without; so that the endeavours between the internal and external aire are opposite, that is, there are two opposite motions, whilest the one goeth in and the other cometh out; but no augmentation at all of aire within the Canon. For there is driven out by the stroke as much pure aire which passeth between the Rammer and the sides of the Canon, as there is forced in of aire impure by the same stroke. And thus by many forcible strokes the quantity of small hard Bodies will be encreased within the Canon, and their motions also will grow stronger and stronger as long as the matter of the Canon is able to endure their force; by which if it be not broken, it will at least be urged every way by their endeavour to free themselves; and as soon as the Valve which serves to let them out is opened, they will fly out with violent motion, and carry with

them the bullet which is in their way. Wherefore I have given a possible cause of this Phaenomenon.

12 Water, contrary to the custome of Heavy Bodies, ascendeth in the Weather-glasse; but it doth it when the aire is cold; for when it is warme it descendeth againe. And this Organ is called a Thermometer, or Thermoscope, because the degrees of Heat and Cold are measured and marked by it. It is made in this manner. Let A B C D (in the 5th figure) be a vessel full of water, and E F G a hollow Cylinder of glasse, closed at E, and open at G. Let it be heated, and set upright within the water to F; and let the open end reach to G. This being done as the aire by little and little grows colder, the water will ascend slowly within the Cylinder from F towards E; till at last the externall and internall aire coming to be both of the same temper, it will neither ascend higher, nor descend lower, till the temper of the aire be changed. Suppose it therefore to be setled any where, as at H. If now the heat of the aire be augmented, the water will descend below H; and if the heat be diminished, it will ascend above it. Which though it be certainely known to be true by experience, the cause neverthelesse hath not as yet been discovered.

In the 6 and 7 articles of the 27th chapter (where I consider the cause of Cold) I have shewne, that fluid Bodies are made colder by the pressure of the aire, that is to say, by a constant Wind that presseth them. For the same cause it is, that the Superficies of the water is pressed at F; and having no place to which it may retire from this pressure besides the cavity of the Cylinder between H and E, it is therefore necessarily forced thither by the Cold, and consequently it ascendeth more or lesse, according as the Cold is more or lesse encreased. And againe, as the Heat is more intense, or the Cold more remisse, the same water will be depressed more or lesse by its own Gravity, that is to say, by the cause of Gravity above explicated.

13 Also Living creatures, though they be Heavy, can by Leaping, Swimming & Flying raise themselvs to a certain degree of height. But they cannot do this except they be supported by some resisting Body, as the Earth, the Water and the Aire. For these motions have their beginning from the contraction (by the helpe of the Muscles) of the Body animate. For to this contraction there succeedeth a distension of their whole Bodies; by which distension, the Earth, the Water or the Aire which supporteth them, is pressed; and from hence, by the reaction of those pressed Bodies, Living Creatures acquire an endeavour upwards, but such, as by reason of the Gravity of their Bodies is presently lost againe. By this endeavour therefore it is, that Living creatures rayse themselues up a little way by Leaping, but to no great purpose; but by Swimming & Flying they raise themselves to a greater height; because before the effect of their endeavour is quite extinguished by the Gravity of their bodies, they can renew the same endeavour againe.

That by the power of the Soule, without any antecedent contraction of the Muscles, or the helpe of something to support him, any man can be able to raise his Body upwards, is a childish conceipt. For if it were true, a man might raise himselfe to what height he pleased.

14 The diaphanous Medium which surrounds the Eie on all fides, is invisible; Nor is Aire to be seen in Aire, nor Water in Water, nor any thing but that which is more opacous. But in the confines of two diaphanous Bodies, one of them may be distinguished from the other. It is not therefore a thing so very ridiculous for ordinary people to think all that Space empty, in which we say is Aire; it being the worke of Reason to make us conceive that the Aire is any thing. For by which of our Senses is it, that we take notice of the Aire, seeing we neither See, nor Hear, nor Tast, nor Smell, nor Feel it to be any thing? When we feel Heat, we do not impute it to the Air, but to the Fire; nor do we say the aire is Cold, but we our selves are Cold;

and when we feel the Wind, we rather think something is comming, then that any thing is already come. Also we do not at al feel the waight of water in water, much less of air in air. That we come to know that to be a Body which we call Aire, it is by Reasoning; but it is from one Reason onely, namely, because it is impossible for remote Bodies to work upon our Organs of Sense but by the help of Bodies intermediate, without which we could have no sense of them, till they came to be contiguous. Wherefore, from the Senses alone, without reasoning from effects, we cannot have sufficient evidence of the nature of Bodies.

For there is under-ground in some Mines of Coles, a certain matter of a middle nature between Water and Aire, which nevertheless cannot by Sense be distinguished from aire; for it is as Diaphanous as the purest aire; and as farre as Sense can judge, equally penetrable. But if we look upon the effect, it is like that of water. For when that matter breaks out of the Earth into one of those Pits, it fils the same either totally, or to some degree; and if a Man, or Fire be then let down into it, it extinguishes them in almost as little time as water would do. But for the better understanding of this Phaenomenon, I shall describe the 6th figure. In which, let A B represent the pit of the Mine; and let part thereof, namely, C B be supposed to be filled with that matter. If now a lighted Ca¯dle be let down into it below C, it wil as suddenly be extinguished, as if it were thrust into water. Also if a grate filled with coles throughly kindled and burning never so brightly, be let down; as soon as ever it is below C, the fire will begin to grow pale, and shortly after (losing its light) be extinguished, no otherwise then if it were quenched in water. But if the grate be drawn up again presently, whilest the coles are still very hot, the fire will by little and little be kindled again, and shine as before. There is indeed between this matter & water this considerable difference, that it neither wetteth, nor sticketh to such things as are put down into it, as water doth; which by the moisture it leaveth, hindereth the kindling again of

the matter once extinguished. In like manner, if a Man be let down below C, he will presently fall into a great difficulty of breathing, and immediately after into a swoun, and die, unless he be suddenly drawn up again. They therefore that go down into these pits, have this custome, that as soon as ever they feel themselves sick, they shake the rope by which they were let down, to signifie they are not well, and to the end that they may speedily be pulled up again. For if a man be drawn out too late, void of sense and motion, they digg up a Turff, and put his face and mouth into the fresh earth; by which means (unless he be quite dead) he comes to himself again by little and little, and recovers life by the breathing out (as it were) of that suffocating matter which he had sucked in whilest he was in the pit; almost in the same manner as they that are drowned come to themselves again by vomiting up the water. But this doth not happen in all Mines, but in some onely; and in those not alwayes, but often. In such Pits as are subject to it, they use this remedy. They dig another pit, as DE, close by it, of equal depth; and joyning them both together with one common channel EF, they make a Fire in the bottom E, which carries out at D the aire contained in the pit DE; and this draws with it the aire contained in the channel EF; which in like manner is followed by the noxious matter contained in CB; & by this means the pit is for that time made healthful. Out of this History (which I write onely to such as have had experience of the truth of it, without any designe to support my Philosophy with Stories of doubtful credit) may be collected the following possible cause of this Phaenomenon; namely, that there is a certain matter, fluid, & most transparent, and not much lighter then water; which breaking out of the Earth fills the Pit to C; and that in this matter, as in water, both Fire and Living creatures are extinguished.

15 About the nature of Heavy Bodies, the greatest difficulty ariseth from the contemplation of those things which make other Heavy Bodies ascend to them; such are Jet, Amber, and the Loadstone. But that which troubles

men most is the Loadstone, which is also called Lapis Herculeus; a stone, though otherwise despicable, yet of so great power, that it taketh up Iron from the Earth, and holds it suspended in the aire, as Hercules did Antaeus. Nevertheless, we wonder at it somewhat the less, because we see Jet draw up Straws, which are Heavy Bodies, though not so Heavy as Iron. But as for Jet, it must first be excited by rubbing, that is to say, by motion to and fro; whereas the Loadstone hath sufficient excitation from its own nature, that is to say, from some internal principle of motion peculiar to it self. Now whatsoever is moved, is moved by some contiguous and moved Body, as hath been formerly demonstrated. And from hence it follows evidently, that the first endeavour which Iron hath towards the Loadstone, is caused by the motion of that aire which is contiguous to the Iron. Also that this motion is generated by the motion of the next aire, and so on successively, till by this succession we find that the motion of all the intermediate air taketh its beginning from some motion which is in the Loadstone it self; which motion (because the Loadstone seems to be at rest) is invisible. It is therefore certain, that the attractive power of the Loadstone is nothing else but some motio¯ of the smallest particles thereof. Supposing therefore that those small Bodies of which the Loadstone is (in the bowels of the Earth) composed, have by nature such motion or endeavour as was above attributed to Jet, namely a reciprocal motio¯ in a line too short to be seen, both those stones wil have one & the same cause of attraction. Now in what manner, and in what order of working this cause produceth the effect of attraction, is the thing to be enquired. And first we know, that when the string of a Lute or Viol is stricken, the Vibration, that is, the reciprocal motion of that string in the same straight Line, causeth like Vibration in another string which has like tension. We know also, that the dregs or small sands which sink to the bottom of a Vessel, will be raised up from the bottom by any strong and reciprocal agitation of the water stirred with the

hand or with a staff. Why therefore should not reciprocal motion of the parts of the Loadstone contribute as much towards the moving of Iron? For if in the Loadstone there be supposed such reciprocal motion, or motion of the parts forwards and backwards, it will follow, that the like motion will be propagated by the aire to the Iron, and consequently that there will be in all the parts of the Iron the same reciprocations or motions forwards and backwards. And from hence also it will follow, that the intermediate aire between the Stone and the Iron will by little and little be thrust away; and the aire being thrust away, the Bodies of the Loadstone and the Iron will necessarily come together. The possible cause therefore why the Loadstone and Jet draw to them, the one Iron, the other Strawes, may be this, that those attracting Bodies have reciprocal motion either in a straight line, or in an Elliptical line, when there is nothing in the nature of the attracted Bodies which is repugnant to such a motion.

But why the Loadstone (if with the help of Cork it float at liberty upon the top of the water) should from any position whatsoever so place it self in the plain of the Meridian, as that the same points which at one time of its being at rest respect the Poles of the Earth, should at all other times respect the same Poles, the cause may be this, That the reciprocal motion which I supposed to be in the parts of the Stone, is made in a line parallel to the Axis of the Earth, and has been in those parts ever since the Stone was generated. Seeing therefore the Stone whilest it remains in the Mine, and is carried about together with the Earth by its diurnal motion, doth by length of time get a habit of being moved in a line which is perpendicular to the line of its reciprocal motion, it will afterwards, though its axis be removed from the parallel situation it had with the axis of the Earth, retain its endeavour of returning to that situation again; and all endeavour being the beginning of motion, and nothing intervening that may hinder the same, the Loadstone will therefore return to its former situation. For any piece of Iron

that has for a long time rested in the plain of the Meridian, whensoever it is forced from that situation, and afterwards left to its own liberty again, will of it self return to lie in the Meridian again; which return is caused by the endeavour it acquired from the diurnal motion of the Earth in the parallel circles which are perpendicular to the Meridians.

If Iron be rubbed by the Loadstone drawn from one Pole to the other, two things will happen; one, that the Iron will acquire the same direction with the Loadstone, that is to say, that it will lie in the Meridian, and have its Axis and Poles in the same position with those of the Stone; the other, that the like Poles of the Stone and of the Iron will avoid one another, and the unlike Poles approach one another. And the cause of the former may be this, that Iron being touched by motion which is not reciprocal, but drawn the same way from Pole to Pole, there will be imprinted in the Iron also an endeavour from the same Pole to the same Pole. For seeing the Loadstone differs from Iron no otherwise then as Ore from Metal, there will be no repugnance at all in the Iron to receive the same motion which is in the Stone. From whence it follows, that seeing they are both affected alike by the diurnal motion of the Earth, they will both equally return to their situation in the Meridian whensoever they are put fro¯ the same Also of the later this may be the cause, that as the Loadstone in touching the Iro¯ doth by its action imprint in the Iron an endeavour towards one of the Poles, suppose towards the North Pole; so reciprocally, the Iron by its action upon the Loadstone doth imprint in it an endeavour towards the other Pole, namely towards the South Pole. It happens therefore in these reciprocations or motions forwards and backwards of the particles of the Stone and of the Iron betwixt the North & the South, that whilest in one of them the motion is from North to South, and the return from South to North, in the other the motion wil be from South to North, & the return fro¯ North to South; which motions being opposite to one another, and communicated to the Air, the

North Pole of the Iron (whilest the attraction is working) will be depressed towards the South Pole of the Loadstone; or contrarily the North Pole of the Loadstone will be depressed towards the South Pole of the Iron; and the Axes both of the Loadstone and of the Iron will be situate in the same straight line. The truth whereof is taught us by experience.

As for the propagation of this Magnetical vertue, not onely through the Aire, but through any other Bodies how hard so ever, it is not to be wondred at, seeing no motion can be so weak, but that it may be propagated infinitely through a space filled with Body of any hardness whatsoever. For in a full Medium, there can be no motion which doth not make the next part yeild, and that the next, and so successively without end; so that there is no effect whatsoever but to the production thereof something is necessarily contributed by the several motions of all the several things that are in the World.

And thus much concerning the nature of Body in general; with which I conclude this my first Section of the Elements of Philosophy. In the first, second and third Parts, where the Principles of Ratiocination consist in our own Understanding, that is to say, in the legitimate use of such Words as we our selves constitute, all the Theoremes (if I be not deceived) are rightly demonstrated. The fourth Part depends upon Hypotheses; which unless we know them to be true, it is impossible for us to demonstrate that those Causes which I have there explicated, are the true Causes of the things whose productions I have derived from them.

Nevertheless, seeing I have assumed no Hypothesis, which is not both possible and easie to be comprehended; and seeing also that I have reasoned aright from those Assumptions, I have withall sufficiently demonstrated that they may be the true Causes; w^{ch} is the end of Physical Contemplation. If any other man from other Hypotheses shall demonstrate the same, or greater things, there wil be greater praise and thanks due to him then I demand for

my self, provided his Hypotheses be such as are conceivable. For as for those that say any thing may be moved or produced by it Self, by Species, by its own Power, by Substantial Forms, by Incorporeal Substances, by Instinct, by Anteperistasis, by Antipathy, Sympathy, Occult Quality, and other empty words of Schoolmen, their saying so is to no purpose.

And now I proceed to the Phaenomena of Mans Body; Where I shall speak of the Opticks, and of the Dispositions, Affections, and Manners of Men (if it shall please God to give me life), and shew their Causes.

Six Lessons to the Professor of Mathematics

1656 EDITION

CONTENTS

To the Right Honourable, Henry Lord Pierrepont, Viscount Newarke, Earle of Kingstone, and Marquis of Dorchester.

TO THE EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS, ONE OF GEOMETRY, THE OTHER OF ASTRONOMY, IN THE CHAIRS SET UP BY THE NOBLE AND LEARNED SIR HENRY SAVILE, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON I.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON II.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON III.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON IIII.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON V.

OF MANNERS. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON VI.

SIX LESSONS TO THE PROFESSORS

OF THE MATHEMATIQUES, ONE OF GEOMETRY,

THE OTHER OF ASTRONOMY: IN THE CHAIRES SET UP BY THE NOBLE AND LEARNED SIR HENRY SAVILE, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

LONDON. PRINTED BY J. M. FOR ANDREW CROOK,

AT THE GREEN-DRAGON,

IN PAULS CHURCH-YARD.

To the Right Honourable, Henry Lord Pierrepont, Viscount Newarke, Earle of Kingstone, and Marquis of Dorchester.

MY MOST NOBLE LORD,

NOT knowing on my own part any cause of the favour your Lordship has been pleased to express towards me, unless it be the Principles, Method, and Manners you have observed and approved in my Writings; and seeing these have all been very much reprehended by men to whom the name of Publique Professors hath procured reputation in the University of Oxford; I thought it would be a forfeiture of your Lordships good opinion, not to justifie my self in publique also against them. Which, whether I have sufficiently performed or not in the six following Lessons addressed to the same Professors, I humbly pray your Lordship to consider. The volume it self is too small to be offered to you as a Present; but to be brought before you as a Controversie it is perhaps the better for being short. Of Arts, some are demonstrable, others indemonstrable; and demonstrable are those the construction of the Subject whereof is in the power of the Artist himself; who in his demonstration does no more but deduce the Consequences of his own operation. The reason whereof is this, that the Science of every Subject is derived from a praecognition of the Causes, Generation, and Construction of the same; and consequently where the Causes are known, there is place for Demonstration; but not where the Causes are to seek for. Geometry therefore is demonstrable; for the Lines and Figures from which we reason are drawn and described by our selves; and Civill Philosophy is , we make the Commonwealth our selves. But because of Naturall Bodies we know not

the Construction, but seek it from the Effects, there lyes no demonstration of what the Causes be we seek for, but onely of what they may be.

And where there is place for Demonstration, if the first Principles, that is to say, the Definitions contain not the Generation of the Subject; there can be nothing demonstrated as it ought to be. And this in the three first Definitions of Euclide sufficiently appeareth. For seeing he maketh not, nor could make any use of them in his Demonstrations, they ought not to be numbered among the Principles of Geometry. And Sextus Empiricis maketh use of them (misunderstood, yet so understood as the said Professors understand them) to the overthrow of that so much renouned Evidence of Geometry. In that part therefore of my Book where I treat of Geometry, I thought it necessary in my Definitions to express those Motions by which Lines, Superficies, Solids and Figures were drawn and described; little expecting that any Professor of Geometry should finde fault therewith; but on the contrary supposing I might thereby not only avoid the Cavils of the Scepticks, but also demonstrate divers Propositions which on other Principles are indemonstrable. And truly, if you shall finde those my Principles of Motion made good, you shall find also that I have added something to that which was formerly extant in Geometry.

For first from the seventh Chapter of my Book de Corpere to the thirteenth, I have rectified and explained the Principles of the Science, id est, I have done that business for which Doctor Wallis receives the wages. In the seventh, I have exhibited and demonstrated the proportion of the Parabola and Parabolasters to the Parallelograms of the same height and base; which (though some of the propositions were extant without their demonstration) were never before demonstrated, nor are by any other then this method demonstrable.

In the eighteenth, (as it is now in English) I have demonstrated the (for any thing I yet perceive) Equation between the crooked line of a Parabola or

any Parabolaster and a straight line.

In the twenty-third, I have exhibited the Center of Gravity of any Sector of a Sphere.

Lastly, the twenty-fourth, (which is of the nature of Refractiand Reflexion) is almost all new.

But your Lordship will ask me what I have done in the twentieth, about the Quadrature of the Circle. Truely, my Lord, not much more then before. I have let stand there that which I did before condemn, not that I think it exact, but partly because the Division of Angles may be more exactly performed by it then by any organicall way whatsoever; and I have attempted the same by another Method, which seemeth to me very naturall, but of calculation difficult and slippery. I call them only Aggressions, retaining nevertheless the formall manner of Assertion used in Demonstration. For I dare not use such a doubtfull word as Videtur, because the Professors are presently ready to oppose me with a Videtur quod non. Nor am I willing to leave those Aggressions out, but rather to try if it may be made pass for lawfull (in spight of them that seek honour not from their own performances but from other mens failings) amongst many difficult undertakings carryed through at once) to leave one and the greatest for a time behind; and partly because the method is such as may hereafter give further light to the finding out of the exact truth.

But the Principles of the Professors that reprehend these of mine, are some of them so void of sense, that a man at the first hearing, whether Geometrician or not Geometrician must abhor them. As for example;

1. That two equall Proportions are not double to one of the same Proportions.

2. That a Proportion is double, triple, &c. of a Number, but not of a Proportion.

3. That the same Body, without adding to it, or taking from it, is sometimes Greater, and sometimes less.

4. That a Quantity may grow less and less Eternally, so as at last to be equall to another Quantity; or (which is all one) that there is a Last in Eternity.

5. That the nature of an Angle consisteth in that which lyes between the lines that comprehend the Angle in the very point of their concourse; that is to say, An Angle is the Superficies which lyes between the two Points which touch, or (as they understand a Point) the Superficies that lyes between the two Nothings which touch.

6. That the Quotient is the Proportion of the Division to the Dividend.

Upon these and some such other Principles is grounded all that Doctor Wallis has said not onely in his Elenchus of my Geometry, but also in his Treatises of the Angle of Contact, and in his Arithmetica Infinitorum; which two last I have Fere in two or three leaves wholly and cleerly confuted. And I verily believe that since the beginning of the world there has not been, nor ever shall be so much absurdity written in Geometry, as is to be found in those books of his; with which there is so much presumption joyned, that an of the like conjunction cannot be expected in less then a Platonick year. The cause whereof I imagine to be this, that he mistook the study of Symboles for the study of Geometry, and thought Symbolicall writing to be a new kinde of Method, and other mens Demonstrations set down in Symboles new Demonstrations. The way of Analysis by Squares, Cubes, &c. is very antient, and usefull for the finding out whatsoever is contained in the nature and generation of rectangled Plains (which also may be found without it) and was at the highest in Vieta; but I never saw any thing added thereby to the Science of Geometry, as being a way wherein men go round from the Equality of rectangled Plains to the Equality of Proportion, and

thence again to the Equality of rectangled Plains; wherein the Symboles serve only to make men go faster about, as greater Winde to a Winde-mill.

It is in Sciences as in Plants; Growth and Branching is but the Generation of the Root continued; nor is the Invention of Theoremes any thing else but the knowledge of the Construction of the Subject prosecuted. The unsoundness of the Branches are no prejudice to the Roots; nor the Faults of Theoremes to the Principles. And active Principles will correct false Theoremes if the Reasoning be good; but no Logique in the world is good enough to draw evidence out of false or unactive Principles. But I detain your Lordship too long. For all this will be much more manifest in the following Discourses: wherein I have not onely explained and rectified many of the most important Principles of Geometry: but also by the examples of those errors which have been committed by my Reprehenders, made manifest the evil Consequence of the Principles they now proceed on. So that it is not only my own Defence that I here bring before you, but also a positive doctrine concerning the true Grounds, or rather Atomes of Geometry: which I dare only say are very singular: but whether they be very good or not, I submit to your Lordships judgement. And seeing you have been pleased to bestow so much time (with great success) in the reading of what has been written by other men in all kindes of Learning. I humbly pray your Lordship to bestow also a little time upon the reading of these few and short Lessons; and if your Lordship finde them agreeable to your Reason and Judgement, let me (notwithstanding the clamour of my Adversaries) be continued in your good opinion, and still retain the honour of being

My most Noble Lord,

London, Iune 10. 1656.

Your Lordships most Humble and Obliged Servant,

THOMAS HOBBES.

TO THE EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS, ONE OF GEOMETRY, THE OTHER OF ASTRONOMY, IN THE CHAIRS SET UP BY THE NOBLE AND LEARNED SIR HENRY SAVILE, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON I.

I SUPPOSE (MOST egregious Professors) you know already that by Geomerry (though the word import no more but the measuring of Land) is understood no less the measuring of all other Quantity, then that of Bodies. And though the Definition of Geometry serve not for proof, nor enter into any Geometricall Demonstration, yet for understanding of the Principles of the Science, and for a Rule to judge by, who is a Geometrician, and who is not, I hold it necessary to begin therewith.

Geometry is the Science of determining the quantity of any thing, not measured, by comparing it with some other Quantity, or Quantities measured. Which Science therefore whosoever shall go about to teach, must first be able to tell his Disciple what Measuring or Dimension is; by what each several kind of Quantity is Measured; what Quantity is, & what are the several kinds thereof. Therefore as they who handle any one part of Geometry, determine by Defiaition the signifie cation of every word whi¯ch they make the Subject, or Praedicate of any Theoreme they undertake to demonstrate; so must he which intendeth to write a whole body of Geometry, Define and Determine the meaning of whatsoever word belongeth to the whole Science; The design of Euclid was to demonstrate the Properties of the five regular bodies mentioned by Plato; in which Demonstrations there was no need to alledge for Argument the Definition of

Quantity, which it may be was the cause he hath not any where Defined it, but done what he undertook without it. And though having perpetually occasion to speak of measure, he hath not Defined Measure; yet instead thereof he hath in the beginning of his first Element, assumed an Axiome which serveth his turn sufficiently, as to the measure of lines, which is the eighth Axiome; That those things which lye upon one another all the way (called by him) are equall. Which Axiome is nothing else but a description of the Art of Measuring Length, and Superficies. For this can have no place in solid bodies, unless two bodies could at the same time be in one place. But amongst the Principles of Geometry universall, the Definitions are necessary, both of Quantity and Dimension.

Quantity is that which is signified by what we answer to him that asketh, How much any thing is, and thereby determine the magnitude thereof. For magnitude being a word indefinite, if a man ask of a thing Quantum est, that is, How much it is; we do not satisfie him by saying it is magnitude or quantity, but by saying it is Tantum, so much. And they that first called it in Greek, and in Latine Quantity, might more properly have called it, in Latine Tantity, and in Greek ; and we, if we allowed our selves the Eloquence of the Greeks and Latines, should call it the So-muchness.

There is therefore to every thing concerning which a man may ask without absurdity how much it is, a certain Quantity belonging; determining the magnitude to be so much. Also wheresoever there is more and less, there is one kinde of Quantity or other. And first, there is the Quantity of Bodies, and that of three kindes; Length, which is by one way of Measuring; Superficies made of the complication of two Lengths, or the Measure taken, two wayes; and Solid which is the complication of three lengths, or of the measure taken three wayes; for breadth or thickness are but other Lengths. And the Science of Geometry so far forth as it contemplateth Bodies onely, is no more but by Measuring the length of one

or more lines, and by the position of others known in one and the same Figure, to Determine by ratiocination, how much is the Superficies; and by Measuring Length, Breadth, and Thickness, to determine the Quantity of the whole Body. Of this kinde of Magnitudes and Quantities the Subject is Body.

And because for the computing of the Magnitudes of Bodies, it is not necessary that the Bodies themselves should be present (the Ideas and memory of them supplying their presence) we reckon upon those Imaginary Bodies, which are the Quantities themselves, and say the length is so great, the breadth so great, &c. which in truth is no better then to say the length is so long, or the breadth so broad, &c. But in the mind of an inteligent man it breedeth no mistake.

Besides the Quantity of Bodies, there is a Quantity of Time. For seeing men, without absurdity do ask how much it is; by answering Tantum, so much, they make manifest there is a a, quantity that belongeth unto Time, namely, a Length. And because Length cannot be an accident of Time, which is it self an accident, it is the accident of a Body; and consequently the length of the Time, is the Length of the Body; by which Length or Line, we determine how much the Time is, supposing some Body to be moved over it.

Also we not improperly ask with how much Swiftness a Body is moved; and consequently there is a Quantity of Motion or Swiftness, and the measure of that Quantity is also a line. But then again, we must suppose another motion, which determineth the time of the former. Also of Force there is a Question of How much, which is to be answered by So much; that is, by Quantity. If the Force consist in Swiftness, the Determination is the same with that of Swiftness, namely, by a Line; if in Swiftness and Quantity of Body joyntly, then by a Line and a Solid; or if in quantity of Body onely (as Weight) by a Solid onely.

So also is Number Quantity; but in no other sense then as a line is Quantity divided into equall parts.

Of an Angle, which is of two Lines whatsoever they be, meeting in one point the digression or openess in other points, it may be asked how great is that digression; This Question is answered also by Quantity. An Angle therefore hath Quantity, though it be not the subject of Quantity; for the body onely can be the subject, in which Body those line are marked.

And because two lines may be made to divaricate by two causes; one, when having one end common, and immoveable, they depart one from another at the other ends circularly, and this is called surply an Angle; and the Quantity thereof is the Quantity of the Arch, which the two lines intercept.

The other cause is the bending of a straight line into a circular or other crooked line, till it touch the place of the same line, whilst it was straight, in one onely point. And this is called an Angle of contingence. And because the more it is bent, the more it digresseth from the Tangent, it may be asked how much more? and therefore the answer, must be made by Quantity; and consequently an Angle of Contingence hath its Quantity as well as that which is called simply an Angle. And in case the digression of two such crooked lines from the Tangent be uniform as in Circles, the Quantity of their digression may be determined. For if a straight line be drawn from the point of Contact, the digression of the lesser Circle will be to the digression of the greater Circle, as the part of the line drawn from the point of Contact, and intercepted by the Circumference of the greater Circle is to the part of the same line intercepted by the Circumference of the Lesser Circle, or, which is all one, as the greater Radius is to the lesser Radius. You may guess by this what will become of that part of your last Book, where you handle the Question of the Quantity of an Angle of Contingence.

Also there lyeth a Question of how much Comparatively one magnitude is to another magnitude, as how much water is in a Tun in respect of the Ocean, how much in respect of a Pint; little in the first respect, much in the Latter. Therefore the Answer must be made by some respective Quantity. This respective Quantity is called Ratio and Proportion, and is determined by the Quantity of their differences; and if their differences be compared also with the Quantities themselves that differ, it is called simply Proportion, or Proportion Geometricall. But if the differences be not so compared, then it is called Proportion Arithmeticall. And where the difference is none, there is no Quantity of the Proportion, which in this case is but a bare comparison.

Also concerning Heat, Light, and divers other Qualities, which have degrees, there lyeth a question of how much, to be answered by a so much, and consequently they have their Quantities, though the same with the Quantity of Swiftness: because the intensions and remissions of such Qualities are but the intensions and remissions of the Swiftness of that motion by which the Agent produceth such a quality. And as Quantity may be considered in all the operations of Nature, so also doth Geometry run quite thorow the whole body of Naturall Philosophy.

To the Principles of Geometry the definition appertaineth also of a Measure, which is this, One Quantity is the Measure of another Quantity, when it, or the Multiple of it, is Coincident in all points, with the other Quantity. In which Definition in stead of that of Euclid, I put Coincidence. For that superposition of Quantities by which they render the word cannot be understood of Bodies, but only of Lines and Superficies. Nevertheless many Bodies may be Coincident successively with one and the same place, and that place will be their Measure, as we see practised continually in the measuring of Liquid Bodies, which Art of Measuring may properly be called , but not Superposition.

Also the definitions of Greater, Less, and Equall, are necessary Principles of Geometry. For it cannot be imagined that any Geometrician should demonstrate to us the Equality, and Inequality of magnitudes, except he tell us first what those words do signifie. And it is a wonder to me' that Euclide hath not any where defined what are Equals, or at least, what are Equall Bodies, but serveth his turn throughout with that forementioned , which hath no place in Solids, nor in Time, nor in Swiftness, nor in Circular, or other crooked lines; and therefore no wonder to me, why Geometry hath not proceeded to the calculation neither of crooked lines, nor sufficiently of Motion, nor of many other things, that have proportion to one another.

Equall Bodies, Superficies, and Lines are those of which every one is capable of being co-incident with the place of every one of the rest. And Equall Times wherein with one and the same Motion Equall lines are described. And Equally Swift are those Motions by which we run over equall spaces in any time determined by any other motion. And universally all Quantities are Equall, that are measured by the same number of the same Measures.

It is necessary also to the Science of Geometry, to define what Quantities are of one and the same kind, which they call Homogeneous; the want of which definitions hath produced those wranglings (which your Book De Angulo Contactus will not make to cease) about the Angle of Contingence.

Homogeneous quantities are those which may be compared by () application of their Measures to one another; So that Solids and Superficies, are Heterogeneous quantities, because there is no coincidence or application of those two dimensions.

No more is there of Line and Superficies, nor of Line and Solid, which are therefore Heterogeneous. But Lines and Lines, Superficies and Superficies, Solids and Solids, are Homogeneous.

Homogeneous also are Line, and the Quantity of Time; because the Quantity of Time is measured by application of a Line to a Line; for though Time be no Line, yet the Quantity of Time is a Line, and the length of two Times is compared by the length of two Lines.

Weight, and Solid have their Quantity Homogeneous, because they measure one another by application, to the beam of a Ballad…. Line and Angle simply so called have their Quantity Homogeneous, because their measure is an Arch or Arches of a Circle applicable in every point to one another.

The Quantity of an Angle sinply so called, and the Quantity of an Angle of Contingence are Heterogeneous. For the measures by which two Angles simply so called are compared, are in two coincident Atches of the same Circle; but, the measure by which an Angle of Coatingence is measured, is a straight line intercepted between the point of Contact, and the Circumference of the Circle; and therefore one of them is not applicable to the other; and consequently, of these two sorts of Angles, the Quantities are Heterogeneous. The Quantities of two Angles of Contingence are Homogeneous; for they may be measured by the of two Lines, whereof one extream is common, namely, the point of Contact, the other Extreams, are in the Arches of the two Circles.

Besides this knowledge of what is Quantity and Measure, and their severall sorts, it behoveth a Geometrician to know why, and of what they are called Principles. For not every Proposition that is evident, is therefore a Principle. A Principle is the beginning of something. And because Definitions are the beginnings or first Propositions of Demonstration, they are therefore called Principles, Principles, I say, of Demonstration. But there be also necessary to the teaching of Geometry other Principles, which are not the beginnings of Demonstration, but of Construction, commonly called Petitions; as that it may be granted that a man can draw a straight Line, and

produce it; and with any Radius; on any Center describe a Circle, and the like. For that a man may be able to describe a square, he must first be able to draw a straight line; and before he can describe an Aequilaterall Triangle, he must be able first to describe a Circle. And these Petitions are therefore properly called Principles (not of Demonstration, but) of Operation. As for the commonly received third sort of Principles, called Common Notions, they are Principles, onely by permission of him that is the Disciples; who being continuous, and comming not to cavill but to learn, is content to receive them (though Demonstrable) without their Demonstrations. And though Definitions be the onely Principles of Demonstration, yet it is not true that every Definition is a Principle. For a man may so precisely determine the signification of a word, as not to be mistaken, yet may his Definition be such, as shall never serve for proof of any Theoreme, nor ever enter into any demonstration (such as are some of the Definitions of Euclide) and consequently can be no beginnings of Demonstration, that is to say, no Principles.

All that hitherto hath been said, is so plain and easie to be understood, that you cannot (most Egregious Professors) without discovering your ignorance to all men of reason, though no Geometricians, deny it. And the same (saving that the words are all to be found in Dictionaties) new; also to him that means to learn, not onely the Practice, but also the Science of Geometry necessary, and (though it grieve you) mine. And now I come to the Definitions of Euclide.

The first is of a Point. &c. Signum est, eujus est pars nulla, that is to say, a. Marke is that of which there is no part. Which definition, not onely to a candid, but also to a rigid construer is sound and usefull. But to one that neither will interpret candidly, nor can interpret accurately, is neither usefull nor true. Theologers say the Soul hath no part, and that an Angel hath no part, yet do not think that Soul or Angel is a point. A mark, or as some put

instead of it , which is a mark with a hot Iron, is visible; if visible then it hath Quantity, and consequently may be divided into parts innumerable. That which is indivisible is no Quantity; and if a point be not Quantity, seeing it is neither substance nor Quality, it is nothing. And if Euclide had meant it so in his definition, (as you pretend he did) he might have defined it more briefly, (but ridiculously) thus, a Point is nothing. Sir Henry Savile was better pleased with the Candid interpretation of Proclus, that would have it understood respectively to the matter of Geometry. But what meaneth this respectively to the matter of Geometry? It meaneth this, that no Argument in any Geometricall demonstration should be taken from the Division, Quantity, or any part of a Point; which is as much as to say, a Point is that whose Quantity is not drawn into the demonstration of any Geometricall conclusion; or (which is all one) whose Quantity is not considered.

An accurate interpreter might make good the definition thus, a Point is that which is undivided; and this is properly the same with cujus non est pars: for there is a great difference between undivided, and in divisible, that is, between cujus non est pars, and cujus non potest esse pars. Division is an Act of the understanding; the understanding therefore is that which maketh parts, and there is no part where there is no consideration bat of one. And consequently Euclides definition of a Point, is accurately true, and the same with mine, which is, that a Point is that Body whose Quantity is not considered. And considered, is that (as I have defined it, Cha. at the end of the third Article) which is not put to account in demonstration.

Euclide therefore seemeth not to be of your opinion, that say a Point is nothing. But why then doth he never use this definition in the Demonstration of any Proposition? Whether he useth it expressly or no, I remember not; but the 16th. Proposition of the third Book without the force of this definition is undemonstrated.

The second Definition is of a Line. . Linea est longitudo latitudinis expers, a Line is length which hath no breadth; and if candidly interpreted, sound enough, though rigorously, not so. For to what purpose is it to say Length not Broad, when there is no such thing as a broad length. One Path may be broader then another Path, but not one Mile then another Mile; and it is not the Path but the Mile which is the ways Length. If therefore a man have any ingenuity he will understand it thus, That' a Line is a Body whose length is considered without its breadth, else we must say absurdly a broad length; or untruly, that there be bodies which have length and yet no breadth; and this is the very sense which Apollonius (saith Proclus) makes of this Definition; when we measure, sayes he, the length of a way, we take not in the breadth or depth, but consider onely one Dimension. See this of Proclus cited by Sir Henry Saviles where you shall finde the very word consider.

The fourth Definition is of a straight line, thus , &c. Recta linaa est quae ex aequo sua ipstus puncta inter jacet. A straight line is that which lieth equally (or perhaps evenly) between its own Points. This Definition is inexcusable. Between what Points of its own can a straight line lye but between its extreams? And how lies, it evenly between them, unless it swarve no more from some other line which hath the same Extreams, one way then another? And then why are not between the same Points both the lines straight? How bitterly, and with what insipide justs, would you have reviled Euclide for this, if living now he had written a Loviathan. And yet there is somewhat in this Definition to help a man, not onely to conceive the nature of a straight line (for who doth not conceive it?) but also to express it. For he meant perhaps to call a straight line that which is all the way from one Extream to another, equally distant from any two or more such Lines as being like and equall have the same Extreams. So the Axis of the Earth is all the way equally distant from the circumference of any two or more

Meridians. But then before he had defined a straight line, he should have defined what lines are like, and what are equall. But it had been best of all, first to have defined crooked lines, by the possibility of a diduction or setting further asunder of their extreams; and then straight Lines, by the impossibility of the same.

The seventh Definition, which is that of a plain Superficies, hath the same fault.

The Eighth is of a plain Angle. , &c. Angulus Planus est duarum Linearum in plano se mutuo tangentium, & non indirectum jacentium, alterius ad alteram inclinatio. A Plain Angle is the inclination one towards another of two lines that touch one another in the same Plain, and lye not in the same straight line: Besides the faults here observed by Mr. Henry Savile, as the clause of not lying in the same straight line, and the obscurity or aequivocation of the word inclination, there is yet another, which is, that by this Definition two Right Angles together taken, are no Angle; which is a fault which you somewhere (asking leave to use the word Angle, acknowledge, but avoid not. For in Geometry, where you confesse there is required all possible accurateness, every is a fault. Besides you see by this Definition, that Euclide is not of your, but of Clavius his opinion. For it is manifest that the two lines which contain an Angle of Contact, incline one towards another, and come together in a Point, and lye not in the same streight line, and consequently make an Angle.

The thirteenth Definition is exact, but makes against your Doctrine, that a Point is nothing. Examine it. . Terminus est quod alicujus extremum est. A Term or Bound is that which is the Extream of any thing We had before, The extreams of a Line are Points. But what is in a Line the extream, but the first or last part, though you may make that part as small as you will? A point is therefore a part, and nothing is no extream.

The fourteenth, Figura est (subaudi Quantitas) quae ab aliquo, vel aliquibus terminis undi{que} continetur five clauditur. A Figure is Quantity contained within some bound or bounds. Or shortly thus, A Figure is Quantity every way determined, is in my opinion as exact a Definition of a Figure as can possibly be given, though it must not be so in yours. For this determination is the same thing with circumscription; and whatsoever is any where (U B Icun{que}) definitivè is there also circumscriptivè; and by this means, the distinction is lost, by which Theologers, when they deny God to be in any place, save themselves from being accused of saying he is no where; for that which is no where is nothing. This definition of Euclide cannot therefore possibly be embraced by you that carry double, namely, Mathematicks and Theology. For if you reject it, you will be cast out of all Mathematick Schooles; and if you maintain it, from the Society of all School-Divines, and lose the thanks of the Favour you have shewn (you the Astronomer) to Bishop Bramhall.

The fifteenth is of a Circle, , &c. A Circle is a plain Figure comprehended by one line which is called the Circumference, to which Circumference all the straight lines drawn from one of the points within the Figure, are equall to one another. This is true. But if a man had never seen the generation of a Circle by the motion of a Compass or other aequivalent means, it would have been hard to perswade him, that there was any such Figure possible. It had been therefore not amiss first to have let him see that such a Figure might be described. Therefore so much of Geometry is no part of Philosophy, which seeketh the proper passions of all things in the generation of the things themselves.

After the fifteenth till the last or thirty fifth Definition all are most accurate, but the last, which is this, Parallel straight lines are those which being in the same Plane, though infinitely produced both wayes shall never meet. Which is lesse accurate. For how shall a man know that there be

straight lines, which shall never meet, though both wayes infinitely produced? Or how is the Definition of Parallels, that is, of lines perpetually aequidistant good, wherein the nature of aequidistance is not signified? Or if it were signified, why should it not comprehend, as well the Parallelism of Circular and other crooked lines, as of streight, and as well of Superficies, as of lines? By Parallels is meant aequidistant both Lines and Superficies, and the word is therefore not well defined without defining first equality of distance. And because the distance between two lines or Superficies, is the shortest line that can joyn them, there either ought to be in the definition, the shortest distance, which is that of the Perpendicular, and without inclination, or the distance in equall inclination, that is, in equall Angles. Therefore if Parallels be defined to be those Lines or Superficies, where the Lines drawn from one to an other in equal Angles be equal, the Definition, as to like Lines, or like Superficies, will be Universall and Convertible. And if we add to this Definition, that the equall Angles be drawn not opposite wayes, it will be absolute, and Convertible in all Lines and Superficies; and the definition will be this, Parallels are those Lines and Superficies between which every line drawn, in any Angle, is equall to any other line drawn in the same Angle the same way. For by this Definition the distance between them will perpetually be equall, and consequently they will never come nearer together, how much, or which way soever they be produced. And the converse of it will be also true, If two Lines, or two Superficies be Paralle, and a straight line be drawn from one to the other, any other straight line, drawn from one to the other in the same Angle, and the same way, will be equall to it. This is manifestly true, and (most egregious Professors) new, at least to you.

And thus much for the Definitions placed before the first of Euclides Elements.

Before the third of his Elements is this Definition. In circulo aequaliter distare à centro rectae lineae dicuntur, cum prependiculares quae à centro in ipsas ducuntur sunt- aequales. In a circle two straight Lines are said to be equally distant from the Center, upon which the perpendiculars drawn from the Center are equall. This is true; but it is rather an Axiome then a Definition, as being demonstrable that the Perpendicular is the measure of the distance between a Point and a straight or crooked Line.

Before the fifth Element the first Definition is of a Part. Pars est magnitudo magnitudinis, minor majoris, cum minor metitur majorem. A Part is one magnitude of another, the lesse of the greater, when the lesse measureth the greater. From which Definition it followeth, that more then the half is not a part of the whole. But because Euclide meaneth here an Aliquot part, as a half, a third, or a fourth, &c. It may pass for the Definition of a measure under the name of part; as thus, a Measure is a Part of the whole, when multiplyed, it may be equall to the whole, though properly a Measure is externall to the thing measured, and not the Aliquot part it self; but equall to an Aliquot part.

But the third Definition is intollerable, It is the definition of , in Latin Ratio, in English Proportion, in this manner; . Ratio est duarum magnitudinum ejusdem generis mutua quaedam secundum quantitatem babitudo. Proportion is a certain mutuall habitude in Quantity, of two magnitudesof the same kinde, one to another. First, we have here ignotum per ignoti¯us; for every man understandeth better what is meant by Proportion then by Habitude. But it was the phrase of the Greeks when they named like Proportions, to say, the first to the second , id est, Ita se habet, and in English, is as, the third to the fourth. As for Example (in the Proportions of two to four, and three to six) to say two to four , id est, ita se habet, id est, is as, three to six. From which phrase Euclide made this his Definition of Proportion by , which the Latines translate quaedam habitudo.

Quaedam in a Definition is a most certain note of not understanding the word defined; And in Greek is much worse; for to render rightly the Greek definition, we are to say in English, that Proportion is a whatshall-I-call-it isaesse, or soness of two magnitudes &c. Then which nothing can be more unworthy of Euclide. It is as bad as any thing was ever said in Geometry by Orontius, or by Dr. Wallis, That Proportion is Quantity compared, that is to say, little or great in respect of some other Quantity (as I have above defined it) is I think intelligible.

The fourth is, . Proportio verò est rationum similitudo. Here we have no one word by which to render ; for our word Proportion, is already bestowed upon the rendring of Neverthelesse the Greek may be translated into English thus, Iterated Proportion is the similitude of Proportions. But Iterated Proportion is the same with eadem Ratio. To what purpose then serveth the sixth Definition, which is of eadem Ratio? For and eadem Ratio, and Similitudo Rationum, are the same thing, as appeareth by Euclide himself; where he defines those Quantities, that are in the same Proportion by . Therefore the sixth Definition is but a Lemma, and assumed without demonstration.

The fourteenth, Compositio Rationis est sunptio Antecedentis cum Consequente, ceu unius, ad ipsum consequentem. To Compound Proportion, is to take both Antecedent, and Consequent together, as one magnitude, and compare it to the consequent, Is good; though he might have compared it as well with the Antecedent; For both wayes it had been a Composition of Proportion. We are to note here, that the Composition defined in this place by Euclide, is not adding together of Proportions, but of two Quantities that have Proportion. And therefore it is not the same Composition which he defineth in the fourth place before the sixth Element; for there

He defineth the addition of Proportion to another Proportion in this manner , &c. A Proportion is said to be compounded of Proportions, when their Quantities multiplyes into one another make a Proportion; as when we would compound or add together, the Proportions, of three to two, and of four to five, we must multiply three and four, which maketh twelve, and two and five which maketh ten. And then the Proportion of twelve to ten, is the sum of the Proportions, of three to two, and of four to five; which is true; but not a definition; for it may and ought to be demonstrated. For to define what is addition of two Proportions (which are alwayes in four Quantities, though sometimes one of them be twice named) we are to say, that they are then added together when we make the second to another in the same Proportion, which the third hath to the fourth.

And thus much of the Definitions; of which, some, very few, you see are faulty; the rest either accurate, or good enough if well interpreted. For before the rest of the Elements all are accurate, notwithstanding, that you allow not for good any definition in Geometry that hath in it the word motion: of which there be divers before the Eleventh Element. But I must here put you in minde, that Geometry being a Science, and all Science proceeding from a precognition of causes, the definition of a Sphere, and also of a Circle, by the generation of it, that is to say, by motion, is better then by the equality of distance from a Point within.

The second sort of Principles, are those of Construction, usually called Postulata, or Petitions. For as for those notiones communes, called Axiomes, they are from the definitions of their terms demonstrable, though they be so evident as they need not demonstration. These Petitions are by Euclide called , such as are granted by favour, that is, simply Petitions whereas by Axiome is understood that which is claimed as due. So that between and there is this other difference, that this later is simply a Petition, the former a Petition of Right.

Of Petitions simply, the first is, That from any Point to any Point may be drawn a straight Line. The second, That a finite straight Line may be produced. The third, That upon any Center, at any distance may be described a Circle. All which are both evident, and necessary to be granted.

And by all these a man may easily perceive that Euclide in the definitions of a Point, a Line, and a Superficies, did not intend that a Point should be Nothing, or a Line be without Latitude, or a Superficies without Thickness, for if he did, his Petitions are not onely unreasonable to be granted, but also impossible to be performed. For Lines are not drawn but by Motion; and Motion is of Body only. And therefore his meaning was, that the Quantity of a Point, the Breadth of a Line, and the Thickness of a Superficies were not to be considered, that is to say, not to be reckoned in the demonstration of any Theoreme concerning the Quantity of Bodies, either in Length, Superficies, or Solid.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON II.

THERE BE BUT two causes from which can spring an error in the demonstration of any conclusion in any Science whatsoever. And those are Ignorance or want of understanding, & Negligence. For as in the adding together of many and great Numbers, he cannot fail, that knoweth the Rules of Addition, and is also all the way so carefull, as not to mistake one number, or one place for another; so in any other Science, he that is perfect in the Rules of Logick, and is so watchfull over his Pen, as not to put one word for another, can never fail of making a true, though not perhaps the shortest and easiest demonstration.

The Rules of Demonstration are but of two kindes; One, that the Principles be true and evident Definitions; the other, that the Inferences be necessary. And of true and evident definitions, the best are those which declare the cause or generation of that Subject, whereof the proper passions are to be demonstrated. For Science is that knowledge which is derived from the comprehension of the cause. But when the cause appeareth not, then may, or rather must we define some known property of the Subject, and from thence derive some possible way, or wayes of the generation. And the more wait of generation are explicated, the more easie will be the derivation of the Properties; whereof some are more immediate to one, some to another generation. He therefore that proceedeth from untrue, or not undefined definitions, is ignorant of that he goes about; which is an il-

favoured fault, be the matter he undertaketh easie or difficult; because he was not forced to undergo a greater charge then he could carry through. But he that from right definitions maketh a false conclusion, erreth through humane frailty, as being less awake, more troubled with other thoughts, or more in haste when he was in writing. Such faults, unless they be very frequent, are not attended with shame, as being common to all men, or are at least less ugly then the former, except then, when he that committeth them reprehendeth the same in other men. For that is in every man intolerable, which he cannot tolerate in another. But to the end that the faults of both kinds may by every man be well understood, it will not be amiss to examine them by some such Demonstrations, as are publikely extant. And for this purpose I will take such as are in mine and in your Books, and begin with your Elenchus of the Geometry contained in my Book de Corpore; to which I will also joyn your Book lately set forth concerning the Angle of Contact, Conique sections, and your Arithm tica Infinitorum; and then examine the rest of my Philosophy, and yours that oppugne it. For I will take leave to consider you both every where, as one Author, because you publikely declare your approbation of one anothers doctrine.

My first Definition is of a Line, of Length, and of a Point; The way (say I) of a Body moved, in which magnitude (though it alwayes have some magnitude) is not considered, is called a Line; and the space gone over by that motion, Length, or one and a simple Dimension. To this Definition you say, First, what Mathematician did ever thus define a Line or Length? Whether you call in others for help or testimony, it is not done like a Geometrician; for they use not to prove their conclusions by witnesses, but relye upon the strength of their own reason; and when your witnesses appear, they will not take your part. Secondly, you grant that what I say is true, but not a Definition. But to tell you truly what it is which we call a

Line, is to define a Line. Why then is not this a Definition? Because (say you in the first place) it is not a reciprocall proposition. But by your favour it is reciprocall. For not only the way of a Body whose Quantity is not considered, is a Line; but also every Line is (or may be conceived to be) the way of a Body so moved. And if you object that there is a difference between is and may be conceived to be, Euclide whom you call to your aid, will be against you in the fourteenth Definition before his eleventh Element; Where he defines a Sphere just as convertibly as I define a Line; except you think the Globes of the Sun and Stars cannot be Globes, unless they were made by the circumduction of a Semicircle; And again in the eighteenth definition, which is of a Cone, unless you admit no Figure for a Cone, which is not generated by the Revolution of a Triangle; And again, in the twentieth Definition, which is of a Cylinder, except it be generated by the circumvolution of a Parallelogram. Euclide saw that what proper passion soever should be derived from these his Definitions, would be true of any other Cylinder, Sphere, or Cone, though it were otherwise generated; And the description of the generation of any one being by the imagination applicable to all (which is equivalent to convertible) he did not believe that any rationall man could be missed by learning Logick, to be offended with it. Therefore this exception proceedeth from want of understanding, that is, from ignorance of the nature, and use of a Definition.

Again, you object and ask What need is there of motion, or of Body moved, to make a man understand what is a Line? Are not Lines in a Body at rest, as well as in a Body moved? And is not the distance of two resting points Length, as well as the measure of the passage? Is not Length one and a simple dimension, and one and a simple dimension Line? Why then is not Line and Length all one? See how impertinent these questions are. Euclide defines a Sphere to be a Solid Figure described by the revolution of a Semicircle, about the unmoved Diameter. Why do you not ask what need

there is to the understanding of what a Sphere is, to bring in the motion of a Semicircle? Is not a Sphere to be understood without such motion? Is not the Figure so made, a Sphere without this motion? And where he defines the Axis of a Sphere to be that unmoved Diameter, may not you ask, whether there be no Axis of a Sphere, when the whole Sphere, Diameter and all is in motion? But it is not my purpose to defend my definition by the example that of Euclide. Therefore first, I say, to me howsoever it may be to others, it was fit to define a Line by Motion. For the generation of a Line is the Motion that describes it. And having defined Philosophy in the beginning, to be the knowledge of the properties from the generation, it was fit to define it by its generation. And to your question, Is not distance Length? I answer, that though sometimes distance be aequivalent to Length, yet certainly the distance between the two ends of a thread wound up into a Clew is not the length of the thread; for the length of the thread is equall to all the windings whereof the Clew is made. But if you will needs have distance and length to be all one, tell me of what, the distance between any two Points is the Length. Is it not the length of the way? And how is that called Way, which is not defined by some motion? And have not severall wayes between the same places, as by Land and by Water, severall lengths? But they have but one distance, because the distance is the shortest way. Therefore between the length of the Path, and the distance of the Places, there is a reall difference in this case, and in all cases a difference of the consideration. Your objection, that Line is Longitude, proceeds from want of understanding English. Do men ever ask what is the Line of a thread, or the Line of a Table, or of any other Body? Do they not alwayes ask what is the length of it? And why, but because they use their own judgements, nor yet corrupted by the subtilty of mistaken Professors. Euclide defines a Line, to be length without breadth. If those terms be all one, why said he not that a Line, is a Line without breadth? But what Definition of a Line give you?

None. Be contented then with such as you receive, and with this of mine, which you shall presently see is not amiss.

Your next objections are to my Definition of a Point. Which Definition adhereth to the former in these words, and the Body it self is called a Point. Here again you call for help; Quis unquum mortalium, &c. What mortall man, what sober man did ever so Define a Point? 'Tis well, and I take it to be an honour to be the first that do so. But what objection do you bring against it? This, that a point added to a Point (if it have magnitude) makes it greater. I say it doth so, but then presently it loseth the name of a Point, which name was given to signifie that it was not the meaning of him that us'd it in demonstration, to add, substract, multiply, divide, or any way compute it. Then you come in with perhaps you will say though it have magnitude, that magditude is not considered. You need not say perhaps. You know I affirm it; and therefore your Argument might have been left out, but that it gave you occasion of a digression into scurvie language.

And whereas you ask why I defined not a Point thus, Punctum est corpus quod non consideratur esse corpus, & magnum quod non consideratur esse magnum. I will tell you why. First, because it is not Latine. Secondly, because when I had defined it by corpus, there was no need to Define it again by magnum. I understand very well this language, Punctum est corpus, quod non consideratur ut corpus. A Point is a Body not considered as Body. But Punctum, est corpus, quod non consideratur esse corpus, vel esse magnum, is not Latine, nor the version of it, A Point is a Body which is not considered to be a Body, English. My Definition was, that a Point is that Body whose magnitude is not considered, not reckoned, not put to account in Demonstration. And I exemplified the same by the Body of the Earth describing the Eclipcique Line; because the magnitude is not there reckoned nor chargeth the Eccliptique Line with any breadth. But I perceive you understand not what the word consideration signifieth, but take it for

comparison or relation; and say I ought to define a Point simply, and not by relation to a greater Body; as if to reckon, and to compare were the same thing. Omnia mihi (saith Cicero) provisa & cousiderata sunt. I have provided and reckoned every thing. There is a great difference between Reckoning and Relation.

Again, you ask why Corpus motum, a Body moved. Ile tell you; because the was necessary for the generation of a Line. And though after the generation of the Line, the Point should rest, yet it is not necessary from this Definition that it should be no more a Point; nor when Euclide defines a Sphere by the circumduction of a Semicircle upon an Axis that resteth, doth it follow from thence when the Sphere, Axis, Center and all (as that of the Earth) is moved from place to place, that it is no more an Axis.

Lastly, you object that motion is accidentary to a Point, and consequently not essentiall, nor to be put into the Definition. And is not the circumduction of a Semicircle accidentary to a Sphere? Or do you think the Sphere of the Sun was generated by the revolution of a Semicircle? And yet it was thought no fault in Euclide to put that motion into the Definition of a Sphere.

The conceit, you have concerning Definitions, that they must explicate the essence of the thing defined, and must consist of a genus, and a difference, is not so universally true as you are made believe, or else there be very many insufficient Definitions that pass for good with you in Euclide. You are much deceived if you think these wofull notions of yours, and the Language that doth every where accompany them, shew handsomely together. Or that such grounds as these be able to sustain so many, and so haughty reproaches as you advance upon them, so as they fall not (as you shall see immediately) upon your own head. I say a point hath Quantity, but not to be reckoned in Demonstrating the properties of Lines,

Solids, or Superficies; You say it hath no Quantity at all, but is plainly Nothing.

The first of the Petitions of Euclide is, that a Line may be drawn from Point to Point at any distance. The second, that a straight Line may be produced. The third, that on any Center a circle may be described at any distance. And the eighth Axiome (which Sir H. Savile observes to be the foundation of all Geometry) is this, Quae sibi mutuo congruunt, &c. Those things that are applyed one to another in all Points, are equall. All or any of these Principles being taken away, there is not in Euclide one Proposition Demonstrated, or Demonstrable. If a Point have not Quantity, a Line can have no Latitude; and because a Line is not drawn but by motion, by motion of a Body, and Body imprinteth Latitude all the way, it is impossible to draw or produce a straight Line, or to describe a circular Line without Latitude. Also if a Line have no Latitude, one straight Line cannot be applyed to another. To them therefore that deny a Point to have Quantity, that is, a Line to have Latitude, the forenamed Principles are not possible, and consequently no proposition in Geometry is demonstrated, or demonstrable. You therefore that deny a Point to have Quantity, and a Line to have Breadth, have nothing at all of the Science of Geometry. The practise you may have; but so hath any man that hath learned the bare Propositions by heart; but they are not fit to be Professors either of Geometry, or of any other Science that dependeth on it. Some man perhaps may say that this controversie is not much worth, and that we both mean the same thing. But that man (though in other things prudent enough) knoweth little of Science and Demonstration. For Definitions are not onely used to give us the Notions of those things whose appellations are defined; for many times they that have no Science have the Ideas of things more perfect then such as are raised by Definitions. As who is there that understandeth not better what a straight Line is, or what Proportion is, and what many

other things are without Definition, then some that set down the Definitions of them. But their use is, when they are truly and clearly made, to draw Arguments from them for the Conclusions to be proved. And therefore you that in your following censures of my Geometry, take your Argument so often from this, That a Point is nothing, and so often revile me for the contrary, are not to be allowed such an excuse. He that is here mistaken, is not to be called Negligent in his Expression, but Ignorant of the Science.

In the next place, you take exceptions to my Definition of Equall Bodies, which is this, Corpora aequalia sunt quae eundem locum possidere possunt. Equall bodies are those which may have the same place. To which you object impertinently, that I may as well define a man to be He that may be Prince of Transilvania, Wittily, as you count wit. Formerly in every Definition, you exacted an Explication of the Essence. You are therefore of opinion that the Possibility of being Prince of Transilvania, is no less Essentiall to a man, then the Possibility of the being of two Bodies successively in the same place, is Essentiall to Bodies equall.

You take no notice of the twenty third Article of this same Chapter, where I define what it is we call Essence; namely, that Accident, for which we give the thing its name. As the Essence of a man is his Capacity of reasoning, the Essence of a white-body, whiteness, &c. because we give the name of man to such Bodies as are capable of Reasoning, for that their capacity; and the name of White to such Bodies as have that colour, for that colour. Let us now examine why it is that men say Bodies are one to another Equall; and thereby we shall be able to determine whether the possibility of having the same place, be Essentiall or not to Bodies equall, and consequently whether this Definition be so like to the Defining of a man by the Possibility of being Prince of Transilvania, as you say it is. There is no man (besides such Egregious Geometricians as your selves) that inquireth the equality of two bodies, but by measure. And for Liquid Bodies, or the

Aggregates of innumerable small Bodies, men (men I say) measure them by putting them one after another into the same vessell, that is to say, into the same place (as Aristotle defines place) or into the space determined by the vessell, as I define place. And the Bodies that so fill the vessell, they acknowledge, and receive for equall. But though, when hard Bodies cannot be so measured, without the incommodity, or trouble of altering their Figure, they then enquire (if the Bodies are both of the same kind) their equality by weight, knowing (without your teaching) that equall bodies of the same nature, weigh Proportionably to their magnitudes; yet they do it not for fear of missing of the equality, but to avoid inconvenience, or trouble But you, (you I say) that have no Definition of Equalls, neither received from others, nor framed by your selves, out of your shallow meditation, and deep conceit of your own Wits, contend against the common light of Nature. So much is unheedy learning a hinderance to the knowledge of the truth, and changeth into Elves those that were beginning to be men.

Again, when men inquire the equality of two Bodies in length, they measure them by a common measure; in which measure they consider neither breadth nor thickness, but how the length of it agreeth; first, with the length of one of the Bodies, then with the length of the other. And both the Bodies whose lengths are measured, are successively in the same place under their common measure. Place therefore in Lines also, is the proper Index and discoverer of Equality, and Inequality. And as in length, so it is in breadth and thickness, which are but Lengths otherwise taken in the same Solid Body. But now when we come from this Equality, and Inequality of Lengths known by measure, to determine the Proportions of Superficies, and of Solids, by ratiocination, then it is that we enter into Geometry; for the making of Definitions, in whatsoever Science they are to be used, is that which we call Philosophiaprima. It is not the work of a Geometrician, as a

Geometrician, to Define what is Equality, or Proportion, or any other word he useth, though it be the work of the same man, as a man. His Geometricall part is, To draw from them, as many true and usefull Theoremes as he can.

You object secondly, That a Pyramis may be equall to a Cube, whilst it is a Pyramis. True, And so also whilst it is a Pyramis it hath a possibility by flexion and transposition of parts to become a Cube, and to be put into the place where another Cube equall to it was before. This is to argue like a child that hath not yet the perfect understanding of any Language.

In the third and fourth objection, you teach me to define Equall Bodies (it I will needs define them by place) by the Equality of place, and to say that Bodies are Equall that have Equall places. Teach others, if you can, to measure their grain, not by the same, but Equall Bushels.

In the fifth objection, you except against the word can, in that I say that Bodies are Equall, which can fill the same place. For the greater Body can (you say) fill the place of the less, though not reciprocally the less of the greater; It is true, that though the place of the less, can never be the place of the greate r yet it may be filled by a part of the greater. But ’tis not then the greater Body that filleth the place of the less, but a part of it, that is to say, a less Body. Howsoever to take away from simple men this straw they stumble at, I have now put the Definition of Equal Bodies into these words, Equall Bodies are those whereof every one can fill the place of every other. And if my Definition displease you, propound your own, either of Equall Bodies, or of Equals simply. But you have none. Take therefore this of mine.

The sixth is a very admirable exception. What (say you) if the same Body can sometimes take up a greater, sometimes a lesser place, as by Rarefaction and Condensation? I understand very well that Bodies may be somtimes thin and sometimes thick, as they chance to stand closer together, or further from one another. So in the Mathematick-Schools, when you read

your Learned Lectures, you have a thick or thronging Audience of Disciples, which in a great Church, would be but a very thin company. I understand how thick and thin may be attributed to bodies in the Plurall, as to a company, but I understand not how any one of them is thicker in the School, then in the Church; or how any one of them taketh up a greater room in the School (when he can get in) then in the street. For I conceive the Dimensions of the Body, and of the Place, whether the place be filled with Gold or with Air, to be coincident and the same; and consequently both the Quantity of the Air, and the Quantity of the Gold to be severally equall to the Quantity of the place; and therefore also (by the first Axiome of Euclide) equall to one another; insomuch, as if the same Air should be by Condensation contained in a part of the place it had, the dimensions of it would be the same with the dimensions of part of the place, that is, should be less then they were, and by consequence the Quantity less. And then either the same body must be less also, or we must make a difference between greater Bodies, and Bodies of greater Quantity; which no man doth that hath not lost his wits by trusting them with absurd teachers. When you receive Salary, if the Steward give you for every shilling a piece of six pence, and then say, every shilling is condensed into the room of a six pence, I believe you would like this Doctrine of yours much the worse. You see how by your ignorance you confound the affairs of mankind, as far forth as they give credit to your opinions, though it be but little. For nature abhorres even empty words, such as are (in the meaning you assign them) Rarefying and Condensing. And you would be as well understood if you should say (coining words by your own power) that the same Body might take up sometimes a greater, sometimes a lesser place, by Wallifaction and Wardensation, as by Rarefaction and Condensation. You see how admirable this your objection is.

In the seventh objection you bewray another kind of Ignorance, which is the Ignorance of what are the proper works of the severall parts of Philosophy. Though it were out of doubt (say you) that the same Body cannot have several Magnitudes yet seeing it is matter of Natural Philosophy, nor hath any thing to do with the present business, to what purpose is it to mention it in a Mathematicall Definition? It seems by this, that all this while you think it is a piece of the Geometry of Euclide, no less to make the Definitions he useth, then to infer from them the Theorems he demonstrateth. Which is not true. For he that telleth you in what sense you are to take the Appelations of those things which he nameth in his discourse, teacheth you but his Language, that afterwards he may teach you his Art. But teaching of Language is not Mathematick, nor Logick, nor Physick, nor any other Science; and therefore to call a Definition (as you do) Mathematicall, or Physicall, is a mark of Ignorance (in a Professor) unexcusable. All Doctrine begins at the understanding of words, and proceeds by Reasoning till it conclude in Science. He that will learn Geometry must understand the Termes before he begin, which that he may do, the Master demonstrateth nothing, but useth his Naturall prudence onely, as all men do, when they endeavour to make their meaning clearly known. For words understood are but the seed, and no part of the harvest of Philosophy. And this seed was it, which Aristotle went about to sow in his twelve Books of Metaphysicks, and in his eight Books concerning the Hearing of Naturall Philosophy. And in these Books he defineth Time, Place, Substance or Essence, Quantity, Relation, &c. that from thence might be taken the Definitions of the most generall words for Principles in the severall parts of Science. So that all Definitions proceed from common understanding; of which, it any man rightly write, he may properly call his writing Philosophia prima, that is, the Seeds, or the Grounds of Philosophy. And this is the Method I have used, defining Place, Magnitude, and the

other the most generall Appellations in that part which I intitle Philosophia prima. But you now not understanding this, talk of Mathematicall Definitions. You will say perhaps that others do the same as well as you. It may be so. But the appeaching of others does not make your ignorance the less.

In the eighth place you object not, but ask me why I define equall Bodies apart. I will tell you. Because all other things which are said to be equall, are said to be so, from the equality of Bodies; as two lines are said to be equall, when they be coincident with the Length of one and the same Body; and equall Times, which are measured by equall Lengths of Body, by the same Motion. And the reason is, because there is no Subject of Quantity, or of Equality, or of any other accident but Body; all which I thought certainly was evident enough to any uncorrupted Judgement; and therefore, that I needed first to define Equality in the Subject thereof, which is Body, and then to declare in what sense it was attributed to Time, Motion, and other things that are not Body.

The ninth objection is an egregious cavill. Having set down the Definition of Equall Bodies, I considered that some men might not allow the attribute of Equality to any things, but those which are the Subjects of Quantity, because there is no Equality, but in respect of Quantity. And to speak rigidly, Magnum & Magnitudo are not the same thing; for that which is great, is properly a Body, whereof greatness is an Accident. In what sense therefore (might you object) can an Accident have Quantity? For their sakes therefore that have not Judgement enough to perceive in what sense men say the Length is so Long, or the Superficies so broad, &c. I added these words, Eâdem ratione (quâ scilicet corpora dicuntur aequalia) Magnitudo magnitudini aequalis dicitur, that is, in the same manner, as Bodies are said to be equal, their magnitudes also are said to be equall. Which is no more then to say, when Bodies are Equall, their Magnitudes also are called

Equall. When Bodies are Equall in Length, their Lengths are also called Equall. And when Bodies are Equall in Superficies, their Superficies are also called Equall. All which is common speech, as well amongst Mathematicians, as amongst common people; and (though improper) cannot be altered, nor needeth to be altered to intelligent men. Nevertheless I did think fit to put in that clause, that men might know what it is we call Equality, as well in Magnitudes as in Magnis, that is, in Bodies. Which you so interpret, as if it bore this sense, that when Bodies are Equall, their Superficies also must be Equall, contrary to your own knowledge, onely to take hold of a new occasion of reviling. How unhandsome, and unmanly this is, I leave to be judged by any Reader that hath had the fortune to see the world, and converse with honest men.

Against the fourteenth Article, where I prove that the same Body hath alwayes the same magnitude, you object nothing but this, that though it be granted, that the same Body hath the same magnitude, while it resteth, yet I bring nothing to prove that when it changeth place, it may not also change its Magnitude by being enlarged or contracted. There is no doubt, but to a Body (whether at rest or in motion) some Body may be added, or part of it taken away. But then it is not the same Body, unless the Whole, and the Part be all one. It the Schools had not set your wit awry, you could never have been so stupid as not to see the weakness of such objections. That which you add in the end of your objections to this eighth Chapter, that I allow not Euclide this Axiom gratis, that the Whole is greater then a Part, you know to be untrue

At my eleventh Chapter, you enter into dispute with me, about the nature of Proportion. Upon the truth of your Doctrine therein, and partly upon the truth of your opinions concerning the Definitions of a Point, and of a Line, dependeth the Question whether you have any Geometry, or none; and the truth of all the Demonstrations you have in your other Books, namely, of

the Angle of Contact, and Arithmetica Infinitorum. Here I say you enter, how you wil get out (your reputation saved) we shall se- hereafter.

When a man asketh what Proportion one Quantity hath to another, he asketh how great or how little the one is comparatively to, or in respect of the other. When a G-ometrician prefixeth before his Demonstrations a D — inition, he doth it not as a part of his Geometry, but of naturall evidence, not to be demonstrated by Argument, but to be understood in understanding the Language wherein it is set down; though the matter may nevertheless (if besides Geometry he have wit) be of some help to his Disciple to make him understand it the sooner. But when there is no -ignificant Definition prefixed (as in this case, where Euclides Definition of Proportion, That it is a whats-i-a-t habitu-e of two Quantities, &c. is in significant, and you alledge no other) every one that will learn Geometry, must gather the Definition from observing how the word to be defined is most constantly used in common speech. But in common speech if a man -hall ask how much (for example) is six in respect of four, and one man answer that it is greater by two, and another that it is greater by half of four, or by a third of six, he that asked the question, will be satisfied by one of them, though perhaps by one of them now, and by the other another time, as being the onely man that knoweth why he himself did ask the Question. But if a man should answer, as you would do, that the Proportion of six to two is of th-se numbers, a certain Quotient, he would receive but little satisfaction. Between the said answers to this Question, How much is six in respect of four? there is this difference. He that answereth that it is more by two, compareth not two with four, nor with six, for two is the name of a Quantity absolute. But he that answereth it is more by half of four, or by a third of six, compareth the difference with one of the differing Quantities. For halfs, and thirds, &c, are names of Quantity compared.

From hence there ariseth two Species or kinds of (Ratio) Proportion, into which the generall word Proportion may be divided. The one whereof (namely, that wherein the Difference is not compared with either of the differing Quantities) is called (Ratio Aritbmetica) Arithmeticall Proportion; the other (Ratio Geometrica) Geometricall Proportion, and (because this latter is onely taken notice of by the name of Proportion) simply Proportion. Having considered this, I defined Proportion, Cha. Arti. 3. in this manner, Ratio est Relatio Antecedentis ad Consequens secundum magnitudinem. Proportion is the Relation of the Antecedent to the Consequent in Magnitude; having immediately before defined Relatives, Antecedent, and Consequen- in the same Article, and by way of explication added, that such Relation was nothing else but that one of the Quantities was equall to the other, or exceeded it by some Quantity, or was by some Quantity exceeded by it. And for exemplification of the same, I added further, that the Proportion of three to two, was that three exceeded two by a unity; but said not that the unity, or the difference whatsoever it were, was their proportion, for Unity, and to exceed another by Unity, is not the same thing. This is cleer enough to others. Let us therefore see why it is not so to you. You say I make Proportion to consist in that which remaineth after the lesser Quantity is substracted out of the greater; and that you make it to consist in the Quotient, when one number is divided by the other. Wherein you are mistaken; first, in that you say I make the Proportion to consist in the Remainder. For I make it to consist in the act of exceeding, or of being exceeded, or of being equall; whereas the Remainder is alwayes an absolute Quantity, and never a Proportion. To be more or less then another number by two, is not the number two; Likewise to be equall to two, where the difference is nothing, is not that nothing? Again, you mistake in saying the Proportion consisteth in the Quotient. For divide twenty by five, the Quotient is four. Is it not absurd to say that the Proportion of five to twenty,

or of twenty to five, is four? You may say the Proportion of five to twenty, is the Proportion of one to four. And so say I. And you may therefore also say, that the Proportion of one to four is a measure of the Proportion of five to twenty, as being Equall. And so say I. But that is onely in Geometricall Proportion, and not in Proportion universally. For though the Species obtain the Denomination of the Genus; yet it is not the Genus. But as the Quotient giveth us a measure of the Proportion of the Dividend to the Divisor in Geometricall Proportion, so also the Remainder after Substraction is the measure of Proportion Arithmeticall.

You object in the next place, That if the Proportion of one Quantity to another be nothing but the excess or defect, then, wheresoever the Excess or Defect is the same, there the Proportion is the same. This you say follows in your Logick, and from thence, that the Proportion of three to two, and five to four is the same. But is not three to two, and five to four, where the Excess is the same number, the same Proportion Arithmeticall? And is not Arithmeticall Proportion, Proportion? You take here (Ratio) Proportion (which is the Genus) for that Species of it, which is called Geometricall, because usually this Species has the name of Proportion simply. Also that the Proportion of three to two, is the same with that of nine to six; Is it not because the excesses are one and three, the same portions of three and nine, that is to say, the same excesses comparatively? I wonder you ask me not what is the G-nus of Arithmeticall, and Geometricall Proportions; and what the Difference. The Genus is (Ratio) Proportion, or Comparison in Magnitude, and the Diff-rence is that one Comparison is made by the absolute Quantity, the other by the Comparative Quantity, of the Excess or Defect, if there be any. Can any thing be clearer then this? You a-ter come in with Ignosce hebitudini to no purpose. I am not so inhumane as not to pardon dulness, or madness; They are not voluntary faults. But when men

adventure voluntarily, to talk of that they understand not censoriously and scornfully, I may tell them of it.

This difference between the Excesses or Defects, as they are simply or comparatively reckoned, being thus explained, all the rest of that you say in your objections to this eleventh Chapter (saving that Artt. 5. for Ratio binarii ad quinarium est superar- T-rnario, as it is in other places, I have put too hastily Ratio binarii ad quinarium est Ternarius) will be understood by every Reader to be frivolous, and to proceed from the ignorance of what Proportion is.

At the twelfth Chapter you onely note that I say, That the Pr-portion of Inequality is Quantity, but the Proportion of Equality not Quantity, and refer that which you have to say against it to the Chapter following; to which place, I shall also come in the following Lesson.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON III.

YOU BEGIN YOUR reprehension of my thirteenth Chapter with a Question. Whereas I divide Proportion into Arithmeticall, and Geometricall; You ask me what proportion it is I so divide. Euclide divides an Angle into Right, Obtuse, and Acute. I may ask you as pertinently what Angle it is he so divides? Or when you divice Animal into Homo, and Br-tum, what Animal that is which you so divide? You see by this how absurd your Q-estion is. But you say the Definition of Proportion which I make at Cha. Art. 3. namely, that Proportion is the comparison of two Magnitudes, one to another, agreeth not, neither with Arithmeticall, nor with Geometricall Proportion. I believe you thought so then, but having read what I have said in the end of the last Lesson, if you think so still, your fault will be too great, to be pardoned easily. But why did you think so before? Is it not because there was no Definition in Euclide of Proportion universall, and because he maketh no mention of Proportion Arithmeticall, and because you had not in your minds a sufficient notion thereof your selves to supply that Defect? And is not this the cause also, why you put in this Parenthesis (if Arithmeticall Proportion, ought to be called Proportion)? which is a confession that you know not whether there be such a thing as Arithmeticall Proportion or not; notwithstanding, that on all occasions, you speak of Arithmetically Proportionals. Yes, this was it that made you think that Proportion universally, and Proportion Geometricall is the same and yet to

say you cannot tell whether they be the same or not. ’Tis no wonder therefore, if in such confusion of the understanding, you apprehend not that the Proportions of two to five, and nine to twelve, are the same; for you are blinded by seeing that they are not the same Proportions Geometricall. Nor doth it help you that I say the Difference is the Proportion, f — by Difference you might if you would, have understood the act of Differing.

At the second Article you note for a fault in Method, that after I had used the words Ant-cedent and Consequent of a Proportion in some of the precedent Chapters, I define them afterwards.. I do not believe you say this against your knowledge, but that the eagerness of your malice made you oversee. Therefore go back again to the third A-ticle of Cha. Where having defined Correlatives, I add these words, Of which the first is called the Antecedent, the second the Consequent. This is but an oversight, though such as in me, you would not have excused.

At the thirteenth Article you find fault with, that I say that the Proportion of Inequality, whether it be of Excess, or of Defect, is Quantity, but the Proportion of Equality is not Quanty. Whether that which you say, or that which I say be the truth, is a Question worthy of a very strict Examination. The first time I heard it argued, was in Mersennus his Chamber at Paris, at such time, as the first volume of his Cogitata Physico-Mathematica was almost printed: In which, because he had not said all he would say of Proportion, he was forced to put the rest into a Generall Preface; which as was his custom, he did read to his Friends, before he sent it to the Pr-ss. In that generall Preface under the Title de Rationibus at{que} Proportionibus, at the Numbers twelve, thirteen, fourteen, he maintaineth against Clavius, that the Composition of Proportions is (as of all other things) a Composition of the Parts to make a Totall; and that the proportion of equality answereth in Quantity, to non-ens, or Nothing; the proportion of excess, to ens, or Quantity; and the Proportion of Defect, to less then Nothing; because

Equality (he saies) is a term of middle signification, between Ex-ess and Defect. And there also he refuteth the Arguments which Clavius at the end of the nineth Element of Euclide bringeth to the contrary. And though this were approved by divers good Geometricians then present, and never gain-sayed by any since, Yet do not I say it upon the credit of them, but upon sufficient grounds. For it hath been demonstrated by Euto-ius that if there be three magnitudes, the proportion of the first to the third is compounded of the proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third; Which also I demonstrate in this Article. And if there were never so many magnitudes ranked, it might be likewise demonstrated, that the Proportion of the first to the last is compounded of the Proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third, and of the third to the fourth, and so on to the last. If therefore we put in order any three numbers, whereof the two last be equall, as four, seven, seven, the Proportion of four the first, to seven the last, will be compounded of the Proportions of four the first, to seven the second, and of seven the second, to seven the third. Wherefore the Proportion of seven to seven (which is of equality) addeth nothing to the Proportion of four the first, to seven the second; and consequently the Proportion of seven to seven hath no Quantity. But that the Proportion of Inequality hath Quantity, I prove it fro- this, that one Inequality may be greater then another.

But for the clearing of this Doctrine (which Mersennus cals Intricate) of the composition of Proportions, I observed, first, that any two Quantities, being exposed to sense, their Proportion was also exposed; which is not Intricate. Again, I observed that if besides the two exposed Quantities, there were exposed a third, so as the first were the least, and the third the greatest, or the first the greatest, and the third the least, that not onely the Proportions of the first to the second, but also (because the Differences, and the Quantities proceed the same way) the Proportion of the first to the last is

exposed by composition, or addition of the Differences; nor is there any intricacy in this. But when the first is less then the second, and the second greater then the third, or the first greater then the second, and the second less then the third, so that to make the first and second equall, if we use addition, we must to make the second and third equall use substraction, then comes in the intricacy, which cannot be extricated, but by such as know the truth of this Doctrine which I now delivered out of Mersennus: namely, That the Proportions of Excess, Equality, and Defect, are as Quantity, not-Quantity, nothing want Quantity, or as Symbo lists mark them . 0. 0-1 And upon this ground I thought depended the universall truth of this Proposition, that in any rank of Magnitudes of the same kind, the Proportion of the first to the last, was compounded of all the Proportions (in order) of the intermediate Quantities; the want of the proof thereof Sir Henry S-vile-als (Naevus) a mole in the Body of Geometry. This Proposition is demonstrated at the thirteenth Article of this Chapter.

But before we come thither, I must examine the Arguments you bring to confute this Proposition, that the Proportion of Inequality is Quantity, of Equality not Quantity.

And first, you object that Equality and Inequality are in the same Predicament. A pretty Argument to flesh a young Scholar in the Logick School, that but now begins to learn the Predicaments. But what do you mean by Aequale, and Inequale? Do you mean Corpus Aequale, and Corpus Inequale? They are both in the Predicament of Substance, neither of them in that of Quantity; Or do you mean Aequalitas, and Inaequalitas? They are both in the Predicament of Relation, neither of them in that of Quantity, and yet both Corpus, and Inaequalitas, though neither of them be Quantity, may be Quanta, that is, both of them have Quantity, And when men say Body is Quantity, or Inequality is Quantity, they are no otherwise understood, then if they had said Corpus est tantum, and Inaequalitas tanta, not Tantitas; that is,

Bodies and Inequalities are so much, not somuchness; and all intelligent men are contented with that expression, and your selves use it. And the Quantity of Inequality is in the Predicament of Quantity, because the measure of it is in that Line by which one Quantity exceeds the other. But when neither exceedeth other, then there is no Line of Excess, or Defect by which the Equality can be measured, or said to be so much, or be called Quantity. Philosophy teacheth us how to range our words; but Aristotles ranging them in his Predicaments, doth not teach Philosophy; And therefore no Argument taken from thence, can become a Doctor, and a Professor of Geometry.

To prove that the Proportion of Inequality was Quantity, but the Proportion of Equality, not Quantity, my Argument was this; That because one Inequality may be greater or less then another, but one Equality cannot be greater nor less then another, Therefore Inequality hath Quantity, or is Tanta, and Equality not. Here you come in again with your Predicaments, and object, that to be susceptible of magis and minus belongs not to quantity, but to Quality; but without any proof, as if you took it for an Axiome. But whether true or false, you understand not in what sense it is true or false. 'Tis true, that one Inequality is Inequality, as well as another; as one heat is heat as well as another; but not as great; Tam, but not Tantus. But so it is also in the Predicament of Quantity; one Line is as well a Line as another, but not so great. All degrees, intensions, and remissions of Quality, are greater or less Quantity of force, and measured by Lines, Superficies, or Solid Quantity, which are properly in the Predicament of Quantity. You see how wise a thing it is to argue from the Predicaments of Aristotle, which you understand not. And yet you pretend to be less addicted to the authority of Aristotle, now, then heretofore.

In the next place you say, I may as well conclude from the not susception of greater and less, that a Right Angle is not Quantity, but an Oblique one

is. Very learnedly. As if to be greater or less could be attributed to a Quantity once determined. Number (that is number indefinitely taken) is susceptible of greater and less, because one number may be greater then another. And this is a good Argument to prove that Number is Quantity. And do you think the Argument the worse for this, that one six cannot be greater then another six? After all these childish Arguments which you have hitherto urged, can you perswade any man, or your selves, that you are Logicians?

To the fifth and sixth Article you object, first, that if I had before sufficiently Defined (Ratio). Proportion, I needed not again define what is (eadem Ratio) the same-Proportion; and ask me whether when I have defined man, I use to define anew what is the same man? You think when you have the Definition of Homo, you have also the Definition of idem Homo, when 'tis harder to conceive what idem signifies, then what Homo. Besides, idem hath not the same signification alwayes, and with whatsoever it be joyned; it doth not signifie the same with Homo, that it doth with Ratio. For with Homo, it signifies the same individual man, but with Ratio it signifies a like, or an equall Proportion. And both (Ratio) Proportion, and (idem) the same, being defined, there will still be need of another Definition for (eadem Ratio) the same Proportion. And this is enough to defend both my self and Euclide, against this objection. For Euclide also after he had Defined (Ratio Proportion, and that su-…ciently as he believed, yet he defines the same Proportion again apart. I know you did not mean in this place to object any thing against Euclide; but you saw not what you were doing. There is within you some spec-all cause of Intenebration, which you -…ld do well to look to.

In the nex- p — ce you say, when I had defined A-…thmeticall Proportions to be the same when the difference is the same; it was to be expected I should define Geometricall Proportions to be then the same,

when the Antecedents are of their Consequents Totuple, or Tantuple, that is, equimultiple (for Tantuplum signifies nothing.) In plain words, you expcted, that as I defined one by substraction, I should define the other by the Quotient in Division. But why should you expect a Definition of the same Proportion by the Quotient? Neither Reason nor the Authority of Euclide could move you to expect it. Or why should you say it was to be expected? But it seems you have the vanity to place the measure of truth in your own Learning. In Lines incommensurable there may be the same Proportion, when nevertheless there is no Quotient; for setting their Symboles one above another doth not make a Quotient; for Quotient there is none, but in aliquot parts. It is therefore impossible to define Proportion universally, by comparing Quotients. This incommensurability of Magnitudes was it that confounded Euclide in the framing of his Definition of Proportion at the fifth Element. For when he came to numbers, he defined the same Proportion irreprehensibly thus, Numbers are then Proportional, when the first of the second, and the third of the fourth are equimultiple, or the same part, or the same parts; and yet there is in this Definition no mention at all of a Quotient. For though it be true that if in dividing two Numbers you make the same Quotient, the Dividends and the Divisors are Proportionall, yet that is not the Definition of the same Proportion, but a Theoreme Demonstrable from it. But this Definition Euclide could not accommodate to Proportion in Generall, because of incommensurability.

To supply this want, I thought it necessary to seek out some way, whereby the Proportion of two Lines, Commensurable, or Incommensurable, might be continued perpetually the same. And this I found might be done by the Proportion of two Lines described by some uniform motion, as by an Efficient cause both of the said Lines, and also of their Proportions. Which motions continuing, the Proportions must needs be all the way the same. And therefore I defined those Magnitudes to have the

same Geometricall Proportion, when some cause producing in equall times, Equall Effects, -id determine both the Proportions. This you say needs an Oedipus to make it understood. You are (I see) no Oedipus; but I do not see any diff — ulty, neither in the Definition, nor in the Demonstration. That which you call perplexity in the Explication, is your prejudice, arising from the Symboles in your fancy. For men that pretend no less to naturall Phylosophy, then to Geometry, to find fault with bringing Motion and Time into a Definition, when there is no effect in nature, which is not produced in Time by Motion, is a shame. But you swim upon other mens bladders in the Superficies of Geometry, without being able to indure diving. Which is no fault of mine; and therefore I shall (without your leave) be bold to say, I am the first that hath made the grounds of Geometry firm and coherent. Whether I have added any thing to the Edifice or not, I leave to be judged by the Readers. You see, you that profess with the pricking of bladders the letting out of their vapour, how much you are deceived. You make them swell more then ever.

For the Corollaries that follow this sixth Article, you say they contain nothing new. Which is not true. For the nineth is new, and the Demonstrations of all the rest are new, being grounded upon a new Definition of Proportion, and the Corollaries themselves for want of a good Definition of Proportion, were never before exactly Demonstrated. For the truth of the sixth Definition of the fifth Elem-…t of Euclide cannot be known but by this Definition of mine, because it requires a Triall in all numbers possible, that is to say, an infinite time of Triall, whether the quimultiples of the first and third, and of the second and fourth in all multiplications do together exceed, together come short, and are together equall; which Triall is impossible.

In objecting against the thirteenth and sixteenth Article, I observe that you bewray together, both the greatest Ignorance, and the greatest malice;

and ’tis well, for they are sutable to one another, and fit for one and the same man. In the thirteenth Article my Proposition is this, If there be three Magnitudes that have Proportion one to another, the Proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third taken together (as one Proposition) are equall to the Proportion of the first to the third. This Demonstrated, there is taken away one of those Moles which Sir Henry Savile complaineth of in the Body of Geometry. Let us see now what you say both against the Enunciation, and against the Demonstration.

Against the Enunciation you object, that other men wo-ld say (not the Proportions of the first to the second, and of the second to the third, taken together, &c. but) the Proportion which is compounded of the Proportion of the first to the second, and of the second to the third, &c. Is not the compounding of any two things whatsoever the finding of the sum of them both, or the taking of them together as one totall. This is that absurdity of which Mersennus in the generall Preface to his Cogitata Physico-Mathematica hath convinced Clavius, who at the end of Euclides nineth Element denyeth the composition of Proportion to be a Composition of Parts to make a Totall; Which therefore he denyed, because he did not observe, that the Addition of a Proportion of defect, to a Proportion of Excess, was a Substraction of Magnitude; and because he understood not that to say, Composition is not the making a whole of Parts, was contradiction; which all, but too learned men would as soon as they heard - bho-re. Therefore in saying that other men would not speak in that manner, you say in effect they would speak absurdly. You do well to mark what other Geometricians say; but you would do better if you could by your own Meditation, upon the things themselves, examine the truth of what they say. But you have no minde (you say) to contend about the Phrase. Let us therefore see what it is you contend about.

The Proportion (you say) which is compounded of double and triple Proportion, is not (as I would have it) Quintuple, but Sextuple, as in these numbers, six, t-ree, one; where the Proportion of six to three is double, the Proportion of three to one tripl-, and the Proportion of six to one sextuple, not quintuple. Tell me (egregsous Professors) how is six to three double Proportion? Is six to three the double of a number, or the double of some Proportion? All men know the number six is double to the number three, and the number three triple to an unity. But is the Question here of compounding numbers, or of compounding Proportions Euclide at the last Proposition of his nineth Element sayes indeed, that these numbers, one, two, four, eight, are in double Proportion, yet there is no m-n that understands it otherwise, then if he had said in Proportion of the single Quantity, to the double Quantity; and after the same Rate, if he had said three, nine, twenty-seven, &c. had been in triple Proportion, all men would have understood it, of the Proportion of any Quantity to its Triple. Your instance therefore of six, three, one, is here impertinent, there being in them no doubling, no tripling, nor sextupling of Proportions, but of numbers. You may observe also that Euclide never distinguisheth between double and duplicate, as you do. One word serves him every where for either. Though I confess some curious Grammarians take for duplicate in number, and for double in Quantity; which will not serve your turn. Your Geometry is not your own, but you case your selves with Euclides; in which, as I have shewed you, there be some few great holes; and you by misunderstanding him, as in this place, have made them greater, Though the beasts that think your railing, -oaring, have for a time admired you; yet now that through these holes of your case, I have shewed them your ears, they will be less affrighted. But to exemplifie the composition of Proportions, take these numbers, thirty-two, eight, one, and then you shall see that the Proportion of thirty-two to one is the sum of the Proportions of thirty-two to eight, and of

eight to one. For the Proportion of thirty-two to eight is double the Proportion of thirty-two to sixteen. And the Proportion of eight to one, is triple the Proportion of thirty-two to sixteen, and the Proportion of thirty-two to one is Quintiple of thirty-two to sixteen. But double and triple added together maketh quintuple. What can be here denyed?

My Demonstration consisteth of three cases. The first is when both the Proportions are of defect, which is then, when the first Quantity is the least; as in these three Quantities, AB, AC, AD. The first case I demonstrated thus. Let it be supposed that the point A were moved uniformly through the whole line AD. The Proportions therefore of AB to AC, and of AC to AD, are determined by the difference of the Times in which they are described. And the Proportion also of AB to AD, is that which is determined by the difference of the Times, in which they are described; but the difference of the Times in which AB and AC are described, together with the difference of the Times, wherein AC and AD are described, is the same with the difference of the Times, wherein are described AB and AD. The same cause therefore which determines both the Proportions of AB to AC, and of AC to AD, determines also the Proportion of AB to AD. Wherefore by the Definition of the same Proportion, Article six, the Proportion of AB to AC, together with the Proportion of AC to AD is the same with the Proportion of AB to AD.

Consider now your argumentation against it. Let there be taken (say you) between A and B the Point a, and then in your own words, I argue thus. The difference of the Times wherein are described AB and AC, together with the difference of the Times, wherein are described AC and AD, is the same with the difference of the Times, in which are described aB and aC (namely BD, or BC † CD) wherefore the same cause which determines the two Proportions of AB to AC, and of AC to AD, determines also the Proportion of aB to aD. Let me ask you here whether you suppose the Motion from a to

B, or from a to D, to have the same switfness with the motion from A to B, or from A to D. If you do not, then you deny the supposition. If you do, then BC which is the difference of the Times AB and AC, cannot be the difference of the Times in which are described aB and aC, except AB and aB are equall. Let any man judge now whether there be any Paralogism in Orontius that can equall this. And whether all that follows in the rest of this, and the next two whole Pages, be not all a kind of raving upon the ignorance of what is the meaning of Proportion, which you also make more ill-favoured by writing it; not in language, but in Gamboles, I mean in the Symboles, which have made you call those demonstrations short, which put into words so many as a true demonstration requires, would be longer then any of those of Clavius upon the twelfth Element of Euclide.

To the sixteenth Article you bring no Argument, but fall into a loud Oncethmus (the special Figure wherewith you grace you Oratory) offended with my unexpected crossing of the Doctrine you teach, that Proportion consisteth it a Quotient. For that being denyed you, your comes to nothing, that is, to just as much as it is worth But are not you very simple men, to say that all Mathematicians speak so, when it is not speaking? When did you see any man but your selves publish his Demonstrations by signs not generally received, except it were not with intention to demonstrate, but to t — ch the use of Signes? Had Pappus no Analytiques? Or wanted he the wit to -…ten his reckoning by Signes? Or has he not proceeded Analytically in an hundred Problems (especially in his seventh Book) and never used Symboles? Symboles are poor unhandsome (though necessary) sc-ffolds of Demonstration; and ought no more to appear in publique, then the most d — rmed necessary business which you do in your Chambers. But why (say you) is this -…tion to the Proportion of the greater to the less? Ile tell you; because i-erating of the Proportion of the less to the greater, is a making of the Proportion less, and the defect greater. And it is absurd to say that the

taking of the same Quantity twice should make it less. And thence it is, that in Quantities, which begin with the less, as one, two, four, the Proportion of one to two, is greater then that of one to four, as is Demonstrated by Euclide Elem. 5. Pro. and by consequent the Proportion of one to four, is a Proportion of greater littleness then that of one to two. And who is there, that when he knoweth that the respective greatness of four to one, is double to that of the respective greatness of four to two, or of two to one, will not presently acknowledge that the respective greatness of one to two, or two to four is double to the respective greatness of one to four. But this was too deep for such men as take their opinions not from weighing, but from reading.

Lastly, you object against the Corollarie of Art. 28. (which you make absurd enough by rehearsing it thus) si quantitas aliqua divisa supponatur in partes aliquot aequales numero infinitas. &c. Do you think that of partes aliquot, or of partes aliquotae, it can be said without absurdity, that they are numero infinitae? And then you say I seem to mean, that if of the Quantity AB, there be supposed a part CB, infinitely little, and that between AC and AB be taken two means, one Arithmeticall AE, the other Geometricall AD, the difference between AD, and AE, will be infinitely little. My meaningis, and is sufficiently expressed, that the said means taken every where (not in one place onely) will be the same throughout. And you that say there needed not so much pains to prove it, and think you do it shorter, prove it not at all. For why may not I pretend against your demonstration, that BE the Arithmeticall difference, is greater then BD the Geometricall difference. You bring nothing to prove it, and if you suppose it, you suppose the thing you are to prove. Hitherto you have proceeded in such manner with your Elenchus, as that so many objections as you have made, so many false Propositions you have advanced. Which is a peculiar excellence of yours,

that for so great a stipend as you receive, you will give place to no man living for the number and grossness of errors you teach your Scholars.

At the fourteenth Chapter your first exception is to the second Article; where I define a plain in this manner. A plain Superficies is that which is described by a straight Line so moved, as that every Point thereof describe a severall straight L-…. In which you require, first, that instead of describe, I should have said can describe. Why do you not require of Euclide in the Definition of a Cone, instead of (Continetur) is contained, he say (contineri potest) can be contained? It I tell you how one Plain is generated, cannot you apply the same generation to any other Plain? But you object that the Plain of a Circle may be generated by the motion of the Radius, whose every point describeth not a straight but a crooked Line, wherein you are deceived; for you cannot draw a Circle (though you can draw the perimeter of a Circle) but in a Plain already generated. For the motion of a straight Line, whose one Point resting, describeth with the other Points severall perimeters of Circles, may as well describe a Conique Superficies, as a Plain. The Question therefore is, how you will in your Definition take in the Plain which must be generated before you begin to describe your Circle, and before you know what Point to make your Center. This objection therefore is to no purpose; and besides, that it reflecteth upon the perfect definitions of Euclide before the eleventh Element; it cannot make good his Definition (which is nothing worth) of a Plain Superficies, before his first Element.

In the next place you reprehend briefly this Corollarie, that two Plaines cannot inclose a Solid. I should indeed have added, with the base on whose extreams they insist. But this is not a fault to be ashamed of. For any man by his own understanding might have mended my expression without departing from my meaning. But from your Doctrine that a Superficies has no thickness, ’tis impossible to include a Solid, with any Number of Plains

whatsoever; unless you say that Solid is included which nothing at all includes.

At the third Article, where I say of crooked lines, some are every where crooked, and some have parts not crooked. You ask me what crooked Line has parts not crooked; and I answer, it is that Line which with a straight Line makes a rectilineall Triangle. But this you say cannot stand with what I said before, namely, that a straight and crooked line cannot be coincident; which is true, nor is there any contradiction; for that part of a crooked line which is straight, may with a straight line be coincident.

To the fourth Article, where I define the Center of a Circle to be that Point of the Radius, which in the description of the Circle is unmoved; You object as a contradiction, that I had before defined a Point to be the body which is moved in the description of a Line. Foolishly, As I have already shown at your objection to Cha. Art. 12.

But at the sixth Article, where I say that crooked, and incongruous Lines touch one another but in one Point, you make a cavill from this, that a Circle may touch a Parabola in two Points. Tell me truely, did you read and understand these words that followed, a crooked Line cannot be congruent with a straight line, because if it could, one and the same line should be both straight and crooked? If you did, you could not but understand the sense of my words to be this; when two crooked lines which are incongruous, or a crooked and a straight line touch one another, the contact is not in a Line, but only in one Point; and then your instance of a Circle and a Parabola, was a wilfull cavill, not befitting a Doctor. If you either read them not, or unstood them not, it is your own fault. In the rest that followeth upon this Article, with your Diagram, there is nothing against me, nor any thing of use, novelty, subtilty or learning.

At the seventh Article, where I define both an Angle, simply so called, and an Angle of Contingence, by their severall generations, namely, that the

former is generated when two straight Lines are coincident, and one of them is moved, and distracted from the other by circular motion upon one common Point resting, &c. You ask me to which of these kinds of Angle, I ref-r the Angle made by a straight Line when it cuts a crooked Line. I answer easily and truly, to that kind of Angle which is called simply an Angle. This you understand not. For how (will you say) can that Angle which is generated by the divergence of two straight Lines, be other then Rectilineall? O, how can that Angle which is not comprehended by two straight Lines, be other then Curvilineall? I see what it is that troubles you, namely, the same which made you say before, that if the Body which describes a Line be a Point, then there is nothing which is not moved that can be called a Point. So you say here, If an Angle be generated by the motion of a straight Line, then no Angle so generated can be Curvilineall. Which is as well argued, as if a man should say, the House was built by the carriage and motion of Stone and Timber, therefore when the carriage and that motion is ended, it is no more a house. Rectilineall and Curvilineall hath nothing to do with the nature of an Angle simply so called, though it be essentiall to an Angle of Contact. The measure of an Angle simply so called is a circumference of a Circle, and the measure is alwayes the same kind of Quantity with the thing measured. The Rectitude or Curvity of the Lines which drawn from the Center intercept the Arch, is accidentary to the Angle, which is the same, whether it be drawn by the motion circular of a streight line or of a crooked. The Diameter and the Circumference of a Circle make a right Angle, and the same which is made by the Diameter and the Tangent. And because the point of Contact is not (as you think) nothing, but a line unreckoned, and common both to the Tangent, and the Circumference, the same Angle computed in the Tangent is Rectilineall, but computed in the Circumference, not Rectilineall, but mixt; or, if two Circles cut one another, Curvilineall. For every Chord maketh the same Angle with

the Circumference which it maketh with the line that toucheth the Circumference at the end of the Chord. And therefore when I divide an Angle simply so called into Rectilineall, and Curvilineall, I respect no more the generation of it, then when I divide it into Right and Oblique. I then respect the generation, when I divide an Angle into an Angle simply so called, and an Angle of Contact. This that I have now said, if the Reader remember when he reads your objections to this, and to the nineth Article, he will need no more to make him see that you are utterly ignorant of the nature of an Angle, and that if ignorance be madness, not I, but you are mad; and when an Angle is comprehended between a straight and a crooked Line (if I may compute the same Angle as comprehended between the same straight Line and the Point of Contact) that it is consonant to my definition of a Point by a Magnitude not considered. But when you in your treatise de Angulo Contactûs Cha. Pag. 6. Lin. 8. have these words, Though the whole concurrent Lines incline to one another, yet they form no Angle any where but in the very point of concourse, You, that deny a Point to be any thing, tell me how two nothings can form an Angle; or if the Angle be not formed neither before the concurrent Lines meet, not in the Point of concourse, how can you apprehend that any Angle can possibly be framed. But I wonder not at this absurdity, because this whole treatise of yours is but one absurdity continued from the beginning to the end; as shall then appear when I come to answer your objections to that which I have briefly and fully said of that Subject in my 14. Chapter.

At the twelfth Article I confess your exception to my universall definition of Parallels to be just, though insolently set down. For it is no fault of ignorance (though it also infect the demonstration next it) but of too much security. The Definition is this: Parallels are those Lines or Superficies, upon which two straight Lines falling, and wheresoever they fall, making equall Angles with them both, are equall; which is not, as it

stands, universally true. But inserting these words the same way, and making it stand thus, Parallel Lines or Superficies are those, upon which two straight Lines falling the same way, and wheresoever they fall, making equall Angles, are equall, it is both true and universall; and the following Consectary with very little change, as you may see in the translation, perspicuously demonstrated. The same fault occurreth once or twice more; and you triumph unreasonably, as if you had given therein a very great proof of your Geometry.

The same was observed also upon this place by one of the prime Geometricians of Paris, and noted in a Letter to his friend in these words, Cha. Art. 12. the Definition of Parallels wanteth somewhat to be supplyed. And of the Consectary, he says, it concludeth not, because it is grounded on the Definition of Parallels. Truely, and severely enough, though without any such words as savour of Arrogance, or of Malice, or of the Clown.

At the thirteenth Article you recite the Demonstration by which I prove the Perimeters of two Circles to be Proportionall to their Semidiameters; and with Esto, fortasse, recte, omnino, noddying to the severall parts thereof, you come at Length to my last inference; Therefore by (Cha. Art. 6.) the Perimeters and Semidiameters of Circles are Proportionall; which you deny; and therefore deny, because you say it followeth by the same Ratiocination, that Circles also and Spheres are Proportionall to their Semidiameters. For the same distance (you say) of the Perimeter from the Center which determines the magnitude of the Semidiameter, determines also the magnitude both of the Circle, and of the Sphere. You acknowledge that Perimeters and Semidiameters have the cause of their determination such as in equal times make equall spaces. Suppose now a Sphere generated by the Semidiameters, whilst the Semicircle is turned about. There is but one Radius of an infinite number of Radii, which describes a great Circle, all the rest describe lesser Circles Parallel to it, in one and the same time of

Revolution. Would you have men believe, that describing greater and lesser Circles, is according to the supposition (temporibus aequalibus aequalia facere) to make equall spaces in equall times? Or when by the turning about of the Semidiameter is described the Plain of a Circle does it (think you) in equall times make the Plains of the interior Circles equall to the plains of the exterior? Or is the Radius that describes the inner Circles equall to the Radius that describes the exterior? It does not therefore follow from any thing I have said in this demonstration, that either Spheres, or Plains of Circles, are Proportionall to their Radii. And consequently all that you have said, triumphing in your own Incapacity, is said imprudently by your selves to your own disgrace. They that have applauded you, have reason by this time to doubt of all the rest that follows, and if they can, to dissemble the opinion they had before of your Geometry. But they shall see before I have done, that not only your whole Elenchus, but also your other Books of the Angle of Contact, &c. are meer ignorance and gibberish.

To the fourteenth Article you object, that (in the sixth figure) I assume gratis, that FG, DE, BC, are Proportionall to AF, AD, AB; and you referre it to be judged by the Reader. And to the Reader I referre it also. The not exact drawing of the Figure (which is now amended) is it that deceived you. For AF, FD, DB, are equall by construction. Also AG, GE, EC, are equall by construction. And FG, DK, BH, KE, HI, IC, are equall by Parallelism. And because AF, FG, are as the velocities wherewith they are described; also 2 AF (that is AD) and 2 FG (that is DE) are as the same velocities. And finally 3 AF (that is AB) and 3 FG (that is BC) are as the same velocities. It is not therefore assumed gratis, that FG, DE, BC, are Proportionall to AF, AD, AB, but grounded upon the sixth Article of the thirteenth Chapter; and consequently your objection is nothing worth. You might better have excepted to the placing of DE, first at adventure, and then making AD, two thirds of AB; for that was a fault, though not great enough to trouble a

Candid Reader; yet great enough, to be a ground, to a malicious Reader, of a Cavill.

That which you object to the third Corollarie of Art. 15. was certainly a dream. There is no a-…ing of an Angle CDE, for an Angle HDE, or BDE, neither in the Demonstration, nor in any of the Corollaries. It may be you dream't of somewhat in the twentieth Article of Cha. But because that Article though once printed, was afterwards left out, as not serving to the use I had designed it for, I cannot guess what it is. For I have no Copy of that Article, neither printed nor written, but am very sure, though it were not usefull, it was true.

Article the sixteenth. Here we come to the Controversie concerning the Angle of Contact, which (you say) you have handled, in a speciall Treatise published; and that you have clearly demonstrated in your publick Lectures, that Peletarius was in the right. But that I agree not sufficiently neither with Peletarius, nor with Clavius. I confess I agree not in all points with Peletarius, nor in all points with Clavius. It does not thence follow that I agree not with the Truth. I am not (as you) of any faction, neither in Geometry, nor in Politicks. If I think that you, or Peletarius, or Clavius, or Euclide have e-red, or been too obscure; I see no cause, for which I ought to dissemble it. And in this same Question, I am of opinion that Peletarius did not well in denying the Angle of Contingence to be an Angle. And that Clavius did not well to say the Angle of a Semicircle was less then a Right-lined Right Angle. And that Euclide did not well to leave it so obscure what he meant by Inclination in the Definition of a Plain Angle, seeing else where he attributeth Inclination onely to Acute Angles, and scarce any man ever acknowledged Inclination in a straight Line, to any other Line, to which it was perpendicular. But you in this Question of what is Inclination, though you pretend not to depart from Euclide, are nevertheless more obscure then he; and also are contrary to him. For Euclide by Inclination

meaneth the Inclination of one Line to another; and you understand it of the Inclination of one Line from another, which is not Inclination, but Declination. For you make two straight. Lines when they lye one on another, to lye that is without any Inclination (because it serves your turn); not observing that it followeth thence that Inclination is a digression of one Line from another. This is in your first Argument in the behalf of Peletarius (Pag. 10. Lin. 22.) and destroyshis opinion. For according to Euclide the greatest Angle is the greatest Inclination, and an Angle equall to two Right Angles by this should not be the greatest Inclination, as it is, but the least that can be. But if by the Inclination of two Lines we understand that proceeding of them to a common Point which is caused by their generation, which (I believ-) was Euclides meaning; then will the Angle of Contact be no less an Angle then a rectilineall Angle, but onely (as Clavius truly saies it is) Heterogeneous to it; and the doctrine of Clavius more conformable to Euclide then that of Peletarius. Besides, if it be granted you, that there is no inclination of the Circumference to the Tangent, yet it does not follow that their concourse doth not form some kind of Angle. For Euclide defineth there but one of the kinds of a Plain Angle. And then you may as much in vain seek for the Proportion of such an Angle to the Angle of Contact, as seek for the Focus, or Parameter of the Parabola of Dives and Lazarus. Your first argument therefore is nothing worth, except you make good that which in your second Argument you affirm, namely, That all Plain Angles, not excepting the Angle of Contact, are (Homogeneous) of the same kind. You prove it well enough of other Curvilineall Angles; but when you should prove the same of an Angle of Contact, you have nothing to say but Pag. 17. Lin. 15. Unde autem illa quam somniet Heterogenia oriatur, neque potest ille ullatenus ostendere, neque ego vel somniare; whence should arise that diversity of kind, which he dreams of, neither can be at all shew, nor I dream; as if you knew what he could do if he were to answer you; or all

were false which you cannot dream of. So that besides your customary vanity, here is nothing hitherto proved neither for the opinion of Peletarius, nor against that of Clavius. I have I think sufficiently explicated in the first Lesson, That the Angle of Contact is Quantity, namely, that it is the Quantity of that crookedness or flexion, by which a straight Line is bent into an Arch of a Circle equall to it; and that because the crookedness of one Arch may be greater then the crookedness of another Arch of another Circle equall to it, therefore the Question Quanta est curvitas, How much is the crookedness, is pertinent, and to be answered by Quantity. And I have also shewn you in the same Lesson, that the Quantity of one Angle of Contact is compared with that of another Angle of Contact, by a Line drawn from the Point of Contact, and intercepted by their Circumferences; and that it cannot be compared by any measure with a Rectilineall Angle.

But let us see how you answer to that which Clavius has objected already. They are Heterogeneous, sayes he, because the Angle of Contact, how oft soever multiplyed, can never exceed a Rectilineall Angle. To answer which you alleadge, it is no Angle at all; and that therefore it is no Angle at all because the Lines have no Inclination one to another. How can Lines that have no Inclination one to another, ever come together? But you answer, at least they have no Inclination in the Point of Contact. And why have two straight Lines Inclination before they come to touch, more then a straight Line and an Arch of a Circle? And in the Point of Contact it self, how can it be that there is less Inclination of the two Points of a straight Line and an Arch of a Circle, then of the Points of two straight Lines? But the straight Lines you say will cut; Which is nothing to the Question; and yet this also is not so evident, but that it may receive an objection. Suppose two Circles AGB and CFB to touch in B, and have a common Tangent through B. Is not the Line CFBGA a crooked Line? And is it not cut by the common Tangent DBE? What is the Quantity of the two Angles FBE and

GBD, seeing you say neither DBG nor EBF is an Angle? 'Tis not therefore the cutting of a crooked Line, and the touching of it, that distinguisheth an Angle simply, from an Angle of Contact. That which makes them differ, and in kind, is, that the one is the Quantity of a Revolution, and the other the Quantity of Flexion.

In the seventh Chapter of the same Treatise, you think you prove the Angle of Contact, if it be an Angle, and a Rectilineall Angle to be (Homogeneous) of the same kind; when you prove nothing but that you understand not what you say. Those Quantities which can be added together, or substracted one from another, are of the same kind; But an Angle of Contact may be substracted from a right Angle, and the Remainder will be the Angle of a Semicircle, &c. So you say, but prove it not, unless you think a man must grant you that the Superficies contained between the Tangent and the Arch, which is it you substract, is the Angle of Contact; and that the Plain of the Semicircle is the Angle of the Semicircle, which is absurd; though as absurd as it is, you say it directly in your Elenchus, Pag. 35. Lin. 14. in these words, When Euclide defines a Plain Angle to be the Inclination of two Lines, he meaneth not their aggregate, but that which lyes between them. It is true, he meaneth not the aggregate of the two Lines; but that he means that which lyes between them, which is nothing else but an indeterminate Superficies, is false, or Euclide was as foolish a Geometrician as either of you two.

Again, you would prove the Angle of Contact, if it be an Angle, to be of the same kind with a Rectilineall Angle, out of Eucl. 3. 16. Where he saies, it is less then any acute Angle. And it follows well, that if it be an Angle, and less then any Rectilineall Angle; it is also of the same kind with it. But to my understanding Euclide meant no more, but that it was neither greater nor equall; which is as truly said of Heterogeneous, as of Homogeneous Quantities. If he meant otherwise, he confirms the opinion of Clavius

against you, or makes the Quantity of an Angle to be a Superficies, and indefinite. But I wonder how you dare venter to determine whether two Quantities be Homogeneous or not, without some Definition of Homogeneous (which is a hard word) that men may understand what it meaneth.

In your eighth Chapter you have nothing but Sir H. Saviles Authority, who had not then resolved what to hold; but esteeming the Angle of contact, first, as others falsely did, by the Superficies that lyes between the Tangent and the Arch, makes the Angle of Contact, and a Rectilineall Angle Homogeneous; and afterwards, because no multiplication of the Angle of Contact can make it equall to the least Rectilineall Angle, with great ingenuity returneth to his former uncertainty.

In your nineth and tenth Chapters you prove with much ado, that the Angles of like Segments are equall; as if that might not have been taken gratis by Peletarius without Demonstration. And yet your Argument contained in the nineth Chapter is not a Demonstration, but a conjecturall discourse upon the word Similitude. And in the eleventh Chapter, wherein you answer to an objection, which might be made to your Argument in the precedent Page, taken from the Parallelism of two concentrique Circles, though the objection be of no moment, yet you have in the same Treatise of yours that which is much more foolish, which is this, Pag. 38. Lin. 12. Non enim magnitu o Anguli, &c. The magnitude of an Angle is not to be estimated by that stradling of the legs, which it hath without the Point of concourse, but by that stradling which it hath in the Point of the concourse it self. I pray you tell me what stradling there is of two coincident Points, especially such Points as you say are nothing. When did you ever see two nothings straddle?

The Arguments in your twelfth and thirteenth Chapters are grounded all on this untruth, that an Angle is that which is contained between the Lines

that make it, that is to say, is a Plain Superficies. Which is manifestly false; because the measure of an Angle is an Arch of a Circle, that is to say, a Line; which is no measure of a Superficies. Besides this gross igno-ance, your way of Demonstration by putting N for a great Number of sides of an aequilaterall Polygon, is not to be admitted. For though you understand something by it, you demonstrate nothing to any Body, but those who understand your Symbolique tongue, which is a very narrow Language. If you had demonstrated it in Irish, or Welsh, though I had not read it, ye- I should not have blamed you, because you had written to a considerable Number of mankind, which now you do not.

In your l-st Chapters you defend Vitellio without need; for there is no doubt but that whatsoever crooked Line be touched by a straight Line, the Angle of Contingence will neither add any thing to, nor take any thing from a Rectilineall Right Angle; but that it is because the Angle of Contact is no Angle, or no Quantity, is not true. For it is therefore an Angle, because an Angle of Contact; and therefore Quantity, because one Angle of Contact may be greater then another; and therefore Heterogeneall, because the measure of an Angle of Contact cannot (congruere) be applyed to the measure of a Rectilineall Angle, as they think it may, who affirm with you that the Nature of an Angle consisteth in that which is contained between the Lines that comprehend it, viz. in a plain Superficies. And thus you see in how few Lines, and without B-achygraphie, your Treatise of the Angle of Contingence is discovered for the greatest part to be false, and for the rest, nothing but a detection of some errors of Clavivs grounded on the same false Principles with your own. To return now from your Treatise of the Angle of Contact back again to your Elenchus.

The fault you find at Art. 18. is, that I understand not that Euclide makes a Plain Angle to be that which is contained between the two Lines that form it. ’Tis true, that I do not understand that Euclide was so absurd, as to think

the nature of an Angle to consist in Superficies; but I understand that you have not had the wit to understand Euclide.

The nineteenth Article of mine in this fourteenth Chapter is this; All respect, or variety of Position of two Lines, seemeth to be comprehended in four kinds. For they are either Parallel; or, (being if need be produced) make an Angle; or, (if drawn out faire enough) Touch; or lastly, they are Asymptotes. In which you are first offended with the word It seems. But I allow you that never erre, to be more peremptory then I am. For to me it seemed, I say again seemed, that such a Phrase, in case I should leave out something in the enumeration of the severall kinds of Position, would save me from being censured for untruth. And yet your instance of two straight Lines in divers Plains, does not make my enumeration insufficient. For those Lines though not Parallels, nor cutting both the Plaines, yet being moved Parallelly from one Plain to another, will fall into one or other of the kinds of position by me enumerated; and consequently are as much that position, as two straight Lines in the same Plain not parallel, make the same Angle, though not produced till they meet, which they would make if they were so produced. For you have no where proved, nor can prove, that two such Lines do not make an Angle. It is not the actuall concurrence of the Lines, but the Arch of a Circle, drawn upon that point for Center, in which they would meet, if they were produced, and intercepted between them, that constitutes the Angle.

Also your objection con-ernin- Asymptotes in generall, is absurd. You would have me add, that their distance shall at last be then any distance that can be assigned; and so make the definition of the Genus the same with that of the Species. But because you are not Professors of Logick, it is not necessary for me to follow your councell. In like manner, if we understand one Line to be moved towards another alwayes parallely to its self, which

is, though not actually, yet potentially the same position, all the rest of your instances will come to nothing.

At the two and twentieth Article you object to me the use of the word Figure, before I had defined it: wherein also you do absurdly; for I have no where before made such use of the word Figure, as to argue any thing from it; and therefore your objection is just as wise as if you had round fault with putting the word Figure in the Titles of the Chapters placed before the Book. If you had known the nature of Demonstration, you had not objected this.

You add further, that by my Definition of Figure, a solid Sphere, and a Sphere made hollow within, is the same Figure; but you say not why, nor can you — iver any such thing from my definition. That which deceived your shallowness, is, that you take those Points that are in the concave Superficies of a hollowed Sphere, not to be contiguous to any thing without it, because that whole con-ave Superficies is within the whole Sphere. Lastly, for the fault you find, with the definition of like Figures in like positions; I confess there wants the same word which was wanting in the Definition of Paralle-s, namely, ad easdem partes (the same way) which should have been added in the end of the definition of like Figures, &c. and may easily be supplyed by any student of Geometry, that is not otherwise a fool.

At the fifteenth Chapter Art. 1. Numb. 6. you object as a contradiction, that I make Motion to be the measure of Time, and yet in other places do usually measure Motion and the affections thereof by Time. If your thoughts were your own, and not taken rashly out of Books, you could not but (with all men else that see Time measured by Clocks, Dyals, Hour-glasses, and the like) have conceived sufficiently, that there cannot be of Time any other measure besides Motion; and that the most universall measure of Motion, is a Line described by some other Motion. Which Line

being once exposed to sense, and the motion whereby it was described sufficiently explicated, will serve to measure all other Motions and their Time; for Time and Motion (Time being but the mentall Image or remembrance of the motion) have but one and the same dimension, which is a Line. But you that would have me measure swiftness and slowness by longer and shorter motion, what do you mean by longer and shorter motion? Is longer and shorter, in the motion, or in the Duration of the motion, which is Time? Or is the Motion, or the Duration of the motion that which is exposed, or designed by a Line? Geometricians say often, let the Line A B, be the Time; but never say, let the Line A B be the Motion. There is no unlearned man that understandeth not what is Time, and Motion, and Measure; and yet you that undertake to teach it (most egregious Professors) understand it not.

At the second Article you bring another Argument (which it seems in its proper place, you had forgotten) to prove that a Point is not Quantity not considered, but absolutely Nothing; which is this, That if a Point be not nothing, then the whole is greater then its two halfs. How does that follow? Is it impossible when a Line is divided into two halfs that the middle Point should be divided into two halfs also, being Quantity?

At the seventh Article, I have sufficiently demonstrated, that all Motion is infinitely propagated, as far as space is filled with Body. You alleadge no fault in the demonstration, but object from sense, that the skipping of a Flea, is not propagated to the Indies. If I ask you how you know it, you may wonder perhaps; but answer you cannot. Are you Philosophers or Geometricians, or Logicians, more then are the simplest of rurall people? Or are you not rather less, by as much as he that standeth still in ignorance, is nearer to knowledge, then he that runneth from it by erroneous learning?

And lastly, what an absurd objection is it which you make to the eighth Article, where I say that when two Bodies of equall magnitude fall upon a

third Body, that which falls with greater velocity, imprints the greater motion? You object, that not so much the magnitude is to be considered as the weight; as if the weight made no difference in the velocity, when notwithstanding weight is nothing else but motion downward? Tell me, when a weighty body thrown upwards worketh on the Body it meeteth with, do you not then think it worketh the more for the greatness, and the less for the weight?

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON IIII.

OF TWENTY ARTICLES which you say (of nineteen which I say) make the six teenth Chapter; you except but three, and confidently affirm the rest are false. On the contrary, except three or four faults, such as any Geometrician may see proceed not from ignonorance of the Subject, or from want of the Art of Demonstration, (and such as any man might have mended of himself) but from security; I affirm that they are all true, and truly Demonstrated; and that all your objections proceed from meer ignorance of the Mathematiques.

The first fault you find is this, that I express not, (Art. 1.) what Impetus it is, which I would have to be multiplyed into the Time.

The last Article of my thirteenth Chapter was this, If there be a Number of Quantities propounded, howsoever equall or unequall to one another; and there be another Quantity which so often taken as there be Quantities propounded, is equall to their whole sum; that Quantity I call the mean Arithmeticall of them all. Which Definition I did there insert to serve me in the explication of those Propositions of which the sixteenth Chapter consisteth, but did not use it here as I intended. My first Proposition therefore as it standeth yet in the Latine, being this, The velocity of any Body moved during any Time, is so much as is the product of the Impetus in one Point of Time, multiplyed into the whole Time; to a man that hath not skill enough to supply what is wanting, is not intelligible. Therefore I

have caused it in the English to go thus, The velocity of any Body in whatsoever Time moved, hath its Quantity determined by the sum of all the severall (Impetus) Quicknesses, which it hath in the severall Points of the Time of the Bodies motion, A-d ad-ed, that all the Impetus together taken through the whole Time is the same thing with the Mean Impetus (which Mean is defined Chapter 13. Art. 29.) multiplyed into the whole Time. To this first Article, as it is uncorrected in the Latine, you object, That meaning by Impetus some middle Impetus, and assigning none, I determine nothing. And ’tis true. But if you had been Geometricians -…ficient to be Professors, you would have shewed your skill much better, by making it appear that this middle Impetus could be none but that, which being taken so often, as there b- Points in the Line of Time, would be equall to the sum of all the severall Impetus taken in the Points of Time respectively; which you could not do.

To the Corollary, you ask first how Impetus can be ordinately applyed to a Line; Absurdly. For does not Ar-himedes sometimes say, and with him many other excellent Geometricians, let such a Line be the Time? And do they not mean, that that Line, or the motion over it, is the measure of the Time? And may not also a Line serve to measure the swiftness of a Motion? You thought (you say) onely Lines ought to be said to be ordinately applyed to Lines. Which I easily believe; for I see you understand not that a Line, though it be not the Time it self, may be the quantity of a Time. You thought also all you have, said in your Elenchus, in your Doctrine of the Angle of Contact, in your Arithmetica Infinitorum, and in your Coniques is true; and yet it is almost all proved false, and the rest nothing worth.

Secondly, you object, that I design a Parallelogram by one onely side. It was indeed a great oversight, and argueth somewhat against the man, but nothing against his Art. For he is not worthy to be thought a Geometrician that cannot supply such a fault as that, and correct his Book himself.

Though you could not do it, yet another from beyond Sea took notice of the same fault in this manuer, He maketh a Parallelogram of but one side; it should be thus, Ve- denique per Parallelogr-… latus est medium proportionale int-r Impetum maximum (five ultimò acquisitum) & impetûs ejusdem maximi semissem; alterum vero latus, medium proportionale, inter totum tempus, & ejus-'em totius temporis semissem. Which I therefore repeat, that you may learn good manners; and know, that they who reprehend, ought also, when they can, to add to their reprehension the correction.

At the second Article, you are pleased to advise me, instead of In omni motu uniformi, to put in In omnibus motibus uniformibus. You have a strange opinion of your own Judgement, to think you know to what end another man useth any word, better then himself. My intention was onely to consider motions uniform, and motions from rest uniformly, or regularly accelerated, that I might thereby compute the lengths of crooked Lines, such as are described by any of those motions. And therefore it was enough to prove this Theoreme to be true in all uniform or uniformly accelerated Motion, not Motions; though it be true also in the Plurall. It seems you think a man must write all he knows, whether it conduce, or not, to his intended purpose. But that you may know that I was not, (as you think) ignorant how far it might be extended, you may read it Demonstrated at the same Article in the English universally. Against the demonstration it self you run to another Article, namely, the thirteenth, which is this Probleme, The length being given, which is passed over in a given Time by uniform Motion, to findet e length which shall be passed over by Motion uniformely accelerated in the same Time, so as that the Impetus last acquired be equall to the Time. Which you recite imperfectly, thereby to make it seem that such a Length is not determined. Whether you did this out of ignorance, or on purpose, thinking it a piece of wit, as your pretended mysterie which

goes immediately before, I cannot tell, fo- in neither place can any wit be espied by any but your selves. To imagine Motions with their Times and Wayes, is a new business, and requires a steddy brain, and a man that can constantly read his own thoughts, without being diverted by the noise of words. The want of this ability, made you stumble and fall unhandsomely in the very first place, (that is in Cha. Art. 13.) where you venture to reckon both Motion and Time at once; and hath made you in this Chapter to stumble in the like manner at every step you go. As for example, when I say, as the product of the Time, and Impetus, to the product of the Time and Impetus, so the Space to the Space when the Motion is Vniform, you come in with nay, rather as the Time to the Time; as if the Parallelograms AI, and AH, were not also as the Times AB, and AF. Thus it is, when men venture upon ways they never had been in before, without a guide.

In the Corollary, you are offended with the permutation of the P-…ortion of Times and Lines, because you think, you that have scarce one right thought of the Principles of Geometry, that Line, and Time are Heterogeneous Quantities. I know Time and Line are of divers natures; and more, that neither of them is Quantity. Yet they may be both of them Quanta, that is, they may have Quantity; but that their Quantities are Heterogeneous is false. For they are compared and measured both of them by straight lines. And to this there is nothing contrary in the place cited by you out of Clavius; or if there were, ‘twere not to be valued. And to your question what is the Proportion of an Hour to an Ell; I answer, it is the same Proportion that two Hours have to two Ells. You see your Question is not so subtile as you thought it By and by you confess that in Times and Lines there is Quid Homogeneum (-…s Quid is an infallible sign of not fully understanding what you say) which is false it you -ake it of the Lines themselves; though if you take it of their Quantities, it is true without a Quid. Lastly, you tell me how I might have expressed my selfso as it might

have been true. But because your expressions please me not, I have not followed your advice.

To the third Article, which is this, In motu uniformiter à quiete accelerato, &c. In motion uniformly acceleratrd from Rest, that is, when the Impetus increaseth in Proportion to the Times, The Length run over in one Time is to the Length run over in another Time, as the Product of the Impetus multiplyed by the Time, to the Product of the Impetus multiplyed by the Time; you object, that the Lengths run over, are in that Proportion which the Impetus hath, to the Impetus; not that which the Impetus hath to the Time, because Impetus to Time has no Proportion, as being Heterogeneous. First, when you say the Impetus, do you mean some one Impetus designed by some one of the unequall straight Lines Parallel to the Base B-? That is manifestly false. You mean the aggregate of all those unequall Parallels. But that is the same thing with the Time multiplyed into the mean Impetus. And so you say the same that I do. Agai-, I ask where it is that I say or dream that the Lengths run over are in the Proportion of the Impetus to the Times? Is it you or I that dream? And for your Heterogeneity of the Quantities of Time and of Swiftness, I have already in divers places shewed you your error. Again, Why do you make BI represent the Lengths run over, which I make to be represented by DE, a Line taken at pleasure; and you also a few Lines before make the same BI to design the greatest acquired Impetus? These are things which shew that you are puzzled and intangled with the unusuall speculation of Time and Motion, and yet are thrust on with Pride and Spi-e to adventure upon the examination of this Chapter.

Secondly, you grant the Demonstration to be good, supposing I meane it (as I seeme to speak) of one and the same Motion. But why doe I not meane it of one and the same Motion, when I say not in Motions, but in Motion uniform? Because (say you) in that which follows, I draw it also to different

Motions. You should have given at least one Instance of it; but there is no such matter. And yet the Proposition, is in that case also true; though then it must not be Demonstrated by the similitude of Triangles, as in the case present. And therefore the objections you make from different Impetus acquired in the same time, and from other cases which you mention, are nothing worth.

At the fourth Article, you allow the Demonstration all the way (except the faults of the third, which I have already proved to be none) till I come to say, that because the Proportion of FK to BI is double to the Proportion of AF to AB, therefore the Proportion of AB to AF is double to the Proportion of BI to FK. This you deny, and wonder at, as strange (for it is indeed strange to you) and in many places you exclaim against it as extream Ignorance in Geometry. In this place you onely say, No such matter; for though one Proportion be double to another, yet it does not follow that th- Converse is the double of the Converse. So that this is the issue to which the Question is reduced, whether you have any or no Geometry. I say, if there he three Quantities in continuall Proportion, and the first be the least, the Proportion of the first to the second is double to the Proportion of the first to the third; and you deny it. The reason of our dissent consisteth in this, that you think the doubling o- a Proportion to be the doubling of the Quantity of the Proportion, as well in Proportions of Defect, -s in Proportions of Excess; and I think that the doubling of a Proportion of Defect, is the doubling of the defect of the Quantity of the same. As for example in these three numb-…s, 1, 2, 4, which are in continuall Proportion, I say the Quantity of the Proportion o- one to two, is double the Quantity of the Proportion of one to four. And the Quantity of the Proportion of one to four, is half the Quantity of the Proportion of one to two. And yet deny not but that the Quantity of the Defect in the Proportion of one to two is doubled in the Proportion of one to four. But because the

doubling of defect makes greate- defect, it maketh the Quantity of the Proportion less. And as for the part which I hold in this Question, first, there is thus much demonstrated by Euclide, E-. 5. Pro; that the Proportion of one to two is greater then the Proportion of one to four, though how much it is greater be not there Demonstrated. Secondly, I have Demonstrated (Cha. A-t. 16.) That it is twice as great, that is to say, (to a man that speaks English) double. The introducing of duplicate, triplicate, &c. instead of double, triple, &c. (thoug- now they be words well understood by such as understand what Proportion is) proceeded at first from such as durst not for fear of absurdity, call the half of any thing double to the whole, though it be manifest that the half of any defect is a double Quantity to the whole defect; -or want added to want maketh greater want, that is, a less positive Quantity. This difference between double, and duplicate, lighting upon weak understandings, h-s put men out of the way of true reasoning in very many Questions of Geometry. Euclide never used but one word both for double and duplicate. It is the same fault when men call half a Quantity Subduplicate, and a third pa-t Subtriplicate of the whole, with intention (as in this case) to make them pass for words of signification different from the half and the third part. Besides, from my Definition of Proportion (which is clear, and easie to be understood by all men, but such as have read the Geometry of others unluckily) I can Demonstrate the same evidently and briefly thus. My Definition is this, Proportion is the Quantity of one Mag-itude taken comparatively to another. Let there be therefore three Quantities, 1, 2, 4, in continuall Proportion. Seeing therefore the Quantitity of four in respect of one, is twice as great as the Quantity of the same four in respect of 2, it followeth manifestly that the Quantity of 1 in respect of 4, is twice as little as the Quantity of the same 1 in respect of 2; and consequently the Quantity of one in respect of two, is twice as great as the Quantity of the same one in respect of four; which is the thing I maintain in

this Question Would not a man that imployes his time at Bowles, choose rather to have the advantage given him of three in nine, then of one in nine? And why, but that three is a greater Quantity in respect of nine, then is one? Which is as much as to say, three to nine hath a greater Proportion then one to nine; as is Demonstrated by Euclide, El. 5. . Is it not therefore (you that profess Mathematiques, and Theology, and practise the depression of the truth in both) well ow-'d of you, to teach the contrary? But where you say that the Point K (in the second Figure of the Table belonging to this 16. Chapter) is not in the Parabolicall Line whose Diameter is AB, and Base BI, but in the Parabolicall Line of the Complement of my Semiparabola (as I may learn from the twenty-third Proposition of your Arithmetica Infinitorum) whose Diameter is AC, and Base IC. What Line is that? Is it the same Line with that of my Semiparabola, or not the same? If the same, why find you fault? If not the same, you ought to have made a Semiparabola on the Diameter AC, and Base IC, and following my Const-uction made it appear that K is not in the Line wherein I say it is; which you have not done, nor could do.

Then again, running on in the same blindness of Passion, you pretend I make the Proportion of BI to FK double to that of AB to AF, and then confute it; when you knew I made the Proportion of FK to BI, double to that of FN, to BI, that is, of AF to AB; and this was it you should have confuted. That which followeth is but a Triumphing in your own Ignorance, wherein you also say, That all that I afterwards build upon this Doctrine is false. You see whether it be like to prove so or not. As for your Arithmetica Infinitorum, I shall then read to you a piece of a Lesson on it when I come to your objections against the next Chapter. In the mean Time let me tell you, it is not likely you should be great Geometricians, that know not what is Quantity, nor Measure, nor Straight, nor Angle, nor Homogeneous, nor

Heterogeneous, nor Proportion, as I have already made appear in this and the former Lessons.

To the first Corollary of this fourth Article your exception I confess is just, and (which I wonder at) without any incivility. But this argues not Ignorance, but Security. For who is there that ever read any thing in the Coniques, that knows not that the parts of a Parabola cut off by Lines Parallel to the Base, are in Triplicate Proportion to their Bases? But having hitherto designed the Time by the Diameter, and the Impetus by the Bas-; and in the next Chapter (where I was to calculate the Proportion of the Parabola, to the Parallelogram) intending to design the Time by the Base, I mistook and put the Diameter again for the Time; which any man but you might as easily have corrected as reprehended.

To the second Corollarie, which is this, That the Lengths run over in equall Times by Motion so accelerated, as that the Imperus increase in double Proportion to their Times, are as the differences of the Cubick numbers beginning at unity, that is, as seven, nineteen, thirty-seven, &c. You say 'tis false. But why? Because (say you) portions of the Parabola of equall altitude taken from the beginning are not as those numbers seven, nineteen, thirty-seven, &c. Does this think you, contradict any thing in this Proposition of mine? Yes, because (you think) the lengths gone over in equall Times, are the same with the parts of the Diameter cut off from the Vertex, and proportionall to the numbers one, two, three, &c. Whereas the lengths run over, are as the aggregates of their velocities, that is, as the parts of the Parabola itself, that is, as the Cubes of their Bases, that is, as the numbers one, eight, twenty-seven, sixty-four, &c. and consequently the lengths run over in equall Times, are as the differences of those Cubick Numbers one, eight, twenty-seven, sixty-four, whose differences are seven, nineteen, thirty-seven, &c. The cause of your mistake was, that you cannot

yet, nor perhaps ever will contempla-e Time and Motion (which requi-eth a steddy b-ain) without confusion.

The third Corollary, you also say is false, Whether it be meant of Motion uniformly accelerated (as the words are) or (as perhaps, you say, I meant it) of such Motion as is accelerated in double Proportion to the Tim-. You need not say perhaps I meant it. The words of the Proposition are enough to make t-e meaning of the Corollary understood. But so also you say it is false. Me thinks you should have offered some little proof to make it seem so. You think your Authority will carry it. But on the contrary I believe rather that they that shall see how your other objections hitherto have sped, will the rather think it true, because you think it false. The Demonstration as it is, is evident enough; and therefore I saw no cause to change a word of it.

To the fifth Article you object nothing, but that it dependeth on this Proposition (Cha. Art. 16.) T-at when thr-e Quantities are in continuall Proportion, and the first is the least, as in these numbers, four, six, nine. The Proportion of the first to the second is double to the Proportion of the same first to the last. Which is there demonstrated, and in the former Lessons so amply explicated, as no man can make any further doubt of the truth of it. And you will, I doubt not as-ent unto it. But in what estate of mind will you be then? A man of a tender forehead after so much insolence, and so much contumelious language grounded upon arrogance and ignorance, would hardly indure to out-live it. In this vanity o- yours, you ask me whether I be angry, or blush, or can endure to hear you. I have some reason to be angry; for what man can be so patient as not to be moved with so many injuries? And I have some reason to blush, considering the opinion men will have beyond Sea, (when they shall see this in Latine) of the Geometry taught in Oxford. But to read the worst you can say against me, I can indure, as easily at least, as to read any thing you have written in your Treatises of the Angle of Co-tact, of the Conique-sections, or your Arithmetica Infinitorum.

The sixth, seventh, eighth Articles, you say are sound. True. But never the more to be thought so for your app-obation, but the less; because you are not fit, neither to reprehend, nor praise; and because all that you have hither to condemned as fals-, hath been proved true. Then you shew me how you could demonstrate the sixth and seventh Articles a shorter way. But though there be your Symboles, yet no man is obliged to take them for demonstration. And though they be granted to be dumb Demoostrations, yet when they are taught to speak as they -ught to do, they will be longer Demonstrations then these of mine.

To the nineth Article, which is this, If a Body be moved by two Movents at once, concurring in what Angle so-ver, of which, one is moved uniformly, the other, with Motion uniformly accelerated from Rest, till it acquire an Impetus equall to that of the uniform motion, the line in which the Body is carried, shall be the crooked line of a Semiparabola. You lift up your voice again, and ask what Latitude? what Diameter? what Inclination of the Diameter to the Ordinate Lines? If your Founder should see this, or the like objections of yours, he would think his money ill bestowed. When I say in what Angle soever, you ask, in what Angle? When I say two Movents, one unif-rm, the other uniformly accelerated, make the Body describe a Semiparabolicall line; you ask, which is the Diameter; as not knowing that the accelerated motion describes the Diameter, and the other a Parallel to the Base. And when I say the two Movents meet in a Point, form which Point both the Motions begin, and one of them from Rest, you ask me, what is the Altitude? As if that Point where the Motion begins from Rest were not the Vertex; or that the Vertex and Base being given, you had not wit enough to see that the Altitude of the Parabola is determined? When Galileo's Proposition, which is he same with this of mine, supposed no more but a Body moved by these two Motions, to prove the Line described to be the crooked Line of a Semiparabola, I never thought of asking him

what Altitude, nor what Diameter, nor what Angle, nor what Base had his Parabola. And when Archimedes said, let the Line A B be the Time, I should never have said to him, do you think Time to be a Line, as you ask me whether I think Impetus can be the Base of a Parabola. And why, but because I am not so egregious a Mathematician, as you are. In this giddiness of yours, caused by looking upon this intricate business of Motion, and of Time, and the concourse of Motion uniform, and uniformly accelerated, you rave upon the numbers 1, 4, 9, 16, &c. without reference to any thing that I had said; insomuch as any one that had seen how much you have been deceived in them before in your scurvy Book of Arithmetica Infinitorum, would presently conclude, that this objection was nothing else but a fit of the same madness which possest you there.

My tenth Article is like my nineth; and your objections to it are the same which are to the former. Therefore you must take for answer just the same which I have given to your objection there.

To the eleventh, you say first, you have done it better at the sixty-fourth Article of your Arithmetica Infinitorum. But what you have done there, shall be examined when I come to the Defence of my next Chapter. And whereas I direct the Reader for the finding of the Proportions of the Complements of those Figures to the Figures themselves, to the Table of Art. 3. Cha. you say that if the encrease of the Spaces, were to the encrease of the Times, as one to two, then the complement should be to the Parallelogram as one to three, and say you find not ⅓ in the Table. Did you not see that the Table is onely of those Figures which are described by the concourse of a Motion uniform with a motion accelerated? You had no reason therefore to look for ⅓ in that Table; for your case is of Motion uniform concurring with Motion retarded, because you make not the Proportions of the Spaces to the Proportions of the Times as two to one, but the contrary; so that your objection ariseth from want of observing what you

read. But I may learn (you say) these, and greater Matters then these, in your twenty-third and sixty-fourth Propositions of your Arithmetica Infinitorum. This which you say here is a great Absurdity; but if you mean I shall finde greater there, I will not say against you. This ⅓ you looked for, belongs to the Complements of the Figures calculated in that Table; which because you are not able to find out of your selves, I will direct you to them. Your case is of ⅓ for the Complement of a Parabola. Take the Denominator of the Fraction which belongs to the Parabola, namely three, and for Numerator take the Numerator of the Fraction which belongs to the Triangle, namely one, and you have the Fraction sought. And in like manner for the Complement of any other Figuer. As for example, of the second Parabolaster, whose Fraction hath for Denominator five, take the Numerator of the Fraction of the same Triangle which is one, and you have ⅕ for the Fraction sought for; and so of the rest, taking alwayes one for the Numerator.

The twelfth Article, which you say is miserably false, I have left standing unaltered. For not comprehending the sense of the Proposition, you make a Figure of your own, and fight against your own fancied Motions, different from mine. Other Geometricians that understand the construction better, find no fault. And if you had in your own fifth Figure drawn a Line through N Parallel to A E, and upon that Line supposed your accelerated Motion, you would quickly have seen that in the Time AE, the Body moved from Rest in A, would have fallen short of the Diagonall A D; and that all your extravagant pursuing of your own mistake had been absurd.

My thirteenth Article you say is ridiculous. But why? The Impetus last acquired cannot (you say) be equall to a Time. But the Quantity of the Impetus may be equall to the Quantity of a Time, seeing they are both measured by Line. And when they are measured by the same described Line, each of their Quantities is equall to that same Line, and consequently

to one another. But when I meet with this kind of objection again, since I have so often already shewn it to be frivolous, and no l-ss to be objected against all the Antients that ever Demonstrated any thing by Motion, then against me, I purpose to neglect it.

Secondly, you object That Motion uniformly accelerated does no more determine Swiftness, then Motion uniform. True; you needed not have used sixteen Lines to set down that. But suppose I add (as I do) so as the last acquired Impetus be equall to the Time. But that (you say) is not sense; Which is the objection I am to neglect. But (you say again) supposing it sense, this limitation helps me nothing. Why? Because (you say) a Parabola may be described upon a Base given, and yet have any Altitude, or any Diameter one will. Who doubts it? But how follows it from thence, that when a Parabolicall Line is described by two Motions, one uniform, the other uniformly accelerated from Rest, that the determining of the Base does not also determine the whole Parabola? But fifthly (you say) that this equality of the Impetus to the Time does not determine the Base. Why not? Because (you say) it is an error proceeding from this, that I understand not what is Ratio subduplicate. I look't for this. I have shewn and inculcated sufficiently before, that the error is on your side; and therefore must tell you, that this objection, and also a great part of the rest of your errors in Geometry proceedeth from this, that you know not what Proportion is. But see how wisely you argue about this duplication of Proportion. For thus you say verbatim. Stay a little. What Proportion has duplicate Proportion to single Proportion? Is it alwayes the same? I think not. For example. Duplicate Proportionis double to the single 2/1. Duplicate Proportionis triple to its single 3/1. Let any man, even of them that are most ready in your Symboles, say in your behalf (if he be not ashamed) that the Proportion of nine to one is triple to the Proportion of three to one, as you do.

In the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Article, you bid me repeat your objections to the thirteenth. I have done it; and find that what you have objected to the thirteenth, may as well be objected to these; and consequently, that my answer there will also serve me here. Therefore (if you can endure it) read the same answer over again.

But you have not yet done (you say) with these Articles. Therefore (after you had for a while spoken perplextly, conjecturing not without just cause, that I could not understand you) you say that to the end I may the better perceive your meaning, I should take the example following. Let a Movent (in the first Figure of this Chapter) be moved uniformly, in the Time A B, with the continuall Impetus A C, or B I, whose whole velocity shall therefore be the Parallelogram A C I B. And another Movent be uniformly accelerated, so as in the Time A B it acquire the same Impetus B I. Now as the whole velocity, is to the whole velocity, so is the length run over, to the length run over. All this I acknowledge to be according to my sense, saving that your putting your word Movens instead of my word Mobile hath corrupted this Article. For in the first Article, I meddle not with Motion by Concourse, wherein only I have to do with two Movents to make one Motion; but in this I do, wherein my word is not Movens but Mobile; by which it is easie to perceive you understand not this Proposition. Then you proceed, But the length run over by that accelerated Motion is greater then the length run over by that unifo-… Motion. Where do I say that? You answer, in the nineth and thirteenth Article, in making (in the fifth Figure) greater then A C; and A H (in the eighth Figure) greater then A B; and consequently, the Triangle A B I, greater then the Parallelogram A C I B. That consequently is without consequence; for it importeth nothing at all in this Demonstration, whether A B, or A C in the fifth Figure be the greater. Besides, I speak there of the Concourse of two Movents that describe the Parabolicall Line A G D; where the increasing Impetus, (because it

increaseth as the Times) will be designed by the Ordinate Lines in the Parabola A G D B. And if both the Motions in A B and A C were uniform, the Aggregate of the Impetus would be designed by the Triangle A B D, which is less then the Parallelogram A C D B. But you thought that the Motion made by A C uniformly, is the same with the Motion made uniformly in the same Time by the Motions in A B, and A C, concurring. So likewise in the eighth Figure, there is nothing hinders A H from being greater then A B, unless I had said that A B had been described in the Time A C with the whole Impetus A C maintained entire; of which there is nothing in the Proposition, nor would at all have been pertinent to it. Therefore all this new undertaking of the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth Articles, is to as little purpose as your former objections. But I perceive that these new and hard Speculations, though they turn the edge of your wit, turn not the edge of your malice.

At the seventeenth Article, you shew again the same confusion. Return to the eighth Figure, If in a Time given a Body run over two lengths, one with uniform, the other with accelerated Motion; as for example, if in the same Time A C a Body run over the Line A B with uniform Motion, and the Line A H with Motion accelerated; and again in a part of that Time it run over a part of the length A H, with uniform Motion, and another part of the same with Motion accelerated; as for example, in the Time A M it run over with uniform Motion the Line A I, and with Motion accelerated the Line A B. I say the excess of the whole A H above the part A B, is to the excess of the whole A B above the part A I, as the whole A H, to the whole A B. But first you will say, that these words as the whole A H to the whole A B, are left out in the Proposition. But you acknowledge that it was my meaning; and you see it is expressed before I come to the Demonstration. And therefore it was absurdly done to reprehend it. Let us therefore pass to the Demonstration. Draw I K Parallel to A C, and make up the Parallelogram A

I K M. And supposing first the acceleration to be uniform, divide I K in the midst at N; and between I N, and I K, take a mean Proportionall I L. And the straight Line A L, drawn and produced, shall cut the Line B D in F, and the Line C G in G (which Lines C G, and B D, as also H G and B F, are determined (though you could not carry it so long in memory) by the Demonstration of the thirteen Article.) For seeing A B is described by Motion uniformly accelerated, and A I by Motion uniform to the same Time A M; and I L is a mean Proportionall between I N (the half of I K) and I K; therefore by the Demonstration of the thirteenth Article; A I is a mean Proportionall between A B and the half of A B, namly A O. Again, because A B is described by uniform Motion, and A H by Motion uniformly accelerated, both of them in the same Time A C, B F is a mean Proportionall betwen B D and half B D, namely B E; Therefore by the Demonstration of the same thirteenth Article, the straight Line A L F produced will fall on G; and the Line A H will be to the Line A B, as the Line A B to the Line A I. And consequently as A H to A B, so H B to B I; which was to be Demonstrated. And by the like Demonstration the same may be proved, where the acceleration is in any other Proportion that can be assigned in Numbers, saving that whereas this Demonstration dependeth on the construction of the thirteenth Article, it the Motion had been accelerated in double Proportion to the Times, it would have depended on the fourteenth, where the Lines are determined. Which determinations being not repeated, but declared before in the thirteenth Article, to which this Diagram belongeth, you take no notic- of, but go back to a Figure belonging to another Article where there was no use of these Determinations. But because I see that the words of the Proposition, are as of four Motions, and not of two Motions made by twice two Movents, I must pardon them that have not righ-ly understood my meaning; and I have now made the Proposition according to the Demonstration. Which being done, all that you

have said in very neer two leaves of your Elenchus comes to nothing; and the fault you find comes to no more then a too much trusting to the skill and diligence of the Reader. And whereas after you had sufficiently troubled your self upon this occasion, you add, that if Sir H. Savile had read my Geometry, he had never given that censure of Joseph Scaliger, in his Lectures upon Euclide, that he was the the worst Geometrician of all Mortall men, not excepting so much as Orontius, but that praise should have been kept for me; You see by this time, at least others do, how little I ought to value that opinion; and that though I be the least of Geometricians, yet my Geometry is to yours as 1 to 0. I recite these words of yours, to let the world see your indiscretion in mentioning so needlesly that passage of your Founder. It is well known that Joseph Scaliger deserved as well of the state of Learning, as any man before or since him; and that though he failed in his Ratiocination concerning the Quadrature of the Circle, yet there appears in that very failing so much knowledge of Geometry, that Sir H. Savile could not but see that there were mortall men very many that had less; and consequently he knew that that censure of his in a rigid sense (without the License of an Hyperbole) was unjust. But who is there that will approve of such Hyperboles to the dishonour of any but of unworthy persons, or think Joseph Scaliger unworthy of honour from Learned men? Besides, it was not Sir H. Savile that confuted that false Quadrature, but Clavius. What honour was it then for him to triumph in the victory of another? When a beast is slain by a Lion, is it not easie for any of the Fowles of the Air to settle upon, and peck him? Lastly, though it were a great error in Scaliger, yet it was not so great a fault as the least Sin; and I believe that a publique contumely done to any worthy person after his death, is not the least of Sins. Judge therefore whether you have not done indiscreetly, in reviving the onely fault, perhaps that any man living can lay to your Founders charge; and yet this error of Scaligers was no greater then one of your own of the like

nature, in making the true Spirals of Archimedes equall to half the circumference of the Circle of the first revolution; and then thinking to cover your fault by calling it afterwards an Aggregate of Arches of Circles (which is no Spirall at all of any kind) you do not repair but double the absurdity. What would Sir Henry Savile have said to this?

The eighteenth Article is this, In any Parallelogram, if the two sides that contain the Angle be moved to their opposite sides, the one uniformly, the other uniformly accelerated; the side that is moved uniformly, by its concourse through all its Longitude, hath the same effect which it would have if the other Motion were also uniform, and the Line described, were a mean Proportionall between the whole Length, and the half of the same.

To the Proposition you object first, that it is all one whether the other motion be uniform or not, because the effect of each of their Motions, is but to carry the Body to the opposite side. But do you think that whatsoever be the Motions, the Body shall be carryed by their concourse alwayes to the same Point of the opposite side? If not, then the effect is not all one when a Motion is made by the concourse of two Motions uniform and accelerated, and when it is made by the concourse of two uniform or of two accelerated Motions.

Secondly, you say that these words, and the Line described were a mean Proportionall between the whole Length, and the half of the same, have no sense, or that you are deceived. True. For you are deceived; or rather you have not understanding enough distinctly to conceive variety of Motions though distinctly expressed. For when a Line is gone over with Motion uniformly accelerated, you cannot understand how a mean Proportionall can be taken between it and its half; or if you can, you cannot conceive that that mean can be gone over with uniform motion in the same Time that the whole Line was run over by motion uniformly accelerated. Yet these are things conceivable, and your want of understanding must be made my fault.

My Demonstration is this, In the Parallelogram A B C D, (Fig. 11.) Let the side A B be conceived to be moved uniformly till it lye in C D; and let the Time of that Motion be A C, or B D. And in the same Time let it be conceived that A C is moved with uniform acceleration, till it lye in B D. To which you object, that then the acceleration last acquired must be far greater then that wherewith A B is moved uniformly; else it shall never come to the place you would have it in the same Time. What proof bring you for this? None here. Where then? No where that I remember. On the contrary I have proved (Art. 9. of this Chapter) that the Line described by the concourse of those two Motions, namely, uniform from A B to C D, and uniformly accelerated from A C to B D, is the crooked Line of the S-miparabola A H D. And though I had not, yet it is well known that the same is demonstrated by Galileo. And seeing it is manifest that in what Proportion the Motion is accelerated in the Line A B, in the same Proportion the Impetus beginning from Rest in A is encreased in the same Times (which Impetus is designed all the way by the ordinate Lines of the Semi-Parabola) the greatest Impetus acquired must needs be the Base of the Semiparabola, namely B D, equal to A C which designs the whole Time. I cannot therefore imagine what should make you say without proof, that the greatest acquired Impetus is greater then that which is designed by the Base B D. Next you say, you see not to what end I divide A B in the middle at E. No wonder; for you have seen nothing all the way. Others would s — it is necessary for the Demonstration; as also that the Point F is not to be taken arbitrarily; and likewise that the thirteenth Article (which you admit not for proof) is sufficiently demonstrated, and your objections to it answered. By the way you advise me, where I say percursam codem motu uniformi, cum Impetu ubi{que} &c. to blot out cum; because the Impetus is not a companion in the way, but the cause. Pardon me in that I cannot take your Learned Counsell; for the word motu uniformi is the Ablative of the Cause, and

Impetu the Ablative of the Manner. But to come again to your objections, you say I make a greater space run over in the same Time by the slower Motion then by the swifter. How does that appear? because there is no doubt, but the swiftness is greater where the greatest Impetus is alwaies maintained, then where it is attained to in the same Time from Rest. True, But that is when they are considered asunder without concourse, but not then when by the concourse they debilitate one another, and describe a third Line different from both the Lines, which they would describe singly. In this place I compare their effects as contributing to the the description of the Parabolicall Line A H D. What the effects of their severall Motions are, when they are considered asunder, is sufficiently shewn b-fore in the first Article. You should first have gotten into your mindes the perfect and distinct Ideás of all the Motions mentioned in this Chapter, and then have ventured upon the censure of them, but not before. And then you would have seen that the Body moved from A, describeth not the Line A C, nor the Line A B, but a third, namely the Semiparabolicall Line A H D.

Again, where I say, Wherefore if the whole A B be uniformly moved to C D, in the same Time wherein A C is moved uniformly to F G; you ask me whether with the same Impetus or not. How is it possible that in the same time two unequall Lengths should be passed over with the same Impetus? But why (say you) do you not tell us with what Impetus A C comes to F G? What need is there of that, when all men know that in unifo-m Motion and the same Time, Impetus is to Impetus, as Length to Length? Which to have expressed had not -een pertinent to the Demonstration. That which follows in the Demonstration rursus suppono quod latus A C, &c. to these words, ut ostensum est, Art. 12, You confute with saying you have proved that Article to be false. But you may see now, if you please, at the same place that I have proved your objections to be frivolous.

After this you run on without any Argument against the rest of the Demonstration, shewing nothing all the way, but that the variety and concourse of Motions, the Speculations whereof you have not been used to, have made you giddy.

To the nineteenth Article you apply the same objection which you made to the eighteenth. Which having been answered, it appeares that from the very beginning of your Elenchus to this place all your objections (except such as are made to three or four mistakes of small importance in setting down my mind,) are meer Paralogisms, and such as are less pardonable then any Paralogism in Orontius, both because the Subject as less difficult is more easily mastered, and because the same faults are more shamefully committed by a Reprehender then by any other man.

I had once added to these nineteen Articles a twentieth, which was this, If from a Point in the Circumference there be drawn a Chord, and a Tangent equall to it, the Angle which they make shall be double to the aggregate of all the Angles made by the chords of all the equal Arches into which the Arch given canpossibly be divided. Which Proposition is true, and I did when I writ it think I might have use of it. But be it, or the Demonstration of it true or false, seeing it was not published by me, it is somewhat barbarous to charge me with the faults thereof. No Doctor of Humanity but would have thought it a poor and wretched malice, publiquely to examine and censure papers of Geometry never published, by what means soever they came into his hands. I must confess that in these words, in such kind of Progression Arithmeticall (that is, which begins with o) the sum of all the Numbers taken together, is equall to half the Number that is made by multiplying the greatest into the least, there is a great error; for by this account these Numbers, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, taken together should be equall to nothing. I should have said they are equall to that Number which is made by multiplying half the greatest into the Number of the Terms. There was

therefore, if those words were mine (for truly I have no Copy of them, nor have had since the Book was Printed, and I have no great reason, as any man may see, to trust your Faith) a great error in the writing, but not an erroneous opinion in the writer. The Demonstration so corrected is true. And the Angles that have the Proportions of the Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, are in the Table of your Elenchus, Fig. 12. the Angles G A D, H D E, I E F, K F B. And if the Divisions were infinite, so that the first were not to be reckoned but as a cypher, the Angle C A B would be double to them all together. This mistake of mine, and the finding that I had made no use of it in the whole book, was the cause why I thought fit to leave it quite out. But your Professorships, could not forbear to take occasion thereby, to commend your zeal against Leviathan to your Doctorships of Divinity, by censuring it.

OF THE FAULTS THAT OCCURRE IN DEMONSTRATION. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON V.

AT THE SEVENTEENTH Chapter, your first exception is to the Definition of Proportionall Prop-rtions, which is this, Four Proportions are then Proportionall, when the first is to the second, as the third to the fourth. The Reader will hardly believe that your exception is in earnest. You say I mean not by Proportionality the Quantity of the Proportions. Yes I do, Therefore I say again, that four Proportions are then Proportionall, when the Quantity of the first Proportion, is to the Quantity of the second Proportion, as the Quantity of the third Proportion, to the Quantity of the fourth Proportion. Is not my meaning now plainly enough expressed? Or is it not the same Definition with the former? But what do I mean (you will say) by the Quantity of a Proportion? I mean the determined greatness of it, that is, for example, in these Numbers, the Quantity of the Proportion of two to three, is the same with the Quantity of the Proportion of four to six, or six to nine; and again, the Quantity of the Proportion of six to four, is the same with the Quantity of the Proportion of nine to six, or of three to two. But now what do you mean by the Quantity of a Proportion? You mean that two and three, are the Quantities of the Proportion of two to three (for so Euclide calls them) and that six and four are the Quantities of the Proportion of six to four, which is the same with the Proportion of three to two. And by this Rule, one and the same Proportion shall have an infinite Number of Quantities; and consequently the Quantity of a Proportion can never be

determined. I call one Proportion double to another, when one is equall to twice the other; as the Proportion of four to one, is double to the Proportion of two to one. You call that Proportion double where one Number, Line, or Quantity absolute is double to the other; so that with you the Proportion of two to one is a double Proportion. It is easie to understand how the Number two is double to one, but to what I pray you, is double the Proportion of two to one, or of one to two? Is not every double Proportion double to some Proportion? See whether this Geometry of yours can be taken by any man of sound mind for sense. But 'tis known (you say) that in Proportions double is one thing, and duplicate another; So that it seems to you, that in talking of Proportion men are allowed to speak senslessly. 'Tis known, you say. To whom? It is indeed in use at this day to call jouble duplicate, and triple triplicate. And it is well enough; for they are words that signifie the same thing, But that they differ (in what subject soever) I never heard till now. I am sure that Euclide whom you have undertaken to expound, maketh no such difference. And even there where he putteth these Numbers, one, two, four, eight, &c. for Numbers in double Proportion (which is the last Proposition of the nineth Element) he meaneth not that one to two, or two to one, is a double Proportion, but that every Number in that Progression is double to the number next before it; and yet lie does not call it Analogia dupla, but Duplicata. This distinction in Proportions between double and duplicate, proceeded long after from want of knowledge that the Proportion of one to two is double to the Proportion of one to four; and this from ignorance of the different nature of Proportions of Excess, and Proportions of Defect. And you that have nothing but by tradition saw not the absurdities that did hang thereon.

In the second Article I make E K, (Fig. 1.) the third part of L K, which you say is false; and consequently the Proposition undemonstrated. And thus you prove it false. Let A C be to G C, or G K to G L, as eight to one

(for seeing the Point G is taken arbitrarily, we may place it where w- will, &c.) and upon this placing of G arbitrarily, you prove well enough that E K is not a third part -f L K. But you did not then observe, that I make the Altitude A G, less then any Qu-ntity given, and by consequence E K to differ from a third part by a less difference then any Quantity that can be given. Therefore as yet the Demonstration proccedeth well enough. But perceiving your oversight, you thought fit (though before, you thought this confutation sufficient) to endeavour to confure it another way; but with much more evidence of ignorance. For when I come to say, the Proportion therefore between A C and G C is triple (in Arithmeticall Proportion) to the Proportion between G K and G E, &c. you say the Proportion of A C to G C, is the Proportion of Identity, as also that of G K to G E. But why? Does my construction make it so? Do not I make G C less then A C, though with less Difference then any Quantity that can be assigned? And then where I say therefore E K is the third part of L K, you come in (by Parenthesis) with (or a fourth, or a fifth &c.) Upon what ground? Because you think it will pass for current, without proof, that a Point is nothing. Which if it do, Geometry also shall pass for nothing, as having no ground nor beginning but in nothing. But I have already in a former Lesson sufficiently shew'd you the consequence of that opinion. To which I may add, that it destroys the method of Indivisibles, invented by Bonaventura; and upon which, not well understood, you have grounded all your scurvy book of Arithmetica Infinitorum; where your Indivisibles have nothing to do, but as they are supposed to have Quantity, that is to say, to be Divisibles. You allow, it seems, your own nothings to be somethings, and yet will not allow my somethings to be considered as nothing. The rest of your objections having no other ground then this, that a Point is nothing, my whole Demonstration standeth firm; and so do the Demonstrations of all such Geometricians, Ancient and Modern, as have inferred any thing in the manner following,

viz. If it be not greater nor less, then it is equall. But it is neither greater nor less. Therefore, &c. If it be greater, say by how much. By so much. 'Tis not greater by so much. Therefore it is not greater. If it be less, say by how much, &c. Which being good Demonstrations are together with mine overthrown by the nothingness of your Point, or rather of your unstanding; upon which you nevertheless have the vanity of advising me what to do, if I demonstrate the same again; meaning I should come to your false, impossible, and absurd Method of Arithmetica Infinitorum, worthy to be gilded, I do not mean with Gold.

And for your Question, why I set the Base of my Figure upwards, you may be sure it was not because I was affraid to say, that the Proportions of the ordinate Lines beginning at the Vertex were triplicate, or otherwise multiplicate of the Proportions of the intercepted parts of the Diameter. For I never doubted to call double duplicate, nor triple triplicate, &c. or if I had, I should have avoided it afterwards at the tenth Article of the same Chapter. But because when I went about t- compare the Proportions of the ordinate Lines with those of their contiguous Diameters, the first thing I considered in them was in what manner the Base grew less and less till it vanished into a Point. And th-ugh the base had been placed below, it had not therefore required any change in the Demonstration. But I was the more apt to place the Base uppermost, because the Motion began at the Base, and ended at the Vertex. To proceed which way I pleased was in my own choice; and it is of grace that I give you any account of it at all.

To the third Article together with its Table, you say, it falls in the ruine of the second; and that the same is to be understood of the sixth, seventh, eighth and nineth. For confutation whereof I need to say no more, but that they all stand good by the confutation of your objections to the second.

To the fourth Article you say, the description of those curvilineall Figures is easie. True, to some men; and now that I have shewed you the

way, ’tis easie enough for you also. For the way you propound is wholly transcribed out of the Figure of the second Article, which Article you had before rejected. For seeing the Lines HF, GE, AB, &c. are equall to the Lines CQ, CO, CD; and the Lines QF, OE, DB, equall to the Lines CH, CG, CA; the Proportion of DB to OE, will be triple (that is, triplicate) to the Proportion of CO to GE; and the Proportion of DB to QF, triple to the Proportion of CD to CQ; and consequently, because the Complement BDCFEB is made by the decrease of AC in triple Proportion to that of the decrease of CD, it will be (by the second Article) a third part of the Figure ABEFCA. So that it comes all to one pass, whether we take triple Proportion in decreasing to make the Complement, or triple Proportion in increasing to make the Figure; for the Proportion of HF to BA, is triple to the Proportion of CH to CA. Wherefore you have done no more but what you have seen first done, saving that from your construction you prove not the Figure to be triple to the Complement; perhaps because you have proved the contrary in your Arithmetica Infinitorum. But your way differs from mine, in that you call the Proportion subtriplicate, which I call triplicate; as if the divers naming of the same thing made it differ from its self. You might as well have said briefly, the Proposition is true, but ill proved, because I call the Proportion of one to two triple, or triplicate of that of one to eight; which you say is salse, and hath infected the fourth, fifth, nineth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth Articles of the sixteenth Chapter. But I say, and you know now, that it is true; and that all those Articles are Demonstrated.

Lastly you add, Tu vero, in presente Articulo, &c. id est, you bid find as many mean Proportionals as one will, between two given Lines; as if that could not be done by the Geometry of Plains, &c. You might have left out Tu vero to seek an Ego quidem. But tell me, do you think you can find two mean Proportionals (which is less then as many as one will) by the

Geometry of Plaines? We shall see anon how you go about it. I never said it was impossible, and if you look upon the places cited by you more attentively, you will find your self mistaken. But I say, the way to do it has not been yet found out, and therefore it may prove a solid Probleme for any thing you know.

The fifth Article you reject, because it citeth the Corollarie of the twenty-eighth Article of the thirteenth Chapter, where there is never a word to that purpose. But there is in the twenty-sixth Article; which was my own fault, though you knew not but it might have been the Printers.

To the tenth you object for almost three leaves together, against these words of mine, Because (in the sixth Figure) BF is to BE in triplicate Proportion of CD to FE, therefore inverting, FE is to CD in triplicate Proportion of BF to BC. This you objected then. But now that I have taught you so much Geometry, as to know that of three Quantities, begining at the least, if the third be to the first in triplicate Proportion of the second to the first, also by conversion the first to the second shall be in triplicate Proportion of the first to the third; if it were to do again, you would not object it.

My eleventh Article you would allow for demonstrated, if my second had been Deccenstrated, upon which it dependeth. Therefore seeing your objections to that Article are sufficiently answered, this Article also is to be allowed.

The twelfth also is allowed upon the same reason. What falsities you shall finde in such following Propositions as depend upon the same second Article, we shall then see when I come to the places where you object against them.

To the thirteenth Article you object, That the same Demonstration may be as well applyed to a Portion of any Conoeides Parabolicall, Hyporbolicall, Ellipticall, or any other, as to the Portion of a Sphere. By the

truth of this let any man judge of your and my Geometry. Your Comparison of the Sphere and Conocides, so far holds good, as to prove that the Superficies of the Conoeides is greater then the Superficies of the Cone described by the subtense of the Parabolicall, Hyperbolicall, or Ellipticall Line. But when I come to say that The cause of the excess of the Superficies of the Portion of the Sphere above the Superficies of the Cone, confisis in the Angle-DAB, and the cause of the excess of the Circle made upon the Tangent AD above the Superficies of the same Cone, consists in the magnitude of the same Angle DAB, how will you apply this to your Con-…? For suppose that the crocked Line AB (in the seventh Figure) were not an Arch of a Circle, do you think that the Angles which it maketh with the Subtense AB, at the Points A and B must needs be equall? Or if they be not, does the excess of the Superficies of the Circle upon AD above the Superficies of the Cone, or the exceis of the Superfici-s of the Portion of the Conoeides above the Superficies of the same Cone consist in the Angle DAB, o- rather in the -…tude of the two unequall Angles DAB, and ABA? You should have drawn some other crooked Line, and made Tangents to it through A and B, and you would presently have seen your error. See how you can answer this; for if this Demonstration of minestand firm, I may be bold to say, though the same be well Demonstrated by Ar-…, that this way of mine is more naturall, as proceeding immediately from the naturall efficient causes of the effect contained in the conclusion; and besides, more brief and more easie to be followed by the fancy of the Reader.

To the fourteenth Article you say that I commit a Circle in that I require in the fourth Article the finding of two mean Proportionals, and come not till now to show how it is to be done. Nor now neither. But in the mean time you commit two mistakes in saying so. The place cited by you in the fourth Article is (in the Latine) Pag. 149. Lin 9. (in the English) Pag. 188. Lin. 3. Let any Reader judge whether that be a requiring it, or a supposing it to be

done; this is your first mistake. The second is, that in this place the Preposition itself, which is, If those Deficient Figures could be described in a Parallel-gram exquisitely, there might be found thereby between any two Lines given, as many mean Proportionals as one would, is a Theoreme, upon supposition of these crooked Lines exquisitely drawn; but you take it for a Probleme.

And proceeding in that error, you undertake the invention of two mean Proportionals, using therein my first Figure, which is of the same construction with the eighth that belongeth to this fourteenth Article. Your construction is, Let there be taken in the Diameter CA (Figure 1) the two given Lines, or two others Proportionall to them, as CH, CG, and their — nate Lines HF, GE (which by construction are in subtriplicate Pr-p-rtion of the intercepted Diameters.) These Lines will shew the Proportions which those four Proportionals are to . But how will you find the Length of HF or GE, the ordinate Lines? Will you not do it by so drawing the crooked Line CFE as it may pa-s through both the Points F and E? You may make it pass through one of them, but to make it pass through the other, you must finde two mean Proportionals between GK and GL, or between HI and HP; Which you cannot do, unless the crooked Line be exactly drawn; which it cannot be by the Geometry of Plunes. Go show this Demonstration of yours to Orontius, and see what he will say to it.

I am now come to an end of your objections to the seventeenth Chapter, where you have an Epiphonema not to be passed over in silence. But becaus- you p-etend to the D-…tration of some of these Propositions by another Method in your Arithmetica Infinitorum, I shall first try whether you be able to defend those Demonstrations as well as I have done theie of mine by the Method of Motion.

The first Proposition of your Arithmetica Infinitorum is this L-mma. In a S-ries (or Row) of Quantities Arith -tically Proportionall, beginning at a

Poi-t or Cyp — r as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. to finde the Proportion of the Aggregate of them all, to the Aggregate of so many times the greatest, as there are Terms. This is to be done by multiplying the greatest into half the Number of the Terms. The Demonstration is easie. But how do you demonstrate the same? The most simple way (say you) of finding this and some other Problemes, it to do the thing it self a little way, and to observe and compare the appearing Proportions, and then by Induction, to conclude it universally. Egregious Logicians and Geometricians, that think an Induction without a Numeration of all the particulars sufficient to infer a Conclusion universall, and fit to be received for a Geometricall Demonstration! But why do you limit it to the naturall consequution of the Numbers, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c? Is it not also true in these Numbers, 0, 2, 4, 6, &c. or in these, 0, 7, 14, 21, &c? Or in any Numbers where the Diff-rence of nothing and the first Number is equall to the difference between the first and second, and between the second and third &c? Again, are not these Quantities 1, 3, 5, 7, &c. in continuall Proportion Arithmaticall? And if you put before them a Cypher thus, 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, do you think that the sum of them is equall to the half of five times seven? Therefore though your Lemma be true, and by me (Cha. Art. 5.) demonstrated; yet you did not know why it is true; which also appears most evidently in the first Proposition of your Conique-sections. Where first you have this, That a Parallelogram whose Altitude is infinitely little, that is to say, none, is scarce any thing else but a Line. Is this the Language of Geometry? How do you determine this word scarce? The least Altitude, is Somewhat or Nothing. If Somewhat, then the first character of your Arithmeticall Progression must not be a cypher; and consequently the first eighteen Propositions of this y-ur Arithmetica Infinitorum are all naught. If Nothing, then your whole figure is without Altitude, and consequently your Understanding naught. Again, in the same Proposition, you say thus, We

will sometimes call those Parallelograms rather by the name of Lines then of Parallelograms, at least, when there is no consideration of a determinate Altitude; But where there is a consideration of a determinate Altitude (which will happen sometimes) there that little Altitude shall be so far considered, as that being infinitely multiplyed it may be equall to the Altitude of the whole Figure. See here in what a confusion you are when you resist the truth. When you consider no determinate Altitude (that is, no Quantity of Altitude) then you say your Parallelogram shall be called a Line. But when the Altitude is determined (that is, when it is Quantity) then you will call it a Parallelogram. Is not this the very same doctrine which you so much wonder at and reprehend in me, in your objections to my eighth Chapter, and your word considered used as I used it? 'Tis very ugly in one that so bitterly reprehendeth a doctrine in another, to be driven upon the same himself by the force of truth when he thinks not on't. Again, seeing you admit in any case, those infinitely little altitudes to be quantity, what need you this limitation of yours, so far forth as that by multiplication they may be made equall to the Altitude of the whole figure? May not the half, the third, the fourth, or the firth part, &c. be made equall to the whole by multiplication? Why could you not have said plainly, so far forth as that every one of those infinitely little Altitudes be not only something but an aliquo-part of the whol-?-o you will have an infinitely little Altitude, that is to say a Point, to be both nothing and something and an aliquot part. And all this proceeds from not understanding the ground of your Profession.

Well, the Lemma is true. Let us see the Theoremes you draw from it. The first is (Pag. 3.) that a Triangle to a Parallelogram of equall Base and Altitude is as one to two. The conclusion is true, but how know you that? Because (say you) the Triangle consists as it were (as is were, is no Phrase of a Geometrician) of an Infinite Number of stra-ght Parallel Lines. Does it so? Then by your own doctrine, which is, that Lines have no breadth, the

Altitude of your Triangle consisteth of an infinite Number of no Altitudes, that is of an infinite Number of Nothings, and consequently the Area of your Triangle has no Quantity. If you say that by the Parallels you mean infinitely little Parallelograms, you are never the better; for if infinitely little, either they are nothing, or if somewha-, yet seeing that no two sides of a Triangle are Parallel, those Parallels cannot be Parallelograms. I see they may be counted for Parallelograms by not considering the Quantity of their Altitudes in the Demonstration. But you are barred of that Plea, by your spightfull arguing against it in your Elenchus. Therefore this third Proposition, and with it the fourth is undemonstrated.

Your fifth Proposition is, The Spirall Line is equall to half the Circle of the first Revolution. But what Spirall Line? We shall understand that by your construction, which is this, The straight Line MA, (in your Figure which I have placed at the end of the fifth Lesson) turned round (the Point M remaining unmoved) is supposed to describe with its Point A the Circle AOA, whilst some Point (in the same MA whilst it goes about) is supposed to be moved uniformly from M to A describing the Spirall Line. This therefore is the Spirall Line of Archimedes; and your Proposition affirms it to be equall to the half of the Circle AOA; which you perceived not long after to be false. But thinking it had been true, you go about to prove it, by inscribing in the Circle an infinite multitude of equall Angles, and consequently an infinite Number of Sectors, whose Arches will therefore be in Arithmeticall Proportion; Which is true. And the Aggregate of those Arches equall to half the Circumference AOA; Which is true also. And thence you conclude that the Spirall Line is equall to half the Circumference of the Circle AOA; Which is false. For the Aggregate of that infinite Number of infinitely little Arches, is not the Spirall Line made by your construction, seeing by your construction the Line you make is manifestly the Spiral of Archimedes; whereas no Number (though infinite) of Arches

of Circles (how little soever) is any kind of Spirall at all; and though you call it a Spirall, that is but a patch to cover your fault, and deceiveth no man but your self. Besides, you saw not how absurd it was (for you that hold a Point to be absolutely nothing) to make an infinite Number of equall Angles (the Radius increasing as the Number of Angles increaseth) and then to say that the Arches of the Sectors whose Angles they are, are as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. For you make the first Angle 0, and all the rest equall to it; and so make 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &c. to be the same Progression with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. The influence of this absurdity reacheth to the end of the eighteenth Proposition. So many are therefore false, or nothing worth. And you needed not to wonder that the Doctrine contained in them was omitted by Archimedes, who never was so senseless as to think a Spi — ll Line was compounded of Arches of Circles.

Your nineteenth Proposition is this other Lemma, In a Series (or a Row) of Quantities, beginning from a Point, or Cypher, and proceeding according to the order of the square Numbers, as 0, 1, 4, 9, 16, &c. to finde what Proportion the whole Series hath to so many times the greatest. And you conclude the Proportion to be that of 1 to 3. Which is false, as you shall presently see. First, let the Series of Squares with the prefixed Cypher, and under every one of them, the greatest 4 be And you have for the sum of the Squares 5, and for thrice the greatest 12, the third part whereof is 4. But 5 is greater then 4, by 1, that is, by one twelfth of 12; which Quantity is somewhat, let it be called A. Again, let the Row of Squares be lengthened one term surther, and the greatest set under every one of them as The sum of the Squares is 14, and the sum of four times the greatest is 36, whereof the third part is 12. But 14 is greater then 12 by two unities, that is, by two twelfths of 12, that is, by 2 A. The difference therefore between the sum of the Squares, and the sum of so many times the greatest Square is greater, when the cypher is followed by three Squares, then when by but two.

Again, let the Row have five terms as in these Numbers with the greatest five times subscribed, and the sum of the Squares will be 30, the sum of all the greatest will be 80. The third part whereof is 26 ⅔. But 30 is greater then 26⅓ by 3⅓, that is, by three twelfths of twelve and ⅓ of a twelfth, that is, by 3⅓ A. Likewise in the Series continued to six places with the greatest six times subscribed, as the sum of the Squares is 55, and the sum of the greatest six times taken is 150, the third part where-f is 50. But 55 is greater then 50 by 5, that is, by five twelfths of 12, that is, by 5. A. And so continually as the Row groweth longer, the excess also of the aggregate of the Squares above the third part of the aggregate of so many times the greatest Square, groweth greater. And consequently if the Number of the Squares were infinite, their sum would be so far from being equal to the third part of the aggregate of the greatest as often taken, as that it would be greater then it by a Quantity greater then any that can be given or named.

That which deceived you was partly this, that you think (as you do in your Elenchus) that these Fractions &c. are Proportions, as if 1/12 were the Proportion of one to twelve, and consequently 2/12 double the Proportion of one to twelve; which is as unintelligible as School-Divinity; and I assure you, far from the meaning of Mr. Ougthred in the sixth Chapter of his Clavis Mathematicae, where he sayes that 43/7 is the Proportion of 31 to 7; for his meaning is, that the Proportion of 43/7 to one, is the Proportion of 31 to 7; whereas if he meant as you do, then 86/7 should be double the Proportion of 31 to 7. Partly also because you think (as in the end of the twentieth Proposition) that if the Proportion of the Numerators of these Fractions to their Denominators decrease eternally, they shall so vanish at last as to leave the Proportion of the sum of all the Squares to the sum of the greatest so often taken, (that is, an infinite Number of times) as one to three, or the sum of the greatest to the sum of the increasing Squares, as three to one; for which there is no more reason then for four to one, or five to one,

or any other such Proportion. For if the Proportions come eternally nearer and nearer to the subtriple, they must needs also come nearer and nearer to subquadruple; and you may as well conclude thence that the upper Quantities shall be to the Lower Quantities as one to four, or as one to five, &c. as conclude they are as one to three. You can see without admonition, what effect this false ground of yours will produce in the whole structure of your Arithmetica Infinitorum; and how it makes all that you have said unto the end of your thirty-eighth Proposition, undemonstrated, and much of it false.

The thirty-nineth is this other Lemma, In a Series of Quantities beginning with a Point or Cypher, and proceeding according to the Series of the Cubique Numbers, as 0. 1. 8. 27. 64, &c. to finde the Proportion of the sum of the Cubes to the sum of the greatest Cube, so many times taken as there be Terms, And you conclude that they have the Proportion of 1 to 4; which is false.

Let the first Series be of three terms subscribed with the greatest ; the sum of the Cubes is nine; the sum of all the greatest is 24; a quarter whereof is 6. But 9 is greater then 6 by three unities. An unity is something. Let it be therefore A. Therefore the Row of Cubes is greater then a quarter of three times eight, by three A. Again, let the Series have four terms, as ; the sum of the Cubes is 36; a quarter of the sum of all the greatest is twenty-seven. But thirty-six is greater then twenty-seven by nine- that is, by 9 A. The excess therefore of the sum of the Cubes above the fourth part of the sum of all the greatest, is increased by the increase of the Number of terms. Again, let the terms be five as the sum of the Cubes is one hundred; the sum of all the greatest three hundred and twenty; a quarter whereof is eighty. But one hundred is greater then eighty by twenty, that is, by 20 A. So you see that this Lemma also is false. And yet there is grounded upon it all that which you have of comparing Parabolas and Paraboloeides with the

Parallelograms wherein they are accommodated. And therefore though it be true, that the Parabola is ⅔, and the Cubicall Paraboloeides ¾ of their Parallelograms respectively' yet it is more then you were certain of when you referred (me for the learning of Geometry) to this Book of yours. Besides, any man may perceive that without these two Lemmas (which are mingled with all your compounded Series with their excesses) there is nothing demonstrated to the end of your Book. Which to prosecute particularly, were but a vain expence of time. Truly were it not that I must defend my reputation, I should not have shewed the world how little there is of sound Doctrine in any of your Books. For when I think how dejected you will be for the future, and how the grief of so much time irrecoverably lost, together with the conscience of taking so great a stipend, for mis-teaching the young men of the University, & the consideration of how much your friends wil be ashamed of you, will accompany you for the rest of your life, I have more compassion for you then you have deserved. Your Treatise of the Angle of Contact, I have before confuted in a very few leaves. And for that of your Conique Sections, it is so covered over with the scab of Symboles that I had not the patience to examine whether it be well or ill demonstrated.

Yet I observed thus much, that you find a Tangent to a Point given in the Section, by a Diameter given; and in the next Chapter after, you teach the finding of a Diameter, which is not artificially done.

I observe also, that you call the Parameter an Imaginary Line, as if the place thereof were less determined then the Diameter it self; and then you take a mean Proportionall between the intercepted Diameter, and its contiguous ordinate Line to find it. And tis true, you find it- But the Parameter has a determined Quantity to be found without taking a mean Proportional. For the Diameter and half the Section being given, draw a Tangent through the Vertex, and dividing the Angle in the midst which is

made by the Diameter and Tangent, the Line that so divideth the Angle, will cut the crooked Line. From intersection draw a Line (if it be a Parabola) Parallel to the Diameter, and that Line shall cut off in the Tangent from the Vertex the Parameter sought. But if the Section be an E-lipsis, or an Hyperbole, you may use the same Method, saving that the Line drawn from the intersection must not be Parallel, but must pass through the end of the transverse Diameter, and then also it shall cut off a part of the Tangent, which measured from the Vertex is the Parameter. So that there is no more reason to call the Parameter an Imaginary Line then the Diameter.

Lastly, I observe that in all this your new Method of Coniques you shew not how to find the Burning Points, which writers call the Foci and Umbilici of the Section, which are of all other things belonging to the Coniques most usefull in Philosophy. Why therefore were they not as worthy of your pains as the rest, for the rest also have already been demonstrated by others? You know the Focus of the Parabola is in the Axis distant from the Vertex a quarter of the Parameter. Know also that the Focus of an Hyperbole, is in the Axis, distant from the Vertex, as much as the Hypotenusall of a rectangled Triangle, whose one side is half the transverse Axis, the other side half the mean Proportionall between the whole transverse Axis and the Parameter, is greater then half the transverse Axis.

The cause why you have performed nothing in any of your Books (saving that in your Elen-…hus you have spied a few negligences of mine, which I need not be ashamed of) is this, that you understood not what is Quantity; Line, Super-…ies, Angle, and Proportion; without which you cannot have the Science of any one Proposition in Geometry. From this one and first Definition of Euclise, a Point is th — whereof there is no p — t, understood by Sextus Empiricus, as you understand it, that is to say, mis-understood, Sextus Empiricus hath utterly destroyed most of the rest, and Demonstrated, that in Geometry there is no Science, and by that means you

have betrayed the most evident of the Sciences to the Sceptiques. But as I understand it for that whereof no part is reckoned, his Arguments have no force at all, and Geometry is redeemed. If a Line have no Latitude, how shall a Cylinder rowling on a Plain, which it toucheth not but in a Line, describe a Superficies? How can you affirm that any of those things can be without Quantity, whereof the one may be greater or less then the other? But in the common Contact of divers Circles the externall Circle maketh with the common Tangent a less Angle of Contact then the internall. Why then is it not Quantity? An Angle is made by the concourse of two Lines from severall Regions, concurring (by their generation) in one and the same Point. How then can you say the Angle of Contact is no Angle? One measure cannot be applicable at once to the Angle of Contact, and Angle of Conversion. How then can you infer, if they be both Angles, that they must be Homogeneous? Proportion is the Relation of two Quantities. How then can a Quotient or Fraction, which is Quantity absolute, be a Proportion? But to come at last to your Ephiphonema, wherein, though I have perfectly demonstrated all those Propositions concerning the Proportion of Parabolasters to their Parallelog-ams, and you have demonstrated none of them (as you cannot now but plainly see) but committed most Paralogisms, How could you be so transported with pride, as insolently to compare the setting of them forth as mine, to the Act of him that steals a horse, and comes to the gallows for it. You have read, I think, of the gallows set up by Haman. Remember therefore also who was hanged upon it.

After your dejection I shall comfort you a little, a very little, with this, that whereas this 18 Chapter containeth two Problems, one, the finding of a straight Line equall to the -rooked Line of a Semiparabola, The other, the finding of straight Lines equall to the crocked Lines of the Parabolasters in the table of the third Article of the 17 Chapter; You have -…uly demonstrated that they are both false; and another hath also Demonstrated

the same another way. Nevertheless the fault was not in my method, but in a mistake of one Line for another, and such as was not hard to correct; and is now so corrected in the English as you shall not be able (if you can sufficiently imagine Motions) to reprehend. The fault was this, That in the Triangles which have the same. Base and Altitude with the Parabola and Parabolaster, I take for designation of the mean uniform Impetus, a mean Proportionall (in the first Figure) between the whole Diameter and its half, and (in the second Figure) a mean Proportionall between the whole Diameter and its third part; which was manifestly false, and contrary to what I had shewn in the 16 Chapter. Whereas I ought to have taken the half of the Base, as now I have done, and thereby exhibited the Straight Lines equall to those crocked Lines, as I undertook to do. Which error therefore proceeded not from want of skill, but from want of care; and what I promised (as bold as you say the promise was,) I have now performed.

The rest of your exceptions to this Chapter, are to these words in the end, there be some that say, that though there be equality between a straight and crooked Line, yet now, (they say) after the full of Adam, it cannot be found without the especiall help of divine grace. And you say you think there be none that say so. I am not bound to tell you who they are. Nevertheless, that other men may see the Spirit of an ambitious part of the Clergy, I will tell you where I read it. It is in the Prolegomena of Lalovera (a Jesuite) to his Quadrature of the Circle, pag. 13 & 14, in these wor-s, Quamvis circuli tetragonismus fitpossibilis, an taman etiam sit, hoc est, post Adae lapsum homo ejus scientiam abs{que} speciali di-inae gratiae auxilio, possit comparare, jure merito inquirunt Theologi, pronunciant{que} hanc veritatem tanta esse caligine involutam ut illam videre nemo possit, nisi Ignorantiae ex primi parentis praevaricatione propagatas tenebras indebitus divina lucis radius dissipet; quod verissimum esse sentio. Wherein I observed that he (supposing he had found that Quadrature) would have us

believe it was not by the ordinary and Naturall help of God (whereby one man reasoneth, judgeth and remembreth better then another) but by a Special (which must be a Superturall) help of God, that he hath given to him of the order of Jesus above others that have attempted the same in vain. Insinuating thereby, as handsomely as he could, a Speciall love of God towards the Jesuites. But you taking no notice of the word Speciall, would have men think I held, that humane Sciences might be acquired without any help of God. And thereupon proceed in a great deal of ill language to the end of your objections to this Chapter. But I shall take notice of your Manners for altogether in my next Lesson.

At the nineteenth Chapter you see not (you say) the Method. Like enough. In this Chapter I consider not the Cause of Reflection, which consisteth in the resistance of Bodies naturall; but I consider the consequences, arising from the supposition of the equality of the Angle of Reflection, to that of Incidence; leaving the causes both of Reflection, and of Refraction to be handled together in the 24 Chapter. Which Method (think what you will) I still think best.

Secondly, you say I define not here, but many Chapters after, what an Angle of Incidence, and what an Angle of Reflection is. Had you not been more hasty then diligent Readers, you had found that those Definitions of the Angle of Incidence, and of Reflection were here set down in the first Article, and not deferred to the 24. Let not therefore your own oversight be any more brought in for an objection.

Thirdly, you say there is no great difficulty in the business of this Chapter. It may be so, now ’tis down; but before it was done, I doubt not but you that are a Professor would have done the same, as well as you have done that of the Angle of Contact, or the business of your Arithmetica Infinitorum. But what a novice in Geometry would have done I cannot tell.

To the third, fourth, and fifth Article, you object a want of Determination; and shew it by instance, as to the third Article. But what those Determinations should be, you determine not, because you could not. The words in the third Article, are first these, If there fall two straight Lines Parallel, &c. which is too generall. It should be, if there fall the same way two straight Lines Parallel, &c. Next these, their Reflected Lines produced inwards shall make an Angle, &c. This also is too generall. I should have said their Reflected Lines produced inwards, if they meet within, shall make an Angle, &c. Which done, both this Article and the 4 and 5 are fully demonstrated. And without it, an intelligent Reader had been satisfied, supplying the want himself by the construction.

To the eight, you object onely the two great Length, and labour of it, because you can do it a shorter way. Perhaps so now, as being easie to shorten many of the Demonstrations both of Euclide, and other the best Geometricians that are or have been. And this is all you had to say to my 19 Chapter. Before I proceed, I must put you in mind that these words of yours, Adducis malleum, ut occi-as muscam, are not good Latine, Malleum affers, Malleum adhi-es, Malleo uteris, are good. When you speak of bringing Bodies animate, Ducere and Adduc-re are good, for there to bring, is to gu — e or lea-. And of Bodies inanimate Adducere is good for Attra-ere, which is to draw to. But when you bring a hammer, will you say Adduco Malleum, I lead a hammer? A man may lead another man, and a ninny may be said to lead another ninny, but not a hammer. Neverthelese, I should not have thought fit to reprehend this fault upon this occasion in an English man, nor to take notice of it, but that I finde you in some places nibling (but causelessly) at my Latine.

Concerning the twentieth Chapter, before I answer to the objections against the Propositions themselves, I must answer to the exception you first take to these words of mine, Quae de dimensione Circuli & Angulorum

pronuntiata sunt tanquam exacté inventa, accipiat Lector — nquam dicta Problematice. To which you say thus, we are wont in Geometry to call some Propositions Theorem-s, other's Problems, &c. of which Theoreme is that wherein some assertion is propou-nded to be proved, a Problem that wherein something is commanded to be done. Do you mean to be done, and not proved? By your favour, a Probleme in all ancient writers signifies no more but a Proposition uttered, to the end to have it by them to whom it is uttered, examined whether it be true or not true, fai-able or not faisable; and differs not amongst Geometricians from a Theoreme, but in the manner of Propounding. For this Proposition, To make an equilaterall Triangle, so propounded they call a Problem. But if propounded thus, If upon the ends of a straight Line given be described two Circles, whose Radius is the same straight Line, and there be drawn from the intersection of the Circles to their two Centers, two straight Lines, there will be made an equilateral Triangle, then they call it a Theoreme; and yet the Proposition is the same. Therefore these words Accipiat Lector tanquam dicta Problemati-ey, signifie plainly this, that I would have the Reader, take for p-opounded to him to examine, whether from my construction the Quadrature of the Circle can be truly inferred or not; and this is not to bid him (as you inte-pret it) to square the Circle. And if you beli-ve that Problematicey signifies probably, you have been very negligent in observing the sense of the an-ien- G-eek Philosophers in the word Probleme. Therefore your Solemus in Geometria, &c. is nothing to the pu pose; nor had it been though you had spoken more properly, and said Sol-nt, leaving out your selves.

My first Article hath this Title, from a False supp-sition, a false Quadrature of the Circle. Seeing therefore you were resolved to shew where I erred, you should have proved either that the Supposition was true, and the Conclusion falsely inferred, or contrarily that though the Supposition be false, yet the Conclusion is true; for else you object nothing to my

Geometry, but only to my Judgement, in thinking fit to publish it; which nevertheless you cannot justly do, seeing it was likely to give occasion to ingenuous men (they practise of it being so accurate to sense) to inquire wherein the Fallacy did consist. And for the Probleme as it was first printed, but never published, and consequently ought to have passed for a private paper stoln out of my study, your publique objecting against it, (in the opinion of all men that have conversed so much with honest company as to know what belongs to civill conversation,) was sufficiently barbarous in Divines. And seeing you knew I had rejected that Proposition, it was but a poor Ambition to take wing as you thought to do, like Beetles from my egestions. But let that be as it will, you will think strange now I should resume, and make good (at least against your objection) that very same Proposition. So much of the Figure as is needfull you will finde noted with the same letters, and placed at the end of this 5 Lesson. Wherein let B I, be an Arch not greater then the Radius of the Circle, and divided into four equall parts, in L, N, O. Draw S N, the Sine of the Arch B N, and produce it to T, so as S T be double to S N, that is, equall to the Chord B I. Draw likewise a L, the Sine of the Arch B L, and produce it to c, so as a c be quadruple to a L, that is, equall to the two Chords B N, N I. Upon the Center N with the Radius N I, draw the A-ch I d, cutting B U the Tangent in d. Then will B N produced cut the Arch I d, in the midst at o. In the Line B S produced take S b, equall to B S; then draw and produce b N, and it will fall on the Point d. And B d, S T, will be equall; and d T joyned and produced will fall upon o, the midst of the Arch I d. Joyn I T, and produce it to the Tangent B U in U. I say, that the st-aight Line I T U shall pass through c. For seeing B S, S h, are equall, and the Angle at S a right Angle, the straight Lines B N, and b N, are also equall, and the Triangles B N b, d N o like and equall; and the Lines d T, T o equall. Draw o i Parallel to d U, cutting I U in i; and the Triangles d T v, o T i will also be like and equal.

Produce S T to the Arch d o I in e, and produce it further to f, so that the Line e f be equall to T c; and then S f will be equall to a c. Therefore f c joyned will be Parallel to B S. In c f produced take f g equall to c f; and draw g m Parallel to d U, cutting I U in m, and d o in n; and let the inte — ction of the two Lines a c and d o be in r; which being done, the Triangles m n T, r c T will be like and equall. Therefore m n and r c are equall; and -… sequently the st-aight Line I m T U shall pass through c. Dividing therefore a c in the midst at t, and S N in the midst at l, and joyning t N, L l, the Lines L l, t N, and c T produced with all meet i one and the same Point of B S produced; suppose at q. Therefore the Point q being given by the two known Points T and I, the Lines drawn from q through equall parts of the Sine of the Arch B I, for example through the Points P, Q, R, of the Sine M I, shall cut off equall Arches, as B L, L N, N O, O I. And this is enough to make good that Probleme, as to your objection.

The straight Line therefore B U for any thing you have said is p-oved equall to the Arch B I, and the division of any Angle given into any proportion given, the Quadrature of any Sector, and the Construction of any equilaterall P-lygon is also given. And though in this also I should have erred, yet it cannot be denyed but that I have used a more natural, a more Geometrical, and a more pe-spicuous method in thes search of this so difficult a Probleme, then you have done in your Arithmetica Infinitorum For though it be true that the aggregate of all the mean Proportionals between the Radius together with an infinitely little part of the same, and the Radius wanting an infinitely little part of the same; and again, between the Radius, together with two infinitely little parts, and the Radius wanting two infinitely little parts, and so on eternally will be equall to the Quadrant (a thing which every mean Geometrician knew before) yet it was absurd to think those Means could be calculated in Numbers by Interpoling of a Symbole; especially when you make that Symbole to stand for a Numbet

neither true nor surd; as if there were a number that could neither be uttered in words, nor not be uttered in words. For what else is surd, but that which cannot be spoken?

To the fifth Article (though your discourse be long) you object but two things. One is, that Whereas the Spirall of A chi-edes is made of two Motions, one straight, the other circular, both uniform, I taking the Motion compounded of them both for one of those that are compounded, conclude falsely, that the generation of the Spirall is like to the generation of the Parabola. What heed you use to take in your rep-ehensions, appears most manifestly in this objection. For I say in that demonstration of mine that the velocity of the point A in describing the Spirall, en-reaseth continually in Proportion to the Times. For seeing it goes on uniformly in the Semidiameter, it is impossible it should not pass into greater and greater Circles proportionally to the Times; and consequently it must have a swifter and swifter Motion circular, to be compounded with the uniform Motion in every Point of the Radius as it turneth about. This objection therefore is nothing but an effect of a Will (without cause) to contradict.

The other objection is that Granting all to be true hith-rto, yet because it depends upon the finding of a straight Line equall to a Parabolic-ll Line in the 18 Chapter where I was deceived, I am also deceived here. True. But because in the 18 Chapter of this English E-ition I have found a straight Line equall to a Parabolicall Line, I have also found a straight Line equall to the Spirall Line of Archime — s. I must here p-t you in minde that by these words in your objections to the fifth Article at your Number 2, Quatenus verum -st, &c. we have demonstrated Pro, 11, 13. Arithmet. Infinit. you make it appear that you thought your Spirall (made of A-ches or Circles) was the true Spirall of Archimedes; which is fully -s absurd as the Quadrature of Joseph Scaliger, whose Geometry you so much d-spise.

To the sixth Article which is a Digression concerning the Analytiques of Geomet-icia-s, you deny that the Efficient cause of the Construction ought to be contained in the Demonstration. As if any Probleme could be known to be truly done, otherwise then by knowing first how, that is to say, by what Efficient Cause, and in what manner it is to be done. Whatsoever is done without that knowledge, cannot be demonstrated to be done; as you see in your computation of the Parabola, and Parabolocides, in your Arithmetica Infinitorum.

And whereas I said that The ends of all straight Lines drawn from a straight Line, and passing through one and the same Point, if their parts be Proportionall, shall be in a-…aight Line; is true and accurate; as also If they begin in the Circumference of a Cir-le, they also be in the Cir-umference of another Circle. And so is this, If the Proportion be duplicate, they shall be in a Parabola. All this I say is true and accurately spoken. But this was no place for the demonstration of it. Others have done it. And I perceive by that you put in by Parenthesis (intelligi- credo inter -du-s Peripheri — concentric-s) that you understand not what I mean.

Hitherto reach your objections to my Geometry. For the rest of your Book, it containeth nothing but a collection of lies, wherewith you do what you can, to extenuate as vulgar, and disgrace as false, that which followeth, and to which you have made no speciall objection.

I shall therefore only add in this place concerning your Analytica per Potestates, that it is no Art. For the Rule, both in Mr. Ougthred, and in Des Cartes is this, When a Probleme or Question is propounded, suppose the thing required done, and then using a fit ratiocination, put A or some other vowell for the magnitude sought. How is a man the better for this Rule without another rule, How to know when the ratiocinatión is fit? There may therefore be in this kind of Analysis more or less naturall prudence, according as the Analyst is more or less wis-, or as one man in chusing of

the unknown Quantity with which he will begin, or in chusing the way of the consequences which he will draw from the Hypothesis, may have better luck then another. But this is nothing to Art. A man may sometimes spend a whole day in deriving of consequences in vain, and perhaps another time solve the same Probleme in a few minutes.

I shall also add, that Symboles though they shorten the writing, yet they do not make the Reader understand it soon-r then if it were written in words. For the conception of the Lines and Figures (without which a man learneth nothing) must proceed from words, either spoken or thought upon. So that there is a double labour of the mind, one to reduce your Symboles to words (which are also Symboles) another to attend to the Ideas which they signifie. Besides, if you but consider how none of the Antients ever used any of them in their published demonstrations of Geometry, nor in their Books of Arithmetique, more then for the Rootes and Potestates themselves; and how bad success you have had your self in the unskilfull using of them, you will not, I think, for the future be so much in love with them as to demonstrate by them that first part you promise of your Opera Mathe-atica. In which if you make not amends for that which you have already published, you will much disgrace those Mathematicians you address your Epistles to, or otherwise have commended; as also the Universities (as to this kinde of Learning) in the sight of learned men beyond Sea. And thus having examined your panier of Mathematiques, and finding in it no knowledge neither of Quantity, nor of measure, nor of Proportion, nor of Time, nor of Motion, nor of any thing, but only of certain Characters, as if a Hen had been scraping there; I take out my hand again, to put it in to your other panier of Theology, and good Manners. In the mean time I will trust the objections made by you the Astronomer (wherein there is neither close reasoning, nor good stile, nor sharpness of wit, to impose upon any man) to the discretion of all sorts of Readers.

OF MANNERS. TO THE SAME EGREGIOUS PROFESSORS OF THE MATHEMATICKS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. LESSON VI.

HAVING IN THE precedent Lessons maintained the Truth of my Geometry, and sufficiently made appear, that your objections against it are but so many errors of your own, proceeding from misunderstanding of the Porpositions you have read in Euclide, and other Masters of Geometry; I leave it to your consideration to whom belong (according to your own sentence) the unhandsome attributes you so often give me upon supposition, that you your selves are in the right, and I mistaken; and come now to purge my self of those greater accusations which concern my Manners. It cannot be expected there should be much Science of any kinde in a man that wanteth Judgement; nor Judgement in a man that knoweth not the Manners due to a publique disputation in writing; wherein the scope of either party ought to be no other then the examination and manifestation of the truth. For whatsoever is added of contumely, either directly, or scommatically, is want of Charity, and uncivil; unless it be done by way of Reddition from him that is first provoked to it. I say unless it be by way of Reddition; for so was the Judgement given by the Emperor Vespasian in a quarrell between a Senato: and a Knight of Rome which had given him ill language. For when the Knight had proved, that the first ill language proceeded from the Senator, the Emperor acquitted him in these words Maledici senctor ibus non oportere; remal-dicere, fas & civtle esse. Nevertheless, now a dayes uncivill words are commonly and bitterly used by all that write in matter of Controversie, especially in Divinity, excepting now and then such writers as

have been more then ordinarily well bred, and have observed, how hainous, and ha-ardous a thing such c-ntumely is amongst some sorts of men, whether that which is said in disgrace be true or false. For evill words by all men of understanding are taken for a defiance, and a challenge to open war. But that you should have bserved so much, who are yet in your mothers belly, was not a thing to be much expected.

The faults in Manners you lay to my charge, are these, 1. Self conceit. 2. That I will be very angry with all men that do not presently submit to my Dictates. 3. That I had my Doctrine concerning Vision, out of papers which I had in my hands of Mr. Warners. 4. That I have injured the Universities. 5. That I am an Enemy to Religion. These are great faults; but such as I cannot yet confess. And therefore I must as well as I can, seek out the grounds upon which you build your Accusation. Which grounds (seeing you are not acquainted with my conve-sation) must be either in my published writings, or reported to you by honest men, and without suspition of interest in reporting it. As for my self-conceit and ostentation, you shall finde no such matter in my writings That which you alleadge from thence is first that in the Epistle Dedicatory I say of my Book de Corpore, Though it be little, yet it is full; and if good may go for great, great enough. When a man presenting a gift great or small to his betters, adorneth it the best he can to make it the more acceptable; he that thinks this to be Ostentation, and self-conceit, is little versed in the common actions of humane life. And in the same Epistle where I say of Civill Philosophy, it is no antienter then my Book de Cive, these words are added, I say it provoked, and that my detractors may see they lose their labour. But that which is truly said, and upon provocation, is not boasting, but defence. A short sum of that Book of mine, now publiquely in French, done by a Gentleman I never saw, carrieth the Title of Ethiques demonstrated. The Book it self translated into French hath not onely a great testimony from the Translator Serberius, but also

from Gassendus, and Mersennus, who being both of the Roman Religion had no cause to praise it, or the Divines of England have no cause to finde fault with it. Besides, you know that the Doctrine therein contained is generally received by all but those of the Clergy, who think their interest concerned in being made subordinate to the Civil Powe-; whose testimonies therefore are invalide. Why therefore if I commend it also against them that dispraise it publiquely, do you call it boasting? You have heard (you say) that I had promised the Quadrature of the Circle, &c. You heard then that which was not true. I have been asked sometimes, by such as saw the Figure before me, what I was doing, and I was not a-…aid to say I was seeking for the solution of that Probleme; but not that I had done it. And afterwards being asked of the success, I have said, I thought it done. This is not boasting; and yet it was enough, when told again, to make a fool believe 'twas boasting. But you the Astronomer in the Epistle before your Philosophicall Essay, say you had a great expectation of my Philosophicall, and Mathematicall works; before they were published. It may be so. Is that my fault? can a man raise a great expectation of himself by boasting? If he could, neither of you would be long before you raised it of your selves; saving that what you have already published, has made it now too late. For I verily believe there was never seen worse reasoning then in that Philo-ophicall Essay; which any judicious Reader would believe proceeded from a Praevaricator, rather then from a man that believed himself; nor worse Principles, then those in your Books of Geometry. The expectation of that which should be written by me, was raised partly by the Cogitata Physico-Mathematica of Mersennus, wherein I am often named with honour; and partly by others with whom I then conversed in Paris, without any ostentation. That no man has a great expectation of any thing that shall proceed from either of you two, I am content to let it be your praise.

Another Argument of my self-conceit, you take from my contempt of the writers of Metaphysiques and School-Divinity. If that be a sign of self-conceit, I must confess I am guilty; and if your Geometry had then been published, I had contemned that as much. But yet I cannot see the consequence (unless you lend me your better Logique) from despising insignificant and absurd language to self-conceit.

And again, in your Vindiciae Academiarum, you put for boasting, that in my Leviathan Pag. 180. I would have that Book by entire Soveraignty imposed upon the Universities; and in my Review Pag. 395. That I say of my Leviathan, I think it m-y be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the University. The cause of my writing that Book, was the consideration of what the Ministers before, and in the beginning of the Civill War, by their preaching and writing did contribute thereunto. Which I saw not onely to -end to the Abatement of the then Civill Power, but also to the gaining of as much thereof as they could (as did ofterwards more plainly appear) unto themselves. I saw also that those Ministers, and many other Gentlemen who were of their Opinion, brought their Doctrines against the Civill Power from their Studies in the Universities. Seeing therefore that so much as could be contributed to the Peace of our Country, and the settlement of Soveraign Power without any Army, must proceed from Teaching; I had reason to wish, that Civill Doctrine were truly taught in the Universities. And if I had not thought that mine was such, I had never written it. And having written it, if I had not recommended it to such as had the Power to cause it to be taught, I had written it to no purpose. To me therefore that never did write any thing in Philosophy to show my Wit, but (as I thought at least) to benefit some part or other of mankind, it was very necessary to commend my Doctrine to such men as should have the Power and Right to Regulate the Universities. I say my Doctrine; I say not my Leviathan. For wiser men may so digest the same Doctrine as to fit it better

for a publique teaching. But as it is, I beli-ve it hath framed the mines of a thousand Gentlemen to a consciencious obedience to present Government, which otherwise would have wave-ed in that Point. This therefore was no vanting, but a necessary part of the business I took in hand. You ought also to have considered, that this was said in the close of that part of my Book which concerneth Policy meerly Civill. Which part if you the Astronomer, that no- think the Doctrine unworthy to be taught, were pleased once to honour with praises printed before it, you are not very constant, no- ingenuous. But whether you did so or not, I am not curtain, though it was -old me for certain. If it were not you, it was some body else whose Judgement has as much weight at least as yours.

And for any thing you have to say from your own knowledge, I remember not that ever I saw eithe- of your faces. Yet you the Professor of Geometry go about obliquely to make me believe that Vindex hath discoursed with me, once at least, though I remember it not. I suppose it therefore true; But this I am sure is false, that either he or any man living did ever hear me brag of my Science, or praise my self, but when my defence required it. Perhaps some of our Philosophe-s that were at Paris at the same time, and acquainted with the same Learned men that I was acquainted with, might take for bragging the maintaining of my opinions, and the not yiel-ing to the reas-ns alieadged against them. If that be ostentation, they tell you the truth. But you that are so wise should have considered, that even such men as profess Philosophy are carried away with the passions of Emulation and Envy (the sole ground of this your accusation) as well as other men, and instanced in your selves. And this is sufficient to shake off your aspersions -f Ostentation and Self-conceit. For if I added, that my acquaintance know that I a- naturally of modest rather then of boasting speech, you will not believe it, becaus- you distinguish not

between that which is said upon provocation, and that which is said without , from vain glory.

The next accusation is, That I will be very angry with all men that do not presently submit to my dictates; and that for advancing the reputation of my own skill, I care not what unwo-…y -ast on others. This is in the Epistle placed before the Vindiciae Academiarum, subscribed by N S, as the Plain Song for H D in the rest of the Book to D-scant upon. I know well enough the Auth — s names; and am sorry that N S has lent his name to be abused to so ill a p — pos-. But how does this appear? What Argument, what witness is t-ere of it? You offer no-e; or a-… I conscious of any. I begin to suspect, since you the P-ofessor of Geometry have in your objections to the 20 Chapter these words concerning Vindex, O-ularis ille testis de quo h-c agitur, erat, ni fallor, ille ipse; That Vindex himself, in other company, has a visit on me. Seeing you will have me believe it, let it be so; and (as it is likely) not long after my return into England. At which time (for the — putation, it seems, I had gotten by my boasting) divers persons that professed to love Philosophy and Mathematiques, came to s-e me; and some of to let me see them, and hear and applaud what they applauded in t — mselves. I see now it hath happened to me with Vin-ex, as it happened to Dr. Harvey with Mor-…s. M-ranus jesui-e came out of Flanders hither, especially (as he sayes) to see what lea-ned men in. Divinity, E — i-ues, Physiques, and G-ometry were here yet alive, to the end by di-coursing with th-m in these Sciences, he might correct either his own, or their , was b-ought (say-s) to that most civill and renowned old man Dr. Ha-vey. very well. And in good ea-nest if he had made good use of the Time which was v — y afforded him, he might have learned of him (or of no man living) very k-owledge conce-ning the Circulation of the blood, the Generation of livin-Creatures, a-d m-ny other difficult Points of naturall Philosophy. And if he had had any thing in him but common and childish learning, he could have

shewed it no where more to his advantage, then before him that was so great a Judge of such matters. But what did he? That pretious time (which was bat little, because he was to depart again presently for Flanders) he bestowed wholly in venting his own childish Opinions, not suffering the Doctor scarce to speak; losing thereby the benefit he came for, and discovering that he came not to hear what others could say, but to show to others how learned he was himself already. Why else did he take so little time, and so mispend it? Or why returned he not again? But when he had talked away his time, and found (though patiently and civilly heard) he was not much admired, he took occasion (writing against me) to be revenged of D. Harvey, by sleighting his learning publiquely; and tels me that his learning was onely Experiments, which he sayes I say have no more certainty then Civil Histories. Which is false. My words are, Ante hos nihil certi in Physicâ erat praeter Experimenta -ui{que} sua, & Historias Naturales, si tamen & -ae dicendae -ertae sint, quae Civilibus Historiis cetiores n — sun-. Where I except expressly nom uncertainty the Experiments that every man maketh to himself. But you see the -ere-cut, by which vain Glory joyned with Ignorance passeth quickly over to E-vy and Contumely.

Thus it seems by your own confession I was used by Uin — x. He comes with some of my acquaintance in a Visit. What he said I know not, but if he -iscou-sed then, as in his Philosophicall Essay he writeth, I will be bold to say of my self, I was so far from morosity, o- (to use his Phrase) from being tetricall, as I may very well have a good opinion of my own patience. And if there passed between us the discourse you mention in your Elenchus, Pag. 116. it was an incivility in him so great, that without great civility I could not have abstained from bidding him be gone. That which passed between us, you say was this. I complained that whereas I made Sense, nothing but a perception of Motion in the Organ, nevertheless the Philosophy Schools through all Europel-d by the Text of A istotle, teach another Doctrin,

namely, that Sensation is performed by Species. This is a little mistaken. For I do glory, not complain, that whereas all the Universities of Europe hold Sensation to proceede from Species, I it to be a perception of Motion in the Organ. The answer of Vindex, you say, was, That the other Hypothesis, whereby Sense was explicated by the Principles of Motion, was commonly admitted here before my Book came out, as having been sufficiently delivered by Des Car — s, Gassendus and Sir Kenelme Digby before I had published any thing in this kinde. This then, it seems, was it that made me angry. Truly I remember not any angry word that ever I uttered in all my life to any man that came to see me, though some of them have troubled me with very impertinent discourse; and with those that argued with me, how -pertinently s-ever, I alwayes thought it more civility to be somewhat earnest in the defence of my opinion, then by obstinate and affected silence to let them see I contemned them, or hea-kned not to what they said. I- I were earnest in making good, that the manner of Sensation by such Motion as I had explicated in my Leviathan, is in none o- the Authors by him named, it was not Anger, but a ca-e of not offending him, with any signe of the contempt -hich his discourse deserved. But it was Incivility in him to make use of a Visi-, which all men take for a p-ofessi-n of Friendship, to tell me that that which I had already published for my own, was found before by Des Cartes, Gassendus, and Sir Kenelme Digby. But let any man read Des Cartes, he shall finde, that he attributeth no Motion at all to the object of sense, but an inclination to action, which inclination no man can imagine what it meaneth. And for Gassendus, and S. Kenelme Digby, it is manifest by their writings, that their opinions are not different from that or Epicurus, which is very different from mine. O- if these two, or any of those I conversed with at Paris, had prevented me in publi — ing my own D — trine, yet since it was there known, and declared for mine by Mersennus in the P-eface to his Ballistica (of which the three fi-st leaves are

imployed wholly in the setting of my opinion concerning sense, and the rest of the faculties of the S-ul) they ought not therefo-e to be said to have found it out before me. And consequently this answer which you say was given me by Vindex was nothing else but Untruth and Envy; and (because it was done by way of Visit) Incivility. But you have not alleadged, nor can alleadge any words of mine, from which can be drawn that I am so angry as you say I am with those that submit not to my Dictates. Though the discipline of the University be never so good; yet certainly this behavour of yours and his are no good Arguments to make it thought so. But you the Professor of Geometry, that out of my words spoken against Vindex in my 20 Chapter, argue my angry humour; do just as well, as when (in your Arithmetica Infinit-rum) from the continuall increase of the excess of the row of Squares above the third part of the aggregate of the greatest, you conclude they shall at last be equall to it. For though you knew that Vindex had given me first the wo-st words that possibly can be given, yet you would have that return of mine to be a Demonstration of an ang-y humou-; not then knowing what I told you even now in the beginning of this Lesson, of the sentence given by Vespasian. But to this Point I shail speak again hereafter.

Your third Accusation is, That I had my doctrine of Vision, which I pretend to be my own, out of papers which I had a long time in my hands of Mr. Warners. I never had sight of any of Mr. Warn. papers in all my life but that of Vision by Refraction (which by his approbation I carryed with me to Paris, and caused it to be printed under his own name, at the end of Mersennus his Cogitata Physico-Mathematica, which you may have there seen) and another Treatise of the Proportions of Alloy in Gold and Silver coine; which is nothing to the present purpose. In all my conversation wi-h him, I never heard him speak of any thing he had written, or was writing de Penicillo optico. And it was from me that he first heard it mentioned that

Light and Colour were but Fancy. Which he imbraced presently as a truth, and told me it would remove a rub he was then come to in the discovery of the place of the Image. If after my going hence he made any use of it (though he had it from me, and not I from him) it was well d-ne. But wheresoever you finde my Principles, make use of them, if you can, to demonstrate all the Symptomes of Vision; and I will do (or rather have done and mean to publish) the same; and let it be judged by that, whether those Principles be of mine, or other mens invention. I give you time enough, and this advantage besides, that much of my Optiques hath been privately read by others. For I never refused to lend my papers to my friends, as knowing it to be a thing of no prejudice to the advancement of Philosophy, though it be (as I have found it since) some prejudice to the advancement of my own reputation in those Sciences; which reputation I have alwayes postposed to the common benefit of the studious.

You say further (you the Geometrician) that I had the Proposition of the Spirall Line equall to a Parabolicall Line from Mr. Robervall. True. And if I had remembred it, I would have taken also his demonstration, though if I had publisht his, I would have suppressed mine. I was comparing in my thoughts those two Lines, Spirall and Parabolicall, by the Motions wherewith they were described; and considering those Motions as uniform, and the Lines from the Center to the Circumference, not to be little Parallelograms, but little Sectors, I saw that to compound the true Motion of that Point which described the Spirall, I must have one Line equall to half the Perimeter, the other equall to half the Diameter. But of all this I had not one word written. But being with Mersennus and Mr. Robervall in the Cloister of the Convent, I drew a Figu-e on the wall, and Mr. Robervall perceiving the deduction I made, told me that since the Motions which make the Parabolicall Line, are one uniform, the other accelerated, the Motions that make the Spirall must be so also; Which I presently

acknowledged; and he the next day, from this very method brought to Mersennus the demonstration of their equality. And this is the mentioned by Mersennus, Pro. Corol. 2. of his Hydraulica; Which I know not who hath most magnanimously interpreted to you in my disgrace.

The fourth accusation is, That I have injured the Universities. Wherein? First In that I — oul- have the Doctrine of my Leviathan by entire Soveraignty imposed on them. You often upb-aid me with thinking well of my own Doctrine; and gram by consequence, that I thought this Doctrine g-od. I desired not therefore that any thing should b- imposed upon them, but what (at least in my opinon) was good both for the Common-wealth and them. Nay more I would have the State make use of them to uphold the civill Power, as the Pope did to uphold the Ecclesiasticall. Is it not absurdly done to call this an Injury? But to question (you will say) whether the Civill Doctrine there taught, be such as it ought to be, or not, -…a disgrace to the Unive-sities. If that be certain, it is ce-tain also that those Se-mons and Books, which have been preached and published, both against the former and the present Government, directly or obliquely, were not made by such Ministe-s and others as had their breeding in the Universities; though all men know the contrary. But the Doctrine which I would have to be taught there, what is it? It is this, That all men that live in a Common-wealth, and receive protection of their lives and fortunes from the Supreme Governour thereof, are reciprocally -ound as far as they are able, and shall be required, to protect that Governour. Is it, think you, an un-e-sonable thing to impose the teaching of such Doctrine upon the Universities? O- will you say they taught it before, when you know that so many men which came from the Universities to preach to the People, and so many others that were not Ministers did stir the People up to resist the then Supreme Civill Power? And was it not truly therefore said, that the Universities receiving their Discipline from the Authority of the Pope, were the Shops, and Operatories

of the Clergy? Though the Competition of the P-pall and Civill power be tataken now away, yet the Competition between the Ecclesiasticall and the Civill power hath manifestly enough appeared very lately. But neither is this an upbraiding of an University (which is a Corporation or Body Artificial) but of particular men that desire to uphold the Authority of a Church, as of a distinct thing from the Common-wealth. How would you have exclaimed, it instead of -ecommending my Lev-athan to be taught in t-e Universities, I had recommen-… the erecting of a New and Lay-University, whe-ein Lay-men should have the reading of Physiqu-s, Mathematicks, Morall Philosophy, and Politicks, as the Clegy have now the sole teaching or Divinity? Yet the thing would be profitable, and tend much to the Polishing of ma-…s -ature, without much publique charge. There will need but one House, and the endowment of a few Professions. And to make some learn the better, it would do very well that none should come thither sent by their Parents, as to a Trade to get their living by, but that it should be a place for such ingenuous men, as being free to dispose of their own time, love Truth for it self. In the mean time Divinity may go on in Oxford and Cambridge to furnish the Pulpit with men to cry down the Civil Power, if they continue to do as they did. If I had (I say) made such a Motion in my Leviathan, though it would have offended the Divines, yet it had been no injury. But ’tis an injury (you will say) to deny in generall the utility of the Antient Schooles, and to deny that we have received from them our Geometry. True, if I had not spoken distinctly of the Schools of Philosophy, and said expresly, that the Geometricians passed n-t then under the name of Philosophers; and that in the School of Plato (the best of the Antient Philosophers) none were received that were not alrea-y in some measure Geometricians. Euclide taught Geometry; but I never heard of a Sect of Philosophers, called Euclidians, or Alexandrians, or ranged with any of the other Sects, as Peripat-tiques, Stoiques, Academiques, Epicureans, Pyrrhonians, &c. But

what is this to the Universities of Christendome? Or why are we beholding for Geometry to our Universities, more then to Gresham Colledge, or to private men in London, Paris, and other places, which never taught or learned it in a publique School? For even those men that living in our Universities have most advanced the Mathematiques, attained their knowledge by other means then that of publique Lectures, where few Auditors, and those of unequall proficiency cannot make benefit by one and the same Lesson. And the true use or publique Professors, especially in the Mathematiques, being to resolve the Doubts, and Problems (as far as they can) of such as come unto them with desire to be informed.

That the Universities now are not regulated by the Pope, but by the Civill Power, is true, and well. But where say I the contrary? And thus much for the first injurie.

Another (you say) is this, that in my Leviathan Pag. 380. I say, The principall Schooles were or-a-n-d for the three Professions of Roman Religion, Roman Law, and the Art of Medicine. Thirdly, that I say. Philosophy had no otherwise place there then as a hand-maid to Roman Religion, Fourthly, since the authority of Aristotle was received there, that Study is not pr-perly Philosophy but A-ist-telity. Fifthly, That for Geometry, till of late times it had no place there at all. As for the second, it is too evident to be denyed; the Fellowships having been all ordained for those Professions; and (saving the Change of Religion) being so yet. Nor hath this any Reflection upon the Universities, either as they now are, or as they then we-e, seeing it was not in their own power to endow themselves, or to receive other Laws and Discipline then their Founder, and the State were pleased to ordain. For the third, it is also evident. For all men know that none but of the Roman Religion had any Stipend or pre-e-ment in any University, where that Religion was established; No, nor for a great w-ile, in their Common-wea-…s; but were every where persecuted as H-r-tiques.

But you will say the words in my L-viat-an are not, Philosophy ha- no place, but hath no place. Are you not ashamed to -y charge a mistake or the word hath-o-had? Which was either a mistake of the Printer, or i- it so in the Copy, it could be no other then the mistake of a letter in the writing, unless you think you ca — ke m-n believe that after fifty years being acquainted with what was publiquely p-of-st an- practised in Ox — rd and Cambridge, I knew not what Religion they were of. taking advantage from the mistake a word, or of a l-t-er, I finde also in the Elenchus, whe — for praetendit s-s-ire, there is praetendit s-ire, wh — you the Geome — ician -…mble, mistaking it I think for an Anglicisme, not for a fault in the impression.

To the -o — th, you p-ete-d, that men are not now so tied to Arist-tle as not to enjoy a liberty of Philosop-i — g, it were otherwise when I was conversant in Magdalen Hall. Was it so then? -hen am I absolved, unless you can shew some publique A — of the University made since that time to alte- it. For it is not enough to name some few particular ingenuous men that usu-p- Liberty in their private discourses, or (with connivence) in their p-blike disputatio-s. And your Doctrine, that even here you avow, of Abstracted Essences, Immatertall Substances, and of Nunc-stans; and your improper language in using the word (not as mine, for I have it no where) Successive Eternity; as also your Doctrine of Condensation, and your a-guing from naturall reason the incomp-eh-nsible Mysteries of Religion, and your Malicious W-iting, are very -…wd — gnes, that you your selves are none of those which you say do freely Philosophise, but that both your Philosophy and your Language are under the S-rvitude, not of the Roman Religion, but of the Ambition of some other Docto-s, that seek, as the Romish Clergy did, to draw all humane learning the upholding of their Power Ecclesiasticall. Hitherto therefore there is no injury done to t-e Universiti — or fifth, you grant it, namely, That till of late there was no allowance for the -…ing o- G-…ry. But least you -houl- be thought to grant

me any thing, y-u say, you th-, G-ome-ry hath now s- much plac- in the Universities, that when Mr.-…bs shall -au- published his Phi — sophicall an- Geometricall p —— s, you assur- your you shall be g-eat -umb-er in the University, who will un — rst-n- as much or more of them, -esireth — ul-, &c. But though this be o- t — now, yet it maketh nothing against my . I k — w enough that Sir He-ry S — iles-ectu — s w — e rounde- an- e-…owed Di- I — ny th-n, th-t there were in Oxford-any Geometricians? But I — ny now,-…at or you is or the Number. For my Philosophicall and G-… pi — es, , and you have understood onely so muc- in them, as all will easily by your o-jectio-s to them, and by your own pub-… Geometry, that neither or you understand any in P-ilos-phy or in . And yet you woul- have Books o- yours -o an A-g — en-, and to be an Ind-x o- the Philosophy and Geomet-y -e -ound in the . W-… is a greater injury and di-g-ace to them, th — any wo — s o- mine though by -o-r selves.

Your last and greatest accusation, or rather railing (for an Accusation should contain, whether true or false, some particular fact, or certain words, out of which it might seem at least to be inferred) is, that I am an enemy to Religion. Your words are, It is said that Mr Hobs is no otherwise an Enemy to the Roman Religion, saving onely as it hath the name of Religion. This is said by Vindex. You the Geometrician in your Epistle Dedicatory say thus, With what pride and imperiousness be tramples on all things both Humane and Divine, uttering fearfull and horrible words of God, (peace) of Sin, of the Holy Scripture, of all Incorporeal substances in generall, of the Immortall soul of man, and of the rest of the weighty points of Religion (down) it is not so much to be doubted as lamented. And at the end of your objections to the 18 Chapter, Perhaps you take the whole History of the Full of Adam for a Fable, which is no wonder, wh-… you say the Rules of honouring and worshipping of God are to be taken from the Laws. Down I say; you ba-ke now at the Supreme Legislative Power. Therefore it is not I,

but the Laws which must rate you off. But do not many other men as well as you read my Leviathan, and my other Books? And yet they all finde not such enmity in them against Religion. Take heed of calling them all Atheists that have read and approved my Leviathan. Do you think I can be an Atheist and not know it? Or knowing it durst have offered my Atheism to the Press? Or do you think him an Atheist, or a co-… of the Holy Scripture, that sayeth nothing of the Deity, but what he prov-… by the Scripture? You that take so hainously that I would have the Rules of Gods worship- a Christian Common-wealth taken from the Laws, tell me, from whom you would have them taken? From yourselves? Why so, more then from me? From the Bishops? Right, if the Supreme Power of the Common-wealth will have it so; If not, why from them rather then from me? From a Consistory of Presbyters by themselves, or joyned with Lay-Elders, whom they may sway as they please? Good, If the Supreme Governour of the Common-wealth will have it so. If not, why from them, rather then from me, or from any man else? They are wiser and learn-der then I. It may be so; but it has not yet appeared. Howsoever, let that be granted. Is there any man so very a fool as to subject himself to the Rules of other men in those -…ings which so neerly concern himself, for the Title they assume of being wise and learned, unless they also have the sword which must protect them. But it seems you understand the sword as comprehended. If so, do you not then receive the Rules of Gods worship from the Civill Power? Yes doubtless; and you would expect, if your Consistory had that sword, that no man should dare to exercise o- teach any Rules concerning Gods worship which were not by you allowed. See therefore how much you have been transported by your malice towards me, to injure the Civill Power by which you live. If you were not despised, you would in some places and times, where and when the Laws are more severely executed, be shipt away for this your madness to America, I would say, to Anticyra. What luck have I,

when this, of the Laws being the Rules of Gods publique worship, was by me said and applyed to the Vindication of the Church of England the Power of the Roman Clergy, it should be followed with such a storm from the Ministers Presbyterian and Episcopall of the Church of England? Again, for those other Points, namely, that I approve not of Incoporeall Bodies, not of other Immortality of the soul, then that which the Scripture calleth Eternall Life, I do but as the Scripture leads me. To the Texts whereof by me alleadged, you should either have answered, or forborne to revile me for the conclusions I derived from them. Lastly, what an absurd question is it to ask me whether it he in the Power of the Magistrate, whether the world be eternall or not? It were fit you knew in the Power of the Supreme Magistrate to make a Law for the punishment of them that shall pronounce publiquely of that question any thing contrary to that which the Law hath once pronounced. The truth is, you are content that the Papall power be cut off, and declaimed against as much as any man will; but the Ecclesiasticall Power which of la-e was ai-ed at by the Clergy here, being a part thereof, every violence done to the Papall Power is sensible to them yet; like that which I have heard say of a man, whose leg being cut off for prevention of a Gangrene that began in his Toe, would nevertheless complain of a pain in his Toe, when his leg was cut off.

Thus much in my defence; which I believe if you had foreseen, this Accusation of yours had been left out. I come now to examine (though it be done in part already) what Manners those are which I finde every where in your Writings.

And first, How came it into your minds that a man can be an Atheist, I mean an Atheist in his Conscience? I know that David confesseth of himself, upon sight of the Prosperity of the wicked, that his feet had almost slipt, that is, that he had slipt into a short doubtfulness of the Divine Providence. And if any thing else can cause a man to slip in the same kinde,

it is the seeing such as you (who though you write nothing, but what is dictated to each of you by a Doctor of Divinity) to break the greatest of Gods Commandement (which is Charity) in every Line before his face. And though such forgettings of God be somewhat more then shor- doubtings, and sudden transportations incident to humane Passion, yet I do not for that cause think you Atheists, and enemies of Religion, but onely ignorant and imprudent Christians. But how, I say, could you think me an Atheist, unless it were because finding your doubts of the Deity more frequent then other men do, you are thereby the apter to fall upon that kinde of reproach? Wherein you are like women of poor & evil Education when they scold; amongst whom the readiest disgracefull word is Whore. Why not Thief, or any other ill name, b-t because when they remember themselves, they think that reproach the likeliest to be true?

Secondly, tell me what crime it was which the Latines called by the name of Scelus? You think not (unless you be Stoiques) that all Crimes are equall. Scelus was never used but for a Crime of greatest mischief, as the taking away of Life and Honour; and besides, basely acted, as by some clandestine way, or by such a way as might be covered with a Lve. But when you insinuate in a writing publisht that I am an Atheist, you make your selves Authors to the multitude, and do all you can to stir them up to attempt upon my life; and if it succeed, then to sneak out of it by leaving the fault on them that are but actors. This is to indeavour great mischief basely; and therefore Scelus. Again, to deprive a man of the honour he hath merited, is no little wickedness; and this you endeavour to do by publishing falsely that I challenge as my own the inventions of other men. This is therefore Scelus Publiquely to tel all the world that I will be angry with all men that do not presently submit to my Dictates; to deprive me of the friendship of the world. Great dammage, and a lie, and yours. For to publish any untruth of another man to his disgrace, on hear-say from his enemy, is

the same fault as if he publisht it on his own credit. I- I should say I have heard that Dr. Wallis was esteemed at Oxford for a simple fellow, and much interiour to his fellow-professor Dr. War- (as indeed I have heard, but do not believe it) though this be no great disgrace to Dr. Wallis, yet he would think I did him injury. Therefore publique Accusation upon hear-say is Scelus. And whosoever does any of these things does Seel rate. But you the Professors of the Mathematiques at Oxford, by the advice of two Doctors of Divinity have dealt thus with me. Therefore you have done (I say not foolishly, though no wickedness he without folly, but Scelera — ,.

Thirdly, it is ill Manners, in reprehending trut-, to send a man in a boasting way to your own errors; as you the Professor of Geometry have often sent me to your two T-actates of the Angle of Contact, and Arithmetica Infinitorum.

Fourthly, it is ill Manners, to diminish the just reputation of worthy men after they be dead, as you the Professor of Geometry have done in the case of Joseph Scaliger.

Fifthly, when I had in my Leviathan suffered the Clergy of the Church of England to -…pe, you did imprudently in bringing any of them in again. An Ulysses upon so light an occasion would not have ventured to again into the Cave of Polyphemus.

Lastly, how ill does such Levi-y and Scurrility, which both of you have shewn so often in your writings, become the gravity and sanctity requisite to the calling o- the Ministery? They are too many to be repeated. Do but consider you the Geometrician how unhandsome it is to play upon my name, when both yours and mine are pl-bcian names; though from Willis by Wallis, you go from yours in Wallisius. The -est of using at every word M-Hobb-, is lest to them beyond Sea. But this is not to ill as some of the rest. I will write out one of them as it is in the fourth Page of your Elenchus; Whence it appears that your Empusa was of the number of those Fairies

which you call in English Hob-goblins. The word is male ofand; and -hence comes the childrens play called the play of Empusa, Anglicé (hitherto in Latine all but Hob-goblins, then follows) Fox, Fox, come out of your hole (in English, then in Latine again,) in which the boy that is called the Fox, holds up one foot, and jumps with the other, which in English is to hop. When a stranger shall read this, and hoping to finde therein some witty conceit, shall with much adoe have gotten it interpreted and explained to him, what will he think of our Doctors of Divinity at Oxford, that will take so much pains as to go out of the language they set forth in, for so ridiculous a purpose? You will say it is a pretty Paranomafia. How you call it there I know not, but it is commonly called here a Clinch; and such a one as is too insipide for a boy of twelve years old, and very unfit for the sanctity of a Minister, and gravity of a Doctor of Divinity. But I pray you tell me where it was you read the word Empusa for the boys play you speak of, or for any other play amongst the Greeks. In this (as you have done throughout all your other writings) you presume too much upon your first cogitations. There be a hundred other scoffing passages, and ill-favoured attributes given me in both your writings, which the Reader will observe without my pointing to them, as easily as you would have him; and which perhaps some young Students, finding them full of Gall, will mistake for Salt. Therefore to disabuse those youngmen, and to the end they may not admire such kind of wit, I have here and there been a little with you then else I would have been. If you think I did not spare you, but that I had not wit enough to give you as scornfull names as you give me, are you content I should try? Yes (you the Geometrician will say) give me what names you please, so you call me not Arithmetica Infinitorum (I will not.) Nor Angle of Contact, nor Arch-Spirall, Nor Quotient (I will not.) But I here dismiss you both together. So go your wayes, you uncivill Ecclesia, — ques, Inhumane Divines, Dedoctors of Morality, Unafinous Colleagues,

Egregious pa-r of Iss-…, most wretched Vindices and Indices Academiarum; and remember Vespasians Law, that it is uncivill to give ill language first, but civill and lawfull to return it. But much more remember the Law of God, to obey your Soveraigns in all things; and not only not to dero-… from them, but also to pray for them, and as far as you can to maintain their Authority, and therein your own . (do you hear?) take heed of speaking your minde so cleerly in answering m- Leviathan, as I have done in writing it. You should do best not to meddle with it at all, because it is undertaken, and in part published already, and will be better performed, from Term to Term, by one Christopher Pike.

Seven Philosophical Problems

1682 TRANSLATION OF ‘PROBLEMATICA PHYSICA’

CONTENTS

TO THE KING.
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
CHAP. I. PROBLEMS OF GRAVITY.
CHAP. II. PROBLEMS OF TIDES.
CHAP. III. PROBLEMS OF VACUUM.
CHAP. IIII. PROBLEMS OF HEAT AND LIGHT.
CHAP. V. PROBLEMS OF HARD AND SOFT.
CHAP. VI. PROBLEMS OF RAIN, WIND, AND OTHER WEATHER.
CHAP. VII. PROBLEMS OF MOTION PERPENDICULAR, OBLIQUE; OF PRESSION AND PERCUSSION; REFLECTION AND REFRACTION; ATTRACTION AND REPULSION.
CHAP. VIII. THE DELPHIQUE PROBLEM OR DUPLICATION OF THE CUBE.

TO THE KING.

THAT WHICH I do here most humbly present to Your Sacred Majesty, is the best Part of my Meditations upon the Natural Causes of Events, both of such as are commonly known, and of such as have been of late artificially exhibited by the Curious.

They are ranged under seven Heads. 1. Problems of Gravity. 2. Problems of Tides. 3. Problems of Vacuum. 4. Problems of Heat. 5. Problems of Hard and Soft. 6. Problems of Wind and Weather. 7. Problems of Motion Perpendicular, and Oblique, &c. To which I have added, Two Propositions of Geometry; One is, The Duplication of the Cube, hitherto sought in vain; The other, A Detection of the absurd Use of Arithmetick, as it is now applied to Geometry.

The Doctrine of Natural Causes hath not infallible and evident Principles. For there is no Effect which the Power of God cannot produce by many several ways.

But seeing all Effects are produced by Motion, he that supposing some one or more Motions can derive from them the necessity of that Effect whose Cause is required, has done all that is to be expected from Natural Reason. And though he prove not that the thing was thus produced, yet he proves that thus it may be produced, when the Materials, and the power of Moving is in our hands; which is as useful as if the Causes themselves were known. And notwithstanding the absence of rigorous Demonstration, this Contemplation of Nature (if not rendred obscure by empty terms) is the most Noble Imployment of the Mind that can be, to such as are at leisure from their necessary Business.

This that I have done I know is anunworthy Present to be offered to a KING, though considered (as God considers Offerings) together with the Mind and Fortune of the Offerer, I hope will not be to Your Majesty unacceptable.

But that which I chiefly consider in it is, that my Writing should be tryed by Your Majesties Excellent Reason untainted with the Language that has been invented or made use of by Men when they were puzzled; and who is acquainted with all the Experiments of the time; and whose approbation (if I have the good Fortune to obtain it) will protect my reasoning from the Contempt of my Adversaries.

I will not break the custom of joyning to my Offering a Prayer; And it is, That Your Majesty will be pleased to pardon this following short Apology for my Leviathan. Not that I rely upon Apologies, but upon Your Majesties most Gracious General Pardon.

That which is in it of Theology, contrary to the general Current of Divines, is not put there as my Opinion, but propounded with submission to those that have the Power Ecclesiastical.

I did never after, either in Writing or Discourse, maintain it.

There is nothing in it against Episcopacy; I cannot therefore imagine what reason any Episcopal-man can have to speak of me (as I hear some of them do) as of an Atheist, or man of no Religion, unless it be for making the Authority of the Church wholly upon the Regal Power; which I hope Your Majesty will think is neither Atheism nor Heresie.

But what had I to do to meddle with matters of that nature, seeing Religion is not Philosophy, but Law?

It was written in a time when the pretence of Christ's Kingdom was made use of for the most horrid Actions that can be imagined; And it was in just Indignation of that, that I desired to see the bottom of that Doctrine of the Kingdom of Christ, which divers Ministers then Preached for a Pretence

to their Rebellion; which may reasonably extenuate, though not excuse the writing of it.

There is therefore no ground for so great a Calamny in my writing. There is no sign of it in my Life; and for my Religion, when I was at the point of Death at St. Germains, the Bishop of Durham can bear witness of it, if he be asked. Therefore, I most humbly beseech Your Sacred Majesty not to believe so ill of me upon reports, that proceed often (and may do so now) from the displeasure which commonly ariseth from difference in Opinion; nor to think the worse of me, if snatching up all the Weapons to fight against Your Enemies, I lighted upon one that had a double edge.

Your Majesties Poor and most Loyal Subject, THOMAS HOBBES.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

CHAP. I. PROBLEMS OF GRAVITY.

A.

WHAT may be the cause, think you, that stones, and other bodies, thrown upward, or carried up and left to their liberty, fall down again (for ought a man can see) of their own accord? I do not think (with the old Philosophers) that they have any love to the Earth, or are sullen, that they will neither go nor stay. And yet I cannot imagine what body there is above that should drive them back.

B.

For my part, I believe the cause of their descending is not in any natural appetite of the bodies that descend, but rather that the Globe of the Earth hath some special motion, by the which it more easily casteth off the Air, than it doth other bodies. And then this descent of those we call heavy bodies, must of necessity follow; unless there be some empty spaces in the world to receive them. For when the Air is thrown off from the Earth, somewhat must come into the place of it, (in case the world be full) and it must be those things which are hardliest cast off, that is those things which we say are heavy.

A.

But suppose there be no place empty (for I will defer the Question till anon) how can the Earth cast off either the Air, or any thing else?

B.

I shall shew you how, and that by a familiar Example. If you lay both your hands upon a Basen with water in it, how little soever, and move it circularly, and continue that motion for a while, and you shall see the water rise upon the sides, and fly over; by which you may be assured that there is a kind of circulating motion, which would cast off such bodies as are contiguous to the body so moved.

A.

I know very well there is; and it is the same motion which Country people use to purge their Corn; For the Chaff and Straws, by casting the Grain to the side of the Seive, will come towards the middle. But I would see the Figure.

B.

Here it is. There is a Circle pricked out, whose Center is A, and three less Circles, whose Centers are B, C, D; let every one of them represent the Earth, as it goeth from B to C, and from C to D, always touching the uttermost Circle, and throwing off the Air, as is marked at E and F. And if the world were not full, there would follow by this scattering of the Air, a great deal of space left empty. But supposing the world full, there must be a perpetual shifting of the Air, one part into the place of another.

A.

But what makes a stone come down, suppose from G?

B.

If the Air be thrown up beyond G, it will follow, that at the last, if the motion be continued, all the Air will be above G, that is, above the stone; which cannot be, till the stone be at the Earth.

A.

But why comes it down still with encreasing swiftness?

B.

Because as it descends, and is already in motion, it receiveth a new impression from the same cause, which is the Air, whereof as part mounteth, part also must descend, supposing as we have done the plenitude of the world. For, as you may observe by the Figure, the motion of the Earth, according to the Diameter of the uttermost Circle, is progressive; and so the whole motion is compounded of two motions, one circular, and the other progressive; and consequently the Air ascends and circulates at once. And because the stone descending receiveth a new pressure in every point of its way, the motion thereof must needs be accelerated.

A.

'Tis true; For it will be accelerated equally in equal times; and the way it makes will encrease in a double proportion to the times, as hath heretofore been demonstrated by Galileo. I see the solution now of an Experiment, which before did not a little puzzle me. You know that if two plummets hang by two strings of equal length, and you remove them from the perpendicular equally, I mean in equal angles, and then let them go, they will make their turns and returns together, and in equal times; And though the arches they describe grow continually less and less, yet the times they

spend in the greater arches, will still be equal to the time they spend in the lesser.

B.

’Tis true. Do you find any Experiment to the contrary?

A.

Yes; For if you remove one of the plummets from the perpendicular, so as (for example) to make an angle with the perpendicular of 80 degrees, and the other so as to make an angle of 60 degrees, they will not make their turns and returns in equal times.

B.

And what say you is the cause of this?

A.

Because the arches are the spaces which these two motions describe, they must be in double proportion to their own times; which cannot be, unless they be let go from equal altitudes, that is, from equal angles.

B.

’Tis right; and the Experiment does not cross, but confirm the equality of the times in all the arches they describe, even from 90 degrees to the least part of one degree.

A.

But is it not too bold, if not extravagant, an assertion, to say the Earth is moved as a man shakes a Basen or a Seive? Does not the Earth move from West to East every day once, upon his own Center, and in the Ecliptick Circle once a year? And now you give it another odd motion; How can all these consist in one and the same body?

B.

Well enough. If you be a Shipboard under sail, do not you go with the Ship? Cannot you also walk upon the Deck? Cannot every drop of bloud move at the same time in your veins? How many motions now do you assign to one and the same drop of bloud? Nor is it so extravagant a thing to attribute to the Earth this kind of motion; but that I believe if we certainly knew what motion it is that causeth the descent of bodies, we should find it either the same, or more extravagant. But seeing it can be nothing above that worketh this effect, it must be the Earth it self that does it; and if the Earth, then you can imagine no other motion to do it withal, but this; And you will wonder more, when by the same motion I shall give you a probable account of the causes of very many other works of Nature.

A.

But what part of the Heaven do you suppose the Poles of your pricked Circle point to?

B.

I suppose them to be the same with the Poles of the Ecliptick. For, seeing the Axis of the Earth in this Nation, and in the annual motion keeps parallel to it self, the Axis must in both motions be parallel as to sense. For, the

Circle which the Earth describes, is not of visible magnitude at the distance it is from the Sun.

A.

Though I understand well enough how the Earth may make a stone descend very swiftly under the Ecliptick, or not far from it, where it throws off the Air perpendicularly; yet about the Poles of the Circle methinks it should cast off the Air very weakly. I hope you will not say that bodies descend faster in places remote from the Poles, than nearer to them.

B.

No; but I ascribe it to the like motion in the Sun and Moon. For such motions meeting, must needs cast the stream of the Air towards the Poles; And then there will be the same necessity for the descent there, that there is in other places, though perhaps a little more slowly. For you may have observed that when it snows in the South Parts, the flakes of Snow are not so great as in the North; which is a probable sign they fall in the South from a greater height, and consequently disperse themselves more, as water does that falls down from a high and steep Rock.

A.

'Tis not improbable.

B.

In natural causes all you are to expect is but probability; which is better yet then making Gravity the cause, when the cause of Gravity is that you desire to know; and better then saying the Earth draws it, when the Question is, how it draws?

A.

Why does the Earth cast off Air more easily than it does Water, or any other heavy bodies?

B.

It is indeed the Earth that casteth off that Air which is next unto it. But it is that Air which casteth off the next Air; and so continually Air moveth Air; which it can more easily do then any other thing, because like bodies are more susceptible of one anothers motions; as you may see in two Lutestrings equally strained, what motion one string being stricken communicates to the Air, the same will the other receive from the Air; but strained to a differing note, will be less, or not at all moved. For there is no body but Air that hath not some internal, though invisible motion of its parts. And it is that internal motion which distinguisheth all natural bodies one from another.

A.

What is the cause why certain Squibs, though their substance be either Wood or other heavy matter, made hollow and filled with Gunpowder, which is also heavy, do nevertheless when the Gunpowder is kindled, fly upwards?

B.

The same that keeps a man that swims from sinking, though he be heavier then so much water; He keeps himself up, and goes forward by beating back the water with his Feet; and so does a Squib, by beating down

the Air with the stream of the fired Gunpowder, that proceeding from its Tail makes it recoil.

A.

Why does any Brass or Iron Vessel, if it be hollow, flote upon the water, being so very heavy?

B.

Because the Vessel and the Air in it, taken as one body, is more easily cast off than a body of water equal to it.

A.

How comes it to pass, that a Fish (especially such a broad Fish as a Turbut or a Plaice, which are broad and thin) in the bottom of the Sea, perhaps a mile deep, is not press'd to death with the weight of water that lies upon the back of it?

B.

Because all heavy bodies descend towards one point, which is the Center of the Earth, and consequently the whole Sea descending at once does arch it self so, as that the upper parts cannot press the parts next below them.

A.

It is evident; Nor can there be possibly any weight, as some suppose there is, of a Cylinder of Air, or Water, or of any other liquid thing, while it remains in its own Element, or is sustained and inclosed in a Vessel, by which one part cannot press the other.

CHAP. II. PROBLEMS OF TIDES.

A.

WHAT makes the Flux and Reflux of the Sea twice in a natural day?

B.

We must come again to our Basen of water; wherein you have seen, whilst it was moved, how the water mounteth up by the sides, and withal goes circling round about. Now if you should fasten to the inside of the Basen some bar from the bottom to the top, you would see the water, instead of going on, go back again from that bar, ebbing, and the water on the other side of the bar to do the same, but in counter-time; and consequently to be highest where the contrary streams meet together, and then return again, marking out four quarters of the Vessel, two by their meeting, which are the high waters, and two by their retiring, which are the low waters.

A.

What bar is that you find in the Ocean, that stops the current of the water, like that you make in the Basen?

B.

You know that the main Ocean lies East and West, between India and the Coast of America; and again, on the other side, between America and India.

If therefore the Earth have such a motion as I have supposed, it must needs carry the current of the Sea East and West; In which course, the bar that stoppeth it is the South part of America, which leaves no passage for the water, but the narrow Streight of Magellan. The Tide rises therefore upon the Coast of America; And the rising of the same in this part of the world proceedeth from the swelling chiefly of the water there; and partly also from the North Sea, which lieth also East and West, and has a passage out of the South Sea by the Streight of Anian, between America and Asia.

A.

Does not the Mediterranean-Sea lie also East and West? why are there not the like Tides there?

B.

So there are, proportionable to their lengths, and quantity of water.

A.

At Genoa, at Ancona there are none at all, or not sensible.

B.

At Venice there are, and in the bottom of the Streights; and a current all along both the Mediterranean-Sea, and the Gulf of Venice; And it is the current that makes the Tides unsensible at the sides but the check makes them visible at the bottom.

A.

How comes it about that the Moon hath such a stroke in the business, as so sensibly to encrease the Tides at Full and Change?

B.

The motion I have hitherto supposed but in the Earth, I suppose also in the Moon, and in all those great Bodies that hang in the Air constantly, I mean the Stars, both fixed and errant. And for the Sun and Moon, I suppose the Poles of their motion to be the Poles of the Aequinoctial; which supposed, it will follow, (because the Sun, the Earth and the Moon at every Full and Change are almost in one streight line) that this motion of the Earth will be made swifter than in the Quarters. For this motion of the Sun and Moon being communicated to the Earth, that hath already the like motion, maketh the same greater; and much greater when they are all three in one streight line, which is only at the Full and Change, whose Tides are therefore called Spring Tides.

A.

But what then is the cause that the Spring-Tides themselves are twice a year, namely when the Sun is in the Equinoctial, greater than at any other times?

B.

At other times of the year, the Earth being out of the Aequinoctial, the motion thereof, by which the Tides are made, will be less augmented, by so much as a motion in the obliquity of 23 degrees or thereabout (which is the distance between the Aequinoctial and Ecliptick Circles) is weaker then the motion which is without obliquity.

A.

All this is reasonable enough, if it be possible that such motions as you suppose in these bodies, be really there. But that is a thing I have some reason to doubt of; For, the throwing off of Air, consequent to these motions, is the cause, you say, that other things come to the Earth; And therefore the like motions in the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, casting off the Air, should also cause all other things to come to every one of them. From whence it will follow, that the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and all other bodies but Air, should presently come together into one heap.

B.

That does not follow: For if two bodies cast off the Air, the motion of that Air will be repress'd both ways, and diverted into a course towards the Poles on both sides; and then the two bodies cannot possibly come together.

A.

'Tis true. And besides, this driving off the Air on both sides, North and South, makes the like motion of Air there also. And this may answer to the Question, How a stone could fall to the Earth under the Poles of the Ecliptick, by the only casting off of Air?

B.

It follows from hence, that there is a certain and determinate distance of one of these bodies (the Stars) from another, without any very sensible variation.

A.

All this is probable enough, if it be true that there is no Vacuum, no place empty in all the World. And supposing this motion of the Sun and Moon to be in the plain of the Aequinoctial, methinks that this should be the cause of the Diurnal motion of the Earth; And because this motion of the Earth is (you say) in the plain of the Aequinoctial, the same should cause also a motion in the Moon on her own Center, answerable to the Diurnal motion of the Earth.

B.

Why not? what else can you think makes the Diurnal motion of the Earth, but the Sun? And for the Moon, if it did not turn upon its own Center, we should see sometimes one, sometimes another face of the Moon, which we do not.

CHAP. III. PROBLEMS OF VACUUM.

WHAT CONVINCING ARGUMENT is there to prove, that in all the world there is no empty place?

B.

Many; but I will name but one; and that is, the difficulty of separating two bodies hard and flat laid one upon another; I say, the difficulty, not the impossibility. It is possible, without introducing Vacuum, to pull assunder any two bodies, how hard and flat soever they be, if the force used be greater than the resistance of the hardness. And in case there be any greater difficulty to part them, (besides what proceeds from their hardness) then there is to pull them further assunder when they are parted, that difficulty is Argument enough to prove there is no Vacuum.

A.

These Assertions need demonstration. And first, how does the difficulty of separation argue the Plenitude of all the rest of the world?

B.

If two flat polish'd Marbles lie one upon another, you see they are hardly separated in all points at one and the same instant; and yet the weight of either of them it is enough to make them slide off one from the other. Is not the cause of this, that the Air succeeds the Marble that so slides, and fills up the place it leaves.

A.

Yes certainly. What then?

B.

But when you pull the whole Superficies assunder, not without great difficulty, what is the cause of that difficulty?

A.

I think as most men do, that the Air cannot fill up the space between in an instant; For the parting is in an instant.

B.

Suppose there be Vacuum in that Air into which the Marble you pull off is to succeed, shall there be no Vacuum in the Air that was round about the two Marbles when they touched? Why cannot that Vacuum come into the place between? Air cannot succeed in an instant, because a body; and consequently cannot be moved through the least space in an instant. But emptiness is not a body, nor is moved, but made by the act it self of separation. There is therefore (if you admit Vacuum) no necessity at all for the Air to fill the space left, in an instant. And therefore, with what ease the Marble coming off presseth out the Vacuum of the Air behind it, with the same ease will the Marbles be pulled assunder. Seeing then, if there were Vacuum, there would be no difficulty of Separation; it follows, because there is difficulty of separation, that there is no Vacuum.

A.

Well now, supposing the world full, how do you prove it possible to pull those Marbles assunder?

B.

Take a piece of soft wax; Do not you think the one half touches the other half as close as the smoothest Marbles? yet you can pull them assunder. But how? still as you pull, the wax grows continually more and more slender; there being a perpetual parting or discession of the outermost part of the wax one from another; which the Air presently fills, and so there is a continual lessening of the wax, till it be no bigger than a hair, and at last separation. If you can do the same to a Pillar of Marble, till the outside give way, the effect will be the same, but much quicker, after it once begins to break in the Superficies; because the force that can master the first resistance of the hardness, will quickly dispatch the rest.

A.

It seems so by the brittleness of some hard bodies. But I shall afterward put some Questions to you, touching the nature of hardness. But now to return to our subject,

What reason can you render (without supposing Vacuum) of the effects produced in the Engine they use at Gresham Colledge?

B.

That Engine produceth the same effects, that a strong wind would produce in a narrow room.

A.

How comes the wind in? You know the Engine is a hollow round pipe of brass; into which is thrust a Cylinder of wood covered with Leather, and fitted to the Cylinder so exactly as no Air can possibly pass between the leather and the brass?

B.

I know it; and that they may thrust it up, there is a hole left in the Cylinder to let the Air out before it; which they can stop when they please. There is also in the bottom of the Cylinder a passage into a hollow Globe of Glass; which passage they can also open and shut at pleasure. And at the top of that Globe there is a wide mouth to put in what they please to try conclusions on; and that also to be opened and shut as shall be needful. 'Tis of the nature of a Pop-gun which Children use, but great, costly, and more ingenious. They thrust forward, and pull back the wooden Cylinder (because it requires much strength) with an Iron screw. What is there in all this to prove the possibility of Vacuum.

A.

Whan this wooden Cylinder covered with leather, fit and close is thrust home to the bottom, and the holes in the hollow Cylinder of Brass close stopped, how can it be drawn back, as with the screw they draw it, but that the space it leaves must needs be empty. For it is impossible that any Air can pass into the place to fill it?

B.

Truly I think it close enough to keep out Straw and Feathers, but not to keep out Air, nor yet matter. For suppose they were not so exactly close but that there were round about a distance for a small hair to lye between, Then

will the pulling back of the Cylinder of wood force so much Air in, as in retiring it forces back, and that without any sensible difficulty. And the Air will so much more swiftly enter as the passage is left more narrow. Or if they touch, and the contract be in some points, and not in all, the Air will enter as before in case the force be augmented accordingly. Lastly, though they touch exactly, if either the Leather yield, or the Brass (which it may do to the force of a strong screw) the Air will again enter. Do you think it possible to make two superficies so exquisitly touch in all points as you suppose, or Leather so hard as not to yield to the force of a screw? The Body of Leather will give passage both to Air and Water, as you will confess when you ride in Rainy and Windy weather. You may therefore be assured that in drawing out their wooden-leather Cylinder they force in as much Air as will fill the place it leaves, and that with as much swiftness as is answerable to the strength that drives it in. The effect therefore of their pumping is nothing else but a vehement Wind, a very vehement Wind coming in on all sides of the Cylinder at once into the hollow of the Brass Pipe, and into the hollow of the Glass Globe joyned to it.

A.

I see the reason already of one of their wonders, which is, that the Cylinder they pump with, if it be left to it self, after it is pulled back will swiftly go up again. You will say the Air comes out again with the same violence by reflection; and I believe it?

B.

This is argument enough that the place was not empty. For what can fetch or drive up the Sucker, as they call it, if the place within were empty; for that there is any weight in the Air to do it, I have already demonstrated to be impossible.

Besides, you know, when they have sucked out (as they think) all the Air from the Glass Globe, they can nevertheless both see through it what is done, and hear a sound from within when there is any made. Which (if there were no other, but there are many other,) is argument enough that the place is still full of Air.

A.

What say you to the swelling of a Bladder even to bursting, if it be a little blown when it is put into the Receiver, (for so they call the Globe of Glass?)

B.

The stream of Air that from every side meeting together, and turning in an infinite number of small points, do pierce the Bladder in innumerable places with great violence at once, like so many invisible small wimbles; especially if the Bladder be a little blown before it be put in, that it may make a little resistance. And when the Air has once pierced it, it is easie to conceive, that it must afterward by the same violent motion be extended till it break. If before it break you let in fresh Air upon it, the violence of the motion will thereby be tempered, and the Bladder be less extended. For that also they have observed. Can you imagine how a Bladder should be extended, and broken, by being too full of Emptiness.

A.

How come living creatures to be killed in this Receiver, in so little a time as 3 or 4 minutes of an hour?

B.

If they suck into their lungs so violent a wind thus made, you must needs think it will presently stop the passage of their bloud; and that is death; though they may recover if taken out before they be too cold. And so likewise will it put out fire; but the Coals taken out whilst they are hot, will revive again. 'Tis an ordinary thing in many Coal-pits, (whereof I have seen the experience,) that a wind proceeding from the sides of the Pit every way, will extinguish any fire let down into it, and kill the workmen, unless they be quickly taken out.

A.

If you put a vessel of water into the Receiver, and then suck out the Air, the water will boil. What say you to that?

B.

It is like enough it will dance in so great a bustling of the Air; but I never heard it would be hot. Nor can I imagine how Vacuum should make any thing dance. I hope you are by this time satisfied, that no experiment made with the Engine at Gresham Colledge, is sufficient to prove that there is, or that there may be Vacuum.

A.

The World you know is finite, and consequently, all that infinite space without it, is empty. Why may not some of that Vacuum be brought in, and mingled with the Air here?

B.

I know nothing in matters without the World.

A.

What say you to Torricellioes Experiment in Quick-silver, which is this. There is a Bason at A filled with Quick-silver, suppose to B, And CD a hollow glass pipe filled with the same. Which if you stop with your finger at B, and so set it upright, and then if you take away your finger, the Quick-silver will fall from C downwards, but not to the bottom. For it will stop by the way, suppose at D. Is it not therefore necessary that that space between C and D be left empty? Or will you say the Quick silver does not exactly touch the sides of the glass pipe?

B.

I'le say neither. If a man thrust down into a vessel of Quick-silver a blown Bladder, will not that Bladder come up to the top?

A.

Yes certanly, or a Bladder of Iron, or of any thing else but Gold.

B.

You see then that Air can pierce Quick-silver.

A.

Yes, with so much force as the weight of Quick-silver comes to.

B.

When the Quick-silver is fallen to D, there is so much the more in the bason. And that takes up the place which so much Air took up before. Whither can this Air go if all the World without that glass pipe B C were

full? There must needs be the same or as much Air come to that space (which only is empty) between C and D. By what force? By the weight of the Quick-silver between D and B. Which Quick-silver weigheth now upward; or else it could never have raised that part higher, which was at first in the Bason. So you see the weight of Quick-silver can press the Air through Quick-silver up into the pipe, till it come to an equality of force as in D. Where the weight of the Quick-silver is equal to the force which is required in Air to go through it.

A.

If a man suck a Vial that has nothing in it but Air, and presently dip the mouth of it into water, the water will ascend into the Vial. Is not that an argument that part of the Air had been sucked out, and part of the room within the Vial left empty?

B.

No. If there were empty space in the World, why should not there be also some empty space in the Vial before it was sucked? And then why does not the water rise to fill that, when a man sucks the Vial he draws nothing out neither into his Belly not into his Lungs, nor into his Mouth; only he sets the Air within the glass into a circular motion, giving it at once an endeavour to go forth by the sucking, and an endeavour to go back by not receiving it into his mouth. And so with a great deal of labour glues his lips to the neck of the Vial. Then taking it off, and dipping the neck of the Vial into the water before the circulation cease, the Air with the endeavour it hath now gotten, pierces the water and goes out. And so much Air as goes out, so much matter comes up into the room of it.

CHAP. IIII. PROBLEMS OF HEAT AND LIGHT.

A.

WHAT is the cause of Heat?

B.

How know you, that any thing is Hot but your self?

A.

Because I perceive by sense it Heats me.

B.

It is no good argument, The thing Heats me; therefore it is Hot. But what alteration do you find in your body at any time by being Hot?

A.

I find my skin more extended in Summer than in Winter; and am sometimes fainter and weaker then ordinary, as if my Spirits were exhaled; and I sweat.

B.

Then that is it you would know the cause of. I have told you before that by the motion I suppose both in the Sun, and in the Earth, the Air is dissipated, and consequently that there would be an infinite number of small

empty places but that the World being full, there comes from the next parts other Air into the spaces, they would else make empty. When therefore this motion of the Sun is excercised upon the Superficies of the Earth, if there do not come out of the Earth it self some corporal substance to supply that tearing of the Air, we must return again to the admission of Vacuum. If there do, then you see how by this motion fluid bodies are made to exhale out of the Earth. The like happens to a mans body or hand, which when he perceives, he says he is Hot. And so of the Earth when it sendeth forth Water and Earth together in Plants, we say it does it by Heat from the Sun.

A.

'Tis very probable, and no less probable, that the same action of the Sun, is that which from the Sea and moist places of the Earth, but especially from the Sea fetcheth up the water into the Clouds. But there be many ways of Heating besides the action of the Sun or of Fire. Two pieces of Wood will take Fire if in Torning they be prest together.

B.

Here again you have a manifest laceration of the Air by the reciprocal and contrary motions of the two pieces of wood, which necessarily causeth a coming forth of whatsoever is Aereal or fluid within them, and (the motion pursued) a dissipation also of the other more solid parts into Ashes.

A.

How comes it to pass that a man is warmed even to sweating almost with every extraordinary labour of his body?

B.

It is easie to understand, how by that labour all that is liquid in his body is tossed up and down, and thereby part of it also cast forth.

A.

There be some things that make a man Hot without sweat or other evaporation, as Caustiques, Nettles and other things.

B.

No doubt. But they touch the part they so Heat, and cannot work that effect at any distance.

A.

How does Heat cause light, and that partially in some bodies more, in some less, though the Heat be equal?

B.

Heat does not cause Light at all. But in many Bodies, the same cause, that is to say, the same motion causeth both together; so that they are not to one another as cause and effect, but are concomitant Effects, sometimes of one and the same motion.

A.

How?

B.

You know the rubbing or heard pressing of the Eye, or a stroke upon it makes an apparition of Light without and before it, which way soever you

look. This can proceed from nothing else but from the restitution of the Organ pressed or stricken, unto its former ordinary situation of parts. Does not the Sun by his thrusting back the Air upon you eyes press them? Or does not those bodies whereon the Sun shines (though by reflection) do the same, though not so strongly? And do not the Organs of Sight, the Eye, the Heart, and Brains resist that pressure by an endeavour of restitution outwards? Why then should there not be without and before the Eye, an apparition of Light in this case as well as in the other?

A.

I grant there must. But what is that which appears after the pressing of the eye? For there is nothing without, that was not there before; or if there were, methinks another should see it better, or as well as he; or if in the dark, methinks it should enlighten the place.

B.

It is a fancy, such as is the appearance of your face in a Looking-glass; such as is a Dream; such as is a Ghost; such as is a spot before the Eye that hath stared upon the Son or Fire. For all these are of the Regiment of Fancy, without any body concealed under them, or behind them, by which they are produced.

A.

And when you look towards the Sun or Moon, why is not that also which appears before your Eyes at that time a fancy?

B.

So it is. Though the Sun it self be a real Body, yet that bright Circle of about a foot Diameter cannot be the Sun, unless there be two Suns, a greater and a lesser. And because you may see that which you call the Sun, both above you in the Skie, and before you in the Water, and two Suns (by distorting your Eye) in two places of the Skie, one of them must needs be Fancy. And if one, both. All sense is Fancy though the cause be always in a real Body.

A.

I see by this that those things which the Learned call the Accidents of Bodies, are indeed nothing else but diversity of Fancy; and are inherent in the Sentient, and not in the Objects, except Motion and Quantity. And I perceive by your Doctrine you have been tampering with Leviathan. But how comes Wood with a certain degree of Heat to shine, and Iron also with a greater degree; but no Heat at all to be able to make water shine?

B.

That which shineth hath the same Motion in its parts that I have all this while supposed in the Sun and Earth. In which Motion there must needs be a competent degree of swiftness, to move the sense, that is, to make it visible. All Bodies that are not fluid will shine with Heat, if the Heat be very great. Iron will shine and Gold will shine; but water will not, because the parts are carried away before they attain to that degree of swiftness; which is requisite.

A.

There are many fluid Bodies, whose parts evaporate, and yet they make a flame, as Oyl, and Wine, and other strong drinks:

B.

As for Oyl I never saw any inflamed by it self; how much soever Heated, therefore I do not think they are the parts of the Oyl, but of the combustible body oyled that shine, but the parts of Wine and strong Drinks have partly a strong Motion of themselves, and may be made to shine, but not with boiling, but by adding to them as they rise the flame of some other body.

A.

How can it be known that the particles of Wine have such a Motion as you suppose?

B.

Have you ever been so much distempered with drinking Wine, as to think the Windows and Table move?

A.

I confess (though you be not my Confessor,) I have, but very seldom, and I remember the window seemed to go and come in a kind of circling Motion, such as you have described. But what of that?

B.

Nothing, but that it was the Wine that caused it; which having a good degree of that Motion before, did when it was Heated in the Veins, give that concussion (which you thought was in the window,) to the Veins themselves, and (by the continuation of the parts of mans Body) to the Brain; and that was it which made the window seem to move.

A.

What is Flame? For I have often thought the Flame that comes out of a small heap of Straw, to be more (before it hath done Flaming,) then a hundred times the Straw it self.

B.

It was but your Fancy. If you take a stick in your hand by one end, the other end burning, and move it swiftly, the burning end, if the Motion be circular, shall seem a circle; if streight, a streight line of Fire, longer or shorter, according to the swiftness of the Motion, or to the space it moves in. You know the cause of that.

A.

I think it is, because the impression of that visible Object, which was made at the first instant of the Motion did last till it was ended. For then it will follow that it must be visible all the way, the impressions in all points of the time being equal.

B.

The cause can be no other. The smallest spark of Fire flying up seems a line drawn upward; and again by that swift circular Motion which we have supposed for the cause of Light, seems also broader then it is. And consequently the Flame of every thing must needs seem much greater then it is.

A.

What are those sparks that flie out of the Fire?

B.

They are small pieces of the wood or Coals, or other Fuel loosened and carried away with the Air that cometh up with them. And being extiguished before their parts be quite dissipated into others, are so much Soot, and black, and may be fired again.

A.

A Spark of Fire may be stricken out of a cold stone. It is not therefore Heat that makes this shining.

B.

No ’Tis the Motion that makes both the Heat and shining; and the stroke makes the Motion. For every of those Sparks, is a little parcel of the stone, which swiftly moved, imprinteth the same Motion into the matter prepared, or receive it.

A.

How comes the Light of the Sun to burn almost any combustible matter by rerefraction through a convex glass, and by reflection from a concave?

B.

The Air moved by the Sun presseth the convex glass in such manner as the action continued through it, proceedeth not in the same streight line by which it proceeded from the Sun, but tendeth more toward the center of the body it enters. Also when the action is continued through the convex body it bendeth again the same way. By which means the whole action of the Sun-beams are enclosed within a very small compass; in which place therefore

there must be a very vehement Motion; and consequently if there be in that place combustible matter, such as is not very hard kindle, the parts of it will be dissipated, and receive that Motion which worketh on the Eye as other Fire does.

The same reason is to be given for burning by Reflection. For there also the Beams are collected into almost a point.

A.

Why may not the Sun-beams be such a Body as we call Fire, and pass through the pores of the glass so disposed as to cary them to a point, or very near?

B.

Can there be a glass that is all pores; If there cannot, then cannot this effect be produced by the passing of Fire through the pores. You have seen men llght their Tobacco at the Sun with a burning glass, or with a ball of Cristal, held which way they will indifferently. Which must be impossible, unless the ball were all pores. Again, neither you nor I can conceive any other Fire then we have seen, nor then such as water will put out. But not only a solid Globe of Glass or Cristal will serve for a burning Glass, but also a hollow one filled with water. How then does the Fire from the Sun pass through the glass of water without being put out before it come to the matter they would have it burn?

A.

I know not. There comes nothing from the Sun. If there did, there is come so much from it already, that at this day we had had no Sun,

CHAP. V. PROBLEMS OF HARD AND SOFT.

A.

WHAT call you Hard, and what Soft.

B.

That body whereof no one part is easily put out of its place, without removing the whole, is that which I and all men call Hard; and the contrary Soft. So that they, are but degrees one of another.

A.

What is the cause that makes one body Harder then another, or (seeing you say they are but degrees of one another) what makes one body Softer then another, and the same body sometimes Harder, sometimes Softer?

B.

The same Motion which we have supposed from the beginning for the cause of so many other effects. Which Motion not being upon the center of the part moved, but the part it self going in another circle to and again, it is not necessary that the Motion be perfectly circular. For it is not circulation, but the reciprocation, I mean the to and again that does cast off, and lacerrate the Air, and consequently produce the fore-mentioned effects.

For the cause therefore of Hardness, I suppose the reciprocation of Motion in those things which are Hard, to be very swift, and in very small

circles.

A.

This is somewhat hard to believe. I would you could supply it with some visible experience.

B.

When you see (for example) a Cross-bow bent, do you think the parts of it stir?

A.

No. I am sure they do not.

B.

How are you sure? You have no argument for it, but that you do not see the Motion. When I see you sitting still, must I believe there is no Motion in your parts within, when there are so many arguments to convince me there is.

A.

What argument have you to convince me that there is Motion in a Cross-bow when it stands bent?

B.

If you cut the string, or any way set the Bow at liberty it will have then a very visible Motion. What can be the cause of that?

A.

Why the setting of the Bow at liberty.

B.

If the Bow had been crooked before it was bent, and a string tied to both ends, and then cut asunder, the Bow would not have stir'd. Where lies the difference?

A.

The Bow bent has a Spring; unbent it has none, how crooked soever.

B.

What mean you by Spring?

A.

An endeavour of restitution to it's former posture.

B.

I understand Spring as well as I do endeavour.

A.

I mean a Prnciple or beginning of Motion in a contrary way to that of the force which bent it.

B.

But the beginning of Motion is also Motion, how insensible soever it be. And you know that nothing can give a beginning of Motion to it self. What is it therefore that gives the Bow (which you say you are sure was at rest when it stood bent) its first endeavour to return to its former posture?

A.

It was he that bent it.

B.

That cannot be. For he gave it an endeavour to come forward, and the Bow endeavours to go backward.

A.

Well, grant that endeavour be Motiou, and Motion in the Bow unbent, how do you derive from thence, that being set at liberty it must return to its former posture?

B.

Thus There being within the Bow a swift (though invisible) Motion of all the parts, and consequently of the whole; the bending causeth that Motion, which was along the Bow (that was beaten out when it was hot into that length) to operate a cross the length in every part of it, and the more by how much it is more bent; and consequently endeavours to unbend it all the while it stands bent. And therefore when the force which kept it bent is removed, it must of necessity return to the posture it had before.

A.

But has that endeavour no effect at all before the impediment be removed? For if endeavour be Motion, and every Motion have some effect more or less, methinks this endavour should in time produce something.

B.

So it does. For in time (in a long time) the course of this internal Motion will lie along the Bow, not according to the former, but to the new acquired posture. And then it will be as uneasie to return it to its former posture, as it was before to bend it.

A.

That's true. For Bows long bent lose their appetite to restitution, long custom becoming nature. But from this internal reciprocation of the parts, how do you infer the Hardness of the whole Body.

B.

If you apply force to any single part of such a body, you must needs disorder the Motion of the next parts to it before it yield, and there disordered, the Motion of the next again must also be disordered; and consequently no one part can yield without force sufficient to disorder all. But then the whole body must also yield. Now when a body is of such a nature as no single part can be removed without removing the whole, men say that body is Hard.

A.

Why does the Fire melt divers Hard bodies, and yet not all?

B.

The hardest bodies are those wherein the Motion of the parts are the most swift, and yet in the least circles.

Wherefore if the Fire, the Motion of whose parts are swift, and in greater circiles, he made so swit, as to be strong enough to master the Motion of the parts of the Hard body, it will make those parts to move in a greater compass, and thereby weaken their resistance, that is to say, Soften them, which is a degree of liquefaction. And when the Moton is so weakened, as that the parts lose their coherence by the force of their own weight, then we count the body melted.

A.

Why are the Hardest things the most brittle, insomuch that what force soever is enough to bend them, is enough also to break them?

B.

In bending a Hard body, as (for example) a Rod of Iron, you do not inlarge the space of the internal Motion of the parts of Iron, as the Fire does; but you master and interrupt the Motion, and that chiefly in one place. In which place the Motion that makes the Iron Hard being once overcome, the prosecution of that bending must needs suddenly master the Motions of the parts next unto it, being almost mastered before.

A.

I have seen a small piece of glass, the figure whereof is this A A B C. Which piece of glass if you bend toward to top, as in C, the whole body will shatter asunder into a Million of pieces, and be like to so much dust. I would fain see you give a probable reason of that.

B.

I have seen the Experiment. The making of the glass, is thus, They dip an Iron Rod into the molten glass that stands in a Vessel within the Furnace. Upon which Iron Rod taken out, there will hang a drop of molten but tough Mettal of the figure you have described, which they let fall into the water. So that the main drop comes first to the water, and after it the tail, which though streight whilst it hung on the end of the Rod, yet by falling into the water becomes crooked. Now you know the making of it, you may consider what must be the consequence of it. Because the main drop A comes first to the water, it is therefore first quenched, and consequently that the Motion of the parts of that drop, which by the Fire were made to be moved in a larger compass, is by the water made to shrink into lesser circles towards the other end B, but with the same or not much less swiftness.

A.

Why so?

B.

If you take any long piece of Iron, Glass, or other uniform and continued body; and having Heated one end thereof, you hold the other end in your hand, and so quench it suddenly, though before, you held it easily enough, yet now it will burn your fingers.

A.

It will so.

B.

You see then how the Motion of the parts from A toward C is made more violent and in less compass by quenching the other parts first. Besides, the whole Motion that was in all the parts of the main drop A, is now united in the small end B C. And this I take to be the cause why that small part B C is so exceeding stiff. Seeing also this Motion in every small part of the glass, is not only circular, but proceeds also all along the glass from A to B, the whole Motion compounded will be such as the Motion of Spinning any Soft matter unto Thread, and will dispose the whole body of the glass in Threads, which in other Hard bodies are called the grain.

Therefore if you bend this body (for example) in C (which to do will require more force then a man would think that has not tryed) those threads of Glass must needs be all bent at the same time, and stand so, till by the breaking of the Glass at C, they be all at once set at liberty. And then all at once being suddenly unbent, like so many brittle, and over-bent Bows, their Strings breaking, be shivered in pieces.

A.

'Tis like enough to be so. And if nature have betrayed her self in any thing, I think it is in this, and in that other experience of the Cross-bow; which strongly and evidently demonstrates the internal reciprocation of the Motion, which you suppose to be in the internal parts of every Hard body. And I have observed somewhat in Looking-glasses which much confirms that there is some such Motion in the internal parts of Glass, as you have supposed for the cause of Hardness. For let the Glass be A B, and let the Object at C be a Candle, and the Eye at D. Now by divers Reflections and Refractions in the two superficies of the Glass, if the Lines of Vision be very oblique, you shall see many images of the Candle, as E, F, G, in such order and position as is here described. But if you remove your Eye to C, and the Candle to D, they will appear in a situation manifestly different

from this. Which you will yet more plainly perceive if the Looking-Glass be coloured, as I have obseved in Red and Blew Glasses; and could never conceive any probable cause of it, till now you tell me of this secret Motion of the parts across the grain of the Glass, acquired by cooling it this or that way.

B.

There be very many kinds of Hard bodies, Metals, Stones, and other kinds in the bowels of the Earth, that have been there ever sence the beginning of the World; and I believe also many different sorts of Juices that may be made Hard. But for one general cause of Hardness it can be no other then such an internal Motion of parts as I have already described, whatsoever may be the cause of the several concomitant qualities of their Hardness in particular.

A.

We see water Hardened every Frosty day. It's likely therefore you may give a pribable cause of Ice. What is the cause of Freezing of the Ocean towards the Poles of the Earth?

B.

You know the Sun being always between the Tropicks, and (as we have supposed) always casting off the Air; and the Earth likewise casting it off from it's self, there must needs on both sides be a great Stream of Air towards the Poles, shaving the superficies of the Earth and Sea, in the Northern and Southern Climates. This shaving of the Earth and Sea by the Stream of Air must needs contract and make to shrink those little Circles of the internal parts of Earth and Water, and consequently Harden them, first at

the superficies, into a thin skin, which is the first Ice; and afterwards the same Motion continuing, and the first Ice co-operating, the Ice becomes thicker. And this I conceive to be the cause of the Freezing of the Ocean.

A.

If that be the cause, I need not ask how a Bottle of water is made to Freeze in warm weather with Snow, or Ice mingled with Salt. For when the Bottle is in the midst of it, the Wind that goeth out both of the Salt and of the Ice as they dissolve, must needs shave the superficies of the Bottle, and the Bottle work accordingly on the water without it, and so give it first a thin skin, and at last thicken it into a solid piece of Ice. But how comes it to pass that water does not use to Freeze in a deep Pit?

B.

A deep Pit is a very thick Bottle, and such as the Air cannot come at but only at the top, or where the Earth is very loose and spungy.

A.

Why will not Wine Freeze as well as Water?

B.

So it will when the Frost is great enough. But the internal Motion of the parts of Wine and other Heating Liquors is in greater Circles and stronger then the Motion of the parts of water; and therefore less easily to be Frozen, especally quite through, because those parts that have the strongest Motion retire to the center of the Vessel.

CHAP. VI. PROBLEMS OF RAIN, WIND, AND OTHER WEATHER.

A.

WHAT is the original cause of Rain? and how is it generated?

B.

The motion of the Air (such as I have described to you already) tending to the dis-union of the parts of the Air, must needs cause a continual endeavour (there being no possibility of Vacuum) of whatsoever fluid parts there are upon the face of the Earth and Sea, to supply the place which would else be empty.

This makes the water, and also very small and loose parts of the Earth and Sea to rise, and mingle themselves with the Air, and to become mist and Clouds. Of which the greatest quantity arise there, where there is most water, namely, from the large parts of the Ocean; which are the South Sea, the Indian Sea, and the Sea that divideth Europe and Africa from America; over which the Sun, for the greatest part of the year is perpendicular, and consequently raiseth a greater quantity of water. Which afterwards gathered into Clouds, falls down in Rain.

A.

If the Sun can thus draw up the water; though but in small drops, why can it not as easily hold it up?

B.

It is likely it would also hold them up, if they did not grow greater by meeting together, nor were carried away by the Air towards the Poles.

A.

What makes them gather together?

B.

It is not improbable that they are carried against Hills, and there stopt till more overtake them. And when they are carried towards the North or South where the force of the Sun is more oblique and thereby weaker, they descend gently by their own weight. And because they tend all to the center of the Earth, they must needs be united in their way for want of room, and so grow bigger. And then it Rains.

A.

What is the reason it Rains so seldom, but Snows so often upon very high Mountains?

B.

Because perhaps when the water is drawn up higher then the highest Mountains, where the course of the Air between the Aequator and the Poles is free from stopping, the Stream of the Air Freezeth it into Snow. And ’tis in those places only where the Hills shelter it from that Stream, that it falls in Rain.

A.

Why is there so little Rain in Egypt, and yet so much in other parts nearer the Aequinoctial, as to make the Nile overflow the Countrey?

B.

The cause of the falling of Rain, I told you was the the stopping, and consequently the collection of Clouds about great Mountains, especially when the Sun is near the Aequinoctial, and thereby draws up the water more potently, and from greater Seas. If you consider therefore that the Mountains in which are the springs of Nile, lye near the Aequinoctial and are exceeding great, and near the Indian Sea, you will not think it strange there should be great store of Snow. This as it melts makes the Rain of Nile to rise, which in April and May going on toward Egypt arrived there about the time of the Solstice, and overflow the Countrey.

A.

Why should not the Nile then overflow that Countrey twice a year? For it comes twice a year to the Aequinoctial.

B.

From the Autumnal Aequinox, the Sun goeth on toward the Southern Tropique. And therefore cannot dissolve, the Snow on that side of the Hills that look towards Egypt.

A.

But then there ought to be such another Innundation Southward.

B.

No doubt but there is a greater descent of water there in their Summer then at other times; as there must be wheresoever there is much Snow melted. But what should that innundate, unless it should overflow the Sea that comes close to the foot of those Mountains? And for the cause why it seldom Rains in Egypt, it may be this, That there are no very high Hills near it to collect the Clouds. The Mountains whence Nile riseth being near 2000 Miles off. The nearest on one side are the Mountains of Nubia, and on the other side Sina, and the Mountains of Arrabia.

A.

Whence think you proceed the Winds?

B.

From the Motion (I think) especially of the Clouds, partly also from whatsoever is moved in the Air.

A.

It is manifest, that the Clouds are moved by the Winds; so that there were Winds before any clouds could be moved. Therefore I think you make the Effect before the Cause.

B.

If nothing could move a Cloud but Wind, your objection were good. But you allow a Cloud to descend by it's own weight. But when it so descends, it must needs move the Air before it, even to the Earth, and the Earth again repel it, and so make lateral Winds every way. Which will carry forwards other Clouds if there be any in their way, but not the Cloud that made them

The Vapour of the water rising into Clouds, must needs also as they rise, raise a Wind?

A.

I grant it. But how can the slow motion of a Cloud make so swift a Wind as it does?

B.

It is not one or two little Clouds, but many and great ones that do it. Besides, when the Air is driven into places already covered; it cannot but be much the swifter for the narrowness of the passage

A.

Why does the South Wind more often then any other bring Rain with it?

B.

Where the Sun hath most power, and where the Seas are greatest, that is in the South, there is most water in the Air; which a South wind can only bring to us. But I have seen great showers of Rain sometimes also when the wind hath been North, but it was in Summer, and came first, I think, from the South or West, and was but brought back from the North.

A.

I have seen at Sea very great Waves when there was no Wind at all. What was it then that troubled the Water?

B.

But had you not Wind enough presently after?

A.

We had a Storm within a little more then a quarter of an hour after.

B.

That Storm was then coming and had moved the Water before it. But the Wind you could not perceive, for it came downwards with the descending of the Clouds, and pressing the Water bounded above your Sail till it came very near. And that was it that made you think there was no Wind at all.

A.

How comes it to pass that a Ship should go against the Wind which moves it, even almost point blank, as if it were not driven but drawn?

B.

You are to know first, that what Body soever is carryed against another Body, whether perpendicularly, or obliquely, it drives it in a perpendicular to the superficies it lighteth on. As for Example, a Bullet shot against a flat wall, maketh the Stone (or other matter it hits) to retire in a perpendicular to that flat; or, if the Wall be round, towards the center, that is to say, perpendicularly. For if the way of the motion be oblique to the Wall, the motion is compounded of two motions, one parrallel to the Wall, and the other perpendicular. By the former whereof the Bullet is carried along the Wall side, by the other it approacheth to it. Now the former of these motions can have no effect upon it; all the battery is from the motion perpendicular, in which it approacheth. And therefore the part it hits must also retire perpendicularly. If it were not so, a Bullet with the same swiftness would

execute as much obliquely shot, as perpendicularly; which you know it does not.

A.

How do you apply this to a Ship?

B.

Let A. B. be the Ship, the head of it A. If the Wind blow just from A. towards B. ’tis true, the Ship cannot go forward howsoever the sail be set. Let C. D. be perpendicular to the Ship, and let the Sail E. C. be never so little oblique to it, and F. C. perpendicular to E. C. and then you see the Ship will gain the space D. F. to the headward.

A.

It will so, but when it is very near to the Wind it will go forward very slowly, and make more way with her side to the Leeward.

A.

It will indeed go slower in the proportion of the Line A. E. to the Line C. E. But the Ship will not go so fast as you think sideward: One is the force of that Wind which lights on the side of the Ship it self; the other is, the bellying of the Sail; for the former, it is not much because the Ship does not easily put from her the Water with her side; and bellying of the Sail, gives some little hold for the Wind to drive the Ship a stern.

A.

For the motion sideward I agree with you; but I had thought the bellying of the Sail, had made the Ship go faster.

B.

But it does not; only in a fore-wind it hinders least.

A.

By this reason a broad thin Board should make the best Sail.

B.

You may easily foresee the great incommodities of such a Sail. But I have seen tryed in little what such a Wind can do in such a case. For I have seen a Board set upon four truckles, with a staff set up in the midst of it for a Mast, and another very thin and broad Board fastned to that staff in the stead of a Sail; and so set as to receive the Wind very obliquely, I mean so as to be within a point of the Compass directly opposite to it; and so placed upon a reasonable smooth pavement where the Wind blew somewhat strongly. The event was first, that it stood doubting whether it should stir at all or no, but that was not long; and then it ran a head extream swiftly, till it was overthrown by a Rub.

A.

Before you leave the Ship tell me how it comes about that so small a thing as a Rudder, can so easily turn the greatest Ship?

B.

’Tis not the Rudder only, there must also be a stream to do it; you shall never turn a Ship with a Rudder in a standing pooll, nor in a natural current.

You must make a stream from head to stern, either with Oares or with Sails: when you have made such a stream, the turning of the Rudder obliquely holds the Water from passing freely; and the Ship or Boat cannot go on directly, but as the Rudder inclines to the stern, so will the Ship turn. But this is too well known to insist upon: you have observed, that the Rudders of the greatest Ships are not very broad, but go deep into the Water, whereas Western Barges, though but small Vessels, have their Rudders much broader, which argues that the holding of Water from passing is the office of a Rudder: and therefore to a Ship that draws much Water the Rudder is made deep accordingly, and in Barges that draw little Water, the Rudders as less deep, must so much the more be extended in breadth.

A.

What makes Snow?

B.

The same cause which (speaking of Hardness) I supposed for the cause of Ice. For the Stream of Air proceeding from. That both the Earth and the Sun cast off the Air, and consequently maketh a stream of Air from the Aequinoctial towards the Poles, passing amongst the Clouds, shaving those small drops of Water whereof the Clouds consist, and congeals them as they do the Water of the Sea, or of a River. And these small frozen drops are that which we call Snow.

A.

But then how are great drops frozen into Hailstones, and that especially (as we see they are) in Summer?

B.

It is especially in Summer; and hot weather, that the drops of Water which make the Clouds, are great enough; but it is then also that Clouds are sooner and more plentifully carryed up. And therefore the current of the Air strengthned between the Earth and the Clouds, becomes more swift; and thereby freezeth the drops of Water, not in the Cloud it self, but as they are falling. Nor does it freeze them throughly, the time of their falling not permitting it, but gives them only a thin coat of Ice; as is manifest by their suddain dissolving.

A.

Why are not somteimes also whole Clouds when pregnant and ready to drop, frozen into one piece of Ice?

B.

I belive they are so whensoever it Thunders.

A.

But upon what ground do you believe it?

B.

From the manner or kind of noise they make, namely a crack; which I see not how it can possibly be made by Water or any other soft Bodies whatsoever.

A.

Yes, the Powder they call Aurum Fulminans, when throughly warm, gives just such another crack as Thunder.

B.

But why may not every small grain of that Aurum Fulminans by it self be heard, though a heap of them together be soft, as is any heap of Sand. Salts of all sorts are of the nature of Ice. But Gold is dissolved into Aurum Fulminans by Nitre and other Salts. And the least grain of it gives a little crack in the fire by it self. And therefore when they are so warmed by degrees, the crack cannot chuse but be very great.

A.

But before it be Aurum Fulminans they use to wash away the Salt (which they call dulcifying it,) and then they dry it gently by degrees.

B.

That is, they exhale the pure Water that is left in the Powder, and leave the Salt behind to Harden with drying. Other Powder made of Salts without any Gold in them will give a crack as great as Aurum Fulminans. A very great Chymist of our times hath written, that Salt of Tarter, Salt-peter, and a little Brimstone ground together into a Powder, and dryed, a few grains of that Powder will be made by the fire to give as great a Clap as a Musquet.

A.

Me thinks it were worth your tryal to see what effect a Quart or a Pint of Aurum Fulminans would produce, being put into a great Gun made strong

enough on purpose, and the Breech of the Gun set in hot Cinders, so as to heat by degrees, till the Powder fly.

B.

I pray you try it your self; I cannot spare so much Money.

A.

What is it that breaketh the Clouds when they are frozen?

B.

In very hot weather the Sun raiseth from the Sea and all moist places abundance of Water, and to a great height. And whilst this Water hangs over us in Clouds, or is again descending, it raiseth other Clouds, and it hapens very often that they press the Air between them, and squeeze it through the Clouds themselves very violently; which as it passes shaves and hardens them in the manner declared.

A.

That has already been granted, my question is what breaks them?

B.

I must here take in one supposition more.

A.

Then your Basen (it seems) holds not all you have need of.

B.

It may for all this, for the supposition I add is no more but this; that what internal motion I ascribe to the Earth, and other the Concrete parts of the World, is to be supposed also in every of their parts how small soever; for what reason is there to think, in case the whole Earth have in truth the motion I have ascribed to it, that one part of it taken away, the remaining part should love that motion. If you break a Load-stone both parts will retain their vertue, though weakened according to the diminution of their quantity; I suppose therefore in every small part of the Earth, the same kind of motion, which I have supposed in the whole: and so I recede not yet from my Basen.

A.

Let it be supposed, and withall, that abundance of Earth (which I see you aim at,) be drawn up together with the Water. What then?

B.

Then if many pregnant Clouds, some ascending and some descending meet together, and make concavities between, and by the pressing out of the Air, as I have said before, become Ice; those Atomes (as I may call them) of Earth will be by the straining of the Air through the water of the Clouds, be left behind, and remain in the Cavities of the Clouds, and be more in number then for the proportion of the Air therein. Therefore for want of liberty they must needs justle one another, and become (as they are more and more streightened of room) more and more swift, and consequently at last break the Ice suddenly and violently, now in one place, and by and by in another; and make thereby so many claps of Thunder, and so many Flashes of Lightning. For the Air Recoiling upon our Eyes, is that which maketh those Flashes to our Fancy.

A.

But I have seen Lightning in a very clear Evening, when there has been neither Thunder nor Clouds.

B.

Yes in a clear evening; because the Clouds and the Rain were below the Horison, perhaps 40 or 50 Miles off; so that you could not see the Clouds nor hear the Thunder.

A.

If the Clouds be indeed Frozen into Ice, I shall not wonder if they be sometimes also so scituated, as (like Looking-Glasses) to make us see sometimes three or more Suns by Refraction and Reflection.

CHAP. VII. PROBLEMS OF MOTION PERPENDICULAR, OBLIQUE; OF PRESSION AND PERCUSSION; REFLECTION AND REFRACTION; ATTRACTION AND REPULSION.

IF A BULLET from a certain point given, be shot against a wall Perpendicularly and again from the same Point Oblique, What will be the proportion of the Forces wherewith they urge the wall?

For Example, let the wall be A B, a point given E, a Gun C E that carries the Bullet Perpendicularly to F, and another Gun D E that carries the like Bullet with the same swiftness Oblique to G; In what proportion will their Forces be upon the Wall?

B.

The force of the stroke Perpendicular from E to F will be greater then the Oblique force from E to G, in the proportion of the line E G to the line E F.

A.

How can the difference be so much? Can the Bullet lose so much of its force in the way from E to G?

B.

No we will suppose it loseth nothing of its swiftness. But the cause is, That their swiftness being equal, the one is longer in coming to the wall then the other, in Proportion of Time, as E G to E F. For though their

swiftness be the same considered in themselves, yet the swiftness of their approach to the wall is greater in E F then in E G, in proportion of the lines themselves.

A.

When a Bullet enters not, but rebounds from the wall, does it make the same Angle going off, which it did falling on, as the Sun-beams do?

B.

If you measure the Angles close by the wall there difference will not be ensible; otherwise it will be great enough, For the Motion of the Bullet grows continually weaker. But it is not so with the Sun-beams which press continually and equally.

A.

What is the cause of Reflection? When a body can go no further on, it has lost its Motion. Whence then comes the Motion by which it reboundeth?

B.

This Motion of rebounding or reflecting proceedeth from the resistance. There is a difference to be considered between the Reflection of Light, and of a Bullet, answerable to their different Motions, pressing and striking. For the action which makes Reflection of Light, is the Pressure of the Air upon the Reflecting Body, caused by the Sun, or other shining body, and is but a contrary endeavour; as if two men should press with their breasts upon the two ends of a Staff, though they did not remove one another, yet they would find in themselves a great disposition to press backward upon whatsoever is

behind them, though not a total going out of their places. Such is the way of Reflecting Light. Now, when the falling on of the Sun-beams is Oblique, the action of them is nevertheless Perpendicular to the Superficies it falls on. And therefore the Reflecting Body, by resisting, turneth back that Motion Perpendicularly, as from F to E, but taketh nothing from the force that goes on parallel in the line of E H; because the Motion never presses. And thus of the two Motions from F to E, and from E to H is a compounded Motion in the line F H, which maketh an Angle in B G, equal to the Angle F G E.

But in Percussion (which is the Motion of the Bullet against a wall,) the Bullet no sooner goeth off then it loseth of its swiftness, and inclineth to the Earth by its weight. So that the Angles made in falling on and going off, cannot be equal, unless they be measured close to the point where the stroke is made.

A.

If a man set a Board upright upon its edge, though it may very easily be cast down with a little Pressure of ones finger, yet a Bullet from a Musquet shall not throw it down but go through it. What is the cause of that?

B.

In pressing with your finger you spend time to throw it down. For the Motion you give to the part you touch is communicated to every other part before it fall. For the whole cannot fall till every part be moved. But the stroke of a Bullet is so swift, as it breaks through before the Motion of the part it hits can be communicated to all the other parts that must fall with it.

A.

The stroke of a Hammer will drive a Nail a great way into a piece of Wood on a sudden. What weight laid upon the head of a Nail, and in how much time will do the same? It is a question I have heard propounded amonst Naturalists,

B.

The different manner of the operation of weight from the operation of a stroke, makes it uncalculable. The suddenness of the stroke upon one point of the wood takes away the time of resistance from the rest. Therefore the Nail enters so far as it does. But the weight not only gives them time, but also augments the resistance; but how much, and in how much time, is (I think) impossible to determine.

A.

What is tbe difference between Reflection and Recoiling?

B.

Any Reflection may (and not unproperly) be called recoiling; but not contrariwise every Recoiling Reflection. Reflection is always made by the Re-action of a Body prest or stricken; but Recoiling not always. The Recoiling of a Gun is not caused by its own pressing upon the Gun-powder, but by the force of the Powder it self, inflamed and moved every way alike:

A.

I had thought it had been by the sudden re-entring of the Air after the flame and Bullet were gone out. For it is impossible that so much room as is left empty by the discharging of the Gun, should be so suddenly filled with the Air that entereth at the Touch-hole.

B.

The flame is nothing but the Powder it self, which scattered into its smallest parts seems, of greater bulk by much, then in truth it is, because they shine. And as the parts scatter more and more, so still more Air gets between them, entring not only at the Touch-hole, but also at the mouh of the Gun. which two ways being opposite, it will be much too weak to make the Gun Recoil.

A.

I have heard that a great Gun charged too much or too little, will Shoot (not above, nor below but) besides the mark; and charged with one certain charge between both will hit it.

B.

How that should be I cannot imagine. For when all things in the cause are equal, the effects cannot be unnequal. As soon as Fire is given, and before the Bullet be out, the Gun begins to Recoil. If then there be any unevenness or rub in the ground more on one side then on the other, it shall shoot besides the mark, whether too much, or too little, or justly charged; because if the line wherein the Gun Recoileth decline, the way of the Bullet will also decline to the contrary side of the mark. Therefore I can imagine no cause of this event, but either in the ground it Recoils on, or in the unequal weight of the parts of the Breech.

A.

How comes Refractin?

B.

When the action is in a line Perpendicular to the superficies of the Body wrought upon, there will be no Refraction at all. The action will proceed still in the same straight Line, whether it be Pression as in Light, or in Percussion as in the shooting of a Bullet. But when the Pression is Oblique, then will the Refraction be that way which the Nature of the Bodies through which the Action proceeds shall determin.

H.

How is light Refracted?

B.

If is pass through a Body of less, into a Body of greater resistance, and to the Point of the Superficies it falleth on, you draw a Line Perpendicular to the same superficies, the Action will proceed not in the same Line by which it fell on, but in another Line bending toward that Perpendiculare.

A.

What is the reason of that?

B.

I told you before, that the falling on worketh only in the Perpendicular; But as soon as the Action proceedeth further inward then a meer touch, it worketh partly in the Perpendicular, and partly forward, and would proceed in the same line in which it fell on, but for for the greater resistance which now weakneth the Motion forward, and makes it to incline towards the Perpendicular.

A.

In transparent Bodies it may be so; but there be Bodies through which the Light cannot pass at all.

B.

But the Action by which Light is made, passeth through all Bodies. For this Action is Pression; and whatsoever is prest, presseth that which is next behind, and so continually. But the cause why there is no Light seen through it, is the uneveness of the parts within, whereby the Action is by an infinite number of Reflections so diverted and weakned, that before it hath proceeded through, it hath not strength left towork upon the Eye strongly enough to produce sight.

A.

If the Body being transparent the Action proceed quite through, into a Body again of less resistance, as out of Glass into the Air, which way shall it then proceed in the Air?

B.

From the Point where it goeth forth, draw a Perpendicular to the superficies of the Glass, the Action now freed from the resistance it suffered, will go from that Perpendicular, as much as it did before come towards it.

A.

When a Bullet from out of the Air entreth into a Wall of Earth, will that also be Refracted towards the Perpendicular?

B.

If the Earth be all of one kind, it will. For the parallel Motion, will there also at the first entrance be resisted, which it was not before it entred.

A.

How then comes a Bullet, when shot very Obliquely into any broad Water, and having entred, yet to rise, again into the Air?

B.

When a Bullet is shot very Obliquely, though the Motion be never so swift, yet approach downwards to the Water is very slow, and when it cometh to it, it casteth up much Water before it, which with its weight presseth downwards again, and maketh the Water to rise under the Bullet with force enough to master the weak Motion of the Bullet downwards, and to make it rise in such manner as Bodies use to rise by Reflection.

A.

By what Motion (seeing you ascribe all Effects to Motion) can a Load-stone draw Iron to it?

B.

By the same Motion hitherto supposed. But though all the smallest parts of the Earth have this Motion, yet it is not supposed that their Motions are in equal Circles; nor that they keep just time with one another; nor that they have all the same Poles. If they had, all Bodies would draw one another alike. For such an agreement of Motion, of Way, of Swiftness, of Poles, cannot be maintained without the conjunction of the Bodies themselves in the Center of their common Motion, but by violence.

If therefore the Iron have but so much of the Nature of the Load-stone as redily to receive from it the like Motion, as one String of a Lute doth from another String strained to the same Note (as it is like enough it hath, the Load-stone being but one kind of Iron Ore) it must needs after that Motion received from it, (unless the greatness of the weight hinder) come nearer to it, because at distance their Motions will differ in time, and oppose each other whereby they will be forced to a common Center. If the Iron be lifted up from the Earth, the Motion of the Load-stone must be stronger, or the Body of it nearer, to overcome the Weight; and then the Iron will leap up to the Load-stone as as Swiftly as from the same distance, it would fall down to the Earth; but if both the Stone and the Iron be set floating upon the Water, the attraction will begin to be manifest at a greater distance, because the hindrance of the weight is in part removed.

A.

But why does the Load-stone if it float on a Calm Water, never fail to place it self at last in the Meridian just North and South.

B.

Not so, just in the Meridian, but almost in all places with some variations. But the cause I think is, that the Axis of this Magnetical Motion is parallel to the Axis of the Ecliptique, which is the Axis of the like Motion in the Earth, and consequently that it cannot freely exercise its Natural Motion in any other Scituation.

A.

Whence may this consent of Motion in the Load-stone and the Earth proceed? Do you think (as some have written) that the Earth is a great

Load-stone?

B.

Dr. Gilbert that was the first that wrote any thing of this Subject rationally, inclines to that opinion. Decartes thought the Earth (excepting this upper crust of a few Miles depth) to be of the same Nature with all other Stars, and bright. For my part I am content to be ignorant; but I believe the Load stone hath given its virtue by a long habitude in the Mine, the Vein of it lying in the plain of some of the Meridians, or rather of some of the great Circles that pass through the Poles of the Ecliptique, which are the same with the Poles of the like Motion supposed in the Earth.

A.

If that be true I need not ask why the filings of Iron laid on a Load-stone equally distant from its Poles will lie parallel to the Axis, but one each side incline to the Pole that is next it. Nor why by drawing a Load-ston all a long a Needle of Iron, the Needle will receive the same Poles Nor why when the Load-stone and Iron (or two Load-stones) are put together floating upon Water, will fall one of them a Stern of the other, that their like parts may look the same way, and their unlike touch, in which Action they are commonly said to Repel one another. For all this may be deriv'd from the union of their Motions. One thing more I desire to know, and that is; What are those things they call Spirits? I mean Ghosts, Fairies, Hobgoblins, and the like Apparitions.

B.

They are no part of the Subject of Natural Philosophy.

A.

That which in all Ages, and all places is commonly seen (as those have been, unless a great part of Mankind by Lyers) cannot, I think, be supernatural.

B.

All this that I have hitherto said, though upon better ground than can be had for a discourse of Ghosts, you ought to take but for a Dream.

A.

I do so. But there be some Dreams more like sense then others. And that which is like sense pleases me as well (in natural Philosophy) as if it were the very truth.

B.

I was Dreaming also once of these things; but was weakened by their noise. And they never came into any Dream of mine since, unless Apparitionrs in Dreams and Ghoasts be all one.

CHAP. VIII. THE DELPHIQUE PROBLEM OR DUPLICATION OF THE CUBE.

A.

HAVE you seen a Printed Paper sent from Paris, containing the Duplication of the Cube, written in French?

B.

Yes. It was I that Writ it, and sent it thither to be Printed, on purpose to see what objections would be made to it by our Professors of Algebra here.

A.

Then you have also seen the confutations of it by Algebra.

B.

I have seen some of them; and have one by me. For there was but one that was rightly Calculated, and that is it which I have kept.

A.

Your Demonstration then is confuted though but by one.

B.

That does not follow. For though an Arithmetical Calculation be true in Numbers, yet the same may be, or rather must be false, if the Units be not

constantly the same.

A.

Is their Calculation so inconstant, or rather so foolish as you make it?

B.

Yes. For the same number is sometimes so many Lines, sometimes so many Plains, and sometimes so many Solids; as you shall plainly see, if you will take the pains to examine first a Demonstration I have to prove the said Duplication, and after that, the Algebrique Calculation which is pretended to confute it. And not only that this one is false, but also any other Arithmetical account used in Geometry, unless the numbers be always so many Lines, or always so many superficies, or always many solids.

A.

Let me see the Geometrical Demonstration.

B.

There it is: Read it.

To find a Cube double to a Cube given.

LET the side of the Cube given be V D. Produce V D to A, till A D be double to D V. Then make the square of A D, namely A B C D. Divide A B and C D in the middle at E and F. Draw E F. Draw also A C cutting E F in I. Then in the sides B C and A D take B R and A S each of them equal to A I or I C.

Lastly, divide S D in the middle at T, and upon the Center T, with the distance T V, describe a semi-circle cutting A D in Y, and D C in X.

I say the Cube of D X is double to the Cube of D V. For the three lines D Y, D X, D V are in continual proportion. And Cntinuing the semi-circle V X Y till it cut the line R S drawn and produced in Z, the line S Z, will be equal to D X. And drawing X Z it will pass through T. And the four lines T V, T X, T Y and T Z will be equal. And therefore joyning Y X and Y Z, the Figure V X Y Z will be a Rectangle.

Produce C D to P so as D P be equal to A D. Now if Y Z produced fall on P, there will be three Rectangle equiangled Triangles, D P Y, D Y X, and D X V; and consequently four continual proportionals, D P, D Y, D X and D V, whereof D X is the least of the means. And therefore the Cube of D X will be double to the Cube of D V.

A.

That's true; and the Cube of D Y will be double to the Cube of D X; and the Cube of D P double to the Cube of D Y. But that Y Z produced, falls upon P, is the thing they deny, and which you ought to demonstrate.

B.

If Y Z produced fall not on P, then draw P Y, and from V let fall a perpendicular upon P Y, suppose at u. Divide P V in the midst at a, and joyn a u; which done a u will be equal to a V or a P. For because V u P is a right Angle, the point u will be in the semi-circle whereof P V is the Diameter.

Therefore drawing V R, the Angle u V R will be a right Angle.

A.

Why so?

B.

Because T V and T Y are equal; and T D, T Sequal; S V will also be equal to D V. And because D P and R S are equal and parallel, R Y will be equal and parallel to P V. And therefore V R and P Y that joyn them will be equal and parallel. And the Angles P u V, R V u will be alternate, and consequently equal. But P u V is a right Angle; therefore also R V u will be a right Angle.

A.

Hitherto all is evident. Proceed.

B.

From the point Y raise a perpendicular cutting V R wheresoever in t, and then (because P Y and V R are parallel) the Angle Y t V will be a right Angle. And the figure u Y t V a Rectangle, and u t equal to Y V. But Y V is equal to Z X; and therefore Z X is equal to u t. And u t must pass through the point T (For the Diameters of any Rectangle, divide each other in the middle) therefore Z and u are the same point, and X and t the same point. Therefore Y Z produced falls upon P. and D X is the lesser of the two means between A D and D V. And the Cube of D X double to the Cube of D V which was to be demostraten.

A

I cannot imagine what fault there can be in this Demonstration, and yet there is one thing which seems a little strange to me. And ’tis this. You take B R, which is half the Diagonal, and which is the sine of 45 degrees, and which is also the mean proportional between the two Extreams. And yet you bring none of these proprieties into your Demonstration. So that though you argue from the Construction, yet you do not argue from the Cause. And

this perhaps your adversaries will object (at least) against the Art of you Demonstratieon, or enqure by what luck you pitched upon half the Diagonal for your Foundation.

B.

I see you let nothing pass. But for answer you must know, That if a man argue from the negative of the truth, though he know not that it is the truth which is denyed, yet he will fall at last, after many consequences, into one absurdity or another. For though false do often produce Truth, yet it produces also absurdity, as it hath done here. But Truth produceth nothing but Truth. Therefore in Demonstrations that tend to absurdity, it is no good Logick to require all along the operation of the cause.

A.

Have you drawn from hence no Corollaries?

B.

No. I leave that for others that will; unless you take this for a Corollary, That, what Arithmetical Calculation soever contradicts it, is false.

A.

Let me see now the Algebrical Demonstration against it.

B.

Here it is.
Let A B or A D be equal to 2
Then D F or D V is equal to 1

And B R or A S is equal to the square root of 2

And A V equal to 3 want the square root of 2.

The Cube of A B is equal to 8

The Cube of D Y is equal to 45 want the Square Root of 1682 that is almost equal to 4

For 45 want the Square Root of 6681 is equal to 4

Therefore D Y is a little less then the greater of the two Means between AD and DV.

A.

There is I see some little difference between this Arithmetical aud your Geometrical Demonstration. And though it be insensible, yet if his Calculation be true, yours must needs be false, which I am sure cannot be.

B.

His Calculation is so true, that there is never a Proposition in it false, till he come to the conclusion, that the Cube of D Y. is equal to 45, want the square Root of 1682. But that, and the rest, is false.

A.

I shall easily see that A D. is certainly 2, whereof D V. is 1, and A V. is certainly 3, whereof D V. is 1.

B.

Right.

A.

And B R. is without doubt the square Root of 2.

B.

Why, what is 2?

A.

2, is the Line A D. as being double to D V. which is 1.

B.

And so, the Line B R. is the square Root of the Line A D.

A.

Out upon it it, it's absurd. Why do you grant it to be true in Arithmetick?

B.

In Arithmetick the numbers consist of so many Units; and are never considered there as nothings. And therefore every one Line has some Latitude, and if you allow to BI. the Semi-diagonal the same Latitude you do to AB. or to BR. you will quickly see the Square of half the Diagonal to be equal to twice the Square of half AB.

A.

Well, but then your Demonstration is not confuted; for the Point Y, will have Latitude enough to take in that little difference which is between the Root of 1681 and the Root of 1682. This putting off an Vuit sometimes for one Line, sometimes for one Square, must needs marr the reckoning. Again he says the Cube of AB. is equal to 8. but seeing AB. is 2, the Cube of AB.

must be just equal to four of its own sides; so that the Vnit which was before sometimes a Line, sometimes a Square, is now a Cube.

B.

It can be no otherwise when you so apply Arithmetick to Geometry, as to mumber the Lines of a Plain, or the Plains of a Cube.

A.

In the next place, I find that the Cube of DY. is equal to 45, want the Square Root of 1622. What is that 45? Lines, or Squares, or Cubes?

B.

Cubes, Cubes of DV.

A.

Then if you add to 45 Cubes of DV. the Square Root of 1682, the sum will be 45 Cubes of DV. And if you add to the Cube of DY. the same Root of 1682, the sum will be the Cube of DY. plus the Square Root of 1682. And these two sums must be equal.

B.

They must so.

A.

But the Square Root of 1682, being a Line, adds nothing to a Cube; therefore the Cube alone of DY. which he says is equal almost to 4. Cubes of DV. is equal to 45 Cubes of the same DV.

B.

All these impossibilities do necessarily follow the confounding of Arithmetick and Geometry.

A.

I pray you let me see the Operation by which the Cube of DY. (that is the Cube of 3, want the Root of 2,) is found equal to 45, want the Square Root of 1682.

A detection of the absurd use of Arithmetick as it is now applyed to Geometry.

B.

Here it is.

3 — r. 2.
3 — r. 2.
— r. 18 +2:
9 — r. 18
9 — r. 72 +2.
3 — r. 2.
— r. 162+12 — r. 8.
27 — r. 648+6
27 — r. 658 — r. 162+18 — r. 8.

A.

Why for two Roots of 18 do you put the Root of 72.

B.

Because 2 Roots of 18 is equal to one Root of 4 times 18, which is 72.

A.

Next we have, That the Root of 2 Multiplyed into 2, makes the Root of 8. How is that true?

B.

Does it not make 2 Roots of 2? And is not BR. the Root of 2, and 2 BR equal to the Diagonal? And is not the diagonal the root of a square equal to 8 squares of DV?

A.

'Tis true. But here the root of 8 is put for the Cube of the root of 2. Can a line be equal to a Cube?

B.

No. But here we are in Arithmetick again, and 8 is a Cubique number.

A.

How does the root of 2 multiplyed into the root of 72 make 12?

B.

Because it makes the root of 2 times 72, that is to say the root of 144 which is 12.

A.

How does 9 roots of 2 make the root of 162?

B.

Because it makes the root of 2 squares of 9, that is the root of 162.

A.

How does 3 roots of 72 make the root of 648?

B.

Because it makes the root of 9 times 72, that is of 648.

A.

For the total Sum I see 27 and 18 which make 45. Therefore the root of 648 together with the root of 162• and of 8, which are to be deducted from 45, ought to be equal to the root of 1682.

B.

So they are. For 648 multiplyed by 162 makes 104976 of which the double root is — 648 and 648 and 162 added together make — 810.

Therefore the root of 948, added to the root of 162 makes the root of — 1459

Again 1458 into 8 is 11664. The double root whereof is — 216.

The Sum of 1458 and 8 added together is — 1466.

The Sum of 1466 and 216 is 1682, and the root, the root of — 1682.

A.

I see the Calculation in numbers is right, though false in lines. The reason whereof can be no other then some difference between multiplying

numbers into lines or plains, and multiplying lines into the same lines or plains.

B.

The difference is manifest. For when you multiply a number into lines, the product is lines; as the number 2 multiplyed into 3 lines is no more then 3 lines 2 times told. But if you multiply lines into lines you make plains, and if you multiply lines into plains you make solid bodies. In Geometry there are but three dimensions, Length, Superficies, and Body. In Arithmetick there is but one, and that is Number or Length which you will. And though there be some Numbers called Plain, others Solid, others Plano-solid, others Square, others Cubique, others Square-square, others Quadrato-cubique, others Cubi-cubique &c. yet are all these but one dimension, namely Number, or a file of things Numbered.

A.

But seeing this way of Calculation by Numbers is so apparently false, what is the reason this Calculation came so near the truth.

B.

It is because in Arithmetick Units are not Nothings, and therefore have breadth. And therefore many Lines set together make a superficies though their breadth be insensible. And the greater the number is into which you divide your Line, the less sensible will be your errour.

A.

Archimedes, to find a streight Line equal to the circumferrence of a Circle, used this may of extracting Roots. And ’tis the way also by which

the Table of Sines, Secants aud Tangents have been calculated, Are they all Cut?

B.

As for Archimedes, there is no man that does more admire him then I do. But there is no man that cannot Err. His reasoning is good. But he ads all other Geometricans before and after him, have had two Principles that cross one another when they are applyed to one and the same Science. One is, that a Point is no part of a Line which is true in Geometry, where a part of a Line when it is called a Point, is not reckoned; another is, that a Unit is part of a Number which is also true; but when they reckon by Arethmetick in Geometry, there a Unit is somtimes part of a Line, sometimes a part of a Square, and sometimes part of a Cube.

As for the Table of Sines, Secants and Tangents, I am not the first that find fault with them. Yet I deny not but they are true enough for the reckoning of Acres in a Map of Land.

A.

What a deal of Labour has been lost by them that being Professors of Geometry have read nothing else to their Auditors but such stuff as this you have here seen. And some of them have written great Books of it in strange characters, such as in troublesome times, a man would suspect to be a Cypher.

B.

I think you have seen enough to satisfie you, that what I have written heretofore concerning the Quadrature of the Circle, and of other Figures made in imitation of the Parabola, has not been yet confuted.

A.

I see you have wrested out of the hands of our Antagonists this weapon of Algebra, so as they can never make use of it again. Which I consider as a thing of much more consequence to the science of Geometry, then either of the Duplication of the Cube, or the finding of two mean Proportionals, or the Quadrature of a Circle, or all these Problems put together.

FINIS.

A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England

MOLESWORTH 1840 EDITION

This late treatise reveals an unexplored dimension of Hobbes' famous doctrine of sovereignty. First published posthumously in 1681, the *Dialogue* sets forth his mature reflections of the relation between reason and law, offering ideas that are more liberal than those found in *Leviathan* and his other well-known writings. Hobbes proposes a separation of the functions of government in the interest of common sense and humaneness, without visibly violating his belief that the sharing or division of sovereignty is an absurdity.

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER & A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND.

LAWYER.

What makes you say, that the study of the law is less rational than the study of the mathematics?

Of the law of reason.

Philosopher.

I say not that; for all study is rational, or nothing worth: but I say, that the great masters of the mathematics do not so often err as the great professors of the law.

L.

If you had applied your reason to the law, perhaps you would have been of another mind.

P.

In whatsoever study, I examine whether my inference be rational: and have looked over the titles of the statutes from Magna Charta downward to this present time. I left not one unread, which I thought might concern myself; which was enough for me, that meant not to plead for any but myself. But I did not much examine which of them was more or less rational; because I read them not to dispute, but to obey them, and saw in all of them sufficient reason for my obedience, and that the same reason, though the Statutes themselves were changed, remained constant. I have also diligently read over Littleton's book of Tenures, with the commentaries thereupon of the renowned lawyer Sir Edward Coke; in which I confess I

found great subtilty, not of the law, but of inference from law, and especially from the law of human nature, which is the law of reason: and I confess that it is truth which he says in the epilogue to his book, that by arguments and reason in the law, a man shall sooner come to the certainty and knowledge of the law: and I agree with Sir Edward Coke, who upon that text farther says, that reason is the soul of the law; and upon section 138, nihil, quod est contra rationem, est licitum; that is to say, nothing is law that is against reason; and that reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is nothing else but reason; and upon section 21, æquitas est perfecta quædam ratio, quæ jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat, nulla scriptura comprehensa, sed solum in vera ratione consistens; i. e. Equity is a certain perfect reason, that interpreteth and amendeth the law written, itself being unwritten, and consisting in nothing else but right reason. When I consider this, and find it to be true, and so evident as not to be denied by any man of right sense, I find my own reason at a stand; for it frustrates all the laws in the world. For upon this ground any man, of any law whatsoever, may say it is against reason, and thereupon make a pretence for his disobedience. I pray you clear this passage, that we may proceed.

L.

I clear it thus, out of Sir Edward Coke (i. Inst. sect. 138), that this is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man's natural reason; for nemo nascitur artifex. This legal reason is summa ratio; and therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many several heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law of England is; because by so many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men.

P.

This does not clear the place, as being partly obscure, and partly untrue. That the reason which is the life of the law, should be not natural, but artificial, I cannot conceive. I understand well enough, that the knowledge of the law is gotten by much study, as all other sciences are, which when they are studied and obtained, it is still done by natural, and not by artificial reason. I grant you, that the knowledge of the law is an art; but not that any art of one man, or of many, how wise soever they be, or the work of one or more artificers, how perfect soever it be, is law. It is not wisdom, but authority that makes a law. Obscure also are the words legal reason. There is no reason in earthly creatures, but human reason. But I suppose that he means, that the reason of a judge, or of all the judges together without the King, is that summa ratio, and the very law: which I deny, because none can make a law but he that hath the legislative power. That the law hath been fined by grave and learned men, meaning the professors of the law, is manifestly untrue; for all the laws of England have been made by the kings of England, consulting with the nobility and commons in parliament, of which not one of twenty was a learned lawyer.

L.

You speak of the statute law, and I speak of the common law.

P.

I speak generally of law.

L.

Thus far I agree with you, that statute law taken away, there would not be left, either here, or any where, any law at all that would conduce to the peace of a nation; yet equity and reason, (laws Divine and eternal, which oblige all men at all times, and in all places), would still remain, but be obeyed by few: and though the breach of them be not punished in this

world, yet they will be punished sufficiently in the world to come. Sir Edward Coke, for drawing to the men of his own profession as much authority as lawfully he might, is not to be reprehended; but to the gravity and learning of the judges they ought to have added in the making of laws, the authority of the King, which hath the sovereignty: for of these laws of reason, every subject that is in his wits, is bound to take notice at his peril, because reason is part of his nature, which he continually carries about with him, and may read it, if he will.

P.

It is very true; and upon this ground, if I pretend within a month or two to make myself able to perform the office of a judge, you are not to think it arrogance; for you are to allow to me, as well as to other men, my pretence to reason, which is the common law, (remember this, that I may not need again to put you in mind, that reason is the common law): and for statute law, seeing it is printed, and that there be indexes to point me to every matter contained in them, I think a man may profit in them very much in two months.

L.

But you will be but an ill pleader.

P.

A pleader commonly thinks he ought to say all he can for the benefit of his client, and therefore has need of a faculty to wrest the sense of words from their true meaning, and the faculty of rhetoric to seduce the jury, and sometimes the judge also, and many other arts which I neither have, nor intend to study.

L.

But let the judge, how good soever he thinks his reasoning, take heed that he depart not too much from the letter of the statute: for it is not without danger.

P.

He may without danger recede from the letter, if he do not from the meaning and sense of the law; which may be by a learned man, (such as judges commonly are,) easily found out by the preamble, the time when it was made, and the incommodities for which it was made. But I pray tell me, to what end were statute laws ordained, seeing the law of reason ought to be applied to every controversy that can arise.

L.

You are not ignorant of the force of an irregular appetite to riches, to power, and to sensual pleasures, how it masters the strongest reason, and is the root of disobedience, slaughter, fraud, hypocrisy, and all manner of evil habits; and that the laws of man, though they can punish the fruits of them, which are evil actions, yet they cannot pluck up the roots that are in the heart. How can a man be indicted of avarice, envy, hypocrisy, or other vicious habit, till it be declared by some action which a witness may take notice of? The root remaining, new fruit will come forth, till you be weary of punishing, and at last destroy all power that shall oppose it.

P.

What hope then is there of a constant peace in any nation, or between one nation and another?

L.

You are not to expect such a peace between two nations; because there is no common power in this world to punish their injustice. Mutual fear may keep them quiet for a time; but upon every visible advantage they will

invade one another; and the most visible advantage is then, when the one nation is obedient to their king, and the other not. But peace at home may then be expected durable, when the common people shall be made to see the benefit they shall receive by their obedience and adhesion to their own sovereign, and the harm they must suffer by taking part with them, who by promises of reformation, or change of government, deceive them. And this is properly to be done by divines, and from arguments not only from reason, but also from the Holy Scripture.

P.

This that you say is true, but not very much to that I aim at by your conversation, which is to inform myself concerning the laws of England. Therefore I ask you again, what is the end of statute-laws?

L.

I say then that the scope of all human law is peace, and justice in every nation amongst themselves, and defence against foreign enemies.

Of sovereign power.

P.

But what is justice?

L.

Justice is giving to every man his own.

P.

The definition is good, and yet it is Aristotle's. What is the definition agreed upon as a principle in the science of the common law?

L.

The same with that of Aristotle.

P.

See, you lawyers, how much you are beholden to the philosopher; and it is but reason; for the more general and noble science and law of all the world, is true philosophy, of which the common law of England is a very little part.

L.

It is so, if you mean by philosophy nothing but the study of reason; as I think you do.

P.

When you say that justice gives to every man his own, what mean you by his own? How can that be given me, which is my own already? Or, if it be not my own, how can justice make it mine?

L.

Without law, every thing is in such sort every man's, as he may take, possess, and enjoy, without wrong to any man; every thing, lands, beasts, fruits, and even the bodies of other men, if his reason tell him he cannot otherwise live securely. For the dictates of reason are little worth, if they tended not to the preservation and improvement of men's lives. Seeing then without human law all things would be common, and this community a cause of encroachment, envy, slaughter, and continual war of one upon another, the same law of reason dictates to mankind, for their own preservation, a distribution of lands and goods, that each man may know what is proper to him, so as none other might pretend a right thereunto, or disturb him in the use of the same. This distribution is justice, and this properly is the same which we say is one's own; by which you may see the great necessity there was of statute laws, for preservation of all mankind. It is also a dictate of the law of reason, that statute laws are a necessary means

of the safety and well-being of man in the present world, and are to be obeyed by all subjects, as the law of reason ought to be obeyed, both by King and subjects, because it is the law of God.

P.

All this is very rational; but how can any laws secure one man from another, when the greatest part of men are so unreasonable, and so partial to themselves as they are, and the laws of themselves are but a dead letter, which of itself is not able to compel a man to do otherwise than himself pleaseth, nor punish or hurt him when he hath done a mischief?

L.

By the laws, I mean laws living and armed. For you must suppose, that a nation that is subdued by war to an absolute submission to a conqueror, may, by the same arm that compelled it to submission, be compelled to obey his laws. Also, if a nation choose a man, or an assembly of men, to govern them by laws, it must furnish him also with armed men and money, and all things necessary to his office; or else his laws will be of no force, and the nation remains, as before it was, in confusion. It is not therefore the word of the law, but the power of a man that has the strength of a nation, that make the laws effectual. It was not Solon that made Athenian laws, though he devised them, but the supreme court of the people; nor, the lawyers of Rome that made the imperial law in Justinian's time, but Justinian himself.

P.

We agree then in this, that in England it is the King that makes the laws, whosoever pens them; and in this, that the King cannot make his laws effectual, nor defend his people against their enemies, without a power to levy soldiers; and consequently, that he may lawfully, as oft as he shall

really think it necessary to raise an army, (which in some occasions be very great) I say, raise it, and money to maintain it. I doubt not but you will allow this to be according to the law, at least of reason.

L.

For my part I allow it. But you have heard how, in and before the late troubles the people were of another mind. Shall the King, said they, take from us what he pleases, upon pretence of a necessity whereof he makes himself the judge? What worse condition can we be in from an enemy? What can they take from us more than what they list?

P.

The people reason ill. They do not know in what condition we were, in the time of the Conqueror, when it was a shame to be an Englishman; who, if he grumbled at the base offices he was put to by his Norman masters, received no other answer than this, thou art but an Englishman. Nor can the people, nor any man that humours their disobedience, produce any example of a King that ever raised any excessive sums, either by himself or by the consent of his Parliament, but when they had great need thereof; nor can show any reason that might move any of them so to do. The greatest complaint by them made against the unthriftiness of their Kings, was for the enriching now and then a favourite, which to the wealth of the kingdom was inconsiderable, and the complaint but envy. But in this point of raising soldiers, what is, I pray you, the statute law?

L.

The last statute concerning it, is 13 Car. II. ca, by which the supreme government, command, and disposing of the militia of England, is delivered to be, and always to have been, the ancient right of the Kings of England. But there is also in the same act a proviso, that this shall not be construed

for a declaration, that the King may transport his subjects, or compel them to march out of the kingdom; nor is it, on the contrary, declared to be unlawful.

P.

Why is not that also determined?

L.

I can imagine cause enough for it, though I may be deceived. We love to have our King amongst us, and not to be governed by deputies, either of our own or another nation. But this I verily believe, that if a foreign enemy should either invade us, or put himself into a readiness to invade either England, Ireland, or Scotland, no Parliament then sitting, and the King send English soldiers thither, the Parliament would give him thanks for it. The subjects of those Kings who affect the glory, and imitate the actions, of Alexander the Great, have not always the most comfortable lives, nor do such Kings usually very long enjoy their conquests. They march to and fro perpetually, as upon a plank sustained only in the midst; and when one end rises, down goes the other.

P.

It is well. But where soldiers, in the judgment of the King's conscience, are indeed necessary, as in an insurrection, or rebellion at home; how shall the kingdom be preserved without a considerable army ready and in pay? How shall money be raised for this army, especially when the want of public treasure inviteth neighbour Kings to encroach, and unruly subjects to rebel?

L.

I cannot tell. It is matter of polity, not of law. But I know, that there be statutes express, whereby the King hath obliged himself never to levy

money upon his subjects without the consent of his Parliament. One of which statutes is 25 Edw. I. c. 6, in these words: We have granted for us, and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and other folk of holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to all the commonalty of the land, that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common consent of the realm. There is also another statute of Edward I. (34 Edw. I. stat. 4) in these words: No tallage, or aid shall be taken or levied by us or our heirs in our realm, without the good will and assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land; which statutes have been since that time confirmed by divers other Kings, and lastly by the King that now reigneth.

P.

All this I know, and am not satisfied. I am one of the common people, and one of that almost infinite number of men, for whose welfare Kings and other sovereigns were by God ordained: for God made Kings for the people, and not people for Kings. How shall I be defended from the domineering of proud and insolent strangers that speak another language, that scorn us, that seek to make us slaves, or how shall I avoid the destruction that may arise from the cruelty of factions in a civil war, unless the King, to whom alone, you say, belongeth the right of levying and disposing of the militia by which only it can be prevented, have ready money, upon all occasions, to arm and pay as many soldiers, as for the present defence, or the peace of the people, shall be necessary? Shall not I, and you, and every man be undone? Tell me not of a Parliament, when there is no Parliament sitting, or perhaps none in being, which may often happen. And when there is a Parliament, if the speaking and leading men should have a design to put down monarchy, as they had in the Parliament which began to sit the third of November, 1640, shall the King, who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of the

people, and to that end is intrusted with the power to levy and dispose of the soldiery, be disabled to perform his office, by virtue of these acts of Parliament which you have cited? If this be reason, it is reason also that the people be abandoned, or left at liberty to kill one another, even to the last man; if it be not reason, then you have granted it is not law.

L.

It is true, if you mean recta ratio; but recta ratio, which I grant to be law, as Sir Edward Coke says, (1 Inst. sect. 138), is an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not every man's natural reason; for nemo nascitur artifex. This legal reason is summa ratio; and therefore, if all the reason that is dispersed into so many several heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law of England is, because by many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men. And this is it, he calls the common law.

P.

Do you think this to be good doctrine? Though it be true, that no man is born with the use of reason, yet all men may grow up to it as well as lawyers; and when they have applied their reason to the laws, (which were laws before they studied them, or else it was not law they studied), may be as fit for and capable of judicature, as Sir Edward Coke himself, who whether he had more or less use of reason, was not thereby a judge, but because the King made him so. And whereas he says, that a man who should have as much reason as is dispersed in so many several heads, could not make such a law as this law of England is; if one should ask him who made the law of England, would he say a succession of English lawyers or judges made it, or rather a succession of kings? And that upon their own reason, either solely, or with the advice of the Lords and Commons in

Parliament, without the judges or other professors of the law? You see therefore that the King's reason, be it more or less, is that anima legis, that summa lex, whereof Sir Edward Coke speaketh, and not the reason, learning, or wisdom of the judges. But you may see, that quite through his Institutes of Law, he often takes occasion to magnify the learning of the lawyers, whom he perpetually termeth the sages of the Parliament, or of the King's council. Therefore unless you say otherwise, I say, that the King's reason, when it is publicly upon advice and deliberation declared, is that anima legis; and that summa ratio and that equity, which all agree to be the law of reason, is all that is or ever was law in England, since it became Christian, besides the Bible.

L.

Are not the Canons of the Church part of the law of England, as also the imperial law used in the Admiralty, and the customs of particular places, and the by-laws of corporations and courts of judicature?

P.

Why not? For they were all constituted by the Kings of England; and though the civil law used in the Admiralty were at first the statutes of the Roman empire, yet because they are in force by no other authority than that of the King, they are now the King's laws, and the King's statutes. The same we may say of the Canons; such of them as we have retained, made by the Church of Rome, have been no law, nor of any force in England, since the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign, but by virtue of the great seal of England.

L.

In the said statutes that restrain the levying of money without consent of Parliament, is there any thing you can take exceptions to?

P.

No. I am satisfied that the kings that grant such liberties, are bound to make them good, so far as it may be done without sin: but if a King find that by such a grant he be disabled to protect his subjects, if he maintain his grant, he sins; and therefore may, and ought to take no notice of the said grant. For such grants, as by error or false suggestion are gotten from him, are, as the lawyers do confess, void and of no effect, and ought to be recalled. Also the King, as is on all hands confessed, hath the charge lying upon him to protect his people against foreign enemies, and to keep the peace betwixt them within the kingdom: if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof, he committeth a sin, which neither King nor Parliament can lawfully commit.

L.

No man, I think, will deny this. For if levying of money be necessary, it is a sin in the Parliament to refuse; if unnecessary, it is a sin both in King and Parliament to levy. But for all that, it may be, and I think it is, a sin in any one that hath the sovereign power, be he one man or one assembly, being intrusted with the safety of a whole nation, if rashly, and relying upon his own natural sufficiency, he make war or peace, without consulting with such, as by their experience and employment abroad, and intelligence by letters, or other means, have gotten the knowledge in some measure of the strength, advantages, and designs of the enemy, and the manner and the degree of the danger that may from thence arise. In like manner, in case of rebellion at home, if he consult not with those of military condition; which if he do, then I think he may lawfully proceed to subdue all such enemies and rebels; and that the soldiers ought to go on without inquiring whether they be within the country, or without. For who shall suppress rebellion, but he that hath right to levy, command, and dispose of the militia? The last

Long Parliament denied this. But why? Because by the major part of their votes the rebellion was raised with the design to put down monarchy, and to that end maintained.

P.

Nor do I hereby lay any aspersion upon such grants of the King and his ancestors. Those statutes are in themselves very good for the King and the people, as creating some kind of difficulty for such Kings as, for the glory of conquest, might spend one part of their subjects' lives and estates in molesting other nations, and leave the rest to destroy themselves at home by factions. That which I here find fault with, is the wresting of those, and other such statutes, to the binding of our Kings from the use of their armies in the necessary defence of themselves and their people. The late Long Parliament, that in 1648 murdered their King, (a King that sought no greater glory upon earth, but to be indulgent to his people, and a pious defender of the Church of England,) no sooner took upon them the sovereign power, than they levied money upon the people at their own discretion. Did any of their subjects dispute their power? Did they not send soldiers over the sea to subdue Ireland, and others to fight against the Dutch at sea; or made they any doubt but to be obeyed in all that they commanded, as a right absolutely due to the sovereign power in whomsoever it resides? I say not this as allowing their actions, but as a testimony from the mouths of those very men that denied the same power to him whom they acknowledged to have been their sovereign immediately before; which is a sufficient proof, that the people of England never doubted of the King's right to levy money for the maintenance of his armies, till they were abused in it by seditious teachers, and other prating men, on purpose to turn the State and Church into popular government, where the most ignorant and boldest talkers do commonly obtain the best preferments. Again, when their new republic returned into monarchy by Oliver, who durst deny him money upon any

pretence of Magna Charta, or of these other acts of Parliament which you have cited? You may therefore think it good law, for all your books, that the King of England may at all times, that he thinks in his conscience it will be necessary for the defence of his people, levy as many soldiers and as much money as he please, and that himself is judge of the necessity.

L.

Is there nobody hearkening at the door?

P.

What are you afraid of?

L.

I mean to say the same that you say: but there be very many yet, that hold their former principles, whom neither the calamities of the civil wars, nor their former pardon, have thoroughly cured of their madness.

P.

The common people never take notice of what they hear of this nature, but when they are set on by such as they think wise; that is, by some sorts of preachers, or some that seem to be learned in the laws, and withal speak evil of the governors. But what if the King, upon the sight or apprehension of any great danger to his people, (as when their neighbours are borne down by the current of a conquering enemy), should think his own people might be involved in the same misery; may he not levy, pay, and transport soldiers to help those weak neighbours, by way of prevention to save his own people and himself from servitude? Is that a sin?

L.

First, if the war upon our neighbour be just, it may be questioned whether it be equity or no to assist them against the right.

P.

For my part, I make no question of that at all, unless the invader will, and can, put me in security, that neither he nor his successors shall make any advantage of the conquest of my neighbour, to do the same to me in time to come. But there is no common power to bind them to the peace.

L.

Secondly, when such a thing shall happen, the Parliament will not refuse to contribute freely to the safety of themselves and the whole nation.

P.

It may be so, and it may be not; for if a Parliament then sit not, it must be called; that requires six weeks' time; debating and collecting what is given requires as much, and in this time the opportunity perhaps is lost. Besides, how many wretched souls have we heard to say in the late troubles; what matter is it who gets the victory? We can pay but what they please to demand, and so much we pay now. And this they will murmur, as they have ever done, whosoever shall reign over them, as long as their covetousness and ignorance hold together; which will be till doomsday, if better order be not taken for their instruction in their duty, both from reason and religion.

L.

For all this I find it somewhat hard, that a King should have right to take from his subjects, upon the pretence of necessity, what he pleaseth.

P.

I know what it is that troubles your conscience in this point. All men are troubled at the crossing of their wishes; but it is our own fault. First, we wish impossibilities; we would have our security against all the world upon right of property, without paying for it; this is impossible. We may as well

expect that fish and fowl should boil, roast, and dish themselves, and come to the table, and that grapes should squeeze themselves into our mouths, and have all other the contentments and ease which some pleasant men have related of the land of Cocagne. Secondly, there is no nation in the world where he or they that have the sovereignty, do not take what money they please for the defence of those respective nations, when they think it necessary for their safety. The late Long Parliament denied this; but why? Because there was a design amongst them to depose the King. Thirdly, there is no example of any King of England that I have read of, that ever pretended any such necessity for levying money against his conscience. The greatest sums that ever were levied, comparing the value of money, as it was at that time, with what it is now, were levied by King Edward III and King Henry V; kings in whom we glory now, and think their actions great ornaments to the English history. Lastly, as to the enriching now and then a favourite, it is neither sensible to the kingdom, nor is any treasure thereby conveyed out of the realm, but so spent as it falls down again upon the common people. To think that our condition being human should be subject to no incommodity, were injuriously to quarrel with God Almighty for our own faults.

L.

I know not what to say.

P.

If you allow this that I have said, then say, that the people never were, shall be, or ought to be, free from being taxed at the will of one or other; that if civil war come, they must levy all they have, and that dearly, from the one or from the other, or from both sides. Say, that adhering to the King, their victory is an end of their trouble; that adhering to his enemies there is no end; for the war will continue by a perpetual subdivision, and when it

ends, they will be in the same estate they were before. That they are often abused by men who to them seem wise, when then their wisdom is nothing else but envy of those that are in grace and in profitable employments; and that those men do but abuse the common people to their own ends, that set up a private man's propriety against the public safety. But say withal, that the King is subject to the laws of God, both written and unwritten, and to no other; and so was William the Conqueror, whose right is all descended to our present King.

L.

As to the law of reason, which is equity, it is sure enough there is but one legislator, which is God.

P.

It followeth, then, that which you call the common law, distinct from statute law, is nothing else but the law of God.

L.

In some sense it is; but it is not Gospel, but natural reason, and natural equity.

P.

Would you have every man to every other man allege for law his own particular reason? There is not amongst men a universal reason agreed upon in any nation, besides the reason of him that hath the sovereign power. Yet though his reason be but the reason of one man, yet it is set up to supply the place of that universal reason, which is expounded to us by our Saviour in the Gospel; and consequently our King is to us the legislator both of statute-law, and of common-law.

L.

Yes, I know that the laws spiritual, which have been law in this kingdom since the abolishing of popery, are the King's laws, and those also that were made before. For the Canons of the Church of Rome were no laws, neither here, nor anywhere else without the Pope's temporal dominions, farther than kings and states in their several dominions respectively did make them so.

P.

I grant that. But you must grant also, that those spiritual laws were made by the legislators of the spiritual law And yet not all kings and states make laws by consent of the Lords and Commons; but our King here is so far bound to their assents, as he shall judge conducing to the good and safety of his people. For example, if the Lords and Commons should advise him to restore those laws spiritual, which in Queen Mary's time were in force, I think the King were by the law of reason obliged, without the help of any other law of God, to neglect such advice.

L.

I grant you that the King is sole legislator; but with this restriction, that if he will not consult with the Lords of Parliament, and hear the complaints and informations of the Commons, that are best acquainted with their own wants, he sinneth against God, though he cannot be compelled to any thing by his subjects by arms and force.

P.

We are agreed upon that already. Since therefore the King is sole legislator, I think it also reason he should be sole supreme judge.

L.

There is no doubt of that; for otherwise there would be no congruity of judgments with the laws. I grant also that he is the supreme judge over all

persons, and in all causes civil and ecclesiastical within his own dominions; not only by act of Parliament at this time, but that he has ever been so by the common law. For the judges of both the Benches have their offices by the King's letters-patent; and so as to judicature have the bishops. Also the Lord Chancellor hath his office by receiving from the King the Great Seal of England. And, to say all at once, there is no magistrate, or commissioner for public business, neither of judicature nor execution, in State or Church, in peace or war, but he is made so by authority from the King.

The King is the supreme judge.

P.

It is true; but perhaps you may think otherwise, when you read such acts of parliament, as say, that the King shall have power and authority to do this or that by virtue of that act, as Elizabeth c. I "that your highness, your heirs, and successors, Kings, or Queens of this realm, shall have full power and authority, by virtue of this act, by letters-patent under the great seal of England, to assign, &c." Was it not this Parliament that gave this authority to the Queen?

L.

No. For the statute in this clause is no more than, as Sir Edward Coke useth to speak, an affirmance of the common-law. For she being head of the Church of England, might make commissioners for the deciding of matters ecclesiastical, as freely as if she had been Pope, who did, you know, pretend his right from the law of God.

P.

We have hitherto spoken of laws without considering anything of the nature and essence of a law; and now unless we define the word law, we can go no farther without ambiguity and fallacy, which will be but loss of time;

whereas, on the contrary, the agreement upon our words will enlighten all we have to say hereafter.

L.

I do not remember the definition of law in any statute.

P.

I think so: for the statutes were made by authority, and not drawn from any other principles than the care of the safety of the people. Statutes are not philosophy, as is the common-law, and other disputable arts, but are commands or prohibitions, which ought to be obeyed, because assented to by submission made to the Conqueror here in England, and to whosoever had the sovereign power in other commonwealths; so that the positive laws of all places are statutes. The definition of law was therefore unnecessary for the makers of statutes, though very necessary to them whose work it is to teach the sense of the law.

L.

There is an accurate definition of a law in Bracton, cited by Sir Edward Coke: Lex est sanctio justa, jubens honesta, et prohibens contraria.

P.

That is to say, law is a just statute, commanding those things which are honest, and forbidding the contrary. From whence it followeth, that in all cases it must be the honesty or dishonesty that makes the command a law; whereas you know that but for the law we could not, as saith St. Paul, have known what is sin. Therefore this definition is no ground at all for any farther discourse of law. Besides, you know the rule of honest and dishonest refers to honour, and that it is justice only, and injustice, that the law respecteth. But that which I most except against in this definition, is, that it supposes that a statute made by the sovereign power of a nation may be

unjust. There may indeed in a statute-law, made by men, be found iniquity, but not injustice.

L.

This is somewhat subtile. I pray deal plainly. What is the difference between injustice and iniquity?

P.

I pray you tell me first, what is the difference between a court of justice, and a court of equity?

L.

A court of justice is that which hath cognizance of such causes as are to be ended by the positive laws of the land; and a court of equity is that, to which belong such causes as are to be determined by equity; that is to say, by the law of reason.

P.

You see then that the difference between injustice and iniquity is this; that injustice is the transgression of a statute-law, and iniquity the transgression of the law of reason. But perhaps you mean by common-law, not the law itself, but the manner of proceeding in the law, as to matter of fact, by twelve men, freeholders; though those twelve men are no court of equity, nor of justice, because they determine not what is just or unjust, but only whether it be done or not done; and their judgment is nothing else but a confirmation of that which is properly the judgment of the witnesses. For to speak exactly, there cannot possibly be any judge of fact besides the witnesses.

L.

How would you have a law defined?

P.

Thus; a law is the command of him or them that have the sovereign power, given to those that be his or their subjects, declaring publicly and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do.

L.

Seeing all judges in all courts ought to judge according to equity, which is the law of reason, a distinct court of equity seemeth to me to be unnecessary, and but a burthen to the people, since common-law and equity are the same law.

P.

It were so indeed, if judges could not err; but since they may err, and that the King is not bound to any other law but that of equity, it belongs to him alone to give remedy to them that, by the ignorance or corruption of a judge, shall suffer damage.

L.

By your definition of a law, the King's proclamation under the Great Seal of England is a law; for it is a command, and public, and of the sovereign to his subjects.

P.

Why not, if he think it necessary for the good of his subjects? For this is a maxim at the common-law alleged by Sir Edward Coke himself, (i Inst. sect. 306), Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id per quod devenitur ad illud. And you know out of the same author, that divers Kings of England have often, to the petitions in Parliament which they granted, annexed such exceptions as these, unless there be necessity, saving our regality; which I think should be always understood, though they be not

expressed; and are understood so by common lawyers, who agree that the King may recall any grant wherein he was deceived.

L.

Again, whereas you make it of the essence of a law to be publicly and plainly declared to the people, I see no necessity for that. Are not all subjects bound to take notice of all acts of Parliament, when no act can pass without their consent?

P.

If you had said that no act could pass without their knowledge, then indeed they had been bound to take notice of them; but none can have knowledge of them but the members of the houses of Parliament; therefore the rest of the people are excused. Or else the knights of the shire should be bound to furnish people with a sufficient number of copies, at the people's charge, of the acts of Parliament, at their return into the country; that every man may resort to them, and by themselves, or friends, take notice of what they are obliged to. For otherwise it were impossible they should be obeyed: and that no man is bound to do a thing impossible, is one of Sir Edward Coke's maxims at the common-law. I know that most of the statutes are printed; but it does not appear that every man is bound to buy the book of statutes, nor to search for them at Westminster or at the Tower, nor to understand the language wherein they are for the most part written.

L.

I grant it proceeds from their own faults; but no man can be excused by ignorance of the law of reason, that is to say, by ignorance of the common-law, except children, madmen, and idiots. But you exact such a notice of the statute-law, as is almost impossible. Is it not enough that they in all places have a sufficient number of the penal statutes?

P.

Yes; if they have those penal statutes near them. But what reason can you give me why there should not be as many copies abroad of the statutes, as there be of the Bible?

L.

I think it were well that every man that can read, had a statute-book; for certainly no knowledge of those laws, by which men's lives and fortunes can be brought into danger, can be too much. I find a great fault in your definition of law; which is, that every law either forbiddeth or commandeth something. It is true that the moral law is always a command or a prohibition, or at least implieth it. But in the Levitical law, where it is said that he that stealeth a sheep shall restore fourfold, what command or prohibition lieth in these words?

P.

Such sentences as that are not in themselves general, but judgments; nevertheless, there is in those words implied a commandment to the judge, to cause to be made a fourfold restitution.

L.

That is right.

P.

Now define what justice is, and what actions and men are to be called just.

L.

Justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own; that is to say, of giving to every man that which is his right, in such manner as to exclude the right of all men else to the same thing. A just action is that which is not

against the law. A just man is he that hath a constant will to live justly; if you require more, I doubt there will no man living be comprehended within the definition.

P.

Seeing then that a just action, according to your definition, is that which is not against the law; it is manifest that before there was a law, there could be no injustice; and therefore laws are in their nature antecedent to justice and injustice. And you cannot deny but there must be law-makers, before there were any laws, and consequently before there was any justice, (I speak of human justice); and that law-makers were before that which you call own, or property of goods or lands, distinguished by meum, tuum, alienum.

L.

That must be granted; for without statute-laws, all men have right to all things; and we have had experience, when our laws were silenced by civil war, there was not a man, that of any goods could say assuredly they were his own.

P.

You see then that no private man can claim a propriety in any lands, or other goods, from any title from any man but the King, or them that have the sovereign power; because it is in virtue of the sovereignty, that every man may not enter into and possess what he pleaseth; and consequently to deny the sovereign anything necessary to the sustaining of his sovereign power, is to destroy the propriety he pretends to. The next thing I will ask you is, how you distinguish between law and right, or lex and jus.

L.

Sir Edward Coke in divers places makes lex and jus to be the same, and so lex communis and jus communis, to be all one; nor do I find that he does

in any place distinguish them.

P.

Then will I distinguish them, and make you judge whether my distinction be not necessary to be known by every author of the common-law. For law obligeth me to do, or forbear the doing of something; and therefore it lays upon me an obligation. But my right is a liberty left me by the law to do any thing which the law forbids me not, and to leave undone any thing which the law commands me not. Did Sir Edward Coke see no difference between being bound and being free?

L.

I know not what he saw, but he has not mentioned it. Though a man may dispense with his own liberty, he cannot do so with the law.

P.

But what are you better for your right, if a rebellious company at home, or an enemy from abroad, take away the goods, or dispossess you of the lands you have a right to? Can you be defended or repaired, but by the strength and authority of the King? What reason therefore can be given by a man that endeavours to preserve his propriety, why he should deny or malignly contribute to the strength that should defend him or repair him? Let us see now what your books say to this point, and other points of the right of sovereignty. Bracton, the most authentic author of the common law, (fol. 55), saith thus: Ipse Dominus Rex habet omnia jura in manu sua, sicut Dei vicarius; habet etiam ea quæ sunt pacis; habet etiam coercionem, ut delinquentes puniat; item habet in potestate sua leges. Nihil enim prodest jura condere, nisi sit qui jura tueatur. That is to say: Our Lord the King hath all right in his own hands; is God’s vicar; he has all that concerns the peace; he has the power to punish delinquents; all the laws are in his power: to

make laws is to no purpose, unless there be somebody to make them obeyed. If Bracton's law be reason, as I and you think it is, what temporal power is there which the King hath not? Seeing that at this day all the power spiritual, which Bracton allows the Pope, is restored to the crown; what is there that the King cannot do, excepting sin against the law of God? The same Bracton, (lib. ii. c. 8, fol. 5), saith thus: Si autem a Rege petatur, cum breve non currat contra ipsum, locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat et emendet; quod quidem si non fecerit, satis sufficit ei ad pœnam, quod Dominum expectet ultorem: nemo quidem de factis suis præsumat disputare, multo fortius contra factum suum venire. That is to say: If any thing be demanded of the King, seeing a writ lieth not against him, he is put to his petition, praying him to correct and amend his own fact; which if he will not do, it is a sufficient penalty for him, that he is to expect a punishment from the Lord: no man may presume to dispute of what he does, much less to resist him. You see by this, that this doctrine concerning the rights of sovereignty, so much cried down by the Long Parliament, is the ancient common-law, and that the only bridle of the Kings of England, ought to be the fear of God. And again, Bracton, (lib. ii. c. 24, fol. 55), says, that the rights of the Crown cannot be granted away: Ea vero quæ jurisdictionis sunt et pacis, et ea quæ sunt justitiæ et paci annexa, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad coronam et dignitatem Regiam, nec a corona separari poterunt, nec a privata persona possideri. This is to say: those things which belong to jurisdiction and peace, and those things that are annexed to justice and peace, appertain to none but to the crown and dignity of the King, nor can be separated from the crown, nor be possessed by a private person. Again, you will find in Fleta, a law-book written in the time of Edward II, that liberties, though granted by the King, if they tend to the hinderance of justice, or subversion of the regal power, were not to be used, nor allowed; for in that book, (lib. i. c. 20, § 54) concerning articles of the

crown, which the justices itinerant are to enquire of, the 54th article is this: You shall inquire, de libertatibus concessis quæ impediunt communem justitiam, et Regiam potestatem subvertunt. Now what is a greater hinderance to common justice, or a greater subversion of the regal power, than a liberty in subjects to hinder the King from raising money necessary to suppress or prevent rebellions, which doth destroy justice, and subvert the power of the sovereignty? Moreover, when a charter is granted by the King in these words: "Dedita etc. . . . coram etc. . . . pro me et hæredibus meis:" the grantor by the common-law, as Sir Edward Coke says in his Commentaries on Littleton, is to warrant his gift; and I think it reason, especially if the gift be upon consideration of a price paid. Suppose a foreign state should lay claim to this kingdom, (it is no matter as to the question I am putting, whether the claim be unjust), how would you have the King to warrant to every freeholder in England the lands they hold of him by such a charter? If he cannot levy money, their estates are lost, and so is the King's estate; and if the King's estate be gone, how can he repair the value due upon the warranty? I know that the King's charters are not so merely grants, as that they are not also laws; but they are such laws as speak not to all the King's subjects in general, but only to his officers; implicitly forbidding them to judge or execute any thing contrary to the said grants. There be many men that are able judges of what is right reason, and what not; when any of these shall know that a man has no superior nor peer in the kingdom, he will hardly be persuaded he can be bound by any law of the kingdom, or that he who is subject to none but God, can make a law upon himself, which he cannot also as easily abrogate as he made it. The main argument, and that which so much taketh with the throng of people, proceedeth from a needless fear put into their minds by such men as mean to make use of their hands to their own ends. For if, say they, the King may notwithstanding the law do what he please, and nothing to restrain him but

the fear of punishment in the world to come, then, in case there come a king that fears no such punishment, he may take away from us, not only our lands, goods, and liberties, but our lives also if he will. And they say true; but they have no reason to think he will, unless it be for his own profit; which cannot be, for he loves his own power; and what becomes of his power when his subjects are destroyed or weakened, by whose multitude and strength he enjoys his power, and every one of his subjects his fortune? And lastly, whereas they sometimes say the King is bound, not only to cause his laws to be observed, but also to observe them himself; I think the King causing them to be observed is the same thing as observing them himself. For I never heard it taken for good law, that the King may be indicted, or appealed, or served with a writ, till the Long Parliament practised the contrary upon the good King Charles; for which divers of them were executed, and the rest by this our present King pardoned.

L.

Pardoned by the King and Parliament.

P.

By the King in Parliament if you will, but not by the King and Parliament. You cannot deny, but that the pardoning of injury belongs to the person that is injured; treason, and other offences against the peace and against the right of the sovereign, are injuries done to the King; and therefore whosoever is pardoned any such offence, ought to acknowledge he owes his pardon to the King alone: but as to such murders, felonies, and other injuries as are done to any subject how mean soever, I think it great reason that the parties endamaged ought to have satisfaction before such pardon be allowed. And in the death of a man, where restitution of life is impossible, what can any friend, heir, or other party that may appeal, require more than reasonable satisfaction some other way? Perhaps he will

be content with nothing but life for life; but that is revenge, and belongs to God, and under God to the King, and none else; therefore if there be reasonable satisfaction tendered, the King without sin, I think, may pardon him. I am sure, if the pardoning him be a sin, that neither King, nor Parliament, nor any earthly power can do it.

L.

You see by this your own argument, that the Act of Oblivion, without a Parliament, could not have passed; because, not only the King, but also most of the Lords, and abundance of common people had received injuries; which not being pardonable but by their own assent, it was absolutely necessary that it should be done in Parliament, and by the assent of the Lords and Commons.

P.

I grant it; but I pray you tell me now what is the difference between a general pardon, and an act of oblivion?

L.

The word Act of Oblivion was never in our books before; but I believe it is in yours.

P.

In the state of Athens long ago, for the abolishing of the civil war, there was an act agreed on; that from that time forward, no man should be molested for anything before that act done, whatsoever, without exception; which act the makers of it called an act of oblivion; not that all injuries should be forgotten (for then we could never have had the story), but that they should not rise up in judgment against any man. And in imitation of this act, the like was propounded, though it took no effect, upon the death of Julius Cæsar, in the senate of Rome. By such an act you may easily

conceive that all accusations for offences past were absolutely dead and buried; and yet we have no great reason to think, that the objecting one to another of the injuries pardoned, was any violation of those acts, except the same were so expressed in the act itself.

L.

It seems then that the act of oblivion was here no more, nor of other nature, than a general pardon.

P.

Since you acknowledge that in all controversies, the judicature originally belongeth to the King, and seeing that no man is able in his own person to execute an office of so much business: what order is taken for deciding of so many and so various controversies?

Of Courts.

L.

There be divers sorts of controversies, some of which are concerning men's titles to lands and goods; and some goods are corporeal, as lands, money, cattle, corn, and the like, which may be handled or seen; and some incorporeal, as privileges, liberties, dignities, offices, and many other good things, mere creatures of the law, and cannot be handled or seen; and both of these kinds are concerning meum and tuum. Others there are concerning crimes punishable divers ways: and amongst some of these, part of the punishment is some fine or forfeiture to the King; and then it is called a plea of the Crown, in case the King sue the party; otherwise it is but a private plea, which they call an appeal. And though upon judgment in an appeal the King shall have his forfeiture, yet it cannot be called a plea of the Crown, but when the Crown pleadeth for it. There be also other controversies concerning the government of the Church, in order to religion and virtuous

life. The offences both against the Crown and against the laws of the Church, are crimes; but the offences of one subject against another, if they be not against the Crown, the King pretendeth nothing in those pleas but the reparation of his subjects injured.

P.

A crime is an offence of any kind whatsoever, for which a penalty is ordained by the law of the land: but you must understand that damages awarded to the party injured, has nothing common with the nature of a penalty, but is merely a restitution or satisfaction, due to the party grieved by the law of reason, and consequently is no more a punishment than is the paying of a debt.

L.

It seems by this definition of a crime, you make no difference between a crime and a sin.

P.

All crimes are indeed sins, but not all sins crimes. A sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man can take notice; but a crime is such a sin as consists in an action against the law, of which action he can be accused, and tried by a judge, and be convinced or cleared by witnesses. Farther; that which is no sin in itself, but indifferent, may be made sin by a positive law: as when the statute was in force that no man should wear silk in his hat, after the statute such wearing of silk was a sin, which was not so before. Nay, sometimes an action that is good in itself, by the statute law may be made a sin; as if a statute should be made to forbid the giving of alms to a strong and sturdy beggar, such alms, after that law, would be a sin, but not before; for then it was charity, the object whereof is not the strength or other quality of the

poor man, but his poverty. Again, he that should have said in Queen Mary's time, that the Pope had no authority in England, should have been burnt at a stake; but for saying the same in the time of Queen Elizabeth, should have been commended. You see by this, that many things are made crimes, and no crime, which are not so in their own nature, but by diversity of law, made upon diversity of opinion or of interest by them which have authority: and yet those things, whether good or evil, will pass so with the vulgar, if they hear them often with odious terms recited, for heinous crimes in themselves, as many of those opinions, which are in themselves pious and lawful, were heretofore, by the Pope's interest therein, called detestable heresy. Again, some controversies are of things done upon the sea, others of things done upon the land. There need be many courts to the deciding of so many kinds of controversies. What order is there taken for their distribution?

L.

There be an extraordinary great number of courts in England. First, there be the King's courts, both for law and equity, in matters temporal; which are the Chancery, the King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas; and, for the King's revenue, the Court of the Exchequer: and there be subjects' courts by privilege, as the Courts in London and other privileged places. And there be other courts of subjects, as the Court of Landlords, called the Court of Barons, and the Courts of Sheriffs. Also the Spiritual Courts are the King's courts at this day, though heretofore they were the Pope's courts. And in the King's courts, some have their judicature by office, and some by commission; and some authority to hear and determine, and some only to inquire, and to certify into other courts. Now for the distribution of what pleas every court may hold, it is commonly held, that all the pleas of the Crown, and of all offences contrary to the peace, are to be holden in the King's Bench, or by commissioners. For Bracton saith: Sciendum est, quod

si actiones sunt criminales, in Curia Domini Regis debent determinari; cum sit ibi pœna corporalis infligenda, et hoc coram ipso rege, si tangat personam suam, sicut crimen læsæ majestatis, vel coram justitiariis ad hoc specialiter assignatis: that is to say, that if the plea be criminal, it ought to be determined in the Court of our Lord the King, because there they have power to inflict corporal punishment; and if the crime be against his person, as the crime of treason, it ought to be determined before the King himself; or if it be against a private person, it ought to be determined by justices assigned, that is to say, before commissioners. It seems by this, that heretofore Kings did hear and determine pleas of treason against themselves, by their own persons; but it has been otherwise a long time, and is now; for it is now the office of the Lord Steward of England, in the trial of a peer, to hold that plea by a commission especially for the same. In causes concerning meum and tuum, the King may sue, either in the King's Bench, or in the Court of Common Pleas; as it appears by Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium, at the writ of escheat.

P.

A king perhaps will not sit to determine of causes of treason against his person, lest he should seem to make himself judge in his own cause; but that it shall be judged by judges of his own making can never be avoided, which is all one as if he were judge himself.

L.

To the King's Bench also, I think, belongeth the hearing and determining of all manner of breaches of the peace whatsoever, saving always to the King that he may do the same, when he pleaseth, by commissioners. In the time of Henry III and Edward I (when Bracton wrote) the King did usually send down every seven years into the country, commissioners called justices itinerant, to hear and determine generally all causes temporal, both

criminal and civil; whose places have been now a long time supplied by the justices of assize, with commissions of the peace of oyer and terminer, and of gaol-delivery.

P.

But why may the King only sue in the King's Bench or Court of Common Pleas, which he will, and no other person may do the same?

L.

There is no statute to the contrary, but it seemeth to be the common-law. For Sir Edward Coke (ivth Instit.), setteth down the jurisdiction of the King's Bench; which, he says, has: first, jurisdiction in all pleas of the Crown. Secondly, the correcting of all manner of errors of other justices and judges, both of judgments and process, except of the Court of Exchequer, which, he says, is to this court proprium quarto modo. Thirdly, that it has power to correct all misdemeanours extrajudicial, tending to the breach of the peace, or oppression of the subjects, or raising of factions, controversies, debates, or any other manner of misgovernment. Fourthly, it may hold plea by writ out of the Chancery of all trespasses done vi et armis. Fifthly, it hath power to hold plea by bill for debt, detenue, covenant, promise, and all other personal actions. But of the jurisdiction of the King's Bench in actions real he says nothing; save, that if a writ in a real action be abated by judgment in the Court of Common Pleas, and that the judgment be by a writ of error reversed in the King's Bench, then the King's Bench may proceed upon the writ.

P.

But how is the practice?

L.

Real actions are commonly decided, as well in the King's Bench, as in the Court of Common Pleas.

P.

When the King by authority in writing maketh a Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench; does he not set down what he makes him for?

L.

Sir Edward Coke sets down the letters-patent, whereby of ancient time the Lord Chief Justice was constituted, wherein is expressed to what end he hath his office; viz. pro conservatione nostra et tranquillitatis regni nostri, et ad justitiam universis et singulis de regno nostro exhibendam, constituimus dilectum et fidelem nostrum P.B. Justitiarium Angliæ, quamdiu nobis placuerit, Capitalem, etc. that is to say, for the preservation of ourself, and of the peace of our realm, and for the doing of justice to all and singular our subjects, we have constituted our beloved and faithful P. B. during our pleasure, Chief Justice of England, &c.

P.

Methinks it is very plain by these letters-patent, that all causes temporal within the kingdom, except the pleas that belong to the Exchequer, should be decidable by this Lord Chief Justice. For as for causes criminal, and that concern the peace, it is granted him in these words, "for the conservation of our self, and peace of the kingdom," wherein are contained all pleas criminal; and, in the doing of justice to all and singular the King's subjects are comprehended all pleas civil. And as to the Court of Common Pleas, it is manifest it may hold all manner of civil pleas, except those of the Exchequer, by Magna Charta, cap. ii. So that all original writs concerning civil pleas are returnable into either of the said courts. But how is the Lord Chief Justice made now?

L.

By these words in their letters-patent: Constituimus vos Justitiarium nostrum Capitalem ad placita coram nobis tenenda, durante beneplacito nostro: that is to say, we have made you our Chief Justice, to hold pleas before ourself, during our pleasure. But this writ, though it be shorter, does not at all abridge the power they had by the former. And for the letters-patent for the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, they go thus: Constituimus dilectum et fidelem, etc., Capitalem Justitiarium de Communi Banco, habendum, etc., quamdiu nobis placuerit, cum vadiis et fœdis ab antiquo debitis et consuetis. Id est, We have constituted our beloved and faithful, &c., Chief Justice of the Common Bench, to have, &c., during our pleasure, with the ways and fees thereunto heretofore due, and usual.

P.

I find in history, that there have been in England always a Chancellor and a Chief Justice of England, but of a Court of Common Pleas there is no mention before Magna Charta. Common pleas there were ever both here, and, I think, in all nations; for common pleas and civil pleas I take to be the same.

L.

Before the statute of Magna Charta, common pleas, as Sir Edward Coke granteth, (2 Inst.), might have been holden in the King's Bench; and that court being removeable at the King's will, the returns of writs were Coram nobis ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia; whereby great trouble of jurors ensued, and great charges of the parties, and delay of justice; and for these causes it was ordained, that the common pleas should not follow the King, but be held in a place certain.

P.

Here Sir Edward Coke declares his opinion, that no common plea can be holden in the King's Bench, in that he says they might have been holden then. And yet this doth not amount to any probable proof, that there was any Court of Common Pleas in England before Magna Charta. For this statute being to ease the jurors, and lessen the charges of parties, and for the expedition of justice, had been in vain, if there had been a Court of Common Pleas then standing; for such a court was not necessarily to follow the King, as was the Chancery and the King's Bench. Besides, unless the King's Bench, wheresoever it was, held plea of civil causes, the subject had not at all been eased by this statute. For supposing the King at York, had not the King's subjects about London, jurors and parties, as much trouble and charge to go to York, as the people about York had before to go to London? Therefore I can by no means believe otherwise, than that the erection of the Court of Common Pleas was the effect of that statute of Magna Charta, ca; and before that time not existent, though I think that for the multiplicity of suits in a great kingdom there was need of it.

L.

Perhaps there was not so much need of it as you think. For in those times the laws, for the most part, were in settling, rather than settled; and the old Saxon laws concerning inheritances were then practised, by which laws speedy justice was executed by the King's writs, in the courts of Barons, which were landlords to the rest of the freeholders; and suits of barons in County courts; and but few suits in the King's courts, but when justice could not be had in those inferior courts. But at this day there be more suits in the King's courts, than any one court can despatch.

P.

Why should there be more suits now, than formerly? For I believe this kingdom was as well peopled then as now.

L.

Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst.) assigneth for it six causes: 1. Peace. 2. Plenty. 3. The dissolution of religious houses, and dispersing of their lands among so many several persons. 4. The multitude of informers. 5. The number of concealers. 6. The multitude of attorneys.

P.

I see Sir Edward Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the men of his own profession, and that he assigns for causes of the mischiefs, such things as would be mischief and wickedness to amend. For if peace and plenty be the cause of this evil, it cannot be removed but by war and beggary; and the quarrels arising about the lands of religious persons cannot arise from the lands, but from the doubtfulness of the laws. And for informers, they were authorized by statutes; to the execution of which statutes they are so necessary, as that their number cannot be too great; and if it be too great, the fault is in the law itself. The number of concealers are indeed a number of cozeners, which the law may easily correct. And lastly, for the multitude of attorneys, it is the fault of them that have the power to admit or refuse them. For my part, I believe that men at this day have better learned the art of cavilling against the words of a statute, than heretofore they had, and thereby encourage themselves and others to undertake suits upon little reason. Also the variety and repugnancy of judgments of common-law, do oftentimes put men to hope for victory in causes whereof in reason they had no ground at all: also the ignorance of what is equity in their own causes, which equity not one man in a thousand ever studied. And the lawyers themselves seek not for their judgments in their own breasts, but in the precedents of former judges: as the ancient judges sought the same, not in their own reason, but in the laws of the empire. Another, and perhaps the greatest cause of multitude of suits, is this, that for want of registering of

conveyances of land, which might easily be done in the townships where the lands lay, a purchase cannot easily be had which will not be litigious. Lastly, I believe the covetousness of lawyers was not so great in ancient time, which was full of trouble, as they have been since in time of peace; wherein men have leisure to study fraud, and get employment from such men as can encourage to contention. And how ample a field they have to exercise this mystery in, is manifest from this, that they have a power to scan and construe every word in a statute, charter, feoffment, lease, or other deed, evidence, or testimony. But to return to the jurisdiction of this Court of the King's Bench, where, as you say, it hath power to correct and amend the errors of all other judges, both in process and in judgments; cannot the judges of the Common Pleas correct error in process in their own courts, without a writ of error from another court?

L.

Yes; and there be many statutes which command them so to do.

P.

When a writ of error is brought out of the King's Bench, be it either error in process or in law, at whose charge is it to be done?

L.

At the charge of the client.

P.

I see no reason for that; for the client is not in fault, who never begins a suit but by the advice of his counsel, learned in the law, whom he pays for his counsel given. Is not this the fault of his counsellor? Nor when a judge in the Common Pleas hath given an erroneous sentence, is it always likely that the judge of the King's Bench will reverse the judgment, (though there be no question, but as you may find in Bracton and other learned men, he

has power to do it); because being professors of the same common-law, they are persuaded, for the most part, to give the same judgments. For example: if Sir Edward Coke, in the last term that he sat as Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Common Pleas, had given an erroneous judgment, is it likely that when he was removed, and made Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, he would therefore have reversed the said judgment? It is possible he might, but not very likely. And therefore I do believe there is some other power, by the King constituted, to reverse erroneous judgments, both in the King's Bench and in the Court of Common Pleas.

L.

I think not; for there is a statute to the contrary, made 4 Henry IV, ca, in these words: Whereas, as well in plea real, as in plea personal, after judgment in the court of our Lord the King, the parties be made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself, sometimes before the King's council, and sometimes to the Parliament, to answer thereof anew, to the great impoverishing of the parties aforesaid, and to the subversion of the common-law of the land, it is ordained and established, that after judgment given in the court of our Lord the King, the parties and their heirs shall be there in peace, until the judgment be undone by attaint, or by error, if there be error, as hath been used by the laws in the times of the King's progenitors.

P.

This statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say, as it seemeth to me to have been made expressly to confirm the same. For the substance of the statute is, that there shall be no suit made by either of the parties for anything adjudged, either in the King's Bench, or Court of Common Pleas, before the judgment be undone by error, or corruption proved; and that this was the common-law before the making of this statute, which could not be,

except there were before this statute some courts authorized to examine and correct such errors as by the plaintiff should be assigned. The inconvenience which by this statute was to be remedied was this, that often judgment given in the King's courts, by which are meant in this place the King's Bench and Court of Common Pleas, the party against whom the judgment was given, did begin a new suit, and cause his adversary to come before the King himself. Here, by the King himself must be understood the King in person; for though in a writ by the words coram nobis is understood the King's Bench, yet in a statute it is never so; nor is it strange, seeing in those days the King did usually sit in court with his council to hear causes, as sometimes King James. And sometimes the same parties commenced their suit before the Privy Council, though the King were absent, and sometimes before the Parliament, the former judgment yet standing. For remedy whereof, it was ordained by this statute, that no man should renew his suit till the former judgment was undone by attaint or error; which reversing of a judgment had been impossible, if there had been no court besides the aforesaid two courts, wherein the errors might be assigned, examined, and judged; for no court can be esteemed, in law or reason, a competent judge of its own errors. There was therefore before this statute, some other court existent for the hearing of errors, and reversing of erroneous judgments. What court this was, I inquire not yet; but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy Council, or the court wherein the erroneous judgment was given.

L.

The Doctor and Student discourses of this statute (ca et seq.) much otherwise than you do. For the author of that book saith, that against an erroneous judgment all remedy is by this statute taken away. And though neither reason, nor the office of a King, nor any law positive, can prohibit

the remedying of any injury, much less of an unjust sentence; yet he shows many statutes, wherein a man's conscience ought to prevail above the law.

P.

Upon what ground can he pretend, that all remedy in this case is by this statute prohibited?

L.

He says it is thereby enacted, that judgment given by the King's Courts shall not be examined in the Chancery, Parliament, nor elsewhere.

P.

Is there any mention of Chancery in this act? It cannot be examined before the King and his council, nor before the Parliament; but you see that before the statute it was examined somewhere, and that this statute will have it examined there again. And seeing the Chancery was altogether the highest office of judicature in the kingdom for matter of equity, and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the judgments of all other courts, at least it is not taken from it by this statute. But what cases are there in this chapter of the Doctor and Student, by which it can be made probable, that when law and conscience, or law and equity, seem to oppugn one another, the written law should be preferred?

L.

If the defendant wage his law in an action of debt brought upon a true debt, the plaintiff hath no means to come to his debt by way of compulsion, neither by subpœna, nor otherwise; and yet the defendant is bound in conscience to pay him.

P.

Here is no preferring, that I see, of the law above conscience or equity. For the plaintiff in this case loseth not his debt for want either of law, or equity, but for want of proof; for neither law nor equity can give a man his right, unless he prove it.

L.

Also if the grand jury in attaint affirm a false verdict given by the petty jury, there is no further remedy, but the conscience of the party.

P.

Here again the want of proof is the want of remedy. For if he can prove that the verdict given was false, the King can give him remedy such way as himself shall think best, and ought to do it, in case the party shall find surety, if the same verdict be again affirmed, to satisfy his adversary for the damage and vexation he puts him to.

L.

But there is a statute made since, viz. 27 Eliz. c. 8, by which that statute of 4 Hen. IV. 23, is in part taken away. For by that statute, erroneous judgments given in the King's Bench, are by a writ of error to be examined in the Exchequer-chamber, before the justices of the Common Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer; and by the preamble of this act it appears, that erroneous judgments are only to be reformed by the High Court of Parliament.

P.

But here is no mention, that the judgments given in the Court of Common Pleas should be brought in to be examined in the Exchequer-chamber. Why therefore may not the Court of Chancery examine a judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas?

L.

You deny not but, by the ancient law of England, the King's Bench may examine the judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas.

P.

It is true. But why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same, especially if the fault of the judgment be against equity, and not against the letter of the law?

L.

There is no necessity of that; for the same court may examine both the letter and the equity of the statute.

P.

You see by this, that the jurisdiction of courts cannot easily be distinguished, but by the King himself in his Parliament. The lawyers themselves cannot do it; for you see what contention there is between courts, as well as between particular men. And whereas you say, that law of 4 Hen. IV. 23, is by that of 27 Eliz. c. 8, taken away, I do not find it so. I find indeed a diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter statute, in the preamble of the latter and conclusion of the former. The preamble of the latter is, forasmuch as erroneous judgments given in the Court called the King's Bench, are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament; and the conclusion of the former is, that the contrary was law in the times of the King's progenitors. These are no parts of those laws, but opinions only concerning the ancient custom in that case, arising from the different opinions of the lawyers in those different times, neither commanding nor forbidding anything; though of the statutes themselves, the one forbids that such pleas be brought before the Parliament, the other forbids it not. But yet, if after the act of Hen. IV such a plea had been

brought before the Parliament, the Parliament might have heard and determined it. For the statute forbids not that; nor can any law have the force to hinder the Parliament of any jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them, seeing it is a court of the King and of all the people together, both Lords and Commons.

L.

Though it be, yet seeing the King (as Sir Edward Coke affirms, 4 Inst.) hath committed all his power judicial, some to one court, and some to another, so as if any man would render himself to the judgment of the King, in such case where the King hath committed all his power judicial to others, such a render should be to no effect. And , he saith farther: that in this court, the Kings of this realm have sitten on the high bench, and the judges of that court on the lower bench, at his feet; but judicature belongeth only to the judges of that court, and in his presence they answer all motions.

P.

I cannot believe that Sir Edward Coke, how much soever he desired to advance the authority of himself and other justices of the common-law, could mean that the King in the King's Bench sat as a spectator only, and might not have answered all motions, which his judges answered, if he had seen cause for it. For he knew that the King was supreme judge then in all causes temporal, and is now in all causes both temporal and ecclesiastical; and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the laws for them that shall deny it. But Sir Edward Coke, as he had (you see) in many places before, hath put a fallacy upon himself, by not distinguishing between committing and transferring. He that transferreth his power, hath deprived himself of it: but he that committeth it to another to be exercised in his name and under him, is still in the possession of the same power. And therefore, if a man render himself, that is to say, appealeth to the King from

any judge whatsoever, the King may receive his appeal; and it shall be effectual.

L.

Besides these two courts, the King's Bench for Pleas of the Crown, and the Court of Common Pleas for causes civil, according to the common-law of England, there is another court of justice, that hath jurisdiction in causes both civil and criminal, and is as ancient a court at least as the Court of Common Pleas, and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral; but the proceedings therein are according to the laws of the Roman empire, and the causes to be determined there are such as arise upon the marine sea: for so it is ordained by divers statutes, and confirmed by many precedents.

P.

As for the statutes, they are always law, and reason also; for they are made by the assent of all the kingdom; but precedents are judgments, one contrary to another; I mean divers men in divers ages, upon the same case give divers judgments. Therefore I will ask your opinion once more concerning any judgments besides those of the King, as to their validity in law. But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty, and the Court of Common-law?

L.

One is, that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two witnesses, without any either grandjury to indict, or petty to convict; and the judge giveth sentence according to the laws imperial, which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe, and now are laws, not by the will of any other Emperor or foreign power, but by the will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own dominions; the reason whereof seems to be, that the causes that arise at sea are very often between us, and people of

other nations, such as are governed for the most part by the self-same laws imperial.

P.

How can it precisely enough be determined at sea, especially near the mouth of a very great river, whether it be upon the sea, or within the land? For the rivers also are, as well as their banks, within or a part of one country or other.

L.

Truly the question is difficult; and there have been many suits about it, wherein the question has been, whose jurisdiction it is in.

P.

Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself, in case it be not declared in the Lord Admiral's letters-patent.

L.

But though there be in the letters-patent a power given to hold plea in some certain cases, not contrary to any of the statutes concerning the Admiralty, the justices of the common-law may send a prohibition to that court, to proceed in the plea, though it be with a non-obstante of any statute.

P.

Methinks that that should be against the right of the Crown, which cannot be taken from it by any subject. For that argument of Sir Edward Coke's, that the King has given away all his judicial power, is worth nothing: because, as I have said before, he cannot give away the essential rights of his Crown, and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his grant.

L.

But you may see by the precedents alleged by Sir Edward Coke, the contrary has been perpetually practised.

P.

I see not that perpetually. For who can tell but there may have been given other judgments, in such cases, which have either been not preserved in the records, or else by Sir Edward Coke, because they were against his opinion, not alleged? For this is possible, though you will not grant it to be very likely. Therefore I insist only upon this, that no record of a judgment is a law, save only to the party pleading until he can by law reverse the former judgment. And as to the proceeding without juries, by two sufficient witnesses, I do not see what harm can proceed from it to the commonwealth, nor consequently any just quarrel that the justice of the common-law can have against their proceedings in the Admiralty. For the proof of the fact in both courts lieth merely on the witnesses; and the difference is no more, but that in the imperial law, the judge of the court judgeth of the testimony of the witnesses, and the jury doth it in a court of common-law. Besides, if a court of common-law should chance to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Admiral, may not he send a prohibition to the court of common-law to forbid their proceeding? I pray you tell me what reason there is for the one, more than for the other?

L.

I know none but long custom, for I think it was never done. The highest ordinary court in England is the Court of Chancery, wherein the Lord Chancellor, or otherwise Keeper of the Great Seal, is the only judge. This court is very ancient, as appears by Sir Edward Coke, 4 Inst. , where he nameth the Chancellors of King Edgar, King Etheldred, King Edmund, and King Edward the Confessor. His office is given to him, without letters-patent, by the King’s delivery to him of the Great Seal of England; and

whosoever hath the keeping of the Great Seal of England, hath the same, and the whole jurisdiction that the Lord Chancellor ever had by the statute of 5 Eliz. c. 18, wherein it is declared, that such is, and always has been the common-law. And Sir Edward Coke says, he has his name of Chancellor from the highest point of his jurisdiction, viz. a cancellando; that is, from cancelling the King's letters-patent, by drawing strokes through it like a lattice.

P.

Very pretty. It is well enough known that Cancellarius was a great officer under the Roman empire, whereof this island was once a member, and that the office came into this kingdom, either with, or in imitation of the Roman government. Also, it was long after the time of the twelve Cæsars, that this officer was created in the state of Rome. For till after Septimius Severus his time, the emperors did diligently enough take cognizance of all causes and complaints for judgments given in the Courts of the Prætors, which were in Rome the same that the judges of the common-law are here. But by the continual civil wars in after times for the choosing of Emperors, that diligence by little and little ceased. And afterwards, as I have read in a very good author of the Roman civil law, the number of complaints being much increased, and being more than the Emperor could dispatch, he appointed an officer as his clerk, to receive all such petitions; and that this clerk caused a partition to be made in a room convenient, in which partition-wall, at the heighth of a man's reach, he placed at convenient distances certain bars; so that when a suitor came to deliver his petition to the clerk, who was sometimes absent, he had no more to do but to throw in his petition between those bars, which in Latin are called properly cancelli; not that any certain form of those bars, or any bars at all were necessary, for they might have been thrown over, though the whole space had been left open; but because they were cancelli, the clerk attendant, and keeping his office there, was

called Cancellarius. And any court bar may properly enough be called cancelli, which does not signify a lattice; for that is but a mere conjecture grounded upon no history nor grammar, but taken up at first, as is likely, by some boy that could find no other word in the dictionary for a lattice, but cancelli. The office of this Chancellor was at first but to breviate the matter of the petitions, for the easing of the Emperor; but complaints increasing daily, they were too many, considering other businesses more necessary for the Emperor to determine; and this caused the Emperor to commit the determination of them to the Chancellor again. What reason doth Sir Edward Coke allege to prove, that the highest point of the Chancellor's jurisdiction is to cancel his master's letters-patent, after they were sealed with his master's seal; unless he hold plea concerning the validity of them, or of his master's meaning in them, or of the surreptitious getting of them, or of the abusing of them, which are all causes of equity? Also, seeing the Chancellor hath his office only by the delivery of the Great Seal, without any instruction, or limitation of the process of his court to be used; it is manifest, that in all causes whereof he has the hearing, he may proceed by such manner of hearing and examining of witnesses, with jury or without jury, as he shall think fittest for the exactness, expedition, and equity of the decrees. And therefore, if he think the custom of proceeding by jury, according to the custom of England in Courts of common-law, tend more to equity, which is the scope of all the judges in the world, or ought to be, he ought to use that method; or if he think better of another proceeding, he may use it, if it be not forbidden by a statute.

L.

As for this reasoning of yours, I think it well enough. But there ought to be had also a reverend respect to customs not unreasonable; and therefore, I think, Sir Edward Coke says not amiss, that in such cases where the Chancellor will proceed by the rule of the common-law, he ought to deliver

the record in the King's Bench; and also it is necessary for the Lord Chancellor to take care of not exceeding as it is limited by statutes.

P.

What are the statutes by which his jurisdiction is limited? I know that by the 27 Eliz. c. 8, he cannot reverse a judgment given in the King's Bench for debt, detinue, &c.; nor before the statute could he ever, by virtue of his office, reverse a judgment in pleas of the Crown, given by the King's Bench, that hath the cognizance of such pleas. Nor need he; for the judges themselves, when they think there is need to relieve a man oppressed by ill witnesses, or power of great men prevailing on the jury, or by error of the jury, though it be in case of felony, may stay the execution and inform the King, who will in equity relieve him. As to the regard we ought to have to custom, we will consider of it afterwards.

L.

First, in a Parliament holden the 13th of Richard II, the Commons petitioned the King, that neither the Chancellor, nor other Chancellor, do make any order against the common-law, nor that any judgment be given without due process of law.

P.

This is no unreasonable petition; for the common-law is nothing else but equity: and by this statute it appears, that the Chancellors, before that statute, made bolder with the Courts of common-law than they did afterward; but it does not appear that common-law in this statute signifies any thing else but generally the law temporal of the realm, nor was this statute ever printed, that such as I might take notice of it. But whether it be a statute or not, I know not, till you tell me what the Parliament answered to this petition.

L.

The King’s answer was, the usages heretofore shall stand, so as the King’s royalty be saved.

P.

This is flatly against Sir Edward Coke, concerning the Chancery.

L.

In another Parliament, 17 Rich. II, it is enacted, at the petition of the Commons, that forasmuch as people were compelled to come before the King’s Council, or in Chancery, by writs grounded upon untrue suggestions, the Chancellor for the time being, presently after such suggestions be duly found and proved untrue, shall have power to ordain and award damages according to his discretion, to him which is so travelled unduly as is aforesaid.

P.

By this statute it appears, that when a complaint is made in Chancery upon undue suggestions, the Chancellor shall have the examination of the said suggestions, and as he may award damages when the suggestions are untrue, so he may also proceed by process to the determining of the cause, whether it be real or personal, so it be not criminal.

L.

Also the Commons petitioned in a Parliament of 2 Hen. IV, (not printed) that no writs, nor privy seals, be sued out of Chancery, Exchequer, or other places, to any man to appear at a day upon a pain, either before the King and his Council, or in any other place, contrary to the ordinary course of common-law.

P.

What answer was given to this petition by the King?

L.

That such writs should not be granted without necessity.

P.

Here again, you see, the King may deny or grant any petitions in Parliament, either as he thinks it necessary, as in this place, or as he thinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his royalty; as in the answer of the former petition, which is a sufficient proof that no part of his legislative power, or any other essential part of royalty, can be taken from him by a statute. Now seeing it is granted that equity is the same thing with the law of reason, and seeing Sir Edward Coke (1 Inst. sec. xxi.), defines equity to be a certain reason comprehended in no writing, but consisting only in right reason, which interpreteth and amendeth the written law; I would fain know to what end there should be any other Court of Equity at all, either before the Chancellor or any other person, besides the Judges of the Civil or Common Pleas? Nay, I am sure you can allege none but this, that there was a neeessity for a higher Court of Equity than the Courts of common-law, to remedy the errors in judgment given by the justices of inferior courts; and the errors in Chancery were irrevocable, except by Parliament, or by special commission appointed thereunto by the King.

L.

But Sir Edward Coke says, that seeing matters of fact by the common-law are triable by a jury of twelve men, this court should not draw the matter ad aliud examen, that is, to another kind of examination, viz. deposition of witnesses, which should be but evidence to a jury.

P.

Is the deposition of witnesses any more or less, than evidence to the Lord Chancellor? It is not therefore another kind of examination; nor is a jury more capable of duly examining witnesses than a Lord Chancellor. Besides, seeing all courts are bound to judge according to equity, and that all judges in a case of equity may sometimes be deceived, what harm is there to any man, or to the state, if there be a subordination of judges in equity, as well as of judges in common-law? Seeing it is provided by an Act of Parliament, to avoid vexation, that subpœnas shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfy the party so grieved and vexed for his damages and expenses, if so be the matter may not be made good which is contained in the bill.

L.

There is another statute of 31 Hen. VI. c. 2, wherein there is a proviso cited by Sir Edward Coke in these words: "Provided that no matter determinable by the laws of the realm, shall be by the said Act determined in other form, than after the course of the same law in the King's Courts, having the determination of the same law."

P.

This law was made but for seven years, and never continued by any other Parliament, and the motive of this law was the great riots, extortions, oppressions, &c. used during the time of the insurrection of John Cade, and the indictments and condemnations wrongfully had by this usurped authority. And thereupon the Parliament ordained, that for seven years following no man should disobey any of the King's writs under the Great Seal, or should refuse to appear upon proclamation before the King's Council, or in the Chancery, to answer to riots, extortions, &c.; for the first time he should lose, &c. Wherein there is nothing at all concerning the jurisdiction of the Chancery or any other court, but an extraordinary power given to the Chancery, and to the King's Privy Council, to determine of

those crimes, which were not before that time triable but only by the King's Bench or special commission. For the Act was made expressly for the punishment of a great multitude of crimes committed by those who had acted under the said Cade's authority; to which Act the proviso was added which is here mentioned, that the proceedings in those Courts of Chancery, and of the King's Council, should be such as should be used in the courts, to which the said causes, before this Act was made, do belong: that is to say, such causes as were criminal, should be after the order of the King's Bench; and such causes as were not criminal, but only against equity, should be tried after the manner of the Chancery, or in some cases according to the proceedings in the Exchequer. I wonder why Sir Edward Coke should cite a statute, as this is, above two hundred years before expired, and other two petitions, as if they were statutes, when they were not passed by the King; unless he did it on purpose to diminish, as he endeavours to do throughout his Institutes, the King's authority, or to insinuate his own opinions among the people for the law of the land; for that also he endeavours by inserting Latin sentences, both in his text and in the margin, as if they were principles of the law of reason, without any authority of ancient lawyers, or any certainty of reason in themselves, to make men believe they are the very grounds of the law of England. Now as to the authority you ascribe to custom, I deny that any custom of its own nature can amount to the authority of a law. For if the custom be unreasonable, you must, with all other lawyers, confess that it is no law, but ought to abolished; and if the custom be reasonable, it is not the custom, but the equity that makes it law. For what need is there to make reason law by any custom how long soever, when the law of reason is eternal? Besides, you cannot find it in any statute, though lex et consuetudo be often mentioned as things to be followed by the judges in their judgments, that consuetudines, that is to say, customs or usages, did imply any long continuance of former time; but that it signified

such use and custom of proceeding, as was then immediately in being before the making of such statute. Nor shall you find in any statute the word common-law, which may not be there well interpreted for any of the laws of England temporal; for it is not the singularity of process used in any court that can distinguish it, so as to make it a different law from the law of the whole nation.

L.

If all the courts were, as you think, courts of equity, would it not be incommodious to the commonwealth?

P.

I think not; unless perhaps you may say, that seeing the judges, whether they have many or few causes to be heard before them, have but the same wages from the King, they may be too much inclined to put off the causes they use to hear, for the easing of themselves, to some other court, to the delay of justice, and damage of the parties suing.

L.

You are very much deceived in that; for on the contrary, the contention between the courts for jurisdiction is, of who shall have most causes brought before them.

P.

I cry you mercy, I smelt not that.

L.

Seeing also all judges ought to give their sentence according to equity, if it should chance that a written law should be against the law of reason, which is equity, I cannot imagine in that case how any judgment can be righteous.

P.

It cannot be that a written law should be against reason; for nothing is more reasonable than that every man should obey the law which he hath himself assented to. But that is not always the law, which is signified by grammatical construction of the letter, but that which the legislature thereby intended should be in force; which intention, I confess, is a very hard matter many times to pick out of the words of the statute, and requires great ability of understanding, and greater meditations and consideration of such conjuncture of occasions and incommodities, as needed a new law for a remedy. For there is scarce anything so clearly written, that when the cause thereof is forgotten, may not be wrested by an ignorant grammarian, or a cavilling logician, to the injury, oppression, or perhaps destruction of an honest man. And for this reason the Judges deserve that honour and profit they enjoy. Since the determination of what particular causes every particular court should have cognizance, is a thing not yet sufficiently explained, and is in itself so difficult, as that the sages of the law themselves, (the reason Sir Edward Coke will leave to law itself), are not yet agreed upon it; how is it possible for a man who is no professed or no profound lawyer, to take notice in what court he may lawfully begin his suit, or give counsel in it to his client?

L.

I confess that no man can be bound to take notice of the jurisdiction of courts, till all the courts be agreed upon it amongst themselves; but what rule to give judgment by, a judge can have, so as never to contradict the law written, nor displease his legislator, I understand not.

P.

I think he may avoid both, if he take care by his sentence that he neither punish an innocent man, nor deprive him of his damages due from one that

maliciously sueth him without reasonable cause, which to the most of rational men and unbiassed, is not, in my opinion, very difficult. And though a judge should, as all men may do, err in his judgment, yet there is always such power in the laws of England, as may content the parties, either in the Chancery, or by commissioners of their own choosing, authorized by the King; for every man is bound to acquiesce in the sentence of the judges he chooseth.

L.

In what cases can the true construction of the letter be contrary to the meaning of the lawmaker?

P.

Very many, whereof Sir Edward Coke nameth three: fraud, accident, and breach of confidence. But there be many more; for there be a very great many reasonable exceptions almost to every general rule, which the makers of the rule could not foresee; and very many words in every statute, especially long ones, that are, as to grammar, of ambiguous signification, and yet to them that know well to what end the statute was made, perspicuous enough; and many connexions of doubtful reference, which by a grammarian may be cavilled at, though the intention of the lawmaker be never so perspicuous. And these are the difficulties which the judges ought to master, and can do it in respect of their ability for which they are chosen, as well as can be hoped for; and yet there are other men can do the same, or else the judges' places could not be from time to time supplied. The bishops commonly are the most able and rational men, and obliged by their profession to study equity, because it is the law of God; and are therefore capable of being judges in a court of equity. They are the men that teach the people what is sin; that is to say, they are the doctors in cases of conscience. What reason then can you show me, why it is unfit and hurtful to the

commonwealth that a bishop should be a Chancellor; as they were most often before the time of Henry VIII, and since that time once in the reign of King James?

L.

But Sir Edward says, that soon after that a Chancellor was made which was no professor of the law, he finds in the rolls of the Parliament a grievous complaint by the whole body of the realm, and a petition that the most wise and able men within the realm might be chosen Chancellors.

P.

That petition was reasonable; but it does not say which are the abler men, the judges of the common-law, or the bishops.

L.

That is not the great question as to the ability of a judge; both of one and the other, there are able men in their own way. But when a judge of equity has need, almost in every case, to consider as well the statute-law, as the law of reason, he cannot perform his office perfectly, unless he be also ready in the statutes.

P.

I see no great need he has to be ready in the statutes. In the hearing of a cause, do the judges of the common-law inform the counsel at the bar what the statute is, or the counsel the judges?

L.

The counsel inform the judges.

P.

Why may they not as well inform the Chancellor? Unless you will say, that a bishop understands not as well as a lawyer what is sense, when he hears it read in English. No, no; both the one and the other are able enough: but to be able enough is not enough, when not the difficulty of the case only, but also the passion of the judge is to be conquered. I forgot to tell you of the statute of 36 Edw.III,c.9, that if any person thinking himself grieved contrary to any of the articles above-written, or others contained in divers statutes, will come to the Chancery, or any for him, and thereof make his complaint, he shall presently there have remedy by force of the said articles and statutes, without elsewhere pursuing to have remedy. By the words of this statute it is very apparent, in my opinion, that the Chancery may hold plea upon the complaint of the party grieved, in any case triable at the common-law; because the party shall have present remedy in that court, by force of this Act, without pursuing for remedy elsewhere.

L.

Yes; but Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst.) answers this objection in this manner. These words, says he, he shall have remedy, signify no more but that he shall have presently there a remedial writ grounded upon those statutes, to give him remedy at the common-law.

P.

Very like Sir Edward Coke thought, as soon as the party had his writ, he had his remedy, though he kept the writ in his pocket without pursuing his complaint elsewhere: or else he thought, that the Common-bench was not elsewhere than in the Chancery.

L.

Then there is the Court of —

P.

Let us stop here; for this which you have said satisfies me, that seek no more than to distinguish between justice and equity; and from it I conclude, that justice fulfils the law, and equity interprets the law, and amends the judgments given upon the same law. Wherein I depart not much from the definition of equity cited in Sir Edward Coke (1 Inst. sec .xxi.); viz. equity is a certain perfect reason, that interpreteth and amendeth the law written; though I construe it a little otherwise than he would have done; for no one can mend a law but he that can make it, and therefore I say it amends not the law, but the judgments only when they are erroneous. And now let us consider of crimes in particular, the pleas whereof are commonly called the Pleas of the Crown, and of the punishments belonging to them. And first of the highest crime of all, which is high-treason. Tell me, what is high-treason?

L.

The first statute that declareth what is high-treason, is the statute of the 25 Edw. III, in these words: “Whereas divers opinions have been before this time, in what case treason shall be said, and in what not; the King, at the request of the Lords and of the Commons, hath made declaration in the manner as hereafter follows: that is to say, when a man doth compass or imagine the death of our Lord the King, of our Lady the Queen, or of their eldest son and heir; or if a man doth violate the King’s companion, or the King’s eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the King’s eldest son and heir; or if a man do levy war against our Lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere; and thereof be provably attainted by open deed by people of their condition: and if a man counterfeit the King’s Great or Privy Seal, or his money: and if a man bring false money into this realm counterfeit to the money of England, as the money called Lushburgh, or other like to the said money of England, knowing the money to be false, to

merchandize, and make payment in deceit of our said Lord the King, and of his people: and if a man slay the Chancellor, Treasurer, or the King's Justices of one Bench or the other, Justices in Eyre, or Justices of Assizes, and all other justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places and doing their offices. And is to be understood in the cases above rehearsed, that that ought to be adjudged treason, which extends to our royal Lord the King, and his royal Majesty; and of such treason the forfeiture of the escheats pertains to our Lord the King, as well the lands and tenements holden of others, as himself. And moreover there is another manner of treason; that is to say, when a servant slayeth his master, or a wife her husband; or when a man, secular or religious, slayeth his prelate, to whom he oweth faith and obedience; and of such treason the escheats ought to pertain to every Lord of his own fee. And because many other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which a man cannot think nor declare at this present time, it is accorded, that if any case supposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any justices, the justices shall tarry without giving any judgment of the treason, till the cause be showed and declared before the King and his Parliament, whether it ought to be adjudged treason or other felony."

Of crimes capital.

P.

I desired to understand what treason is, wherein no enumeration of facts can give me satisfaction. Treason is a crime of itself, malum in se, and therefore a crime at the common-law; and high-treason the highest crime at the common-law that can be. And therefore not the statute only, but reason without a statute makes it a crime. And this appears by the preamble, where it is intimated, that all men, though of divers opinions, did condemn it by the name of treason, though they knew not what treason meant, but were forced to request the King to determine it. That which I desire to know is,

how treason might have been defined without the statute, by a man that has no other faculty to make the definition of it, than by mere natural reason.

L.

When none of the lawyers have done it, you are not to expect that I should undertake it on such a sudden.

P.

You know that salus populi is suprema lex, that is to say, the safety of the people is the highest law; and that the safety of the people of a kingdom consisteth in the safety of the King, and of the strength necessary to defend his people, both against foreign enemies and rebellious subjects. And from this I infer, that to compass, that is, to design, the death of the then present King, was high treason before the making of this statute, as being a designing of a civil war and the destruction of the people. 2. That the design to kill the King's wife, or to violate her chastity, as also to violate the chastity of the King's heir-apparent, or of his eldest daughter unmarried, as tending to the destruction of the certainty of the King's issue, and by consequence to the raising of contentions about the Crown, and destruction of the people in succeeding time by civil war, was therefore high-treason before this statute. 3. That to levy war against the King within the realm, and aiding the King's enemies, either within or without the realm, are tending to the King's destruction or disherison, and was high-treason, before this statute, by the common-law. 4. That counterfeiting the principal seals of the kingdom, by which the King governeth his people, tendeth to the confusion of government, and consequently to the destruction of the people, and was therefore treason before the statute. 5. If a soldier design the killing of his general or other officer in time of battle, or a captain hover doubtfully with his troops, with intention to gain the favour of him that shall chance to get the victory, it tendeth to the destruction both of King and

people, whether the King be present or absent, and was high-treason before the statute. 6. If any man had imprisoned the King's person, he had made him incapable of defending his people, and it was therefore high-treason before the statute. 7. If any man had, with design to raise rebellion against the King, by words written or advisedly uttered, denied the King regnant to be their lawful King, he that wrote, preached, or spoke such words, living then under the protection of the King's laws, it had been high-treason before the statute, for the reasons aforesaid. And perhaps there may be some other cases upon this statute, which I cannot presently think upon. But the killing of a justice or other officer, as is determined by the statute, is not otherwise high-treason, but by the statute. And to distinguish that which is treason by the common-law from all other inferior crimes, we are to consider, that if such high-treason should take effect, it would destroy all laws at once; and being done by a subject, it is a return to hostility by treachery; and consequently, such as are traitors may, by the law of reason, be dealt withal as ignoble and treacherous enemies: but the greatest of other crimes, for the most part, are breaches of one only, or at least of very few laws.

L.

Whether this you say be true or false, the law is now unquestionable, by a statute made in the 1st and 2nd years of Queen Mary, whereby there is nothing to be esteemed treason, besides those few offences specially mentioned in the act of 25 Edward III.

P.

Amongst these great crimes the greatest is that which is committed by one that has been trusted and loved by him whose death he so designeth: for a man cannot well take heed of those whom he thinks he hath obliged, whereas an open enemy gives a man warning before he acteth. And this it is for which the statute hath declared, that it is another kind of treason, when a

servant killeth his master or mistress, or a wife killeth her husband, or a clerk killeth his prelate. And I should think it petty treason also, though it be not within the words of the statute, when a tenant in fee, that holdeth by homage and fealty, shall kill the lord of his fee; for fealty is an oath of allegiance to the lord of the fee; saving he may not keep his oath in any thing sworn to, if it be against the King. For homage, as it is expressed in a statute of 17 Edw. II, is the greatest submission that is possible to be made to one man by another. For the tenant shall hold his hands together between the hands of his landlord, and shall say thus; I become your man from this day forth for life, for member, and for worldly honour, and shall owe that my faith for the lands that I shall hold of you, saving the faith that I owe unto our Sovereign Lord the King, and to many other lords. Which homage, if made to the King, is equivalent to a promise of simple obedience, and if made to another lord, there is nothing excepted but the allegiance to the King; and that which is called fealty, is but the same confirmed by an oath.

L.

But Sir Edward Coke, (4 Inst.), denies that a traitor is in legal understanding the King's enemy. For enemies, saith he, be those that be out of the allegiance of the King. And his reason is, because, if a subject join with a foreign enemy, and come into England with him, and be taken prisoner here, he shall not be ransomed, or proceeded with as an enemy shall, but he shall be taken as a traitor to the King. Whereas an enemy coming in open hostility, and taken, shall either be executed by martial law, or ransomed; for he cannot be indicted of treason, for that he never was in the protection and ligeance of the King; and the indictment of the treason saith, contra ligeantiam suam debitam.

P.

This is not an argument worthy of the meanest lawyer. Did Sir Edward Coke think it impossible for a King lawfully to kill a man, by what death soever, without an indictment, when it is manifestly proved he was his open enemy? Indictment is a form of accusation peculiar to England, by the command of some King of England, and retained still, and therefore a law to this country of England. But if it were not lawful to put a man to death otherwise than by an indictment, no enemy could be put to death at all in other nations, because they proceed not, as we do, by indictment. Again, when an open enemy is taken and put to death by judgment of martial-law; it is not the law of the general or council of war, that an enemy shall be thus proceeded with, but the law of the King contained in their commissions; such as from time to time the Kings have thought fit, in whose will it always resteth, whether an open enemy, when he is taken, shall be put to death, or no, and by what death; and whether he shall be ransomed, or no, and at what price. Then for the nature of treason by rebellion; is it not a return to hostility? What else does rebellion signify? William the Conqueror subdued this kingdom; some he killed; some upon promise of future obedience he took to mercy, and they became his subjects, and swore allegiance to him. If therefore they renew the war against him, are they not again open enemies? Or if any of them lurking under his laws, seek occasion thereby to kill him secretly, and come to be known, may he not be proceeded against as an enemy, who, though he had not committed what he designed, yet had certainly a hostile design? Did not the Long Parliament declare all those for enemies to the state, that opposed their proceedings against the late King? But Sir Edward Coke does seldom well distinguish, when there are two divers names for one and the same thing: though one contain the other, he makes them always different; as if it could not be that one and the same man should be both an enemy and a traitor. But now let us come to his comment upon this statute. The statute says (as it is printed in

English) when a man doth compass, or imagine, the death of our Lord the King, &c. What is the meaning of the word compassing, or imagining?

L.

On this place Sir Edward Coke says, that before the making of this act, voluntas reputabatur pro facto, the will was taken for the deed. And so saith Bracton; spectatur voluntas, et non exitus; et nihil interest utrum quis occidat, aut causam præbeat, that is to say, the cause of the killing. Now Sir Edward Coke says, this was the law before the statute; and that to be a cause of the killing, is to declare the same by some open deed tending to the execution of his intent, or which might be cause of death.

P.

Is there any Englishman can understand, that to cause the death of a man, and to declare the same, is all one thing? And if this were so, and that such was the common-law before the statute, by what words in the statute is it taken away?

L.

It is not taken away, but the manner how it must be proved is thus determined, that it must be proved by some open deed, as providing of weapons, powder, poison, assaying of armour, sending of letters, &c.

P.

But what is the crime itself, which this statute maketh treason? For as I understand the words, to compass or imagine the King's death, &c. the compassing (as it is in the English) is the only thing which is made high-treason. So that not only the killing, but the design, is made high-treason; or, as it is in the French record, fait compasser, that is to say, the causing of others to compass or design the King's death is high-treason; and the words par overt fait, are not added as a specification of any treason, or other crime,

but only of the proof that is required by the law. Seeing then the crime is the design and purpose to kill the King, or cause him to be killed, and lieth hidden in the breast of him that is accused; what other proof can there be had of it than words spoken or written? And therefore, if there be sufficient witness that he by words declared that he had such a design, there can be no question, but that he is comprehended within the statute. Sir Edward Coke doth not deny, but, that if he confess this design, either by word or writing, he is within the statute. As for that common saying, that bare words may make a heretic but not a traitor, which Sir Edward Coke on this occasion maketh use of, they are to little purpose; seeing that this statute maketh not the words high-treason, but the intention, whereof the words are but a testimony: and that common saying is false as it is generally pronounced. For there were divers statutes made afterwards, though now expired, which made bare words to be treason without any other deed; as, 1 Eliz. c. 6, and 13 Eliz. c. 1, if a man should publicly preach that the King were an usurper, or that the right of the crown belonged to any other than the King that reigned, there is no doubt but it were treason, not only within this statute of Edward III, but also within the statute of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, which are both still in force.

L.

Not only so; but if a subject should counsel any other man to kill the King, Queen, or heir-apparent to the Crown, it would at this day be adjudged high-treason; and yet it is no more than bare words. In the third year of King James, Henry Garnet, a Jesuit priest, to whom some of the gunpowder traitors had revealed their design by way of confession, gave them absolution without any caution taken for their desisting from their purpose, or other provision against the danger, and was therefore condemned and executed as a traitor, though such absolution was nothing else but bare words. Also I find in the reports of Sir John Davis, Attorney-

General for Ireland, that in the time of King Henry VI, a man was condemned of treason for saying the King was a natural fool, and unfit to govern. But yet this clause in the statute of Edw. III, viz. that the compassing there mentioned ought to be proved by some overt act, was by the framers of the statute not without great wisdom and providence inserted; for as Sir Edward Coke very well observeth, when witnesses are examined concerning words only, they never, or very rarely, agree precisely about the words they swear to.

P.

I deny not but that it was wisely enough done. But the question is not here of the treason, which is either fact or design, but of the proof, which when it is doubtful, is to be judged by a jury of twelve lawful men. Now whether think you is it a better proof of a man's intention to kill, that he declare the same with his own mouth, so as it may be witnessed, or that he provide weapons, powder, poison, or assay arms? If he utter his design by words, the jury has no more to do than to consider the legality of the witnesses, the harmony of their testimonies, or whether the words were spoken advisedly. For they might have been uttered in a disputation, for exercise only; or when he that spake them, had not the use of reason, nor perhaps any design or wish at all, towards the execution of what he talked of. But how a jury, from providing or buying of armour, or buying of gunpowder, or from any other overt act, not treason in itself, can infer a design of murdering the King, unless there appear some words also signifying to what end he made such provision, I cannot easily conceive. Therefore, as the jury on the whole matter, words and deeds, shall ground their judgment concerning design or not design, so, in reason, they ought to give verdict. But to come to the treason of counterfeiting the great or privyseal, seeing there are so many ways for a cheating fellow to make use

of these seals, to the cozening of the King and his people; why are not all such abuses high-treason, as well as the making of a false seal?

L.

So they are; for Sir Edward Coke produceth a record of one that was drawn and hanged for taking the great seal from an expired patent, and fastening it to a counterfeit commission to gather money. But he approveth not the judgment, because it is the judgment for petty treason: also, because the jury did not find him guilty of the offence laid in the indictment, which was, the counterfeiting of the great seal, but found the special matter, for which the offender was drawn and hanged.

P.

Seeing this crime of taking the great seal from one writing, and fastening it to another, was not found high-treason by the jury, nor could be found upon special matter to be the other kind of treason mentioned in the same statute; what ground had either the jury to find it treason, or the judge to pronounce sentence upon it?

L.

I cannot tell. Sir Edward Coke seems to think it a false record; for hereupon he saith, by way of admonition to the reader, that hereby it appeareth how dangerous it is to report a case by the ear.

P.

True; but he does not make it apparent that this case was untruly reported; but on the contrary, confesseth that he had persued the same record; and a man may, if it may be done without proof of the falsity, make the same objection to any record whatsoever. For my part, seeing this crime produced the same mischief that ariseth from counterfeiting, I think it reason to understand it as within the statute; and for the difference between

the punishments, which are both of them capital, I think it is not worthy to be stood upon; seeing death, which is ultimum supplicium, is a satisfaction to the law, as Sir Edward Coke himself hath in another place affirmed. But let us now proceed to other crimes.

L.

Appendant to this is another crime, called misprision of treason; which is the concealing of it by any man that knows it; and is called misprision from the French mespriser, which signifies to contemn or undervalue. For it is no small crime in any subject, so little to take to heart a known danger to the King's person, and consequently to the whole kingdom, as not to discover not only what he knows, but also what he suspecteth of the same, that the truth therefore may be examined. But for such discovery, though the thing prove false, the discoverer shall not, as I think, be taken for a false accuser; if for what he directly affirms, he produce a reasonable proof, and some probability for his suspicion. For else the concealment will seem justifiable by the interest, which is to every man allowed, in the preservation of himself from pain and damage.

P.

This I consent to.

L.

All other crimes merely temporal, are comprehended under felony or trespass.

P.

What is the meaning of the word felony? Does it signify anything that is in its own nature a crime, or that only which is made a crime by some statute? For I remember some statutes that make it felony to transport horses, and some other things, out of the kingdom; which transportation,

before such statutes were made, and after the repealing of the same, was no greater crime than any other usual traffic of a merchant.

L.

Sir Edward Coke derives the word felony from the Latin word fel, the gall of a living creature; and accordingly defines felony to be an act done animo felleo; that is to say, a bitter, a cruel act.

P.

Etymologies are no definitions, and yet when they are true, they give much light towards the finding out of a definition. But this of Sir Edward Coke's carries with it very little of probability; for there be many things made felony by the statute law, that proceed not from any bitterness of mind at all, and many that proceed from the contrary.

L.

This is matter for a critic, to be picked out of the knowledge of history and foreign languages, and you may perhaps know more of it than I do.

P.

All that I, or I think any other, can say in this matter, will amount to no more than a reasonable conjecture, insufficient to sustain any point of controversy in law. The word is not to be found in any of the old Saxon laws, set forth by Mr. Lambard, nor in any statute printed before that of Magna Charta; there it is found. Now Magna Charta was made in the time of Henry III, grandchild to Henry II, Duke of Anjou, a Frenchman born, and bred in the heart of France, whose language might very well retain many words of his ancestors the German Franks, as ours doth of the German Saxons; as also many words of the language of the Gauls, as the Gauls did retain many words of the Greek colony planted at Marseilles. But certain it is, the French lawyers at this day use the word felon, just as our lawyers use

the same; whereas the common people of France use the word filou in the same sense. But filou signifieth, not the man that hath committed such an act as they call felony, but the man that maketh it his trade to maintain himself by the breaking and contemning of all laws generally; and comprehendeth all those unruly people called cheaters, cutpurses, picklocks, catchcloaks, coiners of false money, forgers, thieves, robbers, murderers, and whosoever make use of iniquity on land or sea as a trade or living. The Greeks upon the coast of Asia, where Homer lived, were they that planted the colony of Marseilles. They had a word that signified the same with felon, which was φιλήτης, filetes; and this filetes of Homer signifies properly the same that a felon signifies with us. And therefore Homer makes Apollo to call Mercury φιλήτην, fileteen, and ἄρχον φιλήτων. I insist not upon the truth of this etymology, but it is certainly more rational than the animus felleus of Sir Edward Coke. And for the matter itself, it is manifest enough, that which we now call murder, robbery, theft, and other practices of felons, are the same that we call felony, and crimes in their own nature without the help of statute. Nor is it the manner of punishment, that distinguisheth the nature of one crime from another; but the mind of the offender and the mischief he intendeth, considered together with the circumstances of person, time, and place.

L.

Of felonies, the greatest crime is murder.

P.

And what is murder?

L.

Murder is the killing of a man upon malice forethought, as by a weapon, or by poison, or any way, if it be done upon antecedent meditation; or thus,

murder is the killing of a man in cold blood.

P.

I think there is a good definition of murder set down by statute, 52 Henry III, c. 25, in these words: Murder, from henceforth, shall not be judged before our justices, where it is found misfortune only, but it shall take place in such as are slain by felony, and not otherwise. And Sir Edward Coke interpreting this statute, 2 Inst. , saith, that the mischief before this statute was, that he that killed a man by misfortune, as by doing any act that was not against law, and yet against his intent the death of a man ensued, this was adjudged murder. But I find no proof of that he allegeth, nor find I any such law among the laws of the Saxons set forth by Mr. Lambard. For the word, it is, as Sir Edward Coke noteth, old Saxon, and amongst them it signified no more than a man slain in the field or other place, the author of his death not known. And according hereunto, Bracton, who lived in the time of Magna Charta, defineth it, fol. 134, thus: Murder is the secret killing of a man, when none besides the killer and his companions saw or knew it; so that it was not known who did it, nor fresh suit could be made after the doer. Therefore, every such killing was called murder, before it could be known whether it could be by felony or not; for a man may be found dead that kills himself, or was lawfully killed by another. This name of murder came to be the more horrid, when it was secretly done, for that it made every man to consider of their own danger, and him that saw the dead body, to boggle at it, as a horse will do at a dead horse. And to prevent the same, they had laws in force, to amerce the hundred where it was done, in a sum defined by law to be the price of his life. For in those days, the lives of all sorts of men were valued by money, and the value set down in their written laws. And therefore Sir Edward Coke was mistaken, in that he thought that killing a man by misfortune before the statute of Marlebridge, was adjudged murder. And those secret murders were abominated by the people, for that

they were liable to so great a pecuniary punishment for suffering the malefactor to escape. But this grievance was by Canutus, when he reigned, soon eased. For he made a law, that the county in this case should not be charged, unless he were an Englishman that was so slain; but if he were a Frenchman, (under which name were comprehended all foreigners, and especially the Normans,) though the slayer escaped, the county was not to be amerced. And this law, though it were very hard and chargeable, when an Englishman was so slain, for his friend to prove he was an Englishman, and also unreasonable to deny the justice to a stranger, yet was it not repealed till the 14th Edw. III. By this you see that murder is distinguished from homicide by the statute laws, and not by any common-law without the statute; and that it is comprehended under the general name of felony.

L.

And so also is petit treason: and I think so is high-treason also. For in the abovesaid statute in the 25th Edw. III, concerning treasons, there is this clause: And because that many other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which a man cannot think or declare at the present time; it is accorded, that if any other case, supposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any of the justices, the justices shall tarry without any going to judgment of the treason, till the cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament, whether it be treason or other felony. Which thereby shews that the King and Parliament thought that treason was one of the sorts of felony.

P.

And so think I.

L.

But Sir Edward Coke denies it to be so at this day. For (1 Inst. sec. 745) at the word felony, he saith, that in ancient time this word felony was of so large an extent, as that it included high-treason; but afterwards it was resolved, that in the King's pardon or charter, this word felony should extend only to common felonies; and at this day, under the word felony, by law is included petite treason, murder, homicide, burning of houses, burglary, robbery, rape, &c. chance medley, se defendendo, and petite larceny.

P.

He says it was resolved: but by whom?

L.

By the justices of assize in the time of Henry IV, as it seems in the margin.

P.

Have justices of assize any power by their commission to alter the language of the land and the received sense of words? Or in the question in what case felony shall be said, is it referred to the judges to determine; as in the question in what case treason shall be said, it is referred by the statute of Edward III to the Parliament? I think not; and yet perhaps they may be obliged to disallow a pardon of treason, when mentioning all felonies it nameth not treason, nor specifies it by any description of the fact.

L.

Another kind of homicide there is, simply called so, or by the name of manslaughter, and is not murder: and that is, when a man kills another man upon sudden quarrel, during the heat of blood.

P.

If two meeting in the street chance to strive who shall go nearest to the wall, and thereupon fighting, one of them kills the other, I believe verily he that first drew his sword, did it of malice forethought, though not long forethought; but whether it be felony or no, it may be doubted. It is true, that the harm done is the same as if it had been done by felony; but the wickedness of the intention was nothing near so great. And supposing it had been done by felony, then it is manifest, by the statute of Marlebridge, that it was very murder. And when a man for a word or a trifle shall draw his sword and kill another man, can any man imagine that there was not some precedent malice?

L.

It is very likely there was malice, more or less: and therefore the law hath ordained for it a punishment equal to that of murder, saving that the offender shall have the benefit of his clergy.

P.

The benefit of clergy comes in upon another account, and importeth not any extenuation of the crime. For it is but a relic of the old usurped papal privilege, which is now by many statutes so pared off, as to spread but to few offences, and is become a legal kind of conveying mercy, not only to the clergy, but also to the laity.

L.

The work of a judge, you see, is very difficult, and requires a man that hath a faculty of well distinguishing of dissimilitudes in such cases as common judgments think to be the same. A small circumstance may make a great alteration; wherefore a man that cannot well discern, ought not to take upon him the office of a judge.

P.

You say very well; for if judges were to follow one another's judgments in precedent cases, all the justice in the world would at length depend upon the sentence of a few learned, or unlearned, ignorant men, and have nothing at all to do with the study of reason.

L.

A third kind of homicide is when a man kills another, either by misfortune, or in the necessary defence of himself, or of the King, or of his laws; for such killing is neither felony nor crime, saving, as Sir Edward Coke says (3 Inst.), that if the act that a man is doing, when he kills another man, be unlawful, then it is murder. As, if A meaning to steal a deer in the park of B, shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush, this is murder, for that the act was unlawful; but if the owner of the park had done the like, shooting at his own deer, it had been by misadventure, and no felony.

P.

This is not so distinguished by any statute, but is the common-law only of Sir Edward Coke. I believe not a word of it. If a boy be robbing an appletree, and falleth thence upon a man that stands under it and breaks his neck, but by the same chance saveth his own life, Sir Edward Coke, it seems, will have him hanged for it, as if he had fallen of prepensed malice. All that can be called crime in this business is but a simple trespass, to the damage perhaps of sixpence or a shilling. I confess the trespass was an offence against the law, but the falling was none, nor was it by the trespass but by the falling that the man was slain; and as he ought to be quit of the killing, so he ought to make restitution for the trespass. But I believe the cause of Sir Edward Coke's mistake was his not well understanding of Bracton, whom he cites in the margin. For, fol. 120 b. lib. iii. ca, he saith thus: Sed hic erit distinguendum, utrum quis dederit operam rei licitæ, vel

illicitæ; si illicitæ, ut si lapidem projiciebat quis versus locum per quem consueverunt homines transitum facere, vel dum insequitur quis equum vel bovem, et aliquis a bove vel equo percussus fuerit, et hujusmodi, hoc imputatur ei. That is: But here we are to distinguish whether a man be upon a lawful or unlawful business; if an unlawful, as he that throws a stone into a place where men use to pass; or if he chase a horse or an ox, and thereby the man be stricken by the horse or the ox; this shall be imputed to him. And it is most reasonable; for the doing of such an unlawful act as is here meant, is a sufficient argument of a felonious purpose, or at least a hope to kill somebody or other, and he cared not whom, which is worse than to design the death of a certain adversary, which nevertheless is murder. Also, on the contrary, though the business a man is doing be lawful, and it chanceth sometimes that a man be slain thereby, yet may such killing be felony. For if a carman drive his cart through Cheapside in a throng of people, and thereby he kill a man, though he bare him no malice, yet because he saw there was very great danger, it may reasonably be inferred, that he meant to adventure the killing of somebody or other, though not of him that was killed.

L.

He is a felon also that killeth himself voluntarily, and is called, not only by common lawyers, but also in divers statute laws, felo de se.

P.

And it is well so; for names imposed by statutes are equivalent to definitions. But I conceive not how any man can bear animum felleum, or so much malice towards himself, as to hurt himself voluntarily, much less to kill himself. For naturally and necessarily the intention of every man aimeth at somewhat which is good to himself, and tendeth to his preservation. And therefore, methinks, if he kill himself, it is to be presumed that he is not

compos mentis, but by some inward torment or apprehension of somewhat worse than death, distracted.

L.

Nay, unless he be compos mentis, he is not felo de se, as Sir Edward Coke saith, 3 Inst. ; and therefore he cannot be judged a felo de se, unless it be first proved he was compos mentis.

P.

How can that be proved of a man dead; especially if it cannot be proved by any witness, that a little before his death he spake as other men used to do? This is a hard place; and before you take it for common-law, it had need to be cleared.

L.

I will think on it. There is a statute of 3 Hen. VII, c. 14, which makes it felony in any of the King's household servants, under the degree of a Lord, to compass the death of any of the King's Privy Council. The words are these: That from henceforth the steward, treasurer, and comptroller of the King's house for the time being, or one of them, have full authority and power, to inquire by twelve staid men and discreet persons of the chequer-roll of the King's honourable household, if any servant, admitted to be his servant sworn, and his name put into the chequer-roll, whatsoever he be, serving in any manner, office, or room, reputed, had, or taken under the estate of a Lord, make any confederacies, compassings, conspiracies, or imaginations with any person, to destroy or murder the King, or any Lord of this realm, or any other person sworn of the King's council, steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the King's house. And if such misdoers shall be found guilty by confession, or otherwise, that the said offence shall be judged felony.

P.

It appears by this statute, that not only the compassing the death, as you say, of a privy-councillor, but also of any Lord of this realm, is felony; if it be done by any of the King's household servants, that is not a Lord.

L.

No; Sir Edward Coke upon these words, any Lord of this realm, or other person sworn of the King's council, infers (3 Inst.), that it is to be understood of such a Lord only as is a privy-councillor.

P.

For barring of the Lords of Parliament from this privilege, he strains this statute a little farther, in my opinion, than it reacheth of itself. But how are such felonies to be tried?

L.

The indictment is to be found before the steward, treasurer, and comptroller of the King's house, or one of them, by twelve of the King's household servants. The petit jury for the trial must be twelve other of the King's servants. And the judges are again the steward, treasurer, and comptroller of the King's house, or two of them; and yet I see that these men are not usually great students of the law.

P.

You may hereby be assured, that either the King and Parliament were very much overseen in choosing such officers perpetually for the time being to be judges in a trial at the common-law, or else that Sir Edward Coke presumes too much to appropriate all the judicature, both in law and equity, to the common lawyers; as if neither lay persons, men of honour, nor any of the Lords spiritual who are the most versed in the examination of equity and

cases of conscience, when they hear the statutes read and pleaded, were fit to judge of the intention and meaning of the same. I know that neither such great persons, nor bishops, have ordinarily so much spare time from their ordinary employment, as to be so skilful as to plead causes at the bar; but certainly they are, especially the bishops, the best able to judge of matters of reason, that is to say (by Sir Edward Coke's confession) of matters, except of blood, at the common-law.

L.

Another sort of felony, though without manslaughter, is robbery; and by Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst.), defined thus: Robbery by the common-law is a felony committed by a violent assault upon the person of another, by putting him in fear, and taking away from him his money, or other goods of any value whatsoever.

P.

Robbery is not distinguished from theft by any statute. Latrocinium comprehendeth them both, and both are felony, and both punished with death. And therefore to distinguish them aright is the work of reason only. And the first difference, which is obvious to all men, is that robbery is committed by force or terror, of which neither is in theft. For theft is a secret act, and that which is taken by violence or terror, either from his person, or in his presence, is still robbery. But if it be taken secretly, whether it be by day or night, from his person, or from his fold, or from his pasture, then it is called theft. It is force and fraud only, that distinguisheth between theft and robbery; both which are, by the pravity only of the intention, felony in their nature. But there be so many evasions of the law found out by evil men, that I know not, in this predicament of felony, how to place them. For suppose I go secretly, by day or night, into another man's

field of wheat, ripe and standing, and loading my cart with it I carry it away: is it theft or robbery?

L.

Neither, it is but trespass. But if you first lay down the wheat you have cut, and then throw it into your cart, and carry it away, then it is felony.

P.

Why so?

L.

Sir Edward Coke tells you the reason of it (3 Inst.). For he defineth theft to be, by the common-law, a felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying away, by any man or woman, of the mere personal goods of another, not from the person, nor by night in the house of the owner. From this definition, he argues thus, : Any kind of corn or grain, growing upon the ground, is a personal chattel, and the executors of the owner shall have them, though they be not severed; but yet no larceny can be committed of them, because they are annexed to the realty; so it is of grass standing on the ground, or of apples, or of any fruit upon the trees, &c.; so it is of a box or chest of charters, no larceny can be committed of them, because the charters concern the realty, and the box or chest though it be of great value, yet shall it be of the same nature the charters are of; et omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus.

P.

Is this definition drawn out of any statute, or is it in Bracton or Littleton, or any other writer upon the science of the laws?

L.

No, it is his own: and you may observe by the logic sentences dispersed through his works, that he was a logician sufficient enough to make a definition.

P.

But if his definitions must be the rule of law, what is there that he may not make felony or not felony, at his pleasure? But seeing it is not statute law that he says, it must be very perfect reason, or else no law at all; and to me it seems so far from reason, as I think it ridiculous. But let us examine it. There can, says he, be no larceny of corn, grass, or fruits that are growing, that is to say, they cannot be stolen. But why? Because they concern the realty; that is, because they concern the land. It is true, that the land cannot be stolen, nor the right of a man's tenure; but corn, and trees, and fruit, though growing, may be cut down, and carried away secretly and feloniously, in contempt and despite of the law. And are they not then stolen? And is there any act which is feloniously committed, that is not more than trespass? Can any man doubt of it, that understands the English tongue? It is true, that if a man pretend a right to the land, and on that pretence take the fruits thereof by way of taking possession of his own, it is no more than a trespass, unless he conceal the taking of them. For in that one case, he but puts the man that was in possession before, to exhibit his complaint, which purpose is not felonious, but lawful; for nothing makes a distinction between felony and not felony, but the purpose. I have heard, that if a man slander another with stealing of a tree standing, there lies no action for it. And that upon this ground: to steal a standing tree is impossible; and that the cause of the impossibility is, that a man's freehold cannot be stolen; which is a very obvious fallacy. For freehold signifieth, not only the tenement, but also the tenure; and though it be true that a tenure cannot be stolen, yet every man sees that the standing trees and corn may easily be stolen. And so far forth as trees, &c. are part of the freehold, so far

forth also, they are personal goods. For whatsoever is freehold is inheritance, and descendeth to the heir, and nothing can descend to the executors but what is merely personal. And though a box or case of evidences are to descend to the heir, yet unless you can shew me positive law to the contrary, they shall be taken into the executors' hands to be delivered to the heir. Besides, how unconscionable a thing is it, that he that steals a shilling's worth of wood, which the wind hath blown down, or which lieth rotting on the ground, should be hanged for it, and he that takes a tree, worth twenty or forty shillings, should answer only for the damage!

L.

It is somewhat hard, but it has been so practised time out of mind. Then follows sodomy, and rape, both of them felonies.

P.

I know that, and that of the former he justly says it is detestable, being in a manner an apostacy from human nature: but in neither of them is there anything of animus felleus. The statutes which make them felony, are exposed to all men's reading. But because Sir Edward Coke's commentaries upon them are more diligent and accurate than to be free from all uncleanness, let us leap over them both; observing only by the way, that he leaves an evasion for an impotent offender, though his design be the same, and pursued to the utmost of his power.

L.

Two other great felonies are, breaking and burning of houses; neither of which are defined by any statute. The former of them is by Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst.), defined thus: — Burglary is by the common-law, the breaking and entering into the mansion-house of another, in the night, with intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some other felony

within the same, whether his intent be executed or not. And he defineth night to be then, when one man cannot know another's face by daylight. And for the parts of a mansionhouse, he reckoneth all houses that belong to housekeeping, as barns, stables, dairyhouses, buttery, kitchen, chambers, &c. But breaking of a house by day, though felony, and punished as burglary, is not within the statute.

P.

I have nothing to say against his interpretations here; but I like not that any private man should presume to determine, whether such or such a fact done be within the words of a statute or not, where it belongs only to a jury of twelve men to declare in their verdict, whether the fact laid open before them, be burglary, robbery, theft, or other felony. For this is to give a leading judgment to the jury, who ought not to consider any private lawyer's institutes, but the statutes themselves pleaded before them for directions.

L.

Burning, as he defines it (ibid.), is a felony at the common-law, committed by any that maliciously and voluntarily, in the night or day, burneth the house of an other. And he hereupon infers, if a man set fire to the house, and it takes not, that then it is not within the statute.

P.

If a man should secretly and maliciously lay a quantity of gunpowder under another man's house, sufficient to blow it up, and set a train of powder in it, and set fire to the train, and some accident hinder the effect, is not this burning? Or what is it? What crime? It is neither treason, nor murder, nor burglary, nor robbery, nor theft, nor (no damage being made) any trespass, nor contrary to any statute. And yet, seeing the common-law is

the law of reason, it is a sin, and such a sin as a man may be accused of, and convicted; and consequently a crime committed of malice prepensed. Shall he not then be punished for the attempt? I grant you that a judge has no warrant from any statute-law, common-law, or commission, to appoint the punishment; but surely the King has power to punish him, on this side of life or member, as he please; and with the assent of Parliament, if not without, to make the crime for the future capital.

L.

I know not. Besides these crimes, there is conjuration, witchcraft, sorcery and enchantment; which are capital by the statute 1 James, c. 12.

P.

But I desire not to discourse of that subject. For though without doubt there is some great wickedness signified by those crimes; yet I have ever found myself too dull to conceive the nature of them, or how the devil hath power to do many things which witches have been accused of. Let us now come to crimes not capital.

L.

Shall we pass over the crime of heresy, which Sir Edward Coke ranketh before murder? But the consideration of it will be somewhat long.

P.

Let us defer it till the afternoon.

L.

Concerning heresy, Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst.) says, that five things fall into consideration. 1. Who be the judges of heresy. 2. What shall be judged heresy. 3. What is the judgment upon a man convicted of heresy. 4. What

the law alloweth him to save his life. 5. What he shall forfeit by judgment against him.

Of heresy.

P.

The principal thing to be considered, which is the heresy itself, he leaveth out, viz. what it is; in what fact or words it consisteth; what law it violateth, statute-law or the law of reason. The cause why he omitteth it, may perhaps be this; that it was not only out of his profession, but also out of his other learning. Murder, robbery, theft, &c. every man knoweth to be evil, and are crimes defined by the statute-law, so that any man may avoid them, if he will. But who can be sure to avoid heresy, (if he but dare to give an account of his faith), unless he know beforehand what it is?

L.

In the preamble of the statute of 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, heresy is laid down, as a preaching or writing of such doctrine as is contrary to the determination of Holy Church.

P.

Then it is heresy at this day to preach or write against worshipping of Saints, or the infallibility of the Church of Rome, or any other determination of the same Church. For Holy Church, at that time, was understood to be the Church of Rome, and now with us the Holy Church I understand to be the Church of England; and the opinions in that statute are now, and were then, the true Christian faith. Also the same statute of Hen. IV declareth, by the same preamble, that the Church of England had never been troubled with heresy.

L.

But that statute is repealed.

P.

Then also is that declaration or definition of heresy repealed.

L.

What, say you, is heresy?

P.

I say, heresy is a singularity of doctrine or opinion contrary to the doctrine of another man, or men; and the word properly signifies the doctrine of a sect, which doctrine is taken upon trust of some man of reputation for wisdom, that was the first author of the same. If you will understand the truth hereof, you are to read the histories and other writings of the ancient Greeks, whose word it is; which writings are extant in these days, and easy to be had. Wherein you will find, that in and a little before the time of Alexander the Great, there lived in Greece many excellent wits, that employed their time in search of the truth in all manner of sciences worthy of their labour, and which to their great honour and applause published their writings; some concerning justice, laws, and government, some concerning good and evil manners, some concerning the causes of things natural and of events discernible by sense, and some of all these subjects. And of the authors of these, the principal were Pythagoras, Plato, Zeno, Epicurus and Aristotle, men of deep and laborious meditation, and such as did not get their bread by their philosophy, but were able to live of their own, and were in honour with princes and other great personages. But these men, though above the rest in wisdom, yet their doctrine in many points did disagree; whereby it came to pass, that such men as studied their writings, inclined some to Pythagoras, some to Plato, some to Aristotle, some to Zeno, and some to Epicurus. But philosophy itself was then so much in fashion, as that every rich man endeavoured to have his children educated in the doctrine of some or other of these philosophers, which were

for their wisdom so much renowned. Now those that followed Pythagoras, were called Pythagoreans; those that followed Plato, Academics; those that followed Zeno, Stoics; those that followed Epicurus, Epicureans; and those that followed Aristotle, Peripatetics; which are the names of heresy in Greek, which signifies no more but taking of an opinion; and the said Pythagoreans, Academics, Stoics, Peripatetics, &c. were termed by the names of so many several heresies. All men, you know, are subject to error, and the ways of error very different; and therefore it is no wonder if these wise and diligent searchers of the truth did, notwithstanding their excellent parts, differ in many points amongst themselves. But this laudable custom of great wealthy persons to have their children at any price to learn philosophy, suggested to many idle and needy fellows an easy and compendious way of maintenance; which was to teach the philosophy, some of Plato, some of Aristotle, &c: whose books to that end they read over, but without capacity or much endeavour to examine the reasons of their doctrines, taking only the conclusions, as they lay. And setting up with this, they soon professed themselves philosophers, and got to be the school-masters to the youth of Greece. But by competition for such employment, they hated and reviled one another with all the bitter terms they could invent; and very often, when upon occasion they were in civil company, fell first to disputation, and then to blows, to the great trouble of the company and their own shame. Yet amongst all their reproachful words, the name of heretic came never in, because they were all equally heretics, their doctrine not being theirs, but taken upon trust from the aforesaid authors. So that though we find heresy often mentioned in Lucian and other heathen authors, yet we shall not find in any of them hæreticus for a heretic. And this disorder among the philosophers continued a long time in Greece, and infecting also the Romans, was at the greatest in the times of the apostles and in the primitive Church, till the time of the Nicene Council, and

somewhat after. But at last the authority of the Stoics and Epicureans was not much esteemed, only Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy were much in credit; Plato's with the better sort, that founded their doctrine upon the conceptions and ideas of things, and Aristotle's with those that reasoned only from the names of things, according to the scale of the categories. Nevertheless, there were always, though not new sects of philosophy, yet new opinions continually arising.

L.

But how came the word heretic to be a reproach?

P.

Stay a little. After the death of our Saviour, his apostles and his disciples, as you know, dispersed themselves into several parts of the world to preach the Gospel, and converted much people, especially in Asia the Less, in Greece, and Italy, where they constituted many churches; and as they travelled from place to place, left bishops to teach and direct those their converts, and to appoint presbyters under them to assist them therein, and to confirm them by setting forth the life and miracles of our Saviour, as they had received them from the writings of the apostles and evangelists; whereby, and not by the authority of Plato, or Aristotle, or any other philosopher, they were to be instructed. Now you cannot doubt but that among so many heathens converted in the time of the apostles, there were men of all professions and dispositions, and some that had never thought of philosophy at all, but were intent upon their fortunes or their pleasures; and some that had a greater, some a less use of reason; and some that had studied philosophy, but professed it not, which were commonly the men of the better rank; and some had professed it only for their better abstinence, and had it not farther than readily to talk and wrangle; and some were Christians in good earnest, and others but counterfeit, intending to make use

of the charity of those that were sincere Christians, which in those times was very great. Tell me now, of these sorts of Christians, which was the most likely to afford the fittest men to propagate the faith by preaching and writing, or public or private disputation; that is to say, who were fittest to be made presbyters and bishops.

L.

Certainly those who, cæteris paribus, could make the best use of Aristotle's rhetoric and logic.

P.

And who were the most prone to innovation?

L.

They that were most confident of Aristotle's and Plato's (their former masters) natural philosophy. For they would be the aptest to wrest the writings of the apostles and all Scriptures to the doctrines in which their reputation was engaged.

P.

And from such bishops and priests and other sectaries it was, that heresy, amongst the Christians, first came to be a reproach. For no sooner had one of them preached or published any doctrine that displeased either the most, or the most leading men of the rest, but it became such a quarrel as not to be decided but by a Council of the bishops in the province where they lived; wherein he that would not submit to the general decree, was called a heretic, as one that would not relinquish the philosophy of his sect. The rest of the Council gave themselves the name of Catholics, and to their Church the name of Catholic Church. And thus came up the opposite terms of catholic and heretic.

L.

I understand how it came to be a reproach, but not how it follows that every opinion condemned by a Church that is, or calls itself catholic, must needs be an error or a sin. The Church of England denies that consequence, and that such doctrine as they hold cannot be proved to be erroneous but by the Scripture, which cannot err; but the Church, being but men, may both err and sin.

P.

In this case we must consider also that error, in its own nature, is no sin. For it is impossible for a man to err on purpose; he cannot have an intention to err; and nothing is sin unless there be a sinful intention: much less are such errors sins, as neither hurt the commonwealth nor any private man, nor are against any law positive or natural; such errors as were those for which men were burnt, in the time when the Pope had the government of this Church.

L.

Since you have told me how heresy came to be a name, tell me also how it came to be a crime; and what were the heresies that first were made crimes.

P.

Since the Christian Church could declare, and none else, what doctrines were heresies, but had no power to make statutes for the punishment of heretics before they had a Christian King, it is manifest that heresy could not be made a crime before the first Christian Emperor, which was Constantine the Great. In his time, one Arius, a priest of Alexandria, in dispute with his bishop publicly denied the divinity of Christ, and maintained it afterwards in the pulpit, which was the cause of a sedition and

much bloodshed both of citizens and soldiers in that city. For the preventing of the like for the time to come, the Emperor called a general Council of bishops to the city of Nice; who being met, he exhorted them to agree upon a confession of the Christian faith, promising that whatsoever they agreed on he would cause to be observed.

L.

By the way, the Emperor, I think, was here a little too indifferent.

P.

In this Council was established so much of the creed we now use and call the Nicene creed, as reacheth to the words, I believe in the Holy Ghost. The rest was established by the three general Councils next succeeding. By the words of which creed almost all the heresies then in being, and especially the doctrine of Arius, were condemned; so that now all doctrines published by writing or by word, and repugnant to this confession of the first four general Councils, and contained in the Nicene creed, were, by the imperial law forbidding them, made crimes; such as are that of Arius, denying the divinity of Christ; that of Eutiches, denying the two natures of Christ; that of the Nestorians, denying the divinity of the Holy Ghost; that of the Anthropomorphites, that of the Manichees, that of the Anabaptists, and many other.

L.

What punishment had Arius?

P.

At the first, for refusing to subscribe, he was deprived and banished; but afterwards having satisfied the Emperor concerning his future obedience (for the Emperor caused this confession to be made, not for the regard of truth of doctrine, but for the preserving of the peace, especially among his

Christian soldiers, by whose valour he had gotten the empire, and by the same was to preserve it), he was received again into grace, but died before he could repossess his benefice. But after the time of those Councils, the imperial law made the punishment for heresy to be capital, though the manner of the death was left to the prefects in their several jurisdictions; and thus it continued till somewhat after the time of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. But the papacy having gotten the upper hand of the Emperor, brought in the use of burning both heretics and apostates; and the Popes from time to time made heresies of many other points of doctrine (as they saw it conduce to the setting up of the chair above the throne), besides those determined in the Nicene creed, and brought in the use of burning; and according to this papal law, there was an apostate burnt at Oxford, in the time of William the Conqueror, for turning Jew. But of a heretic burnt in England, there is no mention made till after the statute of 2 Hen. IV, whereby some followers of Wicliff, called Lollards, were afterwards burned; and that for such doctrines as by the Church of England, ever since the first year of Queen Elizabeth, have been approved for godly doctrines, and no doubt were godly then. And so you see how many have been burnt for godliness.

L.

It was not well done. But it is no wonder we read of no heretics before the time of Henry IV: for in the preamble to that statute it is intimated, that before those Lollards there never was any heresy in England.

P.

I think so too; for we have been the tamest nation to the Pope of all the world. But what statutes concerning heresy have there been made since?

L.

The statute of 2 Hen. V, c. 7, which adds to the burning the forfeiture of lands and goods; and then no more till the 25 Hen. VIII, c. 14, which confirms the two former, and giveth some new rules concerning how they shall be proceeded with. But by the statute of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, all acts of Parliament formerly made to punish any manner of doctrine concerning religion, are repealed. For therein it is ordained, after divers Acts specified, that all and every other Act or Acts of Parliament concerning doctrine or matters of religion, and all and every branch, article, sentence, and matter, pains and forfeitures contained, mentioned, or anywise declared in the same Acts of Parliament or statutes, shall be from henceforth repealed, utterly void, and of none effect. So that in the time of King Edward VI, not only all punishments of heresy were taken away, but also the nature of it was changed to what originally it was, a private opinion. Again, in 2 Phil. & M. those former statutes of 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, 2 Hen. V, c. 17, 25 Hen. VIII, c. 14, are revived; and the branch of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, touching doctrine, though not specially named, seemeth to be this, that the same statute confirmeth the statute of 25 Edw. III, concerning treasons. Lastly, in the first year of Queen Elizabeth, c. 1, the aforesaid statutes of Queen Mary are taken away, and thereby the statute of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, revived; so as there was no statute left for the punishment of heretics. But Queen Elizabeth by the advice of her Parliament gave a commission, which was called the High Commission, to certain persons, amongst whom were very many of the bishops, to declare what should be heresy for the future, but with a restraint that they should judge nothing to be heresy, but what had been so declared in the first four general Councils.

P.

From this which you have showed me, I think we may proceed to the examination of the learned Sir Edward Coke concerning heresy. In his chapter of heresy, 3 Inst. , he himself confesseth that no statute against

heresy stood then in force, when in the 9th year of King James, Bartholomew Legat was burnt for Arianism; and that from the authority of the act of 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, and other acts cited in the margin, it may be gathered that the diocesan hath the jurisdiction of heresy. This I say is not true: for as to acts of Parliament, it is manifest, that from acts repealed, that is to say, from things that have no being, there can be gathered nothing. And as to the other authorities in the margin, Fitzherbert and the Doctor and Student, they say no more than what was law in the time when they writ; that is, when the Pope's usurped authority was here obeyed. But if they had written this in the time of King Edward VI or Queen Elizabeth, Sir Edward Coke might as well have cited his own authority, as theirs; for their opinions had no more the force of laws than his. Then he cites this precedent of Legat, and another of Hammond in the time of Queen Elizabeth; but precedents prove only what was done, and not what was well done. What jurisdiction could the diocesan then have of heresy, when by the statute of Edw. VI, c. 12, then in force, there was no heresy, and all punishment for opinions was forbidden? For heresy is a doctrine contrary to the determination of the Church; but then the Church had not determined any thing at all concerning heresy.

L.

But seeing the high-commissioners had power to correct and amend heresies, they must have power to cite such as were accused of heresy to appear before them; or else they could not execute their commission.

P.

If they had first made and published a declaration of what articles they made heresy, that when one man heard another speak against their declaration, he might thereof inform the commissioners, then indeed they had had power to cite and imprison the person accused. But before they can

know what should be heresy, how was it possible that one man should accuse another? And before he be accused, how can he be cited?

L.

Perhaps it was taken for granted, that whatsoever was contrary to any of the four first general Councils, was to be judged heresy.

P.

That granted, yet I see not how one man might accuse another any the better for those Councils. For not one man of ten thousand had ever read them, nor were they ever published in English, that a man might avoid offending against them; nor perhaps are they extant. Nor if those that we have printed in Latin, are the very acts of the Councils, which is yet much disputed amongst divines, do I think it fit they were put in the vulgar tongues. But it is not likely that the makers of the statutes had any purpose to make heresy of whatsoever was repugnant to those four general Councils. For if they had, I believe the Anabaptists, of which there was great plenty in those times, would one time or other have been questioned upon this article of the Nicence Creed, I believe one baptism for the remission of sins. Nor was the commission itself for a long time after registered, that men might in such uncertainty take heed and abstain, for their better safety, from speaking of religion anything at all. But by what law was this hereitc Legat burnt? I grant he was an Arian, and his heresy contrary to the determination of the Church of England, in the highest points of Christianity. But seeing there was no statute-law to burn him, and no penalty forbidding, by what law, by what authority was he burnt?

L.

That this Legat was accused of heresy, was no fault of the high-commissioners; but when he was accused, it had been a fault in them not to

have examined him, or having examined him and found him an Arian, not to have judged him so, or not to have certified him so. All this they did, and this was all that belonged unto them; they meddled not with his burning, but left him to the secular power to do with him what they pleased.

P.

Your justification of the commissioners is nothing to the question. The question is by what law was he burnt? The spiritual-law gives no sentence of temporal punishment; and Sir Edward Coke confesseth that he could not be burned; and burning being forbidden by statute-law, by what law then was he burned?

L.

By the common-law.

P.

What is that? It is not custom. For before the time of Henry IV, there was no such custom in England; for if there had, yet those laws that came after were but confirmations of the custom, and therefore the repealing of those laws was a repealing of the custom. For when King Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth abolished those statutes, they abolished all pains, and consequently burning, or else they had abolished nothing. And if you will say he was burnt by the law of reason, you must tell me how there can be proportion between doctrine and burning; there can be no equality, nor majority, nor minority assigned between them. The proportion that is between them, is the proportion of the mischief which the doctrine maketh, to the mischief to be inflicted on the doctor; and this is to be measured only by him that hath the charge of governing the people; and consequently the punishing of offences can be determined by none but by the King, and that, if it extend to life or member, with the assent of Parliament.

L.

He does not draw any argument for it from reason, but allegeth for it this judgment executed upon Legat, and a story out of Holinshed and Stow. But I know that neither history nor precedent will pass with you for law. And though there be a writ de hæretico comburendo in the register, as you may read in Fitzherbert, grounded upon the statutes of 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, and 2 Hen. V, c. 7; yet seeing those statutes are void, you will say the writ is also void.

P.

Yes, indeed will I. Besides this, I understand not how that it is true that he saith, that the diocesan hath jurisdiction of heresy, and that so it was put in use in all Queen Elizabeth's reign; whereas by the statute it is manifest, that all jurisdiction spiritual was given under the Queen to the high-commissioners. How then could any one diocesan have any part thereof without deputation from them, which by their letters-patent they could not grant? Nor was it reasonable they should; for the trust was not committed to the bishops only, but also to divers lay persons, who might have an eye upon their proceedings, lest they should encroach upon the power temporal. But at this day there is neither statute nor any law to punish doctrine, but the ordinary power ecclesiastical, and that according to the canons of the Church of England, only authorized by the King, the high-commission being long since abolished. Therefore let us come now to such causes criminal as are not capital.

L.

The greatest offence not capital, is that which is done against the statute of provisors.

Of premunire.

P.

You have need to expound this.

L.

This crime is not unlike to that for which a man is outlawed, when he will not come in and submit himself to the law; saving that in outlawries there is a long process to precede it, and he that is outlawed is put out of the protection of the law. But for the offence against the statute of provisors (which is called præmunire facias, from the words in the original writ), if the offender submit not himself to the law within the space of two months after notice, he is presently an outlaw. And this punishment, if not capital, is equivalent to capital. For he lives secretly at the mercy of those that know where he is, and cannot, without the like peril to themselves, but discover him. And it has been much disputed, before the time of Queen Elizabeth, whether he might not be lawfully killed by any man that would, as one might kill a wolf. It is like the punishment amongst the old Romans, of being barred the use of fire and water; and like the great excommunication in the papacy, when a man might not eat nor drink with the offender without incurring the like penalty.

P.

Certainly the offence for which this punishment was first ordained was some abominable crime, or extraordinary mischief.

L.

So it was. For the Pope, you know, from long before the Conquest, encroached every day upon the power temporal. Whatsoever could be made to seem to be in ordine ad spiritualia, was in every commonwealth claimed and haled to the jurisdiction of the Pope; and for that end, in every country he had his court ecclesiastical, and there was scarce any cause temporal

which he could not, by one shift or other, hook into his jurisdiction, in such sort as to have it tried in his own courts at Rome, or in France, or in England itself. By which means the King's laws were not regarded, judgments given in the King's courts were avoided, and presentations to bishoprics, abbeys, and other benefices, founded and endowed by the Kings and nobility of England, were bestowed by the Pope upon strangers, or such as with money in their purses could travel to Rome to provide themselves of such benefices. And suitably hereunto, when there was a question about a tithe, or a will, though the point were merely temporal, yet the Pope's court here would fetch them in, or else one of the parties would appeal to Rome. Against these injuries of the Roman Church, and to maintain the right and dignity of the Crown of England, Edward III made a statute concerning provisors, that is, such as provide themselves with benefices here from Rome. For in the twenty-fifth year of his reign he ordained, in a full Parliament, that the right of election of bishops, and right of advowsons and presentations, belonged to himself, and to the nobility that were the founders of such bishoprics, abbeys, and other benefices. And he enacted further, that if any clerk which he or any of his subjects should present, should be disturbed by any such provisor, that such provisor or disturber should be attached by his body, and if convicted, lie in prison till he were ransomed at the King's will, and had satisfied the party grieved, renounced his title, and found sureties not to sue for it any further; and that if they could not be found, then exigents should go forth to outlawry, and the profits of the benefice in the mean time be taken into the King's hands. And the same statute is confirmed in the twenty-seventh year of King Edward III; which statute alloweth to these provisors two months to appear: but if they appear before they be outlawed, they shall be received to make answer; but if they render not themselves, they shall forfeit all their lands, goods, and chattels, besides that they stand outlawed. The same law is confirmed

again by 16 Rich. II, c. 5; in which is added, because these provisors obtained sometimes from the Pope, that such English bishops, as according to the law were instituted and inducted by the King's presentees, should be excommunicated, that for this also both they, and the receivers and publishers of such papal process, and the procurers, should have the same punishment.

P.

Let me see the statute itself of 27 Edw. III.

L.

It lies there before you, set down verbatim by Sir Edward Coke himself, both in English and French.

P.

It is well. We are now to consider what it means, and whether it be well or ill interpreted by Sir Edward Coke. And first it appeareth by the preamble, which Sir Edward Coke acknowledgeth to be the best interpreter of the statute, that this statute was made against the encroachments only of the Church of Rome upon the right of the King, and other patrons, to collate bishoprics and other benefices within the realm of England, and against the power of the courts spiritual to hold plea of controversies determinable in any of the courts of the King, or to reverse any judgment there given, as being things that tend to the disherison of the King and destruction of the common-law of the realm always used. Put the case now, that a man had procured the Pope to reverse a decree in chancery. Had he been within the danger of præmunire?

L.

Yes, certainly. Or if the judgment had been given in the Court of the Lord Admiral, or in any other King's court whatsoever, either of law or

equity. For courts of equity are most properly courts of the common-law of England, because equity and common-law, as Sir Edward Coke says, are all one.

P.

Then the word common-law is not in this preamble restrained to such courts only where the trial is by juries, but comprehends all the King's temporal courts, if not also the courts of those subjects that are lords of great manors.

L.

It is very likely, yet I think it will not by every man be granted.

P.

The statute also says, that they who draw men out of the realm in plea, whereof the cognizance pertaineth to the King's court, or of things whereof judgment is given in the King's court, are within the cases of præmunire. But what if one man draw another to Lambeth in plea, whereof judgment is already given at Westminster. Is he by this clause involved in a præmunire?

L.

Yes. For though it be not out of the realm, yet it is within the meaning of the statute; because the Pope's court, not the King's court, was then perhaps at Lambeth.

P.

But in Sir Edward Coke's time the King's court was at Lambeth, and not the Pope's.

L.

You know well enough that the spiritual Court has no power to hold pleas of common-law.

P.

I do so; but I know not for what cause any simple man, that mistakes his right court, should be out of the King's protection, lose his inheritance and all his goods, personal and real, and if taken, be kept in prison all his life. This statute cannot be by Sir Edward Coke's torture made to say it. Besides, such men are ignorant in what courts they are to seek their remedy; and it is a custom confirmed by perpetual usage, that such ignorant men should be guided by their counsel at law. It is manifest, therefore, that the makers of the statute intended not to prohibit men from suing for their right, neither in the Chancery, nor in the Admiralty, nor in any other court, except the Ecclesiastical courts, which had their jurisdiction from the Church of Rome. Again, where the statute says, "which do sue in any other court, or defeat a judgment in the King's court": what is the meaning of another court? Another court than what? Is it here meant the King's Bench, or Court of Common Pleas? Does a præmunire lie for every man that sues in Chancery for that which might be remedied in the Court of Common Pleas? Or can a præmunire lie by this statute against the Lord Chancellor? The statute lays it only on the party that sueth, not upon the judge which holdeth the plea. Nor could it be laid, either by this statute or by the statute of 16 Rich. II, upon the judges, which were then punishable only by the Pope's authority. Seeing then the party suing has a just excuse upon the counsel of his lawyer, and the temporal judge and the lawyer both are out of the statute, the punishment of the præmunire can light upon nobody.

L.

But Sir Edward Coke in this same chapter bringeth two precedents to prove, that though the spiritual courts in England be now the King's courts,

yet whosoever sueth in them for any thing triable by the common-law, shall fall into a præmunire. One is, that whereas in the twenty-second year of Hen. VIII all the clergy of England in a convocation by public instrument acknowledged the King to be supreme head of the Church of England; yet after this, viz. 24 Hen. VIII,this statute was in force.

P.

Why not? A convocation of the clergy could not alter the right of supremacy; their courts were still the Pope's courts. The other precedent, in the twenty-fifth year of Hen. VIII, of the Bishop of Norwich, may have the same answer. For the King was not declared head of the Church by Act of Parliament till the twenty-sixth year of his reign. If he had not mistrusted his own law, he would not have laid hold on so weak a proof as these precedents. And as to the sentence of præmunire upon the Bishop of Norwich, neither doth this statute nor that other of Richard II warrant it. He was sentenced for threatening to excommunicate a man which had sued another before the mayor. But this statute forbids not that, but forbids the bringing in or publishing of excommunications, or other process from Rome, or any other place. Before the twenty-sixth year of Henry VIII, there is no question but that for a suit in the spiritual court here in a temporal cause there lay a præmunire. And if perhaps some judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise, his judgment was erroneous.

L.

Nay, but by the statute of 16 Rich. II. c. 5, it appeareth to the contrary, as Sir Edward Coke here will show you. The effect, saith he, of the statute of Richard II is, that if any pursue, or cause to be pursued, in the Court of Rome or elsewhere, anything which toucheth the King, against him, his crown, or regality, or his realm, they, their notaries, &c. shall be out of the King's protection.

P.

I pray you let me know the very words of the statute as they lie.

L.

Presently. The words are, If any man purchase or pursue, or cause to be purchased or pursued, in the Court of Rome or elsewhere, any such translations, processes and sentences of excommunication, bulls, instruments, or any other things whatsoever, which touch the King, against him, his crown, and his regality, or his realm, as is aforesaid, &c.

P.

If a man bring a plea of common-law into the spiritual court, which is now the King's court, and the judge of this spiritual court hold plea thereof: by what construction can you draw it within the compass of the words you have now read? To sue for my right in the King's court, is no pursuing of translations of bishoprics, made or procured in the Court of Rome, or any place else, but only in the court of the King; nor is this the suit against the King, nor his crown, nor his regality, nor his realm, but the contrary. Why then is it a præmunire? No. He that brings in or setteth out a writing in any place whatsoever, wherein is contained, that the King hath so given away his jurisdiction, as that if a subject be condemned falsely, his submission to the King's judgment is of none effect; or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of Parliament-time raise money for the defence of the kingdom, is, in my opinion, much more within the statute of provisors, than they which begin suit for a temporal matter in a court spiritual. But what argument has he for this law of his, since the statute-law fails him, from the law of reason?

L.

He says, they are called other courts, either because they proceed by the rules of other laws, as by the canon or civil law, or by other trials than the common-law doth warrant. For the trial warranted by the law of England for matter of fact, is by verdict of twelve men before the judges of the common-law, in matters pertaining to the common-law, and not upon examination of witnesses, as in the Court of Equity. So that alia curia is either that which is governed per aliam legem, or which draweth the party ad aliud examen. For if —

P.

Stop there. Let us consider of this you have read: for the trial warranted by the law of England is by verdict of twelve men. What means he here by the law of England? Does it not warrant the trials in Chancery, and in the Court of Admiralty, by witnesses?

L.

By the law of England he means the law used in the King's Bench; that is to say, the common-law.

P.

This is just as if he had said, that two courts did warrant their own way of trial; but other courts not so, but were warranted by the King: only the courts of common-law were warrants to themselves. You see that alia curia is this way ill expounded. In the courts of common-law all trials are by twelve men, who are judges of the fact; and the fact known and proved, the judges are to pronounce the law; but in the spiritual court, the Admiralty, and in all the courts of Equity, there is but one judge, both of fact and of law; this is all the difference. If this difference be intended by the statute by alia curia, there would be a præmunire for suing in a court, being not the King's Court. The King's Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be

different kinds of courts, because the process is different. But it is plain that this statute doth not distinguish courts otherwise than into the courts of the King, and into the courts of the foreign states and princes. And seeing you stand upon the name of a jury for the distinguishing of courts, what difference do you find between the trials at the common-law, and the trials in other courts? You know that in trials of fact naturally, and through all the world, the witnesses are judges, and it is impossible to be otherwise. What then in England can a jury judge of, except it be of the sufficiency of the testimony? The justices have nothing to judge of or do, but after the fact is proved, to declare the law; which is not judgment, but jurisdiction. Again, though the trial be in Chancery, or in the Court of civil law, the witnesses are still judges of the fact, and he that hath the commission to hear the cause, hath both the parts, that is to say, of a jury to judge of the testimony, and of a justice to declare the law. In this, I say, lies all the difference: which is indeed enough to make a dispute (as the world goes) about jurisdiction! But seeing it tends neither to the disherison of the King, nor of the people, nor to the subversion of the law of reason, that is of common-law, nor to the subversion of justice, nor to any harm of the realm, without some of which these statutes are not broken; it cannot be a præmunire.

L.

Let me read on. For if the freehold, inheritances, goods and chattels, debts and duties, wherein the King and subject have right and property by the common-law, should be judged per aliam legem, or be drawn ad aliud examen, the three mischiefs afore expressed would follow; viz. the destruction of the King and his crown, the disherison of his people, and the undoing and destruction of the common-law always used.

P.

That is to say, of the law of reason. From hence it follows, that where there are no juries, and where there are different laws from ours, that is to say, in all the world besides, neither King nor people have any inheritance, nor goods, nor any law of reason. I will examine his doctrine concerning cases criminal no further. He nowhere defineth a crime, that we may know what it is: an odious name sufficeth him to make a crime of any thing. He hath put heresy among the most odious crimes, not knowing what it signifies; and upon no other cause, but because the Church of Rome, to make their usurped power the more terrible, had made it, by long preaching against it, and cruelty shown towards many godly and learned men of this and other reformed Churches, appear to common people a thing detestable. He puts it in as a plea of the crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth; whereas in her time there was no doctrine heresy. But Justice Stamford leaves it out, because, when heresy was a crime, it was a plea of the mitre. I see also in this catalogue of causes criminal, he inserteth costly feeding, costly apparel, and costly building, though they were contrary to no statute. It is true, that by evil circumstances they become sins; but these sins belong to the judgment of the pastors spiritual. A justice of the temporal law (seeing the intention only makes them sins) cannot judge whether they be sins or no, unless he have power to take confessions. Also he makes flattery of the King to be a crime. How could he know when one man had flattered another? He meant therefore that it was a crime to please the King: and accordingly he citeth divers calamities of such as had been in times past in great favour of the Kings they served; as the favourites of Henry III, Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI; which favourites were some imprisoned, some banished, and some put to death by the same rebels that imprisoned, banished, and put to death the same King, upon no better ground than the Earl of Strafford, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and King Charles the First, by the rebels of that time. Empson and Dudley were no favourites of Henry

the seventh, but spunges, which King Henry the eighth did well squeeze. Cardinal Wolsey was indeed for divers years a favourite of Henry the eighth, but fell into disgrace, not for flattering the King, but for not flattering him in the business of divorce from Queen Katherine. You see his reasoning here; see also his passion in the words following: we will for some causes descend no lower: Qui eorum vestigiis insistunt, eorum exitus perhorrescant. This is put in for the favourite, that then was, of King James. But let us give over this, and speak of the legal punishments to these crimes belonging.

And in the first place I desire to know who it is that hath the power, for an offence committed, to define and appoint the special manner of punishment. For I suppose you are not of the opinion of the Stoics in old time, that all faults are equal, and that there ought to be the same punishment for killing a man, and for killing a hen.

Of punishments.

L.

The manner of punishment in all crimes whatsoever, is to be determined by the common-law. That is to say, if it be a statute that determines it, then the judgment must be according to the statute; if it be not specified by the statute, then the custom in such cases is to be followed: but if the case be new, I know not why the judge may not determine it according to reason.

P.

But according to whose reason? If you mean the natural reason of this or that judge authorized by the King to have cognizance of the cause, there being as many several reasons, as there are several men, the punishment of all crimes will be uncertain, and none of them ever grow up to make a custom. Therefore a punishment certain can never be assigned, if it have its beginning from the natural reasons of deputed judges; no, nor from the

natural reason of the supreme judge. For if the law of reason did determine punishments, then for the same offences there should be, through all the world and in all times, the same punishments; because the law of reason is immutable and eternal.

L.

If the natural reason neither of the King, nor of any else, be able to prescribe a punishment, how can there be any lawful punishment at all?

P.

Why not? For I think that in this very difference between the rational faculties of particular men, lieth the true and perfect reason that maketh every punishment certain. For, but give the authority of defining punishments to any man whatsoever, and let that man define them, and right reason has defined them, suppose the definition be both made, and made known before the offence committed. For such authority is to trump in card playing, save that in matter of government, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps. Therefore seeing every man knoweth by his own reason what actions are against the law of reason, and knoweth what punishments are by this authority for every evil action ordained; it is manifest reason, that for breaking the known laws he should suffer the known punishments. Now the person to whom this authority of defining punishments is given, can be no other, in any place of the world, but the same person that hath the sovereign power, be it one man or one assembly of men. For it were in vain to give it to any person that had not the power of the militia to cause it to be executed; for no less power can do it, when many offenders be united and combined to defend one another. There was a case put to King David by Nathan, of a rich man that had many sheep, and of a poor man that had but one, which was a tame lamb: the rich man had a stranger in his house, for whose entertainment, to spare his own sheep he took away the poor man’s

lamb. Upon this case the King gave judgment, “Surely the man that hath done this shall die.” What think you of this? Was it a royal, or tyrannical judgment?

L.

I will not contradict the canons of the Church of England, which acknowledge the King of England within his own dominions hath the same rights, which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs; nor deny King David to have been one of those good Kings. But to punish with death without a precedent law, will seem but a harsh proceeding with us, who unwillingly hear of arbitrary laws, much less of arbitrary punishments, unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David. I will only ask you, by what authority the clergy may take upon them to determine or make a canon concerning the power of their own King, or to distinguish between the right of a good and an evil King.

P.

It is not the clergy that make their canons to be law, but it is the King that doth it by the great seal of England; and it is the King that giveth them power to teach their doctrines, in that, that he authorized them publicly to teach and preach the doctrine of Christ and his apostles, according to the Scriptures, wherein this doctrine is perspicuously contained. But if they had derogated from the royal power in any of their doctrines published, then certainly they had been to blame; nay, I believe that they had been more within the statute of præmunire of 16 Rich. II, c. 5, than any judge of a Court of Equity for holding pleas of common-law. I cite not this precedent of King David, as approving the breach of the great charter, or justifying the punishment with loss of life or member, of every man that shall offend the King; but to show you that before the charter was granted, in all cases where the punishments were not prescribed, it was the King only that could

prescribe them; and that no deputed judge could punish an offender but by force of some statute, or by the words of some commission, and not ex officio. They might for a contempt of their courts, because it is a contempt of the King, imprison a man during the King's pleasure, or fine him to the King according to the greatness of the offence: but all this amounteth to no more, than to leave him to the King's judgment. As for cutting off of ears, and for the pillory, and the like corporal punishments usually inflicted heretofore in the Star-chamber, they were warranted by the statute of Hen. VII, that giveth them power to punish sometimes by discretion. And generally it is a rule of reason, that every judge of crimes, in case the positive law appoint no punishment, and he have no other command from the King, then do consult the King before he pronounce sentence of any irreparable damage on the offender: for otherwise he doth not pronounce the law, which is his office to do, but makes the law, which is the office of the King. And from this you may collect, that the custom of punishing such and such a crime, in such and such a manner, hath not the force of law in itself, but from an assured presumption that the original of the custom was the judgment of some former King. And for this cause the judges ought not to run up, for the customs by which they are warranted, to the time of the Saxon Kings, nor to the time of the Conquest. For the most immediate antecedent precedents are the fairest warrants of their judgments; as the most recent laws have commonly the greatest vigour, as being fresh in the memory of all men, and tacitly confirmed, because not disapproved, by the sovereign legislator. What can be said against this?

L.

Sir Edward Coke, (3 Inst.), in the chapter of judgments and executions, saith, that of judgments some are by the common-law, some by statute-law, and some by custom; wherein he distinguisheth common-law both from statute-law and from custom.

P.

But you know, that in other places he makes the common-law, and the law of reason, to be all one; as indeed they are, when by it is meant the King's reason. And then his meaning in this distinction must be, that there be judgments by reason without statute-law, and judgments neither by statute-law nor by reason, but by custom without reason. For if a custom be reasonable, then, both he and other learned lawyers say, it is common-law; and if unreasonable, no law at all.

L.

I believe Sir Edward Coke's meaning was no other than yours in this point, but that he inserted the word custom, because there be not many that can distinguish between customs reasonable and unreasonable.

P.

But custom, so far forth as it hath the force of a law, hath more of the nature of a statute, than of the law of reason, especially where the question is not of lands and goods, but of punishments, which are to be defined only by authority. Now to come to particulars, what punishment is due by law for high-treason?

L.

To be drawn upon a hurdle from the prison to the gallows, and there to be hanged by the neck, and laid upon the ground alive, and have his bowels taken out and burnt whilst he is yet living; to have his head cut off, his body to be divided into four parts, and his head and quarters to be placed as the King shall assign.

P.

Seeing a judge ought to give judgment according to the law, and that this judgment is not appointed by any statute, how does Sir Edward Coke warrant it by reason, or how by custom?

L.

Only thus: reason it is, that his body, lands, goods, posterity, &c. should be torn, pulled asunder, and destroyed, that intended to destroy the majesty of government.

P.

See how he avoids the saying the majesty of the King. But does not this reason make as much for punishing a traitor, as Mettius Fuffetius in old time was executed by Tullus Hostilius, King of Rome, or as Ravaillac, not many years ago in France, who were torn in pieces by four horses, as it does for drawing, hanging, and quartering?

L.

I think it does. But he confirms it also in the same chapter, by holy Scripture. Thus Joab for treason (1 Kings ii. 28), was drawn from the horns of the altar; that is proof for drawing upon a hurdle: Esth. ii. 22; Bigthan for treason was hanged; there is proof for hanging: Acts i. 18; Judas hanged himself and his bowels were poured out; there is for hanging and embowelling alive: 2 Sam. xviii. 14; Joab pierced Absalom's heart; that is proof for pulling out a traitor's heart: 2 Sam. xx. 22; Sheba the son of Bichri had his head cut off; which is proof that a traitor's head ought to be cut off: 2 Sam. iv. 12; they slew Baanah and Rechab, and hung up their heads over the pool of Hebron; this is for setting up of quarters: and lastly for forfeiture of lands, and goods, Psalms cix. 9-15: Let their children be driven out, and beg, and other men make spoil of their labours, and let their memory be blotted out of the land.

P.

Learnedly said; and no record is to be kept of the judgment. Also the punishments divided between those traitors, must be joined in one judgment for a traitor here.

L.

He meant none of this, but intended (his hand being in) to show his reading, or his chaplain's, in the Bible.

P.

Seeing then for the specifying of the punishment in case of treason, he brings no argument from natural reason, that is to say, from the common-law; and that it is manifest that it is not the general custom of the land, the same being rarely or never executed upon any peer of the realm, and that the King may remit the whole penalty, if he will: it follows, that the specifying of the punishment depends merely upon the authority of the King. But this is certain, that no judge ought to give other judgment, than has been usually given and approved either by a statute, or by consent express or implied of the sovereign power. For otherwise it is not the judgment of the law, but of a man subject to the law.

L.

In petit treason the judgment is, to be drawn to the place of execution, and hanged by the neck; or if it be a woman, to be drawn and burnt.

P.

Can you imagine that this so nice a distinction can have any other foundation than the wit of a private man?

L.

Sir Edward Coke upon this place says, that she ought not to be beheaded or hanged.

P.

No, not by the judge, who ought to give no other judgment than the statute or the King appoints; nor the sheriff to make other execution than the judge pronounceth; unless he have a special warrant from the King. And this I should have thought he had meant, had he not said before, that the King had given away all his right of judicature to his courts of justice.

L.

The judgment for felony is —

P.

Heresy is before felony in the catalogue of the pleas of the Crown.

L.

He has omitted the judgment against a heretic, because, I think, no jury can find heresy, nor no judge temporal did ever pronounce judgment upon it. For the statute of 2 Hen. V, c. 7, was, that the bishop having convicted any man of heresy, should deliver him to the sheriff, and that the sheriff should believe the bishop. The sheriff therefore was bound by the statute of 2 Hen. IV, after he was delivered to him, to burn him; but that statute being repealed, the sheriff could not burn him, without a writ de heretico comburendo, and therefore the sheriff burnt Legat (9 King James) by that writ, which was granted by the judges of the common-law at that time, and in that writ the judgment is expressed.

P.

This is strange reasoning. When Sir Edward Coke knew and confessed, that the statutes upon which the writ de hæretico comburendo was

grounded, were all repealed, how could he think the writ itself could be in force? Or that the statute, which repealeth the statutes for burning heretics, was not made with an intent to forbid such burning? It is manifest he understood not his books of common-law. For in the time of Henry IV and Henry V, the word of the bishop was the sheriff's warrant, and there was need of no such writ; nor could be till the 25 Hen. VIII, when those statutes were repealed, and a writ made for that purpose and put into the register, which writ Fitzherbert cites in the end of his Natura Brevium. Again, in the latter end of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, was published a correct register of original and judicial writs, and the writ de hæretico comburendo left out; because that statute of 25 Hen. VIII, and all statutes against heretics, were repealed, and burning forbidden. And whereas he citeth for the granting of this writ, in the ninth year of James I, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chief Baron, and two Justices of the Common-Pleas, it is, as to all but the Lord Chief Justice, against the law. For neither the judges of Common-Pleas, nor of the Exchequer, can hold pleas of the Crown without special commission; and if they cannot hold plea, they cannot condemn.

L.

The punishment for felony is, that the felon be hanged by the neck till he be dead. And to prove that it ought to be so, he cites a sentence, from whence I know not, Quod non licet felonem pro felonia decollare.

P.

It is not indeed lawful for the sheriff of his own head to do it, or to do otherwise than is commanded in the judgment, nor for the judge to give any other judgment than according to statute-law, or the usage consented to by the King; but this hinders not the King from altering his law concerning judgments, if he see good cause.

L.

The King may do so, if he please: and Sir Edward Coke tells you how he altered particular judgments in case of felony, and showeth that judgment being given upon a lord in Parliament, that he should be hanged, he was nevertheless beheaded; and that another lord had the like judgment for another felony, and was not hanged but beheaded: and withal he shows you the inconveniency of such proceeding, because, saith he, if hanging might be altered to beheading, by the same reason it might be altered to burning, stoning to death, &c.

P.

Perhaps there might be inconveniency in it; but it is more than I see, or he shows, nor did there happen any inconveniency from the execution he citeth: besides he granteth, that death, being ultimum supplicium, is a satisfaction to the law. But what is all this to the purpose, when it belongeth not to consider such inconveniences of government but to the King and Parliament? Or who, from the authority of a deputed judge, can derive a power to censure the actions of a King that hath deputed him?

L.

For the death of a man by misfortune, there is, he saith, no express judgment, nor for killing a man in one's own defence; but he saith, that the law hath in both cases given judgment that he, that so killeth a man, shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts and duties.

P.

If we consider what Sir Edward Coke saith (1 Inst. sec. 745), at the word felony, these judgments are very favourable; for there he saith, that killing a man by chance medley, or se defendendo, is felony. His words are: "wherefore by the law at this day, under the word felony in commissions, &c. is included petite treason, murder, homicide, burning of houses,

burglary, robbery, rape, &c. chance-medley, and se defendendo." But if we consider only the intent of him that killeth a man by misfortune or in his own defence, the same judgments will be thought both cruel and sinful judgments. And how they can be felony, at this day cannot be understood, unless there be a statute to make them so. For the statute of 25 Hen. III, c. 25, the words whereof, "murder from henceforth shall not be judged before our justices, where it is found misfortune only, but it shall take place in such as are slain by felony, and not otherwise," make it manifest, if they be felonies, they must also be murders, unless they have been made felonies by some later statute.

L.

There is no such later statute, nor is it to say in commission; nor can a commission, or anything but another statute, make a thing felony that was not so before.

P.

See what it is for a man to distinguish felony into several sorts, before he understands the general name of felony, what it meaneth. But that a man, for killing another man by misfortune only, without any evil purpose, should forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts and duties, is a very hard judgment, unless perhaps they were to be given to the kindred of the man slain, by way of amends for damage. But the law is not that. Is it the common-law, which is the law of reason, that justifies this judgment, or the statute-law? It cannot be called the law of reason, if the case be mere misfortune. If a man be upon his appletree to gather his apples, and by ill-fortune fall down, and lighting on the head of another man, kill him, and by good fortune save himself; shall he for this mischance be punished with the forfeiture of his goods to the King? Does the law of reason warrant this? He should, you will say, have looked to his feet; that is true; but so should he,

that was under, have looked up to the tree. Therefore in this case the law of reason, as I think, dictates that they ought each of them to bear his own misfortune.

L.

In this case I agree with you.

P.

But this case is the true case of mere misfortune, and a sufficient reprehension of the opinion of Sir Edward Coke.

L.

But what if this had happened to be done by one, that had been stealing apples upon the tree of another man? Then, as Sir Edward Coke says (3 Inst.), it had been murder.

P.

There is indeed great need of good distinction in a case of killing by misfortune. But in this case the unlawfulness of stealing apples cannot make it murder, unless the falling itself be unlawful. It must be a voluntary unlawful act that causeth the death, or else it is no murder by the law of reason. Now the death of the man that was under the tree, proceeded not from that, that the apples were not his that fell, but from the fall. But if a man shoot with a bow or a gun at another man's deer, and by misfortune kill a man, such shooting being both voluntary and unlawful, and also the immediate cause of the man's death, may be drawn, perhaps well enough sometimes, to murder by a judge of the common-law. So likewise if a man shoot an arrow over a house, and by chance kill a man in the street, there is no doubt but by the law of reason it is murder: for though he meant no malice to the man slain, yet it is manifest that he cared not whom he slew.

In this difficulty of finding out what it is that the law of reason dictates, who is it that must decide the question?

L.

In the case of misfortune, I think it belongs to the jury; for it is matter of fact only. But when it is doubtful whether the action from which the misfortune came, were lawful or unlawful, it is to be judged by the judge.

P.

But if the unlawfulness of the action, as the stealing of the apples, did not cause the death of the man; then the stealing, be it trespass or felony, ought to be punished alone, as the law requireth.

L.

But for the killing of a man se defendendo, the jury, as Sir Edward Coke here says, shall not in their verdict say it was se defendendo, but shall declare the manner of the fact in special, and clear it to the judge to consider how it is to be called, whether se defendendo, manslaughter, or murder.

P.

One would think so; for it is not often within the capacity of a jury, to distinguish the signification of the different hard names which are given by lawyers to the killing of a man: as murder and felony, which neither the laws, nor the makers of the laws, have yet defined. The witnesses say, that thus and thus the person did, but not that it was murder or felony; no more can the jury say, who ought to say nothing but what they hear from the witnesses or from the prisoner. Nor ought the judge to ground his sentence upon anything else besides the special matter found, which, according as it is contrary or not contrary to the statute, ought to be pronounced.

L.

But I have told you, that when the jury has found misfortune or se defendendo, there is no judgment at all to be given, and the party is to be pardoned of course, saving that he shall forfeit his goods and chattels, debts and duties, to the King.

P.

But I understand not how there can be a crime for which there is no judgment, nor how any punishment can be inflicted without a precedent judgment, nor upon what ground the sheriff can seize the goods of any man, till it be judged that they be forfeited. I know that Sir Edward Coke saith, that in the judgment of hanging, the judgment of forfeiture is implied, which I understand not; though I understand well enough, that the sheriff by his office may seize the goods of a felon convicted; much less do I conceive how the forfeiture of goods can be implied in a no-judgment; nor do I conceive, that when the jury has found the special manner of the fact to be such as is really no other than se defendendo, and consequently no fault at all, why he should have any punishment at all. Can you show me any reason for it?

L.

The reason lies in the custom.

P.

You know that unreasonable customs are not law, but ought to be abolished; and what custom is there more unreasonable, than that a man should be punished without a fault?

L.

Then see the statute of 24 Hen. VIII, c. 5.

P.

I find here, that at the making of this statute there was a question amongst the lawyers, in case one man should kill another, that attempted feloniously to rob or murder him in or near any common highway, courtway, horseway, or footway, or in his mansion, messuage, or dwelling place; whether for the death of such a man one shall forfeit his goods and chattels, as a man should do for killing another by chance medley or in his own defence. This is the preamble, and penned as well as Sir Edward Coke could have wished. But this statute does not determine that a man should forfeit his goods for killing a man se defendendo, or for killing him by misfortune; but supposeth it only upon the opinion of the lawyers that then were. The body of the statute is, that if a man be indicted or appealed for the death of such person so attempting as aforesaid, and the same by verdict be so found and tried, he shall not forfeit anything, but shall be discharged as if he had been found not guilty. You see the statute; now consider thereby, in the case of killing se defendendo. First, if a man kill another in his own defence, it is manifest that the man slain did either attempt to rob, or to kill, or to wound him; for else it were not done in his own defence. If then it were done in the street, or near the street, as in a tavern, he forfeits nothing, because the street is a highway. So likewise it is to be said of all other common-ways. In what place therefore can a man kill another in his own defence, but that this statute will discharge him of the forfeiture?

L.

But the statute says the attempt must be felonious.

P.

When a man assaults me with a knife, sword, club, or other mortal weapon, does any law forbid me to defend myself, or command me to stay so long as to know whether he have a felonious intent, or no? Therefore by this statute, in case it be found se defendendo, the forfeiture is discharged; if

it be found otherwise, it is capital. If we read the statute of Glocester, ca, I think it will take away the difficulty. For by that statute, in case it be found by the country that he did it in his own defence or by misfortune, then by the report of the justices to the King, the King shall take him to his grace, if it please him. From whence it followeth, first, that it was then thought law, that the jury may give the general verdict of se defendendo; which Sir Edward Coke denies. Secondly, that the judge ought to report especial matter to the King. Thirdly, that the King may take him to his grace, if he please; and consequently, that his goods are not to be seized, till the King, after the report of the judge heard, give the sheriff command to do it. Fourthly, that the general verdict of the King hinders not the King but that he may judge of it upon the special matter; for it often happens that an ill-disposed person provokes a man with words or otherwise, on purpose to make him draw his sword, that he may kill him, and pretend it done in his own defence; which appearing, the King may, without any offence to God, punish him, as the cause shall require. Lastly, contrary to the doctrine of Sir Edward Coke, he may in his own person be judge in the case, and annul the verdict of the jury; which a deputed judge cannot do.

L.

There be some cases wherein a man, though by the jury he be found not guilty, shall nevertheless forfeit his goods and chattels to the King. For example; a man is slain, and one A, hating B, giveth out that it was B that slew him; B hearing thereof, fearing if he be tried for it, that through the great power of A, and others that seek his hurt, he should be condemned, flieth, and afterwards is taken and tried; and upon sufficient evidence is by the jury found not guilty; yet because he fled, he shall forfeit his goods and chattels, notwithstanding there be no such judgment given by the judge, nor appointed by any statute; but the law itself authoriseth the sheriff to seize them to the use of the King.

P.

I see no reason (which is common-law) for it, and am sure it is grounded upon no statute.

L.

See Sir Edward Coke, 1 Inst. s. 709, and read.

P.

“If a man that is innocent be accused of felony, and for fear flieth for the same; albeit that he be judicially acquitted of the felony, yet if it be found that he fled for the same, he shall, notwithstanding his innocence, forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts and duties.” O unchristian and abominable doctrine! which also he in his own words following contradicteth: “for,” saith he, “as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption of the law grounded upon his flight, and so it is in many other cases: but that the general rule is, Quod stabitur præsumptioni, donec probetur in contrarium; but you see it hath many exceptions.” This general rule contradicts what he said before; for there can be no exceptions to a general rule in law, that is not expressly made an exception by some statute, and to a general rule of equity there can be no exception at all.

From the power of punishing, let us proceed to the power of pardoning.

Of pardoning.

L.

Touching the power of pardoning, Sir Edward Coke says, (3 Inst.), that no man shall obtain charter of pardon out of Parliament; and cites for it the statute of 2 Edw. III, c. 2; and says further, that accordingly in a Parliament roll it is said, that for the peace of the land it would help that no pardon were granted but by Parliament.

P.

What lawful power would he have left to the King, that thus disableth him to practise mercy? In the statute which he citeth, to prove that the King ought not to grant charters of pardon but in Parliament, there are no such words, as any man may see; for that statute is in print; and that which he says is in the Parliament roll, is but a wish of he tells not whom, and not a law; and it is strange that a private wish should be enrolled among acts of Parliament. If a man do you an injury, to whom, think you, belongeth the right of pardoning it?

L.

Doubtless to me alone, if to me alone be done that injury; and to the King alone, if to him alone be done the injury; and to both together, if the injury be done to both.

P.

What part then has any man in the granting of a pardon, but the King and the party wronged. If you offend no member of either House, why should you ask their pardon? It is possible that a man may deserve a pardon; or he may be such a one sometimes as the defence of the kingdom hath need of. May not the King pardon him, though there be no Parliament then sitting? Sir Edward Coke's law is too general in this point; and I believe, if he had thought on it, he would have excepted some persons, if not all the King's children and his heir apparent; and yet they are all his subjects, and subject to the law as other men.

L.

But if the King shall grant pardons of murder and felony of his own head, there would be very little safety for any man, either out of his house or in it, either by night or by day. And for that very cause there have been

many good statutes provided, which forbid the justices to allow of such pardons as do not specially name the crime.

P.

Those statutes, I confess, are reasonable, and very profitable, which forbid the judge to pardon murders. But what statute is there that forbids the King to do it? There is a statute of 13 Rich. II, c. 1, wherein the King promiseth not to pardon murder; but there is in it a clause for the saving of the King's regality. From which may be inferred that the King did not grant away that power, when he thought good to use it for the commonwealth. Such statutes are not laws to the King, but to his judges, and though the judges be commanded by the King not to allow pardons in many cases, yet if the King by writing command the judges to allow them, they ought to do it. I think, if the King think in his conscience it be for the good of the commonwealth, he sinneth not in it: but I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin, if any other man be damnified by the crime committed, unless he cause reparation to be made as far as the party offending can do it. And howsoever, be it sin or not sin, there is no power in England that may resist him or speak evil of him lawfully.

L.

Sir Edward Coke denies not that; and upon that ground it is that the King, he says, may pardon high-treason; for there can be no high-treason but against the King.

P.

That is well; therefore he confesseth, that whatsoever the offence be, the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself, and that by his own right, without breach of any law positive or natural, or of any grant, if his conscience tell him that it be not to the damage of the commonwealth;

and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to the commonwealth, belongeth to the King only. Now tell me, what it is which is said to be pardoned?

L.

What can it be, but only the offence? If a man hath done a murder, and be pardoned for the same, is it not the murder that is pardoned?

P.

Nay, by your favour, if a man be pardoned for murder or any other offence, it is the man that is pardoned; the murder still remains murder. But what is pardon?

L.

Pardon, as Sir Edward Coke says, (3 Inst.), is derived of per and dono, and signifies thoroughly to remit.

P.

If the King remit the murder, and pardon not the man that did it, what does the remission serve for?

L.

You know well enough that when we say a murder, or any thing else, is pardoned, all Englishmen understand thereby, that the punishment due to the offence is the thing remitted.

P.

But for our understanding of one another, you ought to have said so at first. I understand now, that to pardon murder or felony is thoroughly to save the offender from all the punishment due unto him by the law for his offence.

L.

Not so; for Sir Edward Coke in the same chapter, , saith thus: “a man commits felony, and is attainted thereof, or is abjured; the King pardoneth the felony without any mention of the attainder or abjuration: the pardon is void.”

P.

What is it to be attainted?

L.

To be attainted is, that his blood be held in law as stained and corrupted; so that no inheritance can descend from him to his children, or to any that make claim by him.

P.

Is this attaint a part of the crime or of the punishment?

L.

It cannot be a part of the crime, because it is none of his own act; it is therefore a part of the punishment, viz. a disherison of the offender.

P.

If it be a part of the punishment due, and yet not pardoned together with the rest, then a pardon is not a thorough remitting of the punishment, as Sir Edward Coke says it is. And what is abjuration?

L.

When a clerk heretofore was convicted of felony, he might have saved his life by abjuring the realm; that is, by departing the realm within a certain time appointed, and taking an oath never to return. But at this day all statutes for abjuration are repealed.

P.

That also is a punishment, and by a pardon of the felony pardoned, unless a statute be in force to the contrary. There is also somewhat in the statute of 13 Rich. II, c. 1, concerning the allowance of characters of pardons, which I understand not well. The words are these: “No charter of pardon for henceforth shall be allowed before our justices for murder, or for the death of a man by await, or malice prepensed, treason, or rape of a woman, unless the same be specified in the same charter.” For I think it follows thence, that if the King say in his charter that he pardoneth the murder, then he breaketh not the statute, because he specifies the offence: or if he saith he pardoneth the killing by await or of malice prepensed, he breaketh not the statute, he specifies the offence. Also if he say so much as that the judge cannot doubt of the King’s meaning to pardon him, I think the judge ought to allow it, because the statute saveth the King’s liberty and regality in that point; that is to say, the power to pardon him, such as are these words, “notwithstanding any statute to the contrary,” are sufficient to cause the charter to be allowed; for these words make it manifest that the charter was not granted upon surprise, but to maintain and claim the King’s liberty and power to show mercy when he seeth cause. The like meaning have these words, perdonavimus omnimodam interfectionem; that is to say, we have pardoned the killing, in what manner soever it was done. But here we must remember that the King cannot pardon, without sin, any damage thereby done to another man, unless he causes satisfaction to be made as far as the offender possibly can; but he is not bound to satisfy men’s thirst of revenge; for all revenge ought to proceed from God, and under God from the King. Now, besides in charters, how are these offences specified?

L.

They are specified by their names, as treason, petite treason, murder, rape, felony, and the like.

P.

Petite treason is felony, murder is felony; so is rape, robbery, and theft; and, as Sir Edward Coke says, petite larceny is felony. Now if in a Parliament-pardon, or in a Coronation-pardon, all felonies be pardoned, whether is petite larceny pardoned, or not?

L.

Yes, certainly, it is pardoned.

P.

And yet you see it is not specified; and yet it is a crime that hath less in it of the nature of felony, than there is in robbery. Do not therefore rape, robbery, theft, pass under the pardon of all felonies?

L.

I think they are all pardoned by the words of the statute, but those that are by the same statute excepted; so that specification is needful only in charters of pardon, but in general pardons not so. For the statute 13 Rich. II, c. 1, forbids not the allowance of Parliament-pardons, or Coronation-pardons; and therefore the offences pardoned need not be specified, but may pass under the general word of all felonies. Nor is it likely that the members of the Parliament, who drew up their own pardons, did not mean to make them as comprehensive as they could. And yet Sir Edward Coke (1 Inst. sec. 745), at the word felony, seemeth to be of another mind. For piracy is one species of felony; and yet when certain Englishmen had committed piracy in the last year of Queen Elizabeth, and came home into England in the beginning of the reign of King James, trusting to his coronation-pardon of all felonies, they were indicted (Sir Edward Coke was then Attorney-

general) of the piracy before commissioners, according to the statute of 28 Hen. VIII, and being found guilty were hanged. The reason he allegeth for it is, that it ought to have been specified by the name of piracy in the pardon, and therefore the pardon was not to be allowed.

P.

Why ought it to have been specified more than any other felony? He should therefore have drawn his argument from the law of reason.

L.

Also he does that; for the trial, he says, was by the common-law, and before commissioners, not in the Court of the Lord Admiral, by the civil law; therefore, he says, it was an offence whereof the common-law could not take any notice, because it could not be tried by twelve men.

P.

If the common-law could not, or ought not, to take notice of such offences, how could the offenders be tried by twelve men, and found guilty, and hanged as they were? If the common-law take no notice of piracy, what other offence was it for which they were hanged? Is piracy two felonies, for one of which a man shall be hanged by the civil-law, and for the other by the common-law? Truly I never read weaker reasoning in any author of the law of England, than in Sir Edward Coke's Institutes, how well soever he could plead.

L.

Though I have heard him much reprehended by others as well as by you, yet there be many excellent things, both for subtilty and for truth, in these his Institutes.

P.

No better things than other lawyers have, that write of the law as of a science. His citing of Aristotle, and of Homer, and of other books which are commonly read by gownmen, do, in my opinion, but weaken his authority; for any man may do it by a servant. But seeing the whole scene of that time is gone and past, let us proceed to somewhat else. Wherein doth an Act of Oblivion differ from a Parliament-pardon?

L.

This word Act of Oblivion was never in our law-books before the 12 Car. II. c. 11, and I wish it may never come again; but from whence it came, you may better know perhaps than I.

P.

The first and only Act of Oblivion that ever passed into a law, in any state that I have read of, was that amnestia or oblivion of all quarrels between any of the citizens of Athens, at any time before that act, without all exception of crime or person. The occasion whereof was this. The Lacedæmonians having totally subdued the Athenians, entered into the city of Athens, and ordained that the people should choose thirty people of their own city to have the sovereign power over them. These being chosen, behaved themselves so outrageously, as caused a sedition, in which the citizens on both sides were daily slain. There was then a discreet person that propounded to each of the parties this proposition, that every man should return to his own and forget all that was past; which proposition was made, by consent on both sides, into a public act, which for that cause was called an oblivion. Upon the like disorder happening in Rome by the murder of Julius Cæsar, the like act was propounded by Cicero, and indeed passed, but was within a few days after broken again by Marcus Antonius. In imitation of this act was made the act of 12 Car.II. c. 11.

L.

By this it seems, that the Act of Oblivion made by King Charles was no other than a Parliament-pardon, because it containeth a great number of exceptions, as the other Parliament-pardons do, and the act of Athens did not.

P.

But yet there is a difference between the late Act of Oblivion made here, and an ordinary Parliament-pardon. For concerning a fault pardoned in Parliament by a general word, a suit in law may arise about this, whether the offender be signified by the word or not, as whether the pardon of all felonies be a pardon of piracy or not. For you see by Sir Edward Coke's reports, that notwithstanding a pardon of felony, a sea-felony, when he was Attorney-General, was not pardoned. But by the late Act of Oblivion, which pardoned all manner of offences committed in the late civil war, no question could arise concerning crimes excepted. First, because no man can by law accuse another man of a fact, which by law is to be forgotten. Secondly, because all crimes may be alleged as proceeding from the licentiousness of the time, and from the silence of the law occasioned by the civil war, and consequently (unless the offender's person also were excepted, or unless the crime were committed before the war began) are within the pardon.

L.

Truly I think you say right. For if nothing had been pardoned but what was done by the occasion of the war, the raising of the war itself had not been pardoned.

P.

I have done with crimes and punishments; let us come now to the laws of meum and tuum.

Of the laws of meum and tuum.

L.

We must then examine the statutes.

P.

We must so, what they command and forbid; but not dispute of their justice. For the law of reason commands that every one observe the law which he hath assented to, and obey the person to whom he hath promised obedience and fidelity. Then let us consider next the commentaries of Sir Edward Coke upon Magna Charta and other statutes. For the understanding of Magna Charta it will be very necessary to run up into ancient times, as far as history will give us leave, and consider not only the customs of our ancestors the Saxons, but also the law of nature, the most ancient of all laws, concerning the original of government and acquisition of property, and concerning courts of judicature. And first, it is evident that dominion, government, and laws, are far more ancient than history or any other writing, and that the beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families. In which, first, the father of the family by the law of nature was absolute lord of his wife and children: secondly, made what laws amongst them he pleased: thirdly, was judge of all their controversies: fourthly, was not obliged by any law of man to follow any counsel but his own: fifthly, what land soever the lord sat down upon and made use of for his own and his family's benefit, was his propriety by the law of first possession, in case it was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of war, in case they conquered it. In this conquest what enemies they took and saved, were their servants. Also such men as wanting possessions of lands, but furnished with arts necessary for man's life, came to dwell in the family for protection, became their subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of the family. And all this is consonant, not only to the law of nature, but also to the practice of mankind set forth in history, sacred and profane.

L.

Do you think it lawful for a lord, that is the sovereign ruler of his family, to make war upon another like sovereign lord, and dispossess him of his lands?

P.

It is lawful or not lawful, according to the intention of him that does it. For, first, being a sovereign ruler, he is not subject to any law of man; and as to the law of God, where the intention is justifiable, the action is so also. The intention may be lawful in divers cases by the right of nature; one of those cases is, when he is constrained to it by the necessity of subsisting. So the children of Israel, besides that their leaders, Moses and Joshua, had an immediate command from God to dispossess the Canaanites, had also a just pretence to do what they did, from the right of nature which they had to preserve their lives, being unable otherwise to subsist. And as their preservation, so also is their security a just pretence of invading those whom they have just cause to fear, unless sufficient caution be given to take away their fear: which caution, for anything I can yet conceive, is utterly impossible. Necessity and security are the principal justifications before God, of beginning war. Injuries received justify a war defensive; but for reparable injuries, if reparation be tendered, all invasion upon that title is iniquity. If you need examples, either from Scripture or other history, concerning this right of nature in making war, you are able enough of your own reading to find them out at your leisure.

L.

Whereas you say, that the lands so won by the sovereign lord of a family, are his in propriety, you deny, methinks, all property to the subjects, how much soever any of them have contributed to the victory.

P.

I do so; nor do I see any reason to the contrary. For the subjects, when they come into the family, have no title at all to demand any part of the land, or anything else but security: to which also they are bound to contribute their whole strength, and, if need be, their whole fortunes. For it cannot be supposed that any one man can protect all the rest with his own single strength; and for the practice, it is manifest, in all conquests the land of the vanquished is in the sole power of the victor, and at his disposal. Did not Joshua and the High-priest divide the land of Canaan in such sort among the tribes of Israel as they pleased? Did not the Roman and Grecian princes and states, according to their own discretion, send out the colonies to inhabit such provinces as they had conquered? Is there at this day among the Turks, any inheritor of land besides the Sultan? And was not all the land in England once in the hands of William the Conqueror? Sir Edward Coke himself confesses it. Therefore it is an universal truth, that all conquered lands, presently after victory, are the lands of him that conquered them.

L.

But you know that all sovereigns are said to have a double capacity, viz. a natural capacity, as he is a man; and a politic capacity, as a king. In his politic capacity, I grant you, that King William the Conqueror was the proper and only owner once of all the land in England; but not in his natural capacity.

P.

If he had them in his politic capacity, then they were so his own, as not to dispose of any part thereof but only to the benefit of his people; and that must be either by his own, or by the people's discretion, that is, by Act of Parliament. But where do you find that the Conqueror disposed of his lands (as he did some to Englishmen, some to Frenchmen, and some to Normans,

to be holden by divers tenures, as knight-service, soccage, &c.) by Act of Parliament? Or that he ever called a Parliament, to have the assent of the Lords and Commons of England in disposing of those lands he had taken from them? Or for retaining of such and such lands in his own hands, by the name of forrests, for his own recreation or magnificence? You have heard perhaps that some lawyers, or other men reputed wise and good patriots, have given out that all the lands which the Kings of England have possessed, have been given them by the people, to the end that they should therewith defray the charges of their wars, and pay the wages of their ministers; and that those lands were gained by the people's money. For that was pretended in the late civil war, when they took from the King his town of Kingston-upon-Hull. But I know you do not think that the pretence was just. It cannot therefore be denied but that the lands, which King William the Conqueror gave away to Englishmen and others, and which they now hold by his letters-patent and other conveyances, were properly and really his own, or else the titles of them that now hold them, must be invalid.

L.

I assent. As you have showed me the beginning of monarchies, so let me hear your opinion concerning their growth.

P.

Great monarchies have proceeded from small families. First, by war, wherein the victor not only enlarged his territory, but also the number and riches of his subjects. As for the other forms of commonwealths, they have been enlarged other ways. First, by a voluntary conjunction of many lords of families into one great aristocracy. Secondly, from rebellion proceeded first anarchy, and from anarchy proceeded any form that the calamities of them that lived therein did prompt them to; whether it were, that they chose an hereditary King, or an elective King for life; or that they agreed upon a

council of certain persons, which is aristocracy; or a council of the whole people to have the sovereign power, which is democracy. After the first manner, which is by war, grew up all the greatest kingdoms in the world, viz. the Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and the Macedonian monarchy; and so did the great kingdoms of England, France, and Spain. The second manner, was the original of the Venetian Aristocracy. By the the third way, which is rebellion, grew up divers great monarchies, perpetually changing from one form to another: as in Rome, rebellion against Kings produced democracy, upon which the senate usurped under Sylla, and the people again upon the senate under Marius, and the Emperor usurped upon the people under Cæsar and his successors.

L.

Do you think the distinction between natural and politic capacity is insignificant?

P.

No. If the sovereign power be in an assembly of men, that assembly, whether it be aristocratical or democratical, may possess lands; but it is in their politic capacity: because no natural man has any right to those lands, or any part of them. In the same manner, they can command an act by plurality of commands; but the command of any one of them is of no effect. But when the sovereign power is in one man, the natural and politic capacity are in the same person, and as to possession of lands, undistinguishable. But as to the acts and commands, they may be well distinguished in this manner. Whatsoever a monarch does command or do, by consent of the people of his kingdom, may properly be said to be done in his politic capacity; and whatsoever he commands by word of mouth only, or by letters signed with his hand, or sealed with any of his private seals, is done in his natural capacity. Nevertheless, his public commands, though

they be made in his politic capacity, have their original from his natural capacity. For in the making of laws, which necessarily requires his assent, his assent is natural. Also those acts which are done by the King previously to the passing of them under the Great Seal of England, either by word of mouth, or warrant under his signet or private seal, are done in his natural capacity; but when they have passed the Seal of England, they are to be taken as done in his politic capacity.

L.

I think verily your distinction is good. For natural capacity and politic capacity signify no more than private and public right. Therefore, leaving this argument, let us consider in the next place, as far as history will permit, what were the laws and customs of our ancestors.

P.

The Saxons, as also all the rest of Germany not conquered by the Roman Emperors nor compelled to use the imperial laws, were a savage and heathen people, living only by war and rapine, and as some men learned in the Roman antiquities affirm, had their name of Germans from that their ancient trade of life, as if Germans and hommes de guerre were all one. Their rule over their family, servants, and subjects, was absolute; their laws, no other than natural equity; written law they had little or none; and very few there were in the time of the Cæsars that could write or read. The right to the government was either paternal, or by conquest, or by marriages. Their succession to lands was determined by the pleasure of the master of the family, by gift or deed in his lifetime; and what land they disposed not of in their lifetime, descended after their death to their heirs. The heir was the eldest son. The issue of the eldest son failing, they descended to the younger sons in their order; and, for want of sons, to the daughters jointly as to one heir, or to be divided amongst them, and so to descend to their heirs

in the same manner. And children failing, the uncle by the father's or mother's side, according as the lands had been the father's or the mother's, succeeded to the inheritance, and so continually to the next of blood. And this was a natural descent, because naturally the nearer in blood the nearer in kindness, and was held for the law of nature, not only amongst the Germans, but also in most nations before they had a written law. The right of government, which is called jus regni, descended in the same manner, except only that after the sons it came to the eldest daughter first, and her heirs; the reason whereof was, that government is indivisible. And this law continues still in England.

L.

Seeing all the land, which any sovereign lord possessed, was his own in propriety, how came a subject to have a propriety in their lands?

P.

There be two sorts of propriety. One is, when a man holds his land from the gift of God only, which lands civilians call allodial; which in a kingdom, no man can have but the King. The other is, when a man holds his land from another man, as given him in respect of service and obedience to that man, as a fee. The first kind of propriety is absolute; the other is in a manner conditional, because given for some service to be done unto the giver. The first kind of propriety excludes the right of all others; the second excludes the right of all other subjects to the same land, but not the right of the sovereign, when the common good of the people shall require the use thereof.

L.

When those kings had thus parted with their lands, what was left them for the maintenance of their wars, either offensive or defensive; or for the

maintenance of the royal family in such manner as not only becomes the dignity of a sovereign king, but is also necessary to keep his person and people from contempt?

P.

They have means enough; and besides what they gave their subjects, had much land remaining in their own hands, afforrested for their recreation. For you know very well that a great part of the land of England was given for military service to the great men of the realm, who were for the most part of the King's kindred or great favourites; much more land than they had need of for their own maintenance; but so charged with one or many soldiers, according to the quantity of land given, as there could be no want of soldiers at all times ready to resist an invading enemy: which soldiers those lords were bound to furnish, for a time certain, at their own charges. You know also, that the whole land was divided into hundreds, and those again into decennaries; in which decennaries all men, even to children of twelve years of age, were bound to take the oath of allegiance. And you are to believe, that those men that hold their land by the service of husbandry, were all bound with their bodies and fortunes to defend the kingdom against invaders, by the law of nature. And so also such as they called villains, and as held their land by baser drudgery, were obliged to defend the kingdom to the utmost of their power. Nay, women and children, in such a necessity, are bound to do such service as they can, that is to say, to bring weapons and victuals to them that fight, and to dig. But those that hold their land by service military, have lying upon them a greater obligation. For read and observe the form of doing homage, according as it is set down in the statute of 17 Edw. II, which you doubt not was in use before that time, and before the Conquest.

L.

I become your man for life, for member, and for worldly honour, and shall owe you my faith for the lands that I hold of you.

P.

I pray you expound it.

L.

I think it is as much as if you should say, I promise you to be at your command, to perform with the hazard of my life, limbs, and all my fortune, as I have charged myself in the reception of the lands you have given me, and to be ever faithful to you. This is the form of homage done to the King immediately. But when one subject holdeth land of another by the like military service, then there is an exception added, viz. saving the faith I owe to the King.

P.

Did he not also take an oath?

L.

Yes, which is called the oath of fealty: I shall be to you both faithful, and lawfully shall do such customs and services, as my duty is to you at the terms assigned, so help me God and all his Saints. But both these services, and the services of husbandry, were quickly after turned into rents, payable either in money, as in England, or in corn or other victuals, as in Scotland and France. When the service was military, the tenant was for the most part bound to serve the King in his wars, with one or more persons, according to the yearly value of the land he held.

P.

Were they bound to find horsemen, or footmen?

L.

I do not find any law that requires any man, in respect of his tenancy, to serve on horseback.

P.

Was the tenant bound, in case he were called, to serve in person?

L.

I think he was so in the beginning. For when lands were given for service military, and the tenant dying left his son and heir, the lord had the custody both of body and lands till the heir was twenty-one years old. And the reason thereof was, that the heir, till that age of twenty-one years, was presumed to be unable to serve the King in his wars; which reason had been insufficient, if the heir had not been bound to go to the wars in person. Which, methinks, should ever hold for law, unless by some other law it come to be altered. These services, together with other rights, as wardships, first possession of his tenants' inheritance, licenses for alienation, felons' goods, felons' lands (if they were holden of the King), and the first year's profit of the lands, of whomsoever they were holden, forfeitures, amercements, and many other aids, could not but amount to a very great yearly revenue. Add to this all that which the King might reasonably have imposed upon artificers and tradesmen; for all men, whom the King protecteth, ought to contribute towards their own protection; and consider then whether the Kings of those times had not means enough, and to spare (if God were not their enemy), to defend their people against foreign enemies, and also to compel them to keep the peace amongst themselves.

P.

And so had had the succeeding Kings, if they had never given their rights away, and their subjects always kept their oaths and promises. In

what manner proceeded those ancient Saxons, and other nations of Germany, especially the northern parts, to the making of their laws?

L.

Sir Edward Coke, out of divers Saxon laws, gathered and published in Saxon and Latin by Mr. Lambard, inferreth that the Saxon Kings, for the making of their laws, called together the Lords and Commons, in such manner as is used at this day in England. But by those laws of the Saxons published by Mr. Lambard, it appeareth, that the Kings called together the bishops, and a great part of the wisest and discreetest men of the realm, and made laws by their advice.

P.

I think so. For there is no King in the world, being of ripe years and sound mind, that made any law otherwise. For it concerns them in their own interest to make such laws as the people can endure, and may keep them without impatience, and live in strength and courage to defend their King and country, against their potent neighbours. But how was it discerned, and by whom was it determined, who were those wisest and discreetest men? It is a hard matter to know who is wisest in our times. We know well enough who chooseth a knight of the shire, and what towns are to send burgesses to the Parliament. Therefore if it were determined also in those days, who those wise men should be, then I confess that the Parliaments of the old Saxons, and the Parliaments of England since, are the same thing, and Sir Edward Coke is in the right. Tell me therefore, if you can, when those towns, which now send burgesses to the Parliament, began to do so, and upon what cause one town had this privilege, and another town, though much more populous, had not.

L.

At what time began this custom I cannot tell; but I am sure it is more ancient than the city of Salisbury. Because there come two burgesses to Parliament for a place near to it, called Old Sarum, which, as I rid in sight of it, if I should tell a stranger that knew not what the word burgess meant, he would think it were a couple of rabbits; the place looketh so like a long cony-borough. And yet a good argument may be drawn from thence, that the townsmen of every town were the electors of their own burgesses, and judges of their discretion; and that the law, whether they be discreet or not, will suppose them to be discreet, till the contrary be apparent. Therefore where it is said, that the King called together the more discreet men of his realm; it must be understood of such elections as are now in use. By which it is manifest, that those great and general moots assembled by the old Saxon Kings, were of the same nature with the Parliaments assembled since the Conquest.

P.

I think your reason is good. For I cannot conceive, how the King, or any other but the inhabitants of the boroughs themselves, can take notice of the discretion or sufficiency of those they were to send to the Parliament. And for the antiquity of the burgess-towns, since it is not mentioned in any history or certain record now extant, it is free for any man to propound his conjecture. You know that this land was invaded by the Saxons at several times, and conquered by pieces in several wars; so that there were in England many Kings at once, and every of them had his Parliament. And therefore according as there were more, or fewer walled towns within each King's dominion, his Parliament had the more or fewer burgesses. But when all these lesser kingdoms were joined into one, then to that one Parliament came burgesses from all the boroughs of England. And this perhaps may be the reason, why there be so many more such boroughs in the west, than in any other part of the kingdom; the west being more populous, and also more

obnoxious to invaders, and for that cause having greater store of towns fortified. This I think may be the original of that privilege which some towns have, to send burgesses to the Parliament, and others have not.

L.

The conjecture is not improbable, and for want of greater certainty, may be allowed. But seeing it is commonly received, that for the making of a law, there ought to be had the assent of the Lords spiritual and temporal; whom do you account in the Parliaments of the old Saxons for Lords temporal, and whom for Lords spiritual? For the book called The mode of holding Parliaments, agreeth punctually with the manner of holding them at this day, and was written, as Sir Edward Coke says, in the time of the Saxons, and before the Conquest.

P.

Mr. Selden, a greater antiquary than Sir Edward Coke, in the last edition of his book of Titles of Honour, says, that that book called The mode of holding Parliaments, was not written till about the time of Richard II, and seems to me to prove it. But howsoever that be, it is apparent by the Saxon laws set forth by Mr. Lambard, that there were always called to the Parliament certain great persons called Aldermen, alias Earls. And so you have a House of Lords, and a House of Commons. Also you will find in the same place, that after the Saxons had received the faith of Christ, those bishops that were amongst them, were always at the great moots in which they made their laws. Thus you have a perfect English Parliament, saving that the name of Barons was not amongst them, as being a French title, which came in with the Conqueror.

An Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall, Late Bishop of Derry

1682 TEXT

CONTENTS

TO THE READER.
THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL RELIGION.

AN ANSWER TO A BOOK

Published by D[r]. BRAMHALL, late Bishop of Derry; CALLED The Catching of the Leviathan.

Together With an Historical Narration Concerning HERESIE, And the Punishment thereof.

By THOMAS HOBBES of Malmesbury.

LONDON, Printed for W. Crooke at the Green Dragon without Temple-Barr,

1682.

TO THE READER.

AS IN ALL things which I have written, so also in this Piece, I have endeavoured all I can to be perspicuous; but yet your own attention is always necessary. The late Lord Bishop of Derry published a Book called The Catching of Leviathan, in which he hath put together divers Sentences pickt out of my Leviathan, which stand there plainly and firmly proved, and sets them down without their Proofs, and without the order of their dependance one upon another; and calls them Atheism, Blasphemy, Impiety, Subversion of Religion, and by other names of that kind. My request unto you is, That when he cites my words for Erroneous, you will be pleased to turn to the place it self, and see whether they be well proved, and how to be understood. Which labour his Lordship might have saved you, if he would have vouchsafed, as well to have weighed my Arguments before you, as to have shewed you my Conclusions. His Book containeth two Chapters, the one concerning Religion, the other concerning Politicks. Because he does not so much as offer any refutation of any thing in my Leviathan concluded, I needed not to have answered either of them. Yet to the first I here answer, because the words Atheism, Impiety and the like, are words of the greatest defamation possible. And this I had done sooner, if I had sooner known that such a Book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and yet I never heard of it till about three Months since; so little talk there was of his Lordship's Writings. If you want leasure or care of the questions between us, I pray you condemn me not upon report. To judge and not examine is not just. Farewell.

T. Hobbes.

THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL RELIGION.

J. D.

THE Image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of Man, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and Goodness; which, when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and violent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart, as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, That there was never any Nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole world, which had not their God. They who did never wear cloaths upon their backs, who did never know Magistrate but their Father, yet have their God, and their Religious Rites and Devotions to him. Hence it is, That the greatest Atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly cast their eyes up to Heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are conscious to themselves of any secret Crimes, though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows of a Guilty Conscience, and fear Divine Vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his lucid Intervals. That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with his attributes, where it is manifest in the first place, That existency is to be attributed to him. To which he addeth Infiniteness, Incomprehensibility, Vnity, Vbiquity. Thus for Attributes, next for Actions. Concerning external Actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour, under which are contained Prayers, Thanksgivings, Oblations and Sacrifices.

T. H.

Hitherto his Lordship discharges me of Atheisme. What need he to say that All Nations, how barbarous soever, yet have their Gods and Religious Rites, and Atheists are frighted with thunder, and feel the blind blows of Conscience? It might have been as apt a Preface to any other of his Discourses as this. I expect therefore in the next place to be told that I deny again my afore recited Doctrine.

J. D.

Yet to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with himself, elsewhere reckoning up all the Laws of Nature at large, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth Religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a man were like the Colt of a wild Asse in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus in describing the Laws of Nature, this great Clerk forgeteth the God of Nature, and the main and principle Laws of Nature, which contains a mans duty to his God, and the principal end of his Creation.

T. H.

After I had ended the discourse he mentions of the Laws of Nature, I thought it fittest in the last place once for all, to say they were the Laws of God, then when they were delivered in the Word of God; but before being not known by men for any thing but their own natural reason, they were but Theorems, tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly Laws. Besides, I had formerly in my Book De Cive, ca. proved them severally one by one out of the Scriptures; which his Lordship had read and knew. 'Twas therefore an unjust charge of his to say, I had not one word in them that concerns Religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God; and this upon no other ground then that I added not to every article, This Law is in the Scripture. But why he should call me (ironically) a great Clerk, I cannot tell.

I suppose he would make men believe I arrogated to my self all the learning of a great Clerk, Bishop, or other inferior Minister. A Learned Bishop, is that Bishop that can interpret all parts of Scripture truly, and congruently to the harmony of the whole; that has learnt the History and Laws of the Church, down from the Apostles time to his own; and knows what is the nature of a Law Civil, Divine, Natural, and Positive; and how to govern well the Parochial Ministers of his Diocess, so that they may both by Doctrine and Example keep the people in the belief of all Articles of Faith necessary to Salvation, and in obedience to the Laws of their Country. This is a Learned Bishop. A Learned Minister is he that hath learned the way by which men may be drawn from Avarice, Pride, Sensuality, Prophaness, Rebellious Principles, and all other vices by eloquent and powerful disgracing them, both from Scripture and from Reason; and can terrify men from vice by discreet uttering of the punishments denounced against wicked men, and by deducing rationally the dammage they receive by it in the end. In one word, he is a Learned Minister that can preach such Sermons as St. Chrisostome preached to the Antiochians when he was Presbyter in that City. Could his Lordship find in my Book that I arrogated to my self the eloquence or wisdom of St. Chrisostom, or the ability of governing the Church? 'Tis one thing to know what is to be done, another thing to know how to do it. But his Lordship was pleased to use any artifice to disgrace me in any kind whatsoever.

J. D.

Perhaps he will say that he handleth the Laws of Nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a Common-wealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a trim Common-wealth, which is founded neither upon Religion towards God, nor Justice towards Man; but meerly upon self-interest, and self-preservation. Those raies of heavenly Light, those natural seeds of Religion, which God himself hath imprinted in

the heart of man, are more efficatious towards preservation of a Society; whether we regard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, then all his Pacts, and Surrenders, and Translations of power. He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them Eye-servants, so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey; but is no fit Master to teach men conscience and fidelity.

T. H.

He has not yet found the place where I contradict either the Existence, or Infiniteness, or Incomprehensibility, or Unity, or Ubiquity of God. I am therefore yet absolved of Atheism. But I am, he says, inconsistent and irreconcileable with my self, that is, I am, (though he says not so, he thinks) a forgetful blockhead. I cannot help that: But my forgetfulness appears not here. Even his Lordship where he says, Those raies of heavenly Light, those seeds of Religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man (meaning natural reason) are more efficacious to the preservation of Society, than all the Pacts, Surrenders, and Translating of Power, had forgotten to except the Old Pact of the Jews, and the New Pact of Christians. But pardoning that, did he hope to make any wise man believe, that when this Nation very lately was an Anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason or imprinted Light suggested, did again out of that same Light call in the King, and piece again, and ask pardon for the faults, which that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out of fear of perpetual danger, and hope of preservation.

J. D.

Without Religion, Societies are like but soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as, T. H. himself (though perhaps he will hardly be perswaded to it) that Rome ought more of its grandeur to Religion, than either to strength or stratagems. We have not exceeded the

Spaniards in number, nor the Galls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art, &c. but we have overcome all Nations by our Piety and Religion.

T. H.

Did not his Lordship forget himself here again, in approving this sentence of Tully, which makes the Idolatry of the Romans, not only better than the Idolatry of other Nations; but also better than the Religion of the Jews, whose Law Christ himself says, he came not to destroy but to fulfil? And that the Romans overcame both them and other Nations, by their Piety, when it is manifest that the Romans overran the world by injustice and cruelty, and that their Victories ought not to be ascribed to the Piety of the Romans, but to the impiety as well of the Jews as of other Nations? But what meant he by saying Tully was as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be perswaded to it? Was that any part of the controversie? No: Then it was out of his way. God promiseth to assist good men in their way, but not out of their way. 'Tis therefore the less wonder that his Lordship was in this place deserted of the Light which God imprints in the hearts of rudest Savages.

J. D.

Among his Laws he incerteth gratitude to men as the third precept of the Law of Nature; but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night like Mushroms or Excresences, without all sence of Honour, Justice, Conscience, or Gratitude, he could not have vilified the humane nature more then he doth.

T. H.

My Lord discovers here an ignorance of such method as is necessary for lawful and strict reasoning and explication of the truth in controversie. And

not only that, but also how little able he is to fix his mind upon what he reads in other mens Writings. When I had defined Ingratitude universally, he finds fault that I do not mention Ingratitude towards God, as if his Lordship knew not that an universal comprehends all the particulars. When I had defined Equity universally, why did he not as well blame me for not telling what that Equity is in God? He is grateful to the man of whom he receives a good turn, that confesseth or maketh appear he is pleased with the benefit he receiveth. So also Gratitude towards God is to confess his benefits. There is also in Gratitude towards men a desire to requite their Benefits, so there is in our Gratitude towards God, so far to requite them, as to be kind to Gods Ministers, which I acknowledged in makeing Sacrifices a part of natural Divine Worship; and the benefit of those Sacrifices is the nourishment of Gods Ministers. It appears therefore that the Bishops attention in reading my Writings was either weak in it self, or weakned by prejudice.

J. D.

From this shameful omission or preterition of the main duty of mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his Religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. In these four things, Opinions of Ghosts, Ignorance of second Causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual, for Prognosticks, consisteth the natural seed of Religion; the culture and improvement whereof, he referreth only to Policy. Humane and Divine Politicks, are but Politicks. And again, Mankind hath this from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things. And a little after he telleth us, That Superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and Atheisme from an opinion of reason without fear; making Atheisme to be more reasonable than Superstition.

What is now become of that Divine Worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour of Existence, Infiniteness, Incomprehensibility, Unity, Ubiquity? What is now become of that Dictate or Precept of reason, concerning Prayers, Thanksgivings, Oblations, Sacrifices, if uncertain Opinions, Ignorance, Fear, Mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness, and the admiration of natural Events, be the only seeds of Religion?

He proceedeth further, That Atheisme it self, though it be an erronious opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbred among the sins of imprudence or ignorance. He addeth, that an Atheist is punished not as a Subject is punished by his King, because he did not observe Laws: but as an Enemy, by an Enemy, because he would not accept Laws. His reason is, because the Atheist never submitted his will to the Will of God, whom he never thought to be. And he concludeth that mans obligation to obey God, proceedeth from his weakness. Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandum ipsi (Deo) obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem. First it is impossible that should be a sin of meer ignorance or imprudence, which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The Laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of Man. The Law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent; or rather the Law of Nature is the assent it self. Then if Nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such manner, it is not possible that Atheism should be a sin of meer ignorance.

Secondly, a Rebellious Subject is still a Subject, De Jure, though not, De Facto, by right, though not by deed: and so the most cursed Atheist that is, ought by right to be the Subject of God, and ought to be punished not as a just Enemy, but as a disloyal Traytor. Which is confessed by himself, This fourth Sin, (that is, of those who do not by word and deed confess one God the Supreme King of Kings) in the natural Kingdom of God is the Crime of

High Treason, for it is a denial of Divine Power, or Atheism. Then an Atheist is a Traytor to God, and punishable as a disloyal Subject, not as an Enemy.

Lastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help it, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and preservation to him. Who planteth a Vineyard, and eateth not of the Fruit thereof? And who feedeth a Flock, and eateth not of the Milk of the Flock? And again, Thou art worthy O Lord to receive Glory, and Honour, and Power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created. But it were much better or at least not so ill, to be a down right Atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into the Devils Office, to be the cause of all Sin.

T. H.

Though this Bishop, as I said, had but a weak attention in reading, and little skill in examining the force of an Argument, yet he knew men, and the art, without troubling their judgments to win their assents by exciting their Passions. One Rule of his art was to give his Reader what he would have him swallow, a part by it self, and in the nature of News, whether true or not. Knowing that the unlearned, that is most men, are content to believe, rather than be troubled with examining, Therefore (a little before) he put these words T. H. no friend to Religion, in the Margent. And in this place, before he offer at any confutation, he says my Principles are brim full of Prodigious Impieties. And at the next Paragraph, in the Margent, he puts that I excuse Atheism. This behaviour becomes neither a Bishop, nor a Christian, nor any man that pretends to good education. Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage people, but the fear of somewhat they think a God? What invisible power does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those Phantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we

frequently call Ghosts, and the Savages thought Gods; so that the fear of a God (though not of the true one) to them was the beginning of Religion, as the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews and Christians? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred Devotion and Worship. The ignorance of what that power might do, made them observe the order of what he had done; that they might guess by the like order, what he was to do another time. This was their Prognostication. What Prodigious impiety is here? How confutes he it? Must it be taken for Impiety upon his bare calumny? I said Superstition was fear without reason. Is not the fear of a false God, or fancied Daemon contrary to right reason? And is not Atheism Boldness grounded on false reasoning, such as is this, the wicked prosper, therefore there is no God? He offers no proof against any of this; but says only I make Atheism to be more reasonable than Superstition; which is not true: For I deny that there is any reason either in the Atheist or in the Superstitious. And because the Atheist thinks he has reason, where he has none, I think him the more irrational of the two. But all this while he argues not against any of this; but enquires only, what is become of my natural Worship of God, and of his Existency, Infiniteness, Incomprehensibility, Unity, and Ubiquity. As if whatsoever reason can suggest, must be suggested all at once. First, all men by nature had an opinion of Gods Existency, but of his other Attributes not so soon, but by reasoning, and by degrees. And for the Attributes of the true God, they were never suggested but by the Word of God written. In that I say Atheism is a sin of ignorance, he says I excuse it. The Prophet David says, The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Is it not then a sin of folly? 'Tis agreed between us, that right reason dictates, There is a God. Does it not follow, that denying of God is a sin proceeding from misreasoning. If it be not a sin of ignorance, it must be a sin of malice. Can a man malice that which he thinks has no

being? But may not one think there is a God, and yet maliciously deny him? If he think there is a God, he is no Atheist; and so the question is changed into this, whether any man that thinks there is a God, dares deliberately deny it? For my part I think not. For upon what confidence dares any man (deliberately I say) oppose the Omnipotent? David saith of himself, My feet were ready to slip when I saw the prosperity of the wicked. Therefore it is likely the feet of men less holy slip oftner. But I think no man living is so daring, being out of passion, as to hold it as his opinion. Those wicked men that for a long time proceeded so succesfully in the late horrid Rebellion, may perhaps make some think they were constant and resolved Atheists, but I think rather that they forgot God, than believed there was none. He that believes there is such an Atheist, comes a little too near that opinion himself, Nevertheless, if words spoken in passion signifie a denial of a God, no punishment praeordained by Law, can be too great for such an insolence; because there is no living in a Common-wealth with men, to whose oaths we cannot reasonably give credit. As to that I say, An Atheist is punished by God not as a Subject by his King, but as an Enemy, and to my argument for it, namely, because he never acknowledged himself Gods Subject, He opposeth, That if nature dictate that there is a God, and to be worshiped in such and such manner, then Atheism is not a sin of meer ignorance; as if either I or he did hold that Nature dictates the manner of Gods Worship, or any article of our Creed, or whether to worship with or without a Surplice. Secondly, he answers that a Rebel is still a Subject de Jure, though not de Facto: And ’tis granted. But though the King lose none of his right by the Traytors act, yet the Traytor loseth the priviledg of being punisht by a praecedent Law; and therefore may be punish’d at the Kings will, as Ravillac was for murdering Henry the 4th. of France. An open Enemy and a perfidious Traytor are both enemies. Had not his Lordship read in the Roman story how Perseus and other just enemies of that State were wont to

be punished? But what is this trifling question to my excusing of Atheism? In the seventh Paragraph of my Book de Cive he found the words (in Latin) which he here citeth. And to the same sense I have said in my Leviathan, That the right of nature whereby God raigneth over men, is to be derived not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude; but from his irresistable Power. This he says is absurd and dishonourable. Whereas first all power is honourable, and greatest power is most honourable. Is it not a more noble tenure for a King to hold his Kingdom, and the right to punish those that transgress his Laws from his Power, than from the gratitude or gift of the Transgressor. There is nothing therefore here of dishonour to God Almighty. But see the subtility of his disputing. He saw he could not catch Leviathan in this place, he looks for him in my Book de Cive, which is Latine, to try what he could fish out of that. And says I make our obedience to God, depend upon our weakness, as if these words signified the Dependence, and not the necessity of our submission, or that incumbere and dependere were all one.

J. D.

For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any rational men. Our God is every where, and seeing he hath no parts, he must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where. So Nature it self dictateth. It cannot be said honourably of God that he is in a place; for nothing is in a place, but that which hath proper bounds of its greatness. But T. H. his God is not wholly every where. No man can conceive that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time, for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense. So far well, if by conceiving he mean comprehending; but then follows, That these are absurd Speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived Philosophers, and deceived or deceiving School-men. Thus he denieth the Ubiquity of

God. A Circumscriptive, a Definitive, and a Repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.

T. H.

Though I believe the Omnipotence of God, and that he can do what he will, yet I dare not say how every thing is done, because I cannot conceive nor comprehend either the Divine substance, or the way of its operation. And I think it Impiety to speak concerning God any thing of my own head, or upon the Authority of Philosophers or School-men, which I understand not, without warrant in the Scripture: And what I say of Omnipotence, I say also of Ubiquity. But his Lordship is more valiant in this place, telling us that God is wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where; because he has no parts. I cannot comprehend nor conceive this. For methinks it implies also that the whole World is also in the whole God, and in every part of God, nor can I conceive how any thing can be called Whole, which has no parts, nor can I find any thing of this in the Scripture. If I could find it there, I could believe it; and if I could find it in the publick Doctrine of the Church, I could easily abstain from contradicting it. The School-men say also that the Soul of Man (meaning his upper Soul, which they call the rational Soul) is also wholly in the whole man, and wholly in every part of the man. What is this but to make the humane Soul the same thing in respect of mans Body, that God is in respect of the World? These his Lordship calls here rational men, and some of them which applaud this Doctrine, would have the High Court of Parliament corroborate such Doctrines with a Law. I said in my Leviathan, that it is no honourable attribute to God, to say he is in a place, because, infinite is not confined within a place. To which he replies, T. H. his God is not wholly every where. I confess the consequence. For I understand in English, he that says any thing to be all here, means that neither all nor any of the same thing is else where. He says further, I take a Circumscriptive, a Definitive, and a

Repletive being in a place to be Heathen Language. Truly, if this Dispute were at the Bar, I should go near to crave the assistance of the Court, lest some trick might be put upon me in such obscurity. For though I know what these Latin words singly signifie, yet I understand not how any thing is in a Place Definitively and not Circumscriptively. For Definitively comes from definio which is to set bounds. And therefore to be in a Place Definitively, is when the bounds of the place are every way marked out. But to be in a place Circumscriptively, is when the bounds of the place are described round about. To be in a Place Repletive, is to fill a place. Who does not see that this dictinction is Canting and Fraud? If any man will call it Pious Fraud, he is to prove the Piety as clearly as I have here explained the Fraud. Besides, no Fraud can be Pious in any man, but him that hath a lawful Right to govern him whom he beguileth; whom the Bishop pretends to govern, I cannot tell. Besides his Lordship ought to have considered that every Bishop is one of the Great Councel, trusted by the King to give their advice with the Lords Temporal, for the making of good Laws, Civil and Ecclesiastical, and not to offer them such obscure Doctrines, as if, because they are not versed in School-divinity, therefore they had no Learning at all, nor understood the English Tongue. Why did the Divines of England contend so much heretofore to have the Bible translated into English, if they never meant any but themselves should read it? If a Lay-man be publickly encouraged to search the Scriptures for his own Salvation, what has a Divine to do to impose upon him any strange interpretation, unless if he make him err to Damnation, he will be damned in his stead?

J. D.

Our God is immutable without any shadow of turning by change, to whom all things are present, nothing past, nothing to come. But T. H. his God is measured by time, losing somthing that is past, and acquiring somthing that doth come every minute. That is as much as to say, That our God is infinite,

and his God is finite, for unto that which is actually infinite, nothing can be added neither time nor parts. Hear himself, Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the divine perfection, to attribute to it Potentiality, that is in English, Power (so little doth he understand what Potentiality is) and successive duration. And he chargeth it upon us as a fault; that will not have eternity to be an endless succession of time. How, successive duration, and an endless succession of time in God? Then God is infinite, then God is elder to day than he was yesterday. Away with Blasphemies. Before he destroyed the Ubiquity of God, and now he destroyeth his Eternity.

T. H.

I shall omit both here and henceforth his preambulatory, impertinent, and uncivil calumnies. The thing he pretends to prove is this. That it is a derogation to the Divine Power to attribute to it Potentiality (that is in English Power) and Successive Duration. One of his reasons is, God is infinite, and nothing can be added to infinite, neither of time nor of parts: It is true. And therefore I said, God is infinite and eternal, without beginning or end, either of Time or Place; which he has not here confuted, but confirmed. He denies Potentiality and Power to be all one, and says I little understand what Potentiality is. He ought therefore in this place to have defined what Potenality is: For I understand it to be the same with Potentia, which is in English Power. There is no such word as Potentiality in the Scriptures, nor in any Author of the Latin Tongue. It is found only in School-Divinity, as a word of Art, or rather as a word of Craft, to amaze and puzzle the Laity. And therefore I no sooner read than intepreted it. In the next place he says, as wondring, How an endless succession of time in God! Why not? Gods mercy endureth for ever, and surely God endureth as long as his mercy, therefore there is duration in God, and consequently endless succession of time. God who in sundry times and divers manners spake in time past, &c. But in a former dispute with me about Free-will, he hath

defined Eternity to be Nunc stans, that is an ever standing now, or everlasting instant. This he thinks himself bound in honour to defend. What reasonable soul can digest this? We read in Scripture, that a thousand years with God, is but as yesterday. And why? but because he sees as clearly to the end of a thousand years, as to the end of a day. But his Lordship affirms, That both a thousand years and a day are but one instant, the same standing Now, or Eternity. If he had shewed an holy Text for this Doctrine, or any Text of the Book of Common Prayer (in the Scripture and Book of Common Prayer is contained all our Religion) I had yielded to him, but School-Divinity I value little or nothing at all. Though in this he contradict also the School-men, who say the Soul is eternal only à parte post, but God is eternal both à parte post, and à parte ante. Thus there are parts in eternity, and eternity being, as his Lordship says, the divine substance, the divine substance has parts, and Nunc stans has parts. Is not this darkness? I take it to be the Kingdom of Darkness, and the teachers of it, especially of this Doctrine. That God who is not only Optimus, but also Maximus is no greater than to be wholly contained in the least Atome of earth, or other body, and that his whole duration is but an instant of time, to be either grosly ignorant or ungodly Deceivers.

J. D.

Our God is a perfect, pure, simple indivisible, infinite Essence; free from all composition of matter and form, of substance and accidents. All matter is finite, and he who acteth by his infinite Essence, needeth neither Organs, nor Faculties (id est, no power, note that) nor accidents, to render him more compleat. But T. H. his God is a divisible God, a compounded God, that hath matter, or qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I argue thus, The divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the divine substance. The Major is evident, because God is Actus simplicissimus; the Minor is confessed by all men, that whatsoever is attributed to God, is God. Now listen to his answer,

The Major is so far from being evident, that Actus simplicissimus signifieth nothing. The Minor is said by some men, thought by no man, whatsoever is thought is understood. The Major was this, The divine substance is indivisible. Is this far from being evident? Either it is indivisible or divisible. If it be not indivisible, then it is divisible, then it is materiate, then it is corporeal, then it hath parts, then it is finite by his own confession. Habere partes, aut esse totum aliquid, sunt attributa finitorum. Upon this silly conceit he chargeth me for saying, That God is not just, but justice it self; not eternal, but eternity it self; which he calleth unseemly words to be said of God. And he thinketh he doth me a great courtesie in not adding Blasphemous and Atheistical. But his Bolts are so soon shot, and his Reasons are such vain Imaginations, and such drowsie Phantasies, that no sad man doth much regard them. Thus he hath already destroyed the Ubiquity, the Eternity, and the Simplicity of God. I wish he had considered better with himself, before he had desperately cast himself upon these Rocks.

But paulo majora canamus, my next charge is, That he destroys the very being of God, and leaves nothing in his place, but an empty name. For by taking away all incorporeal substances, he taketh away God himself. The very name (saith he) of an incorporeal substance, is a Contradiction. And to say that an Angel or Spirit, is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect, that there is no Angel or Spirit at all. By the same reason to say, That God is an incorporeal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either God is incorporeal, or he is finite, and consists of parts, and consequently is no God. This, That there is no incorporeal spirit, is that main root of Atheism, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up.

T. H.

God is indeed a Perfect, Pure, Simple, Infinite Substance; and his Name incommunicable, that is to say, not divisible into this and that individual God, in such manner as the name of Man is divisible into Peter and John. And therefore God is individual; which word amongst the Greeks is expressed by the word Indivisible. Certain Hereticks in the primitive Church, because special and individual are called Particulars, maintained that Christ was a particular God, differing in number from God the Father. And this was the Doctrine that was condemned for Heresy in the first Councel of Nice, by these words, God hath no parts. And yet many of the Latin Fathers in their explications of the Nicene Creed, have expounded the word Consubstantial, by the community of nature, which different Species have in their Genus, and different individuals in the Species, as if Peter and John were Consubstantial, because they agree in one humane nature; which is contrary (I confess) to the meaning of the Nice Fathers. But that in a substance infinitely great, it should be impossible to consider any thing as not infinite. I do not see it there condemned. For certainly he that thinks God is in every part of the Church, does not exclude him out of the Church-yard. And is not this a considering of him by parts? For dividing a thing which we cannot reach nor separate one part thereof from another, is nothing else but considering of the same by parts. So much concerning Indivisibility from Natural Reason; for I will wade no farther, but relie upon the Scriptures. God is no where said in the Scriptures to be indivisible, unless his Lordship meant division, to consist only in separation of parts, which I think he did not. St. Paul indeed saith, 1 Cor. 1.13. Is Christ divided? Not that the followers of Paul, Apollo, and Cephas, followed some one part, some another of Christ; but that thinking differently of his nature, they made as it were different kinds of him. Secondly, his Lordship expounds Simplicity, by not being compounded of Matter and Form, or of Substance and Accidents, Unlearnedly. For nothing can be so compounded.

The matter of a Chair is Wood, the form is the figure it hath apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the Chair compounded of the Wood and the Figure? A man is Rational, does it therefore follow that Reason is a part of the man? It was Aristotle deceived him, who had told him that a Rational living Creature, is the definition of a man, and that the definition of a man was his Essence; and therefore the Bishop and other School-men, from this that the word Rational is a part of these words Man is a Rational living Creature, concluded that the Essence of man, was a part of the man, and a Rational man, the same thing with a Rational Soul. I should wonder how any man, much more a Doctor of Divinity, should be so grosly deceived, but that I know naturally the generality of men speak the words of their Masters by rote, without having any Idea of the things, which the words signifie. Lastly, he calls God an Essence. If he mean by Essence the same with Ens, (...) I approve it. Otherwise, what is Essence? There is no such word in the Old Testament. The Hebrew Language, which has no word answerable to the copulative est, will not bear it. The New Testament hath ..., but never for Essence, nor for Substance, but only for Riches. I come now to his Argument in Mood and Figure, which is this, The Divine Substance is indivisible. That's the Major. Eternity is the Divine Substance. That's the Minor. Ergo, the Divine Substance is indivisible. The Major, he says, is evident, because God is Actus simplicissimus. The Minor is confessed, he thinks, by all men, because whatsoever is attributed to God, is God. To this I answered, that the Major was so far from being evident, that Actus Simplicissimus signifieth nothing, and that the Minor was understood by no man. First, what is Actus in the Major? does any man understand Actus for a Substance, that is, for a thing subsisting by it self? Is not Actus in English, either an Act, or an Action, or nothing? or is any of these Substances? If it be evident, why did he not explain Actus by a definition? And as to the Minor, though all men in the world understand that the

Eternal is God, yet no man can understand that the Eternity is God. Perhaps he and the School-men mean by Actus, the same that they do by Essentia. What is the Essence of a man, but his Humanity? or of God, but his Deity; of Great, but Greatness; and so of all other denominating Attributes? And the words God and Deity, are of different signification. Damascene a Father of the Church expounding the Nicene Creed denies plainly that the Deity was incarnate, but all true Christians hold that God was incarnate. Therefore God and the Deity, signifie divers things; and therefore Eternal and Eternity are not the same, no more than a wise man and his wisdom are the same. Nor God and his justice the same thing, and universally 'tis false, that the Attribute in the Abstract is the same with the Substance, to which it is attributed. Also it is universally true of God, that the Attribute in the Concrete, and the substance to which it is attributed, is not the same thing. I come now to his next Period or Paragraph, wherein he would fain prove, that by denying Incorporeal Substance, I take away Gods Existence. The words he cites here are mine; To say an Angel or Spirit is an Incorporeal Substance, is to say in effect there is no Angel nor Spirit at all. It is true also, that to say that God is an Incorporeal Substance, is to say in effect there is no God at all. What alledges he against it, but the School-Divinity which I have already answered? Scripture he can bring none, because the word Incorporeal is not found in Scripture. But the Bishop trusting to his Aristotelean and Scholastick Learning hath hitherto made no use of Scripture, save only of these Texts, Who hath planted a Vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof; or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock, and Rev. 4.11. Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, honour, and power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they were created; thereby to prove that the right of God to govern and punish mankind is not derived from his Omnipotence. Let us now see how he proves Incorporeity by his own Reason without Scripture. Either God (he

saith) is Incorporeal or Finite. He knows I deny both, and say he is Corporeal and Infinite, against which he offers no proof, but only (according to his custom of disputing) calls it the root of Atheism; and interrogates me, what real thing is left in the world, if God be Incorporeal, but Body and Accidents? I say there is nothing left but Corporeal Substance. For I have denyed (as he knew) that there is any reality in accidents; and nevertheless maintain Gods Existence, and that he is a most pure, and most simple Corporeal Spirit. Here his Lordship catching nothing, removes to the eternity of the Trinity, which these my grounds (he says) destroy. How so? I say the Trinity, and the Persons thereof are that one pure, simple, and eternal Corporeal Spirit; and why does this destroy the Trinity, more than if I had called it Incorporeal? He labours here and seeketh somewhat to refresh himself in the word Person, by the same grounds (he saith) every King has as many Persons as there be Justices of Peace in his Kingdom, and God Almighty hath as many Persons as there be Kings, why not? For I never said that all those Kings were that God; and yet God giveth that name to the Kings of the earth. For the signification of the word Person, I shall expound it by and by in another place. Here ends his Lordships School Argument; now let me come with my Scripture Argument. St. Paul concerning Christ, (Col. 2.9.) saith thus, In him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead Bodily. This place Athanasius a great and zealous Doctor in the Nicene Councel, and vehement enemy of Arius the Heretick, who allowed Christ to be no otherwise God, then as men of excellent piety were so called, expoundeth thus. The fullness of the Godhead dwelleth in him Bodily (Greek ...) id est ..., id est, Realiter. So there is one Father for Corporality, and that God was in Christ in such manner as Body is in Body. Again, there were in the primitive Church a sort of Hereticks who maintained that Jesus Christ had not a true real Body, but was onely a Phantasm or Spright, such as the Latins called Spectra. Against the head of

this Sect (whose name I think was Apelles) Tertullian wrote a Book, now extant amongst his other Works, intituled De Carne Christi, wherein after he had spoken of the nature of Phantasms, and shewed that they had nothing of reality in them, he concludeth with these words, whatsoever is not Body, is Nothing. So here is on my side a plain Text of Scripture, and two ancient and learned Fathers, nor was this Doctrine of Tertullian condemned in the Council of Nice; but the division of the Divine Substance into God the Father, God the Son, and God the holy Ghost. For these words, God has no parts, were added, for explication of the word Consubstantial, at the request of the dissenting Fathers, and are farther explained both in Athanasius his Creed, in these words, not three Gods but one God, and by the constant Attribute ever since of the Individual Trinity. The same words nevertheless do condemn the Anthropomorphites also: For though there appeared no Christians that professed that God had an Organical Body, and consequently that the Persons were three Individuals, yet the Gentiles were all Anthropomorphites and there condemned by those words, God has no parts.

And thus I have answered his accusation concerning the Eternity and Existence of the Divine Substance, and made appear that in truth, the question between us, is whether God be a Phantasme (id est, an Idol of the Fancy, which St. Paul saith is nothing) or a Corporeal Spirit, that is to say, something that has Magnitude.

In this place I think it not amiss, leaving for a little while this Theological dispute, to examine the signification of those words which have occasioned so much diversity of opinion in this kind of Doctrine.

The word Substance, in Greek Hypostasis, Hypostan, Hypostamenon signifie the same thing, namely, a Ground, a Base, any thing that has Existence or Subsistence in it self, any thing that upholdeth that which else would fall, in which sence God is properly the Hypostasis, Base, and Substance that upholdeth all the world, having Subsistence not only in

himself, but from himself; whereas other Substances have their subsistence only in themselves, not from themselves. But Metaphorically, Faith is called a Substance, Heb. 11.1. because it is the foundation or Base of our Hope; for Faith failing our Hope falls. And 2 Cor. 9.4. St. Paul having boasted of the liberal promise of the Corinthians towards the Macedonians, calls that promise the ground, the Hypostasis of that his boasting. And Heb. 1.3. Christ is called the Image of the Substance (the Hypostasis) of his Father, and for the proper and adequate signification of the word Hypostasis, the Greek Fathers did always oppose it to Apparition or Phantasme; as when a man seeth his face in the water, his real face is called the Hypostasis of the phantastick face in the water. So also in speaking, the thing understood or named, is called Hypostasis, in respect of the name, so also a Body coloured is the Hypostasis, Substance and Subject of the colour; and in like manner of all its other Accidents. Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the Art of Logick, and signifies only the manner how we consider the Substance it self. And of this I have spoken sufficiently in Pag. 371.372. of my Leviathan. Body [Lat.] Corpus [Grae.]..., is that Substance which hath Magnitude indeterminate, and is the same with Corporeal Substance; but A Body is that which hath Magnitude determinate, and consequently is understood to be totum or integrum aliquid. Pure and Simple Body, is Body of one and the same kind, in every part throughout, and if mingled with Body of another kind, though the total be compounded or mixt, the parts nevertheless retain their simplicity, as when water and wine are mixt, the parts of both kinds retain their simplicity. For water and wine cannot both be in one and the same place at once.

Matter is the same with Body; But never without respect to a Body which is made thereof. Form is the aggregate of all Accidents together, for which, we give the Matter a new name; so Albedo, whiteness is the Form of

Album, or white Body. So also Humanity is the Essence of man, and Deity the Essence of Deus.

Spirit is Thin, Fluid, Transparent, Invisible Body. The word in Latin signifies Breath, Aire, Wind and the like. In Greek ... from ..., Spiro, Flo.

I have seen, and so have many more two waters, one of the River, the other a Mineral Water, so like, that no man could discern the one from the other by his sight; yet when they have been both put together, the whole substance could not by the eye be distinguished from milk. Yet we know that the one was not mixt with the other, so as every part of the one to be in every part of the other, for that is impossible, unless two Bodies can be in the the same place. How then could the change be made in every part, but only by the Activity of the Mineral water, changing it every where to the Sense, and yet not being every where and in every part of the water? If then such gross Bodies have so great Activity, what shall we think of Spirits, whose kinds be as many as there be kinds of Liquor, and Activity greater? Can it then be doubted, but that God, who is an infinitely fine Spirit and withall intelligent, can make and change all species and kinds of Body as he pleaseth; but I dare not say, that this is the way by which God Almighty worketh, because it is past my apprehension, yet it serves very well to demonstrate, that the Omnipotence of God implieth no contradiction; and is better than by pretence of magnifying the fineness of the divine Substance, to reduce it to a Spright or Phantasm, which is Nothing.

A Person, [Lat.] Persona, signifies an intelligent Substance, that acteth any thing in his own or anothers Name, or by his own or anothers Authority. Of this Definition there can be no other proof than from the use of that word, in such Latin Authors as were esteem'd the most skilful in their own Language, of which number was Cicero. But Cicero, in an Epistle to Atticus, saith thus, Vnus sustineo tres Personas, Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis: That is, I that am but one man, sustain three Persons; mine own Person, the

Person of my Adversary, and the Person of the Judge. Cicero was here the Substance intelligent, one man; and because he pleaded for himself, he calls himself, his own Person; and again, because he pleaded for his Adversary, he says, he sustained the Person of his Adversary; and lastly, because he himself gave the Sentence, he says, he sustained the Person of the Judge. In the same sence we use the word in English vulgarly, calling him that acteth by his own Authority, his own Person, and him that acteth by the Authority of another, the Person of that other. And thus we have the exact meaning of the word Person. The Greek Tongue cannot render it; for ... is properly a Face, and Metaphorically, a Vizard of an Actor upon the Stage. How then did the Greek Fathers render the word Person, as it is in the blessed Trinity? Not well. Instead of the word Person they put Hypostasis, which signifies Substance, from whence it might be inferr'd, that the three Persons in the Trinity are three divine Substances, that is, three Gods. The word ..., they could not use, because Face and Vizard are neither of them honourable Attributes of God, nor explicative of the meaning of the Greek Church. Therefore the Latin (and consequently the English) Church renders Hypostasis every where in Athanasius his Creed by Person. But the word Hypostatical Vnion is rightly retained and used by Divines, as being the Union of two Hypostases, that is, of two Substances or Natures in the Person of Christ. But seeing they also hold the Soul of our Saviour to be a Substance, which though separated from his Body, subsisted nevertheless in it self, and consequently before it was separated from his Body upon the Cross, was a distinct Nature from his Body, how will they avoid this Objection, That then Christ had three Natures, three Hypostases, without granting, that his Resurrection was a new vivification, and not a return of his Soul out of Heaven into the Grave? The contrary is not determined by the Church. Thus far in explication of the words that occur in this Controversie. Now I return again to his Lordship's Discourse.

J. D.

When they have taken away all incorporeal Spirits, what do they leave God himself to be? He who is the Fountain of all Being, from whom and in whom all Creatures have their Being, must needs have a real Being of his own. And what real Being can God have among Bodies and Accidents? for they have left nothing else in the Universe. Then T. H. may move the same Question of God, which he did of Devils. I would gladly know in what Classis of Entities, the Bishop ranketh God? Infinite Being and participated Being are not of the same nature. Yet to speak according to humane apprehension, (apprehension and comprehension differ much: T. H. confesseth that natural Reason doth dictate to us, that God is Infinite, yet natural Reason cannot comprehend the Infiniteness of God) I place him among incorporeal Substances or Spirits, because he hath been pleased to place himself in that rank, God is a Spirit. Of which place T. H. giveth his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the same nature, and fall not under humane understanding.

They who deny all incorporeal Substances, can understand nothing by God, but either Nature, (not Naturam naturantem, that is, a real Author of Nature, but Naturam naturatam, that is, the orderly concourse of natural Causes, as T. H. seemeth to intimate) or a fiction of the Brain, without real Being, cherished for advantage and politick Ends, as a profitable Error, howsoever dignified with the glorious title of the eternal Cause of all things.

T. H.

To his Lordship's Question here, What I leave God to be, I answer, I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible Spirit Corporeal. By Corporeal I mean a Substance that has Magnitude, and so mean all learned men, Divines and others, though perhaps there be some common people so rude as to call nothing Body, but what they can see and feel. To his second

Question, What real Being he can have amongst Bodies and Accidents, I answer, The Being of a Spirit, not of a Spright. If I should ask any the most subtil Distinguisher, what middle nature there were between an infinitely subtil Substance, and a meer Thought or Phantasm, by what Name could he call it? He might call it perhaps an Incorporeal Substance, and so Incorporeal shall pass for a middle nature between Infinitely subtil and Nothing, and be less subtil than Infinitely subtil, and yet more subtil than a thought. 'Tis granted (he says) that the Nature of God is incomprehensible. Doth it therefore follow, that we may give to the divine Substance what negative Name we please? Because he says, the whole divine Substance is here and there and every where throughout the World, and that the Soul of a man is here and there and every where throughout man's Body, must we therefore take it for a Mystery of Christian Religion, upon his or any Schoolman's word, without the Scripture, which calls nothing a Mystery but the Incarnation of the eternal God? Or is Incorporeal a Mystery, when not at all mentioned in the Bible, but to the contrary 'tis written, That the fulness of the Deity was bodily in Christ? When the nature of the thing is incomprehensible, I can acquiesce in the Scripture, but when the signification of words are incomprehensible, I cannot acquiesce in the Authority of a Schoolman.

J. D.

We have seen what his Principles are concerning the Deity, they are full as bad or worse concerning the Trinity. Hear himself. A person is he that is represented as often as he is represented. And therefore God who has been represented, that is, personated thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons, though neither the word Person nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. And a little after, To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the same, was the Person represented

by Moses, the Person represented by his Son incarnate, and the Person represented by the Apostles. As represented by the Apostles, the holy Spirit by which they spake is God. As represented by his Son that was God and Man, the Son is that God. As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is that God. From whence we may gather the reason why those Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament. For they are Persons, that is, they have their Names from representing, which could not be, till divers Persons had represented God, in ruling or in directing under him.

Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The Emblem of a little Boy attempting to lade all the Water out of the Sea with a Cockle-shell, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who thinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable Mysteries of Religion, by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become of the great adorable Mystery of the blessed undivided Trinity? It is shrunk into nothing? Upon his grounds there was a time when there was no Trinity. And we must blot these words out of our Creed, The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal. And these other words out of our Bibles, Let us make man after our Image. Unless we mean that this was a consultation of God with Moses and the Apostles. What is now become of the eternal generation of the Son of God, if this Sonship did not begin until about 4000 years after the Creation were expired? Upon these grounds every King hath as many Persons, as there be Justices of Peace, and petty Constables in his Kingdom. Upon this account God Almighty hath as many Persons, as there have been Soveraign Princes in the World since Adam. According to this reckoning each one of us like so many Geryons, may have as many Persons as we please to make Procurations. Such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation.

T. H.

As for the words recited, I confess there is a fault in the Ratiocination, which nevertheless his Lordship hath not discovered, but no Impiety. All that he objecteth is, That it followeth hereupon, that there be as many Persons of a King, as there be petty Constables in his Kingdom. And so there are, or else he cannot be obeyed. But I never said that a King, and every one of his Persons are the same Substance. The fault I here made, and saw not was this; I was to prove, That it is no contradiction (as Lucian, and Heathen Scoffers would have it) to say of God, he was One and Three. I saw the true definition of the word Person would serve my turn in this manner; God in his own Person both created the World, and instituted a Church in Israel, using therein the Ministry of Moses; the same God in the Person of his Son God and Man redeemed the same World, and the same Church; the same God in the Person of the Holy Ghost sanctified the same Church, and all the faithful men in the World. Is not this a clear proof, that it is no contradiction to say that God is three Persons and one Substance? And doth not the Church distinguish the Persons in the same manner? See the words of our Catechism. Quest. What dost thou chiefly learn in these Articles of thy Belief? Answ. First, I learn to believe in God the Father, that hath made me and all the World; Secondly, In God the Son, who hath redeemed me and all Mankind; Thirdly, In God the Holy Ghost, that hath sanctified me and all the elect people of God But at what time was the Church sanctified? Was it not on the day of Pentecost, in the descending of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles? His Lordship all this while hath catched nothing. 'Tis I that catched my self, for saying, (instead of, By the Ministry of Moses) in the Person of Moses. But this Error I no sooner saw, then I no less publickly corrected then I had committed it, in my Leviathan converted into Latin, which by this time I think is printed beyond the Seas with this alteration, and also with the omission of some such passages as Strangers

are not concerned in. And I had corrected this Error sooner, if I had sooner found it. For though I was told by Dr. Cosins, now Bishop of Duresme, that the place above-cited was not applicable enough to the Doctrine of the Trinity, yet I could not in reviewing the same espy the defect till of late, when being sollicited from beyond Sea to translate the Book into Latin, and fearing some other man might do it not to my liking, I examined this passage and others of the like sence more narrowly. But how concludes his Lordship out of this, that I put out of the Creed these words, The Father eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Ghost eternal? Or these words, Let us make man after our Image, out of the Bible. Which last words neither I nor Bellarmine put out of the Bible, but we both put them out of the number of good Arguments to prove the Trinity; for it is no unusual thing in the Hebrew, as may be seen by Bellarmine's quotations, to joyn a Noun of the plural Number with a Verb of the singular. And we may say also of many other Texts of Scripture alledged to prove the Trinity, that they are not so firm as that high Article requireth. But mark his Lordship's Scholastick charity in the last words of this period, Such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation. This Bishop, and others of his opinion had been in their Element, if they had been Bishops in Queen Maries time.

J. D.

Concerning God the Son, forgetting what he had said elsewhere, where he calleth him God and Man, and the Son of God incarnate, he doubteth not to say, that the word Hypostatical is canting. As if the same Person could be both God and Man without a Personal, that is, an Hypostatical Union of the two Natures of God and Man.

T. H.

If Christian Profession be (as certainly it is in England) a Law, and if it be of the nature of a Law to be made known to all men that are to obey it, in

such manner as they may have no excuse for disobedience from their ignorance, then without doubt all words unknown to the people, and as to them insignificant, are Canting. The word Substance is understood by the Vulgar well enough, when it is said of a Body, but in other sence not at all, except for their Riches. But the word Hypostatical is understood only by those, and but few of those that are learned in the Greek Tongue, and is properly used, as I have said before, of the Union of the two Natures of Christ in one Person. So likewise Consubstantial in the Nicene Creed, is properly said of the Trinity. But to an English man that understands neither Greek nor Latin, and yet is as much concerned as his Lordship was, the word Hypostatical is no less Canting than Eternal now.

J. D.

He alloweth every man who is commanded by his lawful Soveraign, to deny Christ with his tongue before men.

T. H.

I allow it in some Cases, and to some men, which his Lordship knew well enough, but would not mention. I alledged for it, in the place cited, both Reason and Scripture, though his Lordship thought it not expedient to take notice of either. If it be true that I have said, why does he blame it? If false, why offers he no Argument against it, neither from Scripture nor from Reason? Or why does he not show that the Text I cite is not applicable to the Question, or not well interpreted by me. First, He barely cites it, because he thought the words would sound harshly, and make a Reader admire them for Impiety. But I hope I shall so well instruct my Reader ere I leave this place, that this his petty Art will have no effect. Secondly, The Cause why he omitted my Arguments was, That he could not answer them. Lastly, The Cause why he urgeth neither Scripture nor Reason against it was, That he saw none sufficient. My Argument from Scripture was this, (Leviathan,

pag. 271.) taken out of 2 Kings 5.17. where Naaman the Syrian saith to Elisha the Prophet, Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt-offering nor sacrifice to other Gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my self in the house of Rimmon: when I bow my self in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing, and he said unto him, Go in peace. What can be said to this? Did not Elisha say it from God? Or is not this Answer of the Prophet a permission? When St. Paul and St. Peter commanded the Christians of their time to obey their Princes, which then were Heathens and Enemies of Christ, did they mean they should lose their Lives for disobedience? Did they not rather mean they should preserve both their Lives and their Faith, (believing in Christ as they did) by this denial of the tongue, having no command to the contrary? If in this Kingdom a Mahometan should be made by terror to deny Mahomet and go to Church with us, would any man condemn this Mahometan? A denyal with the mouth may perhaps be prejudicial to the power of the Church, but to retain the Faith of Christ stedfastly in his Heart, cannot be prejudicial to his Soul that hath undertaken no charge to Preach to Wolves, whom they know will destroy them. About the time of the Council of Nice, there was a Canon made (which is extant in the History of the Nicene Council) concerning those that being Christians had been seduced, not terrified, to a denyal of Christ, and again repenting, desired to be readmitted into the Church; in which Canon it was ordain'd that those men should be no otherwise readmitted than to be in the number of the Catechised, and not to be admitted to the Communion till a great many years penitence. Surely the Church then would have been more merciful to them that did the same upon terror of present death and torments.

Let us now see what his Lordship might, though but colourably, have alledged from Scripture against it. There be three Places only that seem to favour his Lordship's opinion. The first is where Peter denyed Christ, and Weepeth. The second is, Acts 5.29. Then Peter and the other Apostles answered and said, we ought to obey God rather than men. The third is, Luke 12.9. But he that denyeth me, shall be denyed before the Angels of God.

T. H.

For answer to these Texts, I must repeat what I have written, and his Lordship read in my Leviathan, pag. 362. For an unlearned man that is in the power of an Idolatrous King, or State, if commanded on pain of Death to worship before an Idol, doing it, he detesteth the Idol in his Heart, he doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer Death, rather than worship it, he should do better. But if a Pastor, who as Christ's Messenger has undertaken to teach Christ's Doctrine to all Nations should do the same, it were not only a sinful Scandal in respect of other Christian Mens Consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his Charge. In which words I distinguish between a Pastor and one of the Sheep of his Flock. St. Peter sinned in denying Christ; and so does every Pastor that having undertaken the Charge of Preaching the Gospel in the Kingdom of an Infidel, where he could expect at the undertaking of his Charge no less than Death. And why, but because he violates his Trust in doing contrary to his Commission. St. Peter was an Apostle of Christ, and bound by his voluntary undertaking of that Office, not only to Confess Christ, but also to Preach him before those Infidels whom he knew would (like Wolves) devour him. And therefore when Paul and the rest of the Apostles were forbidden to preach Christ they gave this Answer, We ought to obey God rather than Men. And it was to his Disciples only which had undertaken that Office, that Christ saith, he that denyeth me before Men, shall be denyed before the Angels of God. And so

I think I have sufficiently answered this place, and shewed that I do not allow the denying of Christ, upon any colour of Torments, to his Lordship, nor to any other that has undertaken the Office of a Preacher. Which if he think right, he will perhaps in this case put himself into the number of those whom he calls merciful Doctors, whereas now he extends his severity beyond the bounds of common equity. He has read Cicero, and perhaps this Story in him. The Senate of Rome would have sent Cicero to treat of Peace with Marcus Antonius, but when Cicero had shewed them the just fear he had of being killed by him, he was excused; and if they had forced him to it, and he by terror turned Enemy to them, he had in equity been excusable. But his Lordship I believe did write this more valiantly than he would have acted it.

J. D.

He Deposeth Christ from his true Kingly Office, making his Kingdom not to Commence or begin before the day of Judgment. And the Regiment wherewith Christ Governeth his Faithful in this Life, is not properly a Kingdom, but a Pastoral Office, or a right to Teach. And a little after, Christ had not Kingly Authority committed to him by his Father in this World, but only Consiliary and Doctrinal.

T. H.

How do I take away Christs Kingly Office? He neither draws it by Consequence from my Words, nor offers any Argument at all against my Doctrine. The words he cites are in the Contents of Cha. de Cive. In the Body of the Chapter it is thus. The time of Christ's being upon the Earth is called in Scripture the Regeneration often, but the Kingdom never. When the Son of God comes in Majesty, and all the Angels with him, then he shall sit on the seat of Majesty. My Kingdom is not of this World. God sent not

his Son that he should Judge the World. I came not to Judge the World, but to save the World. Man, who made me a Judge or Divider amongst you? Let thy Kingdom come. And other words to the same purpose; out of which it is clear that Christ took upon him no Regal Power upon Earth before his Assumption. But at his Assumption his Apostles asked him if he would then restore the Kingdom to Israel, and he Answered, it was not for them to know. So that hitherto Christ had not taken that Office upon him, unless his Lordship think that the Kingdom of God, and the Kingdom of Christ be two distinct Kingdoms. From the Assumption ever since, all true Christians say daily in their Prayers, Thy Kingdom come. But his Lordship had perhaps forgot that. But when then beginneth Christ to be a King? I say it shall be then when he comes again in Majesty with all the Angels. And even then he shall Reign (as he is Man) under his Father. For St. Paul saith, 1 Cor. 15.25, 26. He must Raign till he hath put all Enemies under his feet; the last Enemy that shall be destroyed is Death. But when shall God the Father Raign again? St. Paul saith in the same Chapter verse 28. When all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. And verse 24. Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom to God even the Father; when he shall have put down all Rule, Authority and Power. This is at the Resurrection. And by this it is manifest, that his Lordship was not so well versed in Scripture, as he ought to have been.

J. D.

He taketh away his Priestly or Propitiatory Office; And although this Act of our Redemption be not alwayes in Scripture called a Sacrifice and Oblation, but sometimes a Price, yet by Price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof he could claim right to a Pardon for us from his Offended Father, but that Price which God the Father was pleased in mercy

to demand. And again, Not that the Death of one Man, though without sin, can satisfie for the Offences of all Men in the rigour of Justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in mercy to accept. He knoweth no difference between one who is meer man, and one who was both God and man; between a Levitical Sacrifice, and the All-sufficient Sacrifice of the Cross; between the Blood of a Calf, and the precious Blood of the Son of God.

T. H.

Yes, I know there is a difference between Blood and Blood, but not any such as can make a difference in the Case here questioned. Our Saviour's Blood was most precious, but still it was Humane Blood; and I hope his Lordship did never think otherwise, or that it was not accepted by his Father for our Redemption.

J. D.

And touching the Prophetical Office of Christ, I do much doubt whether he do believe in earnest, that there is any such thing as Prophecy in the World. He maketh very little difference between a Prophet and a Mad-man, and a Demoniack. And if there were nothing else (says he) that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is Argument enough. He maketh the pretence of Inspiration in any man to be, and always to have been, on opinion pernicious to Peace, and tending to the dissolution of all Civil Government. He subjecteth all Prophetical Revelations from God, to the sole Pleasure and Censure of the Soveraign Prince, either to Authorize them, or to Exauctorate them. So as two Prophets prophecying the same thing at the same time, in the Dominions of two different Princes, the one shall be a true Prophet, the other a false. And Christ who had the approbation of no Soveraign Prince, upon his grounds, was to be reputed a false Prophet every where. Every man therefore ought

to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet, that is to say, who it is that is Gods Vicegerent upon Earth, and hath next under God the Authority of governing Christian Men, and to observe for a Rule that Doctrine which in the Name of God he hath Commanded to be taught, and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines which pretended Prophets, with miracle, or without, shall at any time advance, &c. And if he disavow them then no more to obey their Voice; or if he Approve them, then to obey them as Men, to whom God hath given a part of the Spirit of their Soveraign. Upon his Principles the case holdeth as well among Jews and Turks and Heathens, as Christians. Then he that Teacheth Transubstantiation in France, is a true Prophet; he that Teacheth it in England, a false Prophet. He that Blasphemeth Christ in Constantinople, a true Prophet; he that doth the same in Italy, a false Prophet. Then Samuel was a false Prophet to Contest with Saul a Soveraign Prophet: So was the Man of God who submitted not to the more Divine and Prophetick Spirit of Jeroboam. And Elijah for Reproving Ahab. Then Michaiah had but his deserts, to be clapt up in Prison, and fed with Bread of Affliction, and Water of Affliction, for daring to Contradict God's Vice-gerent upon Earth. And Jeremiah was justly thrown into a Dungeon, for Prophecying against Zedekiah his Liege Lord. If his Principles were true, it were strange indeed, that none of all these Princes, nor any other that ever was in the World, should understand their own Priviledges. And yet more strange, that God Almighty should take the part of such Rebellious Prophets, and justifie their Prophesies by the Event, if it were true that none but the Soveraign in a Christian (the Reason is the same for Jewish) Commonwealth can take notice, what is or what is not the Word of God.

T. H.

To remove his Lordships doubt in the first place, I confess there was true Prophesie and true Prophets in the Church of God, from Abraham down to

our Saviour the greatest Prophet of all, and the last of the Old Testament, and first of the New. After our Saviour's time, till the Death of St. John the Apostle, there were true Prophets in the Church of Christ, Prophets to whom God spake Supernaturally, and Testified the truth of their Mission by Miracles. Of those that in the Scripture are called Prophets without Miracles, and for this cause only, that they spake in the Name of God to Men, and in the name of Men to God, there are, have been, and shall be in the Church Innumerable. Such a Prophet was his Lordship, and such are all Pastors in the Christian Church. But the Question here is of those Prophets that from the Mouth of God foretell things Future, or do other Miracle. Of this kind I deny there has been any since the Death of St. John the Evangelist. If any Man find fault with this, he ought to Name some Man or other whom we are bound to acknowledge that they have done a Miracle, cast out a Devil, or cured any Disease by the sole Invocation of the Divine Majesty. We are not bound to trust to the Legend of the Roman Saints, nor to the History written by Sulpitius of the Life of St. Martin, or to any other Fables of the Roman Clergy, nor to such things as were pretended to be done by some Divines here in the time of King James. Secondly, he says I make little difference between a Prophet and a Mad-man, or Demoniack; To which I say he accuses me falsly. I say only thus much, That I see nothing at all in the Scripture that requireth a belief, that Demoniacks were any other thing than Madmen. And this is also made very probable out of Scripture by a worthy Divine Mr. Meade. But concerning Prophets, I say only that the Jews both under the Old Testament and under the New, took them to be all one with Mad-men and Demoniacks. And prove it out of Scripture by many places both of the Old and New Testament. Thirdly, that the pretence or arrogating to ones self Divine Inspiration, is argument enough to shew a Man is Mad, is my opinion; but his Lordship understands not Inspiration in the same sence that I do. He understands it properly of God's breathing into

a Man, or pouring into him the Divine Substance, or Divine Graces, and in that sence, he that arrogateth Inspiration into himself, neither understands what he saith, nor makes others to understand him, which is properly Madness in some degree. But I understand Inspiration in the Scripture Metaphorically, for Gods guidance of our minds to Truth and Piety. Fourthly, whereas he says, I make the pretence of Inspiration to be pernicious to Peace. I answer, that I think his Lordship was of my Opinion, for he called those Men which in the late Civil War pretended the Spirit, and New Light, and to be the only faithful men Phanaticks; for he called them in his Book, and did call them in his Life time Phanaticks. And what is a Phanatick but a Madman, and what can be more pernicious to Peace than the Revelations that were by these Phanaticks pretended? I do not say there were Doctrines of other Men, not called Phanaticks as pernicious to Peace, as theirs were, and in great part a cause of those troubles. Fifthly, from that I make Prophetical Revelations subject to the examination of the Lawful Soveraign, he inferreth, that two Prophets prophecying the same thing at the same time, in the Dominions of two different Princes, the one shall be a true Prophet, the other a false. This consequence is not good, for seeing they teach different Doctrines, they cannot both of them confirm their Doctrine with Miracles. But this I prove (in the page 232 he citeth) that, whether either of their Doctrines shall be Taught Publickly or not, ’tis in the power of the Soveraign of the Place only to determine. Nay, I say now further, if a Prophet come to any private Man in the Name of God, that Man shall be Judge whether he be a true Prophet or not, before he obey him. See 1 John 4.1. Sixthly, whereas he says, that upon my grounds Christ was to be reputed a false Prophet every where, because his Doctrine was received no where. His Lordship had Read my Book more negligently than was fit for one that would confute it. My ground is this, that Christ in right of his Father was King of the Jews, and consequently Supream Prophet, and Judge

of all Prophets. What other Princes thought of his Prophesies, is nothing to the purpose. I never said that Princes can make Doctrines or Prophesies true or false, but I say every Soveraign Prince has a right to prohibite the publick Teaching of them, whether false or true. But what an oversight is it in a Divine to say, that Christ had the Approbation of no Soveraign Prince, when he had the Approbation of God, who was King of the Jews, and Christ his Vice-Roy, and the whole Scripture Written (Joh. 20.31.) to prove it? When his Miracles declared it; when Pilate confessed it; and when the Apostles Office was to Proclaim it? Seventhly, If we must not consider in points of Christian Faith who is the Soveraign Prophet, that is, who is next under Christ our Supream Head and Governor, I wish his Lordship would have cleared, ere he dyed, these few Questions, Is there not need of some Judge of Controverted Doctrines? I think no man can deny it, that has seen the Rebellion that followed the Controversie here between Gomar and Arminius. There must therefore be a Judge of Doctrines. But (says the Bishop) not the King. Who then? Shall Dr. Bramhall be this Judge? As profitable an Office as it is, he was more modest than to say that. Shall a private Layman have it? No man ever thought that. Shall it be given to a Presbyterian Minister? No; 'tis unreasonable. Shall a Synod of Presbyterians have it? No; For most of the Presbyters in the Primitive Church were undoubtedly subordinate to Bishops, and the rest were Bishops. Who then? A Synod of Bishops? Very well. His Lordship being too Modest to undertake the whole Power, would have been contented with the six and twentieth part. But suppose it in a Synod of Bishops, who shall call them together? The King. What if he will not? Who should Excommunicate him, or if he despise your Excommunication, who shall send forth a Writ of Significavit? No; all this was far from his Lordships thoughts. The power of the Clergy, unless it be upheld legally by the King, or illegally by the Multitude amounts to nothing. But for the Multitude,

Suarez and the School-men will never gain them, because they are not understood. Besides there be very few Bishops that can act a Sermon (which is a puissant part of Rhetorick) So well as divers Presbyterians, and Phanatick Preachers can do. I conclude therefore, that his Lordship could not possibly believe that the Supream Judicature in matter of Religion could any where be so well placed as in the Head of the Church, which is the King. And so his Lordship and I think the same thing; but because his Lordship knew not how to deduce it, he was angry with me because I did it. He says further that by my Principles, he that blasphemeth Christ at Constantinople is a true Prophet, as if a man that blasphemeth Christ, to approve his Blasphemy can procure a Miracle; for by my principles no Man is a Prophet whose Prophesie is not confirmed by God with a Miracle. In the last place out of this, That the lawful Soveraign is the Judge of Prophesie, he deduces That then Samuel and other Prophets were false Prophets that contested with their Soveraigns. As for Samuel he was at that time the Judge, that is to say the Soveraign Prince in Israel, and so acknowledged by Saul. For Saul received the Kingdom (from God himself, who had right to give and take it) by the hands of Samuel. And God gave it him to himself only, and not to his Seed; though if he had obeyed God, he would have setled it also upon his Seed. The Commandement of God was, that he should not spare Agag. Saul obeyed not. God therefore sent Samuel to tell him that he was rejected. For all this Samuel went not about to resist Saul. That he caused Agag to be slain, was with Sauls consent. Lastly, Saul confesses his sin. Where is this contesting with Saul? After this God sent Samuel to anoint David, not that he should depose Saul, but succeed him, the Sons of Saul having never had a right of Succession. Nor did ever David make War on Saul, or so much as resist him, but fled from his persecution. But when Saul was dead, then indeed he claimed his right against the House of Saul. What Rebellion or Resistance could his Lordship find here, either

in Samuel or in David? Besides, all these Transactions are supernatural, and oblige not to imitation. Is there any Prophet or Priest now that can set up in England, Scotland or Ireland, another King by pretence of Prophesie or Religion? What did Jeroboam to the man of God 1 Kings 13) that Prophesied against the Altar in Bethel, without first doing a Miracle, but offer to seize him for speaking (as he thought) rashly of the Kings Act; and after the Miraculous withering of his Hand, desire the Prophet to pray for him? The sin of Jeroboam was not his distrust of the Prophet, but his Idolatry. He was the sole Judge of the truth which the man of God uttered against the Altar, and the process agreeable to equity. What is the story of Eliah and Ahab (1 Kings 18.) but a confirmation of the Right, even of Ahab to be the Judge of Prophesie? Eliah told Ahab, he had transgressed the Commandement of God. So may any Minister now tell his Soveraign, so he do it with sincerity and discretion. Ahab told Eliah he troubled Israel. Upon this controversie Eliah desired Tryal. Send, saith he, and Assemble all Israel; Assemble also the Prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty. Ahab did so. The Question is stated before the People thus, If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal follow him. Then upon the Altars of God and Baal were laid the Wood and the Bullocks; and the cause was to be Judged by Fire from Heaven, to Burn the Sacrifices; which Eliah procured, the Prophets of Baal could not procure. Was not this cause here Pleaded before Ahab? The Sentence of Ahab is not required; for Eliah from that time forward was no more persecuted by Ahab, but only by his Wife Jezabel. The story of Micaiah (2 Cron. 18.) is this, Ahab King of Israel consulted the Prophets, four hundred in number, whether he should prosper or not, in case he went with Jehosaphat King of Judah to fight against the Syrians at Ramothgilead. The Prophet Micaiah was also called, and both the Kings Ahab and Jehosaphat sat together to hear what they should prophecy. There was no Miracle done. The 400 pronounced Victory, Micaiah alone the

contrary. The King was Judge, and most concern'd in the event; nor had he received any Revelation in the business. What could he do more discreetly than to follow the Counsel of 400 rather than of one Man? But the event was contrary; for he was slain; but not for following the Counsel of the 400, but for his Murder of Naboth and his Idolatry. It was also a sin in him, that he afflicted Micaiah in Prison; but an unjust Judgment does not take away from any King his right of Judicature. Besides, what's all this, or that of Jeremiah, which he cites last, to the Question of who is Judge of Christian Doctrine?

J. D.

Neither doth he use God the Holy Ghost, more favourably than God the Son. Where St. Peter saith, Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit; He saith, By the Spirit, is meant the Voice of God in a Dream or Vision Supernatural, which Dreams or Visions, he maketh to be no more than imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an extasie, which in every true Prophet were Supernatural, but in false Prophets were either natural or feigned, and more likely to be false than true. To say God hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say, he dreamed that God spake to him, &c. To say he hath seen a Vision or heard a Voice, is to say, That he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking. So St. Peter's Holy Ghost is come to be their own imaginations, which might be either feigned, or mistaken, or true. As if the Holy Ghost did enter only at their eyes, and at their ears, not into their understandings, nor into their minds; Or as if the Holy Ghost did not seal unto their hearts the truth and assurance of their Prophesies. Whether a new light be infused into their understandings, or new graces be inspired into their heart, they are wrought, or caused, or created immediately by the Holy Ghost, And so are his imaginations, if they be Supernatural.

T. H.

For the places of my Leviathan he cites, they are all as they stand both true and clearly proved; the setting of them down by Fragments is no Refutation; nor offers he any Argument against them. His consequences are not deduced. I never said that the Holy Ghost was an Imagination, or a Dream, or a Vision, but that the Holy Ghost spake most often in the Scripture by Dreams and Visions supernatural. The next words of his, As if the Holy Ghost did enter only at their eyes, and at their ears, not into their understandings, nor into their minds, I let pass, because I cannot understand them. His last words, Whether new light, &c. I understand and approve.

J. D.

But he must needs fall into these absurdities, who maketh but a jest of inspiration. They who pretend Divine inspiration to be a supernatural entring of the Holy Ghost into a Man, are (as he thinks) in a very dangerous Dilemma; for if they worship not the Men whom they conceive to be inspired, they fall into impiety; and if they worship them, they commit Idolatry. So mistaking the Holy Ghost to be corporeal, some thing that is blown into a Man, and the Graces of the Holy Ghost to be corporeal Graces. And the words, inpoured or infused virtue, and, inblown or inspired virtue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round Quadrangle. He reckons it as a common error, That faith and sanctity are not attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion. And layeth this for a firm ground; Faith and Sanctity are indeed not very frequent, but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to pass by Education, Discipline, Correction, and other natural wayes. I would see the greatest Pelagian of them all fly higher.

T. H.

I make here no jest of Inspiration. Seriously, I say, that in the proper signification of the words Inspiration and Infusion, to say virtue is inspired, or infused, is as absurd as to say a Quadrangle is round. But Metaphorically, for Gods bestowing of Faith, Grace, or other Vertue, those words are intelligible enough.

J. D.

Why should he trouble himself about the Holy Spirit, who acknowledgeth no Spirit but either a subtil fluid body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasm of the imagination; who knoweth no inward Grace or intrinsecal Holyness? Holy is a word which in Gods Kingdom answereth to that which men in their Kingdoms use to call publick, or the Kings. And again, wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still some thing signified of propriety gotten by consent. His Holiness is a Relation, not a Quality; for inward sanctification, or real infused holiness, in respect whereof the third Person is called the Holy Ghost, because he is not only holy in himself, but also maketh us holy, he is so great a stranger to it, that he doth altogether deny it, and disclaim it.

T. H.

The word Holy I had defined in the words which his Lordship here sets down, and by the use thereof in the Scripture made it manifest, That that was the true signification of the word. There is nothing in Learning more difficult than to determine the signification of words. That difficulty excuses him. He says that Holiness (in my sence) is a Relation, not a Quality. All the Learned agree that Quality is an Accident, so that in attributing to God Holiness (as a Quality) he contradicts himself; for he has in the beginning of this his discourse denyed (and rightly) that any Accident is in God, saying whatsoever is in God is the Divine Substance. He affirms also, that to attribute any Accident to God, is to deny the simplicity of the

Divine Substance. And thus his Lordship makes God, as I do, a Corporeal Spirit. Both here, and throughout, he discovers so much ignorance, as had he charged me with error only, and not with Atheism, I should not have thought it necessary to answer him.

J. D.

We are taught in our Creed to believe the Catholick or Universal Church. But T. H. teacheth us the contrary, That if there be more Christian Churches than one, all of them together are not one Church personally. And more plainly, Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they are not one Person, nor is there an Vniversal Church, that hath any Authority over them. And again, The Vniversal Church is not one Person, of which it can be said, that it hath done, or Decreed, or Ordained, or Excommunicated, or Absolved. This doth quite overthrow all the Authority of General Councils.

All other Men distinguish between the Church and the Common-wealth; only T. H. maketh them to be one and the same thing. The Common-wealth of Christian men, and the Church of the same, are altogether the same thing, called by two names, for two reasons. For the matter of the Church and of the Common-wealth is the same, namely the same Christian men; and the Form is the same, which consisteth in the lawful power of convocating them. And hence he concludeth, That every Christian Common-wealth is a Church endowed with all spiritual Authority. And yet more fully, The Church if it be one Person, is the same thing with the Common-wealth of Christians, called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of men united in one Person their Soveraign; And a Church because it consisteth in Christian men united in one Christian Soveraign. Upon which account there was no

Christian Church in these Parts of the World, for some hundreds of years after Christ, because there was no Christian Soveraign.

T. A.

For answer to this Period, I say only this, That taking the Church (as I do in all those places) for a company of Christian men on Earth incorporated into one Person, that can speak, command, or do any act of a Person, all that he citeth out of what I have written is true; and that all private Conventicles, though their belief be right, are not properly called Churches; and that there is not any one Universal Church here on Earth which is a Person indued with Authority universal to govern all Christian men on Earth, no more than there is one Universal Soveraign Prince or State on Earth that hath right to govern all Mankind. I deny also that the whole Clergy of a Christian Kingdom or State being assembled, are the representative of that Church further than the Civil Laws permits; or can lawfully assemble themselves, unless by the command or by the leave of the Soveraign Civil Power. I say further, that the denyal of this point tendeth in England towards the taking away of the Kings Supremacy in causes Ecclesiastical. But his Lordship has not here denyed any thing of mine, because he has done no more but set down my words. He says further, that this Doctrine destroyes the Authority of all General Councils; which I confess. Nor hath any General Council at this day in this Kingdom the force of a Law, nor ever had, but by the Authority of the King.

J. D.

Neither is he more Orthodox concerning the Holy Scriptures, Hitherto, that is, for the Books of Moses, the power of making the Scripture Canonical, was in the Civil Soveraign. The like he saith of the Old Testament, made Canonical by Esdras. And of the New Testament, That it was not the Apostles which made their own Writings Canonical, but every

Convert made them so to himself. Yet with this restriction, That until the Soveraign Ruler had prescribed them, they were but Counsel and Advice, which whether good or bad, he that was counselled might without injustice refuse to observe, and being contrary to the Laws established, could not without injustice observe. He maketh the Primitive Christians to have been in a pretty condition. Certainly the Gospel was contrary to the Laws then established. But most plainly, The word of the Interpreter of the Scripture is the word of God. And the same is the Interpreter of the Scripture, and the Soveraign Judge of all Doctrines, that is, the Soveraign Magistrate, to whose Authority we must stand no less, than to theirs, who at first did commend the Scripture to us for the Canon of Faith. Thus if Christian Soveraigns, of different Communications, do clash one with another, in their interpretations, or misinterpretation of Scripture (as they do daily) then the word of God is contradictory to it self; or that is the word of God in one Common-wealth, which is the word of the Devil in another Common-wealth. And the same thing may be true, and not true at the same time: Which is the peculiar priviledge of T.H. to make Contradictories to be true together.

T. H.

There is no doubt but by what Authority the Scripture or any other Writing is made a Law, by the same Authority the Scriptures are to be interpreted, or else they are made Law in vain. But to obey is one thing, to believe is another; which distinction perhaps his Lordship never heard of. To obey is to do or forbear as one is commanded, and depends on the Will; but to believe depends not on the Will, but on the providence and guidance of our hearts that are in the hands of God Almighty. Laws only required obedience; Belief requires Teachers and Arguments drawn either from Reason, or from some thing already believed. Where there is no reason for our Belief, there is no reason we should believe. The reason why men

believe, is drawn from the Authority of those men whom we have no just cause to mistrust, that is, of such men to whom no profit accrues by their deceiving us, and of such men as never used to lye, or else from the Authority of such men whose Promises, Threats, and Affirmations we have seen confirmed by God with Miracles. If it be not from the Kings Authority that the Scripture is Law, what other Authority makes it Law? Here some man being of his Lordships judgment will perhaps laugh and say, 'tis the Authority of God that makes them Law. I grant that. But my question is, on what Authority they believe that God is the Author of them? Here his Lordship would have been at a Nonplus, and turning round, would have said the Authority of the Scripture makes good that God is their Author. If it be said we are to believe the Scripture upon the Authority of the Universal Church, why are not the Books we call Apocrypha the Word of God as well as the rest? If this Authority be in the Church of England, then it is not any other than the Authority of the Head of the Church, which is the King. For without the Head the Church is mute, the Authority therefore is in the King; which is all that I contended for in this point. As to the Laws of the Gentiles, concerning Religion in the Primitive times of the Church, I confess they were contrary to Christian Faith. But none of their Laws, nor Terrors, nor a mans own Will are able to take away Faith, though they can compel to an external obedience; and though I may blame the Ethnick Princes for compelling men to speak what they thought not, yet I absolve not all those that have had the Power in Christian Churches from the same fault. For I believe since the time of the first four General Councels, there have been more Christians burnt and killed in the Christian Church by Ecclesiastical Authority, than by the Heathen Emperors Laws for Religion only without Sedition. All that the Bishop does in this Argument is but a heaving at the Kings Supremacy. Oh, but (says he) if two Kings interpret a place of Scripture in contrary sences, it will follow that both sences are true.

It does not follow. For the interpretation, though it be made by just Authority, must not therefore always be true. If the Doctrine in the one sence be necessary to Salvation, then they that hold the other must dye in their sins, and be Damned. But if the Doctrine in neither sence be necessary to Salvation, then all is well, except perhaps that they will call one another Atheists, and fight about it.

J. D.

All the power, vertue, use and efficacy, which he ascribeth to the Holy Sacraments, is to be signs or commemorations. As for any sealing, or confirming, or conferring of Grace, he acknowledgeth nothing. The same he saith particularly of Baptism: Upon which grounds a Cardinals red Hat, or a Serjeant at Arms his Mace, may be called Sacraments as well as Baptism, or the holy Eucharist, if they be only signs and commemorations of a benefit. If he except, that Baptism and the Eucharist, are of Divine institution: But a Cardinals red Hat or a Serjeant at Arms his Mace are not: He saith truly but nothing to his advantage or purpose, seeing he deriveth all the Authority of the Word and Sacraments, in respect of Subjects, and all our obligation to them, from the Authority of the Soveraign Magistrate, without which these words repent, and be Baptized in the name of Jesus, are but Counsel, no Command. And so a Serjeant at Arms his Mace, and Baptism, proceed both from the same Authority. And this he saith upon this silly ground, That nothing is a Command, the performance whereof tendeth to our own benefit. He might as well deny the Ten Commandments to be Commands, because they have an advantagious promise annexed to them, Do this and thou shalt live; And Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the words of this Law to do them.

T. H.

Of the Sacraments I said no more, than that they are Signs or Commemorations. He finds fault that I add not Seals, Confirmations, and that they confer grace. First, I would have asked him if a Seal be any thing else besides a Sign, whereby to remember somewhat, as that we have promised, accepted, acknowledged, given, undertaken somewhat. Are not other Signs though without a Seal, of force sufficient to convince me or oblige me? A Writing obligatory, or Release signed only with a mans name is as Obligatory as a Bond signed and sealed, if it be sufficiently proved, though peradventure it may require a longer Process to obtain a Sentence, but his Lordship I think knew better than I do the force of Bonds and Bills; yet I know this that in the Court of Heaven there is no such difference between saying, signing, and sealing, as his Lordship seemeth here to pretend. I am Baptized for a Commemoration that I have enrolled my self. I take the Sacrament of the Lords Supper to Commemorate that Christ's Body was broken, and his Blood shed for my redemption. What is there more intimated concerning the nature of these Sacraments, either in the Scripture or in the Book of Common-Prayer? Have Bread and Wine and Water in their own Nature, any other Quality than they had before the Consecration? It is true that the Consecration gives these bodies a new Relation, as being a giving and dedicating of them to God, that is to say a making of them Holy, not a changing of their Quality. But as some silly young men returning from France affect a broken English, to be thought perfect in the French language; so his Lordship (I think) to seem a perfect understander of the unintelligible language of the Schoolmen, pretends an ignorance of his Mother Tongue. He talks here of Command and Counsel as if he were no English man, nor knew any difference between their significations. What English man when he commandeth, says more than, Do this; yet he looks to be obeyed, if obedience be due unto him. But when he says, Do this, and thou shalt have such or such a Reward, he encourages

him, or advises him, or Bargains with him, but Commands him not. Oh, the understanding of a Schoolman.

J. D.

Sometimes he is for holy Orders, and giveth to the Pastors of the Church the right of Ordination and Absolution, and Infallibility, too much for a particular Pastor, or the Pastors of one particular Church. It is manifest, that the consecration of the chiefest Doctors in every Church, and imposition of hands, doth pertain to the Doctors of the same Church. And it cannot be doubted of, but the power of binding and loosing was given by Christ to the future Pastors, after the same manner as to his present Apostles. And our Saviour hath promised this infallibility in those things which are necessary to Salvation, to his Apostles, until the day of Judgment, that is to say, to the Apostles and Pastors, to be Consecrated by the Apostles successively, by the imposition of hands.

But at other times he casteth all this Meal down with his foot. Christian Soveraigns are the supream Pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God, except such as God speaketh to in these dayes supernaturally. What is now become of the promised infallibility?

And it is from the Civil Soveraign that all other Pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and all other functions pertaining to that Office, and they are but his Ministers in the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, or Judges in Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies. What is now become of their Ordination? Magistrates, Judges, and Generals, need no precedent qualifications. He maketh the Pastoral Authority of Soveraigns to be Jure divino, of all other Pastors Jure civili: He addeth, neither is there any Judge of Heresie among Subjects, but their own civil Soveraign.

Lastly, the Church Excommunicateth no man but whom she Excommunicateth by the Authority of the Prince. And the effect of Excommunication hath nothing in it, neither of dammage in this World, nor

terror upon an Apostate, if the Civil Power did persecute or not assist the Church. And in the World to come, leaves them in no worse estate, than those who never believed. The dammage rather redoundeth to the Church. Neither is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the Laws of his own Soveraign, of any effect. Where is now their power of binding and loosing?

T. H.

Here his Lordship condemneth, first my too much kindness to the Pastors of the Church; as if I ascribed Infallibility to every particular Minister, or at least to the Assembly of the Pastors of a particular Church. But he mistakes me, I never meant to flatter them so much. I say only that the Ceremony of Consecration, and Imposition of hands belongs to them; and that also no otherwise than as given them by the Laws of the Common-wealth. The Bishop Consecrates, but the King both makes him Bishop and gives him his Authority. The Head of the Church not only gives the power of Consecration, Dedication, and Benediction, but may also exercise the Act himself if he please. Solomon did it, and the Book of Canons says, That the King of England has all the Right that any good King of Israel had. It might have added that any other King or soveraign Assembly had in their own Dominions. I deny That any Pastor or any Assembly of Pastors in any particular Church, or all the Churches on earth though united are Infallible. Yet I say the Pastors of a Christian Church assembled are in all such points as are necessary to Salvation. But about what points are necessary to Salvation he and I differ. For I in the 43d chapter of my Leviathan have proved that this Article, Jesus is the Christ, is the unum necessarium, the only Article necessary to Salvation; to which his Lordship hath not offered any Objection. And he (it seems) would have necessary to Salvation every Doctrine he himself thought so. Doubtless in this Article, Jesus is the Christ, every Church is infallible; for else it were no Church. Then he says,

I overthrow this again by saying that Christian Soveraigns are the Supream Pastors, that is, Heads of their own Churches; That they have their Authority Jure Divino; That all other Pastors have it Jure Civili: How came any Bishop to have Authority over me, but by Letters Patents from the King? I remember a Parliament wherein a Bishop, who was both a good Preacher and a good Man, was blamed for a Book he had a little before Published in maintenance of the Jus Divinum of Bishops; a thing which before the Reformation here, was never allowed them by the Pope. Two Jus Divinums cannot stand together in one Kingdom. In the last place he mislikes that the Church should Excommunicate by Authority of the King, that is to say, by Authority of the Head of the Church. But he tells not why. He might as well mislike that the Magistrates of the Realm should execute their Offices by the Authority of the Head of the Realm. His Lordship was in a great error, if he thought such incroachments would add any thing to the Wealth, Dignity, Reverence or Continuance of his Order. They are Pastors of Pastors, but yet they are the Sheep of him that is on earth their soveraign Pastor, and he again a Sheep of that supream Pastor which is in Heaven. And if they did their pastoral Office, both by Life and Doctrine, as they ought to do, there could never arise any dangerous Rebellion in the Land. But if the people see once any ambition in their Teachers, they will sooner learn that, than any other Doctrine; and from Ambition proceeds Rebellion.

J. D.

It may be some of T. H. his Disciples desire to know what hopes of Heavenly joyes they have upon their Masters Principles. They may hear them without any great contentment, There is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason, of the Coelum Empyraeum, that is, the Heaven of the Blessed, where the Saints shall live eternally with God. And again, I have not found any Text that can probably be drawn to prove any Ascention of

the Saints into Heaven, that is to say, into any Coelum Empyraeum. But he concludeth positively, that Salvation shall be upon earth, when God shall Raign at the coming of Christ in Jerusalem. And again, In short, the Kingdom of God is a civil Kingdom, &c. called also the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Kingdom of Glory. All the Hobbians can hope for, is, to be restored to the same condition which Adam was in before his fall. So saith T.H. himself, From whence may be inferred, that the Elect, after the Resurrection, shall be restored to the estate wherein Adam was before he had sinned. As for the beatifical vision he defineth it to be a word unintelligible.

T. H.

This Coelum Empyraeum for which he pretendeth so much zeal, where is it in the Scripture, where in the Book of Common Prayer, where in the Canons, where in the Homilies of the Church of England, or in any part of our Religion? What has a Christian to do with such Language? Nor do I remember it in Aristotle. Perhaps it may be in some Schoolman or Commentator on Aristotle, and his Lordship makes it in English the Heaven of the Blessed, as if Empyraeum signified That which belongs to the Blessed. St. Austin says better; that after the day of Judgment all that is not Heaven shall be Hell. Then for Beatifical vision, how can any man understand it that knows from the Scripture that no man ever saw or can see God. Perhaps his Lordship thinks that the happiness of the Life to come is not real but a Vision. As for that which I say (Lev. pag. 345.) I have answered to it already.

J. D.

But considering his other Principles, I do not marvel much at his extravagance in this point. To what purpose should a Coelum Empyraeum, or Heaven of the Blessed, serve in his judgment, who maketh the blessed

Angels that are the Inhabitants of that happy Mansion, to be either Idols of the brain, that is in plain English, nothing, or thin, subtil, fluid bodies, destroying the Angelical nature. The universe being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body. And elsewhere, Every part of the Vniverse is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Vniverse. And because the Vniverse is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently no where. How? By this Doctrine he maketh not only the Angels, but God himself to be nothing. Neither doth he salve it at all, by supposing erroneously Angels to be corporeal Spirits, and by attributing the name of incorporeal Spirit to God, as being a name of more honour, in whom we consider not what Attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him. Though we be not able to comprehend perfectly what God is, yet we are able perfectly to comprehend what God is not, that is, he is not imperfect, and therefore he is not finite, and consequently he is not corporeal. This were a trim way to honour God indeed to honour him with a lye. If this that he say here be true, That every part of the Vniverse is a Body; and whatsoever is not a Body is nothing. Then by this Doctrine, if God be not a Body, God is nothing; not an incorporeal Spirit, but one of the Idols of the Brain, a meer nothing, though they think they dance under a Net, and have the blind of Gods incomprehensibility, between them and discovery.

T. H.

This of Incorporeal substance he urged before, and there I answered it. I wonder he so often rolls the same stone. He is like Sysiphus in the Poets Hell, that there rolls a heavy stone up a hill, which no sooner he brings to day-light, then it slips down again to the bottom, and serves him so perpetually. For so his Lordship rolls this and other questions with much

adoe till they come to the light of Scripture; and then they vanish, and he vexing, sweating, and railing goes to't again, to as little purpose as before. From that I say of the Universe he infers, that I make God to be nothing. But infers it absurdly. He might indeed have inferr'd that I make him a Corporeal, but yet a pure Spirit. I mean by the Universe, the Aggregate of all things that have being in themselves, and so do all men else. And because God has a being, it follows that he is either the whole Universe, or part of it. Nor does his Lordship go about to disprove it, but only seems to wonder at it.

J. D.

To what purpose should a Coelum Empyraeum serve in his Judgment, who denyeth the immortality of the Soul? The Doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, in as much as his Soul is immortal. Who supposeth that when a man dyeth, there remaineth nothing of him but his Carkase; who maketh the word Soul in holy Scripture to signifie always either the Life, or the Living Creature? And expoundeth the casting of Body and Soul into Hell-fire, to be the casting of Body and Life into Hell-fire. Who maketh this Orthodox truth, that the Souls of men are Substances distinct from their Bodies, to be an error contracted by the contagion of the Demonology of the Greeks, and a window that gives entrance to the dark Doctrine of eternal torments. Who expoundeth these words of Solomon, [Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the Spirit shall return to God that gave it,] Thus, God only knows what becomes of a mans Spirit, when he exspireth. He will not acknowledge that there is a Spirit, or any Substance distinct from the Body. I wonder what they think doth keep their Bodies from stinking.

T. H.

He comes here to that which is a great Paradox in School Divinity. The grounds of my opinion are the Canonical Scripture, and the Texts which I cited I must again recite, to which I shall also add some others. My Doctrine is this, First, That the elect in Christ from the day of Judgment forward, by vertue of Christ's Passion and Victory over death, shall enjoy eternal life, that is, they shall be Immortal. Secondly, that there is no living Soul separated in place from the Body, more than there is a living Body separated from the Soul. Thirdly, That the reprobate shall be revived to Judgment, and shall dye a second death in Torments, which death shall be everlasting. Now let us consider what is said to these points in the Scripture, and what is the harmony therein of the Old and New Testament.

And first, because the word Immortal Soul, is not found in the Scriptures, the question is to be decided by evident consequences from the Scripture. The Scripture saith of God expresly (1 Tim. 6.16.) That He only hath immortality, and dwelleth in inaccessible light. Hence it followeth that the Soul of man is not of its own nature Immortal, but by Grace, that is to say, by the gift of God. And then the question will be whether this grace or gift of God were bestowed on the Soul in the Creation and Conception of the Man, or afterwards by his redemption. Another question will be in what sence immortality of Torments can be called a gift, when all gifts suppose the thing given to be grateful to the receiver. To the first of these, Christ himself saith (Luke 14.13, 14.) When thou makest a Feast, call the Poor, the Maimed, the Lame, the Blind, and thou shalt be Blessed, for they cannot recompense thee; For thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of them that be just. It follows hence that the reward of the Elect is not before the Resurrection. What reward then enjoyes a separated Soul in Heaven, or any where else till that day come, or what has he to do there till the Body rise again? Again St. Paul says (Rom. 2.6, 7.) God will render to every man according to his works. To them who by patient continuance in well doing,

seek for Honour, Glory and Immortality, Eternal Life. But unto them that be contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath. Here it is plain that God gives Eternal Life only to well doers, and to them that seek (not to them that have already) Immortality. Again (1 Tim. 1.10.) Christ hath abolished Death, and brought Life and Immortality to light, through the Gospel. Therefore before the Gospel of Christ, nothing was Immortal but God. And St. Paul speaking of the day of Judgment (1 Cor. 15.54.) saith that This Mortal shall put on Immortality, and that then Death is swallowed in Victory. There was no Immortality of any thing Mortal till Death was overcome, and that was at the Resurrection. And John 8.52. Verily, Verily, if a man keep my sayings he shall never see Death, that is to say, he shall be Immortal; but it is no where said, that he which keeps not Christ's sayings shall never see Death, nor be Immortal, and yet they that say that the wicked, Body and Soul, shall be tormented everlastingly, do therein say they are Immortal. Mat. 10.28. Fear not them that can kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul; but fear him that is able to destroy both Soul and Body in Hell. Man cannot kill a Soul, for the Man kill'd shall revive again. But God can destroy the Soul and Body in Hell, as that it shall never return to life. In the Old Testament we read (Gen. 7.4.) I will destroy every living Substance that I have made from off the face of the Earth; therefore, if the Souls of them that perished in the Flood were Substances, they were also destroyed in the Flood and were not Immortal. (Math. 25.41.) Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting Fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels. These words are to be spoken in the day of Judgment, which Judgment is to be in the Clouds. And there shall stand the men that are reprobated alive, where Souls according to his Lordships Doctrine were sent long before to Hell. Therefore at that present day of Judgment they had one Soul by which they were there alive, and another Soul in Hell. How his Lordship could have

maintained this, I understand not. But by my Doctrine, that the Soul is not a separated Substance, but that the Man at his Resurrection shall be revived by God, and raised to Judgment, and afterwards Body and Soul destroyed in Hell-fire (which is the second death) there is no such consequence or difficulty to be inferred. Besides it avoids the unnecessary disputes about where the Soul of Lazarus was for four dayes he lay dead. And the order of the Divine Process is made good, of not inflicting torments before the Condemnation pronounced.

Now as to the harmony of the two Testaments, it is said in the old (Gen. 2.17.) In the day that thou eatest of the Tree of Knowledge, dying thou shalt dye. Moriendo morieris, that is, when thou art dead thou shalt not revive; for so hath Athanasius expounded it. Therefore Adam and Eve were not Immortal by their Creation. Then (Gen. 3.22.) Behold the man is become as one of us — Now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live for ever, &c. Here they had had an Immortality by the gift of God, if they had not sinned. It was therefore sin that lost them Eternal-life. He therefore that redeemed them from sin was the Author of their Immortality, and consequently began in the day of Judgment when Adam and Eve were again made alive by admission to the new Tree of Life, which was Christ.

Now let us compare this with the New Testament. Where we find these words (1 Cor. 15.21.) since by Man came Death, by Man came also the Resurrection of the dead. Therefore all the Immortality of the Soul, that shall be after the Resurrection, is by Christ, and not by the nature of the Soul. verse 22. As by Adam all dye, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. Therefore since we dyed by Adam's sin, so we shall live by Christ's Redemption of us, that is, after the Resurrection. Again verse 23. But every man in his order; Christ the first Fruits, afterwards they that are Christs, at his coming. Therefore none shall be made alive till the coming of Christ.

Lastly, as when God had said, That day that thou eatest of the Tree of Knowledg of Good and Evil, thou shalt dye, though he condemned him then, yet he suffered him to live a long time after; so when Christ had said to the Thief on the Cross, this day thou shalt be with me in Paradise, yet he suffered him to lye dead till the General Resurrection, for no man rose again from the dead before our Saviours coming, and conquering death.

If God bestowed Immortality on every man then when he made him, and he made many to whom he never purposed to give his saving Grace, what did his Lordship think that God gave any man Immortality with purpose only to make him capable of Immortal Torments? 'Tis a hard saying, and I think cannot piously be believed. I am sure it can never be proved by the Canonical Scripture.

But though I have made it clear that it cannot be drawn by lawful consequence from Scripture, that Man was Created with a Soul Immortal, and that the Elect only, by the Grace of God in Christ, shall both Bodies and Souls from the Resurrection forward be Immortal; yet there may be a Consequence well drawn from some words in the Rites of Burial, that prove the contrary, as these. Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God of his great mercy, to take unto himself the Soul of our dear Brother here departed, &c. And these, Almighty God, with whom do live the Spirits of them that depart hence in the Lord. Which are words Authorised by the Church. I wonder his Lordship that had so often pronounced them, took no notice of them here. But it often happens that men think of those things least, which they have most perfectly learnt by rote. I am sorry I could not without deserting the sence of Scripture and mine own Conscience say the same. But I see no just cause yet why the Church should be offended at it. For the Church of England pretendeth not (as doth the Church of Rome) to be above the Scripture; nor forbiddeth any man to Read the Scripture; nor was I forbidden when I Wrote my Leviathan to Publish any thing which the

Scriptures suggested. For when I Wrote it, I may safely say there was no lawful Church in England, that could have maintained me in, or prohibited me from Writing any thing. There was no Bishop, and though there were Preaching, such as it was, yet no Common-Prayer. For Extemporary Prayer, though made in the Pulpit, is not Common-Prayer. There was then no Church in England that any man living was bound to obey. What I Write here at this present time I am forced to in my defence, not against the Church, but against the accusations and arguments of my Adversaries. For the Church, though it excommunicates for scandalous life, and for teaching false Doctrines, yet it professeth to impose nothing to be held as Faith, but what may be warranted by Scripture, and this the Church it self saith in the 20th of the 39 Articles of Religion. And therefore I am permitted to alledge Scripture at any time in the defence of my Belief.

J. D.

But they that in one case are grieved, in another must be relieved. If perchance T. H. hath given his Disciples any discontent in his Doctrine of Heaven and the holy Angels, and the glorified Souls of the Saints, he will make them amends in his Doctrine of Hell, and the Devils, and the damned Spirits. First of the Devils; He fancieth that all those Devils which our Saviour did cast out, were Phrensies, and all Demoniacks (or Persons possessed) no other than Mad-men. And to justifie our Saviour's speaking to a Disease as to a Person, produceth the example of inchanters. But he declareth himself most clearly upon this Subject, in his Animadversions upon my reply to his defence of fatal destiny. There are in the Scripture two sorts of things which are in English translated Devils. One is that which is called Satan, Diabolus, Abaddon, which signifieth in English an Enemy, an Accuser, and a destroyer of the Church of God, in which sence the Devils are but wicked men. The other sort of Devils are called in the Scripture Daemonia, which are the feigned Gods of the Heathen, and are neither

Bodies nor spiritual Substances, but meer fancies, and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks, and other Heathen People, which St. Paul calleth Nothings. So T.H. hath killed the great infernal Devil, and all his black Angels, and left no Devils to be feared, but Devils Incarnate, that is, wicked men.

T. H.

As for the first words cited (Levi. page 38, 39.) I refer the Reader to the place it self; and for the words concerning Satan, I leave them to the judgment of the Learned.

J. D.

And for Hell he describeth the Kingdom of Satan, or the Kingdom of darkness, to be a confederacy of deceivers. He telleth us that the places which set forth the torments of Hell in holy Scripture, do design Metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves, through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. As if Metaphorical descriptions did not bear sad truths in them, as well as literal, as if final desperation were no more than a little fit of grief or discontent; and a guilty conscience were no more than a transitory passion, as if it were a loss so easily to be born, to be deprived for evermore of the beatifical Vision: and lastly as if the Damned, besides that unspeakable loss, did not likewise suffer actual Torments, proportionable in some measure to their own sins, and Gods Justice.

T. H.

That Metaphors bear sad truths in them, I deny not. It is a sad thing to lose this present life untimely. Is it not therefore much more a sad thing to lose an eternal happy Life? And I believe that he which will venture upon

sin, with such danger, will not stick to do the same notwithstanding the Doctrine of eternal torture. Is it not also a sad truth, that the Kingdom of darkness should be a Confederacy of deceivers?

J. D.

Lastly, for the damned Spirits, he declareth himself every where, that their sufferings are not eternal. The Fire shall be unquenchable, and the Torments everlasting; but it cannot be thence inferred, that he who shall be cast into that Fire, or be tormented with those Torments, shall endure and resist them, so as to be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor dye. And though there be many places, that affirm everlasting fire, into which men may be cast successivily one after another for ever; yet I find none that affirm that there shall be an everlasting life therein of any individual Person. If he had said, and said only, that the pains of the Damned may be lessened, as to the degree of them, or that they endure not for ever, but that after they are purged by long torments from their dross and Corruptions, as Gold in the fire, both the damned Spirits and the Devils themselves should be restored to a better condition, he might have found some Ancients (who are therefore called the merciful Doctors) to have joyned with him, though still he should have wanted the suffrage of the Catholick Church.

T. H.

Why does not his Lordship cite some place of Scripture here to prove that all the Reprobates which are dead, live eternally in torment? We read indeed That everlasting Torments were prepared for the Devil and his Angels, whose natures also are everlasting; and that the Beast and the false Prophet shall be tormented everlastingly; but not that every Reprobate shall be so. They shall indeed be cast into the same fire, but the Scripture says plainly enough, that they shall be both Body and Soul destroyed there. If I

had said that the Devils themselves should be restored to a better condition; his Lordship would have been so kind as to have put me into the number of the Merciful Doctors. Truly if I had had any Warrant for the possibility of their being less enemies to the Church of God than they have been, I would have been as merciful to them as any Doctor of them all. As it is, I am more merciful than the Bishop.

J. D.

But his shooting is not at rovers, but altogether at randome, without either President or Partner. All that eternal fire, all those torments which he acknowledgeth, is but this, That after the Resurrection, the Reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his Posterity were in, after the sin committed, saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam and not to them. Adding, that they shall live as they did formerly, Marry, and give in Marriage; and consequently engender Children perpetually after the Resurrection, as they did before, which he calleth an immortallity of the kind, but not of the persons of men. It is to be presumed, that in those their second lives, knowing certainly from T. H. that there is no hope of Redemption for them from corporal death upon their well-doing; nor fear of any Torments after death for their ill-doing, they will pass their times here as pleasantly as they can. This is all the Damnation which T. H. fancieth.

T. H.

This he has urged once before, and I answered to it, That the whole Paragraph was to prove, that for any Text of Scripture to the contrary, men might, after the Resurrection live as Adam did on earth, and that notwithstanding the Text of St. Luke cha. verse 34, 35, 36. Marry and propagate. But that they shall do so, is no assertion of mine. His Lordship knew I held that after the Resurrection there shall be at all no wicked men;

but the Elect (all that are, have been, and hereafter shall be) shall live on earth. But St. Peter says, there shall then be a new Heaven and a new Earth.

J. D.

In summ I leave it to the free judgment of the understanding Reader, by these few instances which follow, to judge what the Hobbian Principles are in point of Religion. Ex ungue leonem.

First, that no man needs to put himself to any hazzard for his Faith, but may safely comply with the times. And for their Faith it is internal and invisible. They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it.

Secondly, he alloweth Subjects, being commanded by their Soveraign, to deny Christ. Profession with the Tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture, whereby we signifie our obedience. And wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman, &c. Who by bowing before the Idol Rimmon, denyed the true God as much in effect, as if he had done it with his Lips. Alas, why did St. Peter Weep so bitterly for denying his Master, out of fear of his Life or Members? It seems he was not acquainted with these Hobbian Principles. And in the same place he layeth down this general Conclusion. This we may say that whatsoever a Subject is compelled to, in obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the Laws of his Country, that action is not his, but his Soveraign's; nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governor and the Law of his Country. His instance in a Mahometan commanded by a Christian Prince to be present at Divine Service, is a weak mistake, springing from his gross ignorance in Case-Divinity, not knowing to distinguish between an erroneous Conscience, as the Mahometans is, and a Conscience rightly informed.

T. H.

In these his two first instances I confess his Lordship does not much be lye me. But neither does he confute me. Also I confess my ignorance in his Case-Divinity which is grounded upon the Doctrine of the School-men. Who to decide Cases of Conscience, take in, not only the Scriptures, but also the Decrees of the Popes of Rome, for the advancing of the Dominion of the Roman Church over Consciences; whereas the true decision of Cases of Consciences ought to be grounded only on Scripture, or natural Equity. I never allowed the denying of Christ with the Tongue in all men, but expresly say the contrary (Lev. pag. 362.) in these words, For an unlearned man that is in the power of an Idolatrous King or State, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an Idol, he detesteth the Idol in his heart; he doth well, though if he had the fortitude to suffer death rather than worship it, he should do better. But if a Pastor who as Christ's messenger has undertaken to teach Christ's Doctrine to all Nations, should do the same, it were not only a sinful scandal in respect of other Christian mens Consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge. Therefore St. Peter in denying Christ sinned, as being an Apostle. And 'tis sin in every man that should now take upon him to preach against the power of the Pope, to leave his Commission unexecuted for fear of the fire; but in a meer Traveller, not so. The three Children and Daniel were worthy Champions of the true Religion. But God requireth not of every man to be a Champion. As for his Lordship's words of complying with the times, they are not mine, but his own spightful Paraphrase.

J. D.

Thirdly, if this be not enough, he giveth licence to a Christian to commit Idolatry, or at least to do an Idolatrous act, for fear of death or corporal danger. To pray unto a King voluntarily for fair weather, or for any thing

which God only can do for us, is divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not Idolatry. His reason is, because it is not a sign, that he doth inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable life. It seemeth T. H. thinketh there is no divine Worship, but internal. And that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or his limbs more than his God. How much is he wiser than the three Children, or Daniel himself? who were thrown, the first into a fiery Furnace, the last into the Lions Denn, because they refused to comply with the Idolatrous Decree of their Soveraign Prince.

T. H.

Here also my words are truly cited. But his Lordship understood not what the word Worship signifies; and yet he knew what I meant by it. To think highly of God (as I had defined it) is to honour him. But to think is internal. To Worship, is to signifie that Honour which we inwardly give, by signs external. This understood (as by his Lordship it was) all he says to it is but a cavil.

J. D.

A fourth Aphorism may be this, That which is said in the Scripture, it is better to obey God than man, hath place in the Kingdom of God by Pact, and not by Nature. Why? Nature it self doth teach us it is better to obey God than men. Neither can he say that he intended this only of obedience, in the use of indifferent actions and gestures, in the service of God, commanded by the Common-wealth, for that is to obey both God and man. But if divine Law and humane Law clash one with another, without doubt it is evermore better to obey God than man.

T. H.

Here again appears his unskilfulness in reasoning. Who denyes, but it is alwayes, and in all causes better to obey God than Man? But there is no Law, neither divine nor humane that ought to be taken for a Law, till we know what it is, and if a divine Law, till we know that God hath commanded it to be kept. We agree that the Scriptures are the Word of God. But they are a Law by Pact, that is, to us who have been Baptized into the Covenant. To all others it is an invitation only to their own benefit. 'Tis true that even nature suggesteth to us that the Law of God is to be obeyed rather than the Law of man. But nature does not suggest to us that the Scripture is the Law of God, much less how every Text of it ought to be interpreted. But who then shall suggest this? Dr. Bramhall? I deny it. Who then? The stream of Divines? Why so? Am I that have the Scripture it self before my eyes, obliged to venture my eternal life upon their interpretation, how learned soever they pretend to be, when no counter-security that they can give me, will save me harmless? If not the stream of Divines, who then? The lawful Assembly of Pastors or of Bishops? But there can be no lawful Assembly in England without the Authority of the King. The Scripture therefore what it is, and how to be interpreted, is made known unto us here, by no other way than the Authority of our Soveraign Lord both in Temporals and Spirituals, The Kings Majesty. And where he has set forth no Interpretation, there I am allowed to follow my own, as well as any other man, Bishop or not Bishop. For my own part, all that know me, know also it is my opinion, That the best government in Religion is by Episcopacy, but in the King's Right, not in their own. But my Lord of Derry not contented with this, would have the utmost resolution of our Faith to be into the Doctrine of the Schools. I do not think that all the Bishops be of his mind. If they were, I would wish them to stand in fear of that dreadful Sentence, All covet all lose. I must not let pass these words of his Lordship, If divine Law and humane Law clash one with another, without doubt it is better evermore to obey God than man.

Where the King is a Christian, believes the Scripture, and hath the Legislative power both in Church and State, and maketh no Laws concerning Christian Faith, or divine Worship, but by the Counsel of his Bishops whom he trusteth in that behalf, if the Bishops counsel him aright, what clashing can there be between the divine and humane Laws? For if the Civil Law be against God's Law and the Bishops make it clearly appear to the King that it clasheth with divine Law, no doubt he will mend it by himself or by the advice of his Parliament; for else he is no professor of Christ's Doctrine, and so the clashing is at an end. But if they think that every opinion they hold, though obscure and unnecessary to Salvation, ought presently to be Law, then there will be clashings innumerable, not only of Laws, but also of Swords, as we have found it too true by late experience. But his Lordship is still at this, that there ought to be, for the divine Laws that is to say, for the interpretation of Scripture, a Legislative power in the Church, distinct from that of the King, which under him they enjoy already. This I deny. Then for clashing between the Civil Laws of Infidels with the Law of God, the Apostles teach that those their Civil Laws are to be obeyed, but so as to keep their Faith in Christ entirely in their hearts; which is an obedience easily performed. But I do not believe that Augustus Caesar or Nero was bound to make the holy Scripture Law; and yet unless they did so they could not attain to eternal life.

J. D.

His fifth conclusion may be, that the sharpest and most successful Sword, in any War whatsoever, doth give Soveraign Power and Authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject all sorts of Theological Doctrines, concerning the Kingdom of God, not according to their truth or falshood, but according to that influence which they have upon political affairs. Hear him, But because this Doctrine will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it, maintaining nothing in this or any other Paradox of Religion,

but attending the end of that dispute of the Sword, concerning the Authority (not yet amongst my Country-men decided) by which all sorts of Doctrine are to be approved or rejected, &c. For, the points of Doctrine concerning the Kingdom of God, have so great influence upon the Kingdom of Man, as not to be determined, but by them that under God have the Soveraign Power.

— Careat successibus opto,
Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

Let him evermore want success who thinketh actions are to be judged by their events. This Doctrine may be plausible to those who desire to fish in troubled Waters. But it is justly hated by those which are in Authority, and all those who are lovers of peace and tranquillity.

The last part of this conclusion smelleth rankly of Jeroboam, Now shall the Kingdom return to the house of David, if this people go up to do Sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem; whereupon the King took counsel, and made two Calves of Gold, and said unto them, It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem, behold thy Gods O Israel, which brought thee out of the Land of Aegypt. But by the just disposition of Almighty God this Policy turned to a sin, and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam and his Family. It is not good jesting with edge-tools, nor playing with holy things: Where men make their greatest fastness, many times they find most danger.

T. H.

His Lordship either had a strange Conscience, or understood not English. Being at Paris when there was no Bishop nor Church in England, and every man writ what he pleased, I resolved (when it should please God to restore the Authority Ecclesiastical) to submit to that Authority, in whatsoever it should determine. This his Lordship construes for a temporizing and too much indifferency in Religion; and says further that the last part of my words do smell of Jeroboam. To the contrary I say my words were modest,

and such as in duty I ought to use. And I profess still that whatsoever the Church of England (the Church, I say, not every Doctor) shall forbid me to say in matter of Faith, I shall abstain from saying it, excepting this point. That Jesus Christ the Son of God dyed for my sins. As for other Doctrins, I think it unlawful if the Church define them, for any Member of the Church to contradict them.

J. D.

His sixth Paradox is a rapper, the Civil Laws are the Rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, and therefore what the Lawgiver commands that is to be accounted good, what he forbids bad. And a little after, before Empires were, just and unjust were not, as whose nature is Relative to a Command, every action in its own nature is indifferent. That it is just or unjust proceedeth from the right of him that commandeth. Therefore lawful Kings make those things which they command, Just by commanding them, and those things which they forbid Vnjust by forbidding them. To this add his definition of a sin, that which one doth, or omitteth, saith, or willeth contrary to the reason of the Common-wealth, that is, the [Civil] Laws. Where by the Laws he doth not understand the Written Laws, elected and approved by the whole Common-wealth, but the verbal Commands or Mandates, of him that hath the Soveraign Power, as we find in many places of his Writings. The Civil Laws are nothing else but the Commands of him, that is endowed with Soveraign Power in the Common-wealth, concerning the future actions of his Subjects. And the Civil Laws are fastned to the Lips of that man who hath the Soveraign Power.

Where are we? In Europe or in Asia? Where they ascribed a Divinity to their Kings, and, to use his own Phrase, made them Mortal Gods. O King live for ever. Flatterers are the common Moths of great Pallaces, where Alexander's friends are more numerous than the King's friends. But such gross palpable pernicious flattery as this is, I did never meet with, so

derogatory both to piety and policy. What deserved he who should do his uttermost endeavour to poyson a common Fountain, whereof all the Common-wealth must drink? He doth the same who poisoneth the mind of a Soveraign Prince.

Are the Civil Laws the Rules of good and bad, just and unjust, honest and dishonest? And what I pray your are the Rules of the Civil Law it self? Even the Law of God and Nature. If the Civil Laws swerve from these more authentick Laws, they are Lesbian Rules. What the Lawgiver commands is to be accounted good, what he forbids bad. This was just the garb of the Athenian Sophisters, as they are described by Plato. Whatsoever pleased the great Beast [the Multitude] they call holy, and just, and good. And whatsoever the great Beast disliked, they called evil, unjust, prophane. But he is not yet arrived at the height of his flattery. Lawful Kings make those things which they command just by commanding them. At other times when he is in his right wits he talketh of sufferings, and expecting their reward in Heaven. And going to Christ by Martyrdome. And if he had the fortitude to suffer death he should do better. But I fear all this was but said in jest. How should they expect their reward in Heaven, if his Doctrine be true, that there is no reward in Heaven? Or how should they be Martyrs, if his Doctrine be true, that none can be Martyrs but those who conversed with Christ upon earth? He addeth, Before Empires were, just and unjust were not. Nothing could be written more false in his sence, more dishonourable to God, more inglorious to the humane nature. That God should create Man and leave him presently without any Rules, to his own ordering of himself, as the Ostridg leaveth her Eggs in the sand. But in truth there have been Empires in the World ever since Adam. And Adam had a Law written in his heart by the finger of God, before there was any Civil Law. Thus they do endeavour to make goodness, and justice, and honesty, and conscience, and God himself, to be empty names, without any reality, which signifie

nothing, further than they conduce to a man's interest. Otherwise he would not, he could not say, That every action as it is invested with its circumstances, is indifferent in its own nature.

T. H.

My sixth Paradox he calls a Rapper. A Rapper, a Swapper and such like terms are his Lordships elegancies. But let us see what this Rapper is. 'Tis this, The Civil Laws are the Rules of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest. Truly I see no other Rules they have. The Scriptures themselves were made Law to us here, by the Authority of the Common-wealth, and are therefore part of the Law Civil. If they were Laws in their own nature, then were they Laws over all the World, and men were obliged to obey them in America, as soon as they should be shown there (though without a Miracle) by a Frier. What is Injust but the Transgression of a Law? Law therefore was before Unjust. And the Law was made known by Soveraign Power before it was a Law. Therefore Soveraign Power was antecedent both to Law and Injustice. Who then made Injust but Soveraign Kings or Soveraign Assemblies? Where is now the wonder of this Rapper, That Lawful Kings make those things which they command Just by commanding them, and those things which they forbid Vnjust by forbidding them? Just and Unjust were surely made; if the King made them not, who made them else? For certainly the breach of a Civil Law is a sin against God. Another Calumny which he would fix upon me, is, That I make the King's verbal Commands to be Laws. How so? Because I say the Civil Laws are nothing else but the Commands of him that hath the Soveraign Power, concerning the future Actions of his Subjects. What verbal Command of a King can arrive at the ears of all his Subjects (which it must do ere it be a Law) without the Seal of the Person of the Common-wealth (which is here the Great Seal of England?) Who but his Lordship ever denyed that the command of England was a Law to English men? Or that

any but the King had Authority to affix the Great Seal of England to any Writing? And who did ever doubt to call our Laws (though made in Parliament) the King's Laws? What was ever called a Law which the King did not assent to? Because the King has granted in divers cases not to make a Law without the advice and assent of the Lords and Commons, therefore when there is no Parliament in being, shall the Great Seal of England stand for nothing? What was more unjustly maintained during the long Parliament (besides the resisting and Murdering of the King) then this Doctrine of his Lordship's? But the Bishop endeavoured here to make the Multitude believe I maintain, That the King sinneth not though he bid hang a man for making his Apparel otherwise than he appointed, or his Servant for negligent attendance. And yet he knew I distinguished always between the King's natural and politick capacity. What name should I give to this wilful slander? But here his Lordship enters into passion, and exclaims, Where are we, in Europe or in Asia? Gross, palpable, pernicious flattery, poisoning of a Common-wealth, poysoning the King's mind. But where was his Lordship when he wrote this? One would not think he was in France, nor that this Doctrine was Written in the year 1658, but rather in the year 1648, in some Cabal of the King's enemies. But what did put him into this fit of Choller? Partly, this very thing, that he could not answer my reasons; but chiefly, that he had lost upon me so much School-learning in our controversie touching Liberty and Necessity, wherein he was to blame himself, for believing that the obscure and barbarous Language of School Divinity could satisfie an ingenuous Reader as well as plain and perspicuous English. Do I flatter the King? Why am I not rich? I confess his Lordship has not flattered him here.

J. D.

Something there is which he hath a confused glimmering of, as the blind man sees men walking like Trees, which he is not able to apprehend and express clearly. We acknowledge, that though the Laws or Commands of a

Soveraign Prince be erroneous, or unjust, or injurious, such as a Subject cannot approve for good in themselves; yet he is bound to acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist, otherwise than by Prayers and Tears, and at the most by flight. We acknowledge that the Civil Laws have power to bind the Conscience of a Christian, in themselves, but not from themselves, but from him who hath said, Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers. Either they bind Christian Subjects to do their Soveraign's Commands, or to suffer for the Testimony of a good Conscience. We acknowledge that in doubtful Cases semper praesumitur pro Rege & Lege, the Soveraign and the Law are always presumed to be in the right. But in plain evident cases which admit no doubt, it is always better to obey God than man. Blunderers whilst they think to mend one imaginary hole, make two or three real ones. They who derive the Authority of the Scriptures or God's Law from the Civil Laws of men, are like those who seek to underprop the Heavens from falling with a Bullrush. Nay, they derive not only the Authority of the Scripture, but even the Law of nature it self from the Civil Law. The Laws of nature (which need no promulgation) in the condition of nature are not properly Laws, but qualities which dispose men to peace and obedience. When a Common-wealth is once setled, then are they actually Laws and not before. God help us, into what times are we fallen, when the immutable Laws of God and Nature are made to depend upon the mutable Laws of mortal men, just as one should go about to controll the Sun by the Authority of the Clock.

T. H.

Hitherto he never offered to mend any of the Doctrines he inveighs against; but here he does. He says I have a glimmering of something I was not able to apprehend and express clearly. Let us see his Lordship's more clear expression. We acknowledge, (saith he) that though the Laws or Commands of a Soveraign Prince be erroneous, or unjust, or injurious, such as a Subject cannot approve for good in themselves, yet he is bound to

acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist otherwise than by Prayers and Tears, and at the most by Flight. Hence it follows clearly, that when a Soveraign has made a Law, though erroneous, then if his Subject oppose it, it is a sin. Therefore I would fain know, when a man has broken that Law by doing what it forbad, or by refusing to do what it commanded, whether he have opposed this Law or not. If to break the Law be to oppose it, he granteth it. Therefore his Lordship has not here expressed himself, so clearly as to make men understand the difference between breaking a Law and opposing it. Though there be some difference between breaking of a Law, and opposing those that are sent with force to see it executed; yet between breaking and opposing the Law it self there is no difference. Also though the Subject think the Law just, as when a Thief is by Law Condemned to dye, yet he may lawfully oppose the Execution, not only by Prayers, Tears and Flight, but also (as I think) any way he can. For though his fault were never so great, yet his endeavour to save his own life is not a fault. For the Law expects it, and for that cause appointeth Felons to be carryed bound and encompassed with Armed men to Execution. Nothing is opposite to Law but sin. Nothing opposite to the Sheriff but force. So that his Lordship's sight was not sharp enough to see the difference between the Law and the Officer. Again, We acknowledge (says he) that the Laws have power to bind the Conscience of a Christian in themselves, but not from themselves. Neither do the Scriptures bind the Conscience because they are Scriptures, but because they were from God. So also the Book of English Statutes bindeth our Consciences in it self, but not from it self, but from the Authority of the King, who only in the right of God has the legislative Powers. Again he saith, We acknowledge that in doubtful cases, the Soveraign and the Law are always presumed to be in the right. If he presume they are in the right, how dare he presume that the cases they determine are doubtful? But saith he, in evident cases which admit no doubt

it is always better to obey God than man. Yes, and in doubtful cases also say I. But not always better to obey the inferior Pastors than the Supream Pastor, which is the King. But what are those cases that admit no doubt? I know but very few, and those are such as his Lordship was not much acquainted with.

J. D.

But it is not worthy of my labour, nor any part of my intention, to pursue every shadow of a Question which he springeth. It shall suffice to gather a Posie of Flowers (or rather a bundle of Weeds) out of his Writings, and present them to the Reader, who will easily distinguish them from healthful Plants by the rankness of their smell. Such are these which follow.

T. H.

As for the following Posie of Flowers, there wants no more to make them sweet, than to wipe off the Venome blown upon some of them by his Lordships breath.

J. D.

1. To be delighted in the imagination only of being possessed of another man's Goods, Servants, or Wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the Law which saith, Thou shalt not covet.

T. H.

What man was there ever whose imagination of any thing he thought would please him, was not some delight? Or what sin is there, where there is not so much as an intention to do injustice? But his Lordship would not distinguish between delight and purpose, nor between a Wish and a Will. This was venome. I believe, that his Lordship himself even before he was Married took some delight in the thought of it, and yet the Woman then was

not his own. All love is delight, but all love is not sin. Without this love of that which is not yet a mans own, the World had not been Peopled.

J. D.

2. If a Man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a Fact against the Law, he is totally excused, because no Law can oblige a Man to abandon his own preservation, nature compelleth him to the Fact. The like Doctrine he hath elsewhere. When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by the Command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenants to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature.

T. H.

The second Flower is both sweet and wholsom.

J. D.

3. It is a Doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience is sin.

T. H.

'Tis plain, that to do what a man thinks in his own Conscience to be sin, is sin; for it is a contempt of the Law it self; and from thence ignorant men, out of an erroneous Conscience, disobey the Law which is pernicious to all Government.

J. D.

4. The Kingdom of God is not shut but to them that sin, that is, to them who have not performed due obedience to the Laws of God; nor to them, if they believe the necessary Articles of the Christian Faith.

5. We must know that the true acknowledging of sin is Repentance it self.

6. An opinion publickly appointed to be taught cannot be Heresie, nor the Soveraign Princes that Authorised the same Hereticks.

T. H.

The 4th. 5th. and 6th. smell well. But to say, that the Soveraign Prince in England is a Heretick, or that an Act of Parliament is Heretical, stinks abominably, as ’twas thought Primo Elizabethae.

J. D.

7. Temporal and Spiritual government are but two words to make men see double and mistake their lawful Soveraign, &c. There is no other Government in this Life, neither of State, nor Religion but Temporal.

8. It is manifest, that they who permit a contrary Doctrine to that which themselves believe and think necessary [to Salvation] do against their Consciences, and Will, as much as in them lyeth the eternal destruction of their Subjects.

T. H.

The 7th. and 8th. are Roses and Jassamin. But his leaving out the words [to Salvation] was venome.

J. D.

9. Subjects sin if they do not worship God according to the Laws of the Common-wealth.

T. H.

The 9th. he hath poisoned, and made it, not mine; he quotes my Book de Cive Ca.19. Where I say, Regnante Deo per solam rationem naturalem, that is, Before the Scripture was given, they sinned that refused to worship God,

according to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Country, which hath no ill scent, but to undutiful Subjects.

J. D.

10. To believe in Jesus [in Jesum] is the same as to believe that Jesus is Christ.

T. H.

And so it is always in the Scripture.

J. D.

11. There can be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the Laws of a Christian Common-wealth. Yet, we see Christian Common-wealths daily contradict one another.

T. H.

The 11th. is also good. But his Lordship's instance, That Christian Common-wealths contradict one another, have nothing to do here. Their Laws do indeed contradict one another, but contradict not the Law of God. For God Commands their Subjects to obey them in all things, and his Lordship himself confesseth that their Laws, though erroneous, bind the Conscience. But Christian Common-wealths would seldome contradict one another, if they made no Doctrine Law, but such as were necessary to Salvation.

J. D.

12. No man giveth but with intention of some good to himself. Of all voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own good. Moses, St. Paul, and the Decij were not of his mind.

T. H.

That which his Lordship adds to the 12th. namely, that Moses, St. Paul, and the Decij were not of my mind is false. For the two former did what they did for a good to themselves, which was eternal Life; and the Decij for a good Fame after death. And his Lordship also, if he had believed there is an eternal happiness to come, or thought a good Fame after death to be any thing worth, he would have directed all his actions towards them, and have despised the Wealth and Titles of the present World.

J. D.

13. There is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of reward which is then to be given to breach of Faith, but only a belief grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally.

T. H.

The 13th. is good and fresh.

J. D.

14. David's killing of Uriah was no injury to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself.

T. H.

David himself makes this good, in saying, To thee only have I sinned.

J. D.

15. To whom it belongeth to determine controversies which may arise from the divers interpretations of Scripture, he hath an imperial power over all men which acknowledge the Scripture to be the Word of God.

16. What is Theft, what is Murder, what is Adultery, and universally what is an injury, is known by the Civil Law, that is, by the Commands of the Soveraign.

T. H.

For the 15th. he should have disputed it with the Head of the Church. And as to the 16th. I would have asked him by what other Law his Lordship would have it determined what is Theft, or what is Injury, than by the Laws made in Parliament, or by the Laws which distinguish between Meum and Tuum? His Lordships ignorance smells rankly (’tis his own phrase) in this and many other places (which I have let pass) of his own Interest. The King tells us what is sin, in that he tells us what is Law. He hath authorised the Clergy to dehort the people from sin, and to exhort them, by good motives, (both from Scripture and Reason) to obey the Laws; and supposeth them (though under forty years old) by the help they have in the University, able in case the Law be not written, to teach the people old and young, what they ought to follow in doubtful cases of Conscience, that is to say, they are authorised to expound the Laws of Nature; but not so as to make it a doubtful case whether the King’s Laws be to be obeyed or not. All they ought to do is from the King’s Authority. And therefore this my Doctrine is no Weed.

J. D.

17. He admitteth incestuous Copulations of the Heathens, according to their Heathenish Laws to have been lawful Marriages. Though the Scripture teach us expresly, that for those abominations the Land of Canaan spued out her Inhabitants, Levit. 18.28.

T. H.

The 17th. he hath corrupted with a false interpretation of the Text. For in that Chapter from the beginning to verse 20, are forbidden Marriages in certain degrees of kindred. From verse 20, which begins with Moreover (to the 28th.) are forbidden Sacrificing of Children to Molech, and Prophaning of God's name, and Buggery with Man and Beast, with this cause exprest (For all these abominations have the men of the Land done which were before you, and the Land is defiled) That the Land spue not you out also. As for Marriages within the degrees prohibited, they are not referred to the abominations of the Heathen. Besides, for some time after Adam, such Marriages were necessary.

J. D.

18. I say that no other Article of Faith besides this, that Jesus is Christ, is necessary to a Christian man for Salvation.

19. Because Christ's Kingdom is not of this World, therefore neither can his Ministers, unless they be Kings, require obedience in his name. They have no right of Commanding, no power to make Laws.

T. H.

These two smell comfortably, and of Scripture. The contrary Doctrine smells of Ambition and encroachment of Jurisdiction, or Rump of the Roman Tyranny.

J. D.

20. I pass by his errors about Oaths about Vows, about the Resurrection, about the Kingdom of Christ, about the Power of the Keys, Binding, Loosing, Excommunication, &c. his ignorant mistakes of meritum congrui and condigni, active and passive obedience, and many more, for fear of being tedious to the Reader.

T. H.

The tears of School Divinity, of which number are meritum congrui, meritum condigni, and passive obedience, are so obscure as no man living can tell what they mean, so that they that use them may admit or deny their meaning, as it shall serve their turns. I said not that this was their meaning, but that I thought it was so. For no man living can tell what a School man means by his words. Therefore I expounded them according to their true signification. Merit ex condigno is when a thing is deserved by Pact; as when I say the Labourer is worthy of his hire, I mean meritum ex condigno. But when a man of his own grace throweth Money among the people, with an intention that what part soever of it any of them could catch, he that catcheth merits it, not by Pact, nor by precedent Merit, as a Labourer, but because it was congruent to the purpose of him that cast it amongst them. In all other meaning these words are but Jargon, which his Lordship had learnt by rote. Also passive obedience signifies nothing, except it may be called passive obedience when a man refraineth himself, from doing what the Law hath forbidden. For in his Lordship's sense the Thief that is hang'd for stealing hath fulfilled the Law; which I think is absurd.

J. D.

His whole works are a heap of mishapen Errors, and absurd Paradoxes, vented with the confidence of a Jugler, the brags of a Mountebank, and the Authority of some Pythagoras, or third Cato, lately dropped down from Heaven.

Thus we have seen how the Hobbian Principles do destroy the Existence, the Simplicity, the Ubiquity, the Eternity, and Infiniteness of God, the Doctrine of the blessed Trinity, the Hypostatical Union, the Kingly Sacerdotal and Prophetical Office of Christ, the Being and Operation of the Holy Ghost, Heaven, Hell, Angels, Devils, the Immortality of the Soul, the

Catholick and all National Churches; the holy Scriptures, holy Orders, the holy Sacraments, the whole frame of Religion, and the Worship of God; the Laws of Nature, the reality of Goodness, Justice, Piety, Honesty, Conscience, and all that is Sacred. If his Disciples have such an implicite Faith, that they can digest all these things, they may feed with Ostriches.

T. H.

He here concludes his first Chapter with bitter Reproaches, to leave in his Reader (as he thought) a sting, supposing perhaps that he will Read nothing but the beginning and end of his Book, as is the custom of many men. But to make him lose that petty piece of cunning, I must desire of the Reader one of these two things. Either that he would read with it the places of my Leviathan which he cites, and see not only how he answers my arguments, but also what the arguments are which he produceth against them; or else that, he would forbear to condemn me, so much as in his thought; for otherwise he is unjust. The name of Bishop is of great Authority, but these words are not the words of a Bishop, but of a passionate School-man, too fierce and unseemly in any man whatsoever. Besides, they are untrue. Who that knows me will say I have the confidence of a Jugler, or that I use to brag of any thing, much less that I play the Mountebank? What my works are, he was no sit Judge. But now he has provoked me, I will say thus much of them, that neither he, if he had lived could, nor I if I would, can extinguish the light which is set up in the World by the greatest part of them; and for these Doctrines which he impugneth, I have few opposers, but such whose Profit, or whose Fame in Learning is concerned in them. He accuses me first of destroying the Existence of God, that is to say, he would make the World believe I were an Atheist. But upon what ground? Because I say, that God is a Spirit, but Corporeal. But to say that, is allowed me by St. Paul, that says There is a Spiritual Body, and there is an Animal Body. 1 Cor. 15. He that holds that there is a God, and

that God is really somewhat (for Body is doubtlesly a real Substance) is as far from being an Atheist, as is possible to be. But he that says God is an Incorporeal Substance, no man can be sure whether he be an Atheist or not. For no man living can tell whether there be any Substance at all, that is not also Corporeal. For neither the word Incorporeal, nor Immaterial, nor any word equivalent to it is to be found in Scripture, or in Reason. But on the contrary that the Godhead dwelleth bodily in Christ, is found in Colos. 2.9. and Tertullian maintains that God is either a Corporeal Substance or Nothing. Nor was he ever condemned for it by the Church. For why? Not only Tertullian but all the learned call Body, not only that which one can see, but also whatsoever has magnitude, or that is somewhere; for they had greater reverence for the Divine Substance than that they durst think it had no Magnitude or was no where. But they that hold God to be a Phantasm, as did the Exorcists in the Church of Rome, that is, such a thing as were at that time thought to be the Sprights that were said to walk in Church-yards, and to be the Souls of men buried, they do absolutely make God to be nothing at all. But how? Were they Atheists? No. For though by ignorance of the consequence they said that which was equivolent to Atheism, yet in their hearts they thought God a Substance, and would also, if they had known what Substance and what Corporeal meant, have said he was a Corporeal Substance. So that this Atheism by consequence is a very easie thing to be fallen into, even by the most Godly men of the Church. He also that says that God is wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where, destroys by consequence the Unity of God, and the Infiniteness of God, and the Simplicity of God. And this the Schoolmen do, and are therefore Atheists by consequence, and yet they do not all say in their hearts that there is no God. So also his Lordship by exempting the Will of man from being subject to the necessity of God's Will or Decree, denies by consequence the Divine Praescience, which also will amount to Atheism by

consequence. But out of this that God is a Spirit corporeal and infinitely pure, there can no unworthy or dishonourable consequence be drawn. Thus far to his Lordship's first Chapter in Justification of my Leviathan, as to matter of Religion; and especially to wipe off that unjust slander cast upon me by the Bishop of Derry. As for the second Chapter which concerns my Civil Doctrines, since my errors there, if there be any, will not tend very much to my disgrace, I will not take the pains to answer it.

Whereas his Lordship has talked in his discourse here and there ignorantly of Heresie, and some others have not doubted to say publickly, that there be many Heresies in my Leviathan; I will add hereunto for a general answer an Historical relation concerning the word Heresie from the first use of it amongst the Graecians, till this present time.

FINIS.

Three Papers Presented to the Royal Society Against Dr. Wallis

TOGETHER WITH CONSIDERATIONS ON DR. WALLIS HIS ANSWER TO THEM

CONTENTS

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND OTHERS, THE LEARNED MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCES.

THE THEOREME.

THE CONFUTATION.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND OTHERS, THE LEARNED MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCES.

CONSEQUENT.

PROP. I.

CONSEQUENT.

PROP. II.

PROP. III.

CONSEQUENT.

THE RADIUS OF A CIRCLE IS A MEAN PROPORTIONAL BETWEEN THE ARC OF A QUADRANT AND TWO FIFTHS OF THE SAME.

COROL.

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE ANSWER OF DR. WALLIS TO THE THREE PAPERS OF MR. HOBBES.

TO THE LATTER PART OF THE FIRST PAPER.

TO THE SECOND PAPER.

TO THE THIRD PAPER.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND OTHERS, THE LEARNED MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCES.

PRESENTETH TO YOUR Consideration, your most humble servant Thomas Hobbes, a Confutation of a Theoreme which hath a long time passed for Truth; to the great hinderance of Geometry, and also of Natural Philosophy, which thereon dependeth.

THE THEOREME.

THE FOUR SIDES of a Square being divided into any number of equal parts, for example into 10; and straight lines drawn through the opposite points, which will divide the Square into 100 lesser Squares; The received Opinion, and which Dr. Wallis commonly useth, is, that the root of those 100, namely 10, is the side of the whole Square.

THE CONFUTATION.

THE ROOT 10 is a number of those Squares, whereof the whole containeth 100, whereof one Square is an Vnitie; therefore the Root 10, is 10 Squares: Therefore the Root of 100 Squares is 10 Squares, and not the side of any Square; because the side of a Square is not a Superficies, but a Line. For as the root of 100 Vnities is 10 Vnities, or of 100 Souldiers 10 Souldiers: so the root of 100 Squares is 10 of those Squares. Therefore the Theoreme is false; and more false, when the root is augmented by multiplying it by other greater numbers.

Hence it followeth, that no Proposition can either be demonstrated or confuted from this false Theoreme. Upon which, and upon the Numeration of Infinites, is grounded all the Geometry which Dr. Wallis hath hitherto published.

And your said servant humbly prayeth to have your Judgement hereupon: And that if you finde it to be false, you would be pleased to correct the same; and not to suffer so necessary a Science as Geometry to be stifled, to save the Credit of a Professor.

Three PAPERS Presented to the ROYAL SOCIETY Against Dr. WALLIS. Together with CONSIDERATIONS ON Dr. Wallis his ANSWER to them.

By THO. HOBBES of Malmsbury.

LONDON: Printed for the Author; and are to be had at the Green Dragon without Temple-bar. 1671.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND OTHERS, THE LEARNED MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENCES.

YOUR MOST HUMBLE servant Thomas Hobbes presenteth, That the quantity of a Line calculated by extraction of Roots, is not to be truely found. And further presenteth to you the Invention of a Straight Line equal to the Arc of a Circle.

A Square Root is a number which multiplied into it self produceth a number. And the number so produced is called a Square number. For example: Because 10 multiplied into 10 makes 100; the Root is 10, and the Square number 100.

CONSEQUENT.

IN THE NATURAL row of Numbers, as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, &c. every one is the Square of some number in the same row. But Square numbers (beginning at 1) intermit first two numbers, then four, then six, &c. So that none of the intermitted numbers is a Square number, nor has any Square root.

PROP. I.

A SQUARE ROOT (speaking of quantity) is not a Line, such as Euclide defines, without Latitude, but a Rectangle.

Suppose A B C D be the Square, and AB, BC, CD, DA be the sides; and every side divided into 10 equal parts, and Lines drawn through the opposite points of division; there will then be made 100 lesser Squares, which taken all together are equal to the Square ABCD. Therefore the whole Square is 100, whereof one Square is an Unit; therefore 10 Units, which is the Root, is ten of the lesser Squares, and consequently has Latitude; and therefore it cannot be the side of a Square, which according to Euclide is a Line without Latitude.

CONSEQUENT.

IT FOLLOWS HENCE, that whosoever taketh for a Principle, That a Side of a Square is a meer Line without Latitude, and That the Root of a Square is such a Line, (as Dr. Wallis continually does) demonstrates nothing.

But if a Line be divided into what number of equal parts soever, so the Line have bredth allowed it, (as all Lines must, if they be drawn) and the length be to the bredth as Number to an Unite, the Side and the Root will be all of one length.

PROP. II.

ANY NUMBER GIVEN is produced by the greatest Root multiplied into it self, and into the remaining Fraction. Let the Number given be two hundred Squares, the greatest Root is 14 4/14 Squares. I say, that 200 is equal to the product of 14 into it self, together with 14 multiplied into 4/14. For 14 multiplied into it self, makes 196. And 14 into 4/14 makes 56/14, which is equal to 4. And 4 added to 196 maketh 200; as was to be proved.

Or take any other Number 8, the greatest Root is 2; which multiplied into it self is 4, and the Remainder 4/2 multiplied into 2 is 4; and both together 8.

PROP. III.

BUT THE SAME Square calculated Geometrically by the like parts, consisteth (by Eucl. 2.4.) of the same numeral great Square 196, and of the two Rectangles under the greatest side 14, and the Remainder of the side, or (which is all one) of one Rectangle under the greatest side, and double the Remainder of the side; and further of the Square of the less Segment; which all together make 200, and moreover 1/49 of those 200 Squares, as by the operation it self appeareth thus.

The side of the greater Segment is

- 14¼.
- 14¼.

Which multiplied into it self, makes 200.

The product of 14 the greatest segment, into the two Fractions 4/14, that is, into 4/14 (or into twice 2/14) is 56/14 (that is 4) and that 4 added to 196 makes 200.

Lastly, the product of 2/14 into 2/142 or 1/7 into 1/7, is 1/49.

And so the same Square calculated by Roots, is less by 1/49 of one of those two hundred Squares, then by the true and Geometrical Calculation; as was to be demonstrated.

CONSEQUENT.

IT IS HENCE manifest, That whosoever calculates the length of an Arc or other Line by the extraction of Roots, must necessarily make it shorter then the truth, unless the Square have a true Root.

THE RADIUS OF A CIRCLE IS A MEAN PROPORTIONAL BETWEEN THE ARC OF A QUADRANT AND TWO FIFTHS OF THE SAME.

DESCRIBE A SQUARE ABCD, and in it a Quadrant DCA. In the side DC take DT two fifths of DC; and between DC and DT a Mean Proportional DR; and describe the Quadrantal Arcs RS, TV.

I say, the Arc RS is equal to the streight line DC.

For seeing the proportion of DC to DT is duplicate of the proportion of DC to DR, it will be also duplicate of the proportion of the Arc CA to the Arc RS; and likewise duplicate of the proportion of the Arc RS to the Arc TV.

Suppose some other Arc less or greater then the Arc RS to be equal to DC, as for example rs: Then the proportion of the Arc rs to the streight line DT will be duplicate of the proportion of RS to TV, or DR to DT. Which is absurd; because Dr is by construction greater or less then DR.

Therefore the Arc RS is equal to the side DC. Which was to be demonstrated.

COROL.

HENCE IT FOLLOWS that DR is equal to two fifths of the Arc CA. For RS, TV, DT being continually proportional; and the Arc TV being described by DT, the Arc RS will be described by a streight line equal to TV. But RS is described by the streight line DR. Therefore DR is equal to TV, that is, to two fifths of CA.

And your said servant most humbly prayeth you to consider (if the demonstration be true and evident) whether the way of objecting against it by Square Roots, used by Dr. Wallis; and whether all his Geometry, as being, built upon it, and upon his supposition of an Infinite Number, be not false.

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE ANSWER OF DR. WALLIS TO THE THREE PAPERS OF MR. HOBBES.

DR. WALLIS SAYES, All that is affirmed, is but, If we SVPPOSE That, This will follow.

But it seemeth to me, that if the Supposition be impossible, then that which follows will either be false, or at least undemonstrated.

First, this Proposition being founded upon his Arithmetica Infinitorum, If there he affirm an absolute Infiniteness, he must here also be understood to affirm the same. But in his 39th Proposition he saith thus: Seeing that the number of terms increasing, the excess above sub-quadruple is perpetually diminished, so as at last it becomes less than any proportion that can be assigned; If it proceed in infinitum it must utterly vanish. And therefore if there be propounded an Infinite row of quantities in triplicate proportion of quantities Arithmetically proportional (that is, according to the row of Cubical numbers) beginning from a point or 0; that row shall be to a row of as many, equal to the greatest, as 1 to 4.

It is therefore manifest that he affirms, That in an Infinite row of quantities the last is given; and he knows well enough that this is but a shift.

Secondly, he sayes, That usually in Euclide and all after him, by Infinite is meant but, more than any assignable Finite, or the greatest possible.

I am content it be so interpreted. But then from thence he must demonstrate those his conclusions, which he hath not yet done. And when he shall have done it, not only the Conclusions, but also the Demonstration will be the same with mine in Ca. Art. 2, 3, &c. of my Book De Corpore. And so he steals what he once condemn’d. A fine quality.

Thirdly, he sayes (by Euclides 10th Proposition, but he tells not of what Book) That a Line may be bisected, and the halves of it may again be bisected, and so onwards infinitely; and that upon such supposed Section Infinitely continued, the parts must be supposed Infinitely many.

I deny that; for Euclide, if he sayes a Line may be divisible into parts perpetually divisible, he means, That all the divisions, and all the parts arising from those divisions, are perpetually Finite in number.

Fourthly, he sayes, That there may be supposed a row of quantities infinitely many, and continually increasing, whereof the last is given.

'Tis true, a man may say (if that be supposing) that white is black; but if Supposing be Thinking, he cannot suppose an Infinite row of quantities whereof the last is given. And if he say it, he can demonstrate nothing from it.

Fifthly, He sayes (for one absurdity begets another) That a Superficies or Solid may be supposed so constituted, as to be Infinitely long, but Finitely great (the breadth continually decreasing in greater proportion than the length increaseth) and so as to have no center of gravity. Such is Toricellio's Solidum Hyperbolicum acutum, and others innumerable discovered by Dr. Wallis, Monsieur Fermat, and others. But to determine this, requires more of Geometry and Logick (whatsoever it do of the Latine Tongue) than Mr. Hobbes is master of.

I do not remember this of Toricellio, and I doubt Dr Wallis does him wrong, and Monsieur Fermat too. For to understand this for sense, 'tis not required that a man should be a Geometrician or a Logician, but that he should be mad.

In the next place he puts to me a Question as absurd as his Answers are to mine. Let him ask himself (saith he) if he be still of opinion, That there is no Argument in Natural Philosophy to prove that the World had a beginning: First, whether in case it had no beginning, there must not have

passed an Infinite number of years before Mr. Hobbes was born. Secondly, whether at this time there have not passed more, that is, more than that Infinite number. Thirdly, whether, in that Infinite (or more than Infinite) number of years, there have not been a greater number of dayes and hours, and of which hitherto the last is given. Fourthly, whether, if this be an Absurdity, we have not then (contrary to what Mr. Hobbes would perswade us) an Argument in Nature to prove the World had a beginning.

To this I answer, not willingly, but in service to the Truth, that by the same Argument he might as well prove that God had a beginning. Thus: in case he had not, there must have passed an Infinite length of time before Mr. Hobbes was born; but there hath passed at this day more than that Infinite length (by eighty four years). And this day, which is the last, is given. If this be an Absurdity, have we not then an Argument in Nature to prove that God had a beginning? Thus ’tis when men intangle themselves in a Dispute of that which they cannot comprehend. But perhaps he looks for a Solution of his Argument to prove that there is somewhat greater than Infinite; which I shall do so far, as to shew it is not concluding. If from this day backwards to Eternity be more than Infinite, and from Mr. Hobbes his birth backwards to the same Eternity be Infinite, then take away from this day backwards to the time of Adam, which is more than from this day to Mr. Hobbes his birth, then that which remains backwards must be less than Infinite. All this arguing of Infinites is but the ambition of School-boyes.

TO THE LATTER PART OF THE FIRST PAPER.

THERE IS NO doubt, if we give what Proportion we will of the Radius to the Arc, but that the Arc upon that Arc will have the same Proportion. But that is nothing to my Demonstration. He knows it, and wrongs the Royal Society in presuming they cannot find the Impertinence of it.

My proof is this; That if the Arc on TV, and the Arc RS, and the streight Line CD, be not equal, then the Arc on TV, the Arc on RS, and the Arc on CA, cannot be proportional. Which is manifest by supposing in DC a less than the said DC; but equal to RS, and another streight Line, less than RS, equal to the Arc on TV; and any body may examine it by himself.

I have been asked by some that think themselves Logicians, Why I proceeded upon 2/5 rather than any other part of the Radius. The reason I had for it was, That long ago some Arabians had determined, That a streight Line whose square is equal to 10 squares of half the Radius, is equal to a quarter of the Perimiter; but their demonstrations are lost. From that Equality it follows, that the third proportional to the Quadrant and Radius, must be a mean proportional between the Radius and 2/5 of the same. But my answer to the Logicians was, That though I took any part of the Radius to proceed on, and lighted on the Truth by chance, the Truth it self would appear by the Absurdity arising from the denial of it. And this is it that Aristotle meant, where he distinguisheth between a Direct demonstration, and a demonstration leading to an absurdity. Hence it appears, that Dr. Wallis his objections to my Rosetum are invalid, as built upon Roots.

TO THE SECOND PAPER.

FIRST, HE SAYES, That it concerns him no more than other men. Which is true. I meant it against the whole Herd of them who apply their Algebra to Geometry.

Secondly, He sayes, That a bare Number cannot be the Side of a Square figure.

I would know what he means by a Bare Number. Ten Lines may be the side of a Square figure. Is there any Number so bare, as by it we are not to conceive or consider any thing numbred? Or by ten Nothings understands he Bare 10? He struggles in vain, his Conscience puzzles him.

Thirdly, He sayes, Ten Squares is the Root of 100 Square-squares. To which I answer, first, That there is no such Figure as a Square-square. Secondly, That it follows hence that a Root is a Superficies, for such is 10 Squares.

Lastly, He sayes, That neither the Number 10, nor 10 Souldiers is the Root of 100 Souldiers; because 100 Souldiers is not the Product of 10 Souldiers into 10 Souldiers.

That last I grant, because nothing but Numbers can be multiplied into one another. A Souldier cannot be multiplied by a Souldier. But no more can a Square-figure by a Square-figure, though a Square-number may. Again, If a Captain will place his hundred Men in a square Form, must not he take the Root of 100 to make a Rank or File? And are not those 10 Men?

TO THE THIRD PAPER.

HE OBJECTS NOTHING here, but that, The Side of a Square is not a Superficies but a Line, and that a Square Root (speaking of quantity) is not a Line but a Rectangle, is a contradiction. The Reader is to judge of that.

To his Scoffings I say no more, but that they may be retorted in the same words, and are therefore childish.

And now I submit the whole to the Royal Society, with confidence that they will never ingage themselves in the maintenance of these Unintelligible Doctrines of Dr. Wallis, that tend to the suppression of the Sciences which they endeavour to advance.

Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy

OR, DECAMERON PHYSIOLOGICUM

1678 EDITION

CONTENTS

CAP. I. OF THE ORIGINAL OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

CAP. II. OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHOD OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

CAP. III. OF VACUUM.

CAP. IV. OF THE SYSTEME OF THE WORLD.

CAP. V. OF THE MOTIONS OF WATER AND AIR.

CAP. VI. OF THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF HEAT AND COLD.

CAP. VII. OF HARD AND SOFT, AND OF THE ATOMES THAT FLIE IN THE AIR.

CAP. VIII. OF GRAVITY AND GRAVITATION.

CAP. IX. OF THE LOADSTONE, AND ITS POLES; AND WHETHER THEY SHEW THE LONGITUDE OF PLACES ON THE EARTH.

CAP. X. OF TRANSPARENCE, REFRACTION; AND OF THE POWER OF THE EARTH TO PRODUCE LIVING CREATURES.



A 1688 line engraving of Hobbes

Decameron Physiologicum:

OR, TEN DIALOGUES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

By THOMAS HOBBES of Malmsbury.

To which is added

The Proportion of a straight Line to half the Arc of a Quadrant.

By the same AUTHOR.

LONDON: Printed by J. C. for W. Crook at the Green Dragon without Temple-Bar.

1678.

CAP. I. OF THE ORIGINAL OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

A.

I Have heard exceeding highly commended a kinde of thing which I do not well understand, though it be much talkt of, by such as have not otherwise much to do, by the name of Philosophy. And the same again by others as much despised and derided. So that I cannot tell whether it be good or ill, nor what to make of it, though I see many other men that thrive by it.

B.

I doubt not, but what so many do so highly praise must be very admirable, and what is derided and scorn'd by many, foolish and ridiculous. The honour and scorn falleth finally not upon Philosophy, but upon the Professors. Philosophy is The knowledge of Natural Causes. And there is no Knowledge but of Truth. And to know the true Causes of things, was never in contempt, but in admiration. Scorn can never fasten upon Truth. But the difference is all in the Writers and Teachers. Whereof some have neither studied, nor care for it, otherwise than as a Trade to maintain themselves or gain Preferment; and some for Fashion, and to make themselves fit for ingenious Company: and their study hath not been meditation, but acquiescence in the Authority of those Authors whom they have heard commended. And some (but few) there be, that have studied it for Curiosity, and the delight which commonly men have in the acquisition of Science, and in the mastery of difficult and subtil Doctrines. Of this last sort I count Aristotle, and a few others of the Ancients, and some few

Moderns: and to these it is that properly belong the Praises which are given to Philosophy.

A.

If I have a minde to study (for example Natural Philosophy) must I then needs read Aristotle, or some of those that now are in request?

B.

There's no necessity of it. But if in your own meditation you light upon a difficulty, I think 'tis no loss of time, to enquire what other men say of it, but to rely onely upon Reason. For though there be some few Effects of Nature (especially concerning the Heavens) whereof the Philosophers of old time have assigned very rational Causes, such as any man may acquiesce in, as of Eclipses of the Sun and Moon by long observation, and by the Calculation of their visible Motions; yet what is that to the numberless and quotidian Phaenomena of Nature? Who is there amongst them or their Successors, that has satisfied you with the Causes of Gravity, Heat, Cold, Light, Sense, Colour, Noise, Rain, Snow, Frost, Winds, Tides of the Sea, and a thousand other things which a few mens lives are too short to go through, and which you and other curious Spirits admire (as quotidian as they are) and fain would know the Causes of them, but shall not finde them in the Books of Naturalists; and when you ask what are the Causes of any of them, of a Philosopher now, he will put you off with mere words; which words, examined to the bottom, signifie not a jot more than I cannot tell, or Because it is: Such as are Intrinsecal quality, Occult quality, Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, and the like. Which pass well enough with those that care not much for such wisdom, though wise enough in their own ways; but will not pass with you that ask not simply what's the Cause, but in what manner it comes about that such Effects are produced.

A.

That's Cozening. What need had they of that? When began they thus to play the Charletants?

B.

Need had they none. But know you not that men from their very birth, and naturally, scramble for every thing they covet, and would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them? If by fortune or industry one light upon a Secret in Nature, and thereby obtain the credit of an extraordinary Knowing man, should he not make use of it to his own benefit? There is scarce one of a thousand but would live upon the charges of the people as far as he dares. What poor Geometrician is there, but takes pride to be thought a Conjurer? what Mountebank would not make a living out of a false opinion that he were a great Physician? And when many of them are once engaged in the maintenance of an Errour, they will joyn together for the saving of their Authority to decry the Truth.

A.

I pray, tell me, if you can, how and where the study of Philosophy first began.

B.

If we may give Credit to old Histories, the first that studyed any of the Natural Sciences were the Astronomers of Aethiopia. My Author is Diodorus Siculus, accounted a very faithful Writer, who begins his History as high as is possible, and tells us that in Aethiopia were the first Astronomers; and that for their Predictions of Eclipses, and other

Conjunctions and Aspects of the Planets, they obtained of their King not onely Towns and Fields to a third part of the whole Land, but were also in such veneration with the People, that they were thought to have discourse with their Gods, which were the Stars; and made their Kings thereby to stand in awe of them, that they durst not either eat or drink but what and when they prescribed; no nor live, if they said the Gods commanded them to die. And thus they continued in subjection to their false Prophets, till by one of their Kings, called Ergamenes, (about the time of the Ptolemies) they were put to the Sword. But long before the time of Ergamenes, the Race of these Astrologers (for they had no Disciples but their own Children) was so numerous, that abundance of them (whether sent for or no I cannot tell) transplanted themselves into Egypt, and there also had their Cities and Lands allowed them, and were in request not onely for Astronomy and Astrologie, but also for Geometry. And Egypt was then as it were an University to all the world, and thither went the curious Greeks, as Pythagoras, Plato, Thales, and others, to fetch Philosophy into Greece. But long before that time, abundance of them went into Assyria, and had their Towns and Lands assigned them also there; and were by the Hebrews called Chaldies.

A.

Why so?

B.

I cannot tell; but I finde in Martinius Lexicon they were called Chasdim, and Chesdim, and (as he saith) from one Chesed the son of Nachor; but I finde no such man as Chesed amongst the issue of Noah in the Scripture. Nor do I finde that there was any certain Country called Chaldaea; though a Town where any of them inhabited were called A Town of the Chaldies.

Martinius saith further, that the same word Chasdim did signifie also Demons.

A.

By this reckoning I should conjecture they were called Chusdim, as being a Race of Ethiopians. For the Land of Chus is Aethiopia; and so the name degenerated first into Chuldim, and then into Chaldim; so that they were such another kinde of people as we call Gypsies; saving that they were admired and feared for their Knavery, and the Gypsies counted Rogues.

B.

Nay pray, except Claudius Ptolomaeus, Author of that great Work of Astronomy, the Almegest.

A.

I grant he was excellent both in Astronomy and Geometry, and to be commended for his Almegest; but then for his Judiciar Astrologie annexed to it, he is again a Gypsie. But the Greeks that travelled (you say) into Egypt, what Philosophy did they carry home?

B.

The Mathematiques and Astronomy. But for that sublunary Physiques, which is commonly called Natural Philosophy, I have not read of any Nation that studied it earlier than the Greeks, from whom it proceeded to the Romans. Yet both Greeks and Romans were more addicted to Moral than to Natural Philosophy; in which kinde we have their Writings, but loosly and incoherently, written upon no other Principles than their own Passions and Presumptions, without any respect to the Laws of Common-

wealth, which are the ground and measure of all true Morality. So that their Books tend rather to teach men to censure than to obey the Laws. Which has been a great hinderance to the Peace of the Western world ever since. But they that seriously applied themselves to Natural Philosophy were but few, as Plato and Aristotle, whose Works we have; and Epicurus, whose Doctrine we have in Lucretius. The Writings of Philolaus and many other curious Students being by fire or negligence now lost: though the Doctrine of Philolaus concerning the Motion of the Earth have been revived by Copernicus, and explained and confirmed by Galileo now of late.

A.

But methinks the Natural Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and the rest, should have been cultivated and made to flourish by their Disciples.

B.

Whom do you mean, the Successors of Plato, Epicurus, Aristotle, and the other first Philosophers? It may be some of them may have been learned and worthy men. But not long after, and down to the time of our Saviour and his Apostles, they were for the most part a sort of needy, ignorant, impudent cheating fellows, who by the profession of the Doctrine of those first Philosophers, got their living. For at that time, the name of Philosophy was so much in fashion and honour amongst great persons, that every rich man had a Philosopher of one Sect or another to be a Schoolmaster to his Children. And these were they that faining Christianity, with their disputing and readiness of talking got themselves into Christian Commons, and brought so many Heresies into the Primitive Church, every one retaining still a tang of what they had been us’d to teach.

A.

But those Heresies were all condemned in the first Council of Nice.

B.

Yes. But the Arrian Heresie for a long time flourished no less than the Roman, and was upheld by divers Emperours, and never fully extinguished as long as there were Vandals in Christendom. Besides, there arose daily other Sects, opposing their Philosophy to the Doctrine of the Councils concerning the Divinity of our Saviour; as, how many Persons he was, how many Natures he had. And thus it continued till the time of Charlemain, when he and Pope Leo the third divided the Power of the Empire into Temporal and Spiritual.

A.

A very unequal division.

B.

Why? Which of them think you had the greater share?

A.

No doubt, the Emperour: For he onely had the Sword.

B.

When the Swords are in the hands of men, whether had you rather command the Men or the Swords?

A.

I understand you. For he that hath the hands of the Men, has also the use both of their Swords and strength.

B.

The Empire thus divided into Spiritual and Temporal, the freedom of Philosophy was to the power Spiritual very dangerous. And for that cause it behoved the Pope to get Schools set up not onely for Divinity, but also for other Sciences, especially for Natural Philosophy. Which when by the power of the Emperour he had effected, out of the mixture of Aristotle's Metaphysicks with the Scripture, there arose a new Science called School-Divinity; which has been the principal Learning of these Western parts from the time of Charlemain till of very late.

A.

But I finde not in any of the Writings of the School-men in what manner, from the causes they assigne, the Effect is naturally and necessarily produced.

B.

You must not wonder at that. For you enquire not so much, when you see a change of any thing, what may be said to be the cause of it, as how the same is generated; which generation is the entire progress of Nature from the efficient cause to the Effect produced. Which is always a hard Question, and for the most part impossible for a man to answer to. For the alterations of the things we perceive by our five Senses are made by the motion of Bodies (for the most part) either for distance, smalness, or transparence, invisible.

A.

But what need had they then to assigne any cause at all, seeing they could not shew the Effect was to follow from it?

B.

The Schools (as I said) were erected by the Pope and Emperour, but directed by the Pope onely, to answer and confute the Heresies of the Philosophers. Would you have them then betray their Profession and Authority, that is to say, their Livelihood, by confessing their ignorance? Or rather uphold the same, by putting for causes, strange and unintelligible words; which might serve well enough not onely to satisfie the people whom they relied on, but also to trouble the Philosophers themselves to finde a fault in.

A.

Seeing you say that Alteration is wrought by the Motion of Bodies, pray tell me first what I am to understand by the word Body.

B.

It is a hard Question, though most men think they can easily answer it, as that it is whatsoever they can see, feel, or take notice of by their Senses. But if you will know indeed what is body, we must enquire first what there is that is not Body. You have seen (I suppose) the Effects of Glasses, how they multiply and magnifie the Object of our sight; as when a Glass of a certain Figure will make a Counter or a Shilling seem twenty, though you be well assured there is but one. And if you set a mark upon it, you will finde the

mark upon them all. The Counter is certainly one of those things we call Bodies: Are not the others so too?

A.

No, without doubt. For looking through a Glass cannot make them really more than they are.

B.

What then be they but fancies, so many fancies of one and the same thing in several places?

A.

’Tis manifest they are so many Idols, mere Nothings.

B.

When you have look’d upon a Star or Candle with both your eyes, but one of them a little turn’d awry with your finger, has not there appeared two Stars, or two Candles? And though you call it a deception of the sight, you cannot deny but there were two Images of the Object.

A.

’Tis true, and observed by all men. And the same I say of our faces seen in Lookingglasses, and of all Dreams, and of all Apparitions of dead mens Ghosts; and wonder, since ’tis so manifest, I never thought upon’t before, for it is a very happy encounter, and such as being by every body well understood, would utterly destroy both Idolatry and Superstition, and defeat abundance of Knaves that cheat and trouble the world with their devices.

B.

But you must not hence conclude that whosoever tells his Dream, or sometimes takes his direction from it, is therefore an Idolater, or Superstitious, or a Cheater. For God doth often admonish men by Dreams of what they ought to do; yet men must be wary in this case that they trust not Dreams with the conduct of their lives further than by the Laws of their Country is allow'd: For you know what God says, Deut. 13. If a Prophet or a Dreamer of Dreams give thee a signe or a wonder, and the signe come to pass, yet if he did thee serve other Gods, let him be put to death. Here by serving other Gods (since they had chosen God for their King) we are to understand revolting from their King, or disobeying of his Laws. Otherwise I see no Idolatry nor Superstition in following a Dream, as many of the Patriarches (in the Old Testament) and of the Saints (in the New Testament) did.

A.

Yes: Their own Dreams. But when another man shall dream, or say that he has dream'd, and require me to follow that, he must pardon me if I ask him by what Authority, especially if he look I should pay him for it.

B.

But if commanded by the Laws you live under, you ought to follow it. But when there proceed from one Sound divers Echoes, what are those Echoes? And when with fingers cross'd you touch a small Bullet, and think it two; and when the same Herb or Flower smells well to one and ill to another, and the same at several times, well and ill to your self, and the like of Tastes, what are those Echoes, Feelings, Odours, and Tastes?

A.

’Tis manifest they are all but Fancies. But certainly when the Sun seems to my eye no bigger than a Dish, there is behinde it somewhere somewhat else (I suppose a real Sun) which creates those fancies, by working (one way or other) upon my eyes, and other Organs of my Senses, to cause that diversity of Fancy.

B.

You say right; and that is it I mean by the word Body, which briefly I define to be any thing that hath a Being in it self, without the help of Sense.

A.

Aristotle (I think) meaneth by Body, Substance, or Subjectum, wherein Colour, Sound, and other Fancies are (as he says) inherent. For the word Essence has no affinity with Substance. And Seneca says, he understands it not. And no wonder: for Essence is no part of the Language of mankinde, but a word devised by Philosophers out of the Copulation of two names, as if a man having two Hounds could make a third (if ‘twere need) of ther• Couples.

B.

’Tis just fo. For having said in themselves (for example) A Tree is a Plant, and conceiving well enough what is the signification of those Names, knew not what to make of the word Is that couples those Names; nor daring to call it a Body, they called it by a new name, (derived from the word est) Essentia, and Substantia, deceived by the Idiome of their own Language. For in many other Tongues, and namely in the Hebrew, there is no such

Copulative. They thought the Names of things sufficiently connected, when they are placed in their natural consequence; and were therefore never troubled with Essences, nor other Fallacy from the Copulative Est.

CAP. II. OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHOD OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

A.

THIS History of the old Philosophers has not put me out of love, but out of hope of Philosophy from any of their Writings. I would therefore try if I could attain any knowledge therein by my own meditation: But I know neither where to begin, nor which way to proceed.

B.

Your desire (you say) is to know the Causes of the Effects or Phaenomena of Nature; and you confess they are Fancies, and (consequently) that they are in your self; so that the Causes you seek for onely are without you, and now you would know how those external Bodies work upon you to produce those Phaenomena. The beginning therefore of your enquiry ought to be at What it is you call a Cause, I mean an Efficient Cause: For the Philosophers make four kindes of Causes, whereof the Efficient is one. Another they call the Formal Cause, or simply the form or essence of the thing caused; as when they say, Four equal Angles and four equal Sides are the Cause of a Square Figure, or that Heaviness is the Cause that makes heavie Bodies to descend. But that's not the Cause you seek for, nor any thing but this: It descends because it descends. The third is the Material Cause, as when they say, The Walls and Roof, &c. of a house, are the cause of a House. The fourth is the Final Cause, and hath place onely in Moral Philosophy.

A.

We will think of Final Causes upon some other occasion; of Formal and Material not at all: I seek onely the Efficient, and how it acteth from the beginning to the production of the Effect.

B.

I say then, that in the first place you are to enquire diligently into the nature of Motion. For the variations of Fancies, or (which is the same thing) of the Phaenomena of Nature, have all of them one Universal Efficient Cause, namely the variety of Motion. For if all things in the world were absolutely at rest, there could be no variety of Fancy, but living Creatures would be without sense of all Objects, which is little less than to be dead.

A.

What if a Childe new taken from the Womb should with open eyes be exposed to the Azure-Sky, do not you think it would have some sense of the Light, but that all would seem unto him Darkness?

B.

Truly, if he had no memory of any thing formerly seen, or by any other sense perceived (which is my supposition) I think he would be in the dark. For Darkness is Darkness, whether it be black or blue, to him that cannot distinguish.

A.

Howsoever that be, it is evident enough that whatsoever worketh is moved: for Action is Motion.

B.

Having well considered the nature of Motion, you must thence take your Principles for the foundation and beginning of your Enquiry.

A.

As how?

B.

Explain as fully and as briefly as you can what you constantly mean by Motion; which will save your self as well as others from being seduced by Aequivocation.

A.

Then I say, Motion is nothing but change of place: For all the Effect of a Body upon the Organs of our Senses is nothing but Fancy. Therefore we can fancy nothing from seeing it moved, but change of place.

B.

'Tis right. But you must then tell me also what you understand by Place: For all men are not yet agreed on that.

A.

Well then; seeing we fancy a Body, we cannot but fancy it somewhere. And therefore I think Place is the fancy of Here or There.

B.

That is not enough. Here and There are not understood by any but your self, except you point towards it. But pointing is no part of a Definition. Besides,

though it help him to finde the Place, it will never bring him to it.

A.

But seeing Sense is Fancy, when we fancy a Body, we fancy also the Figure of it, and the space it fills up. And then I may define Place to be The precise space within which the Body is contained. For Space is also part of the Image we have of the Object seen.

B.

And how define you Time?

A.

As Place is to a Body, so (I think) is Time to the Motion of it; and consequently I take Time to be our fancy or Image of the Motion. But is there any necessity of so much niceness?

B.

Yes. The want of it is the greatest, if not the onely cause, of all the discord amongst Philosophers, as may easily be perceived by their abusing and confounding the names of things that differ in their nature; as you shall see when there is occasion to recite some of the Tenets of divers Philosophers.

A.

I will avoid Aequivocation as much as I can. And for the nature of Motion, I suppose I understand it by the Definition. What is next to be done?

B.

You are to draw from these Definitions, and from whatsoever Truth else you know by the light of Nature, such general Consequences as may serve for Axiomes, or Principles of your Ratiocination.

A.

That is hard to do.

B.

I will draw them my self, as many as for our present discourse of Natural Causes we shall have need of; so that your part will be no more than to take heed I do not deceive you.

A.

I will look to that.

B.

My first Axiome then shall be this: Two Bodies, at the same Time, cannot be in one Place.

A.

That's true: For we number Bodies as we fancy them distinct, and distinguish them by their Places. You may therefore adde, Nor one Body at the same time in two Places. And Philosophers mean the same, when they say, There is no penetration of Bodies.

B.

But they understand not their own words: For penetration signifies it not.

My second Axiome is, That nothing can begin, change, or put an end to its own Motion. For supposing it begin just now, or being now in Motion, change its Way or Stop; I require the Cause why now rather than before or after, having all that is necessary to such Motion, Change, or Rest, alike at all times.

A.

I do not doubt but the Argument is good in Bodies inanimate; but perhaps in Voluntary Agents it does not hold.

B.

How it holds in Voluntary Agents we will then consider when our Method hath brought us to the Powers and Passions of the minde.

A third Axiome shall be this: Whatsoever Body being at Rest is afterwards moved, hath for its Immediate Movent some other Body which is in Motion and toucheth it. For, since nothing can move it self, the Movent must be external. And because Motion is change of place, the Movent must put it from its place, which it cannot do till it touch it.

A.

That is manifest, and that it must more than touch it, it must also follow it. And if more parts of the Body are moved than are by the Movent touched, the Movent is not Immediate. And by this reason, a continued Body though never so great, if the first Superficies be prest never so little back, the Motion will proceed through it.

B.

Do you think that to be impossible? I will prove it from your own words: For you say that the Movent does then touch the Body which it moveth. Therefore it puts it back; But that which is put back, puts back the next behinde, and that again the next; and so onward to any distance, the body being continued. The same is also manifest by experience, seeing one that walks with a Staff can distinguish (though blinde) between Stone and Glass; which were impossible, if the parts of his Staff between the ground and his hand made no resistance. So also he that in the silence of the night lays his Ear to the ground, shall hear the treading of mens feet further than if he stood upright.

A.

This is certainly true of a Staff or other hard Body, because it keeps the Motion in a straight Line from diffusion. But in such a Fluid Body as the Air, which being put back must fill an Orb, and the further it is put back, the greater Orb, the Motion will decrease, and in time, by the resistance of Air to Air, come to an end.

B.

That any Body in the world is absolutely at Rest, I think not true: But I grant, that in a space filled every where with Body, though never so Fluid, if you give Motion to any part thereof, that Motion will by resistance of the parts moved, grow less and less, and at last cease; but if you suppose the space utterly void, and nothing in it, then whatsoever is once moved shall go on eternally: Or else that which you have granted is not true, viz. That nothing can put an end to its own Motion.

A.

But what mean you by resistance?

B.

Resistance is the Motion of a Body in a way wholly or partly contrary to the way of its Movent, and thereby repelling or retarding it. As when a man runs swiftly, he shall feel the Motion of the Air in his face. But when two hard Bodies meet, much more may you see how they abate each others Motion, and rebound from one another. For in a space already full, the Movent cannot, in an instant, be communicated through the whole depth of the Body that is to be moved.

A.

What other Definitions have I need of?

B.

In all Motion, as in all Quantity, you must take the beginning of your reckoning from the least supposed Motion. And this I call the first Endeavour of the Movent; which Endeavour, how weak soever, is also Motion. For if it have no Effect at all, neither will it do any thing though doubled, trebled, or by what number soever multiplied: For Nothing, though multiplied, is still Nothing. Other Axiomes and Definitions we will take in, as we need them, by the way.

A.

Is this all the preparation I am to make?

B.

No, you are to consider also the several kinds and properties of Motion, viz. when a Body being moved by one or more Movents at once, in what way it is carried, straight, circular, or otherwise crooked; and what degree of swiftness; as also the action of the Movent, whether Trusion, Vection, Percussion, Reflexion, or Refraction; and further you must furnish your self with as many experiments (which they call Phaenomenon) as you can. And supposing some Motion for the Cause of your Phaenomenon, try if by evident Consequence, without contradiction to any other manifest truth or experiment, you can derive the Cause you seek for from your Supposition. If you can, 'tis all that is expected (as to that one Question) from Philosophy. For there is no Effect in Nature which the Author of Nature cannot bring to pass by more ways than one.

A.

What I want of Experiments you may supply out of your own store, or such Natural History as you know to be true; though I can be well content with the knowledge of the Causes of those things which every Body sees commonly produced. Let us therefore now enquire the Cause of some Effect particular.

B.

We will begin with that which is the most universal, the Universe, and enquire in the first place, if any place be absolutely empty, that is to say in the language of Philosophers, whether there be any Vacuum in Nature.

CAP. III. OF VACUUM.

A.

‘TIS hard to suppose, and harder to believe that the Infinite and Omnipotent Creator of all things should make a work so vast as is the world we see, and leave a few little spaces with nothing at all in them; which put altogether in respect of the whole Creature, would be insensible.

B.

Why say you that? Do you think any Argument can be drawn from it to prove there is Vacuum?

A.

Why not? For in so great an Agitation of Natural Bodies, may not some small parts of them be cast out, and leave the places empty from whence they were thrown?

B.

Because he that created them is not a Fancy, but the most real substance that is; who being Infinite, there can be no place empty where he is, nor full where he is not.

A.

’Tis hard to answer this Argument, because I do not remember that there is any Argument for the maintenance of Vacuum in the writings of Divines:

Therefore I will quit that Argument, and come to another. If you take a Glass Vial with a narrow neck, and having suckt it, dip it presently at the neck into a bason of water, you shall manifestly see the water rise into the Vial. Is not this a certain signe that you had suckt out some of the Air, and consequently that some part of the Vial was left empty?

B.

No: For when I am about to suck, and have Air in my mouth, contracting my Cheeks I drive the same against the Air in the Glass, and thereby against every part of the sides of the hard Glass. And this gives to the Air within an Endeavour outward, by which (if it be presently dipt into the water) it will penetrate and enter into it. For Air if it be prest will enter into any Fluid, much more into water. Therefore there shall rise into the Vial so much water as there was Air forced into the Bason.

A.

This I confess is possible, and not improbable.

B.

If sucking would make Vacuum, what would become of those women that are Nurses? Should they not be in a very few days exhausted, were it not that either the Air which is in the Childs mouth penetrateth the Milk as it descends, and passeth through it, or the Breast is contracted?

A.

From what Experiment can you evidently infer that there is no Vacuum?

B.

From many, and such as to almost all men are known and familiar. If two hard Bodies, flat and smooth, be joyned together in a common Superficies parallel to the Horizontal Plain, you cannot without great force pull them asunder, if you apply your force perpendicularly to the common Superficies: But if you place that common Superficies erect to the Horizon, they will fall asunder with their own weight. From whence I argue thus: Since their Contiguity, in what posture soever, is the same, and that they cannot be pull'd asunder by a perpendicular force without letting in the ambient Air in an instant, which is impossible; or almost in an instant, which is difficult: and on the other side, when the common Superficies is erect, the weight of the same hard Bodies are able to break the Contiguity, and let in the Air successively, it is manifest that the difficulty of Separation proceeds from this, that neither Air nor any other Body can be moved to any (how small soever) distance in an instant; but may easily be moved (the hardness at the sides once mastered) successively. So that the Cause of this difficulty of Separation is this, that they cannot be parted except the Air or other matter can enter and fill the space made by their diremption. And if they were infinitely hard, not at all. And hence also you may understand the Cause why any hard Body, when it is suddenly broken, is heard to crack; which is the swift Motion of the Air to fill the space between.

Another Experiment, and commonly known, is of a Barrel of Liquor, whose Tap-hole is very little, and the Bung so stopt as to admit no Air; for then the Liquor will not run: but if the Tap-hole be large it will, because the Air prest by a heavier Bodie will pierce through it into the Barrel. The like reason holds of a Gardeners Watering-pot, when the holes in the bottom are not too great. A third Experiment is this: Turn a thin Brass kettle the bottom upwards, and lay it flat upon the Water. It will sink till the water rise within to a certain height, but no higher: Yet let the bottom be perforated, and the Kettle will be full and sink, and the Air rise again through the water

without. But if a Bell were so laid on, it would be fill'd and sink, though it were not perforated, because the weight is greater than the weight of the same bulk of water.

A.

By these Experiments, without any more, I am convinced, that there is not actually in Nature any Vacuum; but I am not sure but that there may be made some little place empty, and this from two Experiments, one whereof is Torricellius his Experiment, which is this: Take a Cylinder of Glass, hollow throughout, but close at the end, in form of a Sack.

B.

How long?

A.

As long as you will, so it be more than 29 inches.

B.

And how broad?

A.

As broad as you will, so it be broad enough to pour into it Quicksilver. And fill it with Quicksilver, and stop up the Entrance with your finger, so as to unstop it again at your pleasure. Then set down a Bason, or (if you will) a Sea of Quicksilver, and inverting the Cylinder full as it is, dip the end into the Quicksilver, and remove your finger, that the Cylinder may empt it self. Do you conceive me? For there is so many passing by, that I cannot paint it.

B.

Yes, I conceive you well enough. What follows?

A.

The Quicksilver will descend in the Cylinder, not till it be level with that in the Bason according to the nature of heavie Fluids, but stay and stand above it at the height of 29 inches or very neer it, the bottom being now uppermost that no Air can get in.

B.

What do you infer from this?

A.

That all the Cavitie above 29 inches is fill'd with Vacuum.

B.

'Tis very strange that I, from this same Experiment, should infer (and I think evidently) that it is fill'd with Air. I pray, tell me, when you had inverted the Cylinder, full as it was, and stopt with your finger, dipt into the Bason, if you had then removed your finger, whether you think the Quicksilver would not all have fallen out?

A.

No sure. The Air would have been prest upward through the Quicksilver it self: For a man with his hand can easily thrust a Bladder of Air to the bottom of a Bason of Quicksilver.

B.

It is therefore manifest that Quicksilver can press the Air through the same Quicksilver.

A.

’Tis manifest; and also it self rise into the Air.

B.

What cause then can there be, why it should stand still at 29 inches above the level of the Bason, rather than any place else?

A.

’Tis not hard to assigne the cause of that. For so much Quicksilver as was above the 29 inches, will raise the first level of that in the bason, as much as if you had pour’d it on; and thereby bring it to an Aequilibrium. So that I see plainly now, that there is no necessity of Vacuum from this Experiment. For I considered onely that naturally Quicksilver cannot ascend in Air, nor Air descend in Quicksilver, though by force it may.

B.

Nor do I think that Torricellius or any other Vacuist thought of it more than you. But what is the second Experiment?

A.

There is a Sphere of Glass, which they call a Recipient, of the Capacity of three or four Gallons. And there is inserted into it the end of a hollow Cylinder of Brass above a foot long; so that the whole is one Vessel, and the

bore of the Cylinder three inches Diameter. Into which is thrust by force a solid Cylinder of Wood, covered with leather so just, as it may in every point exactly touch the Concave Superficies of the Brass. There is also to let out the Air which the wooden Cylinder as it enters (called the Sucker) drives before it, a Flap to keep out the External Air while they are pulling the Sucker. Besides, at the top of the Recipient there is a hole to put into it any thing for Experiment. The Sucker being now forc'd up into the Cylinder, what do you think must follow?

B.

I think it will require as much strength to pull it back, as it did to force it in.

A.

That is not it I ask, but what would happen to the Recipient.

B.

I think so much Air as would fill the place the Sucker leaves, would descend into it out of the Recipient; and also that just so much from the External Air would enter into the Recipient, between the Brass and the Wood, at first very swiftly, but, as the place increased, more leasurely.

A.

Why may not so much Air rather descend into the place forsaken, and leave as much Vacuum as that comes to, in the Recipient? For otherwise no Air will be pumpt out; nor can that wooden Pestle be called a Sucker.

B.

That’s it I say. There is no Air either pumpt or sucked out.

A.

How can the Air pass between the Leather and the Brass, or between the Leather and the Wood being so exactly contiguous, or through the Leather it self?

B.

I conceive no such exact contiguity, nor such fastness of the Leather: For I never yet had any that in a storm would keep out either Air or Water.

A.

But how then could there be made in the Recipient such strange alteration both on animate and inanimate Bodies?

B.

I will tell you how: The Air descends out of the Recipient, because the Air which the Sucker removeth from behinde it self as it is pulling out, has no place to retire into without. And therefore is driven into the Engine between the wood of the Sucker and the brass of the Cylinder, and causes as much Air to come into the place forsaken by the retiring Sucker; which causeth by oft repetition of the force, a violent circulation of the Air within the Recipient, which is able quickly to kill any thing that lives by respiration, and make all the alterations that have appeared in the Engine.

CAP. IV. OF THE SYSTEME OF THE WORLD.

B.

YOU are come in good time; let us therefore sit down. There is Ink, Paper, Ruler, and Compass. Draw a little Circle to represent the Body of the Sun.

A.

'Tis done. The Centre is A, the Circumference is L M.

B.

Upon the same Centre A, draw a larger Circle to stand for the Ecliptick: For you know the Sun is always in the Plain of the Ecliptick.

A.

There 'tis. The Diameters of it at right Angles are B Z.

B.

Draw the Diameter of the Aequator.

A.

How?

B.

Through the Centre A (for the Earth is also always in the Plain of the Aequator or of some of its Parallels) so as to be distant from B 23 deg. and a half.

A.

Let it be H I: And let C G be equal to B H; and so G will be one of the Poles of the Ecliptick, suppose the North-Pole; and then H will be East, and I West. And C A produced to the Circumference in E, makes E the South-Pole.

B.

Take C K equal to C G, and the Chord G K will be the Diameter of the Arctick-Circle, and parallel to H I, the Diameter of the Aequator. Lastly, upon the point B, draw a little Circle wherein I suppose to be the Globe of the Earth.

A.

'Tis drawn, and marked with l m. And B D and K G joyned will be parallel; and as H and I are East and West, and so are B and D, and G and K.

B.

True; but producing Z B to the Circumference l m in b, the Line B b will be in the Diameter of the Ecliptick of the Earth, and B m in the Diameter of the Aequator of the Earth. In like manner, if you produce K G cutting the Circle, whose Centre is G, in d and e, and make an Angle n G d equal to b B m, the Line n G will be in the Ecliptick of the Earth, because G d is in the Aequator of the Earth. So that in the Annual Motion of the Earth through

the Ecliptick, every streight Line drawn in the Earth, is perpetually kept parallel to the place from whence it is removed.

A.

’Tis true; and ’tis the Doctrine of Copernicus. But I cannot yet conceive by what one Motion this Circle can be described otherwise than we are taught by Euclid. And then I am sure that all the Diameters shall cross one another in the Centre, which in this Figure is A.

B.

I do not say that the Diameters of a Sphere or Circle can be parallel; but that if a Circle of a lesser Sphere be moved upon the Circumference of a great Circle of a greater Sphere, that the streight Lines that are in the lesser Sphere may be kept parallel perpetually to the places they proceed from.

A.

How? And by what Motion?

B.

Take into your hand any streight Line, (as in this Figure) the Line L A M, which we suppose to be the diameter of the Suns Body; and moving it parallelly, with the ends in the Circumference, so as that the end M may withal describe a small Circle, as M a. It is manifest that all the other points of the same Line L M will by the same Motion, at the same time, describe equal Circles to it. Likewise if you take in your hand any two Diameters fastened together, the same Parallel-motion of the line L M, shall cause all the points of the other Diameter to make equal Circles to the same M a.

A.

’Tis evident; as also that every point of the Suns body shall do the like. And not onely so, but also if one end describe any other Figure, all the other points of the Body shall describe like and equal Figures to it.

B.

You see by this, that this Parallel-motion is compounded of two Motions, one Circular upon the Superficies of a Sphere, the other a streight Motion from the Centre to every point of the same Superficies, and beyond it.

A.

I see it.

B.

It follows hence, that the Sun by this Motion must every way repel the Air; and since there is no empty place for retiring, the Air must turn about in a Circular stream; but slower or swifter according as it is more or less remote from the Sun, and that according to the nature of Fluids, the Particles of the Air must continually change place with one another; and also that the stream of the Air shall be the contrary way to that of the Motion, for else the Air cannot be repelled.

A.

All this is certain.

B.

Well. Then if you suppose the Globe of the Earth to be in this stream which is made by the Motion of the Suns Body from East to West, the stream of Air wherein is the Earths Annual Motion will be from West to East.

A.

'Tis certain.

B.

Well. Then if you suppose the Globe of the Earth, whose Circle is moved Annually, to be l m, the stream of the Air without the Ecliptick falling upon the Superficies of the Earth l m without the Ecliptick, being slower, and the stream that falleth within swifter, the Earth shall be turned upon its own Centre proportionally to the greatness of the Circles; and consequently their Diameters shall be parallel; as also are other streight Lines correspondent.

A.

I deny not but the streams are as you say; and confess that the proportion of the swiftness without, is to the swiftness within, as the Suns Ecliptick to the Ecliptick of the Earth; that is to say, as the Angle HAB to the Angle m B b. And I like your Argument the better, because it is drawn from Copernicus his foundation. I mean the compounded Motion of Streight and Circular.

B.

I think I shall not offer you many demonstrations of Physical conclusions that are not derived from the Motions supposed or proved by Copernicus. For those Conclusions in Natural Philosophy I most suspect of falshood, which require most variety of Suppositions for their demonstrations.

A.

The next thing I would know, is how great or little you suppose that Circle a M.

B.

I suppose it less than you can make it: For there appears in the Sun no such Motion sensible. ’Tis the first Endeavour of the Suns Motion. But for all that, as small as the Circle is, the Motion may be as swift, and of as great strength as ’tis possible to be named. ’Tis but a kinde of trembling that necessarily happeneth in those Bodies, which with great resistance press upon one another.

A.

I understand now from what Cause proceedeth the Annual Motion: Is the Sun the Cause also of the Diurnal Motion?

B.

Not the immediate Cause. For the Diurnal Motion of the Earth is upon its own Centre, and therefore the Suns Motion cannot describe it. But it proceedeth as a necessary consequence from the Annual Motion. For which I have both experience and demonstration. The Experiment is this: Into a large Hemisphere of Wood, spherically Concave, put in a Globe of Lead, and with your hands hold it fast by the brim, moving your hands circularly, but in a very small compass, you shall see the Globe circulate about the Concave Vessel, just in the same manner as the Earth doth every year in the Air; and you shall see withal, that as it goes, it turns perpetually upon its own Centre, and very swiftly.

A.

I have seen it: And ’tis used in some great Kitchins to grinde Mustard.

B.

Is it so? Therefore take a Hemisphere of Gold (if you have it) the greater the better, and a Bullet of Gold, (and without Mustard) you shall see the same Effect.

A.

I doubt it not. But the of it Cause is evident. For any Spherical Body being in Motion upon the sides of a Concave and hard Sphere, is all the way turned upon its own Centre by the resistance of the hard Wood or Metal. But the Earth is a Bullet without weight, and meeteth onely with Air, without any harder body in the way to resist it.

B.

Do you think the Air makes no resistance, especially to so swift a Motion as is the Annual Motion of the Earth? If it do make any resistance, you cannot doubt but that it shall turn the Earth circularly, and in a contrary way to its Annual Motion; that is to say, from East to West, because the Annual Motion is from West to East.

A.

I confess it. But what deduce you from these Motions of the Sun?

B.

I deduce (first) that the Air must of necessity be moved both circularly about the Body of the Sun according to the Ecliptick, and also every way directly from it. For the Motion of the Suns Body is compounded of this Circular Motion upon the Sphere L M, and of the streight motion of its Semi-diameters from the Centre A to the Superficies of the Suns Body, which is LM. And therefore the Air must needs be repelled every way, and also continually change place to fill up the places forsaken by other parts of the Air, which else would be empty, there being no Vacuum to retire unto. So that there would be a perpetual stream of Air, and in a contrary way to the Motion of the Suns Body, such as is the Motion of Water by the sides of a Ship under sail.

A.

But this Motion of the Earth from West to East, is onely Circular, such as is described by a Compass about a Centre; and cannot therefore repel the Air as the Sun does. And the Disciples of Copernicus will have it to be the Cause of the Moons monthly motion about the Earth.

B.

And I think Copernicus himself would have said the same, if his purpose had been to have shewn the Natural Causes of the Motions of the Stars. But that was no part of his designe; which was onely from his own observations, and those of former Astronomers, to compute the times of their Motions; partly to foretel the Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Aspects of the Planets; and partly to regulate the times of the Churches Festivals. But his followers, Kepler and Galileo, make the Earths Motion to be the Efficient Cause of the Monthly motion of the Moon about the Earth; which without the like Motion to that of the Sun in LM, is impossible. Let us therefore for the present take it in as a necessary Hypothesis; which from some

Experiment that I shall produce in our following discourses, may prove to be a certain truth.

A.

But seeing A is the Centre both of the Suns Body and of the Annual Motion of the Earth, How can it be (as all Astronomers say it is) that the Orb of the Annual Motion of the Earth should be Excentrique to the Suns Body? For you know that from the Vernal Aequinox to the Autumnal, there be 187 days; but from the Autumnal Aequinox to the Vernal, there be but 178 days. What Natural Cause can you assigne for this Excentricity?

B.

Kepler ascribes it to a Magnetique vertue, viz. that one part of the Earths Superficies has a greater kindness for the Sun than the other part.

A.

I am not satisfied with that. It is Magical rather than Natural, and unworthy of Kepler. Tell me your own opinion of it.

B.

I think that the Magnetical vertue he speaks of, consisteth in this: that the Southern Hemisphere of the Earth is for the greatest part Sea, and that the greatest part of the Northern Hemisphere is dry Land. But how it is possible that from thence should proceed the Excentricity (the Sun being neerest to the Earth, when he is in the Winter-Solstice) I shall shew you when we come to speak of the Motions of Air and Water.

A.

That's time enough: For I intend it for our next meeting. In the mean time I pray you tell me what you think to be the Cause why the Equinoctial (and consequently the Solstitial) points are not always in one and the same point of the Ecliptique of the Fixt Stars. I know they are not, because the Sun does not rise and set in points diametrally opposite: For if it did, there would be no difference of the Seasons of the year.

B.

The cause of that can be no other, than that the Earth (which is l m) hath the like Motion to that which I suppose the Sun to have in L M, compounded of streight and circular from West to East in a day, as the Annual Motion hath in a year; so that (not reckoning the Excentricity) it will be moved through the Ecliptiques one Revolution (as Copernicus proveth) about one degree. Suppose then the whole Earth moved from H to I, (which is half the year) circularly, but falling from I to i in the same time about 30 minutes, and as much in the other Hemisphere from H to k; then draw the line i k, which will be equal and parallel to H I, and be the Diameter of the Aequator for the next year. But it shall not cut the Diameter of the Ecliptick B Z in A, which was the Equinoctial of the former year, but in o 36 seconds from the first degree of Aries. Suppose the same done in the Hemisphere under the Plain of the paper, and so you have the double of 36 seconds, that is 72 seconds, or very neer, for the progress of the Vernal Equinox in a year. The cause why I suppose the Arch I i to be half a degree in the Ecliptique of the Earth, is, that Copernicus and other Astronomers, and Experience, agree in this, that the Aequinoctial points proceed according to the order of the Signes, Aries, Taurus, Gemini, &c. from West to East every 100 year one degree or very neer.

A.

In what time do they make the whole Revolution through the Ecliptique of the Sky?

B.

That you may reckon. For we know by Experience that it hath proceeded about one degree, that is 60 minutes constantly a long time in a hundred years. But as 100 years to one degree, so is 36000 years to 360 degrees. Also as 100 years to one degree, so is one year to the hundred part of one degree or 60 minutes; which is 60/100, or 36 seconds for the progress of one year; which must be somewhat more than a degree according to Copernicus, who, lib. 3. ca. saith, That for 400 years before Ptolomie it was one degree almost constantly. Which is well enough as to the Natural Cause of the Precession of the Aequinoctial points, which is the often-said compounded Motion, though not an exact Astronomical Calculation.

A.

And ’tis a great signe that his Supposition is true. But what is the Cause that the Obliquity of the Ecliptique, that is, the distance between the Aequinoctial and the Solstice, is not always the same?

B.

The necessity of the Obliquity of the Ecliptique is but a consequence to the Precession of the Aequinoctial points. And therefore if from C the North-Pole you make a little Circle C u equal to 15 minutes of a degree upon the Earth, and another u s equal to the same, which will appear like this Figure 8, that is (as Copernicus calls it) a Circle twined, the Pole C will be moved half the time of the Aequinoctial points, in the arc C u, and as much in the alternate arc u s descending to s. But in the arc s u, and its alternate rising to

C. The cause of the twining is the Earths Annual Motion the same way in the Ecliptique, and makes the four quarters of it; and makes also their revolution twice as slow as that of the Aequinoctial points. And therefore the Motion of it is the same compounded Motion which Copernicus takes for his Supposition, and is the cause of the Precession of the Aequinoctial points, and consequently of the variation of the Obliquity, adding to it or taking from it somewhere more, somewhere less; so as that one with another the addition is not much more, nor the substraction much less than 30 minutes. But as for the Natural Efficient cause of this compounded Motion, either in the Sun, or the Earth, or any other Natural Body, it can be none but the immediate hand of the Creator.

A.

By this it seems that the Poles of the Earth are always the same, but make this 8 in the Sphere of the fixt Stars neer that which is called Cynosura.

B.

No: ’Tis described on the Earth, but the Annual Motion describes a Circle in the Sphere of the fixed Stars. Though I think it improper to say a Sphere of the fixt Stars, when ’tis so unlikely that all the fixt Stars should be in the Superficies of one and the same Globe.

A.

I do not believe they are.

B.

Nor I, since they may seem less one than another, as well by their different distances, as by their different magnitudes. Nor is it likely that the Sun

(which is a fixt Star) is the Efficient Cause of the Motion of those remoter Planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; seeing the whole Sphere, whose Diameter is the distance between the Sun and the Earth, is but a point in respect of the distance between the Sun and any other fixed Star. Which I say onely to excite those that value the knowledge of the Cause of Comets, to look for it in the Dominion of some other Sun than that which moveth the Earth. For why may not there be some other fixed Star, neerer to some Planet than is the Sun, and cause such a light in it as we call a Comet?

A.

As how?

B.

You have seen how in high and thin Clouds above the Earth, the Sun-beams piercing them have appeared like a Beard; and why might not such a Beard have appeared to you like a Comet, if you had lookt upon it from as high as some of the fixed Stars?

A.

But because it is a thing impossible for me to know, I will proceed in my own way of enquiry. And seeing you ascribe this compounded Motion to the Sun and Earth, I would grant you that the Earth (whose Annual Motion is from West to East) shall give the Moon her Monthly-motion from East to West. But then I ask you whether the Moon have also that compounded Motion of the Earth, and with it a Motion upon its own Centre, as hath the Earth? For seeing the Moon has no other Planet to carry about her, she needs it not.

B.

I see reason enough, and some necessity, that the Moon should have both those Motions. For you cannot think that the Creator of the Stars, when he gave them their Circular Motion, did first take a Centre, and then describe a Circle with a Chain or Compass, as men do? No; he moved all the parts of a Star together and equally in the Creation: And that's the reason I give you. The necessity of it, comes from this Phaenomenon, that the Moon doth turn one and the same face towards the Earth: Which cannot be by being moved about the Earth parallelly, unless also it turn about its own Centre. Besides, we know by experience, that the Motion of the Moon doth adde not a little to the Motion of the Sea: Which were impossible if it did not adde to the Stream of the Air, and by consequence to that of the Water.

A.

If you could get a piece of the true and intimate Substance of the Earth, of the bigness of a Musquet-bullet, do you believe that the Bullet would have the like compounded Motion to that which you attribute to the Sun, Earth, and Moon?

B.

Yes truly; but with less strength, according to its magnitude; saving that by its Gravity falling to the Earth, the activity of it would be unperceived.

A.

I will trouble you no more with the Nature of Celestial appearances. But I pray you tell me by what art a man may finde what part of a Circle the Diameter of the Suns Body doth subtend in the Ecliptique Circle.

B.

Kepler says it subtends 30 minutes, which is half a degree. His way to finde it is by letting in the Sun-beams into a close room through a small hole, and receiving the image of it upon a plain perpendicularly. For by this means he hath a Triangle, whose sides and angles he can know by measure; and the vertical Angle he seeks for, and the substance of the arc of the Suns Body.

A.

But I think it impossible to distinguish where the part illuminate toucheth the part not illuminate.

B.

Another way is this: Upon the Aequinoctial-day, with a Watch that shews the minutes standing by you, observe when the lower brim of the Suns setting first comes to the Horizon, and set the Index to some minute of the Watch; and observe again the upper brim when it comes to the Horizon: then count the minutes, and you have what you look for. Other way I know none.

CAP. V. OF THE MOTIONS OF WATER AND AIR.

A.

I Have considered, as you bad me, this compounded Motion with great admiration. First, it is that which makes the difference between Continuum and Contiguum, which till now I never could distinguish. For Bodies that are but Contiguous, with any little force are parted; but by this compounded Motion (because every point of the body makes an equal Line in equal time, and every Line crosses all the rest) one part cannot be separated from another, without disturbing the Motion of all the other parts at once. And is not that the Cause, think you, that some Bodies when they are prest or bent, as soon as the force is removed, return again of themselves to their former figure?

B.

Yes sure; saving that it is not of themselves that they return, (for we were agreed that nothing can move it self) but it is the Motion of the parts which are not prest, that delivers those that are. And this restitution the Learned now call the Spring of a Body. The Greeks called it Antitypia.

A.

When I considered this Motion in the Sun and the Earth and Planets, I fancied them as so many Bodies of the Army of the Almighty in an immense field of Air, marching swiftly, and commanded (under God) by his glorious Officer the Sun, or rather forced so to keep their order in every part

of every of those Bodies, as never to go out from the distance in which he had set them.

B.

But the parts of the Air and other Fluids keep not their places so.

A.

No. You told me that this Motion is not natural in the Air, but received from the Sun.

B.

True. But since we seek the Natural Causes of Sublunary Effects, where shall we begin?

A.

I would fain know what makes the Sea to ebbe and flow at certain Periods, and what causeth such variety in the Tides.

B.

Remember that the Earth turneth every day upon its own Axis from West to East; and all the while it so turneth, every point thereof by its compounded Motion makes other Circlings, but not on the same Centre, which is (you know) a rising in one part of the day, and a falling in the other part. What think you must happen to the Sea, which resteth on it, and is a Fluid Body?

A.

I think it must make the Sea rise and fall. And the same happeneth also to the Air, from the Motion of the Sun.

B.

Remember also, in what manner the Sea is situated in respect of the Dry Land.

A.

Is not there a great Sea that reacheth from the Straight of Magellan Eastward to the Indies, and thence to the same Straight again? And is not there a great Sea called the Atlantick Sea that runneth Northward to us? and does not the great South-Sea run also up into the Northern Seas? But I think the Indian and the South-Sea of themselves to be greater than all the rest of the Surface of the Globe.

B.

How lieth the water in those two Seas?

A.

East and West, and rises and falls a little, as it is forc'd to do by this compounded Motion, which is a kind of succussion of the Earth, and fills both the Atlantick and Northern Seas.

B.

All this would not make a visible difference between High and Low water, because this Motion being so regular, the unevenness would not be great

enough to be seen. For though in a Bason the water would be thrown into the Air, yet the Earth cannot throw the Sea into the Air.

A.

Yes. The Bason, if gently moved, will make the water so move, that you shall hardly see it rise.

B.

It may be so. But you should never see it rise as it doth, if it were not checkt. For at the Straight of Magellan, the great South-Sea is checkt by the shore of the Continent of Peru and Chily, and forced to rise to a great height, and made to run up into the Northern Seas on that side by the coast of China; and at the return is checkt again and forced through the Atlantick into the British and German Seas. And this is done every day. For we have supposed that the Earths Motion in the Ecliptique caused by the Sun is Annual; and that its Motion in the Aequinoctial, is Diurnal. It followeth therefore from this compounded Motion of the Earth, the Sea must Ebb and Flow twice in the space of Twenty four hours, or thereabout.

A.

Has the Moon nothing to do in this business?

B.

Yes. For she hath also the like Motion. And is, though less swift, yet much neerer to the Earth. And therefore when the Sun and Moon are in Conjunction or Opposition, the Earth, as from two Agents at once, must needs have a greater Succussion. And if it chance at the same time the

Moon also be in the Ecliptique, it will be yet greater, because the Moon then worketh on the Earth less obliquely.

A.

But when the Full or New Moon happen to be then when the Earth is in the Aequinoctial points, the Tides are greater than ordinary. Why is that?

B.

Because then the force by which they move the Sea, is at that time, to the force by which they move the same at other times, as the Aequinoctial Circle to one of its Parallels, which is a lesser Circle.

A.

'Tis evident. And 'tis pleasant to see the Concord of so many and various motions, when they proceed from one and the same Hypothesis. But what say you to the stupendious Tides which happen on the Coasts of Lincolnshire on the East, and in the River of Severn on the West?

B.

The cause of that, is their proper Scituation. For the Current of the Ocean through the Atlantick Sea, and the Current of the South-Sea through the Northern Seas meeting together, raise the water in the Irish and British Seas a great deal higher than ordinary. Therefore the mouth of the Severn being directly opposite to the Current from the Atlantick Sea, and those Sands on the Coast of Lincolnshire directly opposite to the Current of the German Sea, those Tides must needs fall furiously into them, by this Succussion of the water.

A.

Does, when the Tide runs up into a River, the water all rise together, and fall together when it goes out?

No: One part riseth and another falleth at the same time; because the Motion of the Earth rising and falling, is that which makes the Tide.

A.

Have you any Experiment that shews it?

B.

Yes. You know that in the Thames, it is high water at Greenwich before it is high water at London-bridge. The water therefore falls at Greenwich whilst it riseth all the way to London. But except the top of the water went up, and the lower part downward, it were impossible.

A.

'Tis certain. It is strange that this one Motion should salve so many apparences, and so easily. But I will produce one Experiment of water, not in the Sea, but in a Glass. If you can shew me that the cause of it is this compounded Motion, I shall go neer to think it the Cause of all other Effects of Nature hitherto disputed of. The Experiment is common, and described by the Lord Chancellour Bacon, in the third page of his Natural History. Take (saith he) a Glass of water, and draw your finger round about the lip of the Glass, pressing it somewhat hard; after you have done so a few times, it will make the water frisk up into a fine Dew. After I had read this, I tried the same with all diligence my self, and found true not onely the frisking of the water to above an inch high, but also the whole Superficies to circulate,

and withal to make a pleasant sound. The Cause of the frisking he attributes to a tumult of the inward parts of the Substance of the Glass striving to free it self from the pressure.

B.

I have tried and found both the Sound and Motion; and do not doubt but the pressure of the parts of the Glass was part of the Cause. But the Motion of my finger about the Glass was always parallel; and when it chanced to be otherwise, both Sound and Motion ceased.

A.

I found the same. And being satisfied, I proceed to other questions. How is the water (being a heavie Body) made to ascend in small particles into the Air, and be there for a time sustained in form of a Cloud, and then fall down again in Rain?

B.

I have shewn already, that this compounded Motion of the Sun, in one part of its Circumlation, drives the Air one way, and in the other part, the contrary way; and that it cannot draw it back again, no more than he that sets a stone a flying can pull it back. The Air therefore, which is contiguous to the water, being thus distracted, must either leave a Vacuum, or else some part of the water must rise and fill the spaces continually forsaken by the Air. But, that there is no Vacuum, you have granted. Therefore the water riseth into the Air, and maketh the Clouds; and seeing they are very small and invisible parts of the water, are (though naturally heavie) easily carried up and down with the Wind, till, meeting with some Mountain or other Clouds, they be prest together into greater drops, and fall by their weight.

So also it is forced up in moist ground, and with it many small Atomes of the Earth, which are either twisted with the rising water into Plants, or are carried up and down in the Air incertainly. But the greatest Quantity of Water is forced up from the great South and Indian Seas, that lie under the Tropique of Capricorn. And this Climate is that which makes the Suns Perigaeum to be always on the Winter-Solstice. And that is the part of the Terrestrial Globe which Keplerus says is kinde to the Sun; whereas the other part of the Globe (which is almost all dry land) has an Antipathy to the Sun. And so you see where this Magnetical vertue of the Earth lies. For the Globe of the Earth having no Natural Appetite to any place, may be drawn by this Motion of the Sun a little neerer to it, together with the water which it raiseth.

A.

Can you guess what may be the Cause of Wind?

B.

I think it manifest that the unconstant Winds proceed from the uncertain Motion of the Clouds ascending and descending, or meeting with one another. For the Winds after they are generated in any place by the descent of a Cloud, they drive other Clouds this way and that way before them, the Air seeking to free it self from being pent up in a straight. For when a Cloud descendeth, it makes no wind sensible directly under it self. But the Air between it and the Earth is prest and forced to move violently outward. For it is a certain Experiment of Mariners, that if the Sea go high when they are becalmed, they say they shall have more Wind than they would; and take in their Sails all but what is necessary for steering. They know (it seems) that the Sea is moved by the descent of Clouds at some distance off: Which

presseth the water, and makes it come to them in great Waves. For a Horizontal Wind does but curl the Water.

A.

From whence come the Rivers?

B.

From the Rain, or from the falling of Snow on the higher ground. But when it descendeth under ground, the place where it again ariseth is called the Spring.

A.

How then can there be a Spring upon the top of a Hill?

B.

There is no Spring upon the very top of a Hill, unless some Natural Pipe bring it thither from a higher Hill.

A.

Julius Scaliger says, there is a River, and in it a Lake, upon the top of Mount Cenis in Savoy; and will therefore have the Springs to be ingendred in the Caverns of the Earth by Condensation of the Air.

B.

I wonder he should say that. I have pass'd over that Hill twice since the time I read that in Scaliger, and found that River as I pass'd, and went by the side of it in plain ground almost two miles. Where I saw the water from

two great Hills, one on one side, the other on the other, in a thousand small Rillets of melting Snow fall down into it. Which has made me never to use any Experiment the which I have not my self seen. As for the conversion of Air into Water by Condensation, and of Water into Air by Rarefaction (though it be the doctrine of the Peripatetiques) it is a thing incogitable, and the words are insignificant. For by Densum is signified onely frequencie and closeness of parts; and by Rarum the contrary. As when we say a Town is thick with houses, or a Wood with trees, we mean not that one house or tree is thicker than another, but that the spaces between are not so great. But (since there is no Vacuum) the spaces between the parts of Air are no larger than between the parts of Water, or of any thing else.

A.

What think you of those things which Mariners that have sailed through the Atlantick Sea called Spouts, which pour down water enough at once to drown a great Ship?

B.

'Tis a thing I have not seen. And therefore can say nothing to it; though I doubt not but when two very large and heavie Clouds shall be driven together by two great and contrary winds, the thing is possible.

A.

I think your reason good. And now will propound to you another Experiment. I have seen an exceeding small Tube of Glass with both ends open set upright in a Vessel of Water, and that the Superficies of the Water within the Tube was higher a good deal than of that in the Vessel; but I see no reason for it.

B.

Was not part of the Glass under Water? Must not then the Water in the Vessel rise? Must not the Air that lay upon it rise with it? Whither should this rising Air go, since there is no place empty to receive it? It is therefore no wonder if the Water, press'd by the Substance of the Glass which is dipt into it, do rather rise into a very small Pipe, than come about a longer way into the open Air.

A.

'Tis very probable. I observed also that the top of the inclosed Water was a concave Superficies; which I never saw in other Fluids.

B.

The Water hath some degree of tenacity, though not so great but that it will yield a little to the Motion of the Air; as is manifest in the Bubbles of water, where the concavity is always towards the Air. And this I think the cause why the Air and Water meeting in the Tube make the Superficies towards the Air concave, which it cannot do to a Fluid of greater tenacity.

A.

If you put into a Bason of Water a long rag of Cloth, first drenched in water, and let the longer part of it hang out, it is known by Experience, that the Water will drop out as long as there is any part of the other end under Water.

B.

The cause of it is, that water (as I told you) hath a degree of tenacity. And therefore being continued in the rag till it be lower without than within, the

weight will make it continue dropping, though not onely because it is heavie (for if the rag lay higher without than within, and were made heavier by the breadth, it would not descend) but ’tis because all heavie Bodies Naturally descend with proportion of swiftness duplicate to that of the time; whereof I shall say more when we talk of Gravity.

A.

You see how despicable Experiments I trouble you with. But I hope you will pardon me.

B.

As for mean and common Experiments, I think them a great deal better Witnesses of Nature, than those that are forced by fire, and known but to very few.

CAP. VI. OF THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF HEAT AND COLD.

A.

‘TIS a fine day, and pleasant walking through the Fields, but that the Sun is a little too hot.

B.

How know you that the Sun is hot?

A.

I feel it.

B.

That is to say, you know that your self, but not that the Sun is hot. But when you finde your self hot, what Body do you feel?

A.

None.

B.

How then can you infer your heat from the Sense of Feeling? Your walking may have made you hot: Is Motion therefore hot? No. You are to consider the Concomitants of your heat; as, that you are more faint, or more ruddy,

or that you sweat, or feel some Endeavour of Moisture or Spirits tending outward; and when you have found the Causes of those Accidents, you have found the Causes of Heat, which in a living Creature, and specially in a Man, is many times the Motion of the parts within him, such as happen in sickness, anger, and other passions of the minde; which are not in the Sun nor in Fire.

A.

That which I desire now to know, is what Motions and of what Bodies without me are the Efficient Causes of my Heat.

B.

I shewed you yesterday in discoursing of Rain, how by this compounded Motion of the Suns Body, the Air was every way at once thrust off West and East; so that where it was contiguous, the small parts of the water were forced to rise, for the avoiding of Vacuum. Think then that your hand were in the place of water so exposed to the Sun. Must not the Sun work upon it as it did upon the Water? Though it break not the skin, yet it will give to the inner Fluids and looser parts of your hand, an Endeavour to get forth, which will extend the skin, and in some climates fetch up the bloud, and in time make the skin black. The Fire also will do the same to them that often sit with their naked skins too neer it. Nay, one may sit so neer (without touching it) as it shall blister or break the skin, and fetch up both spirits and bloud mixt into a putrid oyly matter sooner, than in a Furnace Oyl can be extracted out of a Plant.

A.

But if the Water be above the Fire in a Kettle, what then will it do? Shall the particles of water go toward the Fire, as it did toward the Sun?

B.

No. For it cannot. But the Motion of the parts of the Kettle which are caused by the Fire, shall dissipate the Water into Vapour till it be all cast out.

A.

What is that you call Fire? Is it a hard or Fluid Body?

B.

It is not any other Body but that of the shining coal; which coal, though extinguished with Water, is still the same Body. So also in a very hot Furnace, the hollow spaces between the shining coals, though they burn that you put into them, are no other Body than Air moved.

A.

Is it not Flame?

B.

No. For flame is nothing but a multitude of Sparks, and Sparks are but the Atomes of the Fewel dissipated by the incredible swift Motion of the Movent, which makes every Spark to seem a hundred times greater than it is, as appears by this; That when a man swings in the Air a small stick fired at one end (though the Motion cannot be very swift) yet the Fire will appear to the eye to be a long, streight, or crooked Line. Therefore a great many

sparks together flying upward, must needs appear unto the sight as one continued Flame. Nor are the sparks striken out of a Flint any thing else but small particles of the stone, which by their swift Motion are made to shine. But that Fire is not a substance of it self, is evident enough by this, that the Sun-beams passing through a Globe of Water will burn as other fire does. Which beams, if they were indeed Fire, would be quenched in the passage.

A.

This is so evident, that I wonder so wise men as Aristotle and his followers, for so long a time could hold it for an Element, and one of the primary parts of the Universe. But the Natural heat of a man or other living Creature, whence proceedeth it? Is there any thing within their Bodies that hath this compounded Motion?

B.

At the breaking up of a Deer I have seen it plainly in his Bowels as long as they were warm. And it is called the Peristaltique Motion, and in the Heart of a Beast newly taken out of his Body; and this Motion is called Systole and Diastole. But they are both of them this compounded Motion, whereof the former causeth the food to Winde up and down through the guts, and the later makes the Circulation of the Blood.

A.

What kind of Motion is the Cause of Cold? Methinks it should be contrary to that which causeth Heat.

B.

So it is in some respect. For seeing the Motion that begets Heat, tendeth to the separation of the parts of the Body whereon it acteth, it stands with reason, that the Motion which maketh Cold, should be such as sets them closer together. But contrary Motions are (to speak properly) when upon two ends of a Line two Bodies move towards each other, the Effect whereof is to make them meet. But each of them (as to this Question) is the same.

A.

Do you think (as many Philosophers have held and now hold) that Cold is nothing but a privation of Heat?

B.

No. Have you never heard the Fable of the Satyre that dwelling with a Husbandman, and seeing him blow his fingers to warm them, and his Pottage to cool it, was so scandalized, that he ran from him, saying he would no longer dwell with one that could blow both Hot and Cold with one breath? Yet the Cause is evident enough. For the Air which had gotten a Calefactive power from his vital parts, was from his mouth and throat gently diffused on his fingers, and retained still that power. But to cool his Pottage he streightened the passage at his lips, which extinguished the Calefactive Motion.

A.

Do you think Wind the general Cause of Cold? If that were true, in the greatest Winds we should have the greatest Frosts.

B.

I mean not any of those uncertain Winds which, I said, were made by the Clouds, but such as a Body moved in the Air makes to and against it self. For it is all one Motion of the Air, whether it be carried against the Body, or the Body against it. Such a Wind as is constant (if no other be stirring) from East to West made by the Earth turning dayly upon its own Centre. Which is so swift, as (except it be kept off by some hill) to kill a man, as by Experience hath been found by those who have passed over great Mountains, and specially over the Andies which are opposed to the East. And such is the Wind which the Earth maketh in the Air by her Annual Motion, which is so swift, as that (by the Calculation of Astronomers) to go Sixty miles in a minute of an hour. And therefore this must be the Motion which makes it so cold about the Poles of the Ecliptique.

A.

Does not the Earth make the Wind as great in one part of the Ecliptique as in another?

B.

Yes. But when the Sun is in Cancer, it tempers the Cold, and still less and less, but least of all in the Winter-Solstice, where his beams are most oblique to the Superficies of the Earth.

A.

I thought the greatest Cold had been about the Poles of the Aequator.

B.

And so did I once. But the reason commonly given for it is so improbable, that I do not think so now. For the Cause they render of it, is onely, that the

Motion of the Earth is swiftest in the Aequinoctial, and slowest about the Poles; and consequently (since Motion is the Cause of Heat, and Cold is but (as ’twas thought) a want of the same) they inferr’d that the greatest Cold must be about the Poles of the Aequinoctial. Wherein they miscounted. For not every Motion causeth Heat, but this agitation onely, which we call compounded Motion; though some have alleadged Experience for that opinion; as that a Bullet out of a Gun will with its own swiftness melt. Which I never shall believe.

A.

’Tis a common thing with many Philosophers to maintain their Fancies with any rash report, and sometimes with a Lye. But how is it possible that so soft a Substance as water should be turned into so hard a Substance as Ice?

B.

When the Air shaves the Globe of the Earth with such swiftness, as that of Sixty miles in a minute of an hour, it cannot (where it meets with still water) but beat it up into small and undistinguishable bubbles, and involve it self in them as in so many bladders or skins of Water. And Ice is nothing else but the smallest imaginable parts of Air and Water mixt; which is made hard by this compounded Motion, that keeps the parts so close together, as not to be separated in one place without disordering the Motion of them all. For when a Body will not easily yield to the impression of an external Movent in one place without yielding in all, we call it Hard; And when it does, we say ’tis Soft.

A.

Why is not Ice as well made in a moved as in a still water? Are there not great Seas of Ice in the Northern parts of the Earth?

B.

Yes, and perhaps also in the Southern parts. But I cannot imagine how Ice can be made in such agitation as is always in the open Sea made by the Tides and by the Winds. But how it may be made at the Shoar, it is not hard to imagine. For in a River or Current, though swift, the water that adhereth to the banks is quiet, and easily by the Motion of the Air driven into small insensible bubbles; and so may the water that adhereth to those bubbles, and so forwards till it come into a stream that breaks it, and then it is no wonder though the fragments be driven into the open Sea, and freeze together into greater lumps. But when in the open Sea, or at the Shoar, the Tide or a great Wave shall arise, this young and tender Ice will presently be washt away. And therefore I think it evident, that as in the Thames the Ice is first made at the banks where the Tide is weak or none, and broken by the stream comes down to London, and part goes to the Sea floating till it dissolve, and part (being too great to pass the Bridge) stoppeth there and sustains that which follows, till the River be quite frozen over: So also the Ice in the Northern Seas begins first at the banks of the Continent and Islands which are scituated in that Climate, and then broken off, are carried up and down, and one against another, till they become great Bodies.

A.

But what if there be Islands, and narrow Inlets of the Sea, or Rivers also about the Pole of the Aequinoctial?

B.

If there be, ’tis very likely the Sea may also there be covered all over with Ice. But for the truth of this, we must stay for some further discovery.

A.

When the Ice is once made and hard, what dissolves it?

B.

The Principal Cause of it, is the weight of the water it self; but not without some abatement in the Stream of the Air that hardned it; as when the Sun-beams are less oblique to the Earth, or some contrary Wind resisteth the stream of the Air. For when the impediment is removed, then the nature of the water only worketh, and (being a heavie Body) downward.

A.

I forgot to ask you, Why two pieces of Wood rub’d swiftly one against another, will at length set on fire.

B.

Not onely at length, but quickly, if the Wood be dry. And the Cause is evident, viz. the compounded Motion which dissipates the external small parts of the Wood. And then the inner parts must of necessity (to preserve the Plenitude of the Universe) come after; first the most Fluid, and then those also of greater consistence, which are first erected, and (the Motion continued) made to flie swiftly out; whereby the Air driven to the Eye of the beholder, maketh that fancie which is called Light.

A.

Yes. I remember you told me before, that upon any strong pressure of the Eye, the resistance from within would appear a Light. But to return to the enquiry of Heat and Cold, there be two things that beyond all other put me into admiration. One is the swiftness of kindling in Gunpowder. The other is the freezing of Water in a Vessel (though not far from the fire) set about with other water with Ice and Snow in it. When Paper or Flax is flaming, the flame creeps gently on; and if a house full of Paper were to be burnt with putting a Candle to it, it will be long in burning; whereas a spark of fire would set on flame a mountain of Gunpowder in almost an instant.

B.

Know you not Gunpowder is made of the powder of Charcole, Brimstone, and Saltpeter? Whereof the first will kindle with a spark, the second flame as soon as toucht with fire; and the third blows it, as being composed of many Orbs of Salt fill'd with Air, and as it dissolveth in the flame, furiously blowing increaseth it. And as for making Ice by the fire side. It is manifest that whilst the Snow is dissolving in the external vessel, the Air must in the like manner break forth, and shave the Superficies of the inner vessel, and work through the water till it be frozen.

A.

I could easily assent to this, if I could conceive how the Air that shaves (as you say) the outside of the Vessel, could work through it. I conceive well enough a pail of water with Ice or Snow dissolving in it, and how it causeth Wind. But how that Wind should communicate it self through the vessel of wood or metal, so as to make it shave the Superficies of the water which is within it, I do not so well understand.

B.

I do not say the inner Superficies of the vessel shaves the water within it. But ’tis manifest that the Wind made in the Pail of water by the melting Snow or Ice presseth the sides of the Vessel that standeth in it; and that the pressure worketh clean through, how hard soever the Vessel be; and that again worketh on the water within, by restitution of its parts, and so hardeneth the water by degrees.

A.

I understand you now. The Ice in the Pail by its dissolution transfers its Hardness to the water within.

B.

You are merry. But supposing, as I do, that the Ice in the Pail is more than the water in the Vessel, you will finde no absurdity in the Argument. Besides, the Experiment, you know, is common.

A.

I confess it is probable. The Greeks have the word ... (whence the Latins have their word Frigus) to signifie the curling of water by the Wind; and use the same also for Horrour, which is the passion of one that cometh suddenly into a cold Air, or is put into a sudden affright, whereby he shrinks, and his hair stands upright. Which manifestly shews that the Motion which causeth Cold, is that which pressing the Superficies of a Body, sets the parts of it closer together. But to proceed in my Quaeries. Monsieur Des Cartes, who (you know) hath written somewhere, that the noise we hear in Thunder, proceeds from breaking of the Ice in the Clouds; What think you of it? Can a Cloud be turned into Ice?

B.

Why not? A Cloud is but Water in the Air.

A.

But how? For he has not told us that.

B.

You know that ’tis onely in Summer, and in hot weather, that it Thunders; or if in Winter, it is taken for a Prodigie. You know also, that of Clouds, some are higher, some lower, and many in number, as you cannot but have oftentimes observed, with spaces between them. Therefore, as in all Currents of water, the Water is there swiftest where it is streightned with Islands, so must the Current of Air made by the Annual Motion be swiftest there, where it is checkt with many Clouds through which it must (as it were) be strained, and leave behinde it many small particles of earth, always in it, and in hot weather more than ordinary.

A.

This I understand, and that it may cause Ice. But when the Ice is made, how is it broken? And why falls it not down in shivers?

B.

The particles are inclosed in small Caverns of the Ice; and their Natural Motion being the same which we have ascribed to the Globe of the Earth, requires a sufficient space to move in. But when it is imprisoned in a less room that that, then a great part of the Ice breaks: And this is the Thunder-clap. The Murmur following is from the settling of the Air. The Lightening

is the fancie made by the recoiling of the Air against the Eye. The fall is in Rain, not in Shivers; because the prisons which they break are extreme narrow, and the shivers being small, are dissolved by the Heat. But in less Heat they would fall in Drops of Hail, that is to say, half frozen by the shaving of the Air as they fall, and be in a very little time (much less than Snow or Ice) dissolved.

A.

Will not that Lightning burn?

B.

No. But it hath often kill'd men with Cold. But this extraordinary swiftness of Lightning consisteth not in the Expansion of the Air, but in a straight and direct stream from where it breaks forth; which is in many places successively, according to the Motion of the Cloud.

A.

Experience tells us that. I have now done with my Problems concerning the great Bodies of the world, the Stars, and Element of Air in which they are moved, and am therein satisfied, and the rather, because you have answered me by the Supposition of one onely Motion, and commonly known, and the same with that of Copernicus, whose Opinion is received by all the Learned; and because you have not used any of these empty terms, Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, &c. for a natural Cause, as the old Philosophers have done to save their credit. For though they were many of them wise men, as Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and others, and have written excellently of Morals and Politiques, yet there is very little Natural Philosophy to be gathered out of their Writings.

B.

Their Ethiques and Politiques are pleasant reading, but I finde not any argument in their discourses of Justice or Vertue drawn from the supreme Authority, on whose Laws all Justice, Vertue, and good Politiques depend.

A.

Concerning this Cover, or (as some have called it) the Scurf or Scab of the Terrestrial Star, I will begin with you to morrow. For it is a large Subject, containing Animals, Vegetables, Metals, Stones, and many other kinds of Bodies, the knowledge whereof is desired by most men, and of the greatest and most general profit.

B.

And this is it, in which I shall give you the least satisfaction; so great is the variety of Motion, and so concealed from humane senses.

CAP. VII. OF HARD AND SOFT, AND OF THE ATOMES THAT FLIE IN THE AIR.

A.

CONCERNING this Cover of the Earth, made up of an infinite number of parts of different natures, I had much ado to finde any tolerable method of enquiry. But I resolved at last to begin with the Questions concerning Hard and Soft, and what kinde of Motion it is that makes them so. I know that in any pulsion of Air, the parts of it go innumerable and inexplicable ways; but I ask only if every point of it be moved.

B.

No. If you mean a Mathematical point, you know it is impossible. For nothing is movable but Body. But I suppose it divisible (as all other Bodies) into parts divisible. For no Substance can be divided into Nothings.

A.

Why may not that Substance within our Bodies, which are called Animal spirits, be another kind of Body, and more subtile than the common Air?

B.

I know not why, no more than you or any man else knows why it is not very Air, though purer perhaps than the common Air, as being strained through the blood into the Brain and Nerves. But howsoever that be, there is no doubt, but the least parts of the common Air, (respectively to the whole)

will easilier pierce (with equal Motion) the Body that resisteth them, than the least parts of water. For it is by Motion onely that any mutation is made in any thing; and all things standing as they did, will appear as they did. And that which changeth Soft into Hard, must be such as makes the parts not easily to be moved without being moved all together; which cannot be done but by some Motion compounded. And we call Hard, that whereof no part can be put out of order without disordering all the rest; which is not easily done.

A.

How Water and Air beaten into extreme small Bubbles is hardned into Ice, you have told me already, and I understand it. But how a soft Homogeneous Body, as Air, or Water, should be so hardned, I cannot imagine.

B.

There is no hard Body that hath not also some degree of Gravity; and consequently, being loose, there must be some Efficient Cause, that is, some Motion, when it is severed from the Earth, to bring the same to it again. And seeing this compounded Motion gives to the Air and Water an Endeavour from the Earth, the Motion which must hinder it, must be in a way contrary to the compounded Motion of the Earth. For whatsoever, having been asunder, comes together again, must come contrary ways, as those that follow one another go the same way, though both move upon the same Line.

A.

What Experiment have you seen to this purpose?

B.

I have seen a drop of glass like that of the second Figure, newly taken out of the furnace, and hanging at the end of an Iron rod, and yet Fluid, and let fall into the water and hardned. The Club-end of it A A coming first to the water, the tail B C following it. 'Tis proved before, that the motion that makes it is a compounded Motion, and gives an Endeavour outward to every part of it; and that the Motion which maketh Cold, is such as shaving the Body in every point of contact, and turning it, gives them all an Endeavour inward. Such is this Motion made by the sinking of the hot and fluid glass into the water. 'Tis therefore manifest that the Motion which hardneth a Soft Body, must in every point of contact be in the contrary way to that which makes a hard body Soft. And further, that slender tail B C shall be made much more hard than common Glass. For towards the upper end, in C, you cannot easily break it, as small as it is. And when you have broken it, the whole Body will fall into dust, as it must do, seeing the bending is so difficult. For all the parts are bent with such force, that upon the breaking at D, by their sudden restitution to their liberty, they will break together. And the cause why the tail B C, being so slender, becomes so hard, is, that all the Endeavour in the great part A B, is propagated to the small part B C, in the same manner as the force of the Sun-beams is derived almost to a point by a Burning-glass. But the Cause why, when it is broken in D, it breaks also in so many other places, is, that the Endeavour in all the other parts (which is called the Spring) unbends it; from whence a Motion is caused the contrary way, and that Motion continued bends it more the other way and breaks it, as a Bow over-bent is broken into shivers by a sudden breaking of the string.

A.

I conceive now how a Body which having been Hard and softned again, may be rehardned; but how a Fluid and meer Homogeneous Body, as Air or Water, may be so, I see not yet. For the hardning of water is making a hard Body of two Fluids, whereof one (which is the water) hath some tenacity; and so a man may make a Bladder hard with blowing into it.

B.

As for meer Air, which hath no Natural Motion of it self, but is moved onely by other Bodies of a greater consistence, I think it impossible to be hardned. For the parts of it so easily change places, that they can never be fixt by any Motion. No more I think can Water, which though somewhat less Fluid, is with an insensible force very easily broken.

A.

It is the opinion of many learned men, that Ice (in long time) will be turned into Christal; and they alleadge Experience for it. For they say that Christal is found hanging on high Rocks in the Alps like Isicles on the Eaves of a house, and why may not that have formerly been Ice, and in many years have lost the power of being reduced?

B.

If that were so, it would still be Ice, though also Christal: Which cannot be, because Christal is heavier than Water, and therefore much heavier than Ice.

A.

Is there then no transubstantiation of Bodies but by mixture?

B.

Mixture is no transubstantiation.

A.

Have you never seen a Stone that seemed to have been formerly Wood, and some like Shells, and some like Serpents, and others like other things?

B.

Yes. I have seen such things, and particularly I saw at Rome in a Stone-cutters work-house a Billet of Wood, as I thought it, partly covered with bark, and partly with the grain bare, as long as a mans Arm, and as thick as the Calf of a mans Leg; which handling I found extreme heavie, and saw a small part of it which was polished, and had a very fine Gloss, and thought it a substance between Stone and Metal, but neerest to Stone. I have seen also a kind of Slate painted naturally with Forest-work. And I have seen in the hands of a Chymist of my acquaintance at Paris, a broken Glass, part of a Retort, in which had been the Rozin of Turpentine, wherein though there were left no Rozin, yet there appeared in the piece of Glass many Trees; and Plants in the ground about them, such as grow in Woods; and better designed than they could be done by any Painter; and continued so for a long time. These be great wonders of Nature, but I will not undertake to shew their causes. But yet this is most certain, that nothing can make a hard Body of a Soft, but by some Motion of its parts. For the parts of the Hardest Body in the world can be no closer together than to touch; and so close are the parts of Air and Water, and consequently they should be equally Hard, if their smallest parts had not different Natural Motions. Therefore if you ask me the Causes of these Effects, I answer, They are different Motions. But if you expect from me how and by what Motions, I shall fail you. For there is no kind of Substance in the World now, that was not at the first Creation, when the Creator gave to all things what Natural and special Motion he

thought good. And as he made some Bodies wondrous great, so he made others wondrous little. For all his works are wondrous. Man can but guess, nor guess further, than he hath knowledge of the variety of Motion. I am therefore of opinion, that whatsoever perfectly Homogeneous is Hard, consisteth of the smallest parts (or, as some call them, Atomes) that were made Hard in the beginning, and consequently by an Eternal Cause; and that the hardness of the whole Body is caused onely by the contact of the parts by pressure.

A.

What Motion is it that maketh a hard Body to melt?

B.

The same compounded Motion that heats, namely, that of Fire, if it be strong enough. For all Motion compounded is an Endeavour to dissipate (as I have said before) the parts of the Body to be moved by it. If therefore hardness consist onely in the pressing Contact of the least parts, this Motion will make the same parts slide off from one another, and the whole to take such a figure as the weight of the parts shall dispose them to, as in Lead, Iron, Gold, and other things melted with Heat. But if the small parts have such figures as they cannot exactly touch, but must leave spaces between them filled with Air or other Fluids, then this Motion of the fire, will dissipate those parts some one way, some another, the Hard part still hard; as in the burning of Wood or Stone into Ashes or Lime. For this Motion is that which maketh Fermentation, scattering dissimilar parts, and congregating similar.

A.

Why do some hard Bodies resist breaking more one way than another?

B.

The Bodies that do so, are for the most part Wood, and receive that quality from their generation. For the heat of the Sun in the Spring-time draweth up the moisture at the Root, and together with it the small parts of the Earth, and twisteth it into a small twig by its Motion upwards to some length, but to very little other dimensions, and so leaves it to dry till the Spring following; and then does the same to that, and to every small part round about it; so that upward the strength is doubled, and the next year trebled, &c. And these are called the grain of the Wood, and but touch one another, like sticks with little or no binding, and therefore can hardly be broken across the grain, but easily all-along it. Also some other hard Bodies have this quality of being more fragile one way than another, as we see in quarrels of a Glass-window, that are aptest many times to break in some crooked Line. The cause of this may be, that when the glass, hot from the Furnace, is poured out upon a Plain, any small stones in or under it will break the stream of it into divers lines, and not onely weaken it, but also cause it falsly to represent the Object you look on through it.

A.

What is the Cause why a Bow of Wood or Steel, or other very hard Body, being bent, but not broken, will recover its former degree of straightness?

B.

I have told you already, how the smallest parts of a hard Body have every one (by the generation of hardness) a Circular, or other compounded Motion; such Motion is that of the smallest parts of the Bow. Which Circles

in the bending you press into narrower figures, as a Circle into an Ellipsis, and an Ellipsis into a narrower but longer Ellipsis with violence; which turns their Natural Motion against the outward parts of the Bow so bent, and is an Endeavour to stretch the Bow into its former posture. Therefore if the impediment be removed, the Bow must needs recover its former Figure.

A.

'Tis manifest; and the cause can be no other but that, except the Bow have Sense.

B.

And though the Bow had Sense, and Appetite to boot, the Cause will be still the same.

A.

Do you think Air and Water to be pure and Homogeneous Bodies?

B.

Yes, and many Bodies both Hard and Heavie to be so too, and many liquors also besides water.

A.

Why then do men say they finde one Air healthy, another infectious?

B.

Not because the nature of the Air varies, but because there are in the Air drawn, or rather, beaten up by the Sun, many little Bodies, whereof some

have such Motion as is healthful, others such as is hurtful to the life of man. For the Sun (as you see in the generation of Plants) can fetch up Earth as well as Water; and from the driest ground any kind of Body that lieth loose, so it be small enough, rather than admit any Emptiness. By some of these small Bodies it is that we live; which being taken in with our breath, pass into our blood, and cause it (by their compounded Motion) to circulate through the Veins and Arteries; which the blood of it self (being a heavie Body) without it cannot do. What kind of substance these Atomes are, I cannot tell. Some suppose them to be Nitre. As for those infectious creatures in the Air, whereof so many die of the Plague, I have heard that Monsieur Des Cartes, a very ingenious man, was of opinion, that they were little Flies. But what grounds he had for it, I know not, though there be many Experiments that invite me to believe it. For first, we know that the Air is never universally infected over a whole Country, but onely in or neer to some populous Town. And therefore the cause must also be partly ascribed to the multitude thronged together, and constrained to carry their Excrements into the fields round about and neer to their habitation. Which in time fermenting breed Worms, which commonly in a month or little more, naturally become Flies; and though engendred at one Town, may flie to another. Secondly, in the beginning of a Plague, those that dwell in the Suburbs, that is to say, neerest to this corruption, are the poorest of the people, that are nourished for the most part with the Roots and Herbs which grow in that corrupted dirt; so that the same filth makes both the blood of poor people, and the substance of the Fly. And ’tis said by Aristotle, that every thing is nourished by the matter whereof it is generated. Thirdly, when a Town is infected, the Gentlemen, and those that live on wholsomest food, scarce one of Five hundred die of the Plague. It seems therefore, whatsoever creatures they be that invade us from the Air, they can discern their proper nourishment, and do not enter into the mouth and nostrils with

the breath of every man alike, as they would do if they were inanimate. Fourthly, a man may carry the infection with him a great way into the Country in his Clothes, and infect a Village. Shall another man there draw the Infection from the Clothes onely by his breath? Or from the Hangings of a Chamber wherein a man hath died? It is impossible. Therefore whatsoever killing thing is in the Clothes or Hangings, it must rise and go into his mouth or nostrils before it can do him hurt. It must therefore be a Fly, whereof great numbers get into the blood, and there feeding and breeding Worms, obstruct the Circulation of the blood, and kill the man.

A.

I would we knew the palate of those little Animals; we might perhaps finde some medicine to fright them from mingling with our breath. But what is that which kills men that lie asleep too neer a Charcole-fire? Is it another kind of Fly? Or is Charcole venimous?

B.

It is neither Fly nor venim, but the Effect of a flameless glowing fire, which dissipates those Atomes that maintain the circulation of the blood; so that for want of it, by degrees they faint, and being asleep cannot remove, but in short time, there sleeping die, as is evident by this, that being brought into the open Air (without other help) they recover.

A.

'Tis very likely. The next thing I would be informed of, is the nature of Gravity. But for that, if you please, we will take another day.

CAP. VIII. OF GRAVITY AND GRAVITATION.

B.

WHAT Books are those?

A.

Two Books written by two learned men concerning Gravity. I brought them with me, because they furnish me with some material Questions about that Doctrine; though of the nature of Gravity, I finde no more in either of them than this, That Gravity is an Intrinsecal Quality by which a Body so qualified descendeth perpendicularly towards the Superficies of the Earth.

B.

Did neither of them consider that descending is local Motion, that they might have called it an intrinsecal Motion rather than an intrinsecal quality?

A.

Yes. But not how Motion should be intrinsecal to the special individual Body moved. For how should they, when you are the first that ever sought the differences of Qualities in local Motion, except your authority in Philosophy were greater with them than it is? For ’tis hard for a man to conceive (except he see it) how there should be Motion within a Body, otherwise than as it is in living creatures.

B.

But it may be they never sought, or despaired of finding what natural Motion could make any inanimate thing tend one way rather than another.

A.

So it seems. But the first of them enquires no further than, Why so much water (being a heavie Body) as lies perpendicularly on a Fishes back in the bottom of the Sea, should not kill it. The other (whereof the Author is Dr. Wallis) treateth universally of Gravity.

B.

Well. But what are the Questions which from these Books you intend to ask me?

A.

The Author of the first Book tells me, that Water and other Fluids are Bodies continued, and act (as to Gravity) as a piece of Ice would do of the same Figure and quantity. Is that true?

B.

That the Universe (supposing there is no place empty) is one entire Body, and also, as he saith it is, a continual Body, is very true. And yet the parts thereof may be contiguous, without any other cohesion but Touch. And it is also true, that a Vessel of Water will descend in a medium less heavie (but Fluid) as Ice would do.

A.

But he means that water in a Tub would have the same Effect upon a Fish in the bottom of the Tub, as so much Ice would have.

B.

That also would be true, if the water were frozen to the sides of it. Otherwise the Ice (if there be enough) will crush the Fish to death. But how applies he this, to prove that the water cannot hurt a Fish in the Sea by its weight?

A.

It plainly appears that Water does not Gravitate on any part of it self beneath it.

B.

It appears by Experience, but not by this Argument, though instead of Water the Tub were fill'd with Quicksilver.

A.

I thought so. But how it comes to pass that the Fish remains uncrush'd, I cannot tell.

B.

The Endeavour of the Quicksilver downward, is stopt by the resistance of the hard bottom. But all Resistance is a contrary Endeavour; that is, an Endeavour upwards, which gives the like Endeavour to the Quicksilver, which is also heavie, and thereby the Endeavour of the Quicksilver is diverted to the sides round-about; where stopt again by the resistance of the

sides, it receives an Endeavour upwards, which carries the Fish to the top, lying all the way upon a soft bed of Quicksilver. This is the true manner how the Fish is saved harmless. But your Author, I believe, either wanted age, or had too much business, to study the doctrine of Motion; and never considered that Resistance is not an impediment onely, or privation, but a contrary Motion; and that when a man claps two pieces of Wax together, their contrary Endeavour will turn both the pieces into one Cake of Wax.

A.

I know not the Author; but it seems he has deeplier considered this Question than other men. For in the Introduction to his Book, he saith, That men have pre-engaged themselves to maintain certain Principles of their own invention, and are therefore unwilling to receive any thing that may render their labour fruitless: and That they have not strictly enough considered the several interventions that abate, impede, advance, or direct the Gravitation of Bodies.

B.

This is true enough; and he himself is one of those men, in that he considered not, that Resistance is one of those interventions, which abate, impede, and direct Gravitation. But what are his Suppositions for the Question he handles?

A.

His first is, That as in a Pyramide of Brick, wherein the Bricks are so joyned, that the uppermost lies every where over the joynt or Cement of the two next below it, you may break down a part, and leave a Cavity, and yet the Bricks above will stand firm and sustain one another by their cross

posture: So also it is in Wheat, Hail-shot, Sand, or Water; and so they arch themselves, and thereby the Fish is every way secured by an arch of water over it.

B.

That the cause why Fishes are not crusht nor hurt in the bottom of the Sea by the weight of the water, is the waters arching it self, is very manifest. For if the uppermost Orb of the water should descend by its Gravity, it would tend toward the Centre of the Earth, and place it self all the way in a less and lesser Orb; which is impossible. For the places of the same Body are always equal. But that Wheat, Sand, Hail-shot, or loose Stones should make a firm arch, is not credible.

A.

The Author therefore (it seems) quits it: And taketh a second Hypothesis for the true Cause, though the former (he saith) be not useless, but contributes its part to it.

B.

I see, though he depart from his Hypothesis, he looks back upon it with some kindness. What is his second Hypothesis?

A.

It is, That Air and Water have an Endeavour to Motion upward, downward, directly, obliquely, and every way. For Air (he saith) will come down his chimney, and in at his door, and up his stairs.

B.

Yes, and mine too; and so would Water if I dwelt under water, rather than admit of Vacuum. But what of that?

A.

Why then it would follow, that those several tendencies or Endeavours would so abate, impede, and correct one another, as none of them should Gravitate. Which being granted, the Fish can take no harm. Wherein I finde one difficulty. Which is this: The Water having an Endeavour to Motion every way at once, methinks it should go no way, but lie at rest; which, he saith, was the opinion of Stevinus, and rejecteth it, saying, it would crush the Fish into pieces.

B.

I think the Water in this case would neither rest nor crush. For the Endeavour being (as he saith) intrinsecal, and every way, must needs drive the water perpetually outward, that is to say (as to this Question) upwards; and seeing the same Endeavour in one individual Body cannot be more ways at once than one, it will carry it on perpetually without limit, beyond the fixed Stars; and so we shall never more have rain.

A.

As ridiculous as it is, it necessarily follows.

B.

What are Dr. Wallis his Suppositions?

A.

He goes upon Experiments. And first he alleadgeth this, That Water left to it self without disturbance, does naturally settle it self into a Horizontal Plain.

B.

He does not then (as your Author and all other men) take Gravity for that Quality whereby a Body tendeth to the Centre of the Earth.

A.

Yes, he defines Gravity to be a Natural propension towards the Centre of the Earth.

B.

Then he contradicteth himself. For if all heavie Bodies tend naturally to one Centre, they shall never settle in a Plain, but in a Spherical Superficies. But against this, That such an Horizontal Plain is found in water by Experience, I say it is impossible. For the Experiment cannot be made in a Bason, but in half a mile at Sea, Experience visibly shews the contrary. According to this, he should think also that a pair of Scales should hang parallel.

A.

He thinks that too.

B.

Let us then leave this Experiment. What saies he further concerning Gravity?

A.

He takes for granted (not as an Experiment, but an Axiome) that Nature worketh not by election, but ad ultimum virium, with all the power it can.

B.

I think he means (for ’tis a very obscure passage) that every inanimate Body by nature worketh all it can without election; which may be true. But ’tis certain that men (and beasts) work often by election, and often without election; as when he goes by election, and falls without it. In this sence I grant him, that Nature does all it can. But what infers he from it?

A.

That naturally every Body has every way (if the ways oppose not one another) an Endeavour to Motion. And consequently, that if a Vessel have two holes, one at the side, another at the bottom, the water will run out at both.

B.

Does he think the Body of water that runs out at the side, and that which runs out at the bottom is but one and the same Body of water?

A.

No sure. He cannot think but that they are two several parts of the whole Water in the Vessel.

B.

What wonder is it then, if two parts of water run two ways at once, or a thousand parts a thousand ways? Does it follow thence that one Body can

go more than one way at once? Why is he still medling with things of such difficulty? He will finde at last that he has not a Genius either for Natural Philosophy or for Geometry. What other Suppositions has he?

A.

My first Author had affirmed, that a lighter Body does not Gravitate on a heavier; against this Dr. Wallis thus argueth: Let there be a Siphon A B C D filled with Quicksilver to the level A D. If then you pour Oyl upon A as high as to E, he asketh if the Oyl in A E (as being heavie) shall not press down the Quicksilver a little at A, and make it rise a little at D, suppose to F. And answers himself, that certainly it will. So that it is neither an Experiment nor an Hypothesis, but onely his opinion.

B.

Whatsoever it be, it is not true; though the Doctor may be pardoned, because the contrary was never proved.

A.

Can you prove the contrary?

B.

Yes. For the Endeavour of the Quicksilver both from A and D downward, is stronger than that of the Oyl downward. If therefore the Endeavour of the Quicksilver were not resisted by the bottom B C, it would fall so, by reason of the acceleration of heavie Bodies in their descending, as to leave the Oyl, so that it should not onely not press, but also not touch the Quicksilver. It is true in a pair of Scales equally charged with Quicksilver, that the addition of

a little Oyl to either Scale, will make it praeponderate. And that was it deceiv'd him.

A.

'Tis evident. The last Experiment he cites is the weighing of Air in a pair of Scales, where 'tis found manifestly that it has some little weight. For if you weigh a Bladder, and put the weight into one Scale, and then blow the Bladder full of Air, and put it into the other Scale, the full Bladder will outweigh the empty. Must not then the Air Gravitate?

B.

It does not follow. I have seen the Experiment just as you describe it, but it can never be thence demonstrated that Air has any weight. For as much Air as is prest downward by the weight of the blown Bladder, so much will rise from below, and lay it self Spherically at the altitude of the Center of gravity of the Bladder so blown. So that all the Air within the Bladder above that Centre, is carried thither imprisoned, and by violence: And the force that carries it up, is equal to that which presseth it down. There must therefore be allowed some little counterpoise in the other Scale to ballance it. Therefore the Experiment proves nothing to his purpose. And whereas they say there be small heavie Bodies in the Air, which make it Gravitate, do they think the force which brought them thither cannot hold them there?

A.

I leave this Question of the Fish, as cleerly resolved, because the water tending every way to one point (which is the Centre of the Earth) must of necessity arch it self. And now tell me your own opinion concerning the

Cause of Gravity, and why all Bodies descend or ascend not all alike. For there can be no more Matter in one place than another if the places be equal.

B.

I have already shewed you in general, that the difference of Motion in the parts of several Bodies makes the difference of their Natures. And all the difference of Motions consisteth either in swiftness, or in the way, or in the duration. But to tell you in Special, why Gold is heaviest, and then Quicksilver, and then (perhaps) Lead, is more than I hope to know, or mean to enquire: for I doubt not but that the Species of heavie, hard, Opaque, and Diaphanous, were all made so at their creation, and at the same time separated from different Species. So that I cannot guess at any particular Motions that should constitute their natures, further than I am guided by the Experiments made by fire or mixture.

A.

You hope not then to make Gold by Art?

B.

No, unless I could make one and the same thing heavier than it was. God hath from the beginning made all the Kindes of Hard, and Heavie, and Diaphanous Bodies that are, and of such Figure and magnitude as he thought fit; but how small soever, they may by accretion become greater in the Mine, or perhaps by generation, though we know not how. But that Gold, by the art of man should be made of not Gold, I cannot understand; nor can they that pretend to shew how. For the heaviest of all Bodies, by what mixture soever of other Bodies, will be made lighter; and not to be received for Gold.

A.

Why, when the Cause of Gravity consisteth in Motion, should you despair of finding it?

B.

It is certain, that when any two Bodies meet, as the Earth and any heavie Body will, the Motion that brings them to or towards one another, must be upon two contrary ways; and so also it is when two Bodies press each other in order to make them Hard. So that one contrariety of Motion might cause both Hard and Heavie. But it doth not. For the hardest Bodies are not always the heaviest. Therefore I finde no access that way to compare the Causes of different Endeavours of heavie Bodies to descend.

A.

But shew me at least how any heavie Body that is once above in the Air, can descend to the Earth, when there is no visible movent to thrust or pull it down.

B.

'Tis already granted, that the Earth hath this compounded Motion supposed by Copernicus, and that thereby it casteth the Contiguous Air from it self every way round-about. Which Air so cast off, must continually by its nature, range it self in a Spherical Orb. Suppose a Stone (for instance) were taken up from the ground, and held up in the Air by a mans hand, what shall come into the place it fill'd when it lay upon the Earth?

A.

So much Air as is equal to the Stone in magnitude, must descend and place it self in an Orb upon the Earth. But then I see that to avoid Vacuum, another Orb of Air of the same magnitude must descend, and place it self in that, and so perpetually to the mans hand; and then so much Air as would fill the place must descend in the same manner, and bring the Stone down with it. For the Stone having no Endeavour upward, the least Motion of the Air (the hand being removed) will thrust it downward.

B.

'Tis just so. And further, the Motion of the Stone downward shall continually be accelerated according to the odde numbers from Unity; as you know hath been demonstrated by Galileo. But we are nothing the nearer by this, to the knowledge of why one Body should have a greater Endeavour downward than another. You see the Cause of Gravity is this compounded Motion with exclusion of Vacuum.

A.

It may be 'tis the Figure that makes the difference. For though Figure be not Motion, yet it may facilitate Motion, as you see commonly the breadth of a heavie Body retardeth the sinking of it. And the cause of it is, That it makes the Air have further to go laterally, before it can rise from under it. For suppose a Body of Quicksilver falling in the Air from a certain height, must it not (going as it does towards the Centre of the Earth) as it draws neerer and neerer to the Earth, become more and more slender, in the form of a Solid Sector? And if it have far to go, divide it self into drops? This Figure of a Solid Sector is like a Needle with the point downward, and therefore I should think that facilitating the Motion of it does the same that would be done by increasing the Endeavour.

B.

Do not you see that this way of facilitating is the same in Water, and in all other Fluid heavy Bodies. Besides, your Argument ought to be applicable to the weighing of Bodies in a pair of Scales (which it is not, for there they have no such Figure) it should also hold in the comparison of Gravity in Hard and Fluid Bodies.

A.

I had not sufficiently consider'd it. But supposing now (as you do) that both heavy and hard Bodies, in their smallest parts, were made so in the Creation; yet, because Quicksilver is harder than Water, a drop of Water shall in descending be prest into a more slender Sector than a drop of Quicksilver, and consequently the Earth shall more easily cast off any quantity of Water than the same quantity of Quicksilver.

B.

This one would think were true; as also that of simple Fluid Bodies, those whose smallest parts, naturally, without the force of Fire do strongliest cohere, are generally the heaviest. But why then should Quicksilver be heavier than Stone or Steel? Fluidity and hardness are but degrees between greater Fluidity and greater hardness. Therefore to the knowledge of what it is that causeth the difference, in different Bodies, of their Endeavour downward, there are required (if it can be known at all) a great many more Experiments than have been yet made. It is not difficult to find why Water is heavier than Ice, or other Body mix'd of Air and Water. But to believe that all Bodies are heavier or lighter according to the quantity of Air within them, is very hard.

A.

I see by this, that the Creator of the World, as by his Power he ordered it, so by his Wisdom he provided it should be never disordered. Therefore leaving this Question, I desire to know whether if a heavy Body were as high as a fixt Star, it would return to the Earth.

B.

'Tis hard to try. But if there be this compounded Motion in the great Bodies so high, such as is in the Earth, it is very likely that some heavy Bodies will be carried to them. But we shall never know it till we be at the like height.

A.

What think you is the reason why a drop of Water (though heavy) will stand upon a Horizontal Plain of dry or unctuous Wood, and not spread it self upon it? For let A B (in the 6th Figure) be the dry Plain, D the drop of Water, and D C perpendicular to A B. The drop D (though higher) will not descend and spread it self upon it.

B.

The reason I think is manifest. For those Bodies which are made by beating of Water and Air together, shew plainly that the parts of Water have a great degree of Cohesion. For the skin of the Bubble is Water, and yet it can keep the Air (though moved) from getting out. Therefore the whole drop of Water at D, hath a good deal of Cohesion of parts. And seeing A B is an Horizontal Plain, the way from the contact in D either to A or B is upwards, and consequently there is no endeavour in D either of those ways, but what proceeds from so much weight of Water as is able to break that Cohesion,

which so small a drop is too weak to do. But the Cohesion being once broken, as with your Finger, the Water will follow.

A.

Seeing the descent of a heavy Body increaseth according to the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, &c. and the aggregates of those numbers, viz. of 1 and 3; and 1 and 3 and 5; and of 1 and 3 and 5 and 7, &c. are square numbers, namely 4. 9. 16, the whole swiftness of the descent will be, I think, to the aggregate of so many swiftnesses equal to the first Endeavour, as square numbers are to their sides, 1, 2, 3, 4. Is it so?

B.

Yes, you know it hath been demonstrated by Galileo.

A.

Then if (for instance) you put into a pair of Scales equal quantities of Quicksilver and Water, seeing they are both accelerated in the same proportion, why should not the weight of Quicksilver to the weight of Water be in duplicate proportions to their first Endeavours?

B.

Because they are in a pair Scales. For there the Motion of neither of them is accelerated. And therefore it will be, as the first Endeavour of the Quicksilver to the first endeavour of the Water, so the whole weight to the whole weight. By which you may see, that the Cause which takes away the Gravitation of Liquid Bodies from Fish or other lighter Bodies within them, can never be derived from the weight.

A.

I have one Question more to ask concerning Gravity. If Gravity be (as some define it) an intrinsecal quality, whereby a Body descendeth towards the Center of the Earth, how is it possible that a piece of Iron that hath this intrinsecal quality, should rise from the Earth, to go to a Loadstone? Hath it also an intrinsecal quality to go from the Earth? It cannot be. The Cause therefore must be extrinsecal. And because when they are come together in the Air, if you leave them to their own nature, they will fall down together, they must also have some like extrinsecal Cause. And so this magnetique vertue will be such another vertue as makes all other heavy Bodies to descend (in this our World) to the Earth. If therefore you can from this your Hypothesis of compounded Motion, by which you have so probably salved the Problem of Gravity, salve also this of the Loadstone, I shall acknowledge both your Hypothesis to be true, and your Conclusion to be well deduced.

B.

I think it not impossible. But I will proceed no further in it now, than (for the facilitating of the demonstrations) to tell you the several proprieties of the Magnet, whereof I am to shew the causes. As first, That Iron, and no other Body, at some little distance (though heavy) will rise to it. Secondly, That if it be laid upon a still Water in a floating Vessel, and left to it self, it will turn it self till it lye in a Meridian, that is to say, with one and the same Line still North and South. Thirdly, If you take a long slender piece of Iron, and apply the Loadstone to it, and (according to the position of the Poles of the Loadstone) draw it over to the end of the Iron, the Iron will have the same Poles with the Magnet, so it be drawn with some pressure; but the Poles will lye in a contrary Position; and also this long Iron will draw other

Iron to it as the Magnet doth. Fourthly, This long Iron, if it be so small as that poiz'd upon a Pin, the weight of it have no visible Effect, the Navigators use it for the Needle of their Compass, because it points North and South; saving that in most places by particular accidents it is diverted; which diversion is called the variation of the Horizontal Needle. Fifthly, The same Needle placed in a Plain perpendicular to the Horizon, hath another Motion called the Inclination. Which that you may the better conceive, draw a fourth Figure; wherein let there be a Circle to represent the Terrella, that is to say, a Spherical Magnet.

A.

Let this be it, whose Center is A, the North Pole B, the South Pole C.

B.

Join B C, and cross it at right Angles with the Diameter D E.

A.

'Tis done.

B.

Upon the point D set the Needle parallel to B C, with the cross for the South Pole, and the Barb for the North; and describe a Square about the Circle B D C E, and divide the arch D B into four equal parts in a, b, c.

A.

'Tis done.

B.

Then place the middle of the Needle on the points a, b, c, so that they may freely turn; and set the Barb which is at D toward the North, and that which is at C towards the South. You see plainly by this, that the Angles of Inclination through the Arch D C taken all together, are double to a Right Angle. For when the South point of the Needle, looking North, as at D, comes to look South, as at C, it must make half a Circle.

A.

That is true. And if you draw the Sine of the Arch D a (which is d a) and the Sine of the Arch B a (which is a c) and the Sine of the Arch D b (which is b f) and the Sine of the Arch B c (which is c g) the Needle will lye upon b f with the North-point downwards, so that the Needle will be parallel to A D. Then from a draw the line a h, making the Angle e a h equal to the Angle D A a. And then the Needle at a shall lye in the line a h with the South point toward h. Finally, draw the line c h, which (with c g) will also make a quarter of a right Angle; and therefore if the Needle be plac'd on the point c it will lye in c h with the South point toward h. And thus you see by what degrees the Needle inclines or dips under the Horizon more and more from D till it come to the North Pole at B; where it will lye parallel to the Needle in D; but with their Barbs looking contrary ways. And this is certain by experience, and by none contradicted.

B.

You see then why the degrees of the Inclinatory Needle in coming from D to B are double to the degrees of a Quadrant. It is found also by experience, that Iron both of the Mine and of the Furnace put into a Vessel so as to float, will lay it self (if some accident in the Earth hinder it not) exactly North and South. And now I am, from this compounded Motion supposed by Copernicus, to derive the causes why a Loadstone draws Iron; why it makes

Iron to do the same; why naturally it placeth it self in a parallel to the Axis of the Earth; why by passing it over the Needle it changes its Poles; and what is the cause that it inclines. But it is your part to remember what I told you of Motion at our second meeting; and what I told you of this compounded Motion supposed by Copernicus, at our fourth meeting.

CAP. IX. OF THE LOADSTONE, AND ITS POLES; AND WHETHER THEY SHEW THE LONGITUDE OF PLACES ON THE EARTH.

A.

I Come now to hear what Natural Causes you can assign of the vertues of the Magnet; and first, why it draws Iron to it, and only Iron.

B.

You know I have no other cause to assign but some local Motion, and that I never approved of any argument drawn from Sympathy, Influence, Substantial Forms, or Incorporeal Effluvia. For I am not, nor am accounted by my Antagonists for a Witch. But to answer this Question, I should describe the Globe of the Earth greater than it is at B in the first Figure, but that the Terrella in the fourth Figure will serve our turn. For ’tis but calling B and C the Poles of the Earth, and D E the Diameter of the Aequinoctial Circle, and making D the East, and E the West. And then you must remember that the Annual Motion of the Earth is from West to East, and compounded of a straight and circular Motion, so as that every point of it shall describe a small Circle from West to East, as is done by the whole Globe. And let the Circles about a b c be three of those small Circles.

A.

Before you go any further, I pray you shew me how I must distinguish East and West in every part of this Figure. For wheresoever I am on Earth

(suppose at London) and see the Sun rise (suppose in Cancer) is not a straight line from my Eye to the Sun terminated in the East?

B.

'Tis not due East, but partly East, partly South. For the Earth (being but a point compared to the Sun) all the parallels to D E the Aequator, such as are e a, f b, e g, if they be produced, will fall upon the Body of the Sun. And therefore A b is North-East; A a East North-East; And A c North North-East.

A.

Proceed now to the Cause of Attraction.

B.

Suppose now that the Internal parts of the Loadstone had the same Motion with that of the Internal parts of the Sun which make the Annual Motion of the Earth from West to East, but in a contrary way, for otherwise the Loadstone and the Iron can never be made to meet. Then set the Loadstone at a little distance from the Earth, marked with z; and the Iron marked with x upon the superficies of the Earth. Now that which makes x rise to z, can be nothing else but Air; for nothing touches it but Air. And that which makes the Air to rise, can be nothing but those small circles made by the parts of the Earth (such as are at a b c,) for nothing else touches the Air. Seeing then the Motion of each point of the Loadstone is from East to West in Circles, and the motion of each point of the Iron from West to East; it follows, that the Air between the Loadstone and the Iron shall be cast off both East and West; and consequently the place left empty, if the Iron did

not rise up and fill it. Thus you see the Cause that maketh the Loadstone and the Iron to meet.

A.

Hitherto I assent. But why they should meet when some Heterogeneous Body lyes in the Air between them, I cannot imagine. And yet I have seen a Knife, though within the Sheath, attract one end of the Needle of a Mariners Compass; and have heard it will do the same though a Stone-wall were between.

B.

Such Iron were indeed a very and vigorous Loadstone. But the Cause of it is the same that causeth Fire or hot Water (which have the same compounded Motion) to work through a Vessel of Brass. For though the Motion be altered by restraint within the Heterogeneous Body, yet being continued quite through it restores it self.

A.

What is the Cause why the Iron rub'd over by a Loadstone will receive the vertue which the Loadstone hath of drawing Iron to it?

B.

Since the Motion that brings two Bodies to meet must have contrary ways, and that the Motions of the Internal parts of the Magnet and of the Iron are contrary; the rubbing of them together does not give the Iron the first Edeavour to rise, but multiplies it. For the Iron untouch'd will rise to a Loadstone; but if touch'd, it becomes a Loadstone to other Iron. For when they touch a piece of Iron they pass the Loadstone over it only one way, viz.

from Pole to Pole; not back again, for that would undo what before had been done; also they press it in passing, to the very end of the Iron, and somewhat hard. So that by this pressing Motion all the small Circles about the points a b c, are turned the contrary way. And the halves of those small Circles made on the Arch D B will be taken away, and the Poles changed, so as that the North-Poles shall point South, and the South Poles North, as in the Figure.

A.

But how comes it to pass, that when a Loadstone hath drawn a piece of Iron, you may add to it another, as if they begat one another? Is there the like Motion in the generation of Animals?

B.

I have told you that Iron of it self will rise to the Loadstone. Much more then will it adhere to it when it is armed with Iron, and both it and the Iron have a plain Superficies. For then not only the points of Contact will be many (which make the coherence stronger) but also the Iron wherewith it is armed is now another Loadstone, differing a little (which you perhaps think) as Male and Female. But whether this compounded Motion and confrication causeth the generation of Animals, how should I know, that never had so much leasure as to make any observation which might conduce to that?

A.

My next Question is, seeing you say the Loadstone, or a Needle touch'd with it, naturally respecteth the Poles of the Earth, but that the variation of it

proceedeth from some accidents in the Superficies of the Earth; what are those accidents?

B.

Suppose there be a Hill upon the Earth (for example) at r; then the stream of the Air which was between z and x Westward, coming to the Hill, shall go up the Hills side, and so down to the other side, according to the crooked Line which I have mark'd about the Hill by points; and this infallibly will turn the North-point of the Needle, being on the East side, more toward the East, and that on the other side more towards the West, than if there had been no Hill. And where upon the Earth are there not Eminencies and depressions, except in some wide Sea, and a great way from Land?

A.

But if that be true, the Variation in the same place should be always the same. For the Hills are not removed.

B.

The Variation of the Needle at the same place is still the same: but the Variation of the Variation is partly from the Motion of the Pole it self, which by the Astronomers is called Motus trepidationis; and partly from that, that the Variation cannot be truly observ'd: for the Horizontal Needle and the Inclinatory Needle incline alike, but cannot incline in due quantity. For whether set upon a Pin or an Axis, their Inclination is hindred in the Horizontal Needle by the Pin it self. If upon an Axis, if the Axis be just, it cannot move; if slack, the weight will hinder it. But chiefly because the North Pole of the Earth draws away from it the North Pole of the Needle.

For two like Poles cannot come together. And this is the cause why the Variation in one place is East, and another West.

A.

This is indeed the most probable reason why the Variation varies, that ever I heard given. And I should presently acknowledge that this parallel Motion of the Axis of the Earth in the Ecliptick, supposed by Copernicus, is the true Annual Motion of the Earth, but that there is lately come forth a Book called Longitude found, which makes the Magnetical Poles distant from the Poles of the Earth eight Degrees and a half.

B.

I have the Book. 'Tis far from being demonstrated, as you shall find if you have the patience to see it examined. For wheresoever his demonstration is true, the conclusion (if rightly inferred) will be this, that the Poles of the Loadstone and the Poles of the Earth are the same. And where on the contrary his demonstrations are fallacies, it is because sometimes he fancieth the Lines he hath drawn, not where they are; sometimes because he mistakes his station; and sometimes because he goes on some false Principle of Natural Philosophy; and sometimes also because he knoweth not sufficiently the Doctrine of Spherical Triangles.

A.

I think that's the Book there which lyes at your Elbow. Pray you read.

B.

I find first (Pag. 4.) that the ground of his Argument are the two observations made by Mr. Burroughs; one at Vaygates, in 1676, where the

Variation from the Pole of the Earth he found to be 11 deg. 15 min. East; the other at Lime-house near London, in 1580, where the Variation from the Pole of the Earth was 8 deg. 38 min. West. By which he saith, he might find out the Magnetical Pole.

A.

Where is Vaygate?

B.

In 70 Degrees of North Latitude, the difference of Longitude between London and it being 58 Degrees.

A.

The Longitude of places being yet to seek, how came he to know this difference of 58 Degrees, except the Poles of the Magnet and the Earth be the same?

B.

I believe he trusted to the Globe for that. For the distance between the places is not above 2000 Miles the nearest way. But we will pass by that, and come to his Demonstration, and to his Diagram, wherein L is London, P the North-Pole of the Earth, V Vaygates. So that L P is 38 deg. 28 min. P V 20 deg. the Angle L P V 58 deg. for the difference between the Longitudes of Vaygates and London. This is the Construction. But before I come to the demonstration, I have an Inference to draw from these observations, which is this. Because in the same year the Variation at London was 11 deg. 15 min. East, and at Vaygates 8 deg. 38 min. West; If you substract 11 deg. 15 min. from the Arc L P; and 8 deg. 38 min. from the Arc L V, the Variation

on both sides will be taken away; so that P V being the Meridian of Vaygates, and L P the Meridian of London, they shall both of them meet in P the Pole of the Earth. And if the Pole of the Magnet be nearer to the Zenith of London than is the Pole of the Earth, it shall be just as much nearer to the Zenith of Vaygates in the Meridian of Vaygates which is P V; as is manifest by the Diurnal Motion of the Earth.

A.

All this I conceive without difficulty. Proceed to the Demonstration.

B.

Mark well now. His words are these, (Pag. 5.) From P L V substract 11 deg. 15 min. and there remains the Angle V L M. Consider now which is the Angle P L V, and which is the remaining Angle V L M, and tell what you understand by it.

A.

He has mark'd the Angle P L V with two numbers, 11 deg. 15 min. and 21 deg. 50 min. which together make 33 deg. 5 min. And the Angle 11 deg. 15 min. being substracted from P L V, there will remain 21 deg. 50 min. for the Angle V L M. I know not what to say to it. For I thought the Arc P V, which is 20 deg. had been the Arc of the Spherical Angle P L V; and that the Arc L V had been 58 deg. because he says the Angle L P V is so; and that the Arc L M had been 46 deg. because the Angle L P M is so; and lastly, that the Angle P L M had been 8 deg. 30 min. because the Arc P M is so.

B.

And what you thought had been true, if a Spherical Angle were a very Angle. For all Men that have written of Spherical Triangles take for the ground of their calculation (as Regiomontanus, Copernicus, and Clavius,) that the Arch of a Spherical Angle is the side opposite to the Angle. You should have considered also that he makes the Angle V P M 12 deg. but sets down no Arc to answer it. But that you may find I am in the right, look into the Definitions which Clavius hath put down before his Treatise of Spherical Triangles, and amongst them is this; The Arc of a Spherical Triangle is a part of a great Circle intercepted between the two sides drawn from the Pole of the said great Circle.

A.

The Book is nothing worth; for it is impossible to substract an Arc of a Circle out of a Spherical Angle. And I see besides that he takes the Superficies that lyeth between the sides L P and L M for an Arch, which is the quantity of an Angle; and is a Line, and cannot be taken out of a Superficies. I wonder how any Man that pretends to Mathematicks could be so much mistaken.

B.

'Tis no great wonder. For Clavius himself striving to maintain that a right Angle is greater than the Angle made by the Diameter and the Circumference, fell into the same errour. A corner (in Vulgar Speech,) and an Angle (in the Language of Geometry) are not the same thing. But it is easie even for a learned Man sometimes to take them for the same, as this Author now has done; and proceeding he saith, Substract 8 deg. 38 min. from the Angle P V L, and there remains the Angle L V M.

A.

That again is false, because impossible. What was it that deceiv'd him now?

B.

The same misunderstanding of the nature of a Spherical Angle. Which appears further in this, that when he knew the Arc V P was part of a great Circle, he thought V M (which he maketh 8 deg. 30 min.) were also parts of a great Circle; which is manifestly false. For two great Circles (because they pass through the Center) do cut each other into halves. But P V is not half a Circle. He sure thought himself at Vaygates, and that P M V was equal to P V, although in the same Hemisphere.

A.

But how proves he that the Arc PM is 8 deg. 30 min?

B.

Thus. We have in two Triangles, P L M and P V M, two sides and one Angle included, to find P M the distance of the Magnetical Pole from the Pole of the Earth 8 deg. 30 min.

A.

Is that all? 'Tis very short for a Demonstration of two so difficult Problems, as the quantity of 8 deg. 30 min. and of the place of the Magnetical Pole. But he has proved nothing till he has shew'd how he found it. And though P M be 8 deg. 30 min. it follows not that M is the Magnetical Pole.

B.

Nor is it true. For if P M be 8 deg. 30 min. and V M 8 deg. 38 min. the whole Arc P M V will be 17 deg. 8 min. which should be 20 deg. Besides, whereas the Variations were East and West, the substracting of them should be also East and West, but they are North and South.

A.

I am satisfied that the Magnetical Poles and the Poles of the Earth are the same. But thus much I confess, that if they were not the same, the Longitude were found. For the difference of the Latitudes of the Earths Aequator and of the Magnetical Aequator is the difference of the Longitude. But proceed.

B.

The Earth being a solid Body, and the Magnetick Sphere that encompasseth the Earth being a substance that hath not solidity to keep pace with the Earth, looseth in its Motion. And that may be the Cause of the Motion of the Magnetick Poles from East to West.

A.

This is very fine, and unexpected. The Magnetick Sphere (which I took for a Globe made of a Magnet) has not solidity to keep pace with the Earth, though it be one of the hardest Stones that are. It encompasseth the Earth; yet I thought nothing had encompassed the Earth but Air in which I breath and move. By this also the whole Earth must be a Loadstone. For two Bodies cannot be in one place. So that he is yet no further than Dr. Gilbert whom he sleights. And if the Sphere be a Magnet, then the Earth and Loadstone have the same Poles. See the force of Truth! which though it could not draw to it his reason, hath drawn his words to it.

B.

But perhaps he meant that the Magnetick vertue encompasseth the Earth, and not the Magnetick Body.

A.

But that helpeth him not. For if the Body of the Magnet be not there, the vertue then is the vertue of the Earth; and so again the Poles of the Earth are Magnetick Poles.

B.

You see how unsafe it is to boast of Doctrines as of Gods gifts, till we are sure that they are true. For God giveth and denieth as he pleaseth, not as our selves wish; as now to him he hath given Confidence enough, but hath denied him (at least hitherto) the finding of the Longitudes. In the next place (Pag. 8.) he seems much pleased that his Doctrine agrees with an opinion of Keplerus, That from the Creation to the year of our Lord it is to the year 1657 now 5650 years; and with that which he saith some Divines have held in times past, That as this World was created in six days, so it should continue six thousand years. By which account the World will be at an end 350 years hence; though the Scripture tell us it shall come as a Thief in the night. O what advantage 340 years hence will they have that know this, over them that know it not, by taking up Money at Interest, or selling Lands at 20 years purchase!

A.

But he says he will not meddle with that.

B.

Yes, when he had medled with it too much already.

A.

But you have not told me wherein consisteth this Agreement between him and Keplerus.

B.

I forgot it. ’Tis in the Motion of the Magnetick Poles. For precedently (Pag. 7.) he had said that their Period or Revolution was 600 years; their yearly Motion 36 min. and (Pag. 8.) that their Motion is by sixes. Six tenths of a degree in one year; six degrees in ten year; sixty degrees in a hundred year; and six times sixty degrees in 600 year.

A.

But what Natural Cause doth he assign of this revolution of 600 years?

B.

None at all. For the Magnet lying upon the Earth, can have no Motion at all but what the Earth and the Air give it. And because it is always at 8 deg. 30 min. distance from the Pole of the Earth, the Earth can give it no other Motion than what it gives to its own Poles by the precession of the Aequinoctial points. Nor can the Air give it any Motion but by its Stream; which must needs vary when the Stream varieth. But what a vast difference does he make between the period of the Motion of the Aequinoctial points, which are about or near 36000 years according to Copernicus (Lib. 3. Ca.) which makes the Annual precession to be 36 seconds, and the period of the Magnetical Poles Motion, which is but 600 years.

A.

Go on.

B.

He comes now (Pag. 15.) to the Inclinatory Needle upon a Spherical Loadstone. Where he shews, by Diagram, that the Needle and the Instrument together moved toward the Magnetical Pole, make the sum of the Inclinations equal to two Quadrants, setting the North-point of the Needle Southward. Which I confess is true. But (in the same Page) he ascribeth the same Motion to the Earth in these words: As the Horizontal Needle hath a double Motion about the Round Loadstone or Terrulla, so also the Inclinatory Needle hath a double Motion about the Earth. What is this, but a confession that the Poles of the Magnet and of the Earth are the same?

A.

’Tis plain enough.

B.

Besides, seeing he placeth the Magnetical Pole at M in the Meridian of Vaygates, the Needle being touch’d shall Incline to the Pole of the Earth which is P, as well there as at London, and make the North-Pole of the Earth point South.

A.

’Tis certain, because he puts both the Magnetical Pole and the Pole of the Earth in the same Meridian of the Earth. Nor see I any Cause why, the

Needle being the same, it should not be as subject to Variation, and to Variation of Variation, and to all Accidents of the Earth there, as in any other part.

B.

He putteth (Pag. 16.) a Question, At what distance from the Earth are the Magnetick Poles? and answers to it, They are very near the Earth, because the nearer the Earth, the greater the strength. What think you of this?

A.

I think they are in the Superficies of the Magnet, as the Pole of the Earth is in the Superficies of the Earth. And consequently, that then the Earth must be a part of the Magnet, and their Poles the same. For the Body of the Magnet and the Body of the Earth, if they be two, cannot be in one place.

B.

His next words are, Some things are to be considered concerning those Variations of the Horizontal Needle which are not according to the scituation of the place from the Magnetick Poles, but are contrary; as all the West-Indies according to the Poles should be Easterly, and they are Westerly. Which is by some Accidental Cause in the Earth; and their Motion, as I formerly said, is a forced Motion, and not Natural.

A.

He has clearly overthrown his main Doctrine. For to say the Motion of the Needle is forced and unnatural, is a most pityful shift, and manifestly false, no Motion being more constant or less accidental, notwithstanding the

Variation, to which the Inclinatory Needle is no less subject than the Horizontal Needle.

B.

That which deceived him, was, that he thought them two sorts of Needles, forgetting what he had said of Normans Invention of the Inclinatory Needle by the inclining of the Horizontal Needle, Pag. 11. For I will shew you that what he says is Easterly and should be Westerly, should be Easterly as it is. Consider the fourth Figure, in which B is the North-Pole, and B c 11 deg. 15 min. Easterly, which was the Variation at London in 1576 Easterly. Suppose A c to be the Needle, shall it not incline, as well here as at D a, and the Variation B c be Easterly? Again, D a is 11 deg. 15 min. and the Needle in D parallel to A B, and at a inclining also 11 deg. 15 min. Westerly. And is not the Variation there D a Westerly, with the North-point of the Needle in the Line a h?

A.

But the West-Indies are not in this Hemisphere B C D E. The Variation therefore will proceed in an Arc of the opposite Hemisphere, which is Westerly.

B.

I believe he might think so, forgetting that he and his Compass were on the Superficies of the Earth, and fancying them in the Center at A.

A.

'Tis like enough. If we had a straight Line exactly equal to the Arc of a Quadrant, I think it would very much facilitate the Doctrine of Spherical

Triangles.

B.

When you have done with your Questions of Natural Philosophy, I will give you a clear Demonstration of the equality of a straight Line to the Arc of a Quadrant, which, if it satisfie you, you may carry with you, and try thereby if you can find the Angle of a Spherical Triangle given.

A.

It is time now to give over. And at our next meeting I desire your opinion concerning the Causes of Diaphaniety, and Refraction. This Copernicus has done much more than he thought of. For he has not only restored to us Astronomy, but also made the way open to Physiology.

CAP. X. OF TRANSPARENCE, REFRACTION; AND OF THE POWER OF THE EARTH TO PRODUCE LIVING CREATURES.

A.

THINKING upon what you said yesterday, it lookt like a generation of living Creatures. I saw the love between the Loadstone and the Iron in their mutual attraction, their engendring in their close and contrary Motion; and their issue in the Iron, which being touch'd hath the same attractive vertue. Now seeing they have the same internal motion of parts with that of the Earth, why should not their substance be the same, or very near a kin?

B.

The most of them (if not all) that have written of this Subject, when they call the Loadstone a Terrella, seem to think as you do. But I, except I could find proof for it, will not affirm it. For the Earth attracteth all kind of Bodies but Air, and the Loadstone none but Iron. The Earth is a Star, and it were too bold to pronounce any sentence of its substance, especially of the Planets, that are so lapt up in their several Coats, as that they cannot work on our Eyes, or any Organ of our other Senses.

A.

I come therefore now to the business of the day. Seeing all Generation, Augmentation, and Alteration is local Motion, how can a Body not Transparent be made Transparent?

B.

I think it can never be done by the Art of Man. For as I said of Hard and Heavy Bodies in the Creation, so I think of Diaphanous, that the very same Individual Body which was not Transparent then, shall never be made Transparent by Humane Art.

A.

Do not you see that every day Men make Glass, and other Diaphanous Bodies not much inferior in beauty to the fairest Gems?

B.

It is one thing to make one Transparent of many by mixture, and another to make Transparent of not Transparent. Any very hard Stone, if it be beaten into small Sands, such as is used for Hour-Glasses, every one of those Sands, if you look upon it with a Microscope, you will find to be Transparent; and the harder and whiter the Sone is, so much the more Transparent, as I have seen in the Stone of which are made Milstones, which Stone is here called Greet. And I doubt not but the Sands of white Marble must be more Transparent. But there are no Sands so Transparent that they have not a scurf upon them as hard, perhaps, as the Stone it self; which they whose profession it is to make Glass, have the Art to scour and wash away. And therefore I think it no great wonder to bring those Sands into one Lump, though I know not how they do it.

A.

I know they do it with Lie made with a Salt extracted from the Ashes of an Herb, of which Salt they make a strong Lie, and mingle it with the Sand,

and then bake it.

B.

Like enough. But still it is a Compound of two Transparent Bodies, whereof one is the Natural Stone, the other is the Morter. This therefore doth not prove, that one and the same Body, of not Transparent can be made Transparent.

A.

Since they can make one Transparent Body of many, why do they not of a great many small sparks of natural Diamant compound one great one? It would bear the charges of all the Materials, and beside, enrich them.

B.

'Tis probable it would. But it may be they know no Salt that howsoever prepared, which (with how great a Fire soever) can make them melt. And, it may be the true Chrystal of the Mountain, which is found in great pieces in the Alps, is but a compound of many small ones, and made by the Earths Annual Motion. For it is a very swift Motion. Suppose now that within a very small Cavern of those Rocks whose smallest Atomes are Chrystal, and the Cavity fill'd with Air; and consider what a tumult would be made by the swift reciprocation of that Air; whether it would not in time separate those Atomes from the Rock, and jumbling them together make them rub off their scruf from one another, and by little and little to touch one another in polish'd plains, and consequently stick together, till in length of time they become one lump of clean Chrystal.

A.

I believe that the least parts of created substances lay mingled together at first, till it pleased God to separate all dissimilar natures, and congregate the similar, to which this Annual Motion is proper. But they say that Chrystal is found in the open Air hanging like Icicles upon the Rocks. Which (if true) defeats this supposition of a narrow Cavern. And therefore I must have some further experience of it before I make it my opinion. But howsoever, it still holds true that Diaphanous Bodies of all sorts, in their least parts, were made by God in the beginning of the World. But it may be true, notwithstanding those Icicles. For the force of the Air that could break off those Diaphanous Atomes in a Cavern, can do the same in the open Air. And I know that a less force of Air can break some Bodies into small pieces, not much less hard than Chystal, by corrupting them.

B.

That which you now have said is somewhat. But I deny not the possibility, but only doubt of the Operation. You may therefore pass to some other Question.

A.

Well, I will ask you then a Question about Refraction. I know already that for the Cause of Refraction (when the Light falleth through a thinner Medium upon a thicker) you assign the resistance of the thicker Body; but you do not mean there by Rarum and Densum, two Bodies whereof in equal spaces one has more substance in it than the other.

B.

No. For equal spaces contain equal Bodies. But I mean by Densum any Body which more resisteth the Motion of the Air, and by Rarum that which

resisteth less.

A.

But you have not declared in what that resistance consisteth.

B.

I suppose it proceedeth from the Hardness.

A.

But from thence it will follow, that all Transparent Bodies that equally refract are equally Hard. Which I think is not true, because the Refraction of Glass is not greater (at least in comparison of their Hardnesses) than that of Water.

B.

I confess it. Therefore I think we must take in Gravity to a Share in the production of this Refraction. For I never considered Refraction but in Glass; because my business then was only to find the Causes of the Phaenomena of Telescopes and Microscopes. Let therefore A B (in Fig. 7.) be a hard, and consequently, a heavy Body. And from above (as from the Sun) let C A be the line of Incidence, and produced to D. And draw A E perpendicular to A B. It is manifest that the Hardness in A B shall turn the stream of the Light inwards toward A E, suppose in the line A e. It is also evident that the Endeavour in B, which is (being heavy) downward, shall turn the stream again inward, towards A E as in A b. Thus it is in Refraction from the Sun downwards. In like manner, if the light come from below, as from a Candle in the point D, the line of Incidence will be D A, and produced will pass to C. And the resistance of the Hardness in A will turn

the stream A C inward, suppose into B l, and make C l equal to D e. For passing into a thinner Medium, it will depart from the perpendicular in an Angle equal to the Angle D A e, by which it came nearer to it in A e. So also the resistance of the Gravity in the point A shall turn the stream of the Light into the line A i, and make the Angle l A i equal to the Angle e A b. And thus you see in what manner, though not in what proportion Hardness and Gravity conjoyn their resistance in the Causing of Refraction.

A.

But you proved yesterday, that a heavy Body does not Gravitate upon a Body equally heavy. Now this A B has upper parts, and lower parts; and if the upper parts do not Gravitate upon the lower parts, how can there be any Endeavour at all downward to contribute to the Refraction?

B.

I told you yesterday, that when a heavy Body was set upon another Body heavier or harder than it self, the Endeavour of it downward was diverted another way, but not that it was extinguished. But in this case, where it lyeth upon Air, the first endeavour of the lowest part worketh downward. For neither Motion nor Body can be utterly extinguished by a less than an Omnipotent power. All Bodies as long as they are Bodies, are in Motion one way or other, though the farther it be communicated, so much the less.

A.

But since you hold that Motion is propagated through all Bodies, how hard or heavy soever they be, I see no Cause but that all Bodies should be Transparent.

B.

There are divers Causes that take away Transparency. First, if the Body be not perfectly Homogeneous, that is to say, if the smallest parts of it be not all precisely of the same nature, or do not so touch one another as to leave no Vacuum within it; or though they touch, if they be not as hard in the contact as in any other line. For then the Refractions will be so changed both in their direction, and in their strength, as that no Light shall come through it to the Eye; as in Wood and ordinary Stone and Metal. Secondly, The Gravity and hardness may be so great, as to make the Angle refracted so great, as the second Refraction shall not direct the beam of light to the Eye; as if the Angle of Refraction were D A E, the Refracted line would be perpendicular to A B, and never come to the line A D, in which is the Eye.

A.

To know how much of the Refraction is due to the Hardness, and how much to the Gravity, I believe it is impossible, though the Quantity of the whole be easily measured in a Diaphanous Body given. And both you and Mr. Warner have demonstrated, that as the Sine of the Angle Refracted in one Inclination is to the Sine of the Angle Refracted in another Inclination, so is the Sine of one Inclination to the Sine of the Angle of the other Inclination. Which Demonstrations are both published by Mersennus in the end of the first Volume of his Cogitata Physico-Mathematica. But since there be many Bodies, through which though there pass Light enough, yet no Object appears through them to the Eye, what is the reason of that?

B.

You mean Paper. For Paper-Windows will enlighten a Room, and yet not show the Image of an Object without the Room. But ’tis because there are

in Paper abundance of pores, through which the Air passing moveth the Air within; by the Reflections whereof any thing within may be seen. And in the same Paper there are again as many parts not Transparent, through which the Air cannot pass, but must be reflected first to all parts of the Object, and from them again to the Paper; and at the Paper either reflected again or transmitted, according as it falls upon Pores or not Pores; so that the Light from the Object can never come together at the Eye.

A.

There belongs yet to this Subject the Causes of the diversity of Colours. But I am so well satisfied with that which you have written of it in the 24th Chapter of your Book de Corpore, that I need not trouble you further in it. And now I have but one Question more to ask you, which I thought upon last night. I have read in an antient Historian that Living Creatures after a great deluge were produced by the Earth, which being then very soft, there were bred in it (it may be by the rapid Motion of the Sun) many Blisters, which in time breaking, brought forth (like so many Eggs) all manner of living Creatures great and small, which since it is grown hard it cannot do. What think you of it?

B.

It is true that the Earth produced the first living Creatures of all sorts but Man. For God said, (Gen. 1. vers. 24.) Let the Earth produce every living Creature, Cattle, and creeping thing, &c. But then again (ver. 25.) it is said that God made the Beast of the Earth, &c. So that it is evident that God gave unto the Earth that vertue. Which vertue must needs consist in Motion, because all Generation is Motion. But Man, though the same day, was made afterward.

A.

Why hath not the Earth the same vertue now? Is not the Sun the same it was? Or is there no Earth now soft enough?

B.

Yes. And it may be the Earth may yet produce some very small Living Creatures: And perhaps Male and Female. For the smallest Creatures which we take notice of, do engender, though they do not all by conjunction; therefore if the Earth produce living Creatures at this day, God did not absolutely rest from all his Works on the seventh day, but (as it is Ca. ver. 2.) he rested from all the work he had made. And therefore it is no harm to think that God worketh still, and when and where and what he pleaseth. Beside, 'tis very hard to believe, that to produce Male and Female, and all that belongs thereto, as also the several and curious Organs of Sense and Memory, could be the work of any thing that had not understanding. From whence, I think we may conclude, that whatsoever was made after the Creation, was a new Creature made by God no therwise than the first Creatures were, excepting only Man.

A.

They are then in an Errour that think there are no more different kinds of Animals in the World now, than there were in the Ark of Noah.

B.

Yes doubtless. For they have no Text of Scripture from which it can be proved.

A.

The Questions of Nature which I could yet propound are innumerable. And since I cannot go through them, I must give over somewhere, and why not here? For I have troubled you enough, though I hope you will forgive me.

B.

So God forgive us both as we do one another. But forget not to take with you the Demonstration of a straight Line equal to an Arc of a Circle.

FINIS.

An Historical Narration concerning Hersey and the Punishment Thereof

1680 EDITION

AN HISTORICAL NARRATION CONCERNING HERESIE, AND THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.

THE word Heresie is Greek, and signifies a taking of any thing, and particularly the taking of an Opinion. After the study of Philosophy begun in Greece, and the Philosophers disagreeing amongst themselves, had started many Questions, not onely about things Natural, but also Moral and Civil; because every man took what Opinion he pleased, each several Opinion was called a Heresie; which signified no more than a private Opinion, without reference to truth or falshood. The beginners of these Heresies were chiefly Pythagoras, Epicurus, Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle; men who as they held many Errours, so also found they out many true and useful Doctrines, in all kinds of Learning: and for that cause were well esteemed of by the greatest Personages of their own times; and so also were some few of their Followers.

But the rest, ignorant men, and very often needy Knaves, having learned by heart the Tenets, some of Pythagoras, some of Epicurus, some of Zeno, some of Plato, some of Aristotle, and pretending to take after them, made use thereof to get their Living by the teaching of Rich mens Children that happened to be in love with these famous Names. But by their ignorant Discourse, sordid and ridiculous Manners, they were generally despised, of what Sect or Heresie soever they were; whether they were Pythagoreans, or Epicureans, or Stoicks (who followed Zeno) or Academicks (Followers of

Plato) or Peripateticks (Followers of Aristotle:) For these were the names of Heresies, or (as the Latines call them) Sects, à sequendo, so much talkt of from after the time of Alexander till this present day, and that have perpetually troubled or deceived the people with whom they lived, and were never more numerous than in the time of the Primitive Church.

But the Heresie of Aristotle was more predominant than any, or perhaps than all the rest: nor was the name of Heresie then a disgrace, nor the word Heretick at all in use, though the several Sects, especially the Epicureans and the Stoicks, hated one another; and the Stoicks being the fiercer men, used to revile those that differed from them with the most despightful words they could invent.

It cannot be doubted, but that, by the preaching of the Apostles and Disciples of Christ in Greece and other parts of the Roman Empire, full of these Philosophers, many thousands of men were converted to the Christian Faith, some really, and some feignedly, for factious ends, or for need; (for Christians lived then in common, and were charitable:) and because most of these Philosophers had better skill in Disputing and Oratory than the Common people, and thereby were better qualified both to defend and propagate the Gospel, there is no doubt (I say) but most of the Pastors of the Primitive Church were for that reason chosen out of the number of these Philosophers; who retaining still many Doctrines which they had taken up on the authority of their former Masters, whom they had in reverence, endeavoured many of them to draw the Scriptures every one to his own Heresie. And thus at first entred Heresie into the Church of Christ. Yet these men were all of them Christians, as they were when they were first baptized: Nor did they deny the Authority of those Writings which were left them by the Apostles and Evangelists, but interpreted them many times with a bias to their former Philosophy. And this Dissention amongst themselves, was a great scandal to the Unbelievers, and which not onely obstructed the

way of the Gospel, but also drew scorn and greater persecution upon the Church.

For remedy whereof, the chief Pastors of Churches did use, at the rising of any new Opinion, to assemble themselves for the examining and determining of the same; wherein, if the Author of the Opinion were convinced of his Errour, and subscribed to the Sentence of the Church assembled, then all was well again: but if he still persisted in it, they laid him aside, and considered him but as an Heathen man; which, to an unfeigned Christian, was a great ignominy, and of force to make him consider better of his own Doctrine; and sometimes brought him to the acknowledgment of the Truth. But other punishment they could inflict none, that being a right appropriated to the Civil Power. So that all the punishment the Church could inflict, was onely Ignominy; and that among the faithful, consisting in this, that his company was by all the Godly avoided, and he himself branded with the name of Heretick in opposition to the whole Church, that condemned his Doctrine. So that Catholick and Heretick were terms relative; and here it was that Heretick became to be a Name, and a name of disgrace, both together.

The first and most troublesome Heresies in the Primitive Church, were about the Trinity. For (according to the usual curiosity of Natural Philosophers) they could not abstain from disputing the very first Principles of Christianity, into which they were baptized, In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Some there were that made them allegorical. Others would make one Creator of Good, and another of Evil; which was in effect to set up two Gods, one contrary to another; supposing that causation of evil could not be attributed to God, without Impiety. From which Doctrine they are not far distant, that now make the first cause of sinful actions to be every man as to his own sin. Others there were that would have God to be a body with parts organical, as Face, Hands, Fore-parts and

Back-parts. Others, that Christ had no real body, but was a meer Phantasm: (for Phantasms were taken then, and have been ever since, by unlearned and superstitious men, for things real and subsistent). Others denied the Divinity of Christ. Others, that Christ being God and Man, was two Persons. Others confest he was one Person, and withal that he had but one Nature. And a great many other Heresies arose from the too much adherence to the Philosophy of those times, whereof some were supprest for a time by St. John's publishing his Gospel, and some by their own unreasonableness vanished, and some lasted till the time of Constantine the Great, and after.

When Constantine the Great (made so by the assistance and valour of the Christian Souldiers) had attained to be the onely Roman Emperour, he also himself became a Christian, and caused the Temples of the Heathen gods to be demolished, and authorized Christian Religion onely to be publick. But in the latter end of his time, there arose a Dispute in the City of Alexandria, between Alexander the Bishop and Arius a Presbyter of the same City; wherein Arius maintained, first, That Christ was inferiour to his Father; and afterwards, That he was no God, alleadging the words of Christ, My Father is greater than I. The Bishop on the contrary alleadging the words of St. John, And the Word was God; and the words of St. Thomas, My Lord and my God. This Controversie presently amongst the Inhabitants and Souldiers of Alexandria became a Quarrel, and was the cause of much Bloudshed in and about the City; and was likely then to spread further, as afterwards it did. This so far concerned the Emperours Civil Government, that he thought it necessary to call a General Council of all the Bishops and other eminent Divines throughout the Roman Empire, to meet at the City of Nice. When they were assembled, they presented the Emperour with Libels of Accusation one against another. When he had received these Libels into his hands, he made an Oration to the Fathers assembled, exhorting them to agree, and to fall in hand with the settlement of the Articles of Faith, for

which cause he had assembled them, saying, Whatsoever they should decree therein, he would cause to be observed. This may perhaps seem a greater indifferency than would in these days be approved of. But so it is in the History; and the Articles of Faith necessary to Salvation, were not thought then to be so many as afterwards they were defined to be by the Church of Rome.

When Constantine had ended his Oration, he caused the aforesaid Libels to be cast into the fire, as became a wise King and a charitable Christian. This done, the Fathers fell in hand with their business, and following the method of a former Creed, called now The Apostles Creed, made a Confession of Faith, viz. I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible, (in which is condemned the Polytheism of the Gentiles.) And in one Lord Iesus Christ the onely begotten Son of God, (against the many sons of the many gods of the Heathen.) Begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, (against the Arians) Uery God of very God, (against the Valentinians, and against the Heresie of Apelles, and others, who made Christ a meer Phantasm.) Light of Light, [This was put in for explication, and used before to that purpose, by Tertullian.] Begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father. In this again they condemn the Doctrine of Arius: for this word Of one substance, in Latine Consubstantialis, but in Greek ὁμοούσιος, that is, Of one Essence, was put as a Touchstone to discern an Arian from a Catholick: And much ado there was about it. Constantine himself, at the passing of this Creed, took notice of it for a hard word; but yet approved of it, saying, That in a divine Mystery it was fit to use divina & arcana Verba; that is, divine words, and hidden from humane understanding; calling that word ὁμοούσιος divine, not because it was in the divine Scripture, (for it is not there) but because it was to him Arcanum, that is, not sufficiently understood. And in this again appeared the indifferency of the Emperour, and that he had for his

end, in the calling of the Synod, not so much the Truth, as the Uniformity of the Doctrine, and peace of his People that depended on it. The cause of the obscurity of this word ὁμοούσιος, proceeded chiefly from the difference between the Greek and Roman Dialect, in the Philosophy of the Peripateticks. The first Principle of Religion in all Nations, is, That God is, that is to say, that God really is Something, and not a meer fancy; but that which is really something, is considerable alone by it self, as being somewhere. In which sence a man is a thing real: for I can consider him to be, without considering any other thing to be besides him. And for the same reason, the Earth, the Air, the Stars, Heaven, and their parts, are all of them things real. And because whatsoever is real here, or there, or in any place, has Dimensions, that is to say, Magnitude; and that which hath Magnitude, whether it be visible or invisible, is called by all the Learned a Body, if it be finite; and Body or Corporeal, if it be infinite: it followeth, that all real things, in that they are somewhere, are Corporeal. On the contrary, Essence, Deity, Humanity, and such-like names, signifie nothing that can be considered, without first considering there is an Ens, a God, a Man, &c. So also if there be any real thing that is white or black, hot or cold, the same may be considered by it self; but whiteness, blackness, heat, coldness, cannot be considered, unless it be first supposed that there is some real thing to which they are attributed. These real things are called by the Latine Philosophers, Entia subjecta, substantiae; and by the Greek Philosophers, τὰ ὄντα ὑποκειμενα, ὑποστάμενα. . The other, which are Incorporeal, are called by the Greek Philosophers, οὐσία συμβεβηχότα, φαντάσματα; but most of the Latine Philosophers use to convert οὐσία into substantia, and so confound real and corpororeal things with incorporeal; which is not well: for Essence and substance signifie divers things. And this mistake is received, and continues

still in these parts, in all Disputes both of Philosophy and Divinity: for in truth Essentia signifies no more, than if we should talk ridiculously of the Isness of the thing that Is. [By whom all things were made.] This is proved out of St. John, ca. vers. 1, 2, 3. and Heb. ca. vers. 3. and that again out of Gen. 1. where God is said to create every thing by his sole Word, as when he said, Let there be Light, and there was Light. And then, that Christ was that Word, and in the beginning with God, may be gathered out of divers places of Moses, David, and other of the Prophets. Nor was it ever questioned amongst Christians (except by the Arians) but that Christ was God Eternal, and his Incarnation eternally decreed. But the Fathers, all that write Expositions on this Creed, could not forbear to philosophize upon it, and most of them out of the Principles of Aristotle: which are the same the School-men now use; as may partly appear by this, that many of them, amongst their Treatises of Religion, have affected to publish Logick and Physick Principles according to the sense of Aristotle; as Athanasius, and Damascene. And so some later Divines of Note, as Zanchius, still confounding the Concret with the Abstract, Deus with Deitas, Ens with Essentia, Sapiens with Sapientia, Aeternus with Aeternitas. If it be for exact and rigid Truth sake, why do they not say also, that Holiness is a Holy man, Covetousness a Covetous man, Hypocrisie an Hypocrite, and Drunkenness a Drunkard, and the like, but that it is an Error? The Fathers agree that the Wisdome of God is the eternal Son of God, by whom all things were made, and that he was incarnate by the Holy Ghost, if they meant it in the Abstract: For if Deitas abstracted be Deus, we make two Gods of one. This was well understood by Damascene, in his Treatise De Fide Orthodoxâ, (which is an Exposition of the Nicene Creed) where he denies absolutely that Deitas is Deus, lest (seeing God was made man) it should follow, the Deity was made man; which is contrary to the Doctrine of all the Nicene Fathers. The Attributes therefore of God in the Abstract, when they are put

for God, are put Metonymically; which is a common thing in Scripture; for Example, Prov. 8.28. where it is said, Before the mountains were settled, before the Hills was I brought forth; the Wisdome there spoken of being the Wisdome of God, signifies the same with the wise God. This kinde of speaking is also ordinary in all Languages. This considered, such abstracted words ought not to be used in Arguing, and especially in the deducing the Articles of our Faith; though in the Language of God's eternal Worship, and in all Godly Discourses, they cannot be avoided: and the Creed it self is less difficult to be assented to in its own words, than in all such Expositions of the Fathers. Who for us men and our Salvation came down from Heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Uirgin Mary, and was made Man. I have not read of any exception to this: For where Athanasius in his Creed says of the Son, He was not made, but begotten, it is to be understood of the Son as he was God Eternal; whereas here it is spoken of the Son as he is man. And of the Son also as he was man, it may be said he was begotten of the Holy Ghost; for a woman conceiveth not but of him that begetteth; which is also confirmed, Mat. 1.20. That which is begotten in her (...) is of the Holy Ghost. And was also Crucified for us under Pontius Pilate: He suffered and was buried: And the third day he rose again according to the Scriptures, and ascended into Heaven: and sitteth on the right hand of the Father; And he shall come again with Glory to judge both the Quick and the Dead. Whose Kingdome shall have no end. [Of this part of the Creed I have not met with any doubt made by any Christian.] Hither the Council of Nice proceeded in their general Confession of Faith, and no further.

This finished, some of the Bishops present at the Council (seventeen or eighteen, whereof Eusebius Bishop of Caesarea was one) not sufficiently satisfied, refused to subscribe till this Doctrine of ... should be better explained. Thereupon the Council Decreed, that whosoever shall say that God hath parts, shall be Anathematized; to which the said Bishops

subscribed. And Eusebius by Order of the Council wrote a Letter, the Copies whereof were sent to every absent Bishop, that being satisfied with the reason of their subscribing, they also should subscribe. The reason they gave of their Subscription was this, That they had now a form of words prescribed, by which, as a Rule, they might guide themselves so, as not to violate the Peace of the Church. By this it is manifest, that no man was an Heretick, but he that in plain and direct words contradicted that Form by the Church prescribed, and that no man could be made an Heretick by Consequence. And because the said Form was not put into the body of the Creed, but directed only to the Bishops, there was no reason to punish any Lay-person that should speak to the contrary.

But what was the meaning of this Doctrine, That God has no parts? Was it made Heresie to say, that God, who is a real substance, cannot be considered or spoken of as here, or there, or any where, which are parts of places? Or that there is any real thing without length every way, that is to say, which hath no Magnitude at all, finite nor infinite? Or is there any whole substance, whose two halves or three thirds are not the same with that whole? Or did they mean to condemn the Argument of Tertullian, by which he confuted Apelles and other Hereticks of his time; namely, Whatsoever was not Corporeal, was nothing but Fantasm, and not Corporeal, for Heretical? No certainly, no Divines say that. They went to establish the Doctrine of One individual God in Trinity; to abolish the diversity of species in God, not the distinction of here and there in substance. When St. Paul asked the Corinthians, Is Christ divided? he did not think they thought him impossible to be considered as having hands and feet, but that they might think him (according to the manner of the Gentiles) one of the Sons of God, as Arius did; but not the only begotten Son of God. And thus also it is expounded in the Creed of Athanasius, who was present in that Council, by these words, Not confounding the Persons, nor dividing

the Substances; that is to say, that God is not divided into three Persons, as man is divided into Peter, James, and John; nor are the three persons one and the same person. But Aristotle, and from him all the Greek Fathers, and other Learned Men, when they distinguish the general Latitude of a word, they call it Division; as when they divide Animal into Man and Beast, they call these ..., Species; and when they again divide the species Man, into Peter and John, they call these ..., partes individuae. And by this confounding the division of the substance with the distinction of words, divers men have been led into the Error of attributing to God a Name, which is not the name of any substance at all, viz. Incorporeal.

By these words, God has no parts, thus explained, together with the part of the Creed which was at that time agreed on, many of those Heresies which were antecedent to that first General Council, were condemned; as that of Menes, who appeared about thirty years before the Reign of Constantine, by the first Article, I believe in one God; though in other words it seems to me to remain still in the Doctrine of the Church of Rome, which so ascribeth a Liberty of the Will to Men, as that their Will and Purpose to commit sin, should not proceed from the Cause of all things, God; but originally from themselves, or from the Devil. It may seem perhaps to some, that by the same words the Anthropomorphites also were then Condemned: And certainly, if by Parts were meant not persons Individual, but Pieces, they were Condemned: for Face, Arms, Feet, and the like, are pieces. But this cannot be, for the Anthropomorphites appeared not till the time of Valens the Emperour, which was after the Council of Nice between fourty and fifty years; and was not condemned till the second General Council at Constantinople.

Now for the Punishment of Hereticks ordained by Constantine, we read of none; but that Ecclesiastical Officers, Bishops and other Preachers, if they refused to subscribe to this Faith, or taught the contrary Doctrine, were

for the first Fault Deprived of their Offices, and for the second Banished. And thus did Heresie, which at first was the name of private Opinion, and no Crime, by vertue of a Law of the Emperour, made only for the Peace of the Church, become a Crime in a Pastor, and punishable with Deprivation first, and next with Banishment.

After this part of the Creed was thus established, there arose presently many new Heresies, partly about the Interpretation of it, and partly about the Holy Ghost, of which the Nicene Council had not determined. Concerning the part established, there arose Disputes about the Nature of Christ, and the word Hypostasis, id est, Substance; for of Persons there was yet no mention made, the Creed being written in Greek, in which Language there is no word that answereth to the Latine word Persona. And the Union, as the Fathers called it, of the Humane and Divine Nature in Christ, Hypostatical, caused Eutyches, and after him Dioscorus, to affirm, there was but one Nature in Christ; thinking that whensoever two things are united, they are one: and this was condemned as Arianism in the Councils of Constantinople and Ephesus. Others, because they thought two living and rational Substances, such as are God and Man, must needs be also two Hypostases, maintained that Christ had two Hypostases: But these were two Heresies condemned together. Then concerning the Holy Ghost, Nestorius Bishop of Constantinople, and some others, denied the Divinity thereof. And whereas about seventy years before the Nicene Council, there had been holden a Provincial Council at Carthage, wherein it was Decreed, that those Christians which in the Persecutions had denied the Faith of Christ, should not be received again into the Church, unless they were again baptized: This also was condemned, though the President in that Council were that most sincere and pious Christian, Cyprian. But at last the Creed was made up entire as we have it, in the Calcedonian Council, by addition of these words, And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life, who

proceedeth from the Father and the Son. Who with the Father & the Son together is Worshipped and Glorified. Who spake by the Prophets. And I believe one Catholick & Apostolick Church. I acknowledge one Baptism for the Remission of Sins. And I look for the Resurrection of the Dead, and the Life of the World to come. In this addition are condemned, first the Nestorians and others, in these words, Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified: And secondly the Doctrine of the Council of Carthage, in these words, I believe one Baptism for the Remission of Sins: For one Baptism is not there put as opposite to several sorts or manners of Baptism, but to the iteration of it: St. Cyprian was a better Christian than to allow any Baptism that was not in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. In the General Confession of Faith contained in the Creed called the Nicene Creed, there is no mention of Hypostasis, nor of Hypostatical Union, nor of Corporeal, nor of Incorporeal, nor of Parts; the understanding of which words being not required of the Vulgar, but only of the Pastors, whose disagreement else might trouble the Church; nor were such Points necessary to Salvation, but set abroach for ostentation of Learning, or else to dazle men, with design to lead them towards some ends of their own. The Changes of prevalence in the Empire between the Catholicks and the Arians, and how the great Athanasius, the most fierce of the Catholicks, was banished by Constantine, and afterwards restored, and again banished, I let pass; only it is to be remembred, that Athanasius composed his Creed then, when (banished) he was in Rome, Liberius being Pope; by whom, as is most likely, the word Hypostasis, as it was in Athanasius's Creed, was disliked: For the Roman Church could never be brought to receive it, but instead thereof used their own word Persona. But the first and last words of that Creed the Church of Rome refused not: for they make every Article, not only those of the body of the Creed, but all the Definitions of the Nicene Fathers to be such, as a man cannot be saved,

unless he believe them all stedfastly; though made only for Peace sake, and to unite the mindes of the Clergy, whose Disputes were like to trouble the Peace of the Empire. After these four first General Councils, the Power of the Roman Church grew up apace; and either by the negligence or weakness of the succeeding Emperours, the Pope did what he pleased in Religion. There was no Doctrine which tended to the Power Ecclesiastical, or to the Reverence of the Clergy, the contradiction whereof was not by one Council or another made Heresie, and punished arbitrarily by the Emperours with Banishment or Death. And at last Kings themselves, and Commonwealths, unless they purged their Dominions of Hereticks, were Excommunicated, Interdicted, and their Subjects let loose upon them by the Pope; insomuch as to an ingenuous and serious Christian, there was nothing so dangerous as to enquire concerning his own Salvation, of the Holy Scripture; the careless cold Christian was safe, and the skilful Hypocrite a Saint. But this is a Story so well known, as I need not insist upon it any longer, but proceed to the Hereticks here in England, and what Punishments were ordained for them by Acts of Parliament. All this while the Penal Laws against Hereticks were such, as the several Princes and States, in their own Dominions, thought fit to enact. The Edicts of the Emperours made their Punishments Capital, but for the manner of the Execution, left it to the Prefects of Provinces: and when other Kings and States intended (according to the Laws of the Roman Church) to extirpate Hereticks, they ordained such Punishment as they pleased. And the first Law that was here made for the punishments of Hereticks called Lollards, and mentioned in the Statutes, was in the fifth year of the Reign of Richard the Second, occasioned by the Doctrine of John Wickliff and his Followers; which Wickliff, because no Law was yet ordained for his punishment in Parliament, by the favour of John of Gaunt, the Kings Son, escaped. But in the fifth year of the next King, which was Richard the Second, there passed an Act of Parliament to this effect; That

Sheriffs and some others should have Commissions to apprehend such as were certified by the Prelates to be Preachers of Heresie, their Fautors, Maintainers and Abettors, and to hold them in strong Prison, till they should justifie themselves, according to the Law of Holy Church. So that hitherto there was no Law in England, by which a Heretick could be put to Death, or otherways punished, than by imprisoning him till he was reconciled to the Church. After this, in the next Kings Reign, which was Henry the Fourth, Son of John of Gaunt by whom Wickliffe had been favoured, and who in his aspiring to the Crown had needed the good Will of the Bishops, was made a Law, in the second Year of his Reign, wherein it was Enacted, That every Ordinary may convene before him, and imprison any person suspected of Heresie; and that an obstinate Heretick shall be burnt before the People.

In the next King's Reign, which was Henry the Fifth, in his Second year, was made an Act of Parliament, wherein it is declared, that the intent of Hereticks, called Lollards, was to subvert the Christian Faith, the Law of God, the Church and the Realm: And, that an Heretick convict should forfeit all his Fee-simple Lands, Goods and Chattels, besides the Punishment of Burning. Again, in the Five and Twentieth Year of King Henry the Eighth, it was Enacted, That an Heretick convict shall abjure his Heresies, and refusing so to do, or relapsing, shall be burnt in open place, for example of others. This Act was made after the putting down of the Pope's Authority: and by this it appears, that King Henry the Eighth intended no farther alteration in Religion, than the recovering of his own Right Ecclesiastical. But in the first year of his Son King Edward the Sixth was made an Act, by which were repealed not only this Act, but also all former Acts concerning Doctrines, or matters of Religion; So that at this time there was no Law at all for the punishment of Hereticks.

Again, in the Parliament of the first and second Year of Queen Mary, this Act of 1 Edw. 6. was not repealed, but made useless, by reviving the Statute of 25 Henr. 8. and freely put it in execution; insomuch as it was Debated, Whether or no they should proceed upon that Statute against the Lady Elizabeth, the Queens Sister.

The Lady Elizabeth not long after (by the Death of Queen Mary coming to the Crown) in the fifth Year of her Reign, by Act of Parliament repealed in the first place all the Laws Ecclesiastical of Queen Mary, with all other former Laws concerning the punishments of Hereticks, nor did she Enact any other Punishments in their place. In the second place it was Enacted, That the Queen by her Letters Patents should give a Commission to the Bishops, with certain other persons, in her Majesties Name, to execute the Power Ecclesiastical; in which Commission the Commissioners were forbidden to adjudge any thing to be Heresie, which was not declared to be Heresie by some of the first four General Councels: but there was no mention made of General Councels, but onely in that branch of the Act which Authorized that Commission, commonly called The High Commission; nor was there in that Commission any thing concerning how Hereticks were to be punished, but it was granted to them, that they might declare or not declare, as they pleased, to be Heresie or not Heresie, any of those Doctrines which had been Condemned for Heresie in the first Four General Councels. So that during the time that the said High Commission was in being, there was no Statute by which a Heretick could be punished otherways, than by the ordinary Censures of the Church; nor Doctrine accounted Heresie, unless the Commissioners had actually declared and published, That all that which was made Heresie by those Four Councels, should be Heresie also now: but I never heard that any such Declaration was made either by Proclamation, or by Recording it in Churches, or by publick Printing, as in penal Laws is necessary; the breaches of it are

excused by ignorance: besides, if Heresie had been made Capital, or otherwise civilly punishable, either the Four General Councels themselves, or at least the Points condemned in them ought to have been Printed or put into Parish-Churches in English, because without it, no man could know how to beware of offending against them.

Some man may perhaps ask, whether no body were Condemned and burnt for Heresie, during the time of the High Commission.

I have heard there w•re: but they which approve such executions, may peradventure know better grounds for them then I do; but those grounds are very well worthy to be enquired after.

Lastly, in the seventeenth year of the Reign of King Charles the First, shortly after that the Scots had Rebelliously put down the Episcopal Government in Scotland, the Presbyterians of England endeavoured the same here. The King, though he saw the Rebels ready to take the Field, would not condescend to that; but yet in hope to appease them, was content to pass an Act of Parliament for the abolishing the High Commission. But though the High Commission were taken away, yet the Parliament having other ends besides the setting up of the Presbyterate, pursued the Rebellion, and put down both Episcopacy and Monarchy, erecting a power by them called The Common-wealth by others the Rump, which men obeyed not out of Duty, but for fear, nor was there any humane Laws left in force to restrain any man from Preaching or Writing any Doctrine concerning Religion that he pleased; and in this heat of the War, it was impossible to disturb the Peace of the State, which then was none.

And in this time it was, that a Book called Leviathan, was written in defence of the Kings Power, Temporal and Spiritual, without any word against Episcopacy, or against any Bishop, or against the publick Doctrine of the Church. It pleas'd God about Twelve years after the Usurpation of this Rump, to Restore His most Gracious Majesty that now is, to his Fathers

Throne, and presently His Majesty restored the Bishops, and pardoned the Presbyterians; but then both the one and the other accused in Parliament this Book of Heresie, when neither the Bishops before the War had declared what was Heresie, when if they had, it had been made void by the putting down of the High Commission at the importunity of the Presbyterians: So fierce are men, for the most part, in dispute, where either their Learning or Power is debated, that they never think of the Laws, but as soon as they are offended, they cry out, Crucifige; forgetting what St. Paul saith, even in case of obstinate holding of an Errour, 2 Tim. 2.24, 25. The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose, if God peradventure may give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth: Of which counsel, such fierceness as hath appeared in the Disputation of Divines, down from before the Council of Nice to this present time, is a Violation.

FINIS.

Behemoth

OR, THE LONG PARLIAMENT

MOLESWORTH 1840 EDITION

Published posthumously in 1681, *Behemoth* was written in 1668, but remained unpublished at the request of Charles II of England. It was intended as a follow-up to the infamously-received *Leviathan* (1651). The latter work served as a representation of an ideal political world, while *Behemoth* has been considered to be a contrasting treatise on what happens when the very worst abuses of government come to pass. Hobbes applies his understanding of the science of human nature to explain the causes of the English Civil War. The book is structured in the form of a discourse between two men. The first speaker, called only "A", is an eyewitness and possible insider to the events of the English Civil War. The second speaker, referred to as "B", is a student aiming to understand the breakdown in the government of England at that time.

Charles II had recognised the correctness of the account of events and issues, yet he was concerned that the book would not be well received. The king withheld his permission to publish, hoping that Hobbes would avoid further scandal and perhaps see his reputation as a great philosopher restored. The manuscript was pirated and printed in unauthorised editions in Europe during the 1670's, in a letter to his friend John Aubrey, Hobbes stated his disappointment with this turn of events. An official edition was released three years after Hobbes' death in 1679, by his literary agent William Crooke.

CONTENTS

THE BOOKSELLER TO THE READER.
PART I. BEHEMOTH, OR THE EPITOME OF THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND.
PART II.
PART III.
PART IV.

BEHEMOTH: THE HISTORY OF THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND, AND OF THE COUNSELS AND ARTIFICES BY WHICH THEY WERE CARRIED ON FROM THE YEAR 1640 TO THE YEAR 1660.

"BELLA PER ANGLIACOS plusquam civilia campos,
Jusque datum sceleri loquimur.—"

THE BOOKSELLER TO THE READER.

MY DUTY, AS well to the public as to the memory of Mr. Hobbes, has obliged me to procure with my utmost diligence, that these tracts should come forth with the most correct exactness.

I am compelled by the force of truth to declare, how much both the world and the memory of Mr. Hobbes have been abused by the several spurious editions of the History of the Civil Wars; wherein, by various and unskilful transcriptions, are committed above a thousand faults, and in above a hundred places whole lines left out, as I can make appear.

I must confess Mr. Hobbes, upon some considerations, was averse to the publishing thereof; but since it is impossible to suppress it, no book being more commonly sold by all booksellers, I hope I need not fear the offence of any man by doing right to the world and this work, which I now publish from the original manuscript, done by his own amanuensis, and given me by himself above twelve years since.

To this I have joined the treatise against Archbishop Bramhall, to prevent the like prejudice, which must certainly have fallen on it, there being so many false copies abroad, if not thus prevented; as also the Discourse of Heresy from a more correct copy; and have likewise annexed his Physical Problems, as they were translated by himself and presented to his Majesty, with the epistle prefixed, in the year 1662, at the same time they came forth in Latin.

These things premised, there remains nothing but to wish for myself good sale, to the buyer much pleasure and satisfaction.

Your humble servant,

William Crooke.

PART I. BEHEMOTH, OR THE EPITOME OF THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND.

A.

If in time, as in place, there were degrees of high and low, I verily believe that the highest of time would be that which passed between 1640 and 1660. For he that thence, as from the Devil's Mountain, should have looked upon the world and observed the actions of men, especially in England, might have had a prospect of all kinds of injustice, and of all kinds of folly, that the world could afford, and how they were produced by their hypocrisy and self-conceit, whereof the one is double iniquity, and the other double folly.

B.

I should be glad to behold that prospect. You that have lived in that time and in that part of your age, wherein men used to see best into good and evil, I pray you set me, that could not see so well, upon the same mountain, by the relation of the actions you then saw, and of their causes, pretensions, justice, order, artifice, and event.

A.

In the year 1640, the government of England was monarchical; and the King that reigned, Charles, the first of that name, holding the sovereignty, by right of a descent continued above six hundred years, and from a much longer descent King of Scotland, and from the time of

his ancestor Henry II, King of Ireland; a man that wanted no virtue, either of body or mind, nor endeavoured anything more than to discharge his duty towards God, in the well governing of his subjects.

B.

How could he then miscarry, having in every county so many trained soldiers, as would, put together, have made an army of 60,000 men, and divers magazines of ammunition in places fortified?

A.

If those soldiers had been, as they and all other of his subjects ought to have been, at his Majesty's command, the peace and happiness of the three kingdoms had continued as it was left by King James. But the people were corrupted generally, and disobedient persons esteemed the best patriots.

B.

But sure there were men enough, besides those that were ill-affected, to have made an army sufficient to have kept the people from uniting into a body able to oppose him.

A.

Truly, I think, if the King had had money, he might have had soldiers enough in England. For there were very few of the common people that cared much for either of the causes, but would have taken any side for pay or plunder. But the King's treasury was very low, and his enemies, that pretended the people's ease from taxes, and other specious things,

had the command of the purses of the city of London, and of most cities and corporate towns in England, and of many particular persons besides.

B.

But how came the people to be so corrupted? And what kind of people were they that did so seduce them?

A.

The seducers were of divers sorts. One sort were ministers; ministers, as they called themselves, of Christ; and sometimes, in their sermons to the people, God's ambassadors; pretending to have a right from God to govern every one his parish, and their assembly the whole nation.

Secondly, there were a very great number, though not comparable to the other, which notwithstanding that the Pope's power in England, both temporal and ecclesiastical, had been by Act of Parliament abolished, did still retain a belief that we ought to be governed by the Pope, whom they pretended to be the vicar of Christ, and, in the right of Christ, to be the governor of all Christian people. And these were known by the name of Papists; as the ministers I mentioned before, were commonly called Presbyterians.

Thirdly, there were not a few, who in the beginning of the troubles were not discovered, but shortly after declared themselves for a liberty in religion, and those of different opinions one from another. Some of them, because they would have all congregations free and independent upon one another, were called Independents. Others that held baptism to infants, and such as understood not into what they are baptized, to be ineffectual, were called therefore Anabaptists. Others that held that Christ's kingdom was at this time to begin upon the earth, were called Fifth-monarchy-men; besides divers other sects, as Quakers, Adamites,

&c., whose names and peculiar doctrines I do not well remember. And these were the enemies which arose against his Majesty from the private interpretation of the Scripture, exposed to every man's scanning in his mother-tongue.

Fourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by that glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they became thereby in love with their forms of government. And out of these men were chosen the greatest part of the House of Commons, or if they were not the greatest part, yet by advantage of their eloquence, were always able to sway the rest.

Fifthly, the city of London and other great towns of trade, having in admiration the prosperity of the Low Countries after they had revolted from their monarch, the King of Spain, were inclined to think that the like change of government here, would to them produce the like prosperity.

Sixthly, there were a very great number that had either wasted their fortunes, or thought them too mean for the good parts they thought were in themselves; and more there were, that had able bodies, but saw no means how honestly to get their bread. These longed for a war, and hoped to maintain themselves hereafter by the lucky choosing of a party to side with, and consequently did for the most part serve under them that had greatest plenty of money.

Lastly, the people in general were so ignorant of their duty, as that not one perhaps of ten thousand knew what right any man had to command him, or what necessity there was of King or Commonwealth, for which

he was to part with his money against his will; but thought himself to be so much master of whatsoever he possessed, that it could not be taken from him upon any pretence of common safety without his own consent. King, they thought, was but a title of the highest honour, which gentleman, knight, baron, earl, duke, were but steps to ascend to, with the help of riches; they had no rule of equity, but precedents and custom; and he was thought wisest and fittest to be chosen for a Parliament, that was most averse to the granting of subsidies or other public payments.

B.

In such a constitution of people, methinks, the King is already ousted of his government, so as they need not have taken arms for it. For I cannot imagine how the King should come by any means to resist them.

A.

There was indeed very great difficulty in the business. But of that point you will be better informed in the pursuit of this narration.

B.

But I desire to know first, the several grounds of the pretences, both of the Pope and of the Presbyterians, by which they claim a right to govern us, as they do, in chief: and after that, from whence and when crept in the pretences of that Long Parliament, for a democracy.

A.

As for the Papists, they challenge this right from a text in Deut.xvii. 12, and other like texts, according to the old Latin translation in these

words: And he that out of pride shall refuse to obey the commandment of that priest, which shall at that time minister before the Lord thy God, that man shall by the sentence of the judge be put to death. And because, as the Jews were the people of God then, so is all Christendom the people of God now, they infer from thence, that the Pope, whom they pretend to be the high-priest of all Christian people, ought also to be obeyed in all his decrees by all Christians, upon pain of death. Again, whereas in the New Testament (Matth. xxviii. 18-20) Christ saith: All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth; go therefore and teach all nations, and baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and teach them to observe all these things which I have commanded you: from thence they infer, that the command of the apostles was to be obeyed, and by consequence the nations were bound to be governed by them, and especially by the prince of the apostles, St. Peter, and by his successors the Popes of Rome.

B.

For the text in the Old Testament, I do not see how the commandment of God to the Jews, to obey their priests, can be interpreted to have the like force in the case of other nations Christian, more than upon nations unchristian (for all the world are God's people); unless we also grant, that a king cannot of an infidel be made Christian, without making himself subject to the laws of that apostle, or priest, or minister, that shall convert him. The Jews were a peculiar people of God, a sacerdotal kingdom, and bound to no other law but what first Moses, and afterwards every high-priest, did go and receive immediately from the mouth of God in Mount Sinai, in the tabernacle of the ark, and in the sanctum sanctorum of the temple. And for the text in St. Matthew, I know the words in the Gospel are not go teach, but go and make

disciples; and that there is a great difference between a subject and a disciple, and between teaching and commanding. And if such texts as these must be so interpreted, why do not Christian kings lay down their titles of majesty and sovereignty, and call themselves the Pope's lieutenants? But the doctors of the Romish Church seem to decline that title of absolute power, in their distinction of power spiritual and temporal; but this distinction I do not very well understand.

A.

By spiritual power they mean the power to determine points of faith, and to be judges in the inner court of conscience of moral duties, and a power to punish those men, that obey not their precepts, by ecclesiastical censure, that is, by excommunication. And this power, they say, the Pope hath immediately from Christ, without dependence upon any king or sovereign assembly, whose subjects they be that stand excommunicate. But for the power temporal, which consists in judging and punishing those actions that are done against the civil laws, they say, they do not pretend to it directly, but only indirectly, that is to say, so far forth as such actions tend to the hindrance or advancement of religion and good manners, which they mean when they say in ordine ad spiritualia.

B.

What power then is left to Kings and other civil sovereigns, which the Pope may not pretend to be his in ordine ad spiritualia?

A.

None, or very little. And this power not only the Pope pretends to in all Christendom; but some of his bishops also, in their several dioceses, jure divino, that is, immediately from Christ, without deriving it from the Pope.

B.

But what if a man refuse obedience to this pretended power of the Pope and his bishops? What harm can excommunication do him, especially if he be the subject of another sovereign?

A.

Very great harm. For by the Pope's or bishop's signification of it to the civil power, he shall be punished sufficiently.

B.

He were in an ill case then, that adventured to write or speak in defence of the civil power, that must be punished by him whose rights he defended, like Uzza, that was slain because he would needs, unbidden, put forth his hand to keep the ark from falling. But if a whole nation should revolt from the Pope at once, what effect could excommunication have upon the nation?

A.

Why, they should have no more mass said, at least by any of the Pope's priests. Besides, the Pope would have no more to do with them, but cast them off, and so they would be in the same case as if a nation should be cast off by their king, and left to be governed by themselves, or whom they would.

B.

This would not be taken so much for a punishment to the people, as to the King; and therefore when a Pope excommunicates a whole nation, methinks he rather excommunicates himself than them. But I pray you tell me, what were the rights that the Pope pretended to in the kingdoms of other princes?

A.

First, an exemption of all priests, friars, and monks, in criminal causes, from the cognizance of civil judges. Secondly, collation of benefices on whom he pleased, native or stranger, and exaction of tenths, first fruits, and other payments. Thirdly, appeals to Rome in all causes where the Church could pretend to be concerned. Fourthly, to be the supreme judge concerning lawfulness of marriage, that is concerning the hereditary succession of Kings, and to have the cognizance of all causes concerning adultery and fornication.

B.

Good! A monopoly of women.

A.

Fifthly, a power of absolving subjects of their duties, and of their oaths of fidelity to their lawful sovereigns, when the Pope should think fit for the extirpation of heresy.

B.

This power of absolving subjects of their obedience, as also that other of being judge of manners and doctrine, is as absolute a sovereignty as is possible to be; and consequently there must be two kingdoms in one and the same nation, and no man be able to know which of his masters he must obey.

A.

For my part, I should rather obey that master that had the right of making laws and of inflicting punishments, than him that pretendeth only to a right of making canons, that is to say, rules, and no right of co-action, or otherwise punishing, but by excommunication.

B.

But the Pope pretends also that his canons are laws; and for punishing, can there be greater than excommunication; supposing it true, as the Pope saith it is, that he that dies excommunicate is damned? Which supposition, it seems, you believe not; else you would rather have chosen to obey the Pope, that would cast your body and soul into hell, than the King, that can only kill the body.

A.

You say true. For it were very uncharitable in me to believe that all Englishmen, except a few Papists, that have been born and called heretics ever since the Reformation of Religion in England, should be damned.

B.

But for those that die excommunicate in the Church of England at this day, do you not think them also damned?

A.

Doubtless, he that dies in sin without repentance is damned, and he that is excommunicate for disobedience to the King's laws, either spiritual or temporal, is excommunicate for sin; and therefore, if he die excommunicate and without desire of reconciliation, he dies impenitent. You see what follows. But to die in disobedience to the precepts and doctrines of those men that have no authority or jurisdiction over us, is quite another case, and bringeth no such danger with it.

B.

But what is this heresy, which the Church of Rome so cruelly persecutes, as to depose Kings that do not, when they are bidden, turn all heretics out of their dominions?

A.

Heresy is a word which, when it is used without passion, signifies a private opinion. So the different sects of the old philosophers, Academians, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, &c., were called heresies. But in the Christian Church, there was in the signification of that word, comprehended a sinful opposition to him, that was chief judge of doctrines in order to the salvation of men's souls; and consequently heresy may be said to bear the same relation to the power spiritual, that rebellion doth to the power temporal, and is suitable to be persecuted by him that will preserve a power spiritual and dominion over men's consciences.

B.

It would be very well, (because we are all of us permitted to read the Holy Scriptures, and bound to make them the rule of our actions, both public and private), that heresy were by some law defined, and the particular opinions set forth, for which a man were to be condemned and punished as a heretic; for else, not only men of mean capacity, but even the wisest and devoutest Christian, may fall into heresy without any will to oppose the Church; for the Scriptures are hard, and the interpretations different of different men.

A.

The meaning of the word heresy, is by law declared in an Act of Parliament in the first year of Queen Elizabeth; wherein it is ordained, that the persons who had by the Queen's letters-patent the authority spiritual, meaning the High Commission, shall not have authority to adjudge any matter or cause to be heresy, but only such as heretofore have been adjudged to be heresy by the authority of the canonical Scriptures, or by the first four general Councils, or by any other general Council, where the same was declared heresy by the express and plain words of the said canonical Scriptures, or such as hereafter shall be adjudged heresy by the high court of Parliament of this realm, with the assent of the clergy in their convocation.

B.

It seems therefore, if there arise any new error that hath not yet been declared heresy, (and many such may arise), it cannot be judged heresy without a Parliament. For how foul soever the error be, it cannot have been declared heresy neither in the Scriptures nor in the Councils;

because it was never before heard of. And consequently there can be no error, unless it fall within the compass of blasphemy against God or treason against the King, for which a man can in equity be punished. Besides, who can tell what is declared by the Scripture, which every man is allowed to read and interpret to himself? Nay more, what Protestant, either of the laity or clergy, if every general Council can be a competent judge of heresy, is not already condemned? For divers Councils have declared a great many of our doctrines to be heresy, and that, as they pretend, upon the authority of the Scriptures.

A.

What are those points, that the first four general Councils have declared heresy?

B.

The first general Council, held at Nicæa, declared all to be heresy which was contrary to the Nicene Creed, upon occasion of the heresy of Arius, which was the denying the divinity of Christ. The second general Council, held at Constantinople, declared heresy the doctrine of Macedonius; which was that the Holy Ghost was created. The third Council, assembled at Ephesus, condemned the doctrine of Nestorius, that there were two persons in Christ. The fourth, held at Chalcedon, condemned the error of Eutyches, that there was but one nature in Christ. I know of no other points condemned in these four Councils, but such as concern church-government, or the same doctrines taught by other men in other words. And these Councils were all called by the Emperors, and by them their decrees confirmed at the petition of the Councils themselves.

A.

I see by this, that both the calling of the Council, and the confirmation of their doctrine and church-government, had no obligatory force but from the authority of the Emperor. How comes it then to pass, that they take upon them now a legislative power, and say their canons are laws? That text, all power is given to me in heaven and earth, had the same force then as it hath now, and conferred a legislative power on the Councils, not only over Christian men, but over all nations in the world.

B.

They say no; for the power they pretend to is derived from this, that when a king was converted from Gentilism to Christianity, he did by that very submission to the bishop that converted him, submit to the bishop's government and became one of his sheep; which right therefore he could not have over any nation that was not Christian.

A.

Did Sylvester, which was Pope of Rome in the time of Constantine the Great, converted by him, tell the Emperor, his new disciple, beforehand, that if he became a Christian he must be the Pope's subject?

B.

I believe not. For it is likely enough, if he had told him so plainly, or but made him suspect it, he would either have been no Christian at all, or but a counterfeit one.

A.

But if he did not tell him so, and that plainly, it was foul play, not only in a priest, but in any Christian. And for this derivation of their right from the Emperor's consent, it proceeds only from this, that they dare not challenge a legislative power, nor call their canons laws in any kingdom in Christendom, further than the kings make them so. But in Peru, when Atabalipa was King, the friar told him, that Christ being King of all the world, had given the disposing of all the kingdoms therein to the Pope, and that the Pope had given Peru to the Roman Emperor Charles the Fifth, and required Atabalipa to resign it; and for refusing it, seized upon his person by the Spanish army there present, and murdered him. You see by this how much they claim, when they have power to make it good.

B.

When began the Popes to take this authority upon them first?

A.

After the inundation of the northern people had overflowed the western parts of the empire, and possessed themselves of Italy, the people of the city of Rome submitted themselves, as well in temporals as spirituals, to their bishop; and then first was the Pope a temporal prince, and stood no more in so great fear of the Emperors, which lived far off at Constantinople. In this time it was that the Pope began, by pretence of his power spiritual, to encroach upon the temporal rights of all other princes of the west; and so continued gaining upon them, till his power was at the highest in that three hundred years, or thereabout, which passed between the eighth and eleventh century, that is, between Pope Leo the Third and Pope Innocent the Third. For in this time Pope Zachary the First deposed Chilperic, then King of France, and gave the

kingdom to one of his subjects, Pepin; and Pepin took from the Lombards a great part of their territory and gave it to the Church. Shortly after, the Lombards having recovered their estate, Charles the Great retook it, and gave it to the Church again; and Pope Leo the Third made Charles Emperor.

B.

But what right did the Pope then pretend for the creating of an Emperor?

A.

He pretended the right of being Christ's vicar; and what Christ could give, his vicar might give; and you know that Christ was King of all the world.

B.

Yes, as God; and so he gives all the kingdoms of the world, which nevertheless proceed from the consent of people, either for fear or hope.

A.

But this gift of the empire was in a more special manner, in such a manner as Moses had the government of Israel given him; or rather as Joshua had it given him, to go in and out before the people as the high-priest should direct him. And so the empire was understood to be given him, on condition to be directed by the Pope. For when the Pope invested him with the regal ornaments, the people all cried out Deus dat, that is to say, it is God that gives it; and the Emperor was contented so to take it. And from that time, all or most of the Christian Kings do put

into their titles the words Dei gratia, that is, by the gift of God; and their successors use still to receive the crown and sceptre from a bishop.

B.

It is certainly a very good custom, for Kings to be put in mind by whose gift they reign; but it cannot from that custom be inferred that they receive the kingdom by mediation of the Pope, or by any other clergy; for the Popes themselves received the Papacy from the Emperor. The first that ever was elected Bishop of Rome after Emperors were Christians, and without the Emperor's consent, excused himself by letters to the Emperor with this: that the people and clergy of Rome forced him to take it upon him, and prayed the Emperor to confirm it, which the Emperor did; but with reprehension of their proceedings, and the prohibition of the like for the time to come. The Emperor was Lotharius, and the Pope Calixtus the First.

A.

You see by this the Emperor never acknowledged this gift of God was the gift of the Pope, but maintained, the Popedom was the gift of the Emperor. But in process of time, by the negligence of the Emperors, (for the greatness of Kings makes them that they cannot easily descend into the obscure and narrow mines of an ambitious clergy), they found means to make the people believe, there was a power in the Pope and clergy, which they ought to submit unto, rather than to the commands of their own Kings, whensoever it should come into controversy: and to that end devised and decreed many new articles of faith, to the diminution of the authority of kings, and to the disjunction of them and their subjects, and to a closer adherence of their subjects to the Church

of Rome; articles either not at all found in, or not well founded upon the Scriptures; as first; that it should not be lawful for a priest to marry.

B.

What influence could that have upon the power of Kings?

A.

Do you not see, that by this the King must of necessity either want the priesthood, and therewith a great part of the reverence due to him from the most religious part of his subjects, or else want lawful heirs to succeed him: by which means, being not taken for the head of the Church, he was sure, in any controversy between him and the Pope, that his subjects would be against him?

B.

Is not a Christian King as much a bishop now, as the heathen Kings were of old? for among them episcopus was a name common to all Kings. Is not he a bishop now, to whom God hath committed the charge of all the souls of his subjects, both of the laity and the clergy? And though he be in relation to our Saviour, who is the chief pastor, but a sheep, yet, compared to his own subjects, they are all sheep, both laic and cleric, and he only shepherd. And seeing a Christian bishop is but a Christian endued with power to govern the clergy, it follows that every Christian king is not only a bishop, but an arch-bishop, and his whole dominion his diocese. And though it were granted, that imposition of hands is necessary from a priest; yet seeing Kings have the government of the clergy, that are his subjects even before baptism; the baptism itself, wherein he is received as a Christian, is a sufficient imposition of

hands, so that whereas before he was a bishop, now he is a Christian bishop.

A.

For my part I agree with you: this prohibition of marriage to priests came in about the time of Pope Gregory the Seventh, and William the First, King of England; by which means the Pope had in England, what with secular and what with regular priests, a great many lusty bachelors at his service.
Secondly, that auricular confession to a priest was necessary to salvation. It is true, that before that time, confession to a priest was usual, and performed for the most part by him that confessed, in writing. But that use was taken away about the time of King Edward III, and priests commanded to take confessions from the mouth of the confitent: and men did generally believe, that without confession and absolution before their departure out of the world, they could not be saved; and having absolution from a priest, that they could not be damned. You understand by this, how much every man would stand in awe of the Pope and clergy, more than they would of the King; and what inconvenience it is to a state for their subjects to confess their secret thoughts to spies.

B.

Yes, as much as eternal torture is more terrible than death, so much they would fear the clergy more than the King.

A.

And though perhaps the Roman clergy will not maintain, that a priest hath power to remit sins absolutely, but only with a condition of repentance, yet the people were never so instructed by them; but were left to believe, that whensoever they had absolution, their precedent sins were all discharged, when their penance, which they took for repentance, was performed. Within the same time began the article of transubstantiation. For it had been disputed a long time before, in what manner a man did eat the body of our Saviour Jesus Christ, as being a point very difficult for a man to conceive and imagine clearly; but now it was made very clear, that the bread was transubstantiated into Christ's body, and so was become no more bread, but flesh.

B.

It seems then that Christ had many bodies, and was in as many places at once, as there were communicants. I think the priests then were so wanton, as to insult upon the dulness, not only of common people, but also of kings and their councillors.

A.

I am now in a narration, not in a disputation; and therefore I would have you at this time to consider nothing else, but what effect this doctrine would work upon kings and their subjects, in relation to the clergy, who only were able of a piece of bread to make our Saviour's body, and thereby at the hour of death to save their souls.

B.

For my part, it would have an effect on me, to make me think them gods, and to stand in awe of them as of God himself, if he were visibly

present.

A.

Besides these, and other articles tending to the upholding of the Pope's authority, they had many fine points in their ecclesiastical polity, conducing to the same end; of which I will mention only such as were established within the same time. For then it was the order came up of preaching friars, that wandered up and down, with power to preach in what congregation they pleased, and were sure enough to instil into the people nothing that might lessen the obedience to the Church of Rome; but, on the contrary, whatsoever might give advantage to it against the civil power. Besides, they privately insinuated themselves with women and men of weak judgment, confirming their adherence to the Pope, and urging them, in the time of their sickness, to be beneficial to it by contribution of money, or building religious houses, or pious works and necessary for the remission of their sins.

B.

I do not remember that I have read of any kingdom or state in the world, where liberty was given to any private man to call the people together, and make orations frequently to them, or at all, without first making the state acquainted, except only in Christendom. I believe the heathen Kings foresaw, that a few such orators would be able to make a great sedition. Moses did indeed command to read the Scriptures and expound them in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day. But the Scriptures then were nothing else but the laws of the nation, delivered unto them by Moses himself. And I believe it would do no hurt, if the laws of England also were often read and expounded in the several

congregations of Englishmen, at times appointed, that they may know what to do; for they know already what to believe.

A.

I think that neither the preaching of friars nor monks, nor of parochial priests, tended to teach men what, but whom to believe. For the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people. And the end which the Pope had in multiplying sermons, was no other but to prop and enlarge his own authority over all Christian Kings and States.

Within the same time, that is, between the time of the Emperor Charles the Great and of King Edward the Third of England, began their second polity; which was, to bring religion into an art, and thereby to maintain all the decrees of the Roman Church by disputation; not only from the Scriptures, but also from the philosophy of Aristotle, both moral and natural. And to that end the Pope exhorted the said Emperor by letter, to erect schools of all kinds of literature; and from thence began the institution of universities; for not long after, the universities began in Paris and in Oxford. It is true, that there were schools in England before that time, in several places, for the instruction of children in the Latin tongue, that is to say, in the tongue of the Church. But for an university of learning, there was none erected till that time; though it be not unlikely there might be then some that taught philosophy, logic, and other arts, in divers monasteries, the monks having little else to do but to study. After some colleges were built to that purpose, it was not long time before many more were added to them, by the devotion of princes and bishops, and other wealthy men: and the discipline therein was confirmed by the Popes that then were; and abundance of scholars sent thither by their friends to study, as to a place from whence the way was

open and easy to preferment both in Church and Commonwealth. The profit the Church of Rome expected from them, and in effect received, was the maintenance of the Pope's doctrine, and of his authority over kings and their subjects, by school-divines; who striving to make good many points of faith incomprehensible, and calling in the philosophy of Aristotle to their assistance, wrote great books of school-divinity, which no man else, nor they themselves, were able to understand; as any man may perceive that shall consider the writings of Peter Lombard, or Scotus, or of him that wrote commentaries upon him, or of Suarez, or any other school-divine of later times. Which kind of learning nevertheless hath been much admired by two sorts of men, otherwise prudent enough. The one of which sorts were of those that were already devoted and really affectionate to the Roman Church; for they believed the doctrine before, but admired the arguments because they understood them not, and yet found the conclusions to their mind. The other sort were negligent men, that had rather admire with others, than take the pains to examine. So that all sorts of people were fully resolved, that both the doctrine was true, and the Pope's authority no more than what was due to him.

B.

I see that a Christian king, or state, how well soever provided he be of money and arms, where the Church of Rome hath such authority, will have but a hard match of it, for want of men. For their subjects will hardly be drawn into the field and fight with courage against their consciences.

A.

It is true that great rebellions have been raised by Church-men in the Pope's quarrel against kings, as in England against King John, and in France against King Henry IV. Wherein the Kings had a more considerable part on their sides, than the Pope had on his; and shall always have so, if they have money. For there are but few whose consciences are so tender as to refuse money when they want it. But the great mischief done to kings upon pretence of religion is, when the Pope gives power to one king to invade another.

B.

I wonder how King Henry the Eighth could then so utterly extinguish the authority of the Pope in England, and that without any rebellion at home, or any invasion from abroad.

A.

First, the priests, monks, and friars, being in the height of their power, were now for the most part grown insolent and licentious; and thereby the force of their arguments was now taken away by the scandal of their lives, which the gentry and men of good education easily perceived: and the Parliament consisting of such persons, were therefore willing to take away their power: and generally the common people, which from a long custom had been in love with Parliaments, were not displeased therewith. Secondly, the doctrine of Luther beginning a little before, was now by a great many men of the greatest judgment so well received, as that there was no hope to restore the Pope to his power by rebellion. Thirdly, the revenue of abbeys and all other religious houses, falling thereby into the King's hands, and by him being disposed of to the most eminent gentlemen in every county, could not but make them do their best to confirm themselves in the possession of them. Fourthly,

King Henry was of a nature quick and severe in the punishing of such as should be the first to oppose his designs. Lastly, as to invasion from abroad, in case the Pope had given the kingdom to another prince, it had been in vain; for England is another manner of kingdom than Navarre. Besides, the French and Spanish forces were employed at that time one against another: and though they had been at leisure, they would have found perhaps no better success than the Spaniards found afterwards in 1588. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the insolence, avarice, and hypocrisy of the then clergy, and notwithstanding the doctrine of Luther, if the Pope had not provoked the King by endeavouring to cross his marriage with his second wife, his authority might have remained in England till there had risen some other quarrel.

B.

Did not the bishops, that then were, and had taken an oath, wherein was, amongst other things, that they should defend and maintain the legal rights of St. Peter: (the words are, Regalia Sancti Petri, which nevertheless some have said are regulas Sancti Petri, that is to say, St. Peter's rules or doctrine; and that the clergy afterward did read it, being perhaps written in short-hand, by a mistake to the Pope's advantage regalia): did not, I say, the bishops oppose that Act of Parliament against the Pope, and against the taking of the oath of supremacy?

A.

No, I do not find that the bishops did many of them oppose the King; for having no power without him, it had been great imprudence to provoke his anger. There was besides a controversy in those times between the Pope and the bishops, most of which did maintain that they exercised their jurisdiction episcopal in the right of God, as immediately as the

Pope himself did exercise the same over the whole Church. And because they saw that by this Act of the King in Parliament they were to hold their power no more of the Pope, and never thought of holding it of the King, they were perhaps better content to let that Act of Parliament pass. In the reign of King Edward VI the doctrine of Luther had taken so great root in England, that they threw out also a great many of the Pope's new articles of faith; which Queen Mary succeeding him restored again, together with all that had been abolished by Henry VIII, saving that which could not be restored, the religious houses; and the bishops and clergy of King Edward were partly burnt for heretics, partly fled, and partly recanted. And they that fled betook themselves to those places beyond sea, where the reformed religion was either protected or not persecuted; who, after the decease of Queen Mary, returned again to favour and preferment under Queen Elizabeth, that restored the religion of her brother King Edward. And so it hath continued till this day, excepting the interruption made in this late rebellion of the presbyterians and other democratical men. But though the Romish religion were now cast out by the law, yet there were abundance of people, and many of them of the nobility, that still retained the religion of their ancestors, who as they were not much molested in points of conscience, so they were not by their own inclination very troublesome to the civil government; but by the secret practice of the Jesuits and other emissaries of the Roman Church, they were made less quiet than they ought to have been; and some of them to venture on the most horrid act that ever had been heard of before, I mean the Gunpowder Treason. And upon that account, the Papists of England have been looked upon as men that would not be sorry for any disorders here that might possibly make way to the restoring of the Pope's authority. And

therefore I named them for one of the distempers of the state of England in the time of our late King Charles.

B.

I see that Monsieur Mornay du Plessis, and Dr. Morton, Bishop of Durham, writing of the progress of the Pope's power, and intituling their books, one of them, The Mystery of Iniquity, the other, The Grand Imposture, were both in the right. For I believe there was never such another cheat in the world, and I wonder that the Kings and States of Christendom never perceived it.

A.

It is manifest they did perceive it. How else durst they make war against the Pope, and some of them take him out of Rome itself and carry him away prisoner? But if they would have freed themselves from his tyranny, they should have agreed together, and made themselves every one, as Henry VIII did, head of the Church within their own respective dominions. But not agreeing, they let his power continue, every one hoping to make use of it, when there should be cause, against his neighbour.

B.

Now, as to that other distemper by Presbyterians, how came their power to be so great, being of themselves, for the most part, but so many poor scholars?

A.

This controversy between the Papist and the Reformed Churches, could not choose but make every man, to the best of his power, examine by the Scriptures, which of them was in the right; and to that end they were translated into vulgar tongues; whereas before, the translation of them was not allowed, nor any man to read them but such as had express license so to do. For the Pope did concerning the Scriptures the same that Moses did concerning Mount Sinai. Moses suffered no man to go up to it to hear God speak or gaze upon him, but such as he himself took with him; and the Pope suffered none to speak with God in the Scriptures, that had not some part of the Pope's spirit in him, for which he might be trusted.

B.

Certainly Moses did therein very wisely, and according to God's own commandment.

A.

No doubt of it, and the event itself hath made it appear so. For after the Bible was translated into English, every man, nay, every boy and wench, that could read English, thought they spoke with God Almighty, and understood what he said, when by a certain number of chapters a day they had read the Scriptures once or twice over. The reverence and obedience due to the Reformed Church here, and to the bishops and pastors therein, was cast off, and every man became a judge of religion, and an interpreter of the Scriptures to himself.

B.

Did not the Church of England intend it should be so? What other end could they have in recommending the Bible to me, if they did not mean I should make it the rule of my actions? Else they might have kept it, though open to themselves, to me sealed up in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, and fed me out of it in such measure as had been requisite for the salvation of my soul and the Church's peace.

A.

I confess this licence of interpreting the Scripture was the cause of so many several sects, as have lain hid till the beginning of the late King's reign, and did then appear to the disturbance of the commonwealth. But to return to the story. Those persons that fled for religion in the time of Queen Mary, resided, for the most part, in places where the Reformed religion was professed and governed by an assembly of ministers; who also were not a little made use of, for want of better statesmen, in points of civil government. Which pleased so much the English and Scotch Protestants that lived amongst them, that at their return they wished there were the same honour and reverence given to the ministry in their own countries. In Scotland, King James being then young, soon with the help of some of the powerful nobility they brought it to pass. Also they that returned into England in the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, endeavoured the same here, but could never effect it till this last rebellion, nor without the aid of the Scots. And it was no sooner effected, but they were defeated again by the other sects, which, by the preaching of the Presbyterians and private interpretation of Scripture, were grown numerous.

B.

I know indeed that in the beginning of the late war, the power of the Presbyterians was so very great, that, not only the citizens of London were almost all of them at their devotion, but also the greatest part of all other cities and markettowns of England. But you have not yet told me by what art and what degrees they became so strong.

A.

It was not their own art alone that did it, but they had the concurrence of a great many gentlemen, that did no less desire a popular government in the civil state than these ministers did in the Church. And as these did in the pulpit draw the people to their opinions, and to a dislike of the Church-government, Canons, and Common-prayerbook, so did the other make them in love with democracy by their harangues in the Parliament, and by their discourses and communication with people in the country, continually extolling liberty and inveighing against tyranny, leaving the people to collect of themselves that this tyranny was the present government of the state. And as the Presbyterians brought with them into their churches their divinity from the universities, so did many of the gentlemen bring their politics from thence into the Parliament; but neither of them did this very boldly in the time of Queen Elizabeth. And though it be not likely that all of them did it out of malice, but many of them out of error, yet certainly the chief leaders were ambitious ministers and ambitious gentlemen; the ministers envying the authority of bishops, whom they thought less learned; and the gentlemen envying the privy-council, whom they thought less wise than themselves. For it is a hard matter for men, who do all think highly of their own wits, when they have also acquired the learning of the university, to be persuaded that they want any ability requisite for the government of a commonwealth, especially having read the glorious histories and the

sententious politics of the ancient popular governments of the Greeks and Romans, amongst whom kings were hated and branded with the name of tyrants, and popular government (though no tyrant was ever so cruel as a popular assembly) passed by the name of liberty. The Presbyterian ministers, in the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, did not, because they durst not, publicly preach against the discipline of the Church. But not long after, by the favour perhaps of some great courtier, they went abroad preaching in most of the market-towns of England, as the preaching friars had formerly done, upon working-days in the morning; in which sermons, these and others of the same tenets, that had charge of souls, both by the manner and matter of their preaching, applied themselves wholly to the winning of the people to a liking of their doctrines and good opinion of their persons.

And first, for the manner of their preaching; they so framed their countenance and gesture at their entrance into the pulpit, and their pronunciation both in their prayer and sermon, and used the Scripture phrase (whether understood by the people or not), as that no tragedian in the world could have acted the part of a right godly man better than these did; insomuch that a man unacquainted with such art, could never suspect any ambitious plot in them to raise sedition against the state, as they then had designed; or doubt that the vehemence of their voice (for the same words with the usual pronunciation had been of little force) and forcedness of their gesture and looks, could arise from anything else but zeal to the service of God. And by this art they came into such credit, that numbers of men used to go forth of their own parishes and towns on working-days, leaving their calling, and on Sundays leaving their own churches, to hear them preach in other places, and to despise their own and all other preachers that acted not so well as they. And as for those ministers that did not usually preach, but instead of sermons

did read to the people such homilies as the Church had appointed, they esteemed and called them dumb dogs.

Secondly, for the matter of their sermons, because the anger of the people in the late Roman usurpation was then fresh, they saw there could be nothing more gracious with them than to preach against such other points of the Romish religion as the bishops had not yet condemned; that so receding further from popery than they did, they might with glory to themselves leave a suspicion on the bishops, as men not yet well purged from idolatry.

Thirdly, before their sermons, their prayer was or seemed to be extempore, which they pretended to be dictated by the spirit of God within them, and many of the people believed or seemed to believe it. For any man might see, that had judgment, that they did not take care beforehand what they should say in their prayers. And from hence came a dislike of the common-prayer-book, which is a set form, premeditated, that men might see to what they were to say amen.

Fourthly, they did never in their sermons, or but lightly, inveigh against the lucrative vices of men of trade or handicraft; such as are feigning, lying, cozening, hypocrisy, or other uncharitableness, except want of charity to their pastors and to the faithful: which was a great ease to the generality of citizens and the inhabitants of market-towns, and no little profit to themselves.

Fifthly, by preaching up an opinion that men were to be assured of their salvation by the testimony of their own private spirit, meaning the Holy Ghost dwelling within them. And from this opinion the people that found in themselves a sufficient hatred towards the Papists, and an ability to repeat the sermons of these men at their coming home, made no doubt but that they had all that was necessary, how fraudulently and

spitefully soever they behaved themselves to their neighbours that were not reckoned amongst the saints, and sometimes to those also.

Sixthly, they did, indeed, with great earnestness and severity, inveigh often against two sins, carnal lusts and vain swearing; which, without question, was very well done. But the common people were thereby inclined to believe, that nothing else was sin, but that which was forbidden in the third and seventh commandments (for few men do understand by the name of lust any other concupiscence, than that which is forbidden in that seventh commandment; for men are not ordinarily said to lust after another man's cattle, or other goods or possessions): and therefore never made much scruple of the acts of fraud and malice, but endeavoured to keep themselves from uncleanness only, or at least from the scandal of it. And, whereas they did, both in their sermons and writings, maintain and inculcate, that the very first motions of the mind, that is to say, the delight men and women took in the sight of one another's form, though they checked the proceeding thereof so that it never grew up to be a design, was nevertheless a sin, they brought young men into desperation and to think themselves damned, because they could not (which no man can, and is contrary to the constitution of nature) behold a delightful object without delight. And by this means they became confessors to such as were thus troubled in conscience, and were obeyed by them as their spiritual doctors in all cases of conscience.

B.

Yet divers of them did preach frequently against oppression.

A.

It is true, I had forgot that; but it was before such as were free enough from it; I mean the common people, who would easily believe themselves oppressed, but never oppressors. And therefore you may reckon this among their artifices, to make the people believe they were oppressed by the King, or perhaps by the bishops, or both; and incline the meaner sort to their party afterwards, when there should be occasion. But this was but sparingly done in the time of Queen Elizabeth, whose fear and jealousy they were afraid of. Nor had they as yet any great power in the Parliament-house, whereby to call in question her prerogative by petitions of right and other devices, as they did afterwards, when democratical gentlemen had received them into their counsels for the design of changing the government from monarchical to popular, which they called liberty.

B.

Who would think that such horrible designs as these could so easily and so long remain covered with the cloak of godliness? For that they were most impious hypocrites, is manifest enough by the war these proceedings ended in, and by the impious acts in that war committed. But when began first to appear in Parliament the attempt of popular government, and by whom?

A.

As to the time of attempting the change of government from monarchical to democratical, we must distinguish. They did not challenge the sovereignty in plain terms, and by that name, till they had slain the King; nor the rights thereof altogether by particular heads, till the King was driven from London by tumults raised in that city against him, and retired for the security of his person to York; where he had not

been many days, when they sent unto him nineteen propositions, whereof above a dozen were demands of several powers, essential parts of the power sovereign. But before that time they had demanded some of them in a petition which they called a Petition of Right; which nevertheless the King had granted them in a former Parliament, though he deprived himself thereby, not only of the power to levy money without their consent, but also of his ordinary revenue by custom of tonnage and poundage, and of the liberty to put into custody such men as he thought likely to disturb the peace and raise sedition in the kingdom. As for the men that did this, it is enough to say they were members of the last Parliament, and of some other Parliaments in the beginning of King Charles and the end of King James his reign; to name them all is not necessary, further than the story shall require. Most of them were members of the House of Commons; some few also, of the Lords; but all, such as had a great opinion of their sufficiency in politics, which they thought was not sufficiently taken notice of by the King.

B.

How could the Parliament, when the King had a great navy, and a great number of trained soldiers, and all the magazines of ammunition in his power, be able to begin the war?

A.

The King had these things indeed in his right; but that signifies little, when they that had the custody of the navy and magazines, and with them all the trained soldiers, and in a manner all his subjects, were, by the preaching of Presbyterian ministers, and the seditious whisperings of false and ignorant politicians, made his enemies; and when the King could have no money but what the Parliament should give him, which

you may be sure should not be enough to maintain his regal power, which they intended to take from him. And yet, I think, they never would have ventured into the field, but for that unlucky business of imposing upon the Scots, who were all Presbyterians, our book of Common-prayer. For I believe the English would never have taken well that the Parliament should make war upon the King, upon any provocation, unless it were in their own defence, in case the King should first make war upon them; and, therefore, it behoved them to provoke the King, that he might do something that might look like hostility. It happened in the year 1637, that the King, by the advice, as it is thought, of the Archbishop of Canterbury, sent down a book of Common-prayer into Scotland, not differing in substance from ours, nor much in words besides the putting of the word Presbyter for that of Minister, commanding it to be used, for conformity to this kingdom, by the ministers there, for an ordinary form of Divine service. This being read in the church at Edinburgh, caused such a tumult there, that he that read it had much ado to escape with his life; and gave occasion to the greatest part of the nobility and others to enter, by their own authority, into a covenant amongst themselves, which impudently they called a covenant with God, to put down episcopacy, without consulting with the King: which they presently did, animated thereto by their own confidence, or by assurance from some of the democratical Englishmen that in former Parliaments had been the greatest opposers of the King's interest, that the King would not be able to raise an army to chastise them without calling a Parliament, which would be sure to favour them. For the thing which those democraticals chiefly then aimed at, was to force the King to call a Parliament, which he had not done for ten years before, as having found no help, but hindrance to his designs in the Parliaments he had formerly called. Howsoever, contrary to their

expectation, by the help of his better-affected subjects of the nobility and gentry, he made a shift to raise a sufficient army to have reduced the Scots to their former obedience, if it had proceeded to battle. And with this army he marched himself into Scotland; where the Scotch army was also brought into the field against him, as if they meant to fight. But then the Scotch sent to the King for leave to treat by commissioners on both sides; and the King, willing to avoid the destruction of his own subjects, condescended to it. The issue was peace; and the King thereupon went to Edinburgh, and passed an Act of Parliament there to their satisfaction.

B.

Did he not then confirm episcopacy?

A.

No, but yielded to the abolishing of it: but by this means the English were crossed in their hope of a Parliament. But the said democraticals, formerly opposers of the King's interest, ceased not to endeavour still to put the two nations into a war; to the end the King might buy the Parliament's help at no less a price than sovereignty itself.

B.

But what was the cause that the gentry and nobility of Scotland were so averse from the episcopacy? For I can hardly believe that their consciences were extraordinarily tender, nor that they were so very great divines, as to know what was the true Church-discipline established by our Saviour and his apostles; nor yet so much in love with their ministers, as to be over-ruled by them in the government either

ecclesiastical or civil. For in their lives they were just as other men are, pursuers of their own interests and preferments, wherein they were not more opposed by the bishops than by their Presbyterian ministers.

A.

Truly I do not know; I cannot enter into other men's thoughts, farther than I am led by the consideration of human nature in general. But upon this consideration I see first, that men of ancient wealth and nobility are not apt to brook, that poor scholars should (as they must, when they are made bishops) be their fellows. Secondly, that from the emulation of glory between the nations, they might be willing to see this nation afflicted by civil war, and might hope, by aiding the rebels here, to acquire some power over the English, at least so far as to establish here the Presbyterian discipline; which was also one of the points they afterwards openly demanded. Lastly, they might hope for, in the war, some great sum of money, as a reward of their assistance, besides great booty, which they afterwards obtained. But whatsoever was the cause of their hatred to bishops, the pulling of them down was not all they aimed at: if it had, now that episcopacy was abolished by act of Parliament, they would have rested satisfied, which they did not. For after the King was returned to London, the English Presbyterians and democraticals, by whose favour they had put down bishops in Scotland, thought it reason to have the assistance of the Scotch for the pulling down of bishops in England. And in order thereunto, they might perhaps deal with the Scots secretly, to rest unsatisfied with that pacification, which they were before contented with. Howsoever it was, not long after the King was returned to London, they sent up to some of their friends at court a certain paper, containing, as they pretended, the articles of the said pacification; a false and scandalous paper, which was by the King's

command burnt, as I have heard, publicly. And so both parties returned to the same condition they were in, when the King went down with his army.

B.

And so there was a great deal of money cast away to no purpose. But you have not told me who was general of that army.

A.

I told you the King was there in person. He that commanded under him was the Earl of Arundel, a man that wanted not either valour or judgment. But to proceed to battle or to treaty, was not in his power, but in the King's.

B.

He was a man of a most noble and loyal family, and whose ancestors had formerly given a great overthrow to the Scots, in their own country; and in all likelihood he might have given them the like now, if they had fought.

A.

He might indeed: but it had been but a kind of superstition to have made him general upon that account, though many generals heretofore have been chosen for the good luck of their ancestors in like occasions. In the long war between Athens and Sparta, a general of the Athenians by sea won many victories against the Spartans; for which cause, after his death, they chose his son for general with ill success. The Romans that conquered Carthage by the valour and conduct of Scipio, when they

were to make war again in Afric against Cæsar, chose another Scipio for general; a man valiant and wise enough, but he perished in the employment. And to come home to our own nation, the Earl of Essex made a fortunate expedition to Cadiz; but his son, sent afterwards to the same place, could do nothing. It is but a foolish superstition, to hope that God has entailed success in war upon a name or family.

B.

After the pacification broken, what succeeded next?

A.

The King sent Duke Hamilton with commission and instructions into Scotland, to call a Parliament there, and to use all the means he could otherwise; but all was to no purpose. For the Scots were now resolved to raise an army and to enter into England, to deliver, as they pretended, their grievances to his majesty in a petition; because the King, they said, being in the hands of evil councillors, they could not otherwise obtain their right. But the truth is, they were animated to it by the democratical and Presbyterian English, with a promise of reward and hope of plunder. Some have said, that Duke Hamilton also did rather encourage them to, than deter them from, the expedition; as hoping by the disorder of the two kingdoms, to bring to pass that which he had formerly been accused to endeavour, to make himself King of Scotland. But I take this to have been a very uncharitable censure, upon so little ground to judge so hardly of a man, that afterwards lost his life in seeking to procure the liberty of the King his master. This resolution of the Scots to enter England being known, the King wanting money to raise an army against them, was now, as his enemies here wished, constrained to call a parliament, to meet at Westminster the 13th day of April 1640.

B.

Methinks a Parliament of England, if upon any occasion, should furnish the King with money now in war against the Scots, out of an inveterate disaffection to that nation that had always anciently taken part with their enemies the French, and which always esteemed the glory of England for an abatement of their own.

A.

It is indeed commonly seen that neighbour nations envy one another's honour, and that the less potent bears the greater malice; but that hinders them not from agreeing in those things which their common ambition leads them to. And therefore the King found not the more, but the less help from this Parliament: and most of the members thereof, in their ordinary discourses, seemed to wonder why the King should make a war upon Scotland; and in that Parliament sometimes called them their brethren the Scots. But instead of taking the King's business, which was the raising of money, into their consideration, they fell upon the redressing of grievances, and especially such ways of levying money as in the late intermission of Parliaments the King had been forced to use; such as were ship-money, for knighthood, and such other vails (as one may call them) of the regal office, which lawyers had found justifiable by the ancient records of the kingdom. Besides, they fell upon the actions of divers ministers of state, though done by the King's own command and warrant. Insomuch, that before they were to come to the business for which they were called, the money which was necessary for this war (if they had given any, as they never meant to do) had come too late. It is true, there was mention of a sum of money to be given the King, by way of bargain, for the relinquishing of his right to ship-

money, and some other of his prerogatives, but so seldom, and without determining any sum, that it was in vain for the King to hope for any success; and therefore upon the 5th of May following he dissolved it.

B.

Where then had the King money to raise and pay his army?

A.

He was forced the second time to make use of the nobility and gentry, who contributed some more, some less, according to the greatness of their estates; but amongst them all they made up a very sufficient army.

B.

It seems then that the same men, that crossed his business in the Parliament, now out of Parliament advanced it all they could. What was the reason of that?

A.

The greatest part of the Lords in Parliament, and of the gentry throughout England, were more affected to monarchy than to a popular government, but so as not to endure to hear of the King's absolute power; which made them in time of Parliament easily to condescend to abridge it, and bring the government to a mixed monarchy, as they called it; wherein the absolute sovereignty should be divided between the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons.

B.

But how, if they cannot agree?

A.

I think they never thought of that; but I am sure they never meant the sovereignty should be wholly either in one or both houses. Besides, they were loath to desert the King, when he was invaded by foreigners; for the Scotch were esteemed by them as a foreign nation.

B.

It is strange to me, that England and Scotland being but one island, and their language almost the same, and being governed by one King, should be thought foreigners to one another. The Romans were masters of many nations, and to oblige them the more to obey the edicts and laws sent unto them from the city of Rome, they thought fit to make them all Romans; and out of divers nations, as Spain, Germany, Italy, and France, to advance some, that they thought worthy, even to be senators of Rome, and to give every one of the common people the privileges of the city of Rome, by which they were protected from the contumelies of other nations where they resided. Why were not the Scotch and English in like manner united into one people?

A.

King James at his first coming to the crown of England did endeavour it, but could not prevail. But for all that, I believe the Scotch have now as many privileges in England as any nation had in Rome, of those which were so as you say made Romans. For they are all naturalized, and have right to buy land in England to themselves and their heirs.

B.

It is true of them, that were born in Scotland after the time that King James was in possession of the kingdom of England.

A.

There be very few now that were born before. But why have they a better right that were born after, than they that were born before?

B.

Because they were born subjects to the King of England, and the rest not.

A.

Were not the rest born subjects to King James? And was not the King of England?

B.

Yes, but not then.

A.

I understand not the subtilty of that distinction. But upon what law is that distinction grounded? Is there any statute to that purpose?

B.

I cannot tell; I think not; but it is grounded upon equity.

A.

I see little equity in this; that those nations that are bound to equal obedience to the same King, should not have equal privileges. And now seeing there be so very few born before King James's coming in, what greater privilege had those ingrafted Romans by their naturalization in the state of Rome, or in the state of England the English themselves, more than the Scotch?

B.

Those Romans, when any of them were in Rome, had their voice in the making of laws.

A.

And the Scotch have their Parliaments, wherein their assent is required to the laws there made, which is as good. Have not many of the provinces of France their several parliaments and several constitutions? And yet they are all equally natural subjects of the King of France. And therefore for my part I think they were mistaken, both English and Scotch, in calling one another foreigners. Howsoever that be, the King had a very sufficient army, wherewith he marched towards Scotland; and by the time he was come to York, the Scotch army was drawn up to the frontiers and ready to march into England; which also they presently did; giving out all the way, that their march should be without damage to the country, and that their errand was only to deliver a petition to the King, for the redress of many pretended injuries they had received from such of the court, whose counsel the King most followed. So they passed through Northumberland quietly, till they came to a ford in the river of Tyne, a little above Newcastle, where they found some little opposition from a party of the King's army sent thither to stop them, whom the Scotch easily mastered; and as soon as they were over, seized

upon Newcastle, and coming further on, upon the city of Durham; and sent to the King to desire a treaty, which was granted; and the commissioners on both sides met at Ripon. The conclusion was, that all should be referred to the Parliament, which the King should call to meet at Westminster on the 3rd of November following, being in the same year 1640; and thereupon the King returned to London.

B.

So the armies were disbanded?

A.

No; the Scotch army was to be defrayed by the counties of Northumberland and Durham, and the King was to pay his own, till the disbanding of both should be agreed upon in Parliament.

B.

So in effect both the armies were maintained at the King's charge, and the whole controversy to be decided by a Parliament almost wholly Presbyterian, and as partial to the Scotch as themselves could have wished.

A.

And yet for all this they durst not presently make war upon the King: there was so much yet left of reverence to him in the hearts of the people, as to have made them odious, if they had declared what they intended. They must have some colour or other to make it believed that the King made war first upon the Parliament. And besides, they had not yet sufficiently disgraced him in sermons and pamphlets, nor removed

from about him those they thought could best counsel him. Therefore they resolved to proceed with him like skilful hunters; first to single him out, by men disposed in all parts to drive him into the open field; and then in case he should but seem to turn head, to call that a making of war against the Parliament.

And first they called in question such as had either preached or written in defence of any of those rights, which, belonging to the Crown, they meant to usurp, and take from the King to themselves: whereupon some few preachers and writers were imprisoned, or forced to fly. The King not protecting these, they proceeded to call in question some of the King's own actions in his ministers, whereof they imprisoned some, and some went beyond sea. And whereas certain persons, having endeavoured by books and sermons to raise sedition, and committed other crimes of high nature, had therefore been censured by the King's council in the Star-chamber, and imprisoned; the Parliament by their own authority, to try, it seems, how the King and the people would take it, (for their persons were inconsiderable), ordered their setting at liberty; which was accordingly done, with great applause of the people, that flocked about them in London, in manner of a triumph. This being done without resistance, the King's right to ship-money —

B.

Ship-money! what's that?

A.

The Kings of England, for the defence of the sea, had power to tax all the counties of England, whether they were maritime or not, for the building and furnishing of ships; which tax the King had then lately found cause to impose, and the Parliament exclaimed against it as an

oppression. And by one of their members that had been taxed but 20s. (mark the oppression; a Parliament-man of 500l. a year, land-taxed at 20s.!) they were forced to bring it to a trial at law, he refusing payment; and he was cast. Again, when all the judges of Westminster were demanded their opinions concerning the legality of it, of twelve that there are, it was judged legal by ten; for which though they were not punished, yet they were affrighted by the Parliament.

B.

What did the Parliament mean, when they did exclaim against it as illegal? Did they mean it was against statute-law, or against the judgments of lawyers given heretofore, which are commonly called reports; or did they mean it was against equity, which I take to be the same with the law of nature?

A.

It is a hard matter, or rather impossible, to know what other men mean, especially if they be crafty: but sure I am, equity was not their ground for this pretence of immunity from contributing to the King but at their own pleasure. For when they have laid the burthen of defending the whole kingdom, and governing it, upon any person whatsoever, there is very little equity he should depend on others for the means of performing it; or if he do, they are his Sovereign, not he theirs. And as for the common law contained in reports, they have no force but what the King gives them. Besides, it were more unreasonable, that a corrupt or foolish judge's unjust sentence should by any time, how long soever, obtain the authority and force of a law. But amongst the statute laws there is one, called Magna Charta, or the Great Charter of the liberties of Englishmen, in which there is one article, wherein a King heretofore

hath granted that no man shall be distrained, that is, have his goods taken from him, otherwise than by the law of the land.

B.

Is not that a sufficient ground for their purpose?

A.

No: that leaves us in the same doubt, which you think it clears. For where was that law of the land then? Did they mean another Magna Charta, that was made by some King more ancient yet? No: that statute was made, not to exempt any man from payments to the public, but for securing every man from such as abused the King's power by surreptitiously obtaining the King's warrants, to the oppressing of those against whom he had any suit in law. But it was conducing to the ends of some rebellious spirits in this Parliament, to have it interpreted in the wrong sense, and suitable enough to the understanding of the rest, or most part of them, to let it pass.

B.

You make the members of that Parliament very simple men; and yet the people chose them for the wisest of the land.

A.

If craft be wisdom, they were wise enough. But wise, as I define it, is he that knows how to bring his business to pass, without the assistance of knavery and ignoble shifts, by the sole strength of his good contrivance. A fool may win from a better gamester by the advantage of false dice, and packing of cards.

B.

According to your definition, there be few wise men now-a-days. Such wisdom is a kind of gallantry, that few are brought up to, and most think folly. Fine cloaths, great feathers, civility towards men that will not swallow injuries, and injury towards them that will, is the present gallantry. But when the Parliament afterwards, having gotten the power into their hands, levied money for their own use; what said the people to that?

A.

What else, but that it was legal and to be paid, as being imposed by consent of Parliaments.

B.

I have heard often that they ought to pay what was imposed by consent of Parliaments to the use of the King, but to their own use never before. I see by this, it is easier to gull the multitude, than any one man amongst them. For what one man, that has not his natural judgment depraved by accident, could be so easily cozened in a matter that concerns his purse, had he not been passionately carried away by the rest to change of government, or rather to a liberty of every one to govern himself?

A.

Judge then, what kind of men such a multitude of ignorant people were like to elect for their burgesses and knights of shires.

B.

I can make no other judgment, but that they who were then elected, were just such as had been elected for former Parliaments, and as are like to be elected for Parliaments to come. For the common people have been, and always will be, ignorant of their duty to the public, as never meditating any thing but their particular interest; in other things following their immediate leaders; which are either the preachers, or the most potent of the gentlemen that dwell amongst them: as common soldiers for the most part follow their immediate captains, if they like them. If you think the late miseries have made them wiser, that will quickly be forgot, and then we shall be no wiser than we were.

A.

Why may not men be taught their duty, that is, the science of just and unjust, as divers other sciences have been taught, from true principles and evident demonstration; and much more easily than any of those preachers and democratical gentlemen could teach rebellion and treason?

B.

But who can teach what none have learned? Or, if any man hath been so singular, as to have studied the science of justice and equity; how can he teach it safely, when it is against the interest of those that are in possession of the power to hurt him?

A.

The rules of just and unjust sufficiently demonstrated, and from principles evident to the meanest capacity, have not been wanting; and notwithstanding the obscurity of their author, have shined, not only in

this, but also in foreign countries, to men of good education. But they are few, in respect of the rest of the men, whereof many cannot read; many, though they can, have no leisure; and of them that have leisure, the greatest part have their minds wholly employed and taken up by their private businesses or pleasures. So that it is impossible that the multitude should ever learn their duty, but from the pulpit and upon holidays; but then, and from thence, it is, that they learned their disobedience. And, therefore, the light of that doctrine has been hitherto covered and kept under here by a cloud of adversaries, which no private man's reputation can break through, without the authority of the Universities. But out of the Universities, came all those preachers that taught the contrary. The Universities have been to this nation, as the wooden horse was to the Trojans.

B.

Can you tell me why and when the Universities here, and in other places, first began?

A.

It seems, for the time, they began in the reign of the Emperor Charles the Great. Before which time, I doubt not, but that there were many grammar schools for the Latin tongue, which was the natural language of the Roman Church; but for Universities, that is to say, schools for the sciences in general, and especially for divinity, it is manifest that the institution of them was recommended by the Pope's letter to the Emperor Charles the Great, and recommended further by a Council held in his time, I think, at Chalons-sur-Saone; and not long after was erected an University at Paris, and the college called University College at Oxford. And so by degrees several bishops, noblemen, and rich men,

and some Kings and Queens, contributing thereunto, the Universities obtained at last their present splendour.

B.

But what was the Pope's design in it?

A.

What other design was he like to have, but what you heard before, the advancement of his own authority in the countries where the Universities were erected? There they learned to dispute for him, and with unintelligible distinctions to blind men's eyes, whilst they encroached upon the rights of kings. And it was an evident argument of that design, that they fell in hand with the work so quickly. For the first Rector of the University of Paris, as I have read somewhere, was Peter Lombard, who first brought in them the learning called School-divinity; and was seconded by John Scot of Duns, who lived in, or near the same time; whom any ingenious reader, not knowing what was the design, would judge to have been two of the most egregious blockheads in the world, so obscure and senseless are their writings. And from these the schoolmen that succeeded, learnt the trick of imposing what they list upon their readers, and declining the force of true reason by verbal forks; I mean, distinctions that signify nothing, but serve only to astonish the multitude of ignorant men. As for the understanding readers, they were so few, that these new sublime doctors cared not what they thought. These schoolmen were to make good all the articles of faith, which the Popes from time to time should command to be believed: amongst which, there were very many inconsistent with the rights of kings, and other civil sovereigns, as asserting to the Pope all

authority whatsoever they should declare to be necessary in ordine ad spiritualia, that is to say, in order to religion.

From the Universities also it was, that all preachers proceeded, and were poured out into city and country, to terrify the people into an absolute obedience to the Pope's canons and commands, which, for fear of weakening kings and princes too much, they durst not yet call laws.

From the Universities it was, that the philosophy of Aristotle was made an ingredient in religion, as serving for a salve to a great many absurd articles, concerning the nature of Christ's body, and the estate of angels and saints in heaven; which articles they thought fit to have believed, because they bring, some of them profit, and others reverence to the clergy, even to the meanest of them. For when they shall have made the people believe that the meanest of them can make the body of Christ; who is there that will not both show them reverence, and be liberal to them or to the Church, especially in the time of their sickness, when they think they make and bring unto them their Saviour?

B.

But, what advantage to them, in these impostures, was the doctrine of Aristotle?

A.

They have made more use of his obscurity than of his doctrine. For none of the ancient philosophers' writings are comparable to those of Aristotle, for their aptness to puzzle and entangle men with words, and to breed disputation, which must at last be ended in the determination of the Church of Rome. And yet in the doctrine of Aristotle, they made use of many points; as, first, the doctrine of separated essences.

B.

What are separated essences?

A.

Separated beings.

B.

Separated from what?

A.

From every thing that is.

B.

I cannot understand the being of any thing, which I understand not to be. But what can they make of that?

A.

Very much, in questions concerning the nature of God, and concerning the estate of man's soul after death, in heaven, hell, and purgatory; by which you and every man know, how great obedience, and how much money they gain from the common people. Whereas Aristotle holdeth the soul of man to be the first giver of motion to the body, and consequently to itself; they make use of that in the doctrine of free will. What, and how they gain by that, I will not say. He holdeth forth, that there be many things that come to pass in this world from no necessity of causes, but mere contingency, casuality, and fortune.

B.

Methinks, in this they make God stand idle, and to be a mere spectator of the games of fortune; for what God is the cause of, must needs come to pass, and, in my opinion, nothing else. But, because there must be some ground for the justice of the eternal torment of the damned; perhaps it is this, that men's wills and propensions are not, they think, in the hands of God, but of themselves; and in this also I see somewhat conducing to the authority of the Church.

A.

This is not much; nor was Aristotle of such credit with them, but that when his opinion was against theirs, they could slight him. What-soever he says is impossible in nature, they can prove well enough to be possible, from the Almighty power of God, who can make many bodies to be in one and the self-same place, and one body to be in many places at the same time, if the doctrine of transubstantiation require it, though Aristotle deny it. I like not the design of drawing religion into an art, whereas it ought to be a law; and though not the same in all countries, yet in every country indisputable; nor that they teach it not, as arts ought to be taught, by shewing first the meaning of their terms, and then deriving from them the truth they would have us believe: nor that their terms are for the most part unintelligible; though, to make it seem rather want of learning in the reader, than want of fair dealing in themselves, they are, for the most part, Latin and Greek words, wryed a little at the point, towards the native language of the several countries where they are used. But that which is most intolerable is, that all clerks are forced to make as if they believed them, if they mean to have any Church preferment, the keys whereof are in the Pope's hands; and the common

people, whatsoever they believe of those subtile doctrines, are never esteemed better sons of the Church for their learning. There is but one way there to salvation; that is, extraordinary devotion and liberality to the Church, and readiness for the Church's sake, if it be required, to fight against their natural and lawful sovereigns.

B.

I see what use they make of Aristotle's logic, physics, and metaphysics; but I see not yet how his politics can serve their turn.

A.

Nor I. It has, I think, done them no good, though it has done us here much hurt by accident. For men, grown weary at last of the insolence of the priests, and examining the truth of these doctrines that were put upon them, began to search the sense of the Scriptures, as they are in the learned languages; and consequently studying Greek and Latin, became acquainted with the democratical principles of Aristotle and Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in love with their politics, and that more and more, till it grew into the rebellion we now talk of, without any other advantage to the Roman Church but that it was a weakening to us, whom, since we broke out of their net in the time of Henry VIII, they have continually endeavoured to recover.

B.

What have they gotten by the teaching of Aristotle's ethics?

A.

It is some advantage to them, that neither the morals of Aristotle, nor of any other, have done them any harm, nor us any good. Their doctrines have caused a great deal of dispute concerning virtue and vice, but no knowledge of what they are, nor any method of obtaining virtue nor of avoiding vice. The end of moral philosophy is, to teach men of all sorts their duty, both to the public and to one another. They estimate virtue, partly by a mediocrity of the passions of men, and partly by that that they are praised. Whereas, it is not the much or little praise that makes an action virtuous, but the cause; nor much or little blame that makes an action vicious, but its being unconformable to the laws in such men as are subject to the law, or its being unconformable to equity or charity in all men whatsoever.

B.

It seems you make a difference between the ethics of subjects, and the ethics of sovereigns.

A.

So I do. The virtue of a subject is comprehended wholly in obedience to the laws of the commonwealth. To obey the laws, is justice and equity, which is the law of nature, and, consequently, is civil law in all nations of the world; and nothing is injustice or iniquity, otherwise, than it is against the law. Likewise, to obey the laws, is the prudence of a subject; for without such obedience the commonwealth (which is every subject's safety and protection) cannot subsist. And though it be prudence also in private men, justly and moderately to enrich themselves, yet craftily to withhold from the public or defraud it of such part of their wealth, as is by law required, is no sign of prudence, but of want of knowledge of what is necessary for their own defence.

The virtues of sovereigns are such as tend to the maintenance of peace at home, and to the resistance of foreign enemies. Fortitude is a royal virtue; and though it be necessary in such private men as shall be soldiers, yet, for other men, the less they dare, the better it is both for the commonwealth and for themselves. Frugality (though perhaps you will think it strange) is also a royal virtue: for it increases the public stock, which cannot be too great for the public use, nor any man too sparing of what he has in trust for the good of others. Liberality also is a royal virtue: for the commonwealth cannot be well served without extraordinary diligence and service of ministers, and great fidelity to their Sovereign; who ought therefore to be encouraged, and especially those that do him service in the wars. In sum, all actions and habits are to be esteemed good or evil by their causes and usefulness in reference to the commonwealth, and not by their mediocrity, nor by their being commended. For several men praise several customs, and that which is virtue with one, is blamed by others; and, contrarily, what one calls vice, another calls virtue, as their present affections lead them.

B.

Methinks you should have placed among the virtues that, which, in my opinion, is the greatest of all virtues, religion.

A.

So I have, though, it seems, you did not observe it. But whither do we digress from the way we were in?

B.

I think you have not digressed at all; for I suppose, your purpose was, to acquaint me with the history, not so much of those actions that passed in the time of the late troubles, as of their causes, and of the councils and artifice by which they were brought to pass. There be divers men that have written the history, out of whom I might have learned what they did, and somewhat also of the contrivance; but I find little in them of what I would ask. Therefore, since you were pleased to enter into this discourse at my request, be pleased also to inform me after my own method; and for the danger of confusion that may arise from that, I will take care to bring you back to the place from whence I drew you; for I well remember where it was.

A.

Well then, to your question concerning religion, inasmuch as I told you, that all virtue is comprehended in obedience to the laws of the commonwealth, whereof religion is one, I have placed religion amongst the virtues.

B.

Is religion then the law of a commonwealth?

A.

There is no nation in the world, whose religion is not established, and receives not its authority from the laws of that nation. It is true, that the law of God receives no evidence from the laws of men. But because men can never by their own wisdom come to the knowledge of what God hath spoken and commanded to be observed, nor be obliged to obey the laws whose author they know not, they are to acquiesce in

some human authority or other. So that the question will be, whether a man ought in matter of religion, that is to say, when there is question of his duty to God and the King, to rely upon the preaching of his fellow-subjects or of a stranger, or upon the voice of the law?

B.

There is no great difficulty in that point. For there are none that preach here or anywhere else, or at least ought to preach, but such as have authority so to do from him or them that have the sovereign power. So that if the King gives us leave, you or I may as lawfully preach as they that do; and I believe we should perform that office a great deal better, than they that preached us into the rebellion.

A.

The Church morals are in many points very different from these, that I have here set down, for the doctrine of virtue and vice; and yet without any conformity with that of Aristotle. For in the Church of Rome, the principal virtues are, to obey their doctrine, though it be treason, and that is to be religious; to be beneficial to the clergy, that is their piety and liberality; and to believe upon their word that which a man knows in his conscience to be false, which is the faith they require. I could name a great many more such points of their morals, but that I know you know them already, being so well versed in the cases of conscience written by their schoolmen, who measure the goodness and wickedness of all actions, by their congruity with the doctrine of the Roman clergy.

B.

But what is the moral philosophy of the Protestant clergy in England?

A.

So much as they show of it in their life and conversation, is for the most part very good, and of very good example; much better than their writings.

B.

It happens many times that men live honestly for fear, who, if they had power, would live according to their own opinions; that is, if their opinions be not right, unrighteously.

A.

Do the clergy in England pretend, as the Pope does, or as the Presbyterians do, to have a right from God immediately, to govern the King and his subjects in all points of religion and manners? If they do, you cannot doubt but that if they had number and strength, which they are never like to have, they would attempt to obtain that power, as the others have done.

B.

I would be glad to see a system of the present morals, written by some divine of good reputation and learning, of the late King's party.

A.

I think I can recommend unto you the best that is extant, and such a one as (except a few passages that I mislike) is very well worth your reading. The title of it is, The whole Duty of Man laid down in a plain and familiar way. And, yet, I dare say, that if the Presbyterian ministers,

even those of them which were the most diligent preachers of the late sedition, were to be tried by it, they would go near to be found not guilty. He has divided the duty of man into three great branches; which are, his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour. In his duty to God, he puts the acknowledgment of him in his essence and his attributes, and in the believing of his word. His attributes are omnipotence, omniscience, infiniteness, justice, truth, mercy, and all the rest that are found in Scripture. Which of these did not those seditious preachers acknowledge equally with the best of Christians? The word of God are the books of Holy Scripture, received for canonical in England.

B.

They receive the word of God; but it is according to their own interpretation.

A.

According to whose interpretation was it received by the bishops and the rest of the loyal party, but their own? He puts for another duty, obedience and submission to God's will. Did any of them, nay, did any man living, do any thing, at any time, against God's will?

B.

By God's will, I suppose, he means there his revealed will, that is to say, his commandments, which I am sure they did most horribly break, both by their preaching and otherwise.

A.

As for their own actions, there is no doubt but all men are guilty enough, if God deal severely with them, to be damned. And for their preaching, they will say, they thought it agreeable to God's revealed will in the Scriptures. If they thought it so, it was not disobedience, but error. And how can any man prove they thought otherwise?

B.

Hypocrisy hath this great prerogative above other sins, that it cannot be accused.

A.

Another duty he sets down is, to honour Him in his house (that is, the Church), in his possessions, in his day, in his word and sacraments.

B.

They perform this duty as well, I think, as any other ministers, I mean the loyal party; and the Presbyterians have always had an equal care to have God's house free from profanation; to have tithes duly paid, and offerings accepted; to have the sabbath day kept holy, the word preached, and the Lord's supper and baptism duly administered. But is not keeping of the feasts and fasts, one of those duties that belong to the honour of God? If it be, the Presbyterians fail in that.

A.

Why so? They kept some holidays, and they had fasts amongst themselves, though not upon the same days that the Church ordains, but when they thought fit; as when it pleased God to give the King any notable victory. And they governed themselves in this point by the Holy

Scripture, as they pretend to believe. And who can prove they do not believe so?

B.

Let us pass over all other duties, and come to that duty which we owe to the King, and consider whether the doctrine taught by those divines which adhered to the King, be such in that point, as may justify the Presbyterians, that incited the people to rebellion. For that is the thing you call in question.

A.

Concerning our duty to our rulers, he hath these words: “An obedience we must pay, either active or passive; the active, in the case of all lawful commands, that is, whenever the magistrate commands something which is not contrary to some command of God, we are then bound to act according to that command of the magistrate, to do the things he requires; but when he enjoins any thing contrary to what God hath commanded, we are not then to pay him this active obedience; we may, nay we must, refuse thus to act (yet, here we must be very well assured, that the thing is so contrary, and not pretend conscience for a cloak of stubbornness); we are, in that case, to obey God rather than men; but even this is a season for the passive obedience; we must patiently suffer what he inflicts on us for such refusal, and not, to secure ourselves, rise up against him.”

B.

What is there in this, to give colour to the late rebellion?

A.

They will say they did it in obedience to God, inasmuch as they did believe it was according to the Scripture; out of which they will bring examples, perhaps of David and his adherents, that resisted King Saul, and of the prophets afterward, that vehemently from time to time preached against the idolatrous Kings of Israel and Judah. Saul was their lawful King, and yet they paid him neither active nor passive obedience; for they did put themselves into a posture of defence against him, though David himself spared his person. And so did the Presbyterians put into their commissions to their general, that they should spare the King's person. Besides, you cannot doubt but that they, who in the pulpit did animate the people to take arms in the defence of the then Parliament, alleged Scripture, that is, the word of God for it. If it be lawful then for subjects to resist the King, when he commands anything that is against the Scripture, that is, contrary to the command of God, and to be judge of the meaning of the Scripture, it is impossible that the life of any King, or the peace of any Christian kingdom, can be long secure. It is this doctrine that divides a kingdom within itself, whatsoever the men be, loyal or rebels, that write or preach it publicly. And thus you see that if those seditious ministers be tried by this doctrine, they will come off well enough.

B.

I see it; and wonder at people that have never spoken with God Almighty, nor knowing one more than another what he hath said, when the laws and the preacher disagree, should so keenly follow the minister, (for the most part an ignorant, though a ready-tongued, scholar), rather

than the laws, that were made by the King with the consent of the peers and the commons of the land.

A.

Let us examine his words a little nearer. First, concerning passive obedience. When a thief hath broken the laws, and according to the law is therefore executed, can any man understand that this suffering of his is in obedience to the law? Every law is a command to do, or to forbear: neither of these is fulfilled by suffering. If any suffering can be called obedience, it must be such as is voluntary; for no involuntary action can be counted a submission to the law. He that means that his suffering should be taken for obedience, must not only not resist, but also not fly, nor hide himself to avoid his punishment. And who is there amongt them that discourse of passive obedience, when his life is in extreme danger, that will voluntarily present himself to the officers of justice? Do not we see that all men, when they are led to execution, are both bound and guarded, and would break loose if they could, and get away? Such is their passive obedience. Christ saith (Matth. xxiii, 2, 3): The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' chair; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do: which is a doing an active obedience. And yet the Scribes and Pharisees appear not by the Scripture to have been such godly men, as never to command any thing against the revealed will of God.

B.

Must tyrants also be obeyed in every thing actively? Or is there nothing wherein a lawful King's command may be disobeyed? What if he should command me with my own hands to execute my father, in case he should be condemned to die by the law?

A.

This is a case that need not be put. We never have read nor heard of any King or tyrant so inhuman as to command it. If any did, we are to consider whether that command were one of his laws. For by disobeying Kings, we mean the disobeying of his laws, those his laws that were made before they were applied to any particular person; for the King, though as a father of children, and a master of domestic servants, yet he commands the people in general never but by a precedent law, and as a politic, not a natural person. And if such a command as you speak of were contrived into a general law (which never was, nor never will be), you were bound to obey it, unless you depart the kingdom after the publication of the law, and before the condemnation of your father.

B.

Your author says further, in refusing active obedience to the King, that commanded anything contrary to God's law, we must be very well assured that the thing is so contrary. I would fain know how it is possible to be assured.

A.

I think you do not believe that any of those refusers do, immediately from God's own mouth, receive any command contrary to the command of the King, who is God's lieutenant, nor any other way than you and I do, that is to say, than by the Scriptures. And because men do, for the most part, rather draw the Scripture to their own sense, than follow the true sense of the Scripture, there is no other way to know, certainly, and in all cases, what God commands, or forbids us to do, but by the sentence of him or them that are constituted by the King to determine

the sense of the Scripture, upon hearing of the particular case of conscience which is in question. And they that are so constituted, are easily known in all Christian commonwealths, whether they be bishops, or ministers, or assemblies, that govern the Church under him or them that have the sovereign power.

B.

Some doubts may be raised from this that you now say. For if men be to learn their duty from the sentence which other men shall give concerning the meaning of the Scriptures, and not from their own interpretation, I understand not to what end they were translated into English, and every man not only permitted, but also exhorted, to read them. For what could that produce, but diversity of opinion, and consequently, as man's nature is, disputation, breach of charity, disobedience, and at last rebellion? Again, since the Scripture was allowed to be read in English, why were not the translations such as might make all that is read, understood even by mean capacities? Did not the Jews, such as could read, understand their law in the Jewish language, as well as we do our statute laws in English? And as for such places of the Scripture, as had nothing of the nature of a law, it was nothing to the duty of the Jews, whether they were understood or not, seeing nothing is punishable but the transgression of some law. The same question I may ask concerning the New Testament. For, I believe, that those men to whom the original language was natural, did understand sufficiently what commands and councils were given them by our Saviour and his apostles, and his immediate disciples. Again, how will you answer that question which was put by St. Peter and St. John (Acts iv, 19), when by Annas the high-priest, and others of the Council of Jerusalem, they were forbidden to teach any more in the

name of Jesus: Whether it is right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than unto God?

A.

The case is not the same. Peter and John had seen and daily conversed with our Saviour; and by the miracles he wrought, did know he was God, and consequently knew certainly that their disobedience to the high-priest's present command was just. Can any minister now say, that he hath immediately from God's own mouth received a command to disobey the King, or know otherwise than by the Scripture, that any command of the King, that hath the form and nature of a law, is against the law of God, which in divers places, directly and evidently, commandeth to obey him in all things? The text you cite does not tell us, that a minister's authority, rather than a Christian King's, shall decide the questions that arise from the different interpretations of the Scripture. And therefore, where the King is head of the Church, and by consequence (to omit that the Scripture itself was not received but by the authority of Kings and States) chief judge of the rectitude of all interpretations of the Scripture, to obey the King's laws and public edicts, is not to disobey, but to obey God. A minister ought not to think that his skill in the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew tongues, if he have any, gives him a privilege to impose upon all his fellow subjects his own sense, or what he pretends to be his sense, of every obscure place of Scripture: nor ought he, as oft as he hath found out some fine interpretation, not before thought on by others, to think he had it by inspiration: for he cannot be assured of that; no, nor that his interpretation, as fine as he thinks it, is not false: and then all his stubbornness and contumacy towards the King and his laws, is nothing but pride of heart and ambition, or else imposture. And whereas you

think it needless, or perhaps hurtful, to have the Scriptures in English, I am of another mind. There are so many places of Scripture easy to be understood, that teach both true faith and good morality (and that as fully as is necessary to salvation), of which no seducer is able to dispossess the mind of any ordinary reader, that the reading of them is so profitable as not to be forbidden without great damage to them and the commonwealth.

B.

All that is required, both in faith and manners, for man's salvation, is, I confess, set down in Scripture as plainly as can be. Children obey your parents in all things: Servants obey your masters: Let all men be subject to the higher powers whether it be the King or those that are sent by him: Love God with all your soul, and your neighbour as yourself: are words of the Scripture, which are well enough understood; but neither children, nor the greatest part of men, do understand why it is their duty to do so. They see not that the safety of the commonwealth, and consequently their own, depends upon their doing it. Every man by nature, without discipline, does in all his actions look upon, as far as he can see, the benefit that shall redound to himself from his obedience. He reads that covetousness is the root of all evil; but he thinks, and sometimes finds, it is the root of his estate. And so in other cases the Scripture says one thing, and they think another, weighing the commodities or incommodities of this present life only, which are in their sight, never putting into the scales the good and evil of the life to come, which they see not.

A.

All this is no more than happens where the Scripture is sealed up in Greek and Latin, and the people taught the same things out of them by preachers. But they that are of a condition and age fit to examine the sense of what they read, and that take a delight in searching out the grounds of their duty, certainly cannot choose but by their reading of the Scriptures come to such a sense of their duty, as not only to obey the laws themselves, but also to induce others to do the same. For commonly men of age and quality are followed by their inferior neighbours, that look more upon the example of those men whom they reverence, and whom they are unwilling to displease, than upon precepts and laws.

B.

These men, of the condition and age you speak of, are, in my opinion, the unfittest of all others to be trusted with the reading of the Scriptures. I know you mean such as have studied the Greek or Latin, or both tongues, and that are withal such as love knowledge, and consequently take delight in finding out the meaning of the most hard texts, or in thinking they have found it, in case it be new and not found out by others. These are therefore they, that prætermitting the easy places which teach them their duty, fall to scanning only of the mysteries of religion. Such as are: How it may be made out with wit, that there be three that bear rule in heaven, and those three but one? How the Deity could be made flesh? How that flesh could be really present in many places at once? Where is the place, and what the torments, of hell? And other metaphysical doctrines: Whether the will of man be free, or governed by the will of God? Whether sanctity comes by inspiration or education? By whom Christ now speaks to us, whether by the King, or by the clergy, or by the Bible, to every man that reads it and interprets it

to himself, or by a private spirit to every private man? These and the like points are the study of the curious, and the cause of all our late mischief, and the cause that makes the plainer sort of men, whom the Scripture had taught belief in Christ, love towards God, obedience to the King, and sobriety of behaviour, forget it all, and place their religion in the disputable doctrines of these your wise men.

A.

I do not think these men fit to interpret the Scripture to the rest, nor do I say that the rest ought to take their interpretation for the word of God. Whatsoever is necessary for them to know, is so easy, as not to need interpretation: whatsoever is more, does them no good. But in case any of those unnecessary doctrines shall be authorized by the laws of the King or other state, I say it is the duty of every subject not to speak against them: in as much as it is every man's duty to obey him or them that have the sovereign power, and the wisdom of all such powers to punish such as shall publish or teach their private interpretations, when they are contrary to the law, and likely to incline men to sedition or disputing against the law.

B.

They must punish then the most of those that have had their breeding in the Universities. For such curious questions in divinity are first started in the Universities, and so are all those politic questions concerning the rights of civil and ecclesiastic government; and there they are furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories of Rome and Greece, for their disputation against the necessary power of their sovereigns. Therefore I despair of any lasting peace amongst ourselves, till the Universities here

shall bend and direct their studies to the settling of it, that is, to the teaching of absolute obedience to the laws of the King, and to his public edicts under the Great Seal of England. For I make no doubt, but that solid reason, backed with the authority of so many learned men, will more prevail for the keeping of us in peace within ourselves, than any victory can do over the rebels. But I am afraid that it is impossible to bring the Universities to such a compliance with the actions of state, as is necessary for the business.

A.

Seeing the Universities have heretofore from time to time maintained the authority of the Pope, contrary to all laws divine, civil, and natural, against the right of our Kings, why can they not as well, when they have all manner of laws and equity on their side, maintain the rights of him that is both sovereign of the kingdom, and head of the Church?

B.

Why then were they not in all points for the King's power, presently after that King Henry VIII was in Parliament declared head of the Church, as much as they were before for the authority of the Pope?

A.

Because the clergy in the Universities, by whom all things there are governed, and the clergy without the Universities, as well bishops as inferior clerks, did think that the pulling down of the Pope was the setting up of them, as to England, in his place, and made no question, the greatest part of them, but that their spiritual power did depend not upon the authority of the King, but of Christ himself, derived to them by

a successive imposition of hands from bishop to bishop; notwithstanding they knew that this derivation passed through the hands of popes and bishops whose authority they had cast off. For though they were content that the divine right, which the Pope pretended to in England, should be denied him, yet they thought it not so fit to be taken from the Church of England, whom they now supposed themselves to represent. It seems they did not think it reasonable that a woman, or a child, or a man that could not construe the Hebrew, Greek, or Latin Bible, nor know perhaps the declensions and conjugations of Greek or Latin nouns and verbs, should take upon him to govern so many learned doctors in matters of religion; meaning matters of divinity: for religion has been for a long time, and is now by most people, taken for the same thing with divinity, to the great advantage of the clergy.

B.

And especially now amongst the Presbyterians. For I see few that are by them esteemed very good Christians, besides such as can repeat their sermons, and wrangle for them about the interpretation of the Scripture, and fight for them also with their bodies or purses, when they shall be required. To believe in Christ is nothing with them, unless you believe as they bid you. Charity is nothing with them, unless it be charity and liberality to them, and partaking with them in faction. How we can have peace while this is our religion, I cannot tell. Hæret lateri lethalis arundo. The seditious doctrine of the Presbyterians has been stuck so hard in the people's heads and memories, (I cannot say into their hearts; for they understand nothing in it, but that they may lawfully rebel), that I fear the commonwealth will never be cured.

A.

The two great virtues, that were severally in Henry VII and Henry VIII, when they shall be jointly in one King, will easily cure it. That of Henry VII was, without much noise of the people to fill his coffers; that of Henry VIII was an early severity; but this without the former cannot be exercised.

B.

This that you say looks, methinks, like an advice to the King, to let them alone till he have gotten ready money enough to levy and maintain a sufficient army, and then to fall upon them and destroy them.

A.

God forbid that so horrible, unchristian, and inhuman a design should ever enter into the King's heart. I would have him have money enough readily to raise an army able to suppress any rebellion, and to take from his enemies all hope of success, that they may not dare to trouble him in the reformation of the Universities; but to put none to death without the actual committing such crimes as are already made capital by the laws. The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted, till by the same authority they shall be repealed; such as are fit to make men understand, that the civil laws are God's laws, as they that make them are by God appointed to make them and to make men know, that the people and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him; that the King owes his

crown to God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in the mean time a resolution to obey the King's laws, which also are God's laws; to injure no man, to be in charity with all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and to live soberly and free from scandal; without mingling our religion with points of natural philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, hypostases, which the people understand not, nor will ever care for. When the Universities shall be thus disciplined, there will come out of them, from time to time, well-principled preachers, and they that are now ill-principled, from time to time fall away.

B.

I think it a very good course, and perhaps the only one that can make our peace amongst ourselves constant. For if men know not their duty, what is there that can force them to obey the laws? An army, you will say. But what shall force the army? Were not the trained bands an army? Were they not the janissaries, that not very long ago slew Osman in his own palace at Constantinople? I am therefore of your opinion, both that men may be brought to a love of obedience by preachers and gentlemen that imbibe good principles in their youth at the Universities, and also that we never shall have a lasting peace, till the Universities themselves be in such manner, as you have said, reformed; and the ministers know they have no authority but what the supreme civil power gives them; and the nobility and gentry know that the liberty of a state is not an exemption from the laws of their own country, whether made by an assembly or by a monarch, but an exemption from the constraint and insolence of their neighbours.

And now I am satisfied in this point, I will bring you back to the place from whence my curiosity drew you to this long digression. We were upon the point of ship-money; one of those grievances which the Parliament exclaimed against as tyrannical and arbitrary government; thereby to single out, as you called it, the King from his subjects, and to make a party against him, when they should need it. And now you may proceed, if it please you, to such other artifices as they used to the same purpose.

A.

I think it were better to give over here our discourse of this business, and refer it to some other day that you shall think fit.

B.

Content. That day I believe is not far off.

PART II.

A.

You are welcome; yet, if you had staid somewhat longer, my memory would have been so much the better provided for you.

B.

Nay, I pray you give me now what you have about you; for the rest I am content you take what time you please.

A.

After the Parliament had made the people believe that the exacting of ship-money was unlawful, and the people thereby inclined to think it tyrannical; in the next place, to increase their disaffection to his Majesty, they accused him of a purpose to introduce and authorize the Roman religion in this kingdom: than which nothing was more hateful to the people; not because it was erroneous, which they had neither learning nor judgment enough to examine, but because they had been used to hear it inveighed against in the sermons and discourses of the preachers whom they trusted to. And this was indeed the most effectual calumny, to alienate the people's affections from him, that could possibly be invented. The colour they had for this slander was, first, that there was one Rosetti, Resident, at and a little before that time, from the Pope, with the Queen; and one Mr. George Con, Secretary to the Cardinal Francisco Barberini, nephew to Pope Urban VIII, sent over, under

favour and protection of the Queen, as was conceived, to draw as many persons of quality about the court, as he should be able, to reconcile themselves to the Church of Rome: with what success I cannot tell; but it is likely he gained some, especially of the weaker sex; if I may say, they were gained by him, when not his arguments, but hope of favour from the Queen, in all probability prevailed upon them.

B.

In such a conjuncture as that was, it had perhaps been better they had not been sent.

A.

There was exception also taken at a convent of friars-capucins in Somerset-House, though allowed by the articles of marriage: and it was reported, that the Jesuits also were shortly after to be allowed a convent in Clerkenwell. And in the mean time, the principal secretary, Sir Francis Windebank, was accused for having by his warrant set at liberty some English Jesuits, that had been taken and imprisoned for returning into England after banishment, contrary to the statute which had made it capital. Also the resort of English Catholics to the Queen's chapel, gave them colour to blame the Queen herself, not only for that, but also for all the favours that had been shown to the Catholics; in so much that some of them did not stick to say openly, that the King was governed by her.

B.

Stange injustice! The Queen was a Catholic by profession, and therefore could not but endeavour to do the Catholics all the good she could: she

had not else been truly that which she professed to be. But it seems they meant to force her to hypocrisy, being hypocrites themselves. Can any man think it a crime in a devout lady, of what sect soever, to seek the favour and benediction of that Church whereof she is a member?

A.

To give the Parliament another colour for their accusation on foot of the King, as to introducing of Popery, there was a great controversy between the Episcopal and Presbyterian clergy about free-will. The dispute began first in the Low Countries, between Gomar and Arminius, in the time of King James, who foreseeing it might trouble the Church of England, did what he could to compose the difference. And an assembly of divines was thereupon got together at Dort, to which also King James sent a divine or two, but it came to nothing; the question was left undecided, and became a subject to be disputed of in the universities here. All the Presbyterians were of the same mind with Gomar: but a very great many others not; and those were called here Arminians, who, because the doctrine of free-will had been exploded as a Papistical doctrine, and because the Presbyterians were far the greater number, and already in favour with the people, were generally hated. It was easy, therefore, for the Parliament to make that calumny pass currently with the people, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Laud, was for Arminius, and had a little before, by his power ecclesiastical, forbidden all ministers to preach to the people of predestination; and when all ministers that were gracious with him, and hoped for any Church preferment, fell to preaching and writing for free-will, to the uttermost of their power, as a proof of their ability and merit. Besides, they gave out, some of them, that the Archbishop was in heart a Papist; and in case he could effect a toleration here of the Roman

religion, was to have a cardinal's hat: which was not only false, but also without any ground at all for a suspicion.

B.

It is a strange thing, that scholars, obscure men that could receive no clarity but from the flame of the state, should be suffered to bring their unnecessary disputes, and together with them their quarrels, out of the universities into the commonwealth; and more strange, that the state should engage in their parties, and not rather put them both to silence.

A.

A state can constrain obedience, but convince no error, nor alter the mind of them that believe they have the better reason. Suppression of doctrines does but unite and exasperate, that is, increase both the malice and power of them that have already believed them.

B.

But what are the points they disagree in? Is there any controversy between Bishop and Presbyterian concerning the divinity or humanity of Christ? Do either of them deny the Trinity, or any article of the creed? Does either party preach openly, or write directly, against justice, charity, sobriety, or any other duty necessary to salvation, except only the duty to the King; and not that neither, but when they have a mind either to rule or destroy the King? Lord have mercy upon us! Can nobody be saved that understands not their disputations? Or is there more requisite, either of faith or honesty, for the salvation of one man than another? What needs so much preaching of faith to us that are no heathens, and that believe already all that Christ and his apostles have

told us is necessary to salvation, and more too? Why is there so little preaching of justice? I have indeed heard righteousness often recommended to the people, but I have seldom heard the word justice in their sermons; nay, though in the Latin and Greek Bible the word justice occur exceeding often, yet in the English, though it be a word that every man understands, the word righteousness (which few understand to signify the same, but take it rather for rightness of opinion, than of action or intention), is put in the place of it.

A.

I confess I know very few controversies amongst Christians, of points necessary to salvation. They are the questions of authority and power over the Church, or of profit, or of honour to Churchmen, that for the most part raise all the controversies. For what man is he, that will trouble himself and fall out with his neighbours for the saving of my soul, or the soul of any other than himself? When the Presbyterian ministers and others did so seriously preach sedition, and animate men to rebellion in these late wars; who was there that had not a benefice, or having one feared not to lose it, or some other part of his maintainance, by the alteration of the Government, that did voluntary, without any eye to reward, preach so earnestly against sedition, as the other party preached for it? I confess, that for aught I have observed in history, and other writings of the heathens, Greek and Latin, that those heathens were not at all behind us in point of virtue and moral duties, notwithstanding that we have had much preaching, and they none at all. I confess also, that considering what harm may proceed from a liberty that men have, upon every Sunday and oftener, to harangue all the people of a nation at one time, whilst the state is ignorant of what they will say; and that there is no such thing permitted in all the world out of

Christendom, nor therefore any civil wars about religion; I have thought much preaching an inconvenience. Nevertheless, I cannot think that preaching to the people the points of their duty, both to God and man, can be too frequent; so it be done by grave, discreet, and ancient men, that are reverenced by the people; and not by light quibbling young men, whom no congregation is so simple as to look to be taught by (as being a thing contrary to nature), or to pay them any reverence, or to care what they say, except some few that may be delighted with their jingling. I wish with all my heart, there were enough of such discreet and ancient men, as might suffice for all the parishes of England, and that they would undertake it. But this is but a wish; I leave it to the wisdom of the State to do what it pleaseth.

B.

What did they next?

A.

Whereas the King had sent prisoners into places remote from London, three persons that had been condemned for publishing seditious doctrine, some in writing, some in public sermons; the Parliament (whether with his Majesty's consent or no, I have forgotten), caused them to be released and to return to London; meaning, I think, to try how the people would be pleased therewith, and, by consequence, how their endeavours to draw the people's affections from the King had already prospered. When these three came through London, it was a kind of triumph, the people flocking together to behold them, and receiving them with such acclamations, and almost adoration, as if they had been let down from heaven; insomuch as the Parliament was now sufficiently assured of a great and tumultuous party, whensoever they

should have occasion to use it. On confidence whereof they proceeded to their next plot, which was to deprive the King of such ministers as by their wisdom, courage, and authority, they thought most able to prevent, or oppose their further designs against the King. And first, the House of Commons resolved to impeach the Earl of Strafford, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, of high-treason.

B.

What was that Earl of Strafford before he had that place? And how had he offended the Parliament or given them cause to think he would be their enemy? For I have heard that in former Parliaments he had been as parliamentary as any other.

A.

His name was Sir Thomas Wentworth, a gentleman both by birth and estate very considerable in his own county, which was Yorkshire; but more considerable for his judgment in the public affairs, not only of that county, but generally of the kingdom; and was therefore often chosen for the Parliament, either as burgess for some borough, or knight of the shire. For his principles of politics, they were the same that were generally proceeded upon by all men else that were thought fit to be chosen for the Parliament; which are commonly these: to take for the rule of justice and government the judgments and acts of former Parliaments, which are commonly called precedents; to endeavour to keep the people from being subject to extra-parliamentary taxes of money, and from being with parliamentary taxes too much oppressed; to preserve to the people their liberty of body from the arbitrary power of the King out of Parliament; to seek redress of grievances.

B.

What grievances?

A.

The grievances were commonly such as these; the King's too much liberality to some favourite; the too much power of some minister or officer of the commonwealth; the misdemeanour of judges, civil or spiritual; but especially all unparliamentary raising of money upon the subjects. And commonly of late, till such grievances be redressed, they refuse, or at least make great difficulty, to furnish the King with money necessary for the most urgent occasions of the commonwealth.

B.

How then can a King discharge his duty as he ought to do, or the subject know which of his masters he is to obey? For here are manifestly two powers, which, when they chance to differ, cannot both be obeyed.

A.

It is true; but they have not often differed so much to the danger of the commonwealth, as they have done in this Parliament, 1640. In all the Parliaments of the late King Charles before the year 1640, my Lord of Strafford did appear in opposition to the King's demands as much as any man, and was for that cause very much esteemed and cried up by the people as a good patriot, and one that courageously stood up in defence of their liberties; and for the same cause was so much the more hated, when afterwards he endeavoured to maintain the royal and just authority of his Majesty.

B.

How came he to change his mind so much as it seems he did?

A.

After the dissolution of the Parliament holden in the years 1627 and 1628, the King, finding no money to be gotten from Parliaments which he was not to buy with the blood of such servants and ministers as he loved best, abstained a long time from calling any more, and had abstained longer if the rebellion of the Scotch had not forced him to it. During that Parliament the King made Sir Thomas Wentworth a baron, recommended to him for his great ability, which was generally taken notice of by the disservice he had done the King in former Parliaments, but which might be useful for him in the times that came on: and not long after he made him of the Council, and after that again Lieutenant of Ireland, which place he discharged with great satisfaction and benefit to his Majesty, and continued in that office, till, by the envy and violence of the Lords and Commons of that unlucky Parliament of 1640, he died. In which year he was made general of the King's forces against the Scots that then entered into England, and the year before, Earl of Strafford. The pacification being made, and the forces on both sides disbanded, and the Parliament at Westminster now sitting, it was not long before the House of Commons accused him to the House of Lords for high-treason.

B.

There was no great probability of his being a traitor to the King, from whose favour he had received his greatness, and from whose protection

he was to expect his safety. What was the treason they laid to his charge?

A.

Many articles were drawn up against him, but the sum of them was contained in these two: first, that he had traitorously endeavoured to subvert the fundamental laws and government of the realm; and in stead thereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law: secondly, that he had laboured to subvert the rights of Parliaments, and the ancient course of Parliamentary proceedings.

B.

Was this done by him without the knowledge of the King?

A.

No.

B.

Why then, if it were treason, did not the King himself call him in question by his attorney? What had the House of Commons to do, without his command, to accuse him in the House of Lords? They might have complained to the King, if he had not known it before. I understand not this law.

A.

Nor I.

B.

Had this been by any former statutes made treason?

A.

Not that I ever heard of; nor do I understand how anything can be treason against the King, that the King, hearing and knowing, does not think treason. But it was a piece of that Parliament's artifice, to put the word traiterously to any article exhibited against any man whose life they meant to take away.

B.

Was there no particular instance of action or words, out of which they argued that endeavour of his to subvert the fundamental laws of Parliament, whereof they accused him?

A.

Yes; they said he gave the King counsel to reduce the Parliament to their duty by the Irish army, which not long before my Lord of Strafford himself had caused to be levied there for the King's service. But it was never proved against him, that he advised the King to use it against the Parliament.

B.

What are those laws that are called fundamental? For I understand not how one law can be more fundamental than another, except only that law of nature that binds us all to obey him, whosoever he be, whom lawfully and for our own safety, we have promised to obey; nor any other fundamental law to a King, but salus populi, the safety and well-being of his people.

A.

This Parliament, in the use of their words, when they accused any man, never regarded the signification of them, but the weight they had to aggravate their accusation to the ignorant multitude, which think all faults heinous that are expressed in heinous terms, if they hate the person accused, as they did this man not only for being of the King's party, but also for deserting the Parliament's party as an apostate.

B.

I pray you tell me also what they meant by arbitrary government, which they seemed so much to hate? Is there any governor of a people in the world that is forced to govern them, or forced to make this and that law, whether he will or no? I think not: or if any be, he that forces him does certainly make laws, and govern arbitrarily.

A.

That is true; and the true meaning of the Parliament was, that not the King, but they themselves, should have the arbitrary government, not only of England, but of Ireland, and, as it appeared by the event, of Scotland also.

B.

How the King came by the government of Scotland and Ireland by descent from his ancestors, everybody can tell; but if the King of England and his heirs should chance (which God forbid) to fail, I cannot imagine what title the Parliament of England can acquire thereby to either of those nations.

A.

Yes; they will say they had been conquered anciently by the English subjects' money.

B.

Like enough, and suitable to the rest of their impudence.

A.

Impudence in democratical assemblies does almost all that is done; it is the goddess of rhetoric, and carries proof with it. For what ordinary man will not, from so great boldness of affirmation, conclude there is great probability in the thing affirmed? Upon this accusation he was brought to his trial in Westminster Hall before the House of Lords, and found guilty, and presently after declared traitor by a bill of attainder, that is, by Act of Parliament.

B.

It is a strange thing that the Lords should be induced, upon so light grounds, to give a sentence, or give their assent to a bill, so prejudicial to themselves and their posterity.

A.

It was not well done, and yet, as it seems, not ignorantly; for there is a clause in the bill, that it should not be taken hereafter for an example, that is for a prejudice, in the like case hereafter.

B.

That is worse than the bill itself, and is a plain confession that their sentence was unjust. For what harm is there in the examples of just sentences? Besides, if hereafter the like case should happen, the sentence is not at all made weaker by such a provision.

A.

Indeed I believe that the Lords, most of them, were not of themselves willing to condemn him of treason; they were awed to it by the clamour of common people that came to Westminster, crying out, Justice, Justice against the Earl of Strafford! The which were caused to flock thither by some of the House of Commons, that were well assured, after the triumphant welcome of Prynne, Burton, and Bastwick, to put the people into tumult upon any occasion they desired. They were awed unto it partly also by the House of Commons itself, which if it desired to undo a Lord, had no more to do but to vote him a delinquent.

B.

A delinquent; what is that? A sinner is it not? Did they mean to undo all sinners?

A.

By delinquent they meant only a man to whom they would do all the hurt they could. But the Lords did not yet, I think, suspect they meant to cashier their whole House.

B.

It is a strange thing the whole House of Lords should not perceive that the ruin of the King's power, and the weakening of it, was the ruin, or

weakening of themselves. For they could not think it likely that the people ever meant to take the sovereignty from the King to give it to them, who were few in number, and less in power than so many Commoners, because less beloved by the people.

A.

But it seems not so strange to me. For the Lords, for their personal abilities, as they were no less, so also they were no more skilful in the public affairs, than the knights and burgesses. For there is no reason to think, that if one that is to-day a knight of the shire in the lower House, be to-morrow made a Lord and a member of the higher House, he is therefore wiser than he was before. They are all, of both Houses, prudent and able men as any in the land, in the business of their private estates, which require nothing but diligence and natural wit to govern them. But for the government of a commonwealth, neither wit, nor prudence, nor diligence, is enough, without infallible rules and the true science of equity and justice.

B.

If this be true, it is impossible any commonwealth in the world, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, should continue long without change, or sedition tending to change, either of the government or of the governors.

A.

It is true; nor have any the greatest commonwealths in the world been long free from sedition. The Greeks had for awhile their petty kings, and then by sedition came to be petty commonwealths; and then growing to

be greater commonwealths, by sedition again became monarchies; and all for want of rules of justice for the common people to take notice of; which if the people had known in the beginning of every of these seditions, the ambitious persons could never have had the hope to disturb their government after it had been once settled. For ambition can do little without hands, and few hands it would have, if the common people were as diligently instructed in the true principles of their duty, as they are terrified and amazed by preachers, with fruitless and dangerous doctrines concerning the nature of man's will, and many other philosophical points that tend not at all to the salvation of the soul in the world to come, nor to their ease in this life, but only to the direction towards the clergy of that duty which they ought to perform to the King.

B.

For aught I see, all the states of Christendom will be subject to these fits of rebellion, as long as the world lasteth.

A.

Like enough; and yet the fault, as I have said, may be easily mended, by mending the Universities.

B.

How long had the Parliament now sitten?

A.

It began November the 3d, 1640. My Lord of Strafford was impeached of treason before the Lords, November the 12th, sent to the Tower

November the 22d, his trial began March the 22d, and ended April the 13th. After his trial he was voted guilty of high-treason in the House of Commons, and after that in the House of Lords, May the 6th, and on the 12th of May beheaded.

B.

Great expedition; but could not the King, for all that, have saved him by a pardon?

A.

The King had heard all that passed at his trial, and had declared he was unsatisfied concerning the justice of their sentence. And, I think, notwithstanding the danger of his own person from the fury of the people, and that he was counselled to give way to his execution, not only by such as he most relied on, but also by the Earl of Strafford himself, he would have pardoned him, if that could have preserved him against the tumult raised and countenanced by the Parliament itself, for the terrifying of those they thought might favour him. And yet the King himself did not stick to confess afterwards, that he had done amiss, in that he did not rescue him.

B.

It was an argument of good disposition in the King. But I never read that Augustus Cæsar acknowledged that he had done a fault, in abandoning Cicero to the fury of his enemy Antonius: perhaps because Cicero, having been of the contrary faction to his father, had done Augustus no service at all out of favour to him, but only out of enmity to Antonius, and out of love to the senate, that is indeed out of love to himself that

swayed the senate; as it is very likely the Earl of Strafford came over to the King's party for his own ends, having been so much against the King in former Parliaments.

A.

We cannot safely judge of men's intentions. But, I have observed often, that such as seek preferment, by their stubbornness have missed of their aim; and on the other side, that those princes that with preferment are forced to buy the obedience of their subjects, are already, or must be soon after, in a very weak condition. For in a market where honour and power is to be bought with stubbornness, there will be a great many as able to buy as my Lord Strafford was.

B.

You have read, that when Hercules fighting with the Hydra, had cut off any one of his many heads, there still arose two other heads in its place; and yet at last he cut them off all.

A.

The story is told false. For Hercules at first did not cut off those heads, but bought them off; and afterwards, when he saw it did him no good, then he cut them off, and got the victory.

B.

What did they next?

A.

After the first impeachment of the Earl of Strafford, the House of Commons, upon December the 18th, accused the Archbishop of Canterbury also of high-treason, that is, of design to introduce arbitrary government, &c.; for which he was, February the 18th, sent to the Tower; but his trial and execution were deferred a long time, till January the 10th, 1643, for the entertainment of the Scots, that were come into England to aid the Parliament.

B.

Why did the Scots think there was so much danger in the Archbishop of Canterbury? He was not a man of war, nor a man able to bring an army into the field; but he was perhaps a very great politician.

A.

That did not appear by any remarkable event of his counsels. I never heard but he was a very honest man for his morals, and a very zealous promoter of the Church-government by bishops, and that desired to have the service of God performed, and the house of God adorned, as suitably as was possible to the honour we ought to do to the Divine Majesty. But to bring, as he did, into the State his former controversies, I mean his squabblings in the University about free-will, and his standing upon punctilios concerning the servicebook and its rubrics, was not, in my opinion, an argument of his sufficiency in affairs of state. About the same time they passed an act, which the King consented to, for a triennial Parliament, wherein was enacted, that after the present Parliament there should be a Parliament called by the King within the space of three years, and so from three years to three years, to meet at Westminster upon a certain day named in the act.

B.

But what if the King did not call it, finding it perhaps inconvenient, or hurtful to the safety or peace of his people, which God hath put into his charge? For I do not well comprehend how any sovereign can well keep a people in order when his hands are tied, or when he hath any other obligation upon him than the benefit of those he governs; and at this time, for any thing you have told me, they acknowledged the King for their sovereign.

A.

I know not; but such was the act. And it was further enacted, that if the King did it not by his own command, then the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Keeper for the time being, should send out the writs of summons; and if the Chancellor refused, then the Sheriffs of the several counties should of themselves, in their next county-courts before the day set down for the Parliament's meeting, proceed to the election of the members for the said Parliament.

B.

But what if the sheriffs refused?

A.

I think they were to be sworn to it: but for that, and other particulars, I refer you to the act.

B.

To whom should they be sworn, when there is no Parliament?

A.

No doubt but to the King, whether there be a Parliament sitting or no.

B.

Then the King may release them of their oath.

A.

Besides, they obtained of the King the putting down the Star-chamber, and the High-Commission Courts.

B.

Besides, if the King, upon the refusal, should fall upon them in anger; who shall (the Parliament not sitting) protect either the Chancellor or the sheriffs in their disobedience?

A.

I pray you do not ask me any reason of such things I understand no better than you. I tell you only an act passed to that purpose, and was signed by the King in the middle of February, a little before the Archbishop was sent to the Tower. Besides this bill, the two Houses of Parliament agreed upon another, wherein it was enacted, that the present Parliament should continue till both the Houses did consent to the dissolution of it; which bill also the King signed the same day he signed the warrant for the execution of the Earl of Strafford.

B.

What a great progress made the Parliament towards the ends of the most seditious Members of both Houses in so little time! They sat down in November, and now it was May; in this space of time, which is but half a year, they won from the King the adherence which was due to him from his people; they drove his faithfullest servants from him; beheaded the Earl of Strafford; imprisoned the Archbishop of Canterbury; obtained a triennial Parliament after their own dissolution, and a continuance of their own sitting as long as they listed: which last amounted to a total extinction of the King's right, in case that such a grant were valid; which I think it is not, unless the Sovereignty itself be in plain terms renounced, which it was not. But what money, by way of subsidy or otherwise, did they grant the King, in recompense of all these his large concessions?

A.

None at all; but often promised they would make him the most glorious King that ever was in England; which were words that passed well enough for well meaning with the common people.

B.

But the Parliament was contented now? For I cannot imagine what they should desire more from the King, than he had now granted them.

A.

Yes; they desired the whole and absolute sovereignty, and to change the monarchical government into an oligarchy; that is to say, to make the Parliament, consisting of a few Lords and about four hundred Commoners, absolute in the sovereignty, for the present, and shortly

after to lay the House of Lords aside. For this was the design of the Presbyterian ministers, who taking themselves to be, by divine right, the only lawful governors of the Church, endeavoured to bring the same form of Government into the civil state. And as the spiritual laws were to be made by their synods, so the civil laws should be made by the House of Commons; who, as they thought, would no less be ruled by them afterwards, than they formerly had been: wherein they were deceived, and found themselves outgone by their own disciples, though not in malice, yet in wit.

B.

What followed after this?

A.

In August following, the King supposing he had now sufficiently obliged the Parliament to proceed no further against him, took a journey into Scotland, to satisfy his subjects there, as he had done here; intending, perhaps, so to gain their good wills, that in case the Parliament here should levy arms against him, they should not be aided by the Scots: wherein he also was deceived. For though they seemed satisfied with what he did, whereof one thing was his giving way to the abolition of episcopacy; yet afterwards they made a league with the Parliament, and for money, when the King began to have the better of the Parliament, invaded England in the Parliament's quarrel. But this was a year or two after.

B.

Before you go any further, I desire to know the ground and original of that right, which either the House of Lords, or House of Commons, or both together, now pretend to.

A.

It is a question of things so long past, that they are now forgotten. Nor have we any thing to conjecture by, but the records of our own nation, and some small and obscure fragments of Roman histories: and for the records, seeing they are of things done only, sometimes justly, sometimes unjustly, you can never by them know what right they had, but only what right they pretended.

B.

Howsoever, let me know what light we have in this matter from the Roman histories.

A.

It would be too long, and an useless digression, to cite all the ancient authors that speak of the forms of those commonwealths, which were amongst our first ancestors the Saxons and other Germans, and of other nations, from whom we derive the titles of honour now in use in England; nor will it be possible to derive from them any argument of right, but only examples of fact, which, by the ambition of potent subjects, have been oftener unjust than otherwise. And for those Saxons or Angles, that in ancient times by several invasions made themselves masters of this nation, they were not in themselves one body of a commonwealth, but only a league of divers petty German lords and states, such as was the Grecian army in the Trojan war, without other

obligation than that which proceeded from their own fear and weakness. Nor were those lords, for the most part, the sovereigns at home in their own country, but chosen by the people for the captains of the forces they brought with them. And therefore it was not without equity, when they had conquered any part of the land, and made some one of them king thereof, that the rest should have greater privileges than the common people and soldiers: amongst which privileges, a man may easily conjecture this to be one; that they should be made acquainted, and be of council, with him that hath the sovereignty in matter of government, and have the greatest and most honourable offices both in peace and war. But because there can be no government where there is more than one sovereign, it cannot be inferred that they had a right to oppose the King's resolutions by force, nor to enjoy those honours and places longer than they should continue good subjects. And we find that the Kings of England did, upon every great occasion, call them together by the name of discreet and wise men of the kingdom, and hear their counsel, and make them judges of all causes, that during their sitting were brought before them. But as he summoned them at his own pleasure, so had he also ever the power at his pleasure to dissolve them. The Normans also, that descended from the Germans, as we did, had the same customs in this particular; and by this means, this privilege of the lords to be of the King's great council, and when they were assembled, to be the highest of the King's courts of justice, continued still after the Conquest to this day. But though there be amongst the lords divers names or titles of honour, yet they have their privilege only by the name of baron, a name received from the ancient Gauls; amongst whom, that name signified the King's man, or rather one of his great men: by which it seems to me, that though they gave him counsel when he required it, yet they had no right to make war upon him if he did not follow it.

B.

When began first the House of Commons to be part of the King's great council?

A.

I do not doubt but that before the Conquest some discreet men, and known to be so by the King, were called by special writ to be of the same council, though they were not lords; but that is nothing to the House of Commons. The knights of shires and burgesses were never called to Parliament, for aught that I know, till the beginning of the reign of Edward I, or the latter end of the reign of Henry III, immediately after the misbehaviour of the barons; and, for aught any man knows, were called on purpose to weaken that power of the lords, which they had so freshly abused. Before the time of Henry III, the lords were descended, most of them, from such as in the invasions and conquests of the Germans were peers and fellow-kings, till one was made king of them all; and their tenants were their subjects, as it is at this day with the lords of France. But after the time of Henry III, the kings began to make lords in the place of them whose issue failed, titulary only, without the lands belonging to their title; and by that means, their tenants being no longer bound to serve them in the wars, they grew every day less and less able to make a party against the King, though they continued still to be his great council. And as their power decreased, so the power of the House of Commons increased; but I do not find they were part of the King's council at all, nor judges over other men; though it cannot be denied, but a King may ask their advice, as well as the advice of any other. But I do not find that the end of their summoning was to give advice, but only, in case they had any petitions

for redress of grievances, to be ready there with them whilst the King had his great council about him. But neither they nor the lords could present to the King, as a grievance, that the King took upon him to make the laws; to choose his own privy-counsellors; to raise money and soldiers; to defend the peace and honour of the kingdom; to make captains in his army; to make governors of his castles, whom he pleased. For this had been to tell the King, that it was one of their grievances that he was King.

B.

What did the Parliament do, whilst the King was in Scotland?

A.

The King went in August; after which, the Parliament, September the 8th, adjourned till the 20th of October; and the King returned about the end of November following. In which time the most seditious of both Houses, and which had designed the change of government and to cast off monarchy, but yet had not wit enough to set up any other government in its place, and consequently left it to the chance of war, made a cabal amongst themselves; in which they projected how, by seconding one another, to govern the House of Commons, and invented how to put the kingdom, by the power of that House, into a rebellion, which they then called a posture of defence against such dangers from abroad, as they themselves should feign and publish. Besides, whilst the King was in Scotland, the Irish Papists got together a great party, with an intention to massacre the Protestants there, and had laid a design for the seizing, on October the 23rd, of Dublin Castle, where the King's officers of the government of that country made their residence; and had effected it, had it not been discovered the night before. The manner of

the discovery, and the murders they committed in the country afterwards, I need not tell you, since the whole story of it is extant.

B.

I wonder they did not expect and provide for a rebellion in Ireland, as soon as they began to quarrel with the King in England. For was there any body so ignorant, as not to know that the Irish Papists did long for a change of religion there, as well as the Presbyterians in England? Or, that in general, the Irish nation did hate the name of subjection to England, nor would longer be quiet, than they feared an army out of England to chastise them? What better time then could they take for their rebellion than this, wherein they were encouraged, not only by our weakness caused by this division between the King and his Parliament, but also by the example of the Presbyterians, both of the Scotch and English nation? But what did the Parliament do upon this occasion, in the King's absence?

A.

Nothing; but consider what use they might make of it to their own ends; partly, by imputing it to the King's evil counsellors, and partly, by occasion thereof to demand of the King the power of pressing and ordering soldiers; which power whosoever has, has also, without doubt, the whole sovereignty.

B.

When came the King back?

A.

He came back the 25th of November; and was welcomed with the acclamations of the common people, as much as if he had been the most beloved of all the Kings that were before him; but found not a reception by the Parliament, answerable to it. They presently began to pick new quarrels against him, out of every thing he said to them. December the 2nd, the King called together both Houses of Parliament, and then did only recommend unto them the raising of succours for Ireland.

B.

What quarrel could they pick out of that?

A.

None: but in order thereto, as they may pretend, they had a bill in agitation to assert the power of levying and pressing soldiers to the two Houses of the Lords and Commons; which was as much as to take from the King the power of the militia, which is in effect the whole sovereign power. For he that hath the power of levying and commanding the soldiers, has all other rights of sovereignty which he shall please to claim. The King, hearing of it, called the Houses of Parliament together again, on December the 14th, and then pressed again the business of Ireland: (as there was need; for all this while the Irish were murdering the English in Ireland, and strengthening themselves against the forces they expected to come out of England): and withal, told them he took notice of the bill in agitation for pressing of soldiers, and that he was contented it should pass with a salvo jure both for him and them, because the present time was unseasonable to dispute it in.

B.

What was there unreasonable in this?

A.

Nothing: what is unreasonable is one question, what they quarrelled at is another. They quarrelled at this: that his Majesty took notice of the bill, while it was in debate in the House of Lords, before it was presented to him in the course of Parliament; and also that he showed himself displeased with those that propounded the said bill; both which they declared to be against the privileges of Parliament, and petitioned the King to give them reparation against those by whose evil counsel he was induced to it, that they might receive condign punishment.

B.

This was cruel proceeding. Do not the Kings of England use to sit in the Lords' House when they please? And was not this bill in debate then in the House of Lords? It is a strange thing that a man should be lawfully in the company of men, where he must needs hear and see what they say and do, and yet must not take notice of it so much as to the same company; for though the King was not present at the debate itself, yet it was lawful for any of the Lords to make him acquainted with it. Any one of the House of Commons, though not present at a proposition or debate in the House, nevertheless hearing of it from some of his fellow-members, may certainly not only take notice of it, but also speak to it in the House of Commons: but to make the King give up his friends and counsellors to them, to be put to death, banishment, or imprisonment, for their good-will to him, was such a tyranny over a king, no king ever exercised over any subject but in cases of treason or murder, and seldom then.

A.

Presently hereupon began a kind of war between the pens of the Parliament and those of the secretaries, and other able men that were with the King. For upon the 15th of December they sent to the King a paper called A Remonstrance of the State of the Kingdom, and with it a petition; both which they caused to be published. In the remonstrance they complained of certain mischievous designs of a malignant party, then, before the beginning of the Parliament, grown ripe; and did set forth what means had been used for the preventing of it by the wisdom of the Parliament; what rubs they had found therein; what course was fit to be taken for restoring and establishing the ancient honour, greatness, and safety, of the Crown and nation.

And first, of these designs the promoters and actors were, they said, Jesuited Papists:

Secondly, the bishops, and that part of the clergy that cherish formality as a support of their own ecclesiastical tyranny and usurpation:

Thirdly, counsellors and courtiers, that for private ends, they said, had engaged themselves to further the interests of some foreign princes.

B.

It may very well be, that some of the bishops, and also some of the court, may have, in pursuit of their private interest, done something indiscreetly, and perhaps wickedly. Therefore I pray you tell me in particular what their crimes were: for methinks the King should not have connived at anything against his own supreme authority.

A.

The Parliament were not very keen against them that were against the King; they made no doubt but all they did was by the King's command; but accused thereof the bishops, counsellors, and courtiers, as being a more mannerly way of accusing the King himself, and defaming him to his subjects. For the truth is, the charge they brought against them was so general as not to be called an accusation, but railing. As first, they said they nourished questions of prerogative and liberty between the King and his people, to the end that seeming much addicted to his Majesty's service, they might get themselves into places of greatest trust and power in the kingdom.

B.

How could this be called an accusation, in which there is no fact for any accusers to apply their proofs to, or their witnesses. For granting that these questions of prerogative had been moved by them, who can prove that their end was to gain to themselves and friends the places of trust and power in the kingdom?

A.

A second accusation was, that they endeavoured to suppress the purity and power of religion.

B.

That is canting; it is not in man's power to suppress the power of religion.

A.

They meant that they suppressed the doctrine of the Presbyterians; that is to say, the very foundation of the then Parliament's treacherous pretensions.
A third, that they cherished Arminians, Papists, and libertines (by which they meant the common Protestants, which meddle not with disputes), to the end they might compose a body fit to act according to their counsels and resolutions.
A fourth, that they endeavoured to put the King upon other courses of raising money, than by the ordinary way of Parliaments.
Judge whether these may be properly called accusations, or not rather spiteful reproaches of the King's government.

B.

Methinks this last was a very great fault. For what good could there be in putting the King upon an odd course of getting money, when the Parliament was willing to supply him, as far as to the security of the kingdom, or to the honour of the King, should be necessary?

A.

But I told you before, they would give him none, but with a condition he should cut off the heads of whom they pleased, how faithfully soever they had served him. And if he would have sacrificed all his friends to their ambition, yet they would have found other excuses for denying him subsidies; for they were resolved to take from him the sovereign power to themselves; which they could never do without taking great care that he should have no money at all. In the next place, they put into the remonstrance, as faults of them whose counsel the King followed, all those things which since the beginning of the King's reign were by them misliked, whether faults or not, and whereof they were not able to

judge for want of knowledge of the causes and motives that induced the King to do them, and were known only to the King himself and such of his privy-council as he revealed them to.

B.

But what were those particular pretended faults?

A.

The dissolution of his first Parliament at Oxford. 2. The dissolution of his second Parliament, being in the second year of his reign. 3. The dissolution of his Parliament in the fourth year of his reign. 4. The fruitless expedition against Calais. 5. The peace made with Spain, whereby the Palatine's cause was deserted, and left to chargeable and hopeless treaties. 6. The sending of commissions to raise money by way of loan. 7. Raising of ship-money. 8. Enlargement of forests, contrary to Magna Charta. 9. The design of engrossing all the gunpowder into one hand, and keeping it in the Tower of London. 10. A design to bring in the use of brass money. 11. The fines, imprisonments, stigmatizings, mutilations, whippings, pillories, gags, confinements, and banishments, by sentence in the Court of Star-chamber. 12. The displacing of judges. 13. Illegal acts of the Council-table. 14. The arbitrary and illegal power of the Earl Marshal's Court. 15. The abuses in Chancery, Exchequer-chamber, and Court of Wards. 16. The selling of titles of honour, of judges, and serjeants' places, and other offices. 17. The insolence of bishops and other clerks, in suspensions, excommunications, deprivations, and degradations, of divers painful, and learned, and pious ministers.

B.

Were there any such ministers degraded, deprived, or excommunicated?

A.

I cannot tell. But I remember I have heard threatened divers painful, unlearned, and seditious ministers.
18. The excess of severity of the High Commission-Court. 19. The preaching before the King against the property of the subject, and for the prerogative of the King above the law. And divers other petty quarrels they had to the government, which though they were laid upon this faction, yet they knew they would fall upon the King himself in the judgment of the people, to whom, by printing, it was communicated.
Again, after the dissolution of the Parliament May the 5th, 1640, they find other faults; as the dissolution itself; the imprisoning some members of both Houses; a forced loan of money attempted in London; the continuance of the Convocation, when the Parliament was ended; and the favour shewed to Papists by Secretary Windebank and others.

B.

All this will go current with common people for misgovernment, and for faults of the King, though some of them were misfortunes; and both the misfortunes and the misgovernment, if any were, were the faults of the Parliament; who, by denying to give him money, did both frustrate hsattempts abroad, and put him upon those extraordinary ways, which they call illegal, of raising money at home.

A.

You see what a heap of evils they have raised to make a show of ill-government to the people, which they second with an enumeration of

the many services they have done the King in overcoming a great many of them, though not all, and in divers other things; and say, that though they had contracted a debt to the Scots of 220,000l. and granted six subsidies, and a bill of poll-money worth six subsidies more, yet that God had so blessed the endeavours of this Parliament, that the kingdom was a gainer by it: and then follows the catalogue of those good things they had done for the King and kingdom. For the kingdom they had done, they said, these things: they had abolished ship-money; they had taken away coat and conduct money, and other military charges, which, they said, amounted to little less than the ship-money; that they suppressed all monopolies, which they reckoned above a million yearly saved by the subject; that they had quelled living grievances, meaning evil counsellors and actors, by the death of my Lord of Strafford, by the flight of the Chancellor Finch, and of Secretary Windebank, by the imprisonment of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and of Judge Bartlet, and the impeachment of other bishops and judges; that they had passed a bill for a triennial Parliament, and another for the continuance of the present Parliament, till they should think fit to dissolve themselves.

B.

That is to say, for ever, if they be suffered. But the sum of all these things, which they had done for the kingdom, is, that they had left it without government, without strength, without money, without law, and without good counsel.

A.

They reckoned, also, putting down of the High-Commission, and the abating of the power of the Council-table, and of the bishops and their courts; the taking away of unnecessary ceremonies in religion;

removing of ministers from their livings, that were not of their faction, and putting in such as were.

B.

All this was but their own, and not the kingdom’s business.

A.

The good they had done the King, was first, they said, the giving of 25,000l. a month for the relief of the northern counties.

B.

What need of relief had the northern counties, more than the rest of the counties of England?

A.

Yes; in the northern counties were quartered the Scotch army, which the Parliament called in to oppose the King, and consequently their quarter was to be discharged.

B.

True; but by the Parliament that called them in.

A.

But they say no; and that this money was given to the King, because he is bound to protect his subjects.

B.

He is no further bound to that, than they to give him money wherewithal to do it. This is very great impudence; to raise an army against the King, and with that army to oppress their fellow-subjects; and then require that the King should relieve them, that is to say, be at the charge of paying the army that was raised to fight against him.

A.

Nay, further; they put to the King's account the 300,000l. given to the Scots, without which they would not have invaded England; besides many other things, that I now remember not.

B.

I did not think there had been so great impudence and villainy in mankind.

A.

You have not observed the world long enough to see all that is ill. Such was their remonstrance, as I have told you. With it they sent a petition, containing three points: 1. That his Majesty would deprive the bishops of their votes in Parliament, and remove such oppressions in religion, church-government, and discipline, as they had brought in; 2. That he should remove from his council all such as should promote the people's grievances, and employ in his great and public affairs such as the Parliament should confide in; 3. That he would not give away the lands escheated to the Crown by the rebellion in Ireland.

B.

This last point, methinks, was not wisely put in at this time: it should have been reserved till they had subdued the rebels, against whom there were yet no forces sent over. It is like selling the lion's skin before they had killed him. But what answer was made to the other two propositions?

A.

What answer should be made, but a denial? About the same time the King himself exhibited articles against six persons of the Parliament, five whereof were of the House of Commons and one of the House of Lords, accusing them of high-treason; and upon the 4th of January, went himself to the House of Commons to demand those five of them. But private notice having been given by some treacherous person about the King, they had absented themselves; and by that means frustrated his Majesty's intentions. And after he was gone, the House making a heinous matter of it, and a high breach of their privileges, adjourned themselves into London, there to sit as a general committee, pretending they were not safe at Westminster: (for the King, when he went to the House to demand those persons, had somewhat more attendance with him, but not otherwise armed than his servants used to be, than he ordinarily had): and would not be pacified, though the King did afterwards waive the prosecution of those persons, unless he would also discover to them those that gave him counsel to go in that manner to the Parliament House, to the end they might receive condign punishment; which was the word they used instead of cruelty.

B.

This was a harsh demand. Was it not enough that the King should forbear his enemies, but also that he must betray his friends? If they thus

tyrannize over the King before they have gotten the sovereign power into their hands, how will they tyrannize over their fellow-subjects when they have gotten it?

A.

So as they did.

B.

How long stayed that committee in London?

A.

Not above two or three days; and then were brought from London to the Parliament House by water in great triumph, guarded with a tumultuous number of armed men, there to sit in security in despite of the King, and make traitorous acts against him, such and as many as they listed; and under favour of these tumults, to frighten away from the House of Peers all such as were not of their own faction. For at this time the rabble was so insolent, that scarce any of the bishops durst go to the House for fear of violence upon their persons: in so much as twelve of them excused themselves of coming thither; and by way of petition to the King, remonstrated that they were not permitted to go quietly to the performance of that duty, and protesting against all determinations, as of none effect, that should pass in the House of Lords during their forced absence. Which the House of Commons taking hold of, sent up to the Peers one of their members, to accuse them of high-treason. Whereupon ten of them were sent to the Tower; after which time there were no more words of their high-treason; but there passed a bill by which they were deprived of their votes in Parliament, and to this bill they got the King's

assent. And, in the beginning of September after, they voted that the bishops should have no more to do in the government of the Church; but to this they had not the King's assent, the war being now begun.

B.

What made the Parliament so averse to episcopacy; and especially the House of Lords, whereof the bishops were members? For I see no reason why they should do it to gratify a number of poor parish priests, that were Presbyterians, and that were never likely any way to serve the Lords; but, on the contrary, to do their best to pull down their power, and subject them to their synods and classes.

A.

For the Lords, very few of them did perceive the intentions of the Presbyterians; and, besides that, they durst not, I believe, oppose the Lower House.

B.

But why were the Lower House so earnest against them?

A.

Because they meant to make use of their tenets, and with pretended sanctity to make the King and his party odious to the people, by whose help they were to set up democracy and depose the King, or to let him have the title only so long as he should act for their purposes. But not only the Parliament, but in a manner all the people of England, were their enemies, upon the account of their behaviour, as being, they said, too imperious. This was all that was colourably laid to their charge; the

main cause of pulling them down, was the envy of the Presbyterians, that incensed the people against them, and against episcopacy itself.

B.

How would the Presbyterians have the Church to be governed?

A.

By national and provincial synods.

B.

Is not this to make the national assembly an archbishop, and the provincial assemblies so many bishops?

A.

Yes; but every minister shall have the delight of sharing the government, and consequently of being able to be revenged on them that do not admire their learning and help to fill their purses, and win to their service them that do.

B.

It is a hard case, that there should be two factions to trouble the commonwealth, without any interest in it of their own, other than every particular man may have; and that their quarrels should be only about opinions, that is, about who has the most learning; as if their learning ought to be the rule of governing all the world. What is it they are learned in? Is it politics and rules of state? I know, it is called divinity; but I hear almost nothing preached but matter of philosophy. For

religion in itself admits no controversy. It is a law of the kingdom, and ought not to be disputed. I do not think they pretend to speak with God and know his will by any other way than reading the Scriptures, which we also do.

A.

Yes, some of them do, and give themselves out for prophets by extraordinary inspiration. But the rest pretend only, for their advancement to benefices and charge of souls, a greater skill in the Scriptures than other men have, by reason of their breeding in the Universities, and knowledge there gotten of the Latin tongue, and some also of the Greek and Hebrew tongues, wherein the Scripture was written; besides their knowledge of natural philosophy, which is there publicly taught.

B.

As for the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew tongues, it was once, to the detection of Roman fraud, and to the ejection of the Romish power, very profitable, or rather necessary; but now that is done, and we have the Scripture in English, and preaching in English, I see no great need of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. I should think myself better qualified by understanding well the languages of our neighbours, French, Dutch, and Italian. I think it was never seen in the world, before the power of popes was set up, that philosophy was much conducing to power in a commonwealth.

B.

But philosophy, together with divinity, have very much conduced to the advancement of the professors thereof to places of the greatest authority, next to the authority of kings themselves, in most of the ancient kingdoms of the world; as is manifestly to be seen in the history of those times.

B.

I pray you cite me some of the authors and places.

A.

First, what were the Druids of old time in Britanny and France? What authority these had you may see in Cæsar, Strabo, and others, and especially in Diodorus Siculus, the greatest antiquary perhaps that ever was; who speaking of the Druids, whom he calls Sarovides, in France, says thus:— "There be also amongst them certain philosophers and theologians, that are exceedingly honoured, whom they also use as prophets. These men, by their skill in augury and inspection into the bowels of the beasts sacrificed, foretell what is to come, and have the multitude obedient to them." And a little after,— "It is a custom amongst them, that no man may sacrifice without a philosopher; because, say they, men ought not to present their thanks to the Gods, but by them that know the divine nature, and are as it were of the same language with them; and that all good things ought by such as these to be prayed for."

B.

I can hardly believe that those Druids were very skilful, either in natural philosophy, or moral.

A.

Nor I; for they held and taught the transmigration of souls from one body to another, as did Pythagoras; which opinion whether they took from him, or he from them, I cannot tell.

What were the Magi in Persia, but philosophers and astrologers? You know how they came to find our Saviour by the conduct of a star, either from Persia itself, or from some country more eastward than Judea. Were not these in great authority in their country? And are they not in most parts of Christendom thought to have been Kings?

Egypt hath been thought by many, the most ancient kingdom and nation of the world, and their priests had the greatest power in civil affairs, that any subjects ever had in any nation. And what were they but philosophers and divines? Concerning whom, the same Diodorus Siculus says thus: “The whole country of Egypt being divided into three parts, the body of the priests have one, as being of most credit with the people both for their devotion towards the Gods, and also for their understanding gotten by education;” and presently after, “For generally these men, in the greatest affairs of all, are the King’s counsellors, partly executing, and partly informing and advising; foretelling him also, by their skill in astrology and art in the inspection of sacrifices, the things that are to come, and reading to him out of their holy books such of the actions there recorded as are profitable for him to know. It is not there as in Greece, one man or one woman that has the priesthood; but they are many that attend the honours and sacrifices of the Gods, and leave the same employment to their posterity, which, next to the King, have the greatest power and authority.”

Concerning the judicature amongst the Egyptians, he saith thus: “From out of the most eminent cities, Hieropolis, Thebes, and Memphis, they choosejudges, which are a council not inferior to that of Areopagus in

Athens, or that of the senate in Lacedæmon. When they are met, being in number thirty, they choose one from amongst themselves to be chief-justice, and the city whereof he is, sendeth another in his place." This chief-justice wore about his neck, hung in a gold chain, a jewel of precious stones, the name of which jewel was truth; which, when the chief-justice had put on, then began the pleading, &c.; and when the judges had agreed on the sentence, then did the chief-justice put this jewel of truth to one of the pleas. You see now what power was acquired in civil matters by the conjuncture of philosophy and divinity.

Let us come now to the commonwealth of the Jews. Was not the priesthood in a family, namely, the Levites, as well as the priesthood of Egypt? Did not the high-priest give judgment by the breast-plate of Urim and Thummim? Look upon the kingdom of Assyria, and the philosophers and Chaldeans. Had they not lands and cities belonging to their family, even in Abraham's time, who dwelt, you know, in Ur of the Chaldeans. Of these the same author says thus: "The Chaldeans are a sect in politics, like to that of the Egyptian priests; for being ordained for the service of the Gods, they spend the whole time of their life in philosophy; being of exceeding great reputation in astrology, and pretending much also to prophecy, foretelling things to come by purifications and sacrifices, and to find out by certain incantations the preventing of harm, and the bringing to pass of good. They have also skill in augury, and in the interpretation of dreams and wonders, nor are they unskilful in the art of foretelling by the inwards of beasts sacrificed; and have their learning not as the Greeks; for the philosophy of the Chaldeans goes to their family by tradition, and the son receives it from his father."

From Assyria let us pass into India, and see what esteem the philosophers had there. "The whole multitude," says Diodorus, "of the

Indians, is divided into seven parts; whereof the first, is the body of philosophers; for number the least, but for eminence the first; for they are free from taxes, and as they are not masters of others, so are no others masters of them. By private men they are called to the sacrifices and to the care of burials of the dead, as being thought most beloved of the Gods and skilful in the doctrine concerning hell; and for this employment receive gifts and honours very considerable. They are also of great use to the people of India; for being taken at the beginning of the year into the great assembly, they foretell them of great droughts, great rains, also of winds, and of sicknesses, and of whatsoever is profitable for them to know beforehand."

The same author, concerning the laws of the Æthiopians, saith thus: "The laws of the Æthiopians seem very different from those of other nations, and especially about the election of their Kings. For the priests propound some of the chief men amongst them, named in a catalogue, and whom the God (which, according to a certain custom, is carried about to feastings) does accept of; him the multitude elect for their King, and presently adore and honour him as a God, put into the government by divine providence. The King being chosen, he has the manner of his life limited to him by the laws, and does all other things according to the custom of the country, neither rewarding nor punishing any man otherwise than from the beginning is established amongst them by law. Nor use they to put any man to death, though he be condemned to it, but to send some officer to him with a token of death; who seeing the token, goes presently to his house, and kills himself presently after. But the strangest thing of all is, that which they do concerning the death of their Kings. For the priests that live in Meroe, and spend their time about the worship and honour of the Gods, and are in greatest authority; when they have a mind to it, send a messenger to the King to bid him

die, for that the Gods have given such order, and that the commandments of the immortals are not by any means to be neglected by those who are, by nature, mortal; using also other speeches to him, which men of simple judgment, and that have not reason enough to dispute against those unnecessary commands, as being educated in an old and indelible custom, are content to admit of. Therefore in former times the Kings did obey the priests, not as mastered by force and arms, but as having their reason mastered by superstition. But in the time of Ptolemy II, Ergamenes, King of the Æthiopians, having had his breeding in philosophy after the manner of the Greeks, being the first that durst dispute their power, took heart as befitted a King; came with soldiers to a place called Abaton, where was then the golden temple of the Æthiopians; killed all the priests, abolished the custom, and rectified the kingdom according to his will."

B.

Though they that were killed were most damnable impostors, yet the act was cruel.

A.

It was so. But were not the priests cruel, to cause their Kings, whom a little before they adored as Gods, to make away themselves? The King killed them, for the safety of his person; they him, out of ambition or love of change. The King's act may be coloured with the good of his people; the priests had no pretence against their kings, who were certainly very godly, or else would never have obeyed the command of the priests by a messenger unarmed, to kill themselves. Our late King, the best King perhaps that ever was, you know, was murdered, having been first persecuted by war, at the incitement of Presbyterian ministers;

who are therefore guilty of the death of all that fell in that war; which were, I believe, in England, Scotland, and Ireland, near 100,000 persons. Had it not been much better that those seditious ministers, which were not perhaps 1000, had been all killed before they had preached? It had been, I confess, a great massacre; but the killing of 100,000 is a greater.

B.

I am glad the bishops were out of this business. As ambitious as some say they are, it did not appear in that business, for they were enemies to them that were in it.

A.

But I intend not by these quotations to commend either the divinity or the philosophy of those heathen people; but to show only what the reputation of those sciences can effect among the people. For their divinity was nothing but idolatry; and their philosophy, (excepting the knowledge which the Egyptian priests, and from them the Chaldeans, had gotten by long observation and study in astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic), very little; and that in great part abused in astrology and fortunetelling. Whereas the divinity of the clergy of this nation, (considered apart from the mixture that has been introduced by the Church of Rome, and in part retained here, of the babbling philosophy of Aristotle and other Greeks, that has no affinity with religion, and serves only to breed disaffection, dissension, and finally sedition and civil war, as we have lately found by dear experience in the differences between the Presbyterians and Episcopals), is the true religion. But for these differences both parties, as they came in power, not only suppressed the tenets of one another, but also whatsoever doctrine

looked with an ill aspect upon their interest; and consequently all true philosophy, especially civil and moral, which can never appear propitious to ambition, or to an exemption from their obedience due to the sovereign power.

After the King had accused the Lord Kimbolton, a member of the House of Lords, and Hollis, Haslerigg, Hampden, Pym, and Stroud, five members of the Lower House, of high-treason; and after the Parliament had voted out the bishops from the House of Peers; they pursued especially two things in their petitions to his Majesty. The one was, that the King would declare who were the persons that advised him to go, as he did, to the Parliament-house to apprehend them, and that he would leave them to the Parliament to receive condign punishment; and this they did, to stick upon his Majesty the dishonour of deserting his friends, and betraying them to his enemies. The other was, that he would allow them a guard out of the city of London, to be commanded by the Earl of Essex; for which they pretended, they could not else sit in safety; which pretence was nothing but an upbraiding of his Majesty for coming to Parliament better accompanied than ordinary, to seize the said five seditious members.

B.

I see no reason, in petitioning for a guard, they should determine it to the city of London in particular, and the command by name to the Earl of Essex, unless they meant the King should understand it for a guard against himself.

A.

Their meaning was, that the King should understand it so, and, as I verily believe, they meant he should take it for an affront: and the King

himself understanding it so, denied to grant it; though he were willing, if they could not otherwise be satisfied, to command such a guard to wait upon them as he would be responsible for to God Almighty. Besides this, the city of London petitioned the King (put upon it, no doubt, by some members of the Lower House) to put the Tower of London into the hands of persons of trust, meaning such as the Parliament should approve of, and to appoint a guard for the safety of his Majesty and the Parliament. This method of bringing petitions in a tumultuary manner, by great multitudes of clamorous people, was ordinary with the House of Commons, whose ambition could never have been served by way of prayer and request, without extraordinary terror.

After the King had waived the prosecution of the five members, but denied to make known who had advised him to come in person to the House of Commons, they questioned the Attorney-General, who by the King's command had exhibited the articles against them, and voted him a breaker of the privilege of Parliament; and no doubt had made him feel their cruelty, if he had not speedily fled the land.

About the end of January, they made an order of both Houses of Parliament, to prevent the going over of popish commanders into Ireland; not so much fearing that, as that by this the King himself choosing his commanders for that service, might aid himself out of Ireland against the Parliament. But this was no great matter, in respect of a petition they sent his Majesty about the same time, that is to say, about the 27th or 28th of January, 1641, wherein they desired in effect the absolute sovereignty of England; though by the name of sovereignty they challenged it not whilst the King was living. For to the end that the fears and dangers of this kingdom might be removed, and the mischievous designs of those who are enemies to the peace of it, might be prevented, they pray, that his Majesty would be pleased to put

forthwith, first, the Tower of London, second, all other forts, third, the whole militia of the kingdom, into the hands of such persons as should be recommended to him by both the Houses of Parliament. And this they style a necessary petition.

B.

Were there really any such fears and dangers generally conceived here? Or did there appear any enemies at that time with such designs as are mentioned in the petition?

A.

Yes. But no other fear of danger, but such as any discreet and honest man might justly have of the designs of the Parliament itself; who were the greatest enemies to the peace of the kingdom that could possibly be. It is also worth observing, that this petition began with these words, Most gracious Sovereign: so stupid they were as not to know, that he that is master of the militia, is master of the kingdom, and consequently is in possession of a most absolute sovereignty. The King was now at Windsor, to avoid the tumults of the common people before the gates of Whitehall, together with their clamours and affronts there. The 9th of February after, he came to Hampton Court, and thence he went to Dover with the Queen, and the Princess of Orange, his daughter; where the Queen with the Princess of Orange embarked for Holland, but the King returned to Greenwich, whence he sent for the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York, and so went with them towards York.

B.

Did the Lords join with the Commons in this petition for the militia?

A.

It appears so by the title; but I believe they durst not but do it. The House of Commons took them but for a cypher; men of title only, without real power. Perhaps also the most of them thought, that the taking of the militia from the King would be an addition to their own power; but they were very much mistaken, for the House of Commons never intended they should be sharers in it.

B.

What answer made the King to this petition?

A.

The following: “His Majesty having well considered of this petition, and being desirous to express how willing he is to apply a remedy, not only to your dangers, but even to your doubts and fears, he therefore returns this answer, That when he shall know the extent of power which is intended to be established in those persons, whom you desire to be the commanders of the militia in the several counties, and likewise to what time it shall be limited, that no power shall be executed by his Majesty alone without the advice of Parliament, then he will declare, that (for the securing you from all dangers or jealousies of any) his Majesty will be content to put in all the places, both of forts and militia in the several counties, such persons as both the Houses of Parliament shall either approve, or recommend unto him; so that you declare before unto his Majesty the names of the persons whom you approve or recommend, unless such persons shall be named, against whom he shall have just and unquestionable exception.”

B.

What power, for what time, and to whom, did the Parliament grant, concerning the militia?

A.

The same power which the King had before planted in his lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants, in the several counties, and without other limitation of time but their own pleasure.

B.

Who were the men that had this power?

A.

There is a catalogue of them printed. They are very many, and most of them lords; nor is it necessary to have them named; for to name them is, in my opinion, to brand them with the mark of disloyalty or of folly. When they had made a catalogue of them, they sent it to the King, with a new petition for the militia. Also presently after, they sent a message to his Majesty, praying him to leave the Prince at Hampton Court; but the King granted neither.

B.

Howsoever, it was well done of them to get hostages, if they could, of the King, before he went from them.

A.

In the meantime, to raise money for the reducing of Ireland, the Parliament invited men to bring in money by way of adventure, according to these propositions. 1. That two millions and five hundred thousand acres of land in Ireland, should be assigned to the adventurers, in this proportion: For an adventure of 200l. 1,000 acres in Ulster..
. . . . 300l. 1,000 acres in Connaught..
. . . . 450l. 1,000 acres in Munster..
. . . . 600l. 1,000 acres in Leinster. All according to English measure, and consisting of meadow, arable, and profitable pasture; bogs, woods, and barren mountains, being cast in over and above. 2. A revenue was reserved to the Crown, from one penny to three-pence on every acre. 3. That commissions should be sent by the Parliament, to erect manors, settle wastes, and commons, maintain preaching ministers, create corporations, and regulate plantations. The rest of the propositions concern only the times and manner of payment of the sums subscribed by the adventurers. And to these propositions his Majesty assented; but to the petition of the militia, his Majesty denied his assent.

B.

If he had not, I should have thought it a great wonder. What did the Parliament after this?

A.

They sent him another petition, which was presented to him when he was at Theobald's, in his way to York; wherein they tell him plainly, that unless he be pleased to assure them by those messengers then sent, that he would speedily apply his royal assent to the satisfaction of their former desires, they shall be enforced, for the safety of his Majesty and his kingdoms, to dispose of the militia by the authority of both Houses,

&c. They petition his Majesty also to let the Prince stay at St. James's, or some other of his Majesty's houses near London. They tell him also, that the power of raising, ordering, and disposing of the militia, cannot be granted to any corporation, without the authority and consent of the Parliament, and that those parts of the kingdom, which have put themselves into a posture of defence, have done nothing therein but by direction of both Houses, and what is justifiable by the laws of this kingdom.

B.

What answer made the King to this?

A.

It was a putting of themselves into arms, and under officers such as the Parliament should approve of. 4. They voted that his Majesty should be again desired that the Prince might continue about London. Lastly, they voted a declaration to be sent to his Majesty by both the Houses; wherein they accuse his Majesty of a design of altering religion, though not directly him, but them that counselled him; whom they also accused of being the inviters and fomenters of the Scotch war, and framers of the rebellion in Ireland; and upbraid the King again for accusing the Lord Kimbolton and the five members, and of being privy to the purpose of bringing up his army, which was raised against the Scots, to be employed against the Parliament. To which his Majesty sent his answer from Newmarket. Whereupon it was resolved by both Houses, that in this case of extreme danger and of his Majesty's refusal, the ordinance agreed upon by both Houses for the militia doth oblige the people by the fundamental laws of this kingdom; and also, that whosoever shall execute any power over the militia, by colour of any commission of

lieutenancy, without consent of both Houses of Parliament, shall be accounted a disturber of the peace of the kingdom. Whereupon his Majesty sent a message to both Houses from Huntingdon, requiring obedience to the laws established, and prohibiting all subjects, upon pretence of their ordinance, to execute anything concerning the militia which is not by those laws warranted. Upon this, the Parliament vote a standing to their former votes; as also, that when the Lords and Commons in Parliament, which is the supreme court of judicature in the kingdom, shall declare what the law of the land is, to have this not only questioned, but contradicted, is a high breach of the privilege of Parliament.

B.

I thought that he that makes the law, ought to declare what the law is. For what is it else to to make a law, but to declare what it is? So that they have taken from the King, not only the militia, but also the legislative power.

A.

They have so; but I make account that the legislative power, and indeed all power possible, is contained in the power of the militia. After this, they seize such money as was due to his Majesty upon the bill of tonnage and poundage, and upon the bill of subsidies, that they might disable him every way they possibly could. They sent him also many other contumelious messages and petitions after his coming to York; amongst which one was: “That whereas the Lord Admiral, by indisposition of body, could not command the fleet in person, he would be pleased to give authority to the Earl of Warwick to supply his place;” when they knew the King had put Sir John Pennington in it before.

B.

To what end did the King entertain so many petitions, messages, declarations and remonstrances, and vouchsafe his answers to them, when he could not choose but clearly see they were resolved to take from him his royal power, and consequently his life? For it could not stand with their safety to let either him or his issue live, after they had done him so great injuries.

A.

Besides this, the Parliament had at the same time a committee residing at York, to spy what his Majesty did, and to inform the Parliament thereof, and also to hinder the King from gaining the people of that county to his party: so that when his Majesty was courting the gentlemen there, the committee was instigating the yeomanry against him. To which also the ministers did very much contribute; so that the King lost his opportunity at York.

B.

Why did not the King seize the committee into his hands, or drive them out of town?

A.

I know not; but I believe he knew the Parliament had a greater party than he, not only in Yorkshire but also in York. Towards the end of April, the King, upon petition of the people of Yorkshire to have the magazine of Hull to remain still there, for the greater security of the northern parts, thought fit to take it into his own hands. He had a little

before appointed governor of that town the Earl of Newcastle. But the townsmen, having been already corrupted by the Parliament, refused to receive him, but refused not to receive Sir John Hotham, appointed to be governor by the Parliament. The King therefore coming before the town, guarded only by his own servants and a few gentlemen of the country thereabouts, was denied entrance by Sir John Hotham, that stood upon the wall; for which act he presently caused Sir John Hotham to be proclaimed traitor, and sent a message to the Parliament, requiring justice to be done upon the said Hotham, and that the town and magazine might be delivered into his hands. To which the Parliament made no answer, but instead thereof published another declaration, in which they omitted nothing of their former slanders against his Majesty's government, but inserted certain propositions declarative of their own pretended right: viz. 1. That whatsoever they declare to be law, ought not to be questioned by the King: 2. That no precedents can be limits to bound their proceedings: 3. That a Parliament, for the public good, may dispose of anything wherein the King or subject hath a right; and that they, without the King, are this Parliament, and the judge of this public good, and that the King's consent is not necessary: 4. That no member of either House ought to be troubled for treason, felony, or any other crime, unless the cause be first brought before the Parliament, that they may judge of the fact and give leave to proceed, if they see cause: 5. That the sovereign power resides in both Houses, and that the King ought to have no negative voice: 6. That the levying of forces against the personal commands of the King (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying war against the King, but the levying war against his laws and authority (which they have power to declare and signify), though not against his person, is levying war against the King; and that treason cannot be committed against his person, otherwise than

as he is entrusted with the kingdom and discharging that trust; and that they have a power to judge whether he discharge this trust or not: 7. That they may depose the King when they will.

B.

This is plain dealing and without hypocrisy. Could the city of London swallow this?

A.

Yes; and more too, if need be. London, you know, has a great belly, but no palate nor taste of right and wrong. In the Parliament-roll of HenryIV, amongst the articles of the oath the King at his coronation took, there is one runs thus: Concedes justas leges et consuetudines esse tenendas; et promittes per te eas esse protegendas, et ad honorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus elegerit. Which the Parliament urged for their legislative authority, and therefore interpret quas vulgus elegeret, which the people shall choose; as if the King should swear to protect and corroborate laws before they were made, whether they be good or bad; whereas the words signify no more, but that he shall protect and corroborate such laws as they have chosen, that is to say, the Acts of Parliament then in being. And in the records of the Exchequer it is thus: Will you grant to hold and keep the laws and rightful customs which the commonalty of this your kingdom have, and will you defend and uphold them? &c. And this was the answer his Majesty made to that point.

B.

And I think this answer very full and clear. But if the words were to be interpreted in the other sense, yet I see no reason why the King should

be bound to swear to them. For Henry IV came to the Crown by the votes of a Parliament not much inferior in wickedness to this Long Parliament, that deposed and murdered their lawful King; saving that it was not the Parliament itself, but the usurper that murdered King Richard II.

A.

About a week after, in the beginning of May, the Parliament sent the King another paper, which they styled the humble petition and advice of both Houses, containing nineteen propositions; which when you shall hear, you shall be able to judge what power they meant to leave to the King more than to any one of his subjects. The first of them is this:
That the Lords and others of his Majesty's privy-council, and all great officers of state, both at home and abroad, be put from their employments and from his council, save only such as should be approved of by both Houses of Parliament; and none put into their places but by approbation of the said Houses. And that all privy-councillors take an oath for the due execution of their places, in such form as shall be agreed upon by the said Houses.
That the great affairs of the kingdom be debated, resolved, and transacted only in Parliament; and such as shall presume to do any thing to the contrary, be reserved to the censure of the Parliament; and such other matters of the state as are proper for his Majesty's privy-council, shall be debated and concluded by such as shall from time to time be chosen for that place by both Houses of Parliament; and that no public act concerning the affairs of the kingdom, which is proper for his Majesty's privy-council, be esteemed valid, as proceeding from the royal authority, unless it be done by the advice and consent of the major part of the council, attested under their hands; and that the council be

not more than twenty-five, nor less than fifteen; and that when a councillor's place falls void in the interval of Parliament, it shall not be supplied without the assent of the major part of the council; and that such choice also shall be void, if the next Parliament after confirm it not.

That the Lord High Steward of England, Lord High Constable, Lord Chancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Lord Treasurer, Lord Privy-Seal, Earl Marshal, Lord Admiral, Warden of the Cinque Ports, Chief Governor of Ireland, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Master of the Wards, Secretaries of State, two Chief Justices and Chief Baron, be always chosen with the approbation of both Houses of Parliament; and in the intervals of Parliament, by the major part of the privy-council.

That the government of the King's children shall be committed to such as both Houses shall approve of; and in the intervals of Parliament, such as the privy-council shall approve of; that the servants then about them, against whom the Houses have just exception, should be removed.

That no marriage be concluded or treated of for any of the King's children, without consent of Parliament.

That the laws in force against Jesuits, priests, and popish recusants, be strictly put in execution.

That the votes of Popish lords in the House of Peers be taken away, and that a bill be passed for the education of the children of Papists in the Protestant religion.

That the King will be pleased to reform the Church-government and liturgy in such manner as both Houses of Parliament shall advise.

That he would be pleased to rest satisfied with that course that the Lords and Commons have appointed for ordering the militia, and recal his declarations and proclamations against it.

That such members as have been put out of any place or office since this Parliament began, may be restored, or have satisfaction.
That all privy-councillors and judges take an oath, (the form whereof shall be agreed on and settled by act of Parliament), for the maintaining of the Petition of Right, and of certain statutes made by the Parliament.
That all the judges and officers placed by approbation of both Houses of Parliament, may hold their places quam diu bene se gesserint.
That the justice of Parliament may pass upon all delinquents, whether they be within the kingdom or fled out of it; and that all persons cited by either House of Parliament, may appear and abide the censure of Parliament.
That the general pardon offered by his Majesty, be granted with such exceptions as shall be advised by both Houses of Parliament.

B.

What a spiteful article was this! All the rest proceeded from ambition, which many times well-natured men are subject to; but this proceeded from an inhuman and devilish cruelty.

A.

That the forts and castles be put under the command of such persons as, with the approbation of the Parliament, the King shall appoint.
That the extraordinary guards about the King be discharged; and for the future none raised but according to the law, in case of actual rebellion or invasion.

B.

Methinks these very propositions sent to the King are an actual rebellion.

A.

That his Majesty enter into a more strict alliance with the United Provinces, and other neighbour Protestant Princes and States.
That his Majesty be pleased, by act of Parliament, to clear the Lord Kimbolton and the five members of the House of Commons, in such manner as that future Parliaments may be secured from the consequence of that evil precedent.
That his Majesty be pleased to pass a bill for restraining peers made hereafter from sitting or voting in Parliament, unless they be admitted with consent of both Houses of Parliament.
These propositions granted, they promise to apply themselves to regulate his Majesty's revenue to his best advantage, and to settle it to the support of his royal dignity in honour and plenty; and also to put the town of Hull into such hands as his Majesty shall appoint with consent of Parliament.

B.

Is not that to put it into such hands as his Majesty shall appoint by the consent of the petitioners, which is no more than to keep it in their hands as it is? Did they want, or think the King wanted, common-sense, so as not to perceive that their promise herein was worth nothing?

A.

After the sending of these propositions to the King, and his Majesty's refusal to grant them, they began, on both sides, to prepare for war. The

King raised a guard for his person in Yorkshire, and the Parliament, thereupon having voted that the King intended to make war upon his Parliament, gave order for the mustering and exercising the people in arms, and published propositions to invite and encourage them to bring in either ready money or plate, or to promise under their hands to furnish and maintain certain numbers of horse, horsemen, and arms, for the defence of the King and Parliament, (meaning by King, as they had formerly declared, not his person, but his laws); promising to repay their money with interest of 8l. in the 100l. and the value of their plate with twelve-pence the ounce for the fashion. On the other side, the King came to Nottingham, and there did set up his standard royal, and sent out commissions of array to call those to him, which by the ancient laws of England were bound to serve him in the wars. Upon this occasion there passed divers declarations between the King and Parliament concerning the legality of this array, which are too long to tell you at this time.

B.

Nor do I desire to hear any mooting about this question. For I think that general law of salus populi, and the right of defending himself against those that had taken from him the sovereign power, are sufficient to make legal whatsoever he should do in order to the recovery of his kingdom, or to the punishing of the rebels.

A.

In the meantime the Parliament raised an army, and made the Earl of Essex general thereof; by which act they declared what they meant formerly, when they petitioned the King for a guard to be commanded by the said Earl of Essex. And now the King sends out his

proclamations, forbidding obedience to the orders of the Parliament concerning the militia; and the Parliament send out orders against the execution of the commissions of array. Hitherto, though it were a war before, yet there was no blood shed; they shot at one another nothing but paper.

B.

I understand now, how the Parliament destroyed the peace of the kingdom; and how easily, by the help of seditious Presbyterian ministers and of ambitious ignorant orators, they reduced this government into anarchy. But I believe it will be a harder task for them to bring in peace again, and settle the government, either in themselves, or any other governor, or form of government. For, granting that they obtained the victory in this war, they must be beholden for it to the valour, good conduct, or felicity of those to whom they give the command of their armies; especially to the general, whose good success will, without doubt, draw with it the love and admiration of the soldiers; so that it will be in his power, either to take the government upon himself, or to place it where himself thinks good. In which case, if he take it not to himself, he will be thought a fool; and if he do, he shall be sure to have the envy of his subordinate commanders, who look for a share either in the present government, or in the succession to it. For they will say: “Has he obtained his power by his own, without our danger, valour, and counsel; and must we be his slaves, whom we have thus raised? Or, is not there as much justice on our side against him, as was on his side against the King?”

A.

They will, and did; insomuch, that it was the reason why Cromwell, after he had gotten into his own hands the absolute power of England, Scotland, and Ireland, by the name of Protector, did never dare to take upon him the title of King, nor was ever able to settle it upon his children. His officers would not suffer it, as pretending after his death to succeed him; nor would the army consent to it, because he had ever declared to them against the government of a single person.

B.

But to return to the King. What means had he to pay, what provision had he to arm, nay, means to levy, an army able to resist the army of the Parliament, maintained by the great purse of the city of London and contributions of almost all the towns corporate in England, and furnished with arms as fully as they could require?

A.

It is true, the King had great disadvantages, and yet by little and little he got a considerable army, with which he so prospered as to grow stronger every day, and the Parliament weaker, till they had gotten the Scotch with an army of 21,000 men to come into England to their assistance. But to enter into the particular narration of what was done in the war, I have not now time.

B.

Well then, we will talk of that at next meeting.

PART III.

B.

We left at the preparations on both sides for war; which when I considered by myself, I was mightily puzzled to find out what possibility there was for the King to equal the Parliament in such a course, and what hopes he had of money, men, arms, fortified places, shipping, counsel, and military officers, sufficient for such an enterprise against the Parliament, that had men and money as much at command, as the city of London, and other corporation towns, were able to furnish, which was more than they needed. And for the men they should set forth for soldiers, they were almost all of them spitefully bent against the King and his whole party, whom they took to be either papists, or flatterers of the King, or that had designed to raise their fortunes by the plunder of the city and other corporation towns. And though I believe not that they were more valiant than other men, nor that they had so much experience in the war as to be accounted good soldiers; yet they had that in them, which in time of battle is more conducing to victory than valour and experience both together; and that was spite.

And for arms, they had in their hands the chief magazines, the Tower of London, and the town of Kingston-upon-Hull; besides most of the powder and shot that lay in several towns for the use of the trained bands.

Fortified places, there were not many then in England, and most of them in the hands of the Parliament.

The King's fleet was wholly in their command, under the Earl of Warwick.
Counsellors, they needed no more than such as were of their own body.
So that the King was every way inferior to them, except it were, perhaps, in officers.

A.

I cannot compare their chief officers. For the Parliament, the Earl of Essex, after the Parliament had voted the war, was made general of all their forces both in England and Ireland, from whom all other commanders were to receive their commissions.

B.

What moved them to make general the Earl of Essex? And for what cause was the Earl of Essex so displeased with the King, as to accept that office?

A.

I do not certainly know what to answer to either of those questions; but the Earl of Essex had been in the wars abroad, and wanted neither experience, judgment, nor courage, to perform such an undertaking. And besides that, you have heard, I believe, how great a darling of the people his father had been before him, and what honour he had gotten by the success of his enterprise upon Calais, and in some other military actions. To which I may add, that this Earl himself was not held by the people to be so great a favourite at court as that they might not trust him with their army against the King. And by this, you may perhaps

conjecture the cause for which the Parliament made choice of him for general.

B.

But why did they think him discontented with the Court?

A.

I know not that; nor indeed that he was so. He came to the court, as other noblemen did, when occasion was, to wait upon the King; but had no office, till a little before this time, to oblige him to be there continually. But I believe verily, that the unfortunateness of his marriages, had so discountenanced his conversation with the ladies, that the court could not be his proper element, unless he had had some extraordinary favour there to balance that calamity. But for some particular discontent from the King, or intention of revenge for any supposed disgrace, I think he had none, nor that he was any ways addicted to Presbyterian doctrines, or other fanatic tenets in Church or State; saving only that he was carried away with the stream, in a manner, of the whole nation, to think that England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; not considering that the supreme power must always be absolute, whether it be in the King or in the Parliament.

B.

Who was the general of the King's army?

A.

None yet but himself; nor indeed had he yet any army. But there coming to him at that time his two nephews, the Princes Rupert and Maurice, he

put the command of his horse into the hands of Prince Rupert, a man than whom no man living has a better courage, nor was more active and diligent in prosecuting his commissions; and, though but a young man then, was not without experience in the conducting of soldiers, as having been an actor in part of his father's wars in Germany.

B.

But how could the King find money to pay such an army as was necessary for him against the Parliament?

A.

Neither the King nor Parliament had much money at that time in their own hands, but were fain to rely upon the benevolence of those that took their parts. Wherein, I confess, the Parliament had a mighty great advantage. Those that helped the King in that kind, were only lords and gentlemen, which, not approving the proceedings of the Parliament, were willing to undertake the payment, every one, of a certain number of horse; which cannot be thought any very great assistance, the persons that payed them being so few. For other moneys that the King then had, I have not heard of any, but what he borrowed upon jewels in the Low Countries. Whereas the Parliament had a very plentiful contribution, not only from London, but generally from their faction in all other places of England, upon certain propositions, published by the Lords and Commons in June 1642, (at what time they had newly voted that the King intended to make war upon them), for bringing in of money or plate to maintain horse and horsemen, and to buy arms for the preservation of the public peace, and for the defence of the King and both Houses of Parliament; for the re-payment of which money and plate, they were to have the public faith.

B.

What public faith is there, when there is no public? What is it that can be called public, in a civil war, without the King?

A.

The truth is, the security was nothing worth, but served well enough to gull those seditious blockheads, that were more fond of change than either of their peace or profit.

Having by this means gotten contributions from those that were well-affected to their cause, they made use of it afterwards to force the like contribution from others. For in November following, they made an ordinance for assessing also of those that had not contributed then, or had contributed, but not proportionably to their estates. And yet this was contrary to what the Parliament promised and declared in the propositions themselves. For they declared, in the first proposition, that no man's affections should be measured by the proportion of his offer, so that he expressed his good will to the service in any proportion whatsoever.

Besides this, in the beginning of March following, they made an ordinance, to levy weekly a great sum of money upon every county, city, town, place, and person of any estate almost, in England; which weekly sum, as may appear by the ordinance itself, printed and published in March 1642 by order of both Houses, comes to almost 33,000l., and consequently to above 1,700,000l. for the year. They had, besides all this, the profits of the King's lands and woods, and whatsoever was remaining unpaid of any subsidy formerly granted him, and the tonnage and poundage usually received by the King; besides the profit of the sequestrations of great persons, whom they pleased to vote delinquents,

and the profits of the bishops' lands, which they took to themselves a year, or a little more, after.

B.

Seeing then the Parliament had such advantage of the King in money and arms and multitude of men, and had in their hands the King's fleet, I cannot imagine what hope the King could have, either of victory (unless he resigned into their hands the sovereignty), or subsisting. For I cannot well believe he had any advantage of them either in counsellors, conductors, or in the resolutions of his soldiers.

A.

On the contrary, I think he had also some disadvantage in that; for though he had as good officers at least as any then served the Parliament, yet I doubt he had not so useful counsel as was necessary. And for his soldiers, though they were men as stout as theirs, yet, because their valour was not sharpened so with malice as theirs was on the other side, they fought not so keenly as their enemies did: amongst whom there were a great many London apprentices, who, for want of experience in the war, would have been fearful enough of death and wounds approaching visibly in glistering swords; but, for want of judgment, scarce thought of such death as comes invisibly in a bullet, and therefore were very hardly to be driven out of the field.

B.

But what fault do you find in the King's counsellors, lords, and other persons of quality and experience?

A.

Only that fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which was, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; and that if the King should clearly subdue this Parliament, that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as little as he pleased: which they counted tyranny. This opinion, though it did not lessen their endeavour to gain the victory for the King in a battle, when a battle could not be avoided, yet it weakened their endeavour to procure him an absolute victory in the war. And for this cause, notwithstanding that they saw that the Parliament was firmly resolved to take all kingly power whatsoever out of his hands, yet their counsel to the King was upon all occasions, to offer propositions to them of treaty and accommodation, and to make and publish declarations; which any man might easily have foreseen would be fruitless; and not only so, but also of great disadvantage to those actions by which the King was to recover his crown and preserve his life. For it took off the courage of the best and forwardest of his soldiers, that looked for great benefit by their service out of the estates of the rebels, in case they could subdue them; but none at all, if the business should be ended by a treaty.

B.

And they had reason: for a civil war never ends by treaty, without the sacrifice of those who were on both sides the sharpest. You know well enough how things passed at the reconciliation of Augustus and Antonius in Rome. But I thought that after they once began to levy soldiers one against another, that they would not any more have returned of either side to declarations, or other paper war, which, if it could have done any good, would have done it long before this.

A.

But seeing the Parliament continued writing, and set forth their declarations to the people against the lawfulness of the King's commission of array, and sent petitions to the King as fierce and rebellious as ever they had done before, demanding of him that he would disband his soldiers, and come up to the Parliament, and leave those whom the Parliament called delinquents (which were none but the King's best subjects) to their mercy, and pass such bills as they should advise him; would you not have the King set forth declarations and proclamations against the illegality of their ordinances, by which they levied soldiers against him, and answer those insolent petitions of theirs?

B.

No; it had done him no good before, and therefore was not likely to do him any afterwards. For the common people, whose hands were to decide the controversy, understood not the reasons of either party; and for those that by ambition were once set upon the enterprise of changing the government, they cared not much what was reason and justice in the cause, but what strength they might procure by reducing the multitude with remonstrances from the Parliament House, or by sermons in the churches. And to their petitions, I would not have had any answer made at all, more than this; that if they would disband their army, and put themselves upon his mercy, they should find him more gracious than they expected.

A.

That had been a gallant answer indeed, if it had proceeded from him after some extraordinary great victory in battle, or some extraordinary assurance of a victory at last in the whole war.

B.

Why, what could have happened to him worse than at length he suffered, notwithstanding his gentle answers and all his reasonable declarations?

A.

Nothing; but who knew that?

B.

Any man might see that he was never likely to be restored to his right without victory: and such his stoutness being known to the people, would have brought to his assistance many more hands than all the arguments of law or force of eloquence, couched in declarations and other writings, could have done by far. And I wonder what kind of men they were, that hindered the King from taking this resolution?

A.

You may know by the declarations themselves, which are very long and full of quotations of records and of cases formerly reported, that the penners of them were either lawyers by profession, or such gentlemen as had the ambition to be thought so. Besides, I told you before, that those which were then likeliest to have their counsel asked in this business, were averse to absolute monarchy, as also to absolute democracy or aristocracy; all which governments they esteemed

tyranny, and were in love with monarchy which they used to praise by the name of mixed monarchy, though it were indeed nothing else but pure anarchy. And those men, whose pens the King most used in these controversies of law and politics, were such, if I have not been misinformed, as having been members of this Parliament, had declaimed against ship-money and other extra-parliamentary taxes, as much as any; but who when they saw the Parliament grow higher in their demands than they thought they would have done, went over to the King's party.

B.

Who were those?

A.

It is not necessary to name any man, seeing I have undertaken only a short narration of the follies and other faults of men during this trouble; but not, by naming the persons, to give you, or any man else, occasion to esteem them the less, now that the faults on all sides have been forgiven.

B.

When the business was brought to this height, by levying of soldiers and seizing of the navy and arms and other provisions on both sides, that no man was so blind as not to see they were in an estate of war one against another; why did not the King, by proclamation or message, according to his undoubted right, dissolve the Parliament, and thereby diminish in some part the authority of their levies, and of other their unjust ordinances?

A.

You have forgotten that I told you, that the King himself, by a bill that he passed at the same time when he passed the bill for the execution of the Earl of Strafford, had given them authority to hold the Parliament till they should by consent of both Houses dissolve themselves. If therefore he had, by any proclamation or message to the Houses, dissolved them, they would to their former defamations of his Majesty's actions have added this, that he was a breaker of his word: and not only in contempt of him have continued their session, but also have made an advantage of it to the increase and strengthening of their own party.

B.

Would not the King's raising of an army against them be interpreted as a purpose to dissolve them by force? And was it not as great a breach of promise to scatter them by force, as to dissolve them by proclamation? Besides, I cannot conceive that the passing of that act was otherwise intended than conditionally; so long as they should not ordain any thing contrary to the sovereign right of the King; which condition they had already by many of their ordinances broken. And I think that even by the law of equity, which is the unalterable law of nature, a man that has the sovereign power, cannot, if he would, give away the right of anything which is necessary for him to retain for the good government of his subjects, unless he do it in express words, saying, that he will have the sovereign power no longer. For the giving away that, which by consequence only, draws the sovereignty along with it, is not, I think, a giving away of the sovereignty; but an error, such as works nothing but an invalidity in the grant itself. And such was the King's passing of this bill for the continuing of the Parliament as long as the two Houses

pleased. But now that the war was resolved on on both sides, what needed any more dispute in writing?

A.

I know not what need they had. But on both sides they thought it needful to hinder one another, as much as they could, from levying of soldiers; and, therefore, the King did set forth declarations in print, to make the people know that they ought not to obey the officers of the new militia set up by ordinance of Parliament, and also to let them see the legality of his own commissions of array. And the Parliament on their part did the like, to justify to the people the said ordinance, and to make the commission of array appear unlawful.

B.

When the Parliament were levying of soldiers, was it not lawful for the King to levy soldiers to defend himself and his right, though there had been no other title for it but his own preservation, and that the name of commission of array had never before been heard of?

A.

For my part, I think there cannot be a better title for war, than the defence of a man's own right. But the people, at that time, thought nothing lawful for the King to do, for which there was not some statute made by Parliament. For the lawyers, I mean the judges of the courts at Westminster, and some few others, though but advocates, yet of great reputation for their skill in the common-laws and statutes of England, had infected most of the gentry of England with their maxims and cases prejudged, which they call precedents; and made them think so well of

their own knowledge in the law, that they were very glad of this occasion to shew it against the King, and thereby to gain a reputation with the Parliament of being good patriots, and wise statesmen.

B.

What was this commission of array?

A.

King William the Conqueror had gotten into his hands by victory all the land in England, of which he disposed some part as forests and chases for his recreation, and some part to lords and gentlemen that had assisted him or were to assist him in the wars. Upon which he laid a charge of service in his wars, some with more men, and some with less, according to the lands he had given them: whereby, when the King sent men unto them with commission to make use of their service, they were obliged to appear with arms, and to accompany the King to the wars for a certain time at their own charges: and such were the commissions by which this King did then make his levies.

B.

Why then was it not legal?

A.

No doubt but it was legal. But what did that amount to with men, that were already resolved to acknowledge for law nothing that was against their design of abolishing monarchy, and placing a sovereign and absolute arbitrary power in the House of Commons.

B.

To destroy monarchy, and set up the House of Commons, are two businesses.

A.

They found it so at last, but did not think it so then.

B.

Let us now come to the military part.

A.

I intended only the story of their injustice, impudence, and hypocrisy; therefore, for the proceeding of the war, I refer you to the history thereof written at large in English. I shall only make use of such a thread as is necessary for the filling up of such knavery, and folly also, as I shall observe in their several actions.
From York the King went to Hull, where was his magazine of arms for the northern parts of England, to try if they would admit him. The Parliament had made Sir John Hotham governor of the town, who caused the gates to be shut, and presenting himself upon the walls flatly denied him entrance: for which the King caused him to be proclaimed traitor, and sent a message to the Parliament to know if they owned the action.

B.

Upon what grounds?

A.

Their pretence was this; that neither this nor any other town in England was otherwise the King's, than in trust for the people of England.

B.

But what was that to the Parliament?

A.

Yes, say they; for we are the representatives of the people of England.

B.

I cannot see the force of this argument: we represent the people, ergo, all that the people has is ours. The mayor of Hull did represent the King. Is therefore all that the King had in Hull, the mayor's? The people of England may be represented with limitations, as to deliver a petition or the like. Does it follow that they, who deliver the petition, have right to all the towns in England? When began this Parliament to be a representative of England? Was it not November 3, 1640? Who was it the day before, that is November 2, that had the right to keep the King out of Hull and possess it for themselves? For there was then no Parliament. Whose was Hull then?

A.

I think it was the King's, not only because it was called the King's town upon Hull, but because the King himself did then and ever represent the person of the people of England. If he did not, who then did, the Parliament having no being?

B.

They might perhaps say, the people had then no representative.

A.

Then there was no commonwealth; and consequently, all the towns of England being the people's, you, and I, and any man else, might have put in for his share. You may see by this what weak people they were, that were carried into the rebellion by such reasoning as the Parliament used, and how impudent they were that did put such fallacies upon them.

B.

Surely they were such as were esteemed the wisest men in England, being upon that account chosen to be of the Parliament.

A.

And were they also esteemed the wisest men of England, that chose them?

B.

I cannot tell that. For I know it is usual with the freeholders in the counties, and the tradesmen in the cities and boroughs, to choose, as near as they can, such as are most repugnant to the giving of subsidies.

A.

The King in the beginning of August, after he had summoned Hull, and tried some of the counties thereabout what they would do for him, sets

up his standard at Nottingham; but there came not in thither men enough to make an army sufficient to give battle to the Earl of Essex. From thence he went to Shrewsbury, where he was quickly furnished; and appointing the Earl of Lindsey to be general, he resolved to march towards London. The Earl of Essex was now at Worcester with the Parliament's army, making no offer to stop him in his passage; but as soon as he was gone by, marched close after him.

The King, therefore, to avoid being enclosed between the army of the Earl of Essex and the city of London, turned upon him and gave him battle at Edgehill: where though he got not an entire victory, yet he had the better, if either had the better; and had certainly the fruit of a victory, which was to march on in his intended way towards London: in which the next morning he took Banbury-castle, and from thence went to Oxford, and thence to Brentford, where he gave a great defeat to three regiments of the Parliament's forces, and so returned to Oxford.

B.

Why did not the King go on from Brentford?

A.

The Parliament, upon the first notice of the King's marching from Shrewsbury, caused all the trained-bands and the auxiliaries of the city of London (which was so frightened as to shut up all their shops) to be drawn forth; so that there was a most complete and numerous army ready for the Earl of Essex, that was crept into London just at the time to head it. And this was it that made the King retire to Oxford. In the beginning of February after, Prince Rupert took Cirencester from the Parliament, with many prisoners and many arms: for it was newly made a magazine. And thus stood the business between the King's and the

Parliament's greatest forces. The Parliament in the meantime caused a line of communication to be made about London and the suburbs, of twelve miles in compass; and constituted a committee for the association, and the putting into a posture of defence, of the counties of Essex, Cambridge, Suffolk, and some others; and one of these commissioners was Oliver Cromwell, from which employment he came to his following greatness.

B.

What was done during this time in other parts of the country?

A.

In the west, the Earl of Stamford had the employment of putting in execution the ordinance of Parliament for the militia; and Sir Ralph Hopton for the King executed the commission of array. Between these two was fought a battle at Liskeard in Cornwall, wherein Sir Ralph Hopton had the victory, and presently took a town called Saltash, with many arms and much ordnance and many prisoners. Sir William Waller in the meantime seized Winchester and Chichester for the Parliament. In the north, for the commission of array, my Lord of Newcastle, and for the militia of the Parliament was my Lord Fairfax. My Lord of Newcastle took from the Parliament Tadcaster, in which were a great part of the Parliament's forces for that country, and had made himself, in a manner, master of all the north. About this time, that is to say in February, the Queen landed at Burlington, and was conducted by my Lord of Newcastle and the Marquis of Montrose to York, and not long after to the King. Divers other little advantages, besides these, the King's party had of the Parliament's in the north.

There happened also between the militia of the Parliament and the Commission of Array in Staffordshire, under my Lord Brook for the Parliament and my Lord of Northampton for the King, great contention, wherein both these commanders were slain. For my Lord Brook, besieging Litchfield-Close, was killed with a shot; notwithstanding which they gave not over the siege till they were masters of the Close. But presently after, my Lord of Northampton besieged it again for the King; which to relieve, Sir William Brereton and Sir John Gell advanced towards Litchfield, and were met at Hopton Heath by the Earl of Northampton, and routed. The Earl himself was slain; but his forces with victory returned to the siege again; and shortly after, seconded by Prince Rupert, who was then abroad in that country, carried the place. These were the chief actions of this year, 1642; wherein the King's party had not much the worse.

B.

But the Parliament had now a better army; insomuch that if the Earl of Essex had immediately followed the King to Oxford, not yet well fortified, he might in all likelihood have taken it. For he could not want either men or ammunition, whereof the city of London, which was wholly at the Parliament's devotion, had store enough.

A.

I cannot judge of that. But this is manifest, considering the estate the King was in at his first marching from York, when he had neither money nor men nor arms enough to put them in hope of victory, that this year, take it altogether, was very prosperous.

B.

But what great folly or wickedness do you observe in the Parliament's actions for this first year?

A.

All that can be said against them in that point, will be excused with the pretext of war, and come under one name of rebellion; saving that when they summoned any town, it was always in the name of King and Parliament, the King being in the contrary army, and many times beating them from the siege. I do not see how the right of war can justify such impudence as that. But they pretended that the King was always virtually in the two Houses of Parliament; making a distinction between his person natural and politic; which made the impudence the greater, besides the folly of it. For this was but an university quibble, such as boys make use of in maintaining in the schools such tenets as they cannot otherwise defend.

In the end of this year they solicited also the Scots to enter England with an army, to suppress the power of the Earl of Newcastle in the North; which was a plain confession, that the Parliament's forces were, at this time, inferior to the King's. And most men thought, that if the Earl of Newcastle had then marched southward, and joined his forces with the King's, most of the members of Parliament would have fled out of England.

In the beginning of 1643 the Parliament, seeing the Earl of Newcastle's power in the North grown so formidable, sent to the Scots to hire them to an invasion of England, and (to compliment them in the meantime) made a covenant amongst themselves, such as the Scots had before taken against episcopacy, and demolished crosses and church-windows, such as had in them any images of saints, throughout all England. Also

in the middle of the year, they made a solemn league with the nation, which was called the Solemn League and Covenant.

B.

Are not the Scots as properly to be called foreigners as the Irish? Seeing then they persecuted the Earl of Strafford even to death, for advising the King to make use of Irish forces against the Parliament, with what face could they call in a Scotch army against the King?

A.

The King's party might easily here have discerned their design, to make themselves absolute masters of the kingdom and to dethrone the King. Another great impudence, or rather a bestial incivility, it was of theirs, that they voted the Queen a traitor, for helping the King with some ammunition and English forces from Holland.

B.

Was it possible that all this could be done, and men not see that papers and declarations must be useless; and that nothing could satisfy them but the deposing of the King, and setting up of themselves in his place?

A.

Yes; very possible. For who was there of them, though knowing that the King had the sovereign power, that knew the essential rights of sovereignty? They dreamt of a mixed power, of the King and the two Houses. That it was a divided power, in which there could be no peace, was above their understanding. Therefore they were always urging the King to declarations and treaties, for fear of subjecting themselves to the

King in an absolute obedience; which increased the hope and courage of the rebels, but did the King little good. For the people either understand not, or will not trouble themselves with controversies in writing, but rather, by his compliance and messages, go away with an opinion that the Parliament was likely to have the victory in the war. Besides, seeing the penners and contrivers of these papers were formerly members of the Parliament, and of another mind, and now revolted from the Parliament because they could not bear that sway in the House which they expected, men were apt to think they believed not what they writ.

As for military actions (to begin at the head quarters) Prince Rupert took Birmingham, a garrison of the Parliament's. In July after, the King's forces had a great victory over the Parliament's, near Devizes on Roundway-Down, where they took 2,000 prisoners, four brass pieces of ordnance, twenty-eight colours, and all their baggage; and shortly after, Bristol was surrendered to Prince Rupert for the King; and the King himself marching into the west, took from the Parliament many other considerable places.

But this good fortune was not a little allayed by his besieging of Gloucester, which after it was reduced to the last gasp, was relieved by the Earl of Essex; whose army was before greatly wasted, but now suddenly recruited with the trained bands and apprentices of London.

B.

It seems not only by this, but also by many examples in history, that there can hardly arise a long or dangerous rebellion, that has not some such overgrown city with an army or two in its belly to foment it.

A.

Nay more; those great capital cities, when rebellion is upon pretence of grievances, must needs be of the rebel party: because the grievances are but taxes, to which citizens, that is, merchants, whose profession is their private gain, are naturally mortal enemies; their only glory being to grow excessively rich by the wisdom of buying and selling.

B.

But they are said to be of all callings the most benefical to the commonwealth, by setting the poorer sort of people on work.

A.

That is to say, by making poor people sell their labour to them at their own prices; so that poor people, for the most part, might get a better living by working in Bridewell, than by spinning, weaving, and other such labour as they can do; saving that by working slightly they may help themselves a little, to the disgrace of our manufacture. And as most commonly they are the first encouragers of rebellion, presuming of their strength; so also are they, for the most part, the first to repent, deceived by them that command their strength.

But to return to the war; though the King withdrew from Gloucester, yet it was not to fly from, but to fight with the Earl of Essex, which presently after he did at Newbury, where the battle was bloody, and the King had not the worst, unless Cirencester be put into the scale, which the Earl of Essex had in his way a few days before surprised.

But in the north and the west, the King had much the better of the Parliament. For in the north, at the very beginning of the year, March 29th, the Earls of Newcastle and Cumberland defeated the Lord Fairfax, who commanded in those parts for the Parliament, at Bramham Moor; which made the Parliament to hasten the assistance of the Scots.

In June following the Earl of Newcastle routed Sir Thomas Fairfax, son to the Lord Fairfax, upon Adderton Heath, and, in pursuit of them to Bradford, took and killed 2,000 men, and the next day took the town and 2,000 prisoners more (Sir Thomas himself hardly escaping) with all their arms and ammunition; and besides this, made the Lord Fairfax quit Halifax and Beverley. Lastly, Prince Rupert relieved Newark, besieged by Sir John Meldrun for the Parliament with 7,000 men, whereof 1,000 were slain; the rest upon articles departed, leaving behind them their arms, bag and baggage.

To balance in part this success, the Earl of Manchester, whose lieutenant-general was Oliver Cromwell, got a victory over the royalists near Horncastle, of whom he slew 400, took 800 prisoners and 1,000 arms, and presently after took and plundered the city of Lincoln.

In the West, May the 16th, Sir Ralph Hopton at Stratton, in Cornwall, had a victory over the Parliamentarians, wherein he took 1700 prisoners, thirteen brass pieces of ordnance, and all their ammunition, which was seventy barrels of powder; and the magazine of their other provisions in the town.

Again at Lansdown, between Sir Ralph Hopton and the Parliamentarians under Sir William Waller, was fought a fierce battle, wherein the victory was not very clear on either side; saving that the Parliamentarians might seem to have the better, because presently after Sir William Waller followed Sir Ralph Hopton to Devizes, in Wiltshire, though to his cost; for there he was overthrown, as I have already told you.

After this the King in person marched into the West, and took Exeter, Dorchester, Barnstable, and divers other places; and had he not at his return besieged Gloucester, and thereby given the Parliament time for new levies, it was thought by many he might have routed the House of

Commons. But the end of this year was more favourable to the Parliament. For in January the Scots entered England, and, March the 1st, crossed the Tyne; and whilst the Earl of Newcastle was marching to them, Sir Thomas Fairfax gathered together a considerable party in Yorkshire, and the Earl of Manchester from Lyn advanced towards York; so that the Earl of Newcastle having two armies of the rebels behind him, and another before him, was forced to retreat to York; which those three armies joining presently besieged. And these are all the considerable military actions of the year 1643.

In the same year the Parliament caused to be made a new Great Seal. The Lord Keeper had carried the former seal to Oxford. Hereupon the King sent a messenger to the judges at Westminster, to forbid them to make use of it. This messenger was taken, and condemned at a council of war, and hanged for a spy.

B.

Is that the law of war?

A.

I know not: but it seems, when a soldier comes into the enemies' quarters without address or notice given to the chief commander, that it is presumed he comes as a spy. The same year, when certain gentlemen at London received a commission of array from the King to levy men for his service in that city, being discovered, they were condemned, and some of them executed. This case is not much unlike the former.

B.

Was not the making of a new Great Seal a sufficient proof that the war was raised, not to remove evil counsellors from the King, but to remove the King himself from the government? What hope then could there be had in messages and treaties?

A.

The entrance of the Scots was a thing unexpected to the King, who was made to believe by continual letters from his commissioner in Scotland, Duke Hamilton, that the Scotch never intended any invasion. The Duke being then at Oxford, the King, assured that the Scotch were now entered, sent him prisoner to Pendennis Castle in Cornwall.

In the beginning of the year 1644, the Earl of Newcastle being, as I told you, besieged by the joint forces of the Scots, the Earl of Manchester and Sir Thomas Fairfax, the King sent Prince Rupert to relieve the town, and as soon as he could to give the enemy battle. Prince Rupert passing through Lancashire, and by the way having stormed that seditious town of Bolton, and taken Stockford and Liverpool, came to York July the 1st, and relieved it; the enemy being risen thence to a place called Marston Moor, about four miles off; and there was fought that unfortunate battle, which lost the King in a manner all the north. Prince Rupert returned by the way he came, and the Earl of Newcastle to York, and thence with some of his officers over the sea to Hamburgh.

The honour of this victory was attributed chiefly to Oliver Cromwell, the Earl of Manchester's lieutenant-general. The Parliamentarians returned from the field to the siege of York, which not long after, upon honourable articles, was surrendered; not that they were favoured, but because the Parliament employed not much time nor many men in sieges.

B.

This was a great and sudden abatement of the King's prosperity.

A.

It was so; but amends was made him for it within five or six weeks after. For Sir William Waller, after the loss of his army at Roundway-Down, had another raised for him by the city of London; who for the payment thereof imposed a weekly tax of the value of one meal's meat upon every citizen. This army, with that of the Earl of Essex, intended to besiege Oxford; which the King understanding, sent the Queen into the west, and marched himself towards Worcester. This made them to divide again, and the Earl to go into the west, and Waller to pursue the King. By this means, as it fell out, both their armies were defeated. For the King turned upon Waller, routed him at Cropredy-bridge, took his train of artillery and many officers; and then presently followed the Earl of Essex into Cornwall, where he had him at such advantage, that the Earl himself was fain to escape in a small boat to Plymouth; his horse broke through the King's quarters by night, but the infantry were all forced to lay down their arms, and upon condition never more to bear arms against the King were permitted to depart.

In October following was fought a second and sharp battle at Newbury. For this infantry, making no conscience of the conditions made with the King, being now come towards London as far as Basingstoke, had arms put again into their hands; to whom some of the trained-bands being added, the Earl of Essex had suddenly so great an army, that he attempted the King again at Newbury; and certainly had the better of the day, but the night parting them, had not a complete victory. And it was

observed here, that no part of the Earl's army fought so keenly as they who had laid down their arms in Cornwall.

These were the most important fights in the year 1644, and the King was yet, as both himself and others thought, in as good condition as the Parliament, which despaired of victory by the commanders they then used. Therefore they voted a new modelling of the army, suspecting the Earl of Essex, though I think wrongfully, to be too much a royalist, for not having done so much as they looked for in this second battle at Newbury. The Earls of Essex and Manchester, perceiving what they went about, voluntarily laid down their commissions; and the House of Commons made an ordinance, that no member of either House should enjoy any office or command, military or civil; with which oblique blow they shook off those that had hitherto served them too well. And yet out of this ordinance they excepted Oliver Cromwell, in whose conduct and valour they had very great confidence (which they would not have done, if they had known him as well then as they did afterwards), and made him lieutenant-general to Sir Thomas Fairfax, their new-made general. In the commission to the Earl of Essex, there was a clause for the preservation of his Majesty's person, which in this new commission was left out; though the Parliament as well as the general were as yet Presbyterian.

B.

It seems the Presbyterians also in order to their ends would fain have had the King murdered.

A.

For my part I doubt it not. For a rightful king living, an usurping power can never be sufficiently secured.

In this same year the Parliament put to death Sir John Hotham and his son, for tampering with the Earl of Newcastle about the rendition of Hull; and Sir Alexander Carew, for endeavouring to deliver up Plymouth, where he was governor for the Parliament; and the Archbishop of Canterbury, for nothing but to please the Scots; for the general article of going about to subvert the fundamental laws of the land, was no accusation, but only foul words. They then also voted down the Book of Common-prayer, and ordered the use of a Directory, which had been newly composed by an Assembly of Presbyterian ministers. They were also then, with much ado, prevailed with for a treaty with the King at Uxbridge; where they remitted nothing of their former demands. The King had also at this time a Parliament at Oxford, consisting of such discontented members as had left the Houses at Westminster; but few of them had changed their old principles, and therefore that Parliament was not much worth. Nay rather, because they endeavoured nothing but messages and treaties, that is to say, defeating of the soldiers' hope of benefit by the war, they were thought by most men to do the King more hurt than good.

The year 1645 was to the King very unfortunate; for by the loss of one great battle, he lost all he had formerly gotten, and at length his life. The new modelled army, after consultation whether they should lay siege to Oxford or march westward to the relief of Taunton, (then besieged by the Lord Goring, and defended by Blake, famous afterwards for his actions at sea), resolved for Taunton; leaving Cromwell to attend the motions of the King, though not strong enough to hinder him. The King upon this advantage drew his forces and artillery out of Oxford. This made the Parliament to call back their general, Fairfax, and order him to besiege Oxford. The King in the meantime relieved Chester, which was besieged by Sir William Brereton, and coming back took Leicester by

force; a place of great importance, and well provided of artillery and provision.

Upon this success it was generally thought that the King's party was the stronger. The King himself thought so; and the Parliament in a manner confessed the same, by commanding Fairfax to rise from the siege, and endeavour to give the King battle. For the successes of the King, and the divisions and treacheries growing now amongst themselves, had driven them to rely upon the fortune of one day; in which, at Naseby, the King's army was utterly overthrown, and no hope left him to raise another. Therefore after the battle he went up and down, doing the Parliament here and there some shrewd turns, but never much increasing his number.

Fairfax in the meantime first recovered Leicester, and then marching into the west subdued it all, except only a few places, forcing with much ado my Lord Hopton upon honourable conditions to disband his army, and with the Prince of Wales to pass over to Scilly; whence not long after they went to Paris.

In April 1646 General Fairfax began to march back to Oxford. In the meantime Rainsborough, who besieged Woodstock, had it surrendered. The King therefore, who was now also returned to Oxford, from whence Woodstock is but six miles, not doubting but that he should there by Fairfax be besieged, and having no army, to relieve him, resolved to get away disguised to the Scotch army about Newark; and thither he came the 4th of May; and the Scotch army, being upon remove homewards, carried him with them to Newcastle, whither he came May 13th.

B.

Why did the King trust himself with the Scots? They were the first that rebelled. They were Presbyterians, that is, cruel; besides, they were

indigent, and consequently might be suspected would sell him to his enemies for money. And lastly, they were too weak to defend him, or keep him in their country.

A.

What could he have done better? For he had in the winter before sent to the Parliament to get a pass for the Duke of Richmond and others, to bring them propositions of peace; it was denied. He sent again; it was denied again. Then he desired he might come to them in person; this also was denied. He sent again and again to the same purpose; but instead of granting it, they made an ordinance, that the commanders of the militia of London, in case the King should attempt to come within the line of communication, should raise what force they thought fit to suppress tumults, to apprehend such as came with him, and to secure, that is to imprison, his person from danger. If the King had adventured to come, and had been imprisoned, what could the Parliament have done with him? They had dethroned him by their votes, and therefore could have no security whilst he lived, though in prison. It may be they would not have put him to death by a high court of justice publicly, but secretly some other way.

B.

He should have attempted to get beyond sea.

A.

That had been from Oxford very difficult. Besides, it was generally believed that the Scotch army had promised him, that not only his Majesty, but also his friends that should come with him, should be in

their army safe; not only for their persons, but also for their honours and consciences. It is a pretty trick, when the army and the particular soldiers of the army are different things, to make the soldiers promise what the army means not to perform.

July the 11th the Parliament sent their propositions to the King at Newcastle; which propositions they pretended to be the only way to a settled and well grounded peace. They were brought by the Earl of Pembroke, the Earl of Suffolk, Sir Walter Earle, Sir John Hippisley, Mr. Goodwin, and Mr. Robinson; whom the King asked if they had power to treat; and when they said no, why they might not as well have been sent by a trumpeter. The propositions were the same dethroning ones which they used to send, and therefore the King would not assent to them. Nor did the Scots swallow them at first, but made some exceptions against them; only, it seems, to make the Parliament perceive they meant not to put the King into their hands gratis. And so at last the bargain was made between them; and upon the payment of 200,000l. the King was put into the hands of the commissioners, which the English Parliament sent down to receive him.

B.

What a vile complexion has this action, compounded of feigned religion and very covetousness, cowardice, perjury, and treachery!

A.

Now the war, that seemed to justify many unseemly things, is ended, you will see almost nothing else in these rebels but baseness and falseness besides their folly.

By this time the Parliament had taken in all the rest of the King's garrisons; whereof the last was Pendennis Castle, whither Duke

Hamilton had been sent prisoner by the King.

B.

What was done during this time in Ireland and Scotland?

A.

In Ireland there had been a peace made by order from his Majesty for a time, which by divisions amongst the Irish was ill kept. The Popish party, the Pope's nuncio being then there, took this to be the time for delivering themselves from their subjection to the English. Besides, the time of the peace was now expired.

B.

How were they subject to the English, more than the English to the Irish? They were subject to the King of England; but so also were the English to the King of Ireland.

A.

This distinction is somewhat too subtile for common understandings. In Scotland the Marquis of Montrose for the King, with very few men and miraculous victories, had overrun all Scotland, where many of his forces, out of too much security, were permitted to be absent for awhile; of which the enemy having intelligence, suddenly came upon them, and forced them to fly back into the Highlands to recruit; where he began to recover strength, when he was commanded by the King, then in the hands of the Scots at Newcastle, to disband; and he departed from Scotland by sea.

In the end of the same year, 1646, the Parliament caused the King's Great Seal to be broken; also the King was brought to Holmeby, and there kept by the Parliament's commissioners. And here was an end of that war as to England and Scotland, but not to Ireland. About this time also died the Earl of Essex, whom the Parliament had discarded.

B.

Now that there was peace in England, and the King in prison, in whom was the sovereign power?

A.

The right was certainly in the King, but the exercise was yet in nobody; but contended for as in a game at cards, without fighting, all the years 1647 and 1648, between the Parliament and Oliver Cromwell, lieutenant-general to Sir Thomas Fairfax.

You must know, that when King Henry VIII abolished the pope's authority here, and took upon him to be the head of the Church, the bishops, as they could not resist him, so neither were they discontented with it. For whereas before the pope allowed not the bishops to claim jurisdiction in their diocesses jure divino, that is of right immediately from God, but by the gift and authority of the pope, now that the pope was ousted, they made no doubt but that the divine right was in themselves. After this, the city of Geneva, and divers other places beyond sea, having revolted from the papacy, set up presbyteries for the government of their several churches. And divers English scholars, that went beyond sea during the persecution in the time of Queen Mary, were much taken with this government, and at their return in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and ever since, have endeavoured, to the great trouble of the Church and nation, to set up that government here, wherein they

might domineer and applaud their own wit and learning. And these took upon them not only a Divine right, but also a Divine inspiration. And having been connived at, and countenanced sometimes in their frequent preaching, they introduced many strange and many pernicious doctrines, out-doing the Reformation, as they pretended, both of Luther and Calvin; receding from the former divinity or church philosophy (for religion is another thing), as much as Luther and Calvin had receded from the pope; and distracted their auditors into a great number of sects, as Brownists, Anabaptists, Independents, Fifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, and divers others, all commonly called by the name of fanatics: insomuch as there was no so dangerous an enemy to the Presbyterians, as this brood of their own hatching.

These were Cromwell's best cards, whereof he had a very great number in the army, and some in the House, whereof he himself was thought one; though he were nothing certain, but, applying himself always to the faction that was strongest, was of a colour like it.

There were in the army a great number, if not the greatest part, that aimed only at rapine and sharing the lands and goods of their enemies; and these also, upon the opinion they had of Cromwell's valour and conduct, thought they could not any way better arrive at their ends than by adhering to him. Lastly, in the Parliament itself, though not the major part, yet a considerable number were fanatics enough to put in doubts, and cause delay in the resolutions of the House, and sometimes also by advantage of a thin House to carry a vote in favour of Cromwell, as they did upon the 26th of July. For whereas on the 4th of May precedent the Parliament had voted that the militia of London should be in the hands of a committee of citizens, whereof the Lord Mayor for the time being should be one; shortly after, the Independents, chancing to be the

majority, made an ordinance, by which it was put into hands more favourable to the army.

The best cards the Parliament had, were the city of London and the person of the King. The General, Sir Thomas Fairfax, was right Presbyterian, but in the hands of the army, and the army in the hands of Cromwell; but which party should prevail, depended on the playing of the game. Cromwell protested still obedience and fidelity to the Parliament; but meaning nothing less, bethought him and resolved on a way to excuse himself of all that he should do to the contrary upon the army. Therefore he and his son-in-law, Commissary-General Ireton (as good at contriving as himself, and at speaking and writing better), contrive how to mutiny the army against the Parliament. To this end they spread a whisper through the army, that the Parliament, now they had the King, intended to disband them, to cheat them of their arrears, and to send them into Ireland to be destroyed by the Irish. The army being herewith enraged, were taught by Ireton to erect a council amongst themselves of two soldiers out of every troop and every company, to consult for the good of the army, and to assist at the council of war, and to advise for the peace and safety of the kingdom. These were called adjutators; so that whatsoever Cromwell would have to be done, he needed nothing to make them do it but secretly to put it into the head of these adjutators. The effect of the first consultation was to take the King from Holmeby and to bring him to the army.

The general hereupon, by letter to the Parliament, excuses himself and Cromwell, and the body of the army, as ignorant of the fact; and that the King came away willingly with those soldiers that brought him: assuring them withal, that the whole army intended nothing but peace, nor opposed Presbytery, nor affected Independency, nor did hold any licentious freedom in religion.

B.

It is strange that Sir Thomas Fairfax could be so abused by Cromwell as to believe this which he himself here writes.

A.

I cannot believe that Cornet Joyce could go out of the army with 1,000 soldiers to fetch the King, and neither the general nor the lieutenant-general, nor the body of the army take notice of it. And that the King went willingly, appears to be false by a message sent on purpose from his Majesty to the Parliament.

B.

Here is perfidy upon perfidy: first, the perfidy of the Parliament against the King, and then the perfidy of the army against the Parliament.

A.

This was the first trick Cromwell played, whereby he thought himself to have gotten so great an advantage that he said openly, “That he had the Parliament in his pocket,” as indeed he had, and the city too. For upon the news of it they were, both one and the other, in very great disorder, and the more, because there came with it a rumour that the army was marching up to London.
The King in the meantime, till his residence was settled at Hampton Court, was carried from place to place, not without some ostentation; but with much more liberty, and with more respect shewn him by far, than when he was in the hands of the Parliament’s commissioners; for his own chaplains were allowed him, and his children and some friends

permitted to see him. Besides that, he was much complimented by Cromwell, who promised him, in a serious and seeming passionate manner, to restore him to his right against the Parliament.

B.

How was he sure he could do that?

A.

He was not sure; but he was resolved to march up to the city and Parliament, to set up the King again, and be the second man, unless in the attempt he found better hope, than yet he had, to make himself the first man by dispossessing the King.

B.

What assistance against the Parliament and the city could Cromwell expect from the King?

A.

By declaring directly for him he might have had all the King's party, which were many more now since his misfortune than ever they were before. For in the Parliament itself, there were many that had discovered the hypocrisy and private aims of their fellows: many were converted to their duty by their own natural reason; and their compassion for the King's sufferings had begot generally an indignation against the Parliament: so that if they had been by the protection of the present army brought together and embodied, Cromwell might have done what he had pleased, in the first place for the King, and in the second for

himself. But it seems he meant first to try what he could do without the King; and if that proved enough, to rid his hands of him.

B.

What did the Parliament and city do to oppose the army?

A.

First, the Parliament sent to the general to redeliver the King to their commissioners. Instead of an answer to this, the army sent articles to the Parliament, and with them a charge against eleven of their members, all of them active Presbyterians: of which articles these are some: 1. That the House may be purged of those, who, by the self-denying ordinance, ought not to be there; 2. That such as abused and endangered the kingdom, might be disabled to do the like hereafter; 3. That a day might be appointed to determine this Parliament; 4. That they would make an account to the kingdom of the vast sums of money they had received; 5. That the eleven members might presently be suspended sitting in the House. These were the articles that put them to their trumps; and they answered none of them, but that of the suspension of the eleven members, which they said they could not do by law till the particulars of the charge were produced: but this was soon answered with their own proceeding against the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Earl of Strafford.

The Parliament being thus somewhat awed, and the King made somewhat confident, he undertakes the city, requiring the Parliament to put the militia of London into other hands.

B.

What other hands? I do not well understand you.

A.

I told you that the militia of London was, on the 4th of May, put into the hands of the lord-mayor and other citizens, and soon after put into the hands of other men more favourable to the army. And now I am to tell you, that on July the 26th, the violence of certain apprentices and disbanded soldiers forced the Parliament to re-settle it as it was, in the citizens; and hereupon the two speakers and divers of the members ran away to the army, where they were invited and contented to sit and vote in the council of war in nature of a Parliament. And out of the citizens' hands they would have the militia taken away, and put again into those hands out of which it was taken the 26th of July.

B.

What said the city to this?

A.

The Londoners manned their works, viz: the line of communication; raised an army of valiant men within the line; chose good officers, all being desirous to go out and fight whensoever the city should give them order; and in that posture stood expecting the enemy.
The soldiers in the meantime enter into an engagement to live and die with Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the Parliament, and the army.

B.

That is very fine. They imitate that which the Parliament did, when they first took up arms against the King, styling themselves the King and

Parliament, maintaining that the King was always virtually in his Parliament: so the army now, making war against the Parliament, called themselves the Parliament and the army: but they might, with more reason, say, that the Parliament, since it was in Cromwell's pocket, was virtually in the army.

A.

Withal they send out a declaration of the grounds of their march towards London; wherein they take upon them to be judges of the Parliament, and of who are fit to be trusted with the business of the kingdom, giving them the name, not of the Parliament, but of the gentlemen at Westminster. For since the violence they were under July the 26th, the army denied them to be a lawful Parliament. At the same time they sent a letter to the mayor and aldermen of London, reproaching them with those late tumults; telling them they were enemies to the peace, treacherous to the Parliament, unable to defend either the Parliament or themselves; and demanded to have the city delivered into their hands, to which purpose, they said, they were now coming to them. The general also sent out his warrants to the counties adjacent, summoning their trained soldiers to join with them.

B.

Were the trained soldiers part of the general's army?

A.

No, nor at all in pay, nor could be without an order of Parliament. But what might an army not do, after it had mastered all the laws of the land? The army being come to Hounslow Heath, distant from London

but ten miles, the Court of Aldermen was called to consider what to do. The captains and soldiers of the city were willing, and well provided, to go forth and give them battle. But a treacherous officer, that had charge of a work on Southwark side, had let in within the line a small party of the enemies, who marched as far as to the gate of London-bridge; and then the Court of Aldermen, their hearts failing them, submitted on these conditions: to relinquish their militia; to desert the eleven members; to deliver up the forts and line of communication, together with the Tower of London, and all magazines and arms therein, to the army; to disband their forces and turn out all the reformadoes, that is, all Essex's old soldiers; to draw off the guards from the Parliament. All which was done, and the army marched triumphantly through the principal streets of the city.

B.

It is strange that the mayor and aldermen, having such an army, should so quickly yield. Might they not have resisted the party of the enemy at the bridge, with a party of their own; and the rest of the enemies, with the rest of their own?

A.

I cannot judge of that: but to me it would have been strange if they had done otherwise. For I consider the most part of rich subjects, that have made themselves so by craft and trade, as men that never look upon anything but their present profit; and who, to every thing not lying in that way, are in a manner blind, being amazed at the very thought of plundering. If they had understood what virtue there is to preserve their wealth in obedience to their lawful sovereign, they would never have sided with the Parliament; and so we had had no need of arming. The

mayor and aldermen therefore, being assured by this submission to save their goods, and not sure of the same by resisting, seem to me to have taken the wisest course. Nor was the Parliament less tame than the city. For presently, August the 6th, the general brought the fugitive speakers and members to the House with a strong guard of soldiers, and replaced the speakers in their chairs. And for this they gave the general thanks, not only there in the House, but appointed also a day for a holy thanksgiving; and not long after made him Generalissimo of all the forces of England and Constable of the Tower. But in effect all this was the advancement of Cromwell; for he was the usufructuary, though the property were in Sir Thomas Fairfax. For the Independents immediately cast down the whole line of communication; divided the militia of London, Westminster and Southwark, which were before united; displaced such governors of towns and forts as were not for their turn, though placed there by ordinance of Parliament; instead of whom, they put in men of their own party. They also made the Parliament to declare null all that had passed in the Houses from July the 26th to August the 6th, and clapped in prison some of the lords, and some of the most eminent citizens, whereof the lord mayor was one.

B.

Cromwell had power enough now to restore the King. Why did he not?

A.

His main end was to set himself in his place. The restoring of the King was but a reserve against the Parliament, which being in his pocket, he had no more need of the King, who was now an impediment to him. To keep him in the army was a trouble; to let him fall into the hands of the Presbyterians had been a stop to his hopes; to murder him privately,

besides the horror of the act, now whilst he was no more than lieutenant-general, would have made him odious without furthering his design. There was nothing better for his purpose than to let him escape from Hampton Court, where he was too near the Parliament, whither he pleased beyond the sea. For though Cromwell had a great party in the Parliament House whilst they saw not his ambition to be their master, yet they would have been his enemies as soon as that had appeared. To make the King attempt an escape, some of those that had him in custody, by Cromwell's direction told him that the adjutators meant to murder him; and withal caused a rumour of the same to be generally spread, to the end it might that way also come to the King's ear, as it did.

The King, therefore, in a dark and rainy night, his guards being retired, as it was thought, on purpose, left Hampton Court and went to the sea-side about Southampton, where a vessel had been bespoken to transport him but failed; so that the King was forced to trust himself with Colonel Hammond, then governor of the Isle of Wight; expecting perhaps some kindness from him, for Dr. Hammond's sake, brother to the colonel and his Majesty's much favoured chaplain. But it proved otherwise; for the colonel sent to his masters of the Parliament, to receive their orders concerning him. This going into the Isle of Wight was not likely to be any part of Cromwell's design, who neither knew whither nor which way he would go; nor had Hammond known any more than other men, if the ship had come to the appointed place in due time.

B.

If the King had escaped into France, might not the French have assisted him with forces to recover his kingdom, and so frustrated the designs both of Cromwell and all the King's other enemies?

A.

Yes, much; just as they assisted his son, our present most gracious Sovereign, who two years before fled thither out of Cornwall.

B.

It is methinks no great polity in neighbouring princes to favour, so often as they do, one another's rebels, especially when they rebel against monarchy itself. They should rather, first, make a league against rebellion, and afterwards, if there be no remedy, fight one against another. Nor will that serve the turn amongst Christian sovereigns, till preaching be better looked to, whereby the interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latin Bible, is oftentimes the cause of civil war and the deposing and assassinating of God's anointed. And yet, converse with those divinity-disputers as long as you will, you will hardly find one in a hundred discreet enough to be employed in any great affair either of war or peace. It is not the right of the sovereign, though granted to him by every man's express consent, that can enable him to do his office; it is the obedience of the subject, that must do that. For what good is it to promise allegiance, and then by and by to cry out, as some ministers did in the pulpit, To your tents, O Israel!? Common people know nothing of right or wrong by their own meditation; they must therefore be taught the grounds of their duty, and the reasons why calamities ever follow disobedience to their lawful sovereigns. But to the contrary, our rebels were publicly taught rebellion in the pulpits; and that there was no sin, but the doing of what the preachers forbade, or the omission of what they advised. But now the King was the Parliament's prisoner, why did not the Presbyterians advance their own interest by restoring him?

A.

The Parliament, in which there were more Presbyterians yet than Independents, might have gotten what they would of the King during his life, if they had not by an unconscionable and sottish ambition obstructed the way to their ends. They sent him four propositions, to be signed and passed by him as Acts of Parliament; telling him, when these were granted, they would send commissioners to treat with him of any other articles.
The propositions were these: First, that the Parliament should have the militia, and the power of levying money to maintain it, for twenty years; and after that term, the exercise thereof to return to the King, in case the Parliament think the safety of the kingdom concerned in it.

B.

The first article takes from the King the militia, and consequently the whole sovereignty for ever.

A.

The second was, that the King should justify the proceedings of the Parliament against himself; and declare void all oaths and declarations made by him against the Parliament.

B.

This was to make him guilty of the war, and of all the blood spilt therein.

A.

The third was, to take away all titles of honour conferred by the King since the Great Seal was carried to him in May 1642.
The fourth was, that the Parliament should adjourn themselves, when, and to what place, and for what time they pleased.
These propositions the King refused to grant, as he had reason; but sent others of his own, not much less advantageous to the Parliament, and desired a personal treaty with the Parliament for the settling of the peace of the kingdom. But the Parliament denying them to be sufficient for that purpose, voted that there should be no more addresses made to him, nor messages received from him; but that they would settle the kingdom without him. And this they voted partly upon the speeches and menaces of the army-faction then present in the House of Commons, whereof one advised these three points: 1. To secure the King in some inland castle with guards; 2. To draw up articles of impeachment against him; 3. To lay him by, and settle the kingdom without him.
Another said, that his denying of the four bills was the denying protection to his subjects; and that therefore they might deny him subjection; and added, that till the Parliament forsook the army, the army would never forsake the Parliament. This was threatening.
Last of all, Cromwell himself told them, it was now expected that the Parliament should govern and defend the kingdom, and not any longer let the people expect their safety from a man whose heart God had hardened; nor let those, that had so well defended the Parliament, be left hereafter to the rage of an irreconcilable enemy, lest they seek their safety some other way. This again was threatening; as also the laying his hand upon his sword when he spake it.
And hereupon the vote of non-addresses was made an ordinance; which the House would afterwards have recalled, but was forced by Cromwell to keep their word.

The Scotch were displeased with it; partly, because their brethren the Presbyterians had lost a great deal of their power in England; and partly also, because they had sold the King into their hands.
The King now published a passionate complaint to his people of this hard dealing with him; which made them pity him, but not yet rise in his behalf.

B.

Was not this, think you, the true time for Cromwell to take possession?

A.

By no means. There were yet many obstacles to be removed. He was not general of the army. The army was still for a Parliament. The city of London discontented about their militia. The Scots expected with an army to rescue the King. His adjutators were levellers, and against monarchy, who though they had helped him to bring under the Parliament, yet, like dogs that are easily taught to fetch, and not easily taught to render, would not make him king. So that Cromwell had these businesses following to overcome, before he could formally make himself a sovereign prince: 1. To be Generalissimo: 2. To remove the King: 3. To suppress all insurrections here: 4. To oppose the Scots: and lastly, to dissolve the present Parliament. Mighty businesses, which he could never promise himself to overcome. Therefore I cannot believe he then thought to be King; but only by well serving the strongest party, which was always his main polity, to proceed as far as that and fortune would carry him.

B.

The Parliament were certainly no less foolish than wicked, in deserting thus the King, before they had the army at a better command than they had.

A.

In the beginning of 1648 the Parliament gave commission to Philip Earl of Pembroke, then made Chancellor of Oxford, together with some of the doctors there as good divines as he, to purge the University. By virtue whereof they turned out all such as were not of their faction, and all such as had approved the use of the Common-prayer-book; as also divers scandalous ministers and scholars, that is, such as customarily and without need took the name of God into their mouths, or used to speak wantonly, or use the company of lewd women: and for this last I cannot but commend them.

B.

So shall not I; for it is just such another piece of piety, as to turn men out of an hospital because they are lame. Where can a man probably learn godliness, and how to correct his vices, better than in the universities erected for that purpose?

A.

It may be, the Parliament thought otherwise. For I have often heard the complaints of parents, that their children were debauched there to drunkenness, wantonness, gaming, and other vices consequent to these. Nor is it a wonder amongst so many youths, if they did corrupt one another in despite of their tutors, who oftentimes were little elder than themselves. And therefore I think the Parliament did not much

reverence that institution of universities, as to the bringing up of young men to virtue; though many of them learned there to preach, and became thereby capable of preferment and maintenance; and some others were sent thither by their parents, to save themselves the trouble of governing them at home, during that time wherein children are least governable. Nor do I think the Parliament cared more for the clergy than other men did. But certainly an university is an excellent servant to the clergy; and the clergy, if it be not carefully looked to, by their dissensions in doctrines and by the advantage to publish their dissensions, is an excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions.

B.

But seeing there is no place in this part of the world, where philosophy and other human sciences are not highly valued; where can they be learned better than in the Universities?

A.

What other sciences? Do not divines comprehend all civil and moral philosophy within their divinity? And as for natural philosophy, is it not removed from Oxford and Cambridge to Gresham College in London, and to be learned out of their gazettes? But we are gone from our subject.

B.

No; we are indeed gone from the greater businesses of the kingdom; to which, if you please, let us return.

A.

The first insurrection, or rather tumult, was that of the apprentices, on the 9th of April. But this was not upon the King's account, but arose from a customary assembly of them for recreation in Moorfields, whence some zealous officers of the trained soldiers would needs drive them away by force; but were themselves routed with stones; and had their ensign taken away by the apprentices, which they carried about in the streets, and frighted the lord mayor into his house; where they took a gun called a drake; and then they set guards at some of the gates, and all the rest of the day childishly swaggered up and down: but the next day the general himself marching into the city, quickly dispersed them. This was but a small business, but enough to let them see that the Parliament was ill-beloved of the people.

Next, the Welch took arms against them. There were three colonels in Wales, Langhorne, Poyer, and Powel, who had formerly done the Parliament good service, but now were commanded to disband; which they refused to do; and the better to strengthen themselves, declared for the King; and were about 8,000.

About the same time, in Wales also, was another insurrection, headed by Sir Nicholas Keymish, and another under Sir John Owen; so that now all Wales was in rebellion against the Parliament: and yet all these were overcome in a month's time by Cromwell and his officers; but not without store of bloodshed on both sides.

B.

I do not much pity the loss of those men, that impute to the King that which they do upon their own quarrel.

A.

Presently after this, some of the people of Surrey sent a petition to the Parliament for a personal treaty between the King and Parliament; but their messengers were beaten home again by the soldiers that were quartered about Westminster and the mews. And then the Kentish men having a like petition to deliver, and seeing how ill it was like to be received, threw it away and took up arms. They had many gallant officers, and for general the Earl of Norwich; and increased daily by apprentices and old disbanded soldiers. Insomuch as the Parliament was glad to restore to the city their militia, and to keep guards on the Thames side: and then Fairfax marched towards the enemy.

B.

And then the Londoners, I think, might easily and suddenly have mastered, first the Parliament, and next Fairfax his 8,000, and lastly Cromwell's army; or at least have given the Scotch army opportunity to march unfoughten to London.

A.

It is true: but the city was never good at venturing; nor were they or the Scots principled to have a King over them, but under them. Fairfax marching with his 8,000 against the royalists, routed a part of them at Maidstone; another part were taking in other places in Kent further off; and the Earl of Norwich with the rest came to Blackheath, and thence sent to the city to get passage through it, to join with those which were risen in Essex under Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle; which being denied, the greatest part of his Kentish men deserted him. With the rest, not above 500, he crossed the Thames into the Isle of Dogs, and so to Bow, and thence to Colchester. Fairfax having notice of this, crossed the Thames at Gravesend; and overtaking them, besieged them

in Colchester. The town had no defence but a breastwork, and yet held out, upon hope of the Scotch army to relieve them, the space of two months. Upon the news of the defeat of the Scots they were forced to yield. The Earl of Norwich was sent prisoner to London. Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, two loyal and gallant persons, were shot to death. There was also another little insurrection, headed by the Earl of Holland, about Kingston; but quickly suppressed, and he himself taken prisoner.

B.

How came the Scots to be so soon dispatched?

A.

Merely, as it is said, for want of conduct. Their army was led by Duke Hamilton, who was then set at liberty, when Pendennis Castle, where he was prisoner, was taken by the Parliamentarians. He entered England with horse and foot 15,000, to which came above 3,000 English royalists. Against these Cromwell marched out of Wales with horse and foot 11,000, and near to Preston in Lancashire, in less than two hours, defeated them. And the cause of it is said to be, that the Scotch army was so ordered as they could not all come to the fight, nor relieve their fellows. After the defeat, they had no way to fly but further into England; so that in the pursuit they were almost all taken, and lost all that an army can lose; for the few that got home, did not all bring home their swords. Duke Hamilton was taken, and not long after sent to London. But Cromwell marched on to Edinburgh, and there, by the help of the faction which was contrary to Hamilton's, he made sure not to be hindered in his designs; the first whereof was to take away the King's life by the hand of the Parliament.

Whilst these things passed in the north, the Parliament, Cromwell being away, came to itself, and recalling their vote of non-addresses, sent to the King new propositions, somewhat, but not much, easier than formerly. And upon the King's answer to them, they sent commissioners to treat with him at Newport in the Isle of Wight; where they so long dodged with him about trifles, that Cromwell was come to London before they had done, to the King's destruction. For the army was now wholly at the devotion of Cromwell, who set the adjutators on work again to make a remonstrance to the House of Commons, wherein they require: 1. That the King be brought to justice: 2. That the Prince and the Duke of York be summoned to appear at a day appointed, and proceeded with, according as they should give satisfaction: 3. That the Parliament settle the peace and future government, and set a reasonable period to their own sitting, and make certain future Parliaments annual or biennial: 4. That a competent number of the King's chief instruments be executed. And this to be done both by the House of Commons and by a general agreement of the people testified by their subscriptions. Nor did they stay for an answer, but presently set a guard of soldiers at the Parliament-house door, and other soldiers in Westminster Hall, suffering none to go into the House but such as would serve their turns. All others were frighted away, or made prisoners, and some upon divers quarrels suspended; above ninety of them, because they had refused to vote against the Scots; and others, because they had voted against the vote of non-addresses: and the rest were a House for Cromwell. The fanatics also in the city being countenanced by the army, pack a new common-council, whereof any forty was to be above the mayor; and their first work was to frame a petition for justice against the King, which Tichborne, the mayor, involving the city in the regicide, delivered to the Parliament.

At the same time, with the like violence, they took the King from Newport in the Isle of Wight, to Hurst Castle, till things were ready for his trial. The Parliament in the meantime, to avoid perjury, by an ordinance declared void the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, and presently after made another to bring the King to his trial.

B.

This is a piece of law that I understood not before, that when many swear singly, they may, when they are assembled, if they please, absolve themselves.

A.

The ordinance being drawn up was brought into the House, where after three several readings it was voted, “that the Lords and Commons of England, assembled in Parliament, do declare, that by the fundamental laws of the realm, it is treason in the King of England to levy war against the Parliament.” And this vote was sent up to the Lords; and they denying their consent, the Commons in anger made another vote; “That all members of committees should proceed and act in any ordinance, whether the Lords concurred or no; and that the people, under God, are the original of all just power; and that the House of Commons have the supreme power of the nation; and that whatsoever the House of Commons enacteth, is law.” All this passed nemine contradicente.

B.

These propositions fight not only against the King of England, but against all the kings of the world. It were good they thought on it. But

yet, I believe, under God the original of all laws was in the people.

A.

But the people, for them and their heirs, by consent and oaths, have long ago put the supreme power of the nation into the hands of their kings, for them and their heirs; and consequently into the hands of this King, their known and lawful heir.

B.

But does not the Parliament represent the people?

A.

Yes, to some purposes; as to put up petitions to the King, when they have leave, and are grieved; but not to make a grievance of the King's power. Besides, the Parliament never represents the people but when the King calls them; nor is it to be imagined that he calls a Parliament to depose himself. Put the case, every county and borough should have given this Parliament for a benevolence a sum of money; and that every county, meeting in their county-court or elsewhere, and every borough in their town-hall, should have chosen men to carry their several sums respectively to the Parliament. Had not these men represented the whole nation?

B.

Yes, no doubt.

A.

Do you think the Parliament would have thought it reasonable to be called to account by this representative?

B.

No, sure; and yet I must confess the case is the same.

A.

This ordinance contained, first, a summary of the charge against the King, in substance this; that not content with the encroachments of his predecessors upon the freedom of the people, he had designed to set up a tyrannical government; and to that end, had raised and maintained in the land a civil war against the Parliament, whereby the country hath been miserably wasted, the public treasure exhausted, thousands of people murdered, and infinite other mischiefs committed. Secondly, a constitution passed of a high court of justice, that is, of a certain number of commissioners, of whom any twenty had power to try the King, and to proceed to sentence according to the merit of the cause, and see it speedily executed.

The commissioners met on Saturday, January 20th, in Westminster Hall, and the King was brought before them; where, sitting in a chair, he heard the charge read, but denied to plead to it either guilty or not guilty, till he should know by what lawful authority he was brought thither. The president told him that the Parliament affirmed their own authority; and the King still persevered in his refusal to plead. Though many words passed between him and the president, yet this was the substance of it all.

On Monday January 22nd the court met again, and the solicitor moved that if the King persisted in denying the authority of the court, the

charge might be taken pro confesso: but the King still denied their authority.

They met again January the 23rd, and then the solicitor moved the court for judgment; whereupon the King was required to give his final answer; which was again a denial of their authority.

Lastly, they met again January the 27th, where the King desired to be heard before the Lords and Commons in the Painted Chamber, and promising after that to abide the judgment of the court. The commissioners retired for half an hour to consider of it, and then returning caused the King to be brought again to the bar, and told him that what he proposed was but another denial of the court's jurisdiction; and that if he had no more to say, they would proceed. Then the King answering that he had no more to say, the president began a long speech in justification of the Parliament's proceedings, producing the examples of many kings killed or deposed by wicked Parliaments, ancient and modern, in England, Scotland, and other parts of the world. All which he endeavoured to justify from this only principle; that the people have the supreme power, and the Parliament is the people. This speech ended, the sentence of death was read; and the same upon Tuesday after, January 30th, executed at the gate of his own palace of Whitehall. He that can delight in reading how villainously he was used by the soldiers between the sentence and execution, may go to the chronicle itself; in which he shall see what courage, patience, wisdom, and goodness was in this prince, whom in their charge the members of that wicked Parliament styled tyrant, traitor, and murderer.

The King being dead, the same day they made an act of Parliament, that whereas several pretences might be made to the crown, &c. it is enacted by this present Parliament and by authority of the same, that no person presume to declare, proclaim, or publish, or any way promote Charles

Stuart, son of Charles late King of England, commonly called Prince of Wales, or any other person, to be King of England or Ireland, &c.

B.

Seeing the King was dead, and his successor barred; by what declared authority was the peace maintained?

A.

They had, in their anger against the Lords, formerly declared the supreme power of the nation to be in the House of Commons; and now, on February the 5th, they vote the House of Lords to be useless and dangerous. And thus the kingdom is turned into a democracy, or rather an oligarchy: for presently they made an act, that none of those members, who were secluded for opposing the vote of non-addresses, should ever be re-admitted. And these were commonly called the secluded members; and the rest were by some styled a Parliament, and by others the Rump.

I think you need not now have a catalogue, either of the vices, or of the crimes, or of the follies of the greatest part of them that composed the Long Parliament; than which greater cannot be in the world. What greater vices than irreligion, hypocrisy, avarice and cruelty; which have appeared so eminently in the actions of Presbyterian members, and Presbyterian ministers? What greater crimes than blaspheming and killing God's anointed; which was done by the hands of the Independents; but by the folly and first treason of the Presbyterians who betrayed and sold him to his murderers? Nor was it a little folly in the Lords, not to see that by the taking away of the King's power they lost withal their own privileges; or to think themselves, either for number or judgment, any way a considerable assistance to the House of Commons.

And for those men who had skill in the laws, it was no great sign of understanding not to perceive that the laws of the land were made by the King, to oblige his subjects to peace and justice, and not to oblige himself that made them. And lastly and generally, all men are fools which pull down anything which does them good, before they have set up something better in its place. He that would set up democracy with an army, should have an army to maintain it; but these men did it, when those men had the army that were resolved to pull it down. To these follies I might add the folly of those fine men, which out of their reading of Tully, Seneca, or other anti-monarchics, think themselves sufficient politicians, and show their discontents when they are not called to the management of the state, and turn from one side to another upon every neglect they fancy from the King or his enemies.

PART IV.

A.

You have seen the Rump in possession, as they believed, of the supreme power over the two nations of England and Ireland, and the army their servant; though Cromwell thought otherwise, serving them diligently for the advancement of his own purposes. I am now therefore to show you their proceedings.

B.

Tell me first, how this kind of government under the Rump or relic of a House of Commons is to be called?

A.

It is doubtless an oligarchy. For the supreme authority must needs be in one man or in more. If in one, it is monarchy; the Rump therefore was no monarchy. If the authority were in more than one, it was in all, or in fewer than all. When in all, it is democracy; for every man may enter into the assembly which makes the Sovereign Court; which they could not do here. It is therefore manifest, that the authority was in a few, and consequently the state was an oligarchy.

B.

Is it not impossible for a people to be well governed, that are to obey more masters than one?

A.

Both the Rump and all other sovereign assemblies, if they have but one voice, though they be many men, yet are they but one person. For contrary commands cannot consist in one and the same voice, which is the voice of the greatest part; and therefore they might govern well enough, if they had honesty and wit enough.
The first act of the Rump was the exclusion of those members of the House of Commons, which had been formerly kept out by violence for the procuring of an ordinance for the King's trial; for these men had appeared against the ordinance of non-addresses, and therefore were excluded, because they might else be an impediment to their future designs.

B.

Was it not rather, because in the authority of few they thought the fewer the better, both in respect of their shares and also of a nearer approach in every one of them to the dignity of king?

A.

Yes certainly, that was their principal end.

B.

When these were put out, why did not the counties and boroughs choose others in their places?

A.

They could not do that without order from the House.
After this they constituted a council of forty persons, which they termed a Council of State, whose office was to execute what the Rump should command.

B.

When there was neither King nor House of Lords, they could not call themselves a Parliament; for a Parliament is a meeting of the King, Lords, and Commons, to confer together about the businesses of the commonwealth. With whom did the Rump confer?

A.

Men may give to their assembly what name they please, what signification soever such name might formerly have had; and the Rump took the name of Parliament, as most suitable to their purpose, and such a name, as being venerable amongst the people for many hundred years, had countenanced and sweetened subsidies and other levies of money, otherwise very unpleasant to the subject. They took also afterwards another name, which was Custodes Libertatis Angliæ, which title they used only in their writs issuing out of the courts of justice.

B.

I do not see how a subject that is tied to the laws, can have more liberty in one form of government than another.

A.

Howsoever to the people, that understand by liberty nothing but leave to do what they list, it was a title not ingrateful.
Their next work was to set forth a public declaration, that they were fully resolved to maintain the fundamental laws of the nation, as to the preservation of the lives, liberties, and proprieties of the people.

B.

What did they mean by the fundamental laws of the nation?

A.

Nothing but to abuse the people. For the only fundamental law in every commonwealth, is to obey the laws from time to time, which he shall make to whom the people have given the supreme power. How likely then are they to uphold the fundamental laws, that had murdered him who was by themselves so often acknowledged for their lawful sovereign? Besides, at the same time that this declaration came forth, they were erecting that High Court of Justice which took away the lives of Duke Hamilton, the Earl of Holland, and the Lord Capel. Whatsoever they meant by a fundamental law, the erecting of this court was a breach of it, as being warranted by no former law or example in England.
At the same time also they levied taxes by soldiers, and to soldiers permitted free quarter, and did many other actions, which if the King had done, they would have said had been done against the liberty and propriety of the subject.

B.

What silly things are the common sort of people, to be cozened as they were so grossly!

A.

What sort of people, as to this matter, are not of the common sort? The craftiest knaves of all the Rump were no wiser than the rest whom they cozened. For the most of them did believe that the same things which they imposed upon the generality, were just and reasonable; and especially the great haranguers, and such as pretended to learning. For who can be a good subject in a monarchy, whose principles are taken from the enemies of monarchy, such as were Cicero, Seneca, Cato, and other politicians of Rome, and Aristotle of Athens, who seldom spake of kings but as of wolves and other ravenous beasts? You may perhaps think a man has need of nothing else to know the duty he owes to his governor, and what right he has to order him, but a good natural wit; but it is otherwise. For it is a science, and built upon sure and clear principles, and to be learned by deep and careful study, or from masters that have deeply studied it. And who was there in the Parliament or in the nation, that could find out those evident principles, and derive from them the necessary rules of justice, and the necessary connexion of justice and peace? The people have one day in seven the leisure to hear instruction, and there are ministers appointed to teach them their duty. But how have those ministers performed their office? A great part of them, namely, the Presbyterian ministers, throughout the whole war, instigated the people against the King; so did also Independents and other fanatic ministers. The rest, contented with their livings, preached in their parishes points of controversy, to religion impertinent, but to the breach of charity among themselves very effectual; or else eloquent things, which the people either understood not, or thought themselves not concerned in. But this sort of preachers, as they did little good, so they did little hurt. The mischief proceeded wholly from the

Presbyterian preachers, who, by a long practised histrionic faculty, preached up the rebellion powerfully.

B.

To what end?

A.

To the end that the State becoming popular, the Church might be so too, and governed by an Assembly; and by consequence, as they thought, seeing politics are subservient to religion, they might govern, and thereby satisfy not only their covetous humour with riches, but also their malice with power to undo all men that admired not their wisdom. Your calling the people silly things, obliged me by this digression to show you, that it is not want of wit, but want of the science of justice, that brought them into these troubles. Persuade, if you can, that man that has made his fortune, or made it greater, or an eloquent orator, or a ravishing poet, or a subtle lawyer, or but a good hunter or a cunning gamester, that he has not a good wit; and yet there were of all these a great many so silly, as to be deceived by the Rump and members of the same Rump. They wanted not wit, but the knowledge of the causes and grounds upon which one person has a right to govern, and the rest an obligation to obey; which grounds are necessary to be taught the people, who without them cannot live long in peace amongst themselves.

B.

Let us return, if you please, to the proceedings of the Rump.

A.

In the rest of this year they voted a new stamp for the coin of this nation. They considered also of agents to be sent to foreign states; and having lately received applause from the army for their work done by the High Court of Justice, and encouragement to extend the same further, they perfected the said High Court of Justice, in which were tried Duke Hamilton, the Earl of Holland, Lord Capel, the Earl of Norwich, and Sir John Owen; whereof, as I mentioned before, the three first were beheaded. This affrighted divers of the King's party out of the land; for not only they, but all that had borne arms for the King, were at that time in very great danger of their lives. For it was put to the question by the army at a council of war, whether they should be all massacred or no; where the noes carried it but by two voices. Lastly, March the 24th, they put the Mayor of London out of his office, fined him 2,000l., disfranchised him, and condemned him to two months imprisonment in the Tower, for refusing to proclaim the act for abolishing the kingly power. And thus ended the year 1648 and the monthly fast; God having granted that which they fasted for, the death of the King and the possession of his inheritance. By these their proceedings they had already lost the hearts of the generality of the people, and had nothing to trust to but the army; which was not in their power, but in Cromwell's; who never failed, when there was occasion, to put them upon all exploits that might make them odious to the people, in order to his future dissolving them whensoever it should conduce to his ends.

In the beginning of 1649 the Scots, discontented with the proceedings of the Rump against the late King, began to levy soldiers in order to a new invasion of England. The Irish rebels, for want of timely resistance from England, were grown terrible; and the English army at home, infected by the adjutators, were casting how to share the land amongst the godly,

meaning themselves and such others as they pleased, who were therefore called Levellers. Also the Rump for the present were not very well provided of money, and, therefore, the first thing they did, was the laying of a tax upon the people of 90,000l. a month for the maintenance of the army.

B.

Was it not one of their quarrels with the King, that he had levied money without the consent of the people in Parliament?

A.

You may see by this, what reason the Rump had to call itself a Parliament. For the taxes imposed by Parliament were always understood to be by the people's consent, and consequently legal. To appease the Scots, they sent messengers with flattering letters to keep them from engaging for the present King: but in vain: for they would hear nothing from a House of Commons, as they called it, at Westminster, without a King and Lords. But they sent commissioners to the King, to let him know what they were doing for him: for they were resolved to raise an army of 17,000 foot and 6,000 horse for themselves. To relieve Ireland, the Rump had resolved to send eleven regiments thither out of the army in England. This happened well for Cromwell. For the levelling soldiers, which were in every regiment many, and in some the major part, finding that instead of dividing the land at home they were to venture their lives in Ireland, flatly denied to go; and one regiment, having cashiered their colonel about Salisbury, was marching to join with three regiments more of the same resolution; but both the general and Cromwell falling upon them at Burford, utterly defeated them, and soon after reduced the whole army to their obedience. And

thus another of the impediments to Cromwell's advancement was soon removed. This done, they came to Oxford, and thence to London: and at Oxford, both the general and Cromwell were made doctors of the civil law; and at London, feasted and presented by the city.

B.

Were they not first made masters, and then doctors?

A.

They had made themselves already masters, both of the laws and Parliament. The army being now obedient, the Rump sent over those eleven regiments into Ireland, under the command of Dr. Cromwell, intituled governor of that kingdom, the Lord Fairfax being still general of all the forces, both here and there.

The Marquis, now Duke, of Ormond was the King's lieutenant of Ireland; and the rebels had made a confederacy amongst themselves; and these confederates had made a kind of league with the lieutenant, wherein they agreed, upon liberty given them in the exercise of their religion, to be faithful to and assist the King. To these also were joined some forces raised by the Earls of Castlehaven and Clanricarde and my Lord Inchiquin; so that they were the greatest united strength in the island. But there were amongst them a great many other Papists, that would by no means subject themselves to Protestants; and these were called the Nuntio's party, as the others were called the confederate party. These parties not agreeing, and the confederate party having broken their articles, the lord-lieutenant seeing them ready to besiege him in Dublin, and not able to defend it, did, to preserve the place for the Protestants, surrender it to the Parliament of England; and came over to the King at that time when he was carried from place to place by the

army. From England he went over to the Prince, now King, residing then at Paris.

But the confederates, affrighted with the news that the Rump was sending over an army thither, desired the Prince by letters, to send back my Lord of Ormond, engaging themselves to submit absolutely to the King's authority, and to obey my Lord of Ormond as his lieutenant. And hereupon he was sent back. This was about a year before the going over of Cromwell.

In which time, by the dissensions in Ireland between the confederate party and the Nuntio's party, and discontents about command, this otherwise sufficient power effected nothing; and was at last defeated, August the 2nd, by a sally out of Dublin, which they were besieging. Within a few days after arrived Cromwell, who with extraordinary diligence and horrid executions, in less than a twelvemonth that he stayed there, subdued in a manner the whole nation; having killed or exterminated a great part of them, and leaving his son-in-law Ireton to subdue the rest. But Ireton died there before the business was quite done, of the plague. This was one step more towards Cromwell's exaltation to the throne.

B.

What a miserable condition was Ireland reduced to by the learning of the Roman, as well as England was by the learning of the Presbyterian clergy.

A.

In the latter end of the preceding year the King was come from Paris to the Hague; and shortly after came thither from the Rump their agent Dorislaus, doctor of civil law, who had been employed in the drawing

up of the charge against the late King. But the first night he came, as he was at supper, a company of cavaliers, near a dozen, entered his chamber, killed him, and got away. Not long after also their agent at Madrid, one Ascham, one that had written in defence of his masters, was killed in the same manner. About this time came out two books, one written by Salmasius, a Presbyterian, against the murder of the King; another written by Milton, an English Independent, in answer to it.

B.

I have seen them both. They are very good Latin both, and hardly to be judged which is better; and both very ill reasoning, hardly to be judged which is worse; like two declamations, pro and con, made for exercise only in a rhetoric school by one and the same man. So like is a Presbyterian to an Independent.

A.

In this year the Rump did not much at home; save that in the beginning they made England a free state by an act which runs thus: “Be it enacted and declared by this present Parliament, and by the authority thereof, that the people of England, and all the dominions and territories thereunto belonging, are, and shall be, and are hereby constituted, made, and declared a commonwealth and free state, &c.”

B.

What did they mean by a free state and commonwealth? Were the people no longer to be subject to laws? They could not mean that: for the Parliament meant to govern them by their own laws, and punish such as broke them. Did they mean that England should not be subject

to any foreign kingdom or commonwealth? That needed not be enacted, seeing there was no king nor people pretended to be their masters. What did they mean then?

A.

They meant that neither this king, nor any king, nor any single person, but only that they themselves would be the people's masters, and would have set it down in those plain words, if the people could have been cozened with words intelligible, as easily as with words not intelligible.
After this they gave one another money and estates out of the lands and goods of the loyal party. They enacted also an engagement to be taken by every man, in these words: You shall promise to be true and faithful to the commonwealth of England, as it is now established, without King or House of Lords.
They banished also from within twenty miles of London all the royal party, forbidding also every one of them to depart more than five miles from his dwelling-house.

B.

They meant perhaps to have them ready, if need were, for a massacre. But what did the Scots in this time?

A.

They were considering of the officers of the army which they were levying for the King, how they might exclude from command all such as had loyally served his father, and all Independents, and all such as commanded in Duke Hamilton's army; and these were the main things that passed this year.

The Marquis of Montrose, that in the year 1645 had with a few men and in little time done things almost incredible against the late King's enemies in Scotland, landed now again, in the beginning of the year 1650, in the north of Scotland, with commission from the present King, hoping to do him as good service as he had formerly done his father. But the case was altered; for the Scotch forces were then in England in the service of the Parliament; whereas now they were in Scotland, and many more for their intended invasion newly raised. Besides, the soldiers which the Marquis brought over were few, and foreigners; nor did the Highlanders come in to him, as he expected; insomuch as he was soon defeated, and shortly after taken, and, with more spiteful usage than revenge required, executed by the Covenanters of Edinburgh, May the 2nd.

B.

What good could the King expect from joining with these men, who during the treaty discovered so much malice to him in one of his best servants?

A.

No doubt, their churchmen being then prevalent, they would have done as much to this King as the English Parliament had done to his father, if they could have gotten by it that which they foolishly aspired to, the government of the nation. I do not believe that the Independents were worse than the Presbyterians: both the one and the other were resolved to destroy whatsoever should stand in the way to their ambition. But necessity made the King pass over both this and many other indignities from them, rather than suffer the pursuit of his right in England to cool, and be little better than extinguished.

B.

Indeed I believe a kingdom, if suffered to become an old debt, will hardly ever be recovered. Besides, the King was sure, wheresoever the victory lighted, he could lose nothing in the war but enemies.

A.

About the time of Montrose's death, which was in May, Cromwell was yet in Ireland, and his work unfinished. But finding, or by his friends advertised, that his presence in the expedition now preparing against the Scots would be necessary to his design, he sent to the Rump to know their pleasure concerning his return. But for all that, he knew, or thought it was not necessary to stay for their answer, but came away, and arrived at London the 6th of June following, and was welcomed by the Rump. Now General Fairfax, who was truly what he pretended to be, a Presbyterian, had been so catechised by the Presbyterian ministers here, that he refused to fight against the brethren in Scotland; nor did the Rump nor Cromwell go about to rectify his conscience in that point. And thus Fairfax laying down his commission, Cromwell was now made general of all the forces in England and Ireland; which was another step to the sovereign power.

B.

Where was the King?

A.

In Scotland, newly come over. He landed in the north, and was honourably conducted to Edinburgh, though all things were not yet well

agreed on between the Scots and him. For though he had yielded to as hard conditions as the late King had yielded to in the Isle of Wight, yet they had still somewhat to add, till the King, enduring no more, departed from them towards the north again. But they sent messengers after him to pray him to return, but they furnished these messengers with strength enough to bring him back, if he should have refused. In fine they agreed; but would not suffer either the King, or any royalist, to have command in the army.

B.

The sum of all is, the King was there a prisoner.

A.

Cromwell from Berwick sends a declaration to the Scots, telling them he had no quarrel against the people of Scotland, but against the malignant party that had brought in the King, to the disturbance of the peace between the two nations; and that he was willing, either by conference to give and receive satisfaction, or to decide the justice of the cause by battle. To which the Scots answering, declare, that they will not prosecute the King's interest before and without his acknowledgment of the sins of his house and his former ways, and satisfaction given to God's people in both kingdoms. Judge by this whether the present King were not in as bad a condition here, as his father was in the hands of the Presbyterians of England.

B.

Presbyterians are everywhere the same: they would fain be absolute governors of all they converse with; and have nothing to plead for it, but

that where they reign, it is God that reigns, and nowhere else. But I observe one strange demand, that the King should acknowledge the sins of his house; for I thought it had been certainly held by all divines, that no man was bound to acknowledge any man's sins but his own.

A.

The King having yielded to all that the Church required, the Scots proceeded in their intended war. Cromwell marched on to Edinburgh, provoking them all he could to battle; which they declining, and provisions growing scarce in the English army, Cromwell retired to Dunbar, despairing of success; and intending by sea or land to get back into England. And such was the condition which this general Cromwell, so much magnified for conduct, had brought his army to, that all his glories had ended in shame and punishment, if fortune and the faults of his enemies had not relieved him. For as he retired, the Scots followed him close all the way till within a mile of Dunbar. There is a ridge of hills, that from beyond Edinburgh goes winding to the sea, and crosses the highway between Dunbar and Berwick, at a village called Copperspeith, where the passage is so difficult, that had the Scots sent timely thither a very few men to guard it, the English could never have gotten home. For the Scots kept the hills, and needed not have fought but upon great advantage, and were almost two to one. Cromwell's army was at the foot of those hills, on the north side; and there was a great ditch or channel of a torrent between the hills and it; so that he could never have got home by land, nor without utter ruin of the army attempted to ship it; nor have stayed where he was, for want of provisions. Now Cromwell knowing the pass was free, and commanding a good party of horse and foot to possess it, it was necessary for the Scots to let them go, whom they bragged they had

impounded, or else to fight; and therefore with the best of their horse they charged the English, and made them at first shrink a little. But the English foot coming on, the Scots were put to flight; and the flight of the horse hindered the foot from engaging; who therefore fled, as did also the rest of their horse. Thus the folly of the Scottish commanders brought all their odds to an even lay between two small and equal parties; wherein fortune gave the victory to the English, who were not many more in number than those that were killed and taken prisoners of the Scots; and the Church lost their cannon, bag and baggage, with 10,000 arms, and almost their whole army. The rest were got together by Lesley to Stirling.

B.

This victory happened well for the King. For had the Scots been victors, the Presbyterians, both here and there, would have domineered again, and the King been in the same condition his father was in at Newcastle, in the hands of the Scottish army. For in pursuit of this victory, the English at last brought the Scots to a pretty good habit of obedience for the King, whensoever he should recover his right.

A.

In pursuit of this victory the English marched to Edinburgh (quitted by the Scots), fortified Leith, and took in all the strength and castles they thought fit on this side the Frith, which now was become the bound betwixt the two nations. And the Scotch ecclesiastics began to know themselves better; and resolved in their new army, which they meant to raise, to admit some of the royalists into command. Cromwell from Edinburgh marched towards Stirling, to provoke the enemy to fight, but finding danger in it returned to Edinburgh and besieged the castle. In the

meantime he sent a party into the west of Scotland to suppress Strachan and Kerr, two great Presbyterians that were there levying forces for their new army. And in the same time the Scots crowned the King at Scone.
The rest of this year was spent in Scotland, on Cromwell's part, in taking of Edinburgh Castle and in attempts to pass the Frith, or any other ways to get over to the Scottish forces; and on the Scots' part, in hastening their levies for the north.

B.

What did the Rump at home during this time?

A.

They voted liberty of conscience to the sectaries; that is, they plucked out the sting of Presbytery, which consisted in a severe imposing of odd opinions upon the people, impertinent to religion, but conducing to the advancement of the power of the Presbyterian ministers. Also they levied more soldiers, and gave the command of them to Harrison, now made major-general, a Fifth-monarchy-man; and of these soldiers two regiments of horse and one of foot were raised by the Fifth-monarchy-men and other sectaries, in thankfulness for this their liberty from the Presbyterian tyranny. Also they pulled down the late King's statue in the Exchange, and in the niche where it stood, caused to be written these words: Exit tyrannus, Regum ultimus, etc.

B.

What good did that do them, and why did they not pull down the statues of all the rest of the Kings?

A.

What account can be given of actions that proceed not from reason, but spite and such-like passions? Besides this, they received ambassadors from Portugal and from Spain, acknowledging their power. And in the very end of the year they prepared ambassadors to the Netherlands to offer them friendship. All they did besides, was persecuting and executing of royalists.

In the beginning of the year 1651 General Dean arrived in Scotland; and on the 11th of April the Scottish Parliament assembled, and made certain acts in order to a better uniting of themselves, and better obedience to the King, who was now at Stirling with the Scottish forces he had, expecting more now in levying. Cromwell from Edinburgh went divers times towards Stirling to provoke the Scots to fight. There was no ford there to pass over his men; at last boats being come from London and Newcastle, Colonel Overton (though it was long first, for it was now July) transported 1,400 foot of his own, besides another regiment of foot and four troops of horse, and entrenched himself at Northferry on the other side; and before any help could come from Stirling, Major-General Lambert also was got over with as many more. By this time Sir John Browne was come to oppose them with 4,500 men, whom the English there defeated, killing about 2,000 and taking prisoners 1,600. This done, and as much more of the army transported as was thought fit, Cromwell comes before St. Johnstone's (from whence the Scottish Parliament, upon the news of his passing the Frith, was removed to Dundee) and summons it; and the same day had news brought him that the King was marching from Stirling towards England; which was true. But notwithstanding the King was three days' march before him, he resolved to have the town before he followed him; and accordingly had it the next day by surrender.

B.

What hopes had the King in coming into England, having before and behind him none, at least none armed, but his enemies?

A.

Yes; there was before him the city of London, which generally hated the Rump, and might easily be reckoned for 20,000 well-armed soldiers; and most men believed they would take his part, had he come near the city.

B.

What probability was there of that? Do you think the Rump was not sure of the services of the mayor and those that had command of the city militia? And if they had been really the King's friends, what need had they to stay for his coming up to London? They might have seized the Rump, if they had pleased, which had no possibility of defending themselves; at least they might have turned them out of the House.

A.

This they did not; but on the contrary, permitted the recruiting of Cromwell's army, and the raising of men to keep the country from coming in to the King. The King began his march from Stirling the last of July, and August the 22nd came to Worcester by way of Carlisle with a weary army of about 13,000, whom Cromwell followed, and joining with the new levies environed Worcester with 40,000, and on the 3rd of September utterly defeated the King's army. Here Duke Hamilton, brother of him that was beheaded, was slain.

B.

What became of the King?

A.

Night coming on, before the city was quite taken he left it; it being dark and none of the enemy's horse within the town to follow him, the plundering foot having kept the gates shut, lest the horse should enter and have a share of the booty. The King before morning got into Warwickshire, twenty-five miles from Worcester, and there lay disguised awhile, and afterwards went up and down in great danger of being discovered, till at last he got over into France, from Brighthelmstone in Sussex.

B.

When Cromwell was gone, what was further done in Scotland?

A.

Lieutenant-General Monk, whom Cromwell left there with 7,000, took Stirling August 14th by surrender, and Dundee the 3rd of September, by storm, because it resisted. This the soldiers plundered, and had good booty, because the Scots for safety had sent thither their most precious goods from Edinburgh and St. Johnstone's. He took likewise by surrender Aberdeen, and the place where the Scottish ministers first learned to play the fool, St. Andrew's. Also in the Highlands, Colonel Alured took a knot of lords and gentlemen, viz. four earls and four lords and above twenty knights and gentlemen, whom he sent prisoners into England. So that there was nothing more to be feared from Scotland: all

the trouble of the Rump being to resolve what they should do with it. At last they resolved to unite and incorporate it into one commonwealth with England and Ireland. And to that end sent thither St. John, Vane, and other commissioners, to offer them this union by public declaration, and to warn them to choose their deputies of shires and burgesses of towns, and send them to Westminster.

B.

This was a very great favour.

A.

I think so: and yet it was by many of the Scots, especially by the ministers and other Presbyterians, refused. The ministers had given way to the levying of money for the payment of the English soldiers; but to comply with the declaration of the English commissioners they absolutely forbad.

B.

Methinks this contributing to the pay of their conquerors was some mark of servitude; whereas entering into the union made them free, and gave them equal privilege with the English.

A.

The cause why they refused the union, rendered by the Presbyterians themselves, was this: that it drew with it a subordination of the Church to the civil state in the things of Christ.

B.

This is a downright declaration to all kings and commonwealths in general, that a Presbyterian minister will be a true subject to none of them in the things of Christ; which things what they are, they will be judges themselves. What have we then gotten by our deliverance from the Pope's tyranny, if these petty men succeed in the place of it, that have nothing in them that can be beneficial to the public, except their silence? For their learning, it amounts to no more than an imperfect knowledge of Greek and Latin, and an acquired readiness in the Scripture language, with a gesture and tone suitable thereunto; but of justice and charity, the manners of religion, they have neither knowledge nor practice, as is manifest by the stories I have already told you. Nor do they distinguish between the godly and the ungodly but by conformity of design in men of judgment, or by repetition of their sermons in the common sort of people.

A.

But this sullenness of the Scots was to no purpose. For they at Westminster enacted the union of the two nations and the abolition of monarchy in Scotland, and ordained punishment for those that should transgress that act.

B.

What other business did the Rump this year?

A.

They sent St. John and Strickland ambassadors to the Hague, to offer league to the United Provinces; who had audience March the 3rd; St. John in a speech showing those states what advantage they might have

by this league in their trade and navigations, by the use of the English ports and harbours. The Dutch, though they showed no great forwardness in the business, yet appointed commissioners to treat with them about it. But the people were generally against it, calling the ambassadors and their followers, as they were, traitors and murderers, and made such tumults about their house that their followers durst not go abroad till the States had quieted them. The Rump advertised hereof, presently recalled them. The compliment which St. John gave to the commissioners at their taking leave, is worth your hearing. You have, said he, an eye upon the event of the affairs of Scotland, and therefore do refuse the friendship we have offered. Now I can assure you, many in the Parliament were of opinion that we should not have sent any ambassadors to you till we had separated those matters between them and that king, and then expected your ambassadors to us. I now perceive our error, and that those gentlemen were in the right. In a short time you shall see that business ended; and then you will come and seek what we have freely offered, when it shall perplex you that you have refused our proffer.

B.

St. John was not sure that the Scottish business would end as it did. For though the Scots were beaten at Dunbar, he could not be sure of the event of their entering England, which happened afterward.

A.

But he guessed well: for within a month after the battle at Worcester, an act passed forbidding the importing of merchandize in other than English ships. The English also molested their fishing upon our coast. They also many times searched their ships (upon occasion of our war

with France), and made some of them prize. And then the Dutch sent their ambassadors hither to desire what they before refused; but partly also to inform themselves what naval forces the English had ready, and how the people here were contented with the government.

B.

How sped they?

A.

The Rump showed now as little desire of agreement as the Dutch did then; standing upon terms never likely to be granted. First, for the fishing on the English coast, that they should not have it without paying for it. Secondly, that the English should have free trade from Middleburgh to Antwerp, as they had before their rebellion against the King of Spain. Thirdly, they demanded amends for the old, but never to be forgotten business of Amboyna. So that the war was already certain, though the season kept them from action till the spring following. The true quarrel, on the English part, was that their proffered friendship was scorned, and their ambassadors affronted; on the Dutch part, was their greediness to engross all traffic, and a false estimate of our and their own strength.

Whilst these things were doing, the relics of the war, both in Ireland and Scotland, were not neglected, though those nations were not fully pacified till two years after. The persecution also of royalists still continned, amongst whom was beheaded one Mr. Love, for holding correspondence with the King.

B.

I had thought a Presbyterian minister, whilst he was such, could not be a royalist, because they think their assembly have the supreme power in the things of Christ; and by consequence they are in England, by a statute, traitors.

A.

You may think so still: for though I called Mr. Love a royalist, I meant it only for that one act for which he was condemned. It was he who during the treaty at Uxbridge, preaching before the commissioners there, said, it was as possible for heaven and hell, as for the King and Parliament, to agree. Both he and the rest of the Presbyterians are and were enemies to the King's enemies, Cromwell and his fanatics, for their own and not for the King's sake. Their loyalty was like that of Sir John Hotham's, that kept the King out of Hull, and afterwards would have betrayed the same to the Marquis of Newcastle. These Presbyterians therefore cannot be rightly called loyal, but rather doubly perfidious, unless you think that as two negatives make an affirmative, so two treasons make loyalty.
This year also were reduced to the obedience of the Rump the islands of Scilly and Man, and the Barbadoes, and St. Christopher's. One thing fell out that they liked not, which was, that Cromwell gave them warning to determine their sitting, according to the bill for triennial Parliaments.

B.

That I think indeed was harsh.

A.

In the year 1652, May the 14th, began the Dutch war, in this manner. Three Dutch men-of-war, with divers merchants from the straights,

being discovered by one Captain Young, who commanded some English frigates, the said Young sent to their admiral to bid him strike his flag, a thing usually done in acknowledgment of the English dominion in the narrow seas; which accordingly he did. Then came up the vice-admiral, and being called to as the other was, to take down his flag, he answered plainly he would not: but after the exchange of four or five broadsides and mischief done on either part, he took it down. But Captain Young demanded also, either the vice-admiral himself or his ship to make good the damage already sustained; to which the vice-admiral answered that he had taken in his flag, but would defend himself and his ship. Whereupon Captain Young consulting with the captains of his other ships, lest the beginning of the war in this time of treaty should be charged upon himself, and night also coming on, thought fit to proceed no further.

B.

The war certainly began at this time. But who began it?

A.

The dominion of the seas belonging to the English, there can be no question but the Dutch began it: and that the said dominion belonged to the English, it was confessed at first by the admiral himself peaceably, and at last by the vice-admiral taking in their flags.

About a fortnight after there happened another fight upon the like occasion. Van Tromp, with forty-two men-of-war, came to the back of Goodwin Sands, Major Bourne being then with a few of the Parliament ships in the Downs, and Blake with the rest further westward; and sent two captains of his to Bourne, to excuse his coming thither. To whom Bourne returned this answer, that the message was civil, but that it

might appear real he ought to depart. So Van Tromp departed, meaning, now Bourne was satisfied, to sail towards Blake, and he did so; but so did also Bourne, for fear of the worst. When Van Tromp and Blake were near one another, Blake made a shot over Van Tromp's ship, as a warning to him to take in his flag. This he did thrice, and then Van Tromp gave him a broadside; and so began the fight, (at the beginning whereof Bourne came in), and lasted from two o'clock till night, the English having the better, and the flag, as before, making the quarrel.

B.

What needs there, when both nations were heartily resolved to fight, to stand so much upon this compliment of who should begin? For as to the gaining of friends and confederates thereby, I think it was in vain; seeing princes and states in such occasions look not much upon the justice of their neighbours, but upon their own concernment in the event.

A.

It is commonly so; but in this case, the Dutch knowing the dominion of the narrow seas to be a gallant title, and envied by all the nations that reach the shore, and consequently that they were likely to oppose it, did wisely enough in making this point the state of the quarrel. After this fight the Dutch ambassadors residing in England sent a paper to the council of state, wherein they styled this last encounter a rash action, and affirmed it was done without the knowledge and against the will of their lords the States-general, and desired them that nothing might be done upon it in heat, which might become irreparable. The Parliament hereupon voted: 1. That the States-general should pay the charges they were at, and for the damages they sustained upon this occasion. 2. That

this being paid, there should be a cessation of all acts of hostility, and a mutual restitution of all ships and goods taken. 3. And both these agreed to, that there should be made a league between the two commonwealths. These votes were sent to the Dutch ambassadors in answer of the said paper; but with a preamble setting forth the former kindnesses of England to the Netherlands, and taking notice of their new fleet of 150 men-of-war, without any other apparent design than the destruction of the English fleet.

B.

What answer made the Dutch to this?

A.

None. Van Tromp sailed presently to Zealand, and Blake with seventy men-of-war to the Orkney Islands to seize their busses, and to wait for five Dutch ships from the East Indies. And Sir George Askew, newly returned from the Barbadoes, came into the Downs with fifteen men-of-war, where he was commanded to stay for a recruit out of the Thames.
Van Tromp being recruited now to 120 sail, made account to get in between Sir George Askew and the mouth of the river, but was hindered so long by contrary winds, that the merchants calling for his convoy he could stay no longer; and so he went back into Holland, and thence to Orkney, where he met with the said five East India ships and sent them home. And then he endeavoured to engage with Blake, but a sudden storm forced him to sea, and so dissipated his fleet that only forty-two came home in a body, the rest singly as well as they could. Blake also came home (but went first to the coast of Holland) with 900 prisoners and six men-of-war taken, which were part of twelve which he found

and took guarding their busses. This was the first bout after the war declared.

In August following there happened a fight between De Ruyter, the admiral of Zealand, with fifty men-of-war, and Sir George Askew, near Plymouth, with forty, wherein Sir George had the better, and might have got an entire victory had the whole fleet engaged. Whatsoever was the matter, the Rump, though they rewarded him, never more employed him after his return in their service at sea: but voted for the year to come three generals, Blake that was one already, and Dean, and Monk.

About this time the Archduke Leopold besieging Dunkirk, and the French sending a fleet to relieve it, General Blake lighting on the French at Calais, and taking seven of their ships, was cause of the town's surrender.

In September they fought again, De Witt and De Ruyter commanding the Dutch, and Blake the English; and the Dutch were again worsted.

Again, in the end of November, Van Tromp with eighty men-of-war shewed himself at the back of Goodwin Sands; where Blake, though he had with him but forty, adventured to fight with him, and had much the worst, and night parting the fray, retired into the river Thames; whilst Van Tromp keeping the sea, took some inconsiderable vessels from the English, and thereupon, as it was said, with a childish vanity hung out a broom from the main-top-mast, signifying he meant to sweep the seas of all English shipping.

After this, in February, the Dutch with Van Tromp were encountered by the English under Blake and Dean near Portsmouth, and had the worst. And these were all the encounters between them in this year in the narrow seas. They fought also once at Leghorn, where the Dutch had the better.

I see no great odds yet on either side; if there were any, the English had it.

A.

Nor did either of them the more incline to peace. For the Hollanders, after they had sent ambassadors into Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and the Hanse Towns whence tar and cordage are usually had, to signify the declaration of the war, and to get them to their party, recalled their ambassadors from England. And the Rump without delay, gave them their parting audience, without abating a syllable of their former severe propositions; and presently, to maintain the war for the next year, laid a tax upon the people of 120,000l. per mensem.

B.

What was done in the mean time at home?

A.

Cromwell was now quarrelling with the last and greatest obstacle to his design, the Rump. And to that end there came out daily from the army petitions, addresses, remonstrances, and other such papers; some of them urging the Rump to dissolve themselves and make way for another Parliament. To which the Rump, unwilling to yield and not daring to refuse, determined for the end of their sitting the 5th of November 1654. But Cromwell meant not to stay so long.
In the meantime the army in Ireland was taking submissions, and granting transportations of the Irish, and condemning whom they pleased in a High Court of Justice erected there for that purpose. Amongst those that were executed, was hanged Sir Phelim O'Neale,

who first began the rebellion. In Scotland the English built some citadels for the bridling of that stubborn nation. And thus ended the year 1652.

B.

Come we then to the year 1653.

A.

Cromwell wanted now but one step to the end of his ambition, and that was to set his foot upon the neck of this Long Parliament; which he did April the 23rd of this present year 1653, a time very seasonable. For though the Dutch were not mastered yet, they were much weakened; and what with prizes from the enemy and squeezing the royal party, the treasury was pretty full, and the tax of 120,000l. a month began to come in; all which was his own in right of the army.
Therefore, without more ado, attended by the Major-Generals Lambert and Harrison, and some other officers, and as many soldiers as he thought fit, he went to the Parliament House, and dissolved them, turning them out, and locked up the doors. And for this action he was more applauded by the people than for any of his victories in the war, and the Parliament men as much scorned and derided.

B.

Now that there was no Parlirment, who had the supreme power?

A.

If by power you mean the right to govern, nobody had it. If you mean the supreme strength, it was clearly in Cromwell, who was obeyed as

general of all the forces in England, Scotland, and Ireland.

B.

Did he pretend that for title?

A.

No: but presently after he invented a title, which was this; that he was necessitated for the defence of the cause, for which at first the Parliament had taken up arms, that is to say, rebelled, to have recourse to extraordinary actions. You know the pretence of the Long Parliament's rebellion was salus populi, the safety of the nation against a dangerous conspiracy of Papists and a malignant party at home; and that every man is bound, as far as his power extends, to procure the safety of the whole nation, which none but the army were able to do, and the Parliament had hitherto neglected. Was it not then the general's duty to do it? Had he not therefore right? For that law of salus populi is directed only to those that have power enough to defend the people; that is, to them that have the supreme power.

B.

Yes, certainly, he had as good a title as the Long Parliament. But the Long Parliament did represent the people; and it seems to me that the sovereign power is essentially annexed to the representative of the people.

A.

Yes, if he that makes a representative, that is in the present case the King, do call them together to receive the sovereign power, and he

divest himself thereof; otherwise not. Nor was ever the Lower House of Parliament the representative of the whole nation, but of the commons only; nor had that House the power to oblige by their acts or ordinances, any lord or any priest.

B.

Did Cromwell come in upon the only title of salus populi?

A.

This is a title that very few men understand. His way was to get the supreme power conferred upon him by Parliament. Therefore he called a Parliament, and gave it the supreme power, to the end that they should give it to him again. Was not this witty? First, therefore, he published a declaration of the causes why he dissolved the Parliament. The sum whereof was, that instead of endeavouring to promote the good of God's people, they endeavoured, by a bill then ready to pass, to recruit the House and perpetuate their own power. Next he constituted a council of state of his own creatures, to be the supreme authority of England; but no longer than till the next Parliament should be called and met. Thirdly, he summoned 142 persons, such as he himself or his trusty officers made choice of; the greatest part of whom were instructed what to do; obscure persons, and most of them fanatics, though styled by Cromwell men of approved fidelity and honesty. To these the council of state surrendered the supreme authority, and not long after these men surrendered it to Cromwell. July the 4th this Parliament met, and chose for their Speaker one Mr. Rous, and called themselves from that time forward the Parliament of England. But Cromwell, for the more surety, constituted also a council of state; not of such petty fellows as most of these were, but of himself and his principal officers. These did all the

business, both public and private; making ordinances, and giving audiences to foreign ambassadors. But he had now more enemies than before. Harrison, who was the head of the Fifth-monarchy-men, laying down his commission, did nothing but animate his party against him; for which afterwards he was imprisoned. This little Parliament in the meantime were making of acts so ridiculous and displeasing to the people, that it was thought he chose them on purpose to bring all ruling Parliaments into contempt, and monarchy again into credit.

B.

What acts were these?

A.

One of them was, that all marriages should be made by a justice of peace, and the banns asked three several days in the next market: none were forbidden to be married by a minister, but without a justice of peace the marriage was to be void: so that divers wary couples, to be sure of one another, howsoever they might repent it afterwards, were married both ways. Also they abrogated the engagement, whereby no man was admitted to sue in any court of law that had not taken it, that is, that had not acknowledged the late Rump.

B.

Neither of these did any hurt to Cromwell.

A.

They were also in hand with an act to cancel all the present laws and law-books, and to make a new code more suitable to the humour of the

Fifth-monarchy-men; of whom there were many in this Parliament. Their tenet being, that there ought none to be sovereign but King Jesus, nor any to govern under him but the saints. But their authority ended before this act passed.

B.

What is this to Cromwell?

A.

Nothing yet. But they were likewise upon an act, now almost ready for the question, that Parliaments henceforward, one upon the end of another, should be perpetual.

B.

I understand not this; unless Parliaments can beget one another like animals, or like the phœnix.

A.

Why not like the phœnix? Cannot a Parliament at the day of their expiration send out writs for a new one?

B.

Do you think they would not rather summon themselves anew; and to save the labour of coming again to Westminster, sit still where they were? Or if they summon the country to make new elections, and then dissolve themselves, by what authority shall the people meet in their county courts, there being no supreme authority standing?

A.

All they did was absurd, though they knew not that; no nor this, whose design was upon the sovereignty, the contriver of this act, it seems, perceived not; but Cromwell's party in the House saw it well enough. And therefore, as soon as it was laid, there stood up one of the members and made a motion, that since the commonwealth was like to receive little benefit by their sitting, they should dissolve themselves. Harrison and they of his sect were troubled hereat, and made speeches against it; but Cromwell's party, of whom the speaker was one, left the House, and with the mace before them went to Whitehall, and surrendered their power to Cromwell that had given it to them. And so he got the sovereignty by an act of Parliament; and within four days after, December the 16th, was installed Protector of the three nations, and took his oath to observe certain rules of governing, engrossed in parchment and read before him. The writing was called the instrument.

B.

What were the rules he swore to?

A.

One was, to call a Parliament every third year, of which the first was to begin September the 3rd following.

B.

I believe he was a little superstitious in the choice of September the 3rd, because it was lucky to him in 1650 and 1651, at Dunbar and Worcester;

but he knew not how lucky the same would be to the whole nation in 1658 at Whitehall.

A.

Another was, that no Parliament should be dissolved till it had sitten five months; and those bills that they presented to him, should be passed by him within twenty days, or else they should pass without him.
A third, that he should have a council of state of not above twenty-one, nor under thirteen; and that upon the Protector's death this council should meet, and before they parted choose a new Protector. There were many more besides, but not necessary to be inserted.

B.

How went on the war against the Dutch?

A.

The generals for the English were Blake, and Dean, and Monk; and Van Tromp for the Dutch; between whom was a battle fought the 2nd of June, which was a month before the beginning of this little Parliament; wherein the English had the victory, and drove the enemies into their harbours, but with the loss of General Dean, slain by a cannon-shot. This victory was great enough to make the Dutch send over ambassadors into England, in order to a treaty; but in the meantime they prepared and put to sea another fleet, which likewise, in the end of July, was defeated by General Monk, who got now a greater victory than before; and this made the Dutch descend so far as to buy their peace with the payment of the charge of the war, and with the

acknowledgment, amongst other articles, that the English had the right of the flag.

This peace was concluded in March, being the end of this year, but not proclaimed till April; the money, it seems, being not paid till then.

The Dutch war being now ended, the Protector sent his youngest son Henry into Ireland, whom also some time after he made lieutenant there; and sent Monk lieutenant-general into Scotland, to keep those nations in obedience. Nothing else worth remembering was done this year at home; saving the discovery of a plot of royalists, as was said, upon the life of the Protector, who all this while had intelligence of the King's designs from a traitor in his court, who afterwards was taken in the manner and killed.

B.

How came he into so much trust with the King?

A.

He was the son of a colonel that was slain in the wars on the late King's side. Besides, he pretended employment from the King's loyal and loving subjects here, to convey to his Majesty money as they from time to time should send him; and to make this credible, Cromwell himself caused money to be sent to him.

The following year, 1654, had nothing of war, but was spent in civil ordinances, in appointing of judges, preventing of plots (for usurpers are jealous), and in executing the King's friends and selling their lands. The 3rd of September, according to the instrument, the Parliament met; in which there was no House of Lords, and the House of Commons was made, as formerly, of knights and burgesses; but not as formerly, of two burgesses for a borough and two knights for a county; for boroughs for

the most part had but one burgess, and some counties six or seven knights. Besides, there were twenty members for Scotland, and as many for Ireland. So that now Cromwell had nothing else to do but to show his art of government upon six coach-horses newly presented to him, which, being as rebellious as himself, threw him out of the coach-box and almost killed him.

B.

This Parliament, which had seen how Cromwell had handled the two former, the long one and the short one, had surely learned the wit to behave themselves better to him than those had done?

A.

Yes, especially now that Cromwell in his speech at their first meeting had expressly forbidden them to meddle either with the government by a single person and Parliament, or with the militia, or with perpetuating of Parliaments, or taking away liberty of conscience; and told them also that every member of the House, before they sat, must take a recognition of his power in divers points. Whereupon, of above 400 there appeared not above 200 at first; though afterwards some relenting, there sat about 300. Again, just at their sitting down he published some ordinances of his own, bearing date before their meeting; that they might see he took his own acts to be as valid as theirs. But all this could not make them know themselves. They proceeded to debate of every article of the recognition.

B.

They should have debated that before they had taken it.

A.

But then they had never been suffered to sit. Cromwell being informed of their stubborn proceedings, and out of hope of any supply from them, dissolved them.
All that passed besides in this year, was the exercise of the High Court of Justice upon some royalists for plots.
In the year 1655 the English, to the number of near 10,000, landed in Hispaniola, in hope of the plunder of the gold and silver, whereof they thought there was great abundance in the town of Santo Domingo; but were well beaten by a few Spaniards, and with the loss of near 1,000 men, went off to Jamaica and possessed it.
This year also the royal party made another attempt in the west; and proclaimed there King Charles the Second; but few joining with them, and some falling off, they were soon suppressed, and many of the principal persons executed.

B.

In these many insurrections, the royalists, though they meant well, yet they did but disservice to the King by their impatience. What hope had they to prevail against so great an army as the Protector had ready? What cause was there to despair of seeing the King's business done better by the dissension and ambition of the great commanders in that army, whereof many had the favour to be as well esteemed amongst them as Cromwell himself?

A.

That was somewhat uncertain. The Protector, being frustrated of his hope of money at Santo Domingo, resolved to take from the royalists

the tenth part yearly of their estates. And to this end chiefly, he divided England into eleven major-generalships, with commission to every major-general to make a roll of the names of all suspected persons of the King's party, and to receive the tenth part of their estates within his precinct; as also to take caution from them not to act against the state, and to reveal all plots that should come to their knowledge; and to make them engage the like for their servants. They had commission also to forbid horse-races and concourse of people, and to receive and account for this decimation.

B.

By this the usurper might easily inform himself of the value of all the estates in England, and of the behaviour and affection of every person of quality; which has heretofore been taken for very great tyranny.

A.

The year 1656 was a Parliament-year by the instrument. Between the beginning of this year and the day of the Parliament's sitting, which was September 17, these major-generals, resided in several provinces, behaving themselves most tyrannically. Amongst other of their tyrannies was the awing of elections, and making themselves and whom they pleased to be returned members for the Parliament; which was also thought a part of Cromwell's design in their constitution: for he had need of a giving Parliament, having lately, upon a peace made with the French, drawn upon himself a war with Spain.

This year it was that Captain Stainer set upon the Spanish Plate-fleet, being eight in number, near Cadiz; whereof he sunk two, and took two, there being in one of them two millions of pieces of eight, which amounts to 400,000l. sterling.

This year also it was that James Naylor appeared at Bristol, and would be taken for Jesus Christ. He wore his beard forked, and his hair composed to the likeness of that in the Volto Santo; and being questioned, would sometimes answer Thou sayest it. He had also his disciples, that would go by his horse's side to the mid-leg in dirt. Being sent for by the Parliament, he was sentenced to stand on the pillory, to have his tongue bored through, and to be marked on the forehead with the letter B, for blasphemy, and to remain in Bridewell. Lambert, a great favourite of the army, endeavoured to save him, partly because he had been his soldier, and partly to curry favour with the sectaries of the army; for he was now no more in the Protector's favour, but meditating how he might succeed him in his power.

About two years before this, there appeared in Cornwall a prophetess, much famed for her dreams and visions, and hearkened to by many, whereof some were eminent officers. But she and some of her accomplices being imprisoned, we heard no more of her.

B.

I have heard of another, one Lilly, that prophecied all the time of the Long Parliament. What did they to him?

A.

His prophecies were of another kind; he was a writer of almanacs, and a pretender to a pretended art of judicial astrology; a meer cozener to get maintenance from a multitude of ignorant people; and no doubt had been called in question, if his prophecies had been any way disadvantageous to that Parliament.

B.

I understand not how the dreams and prognostications of madmen (for such I take to be all those that foretell future contingencies) can be of any great disadvantage to the commonwealth.

A.

Yes, yes: know, there is nothing that renders human counsels difficult, but the uncertainty of future time; nor that so well directs men in their deliberations, as the foresight of the sequels of their actions; prophecy being many times the principal cause of the event foretold. If, upon some prediction, the people should have been made confident that Oliver Cromwell and his army should be, upon a day to come, utterly defeated; would not every one have endeavoured to assist, and to deserve well of the party that should give him that defeat? Upon this account it was that fortune-tellers and astrologers were so often banished out of Rome.

The last memorable thing this year, was a motion made by a member of the House, an alderman of London, that the Protector might be petitioned and advised by the House to leave the title of Protector, and take upon him that of King.

B.

That was indeed a bold motion, and which would, if prosperous, have put an end to many men's ambition, and to the licentiousness of the whole army. I think the motion was made on purpose to ruin both the Protector himself and his ambitious officers.

A.

It may be so. In the year 1657 the first thing the Parliament did, was the drawing up of this petition to the Protector, to take upon him the government of the three nations, with the title of King. As of other Parliaments, so of this, the greatest part had been either kept out of the House by force, or else themselves had forborne to sit and become guilty of setting up this King Oliver. But those few that sat, presented their petition to the Protector, April the 9th, in the Banqueting-house at Whitehall; where Sir Thomas Widdrington, the Speaker, used the first arguments, and the Protector desired some time to seek God, the business being weighty. The next day they sent a committee to him to receive his answer; which answer being not very clear, they pressed him again for a resolution; to which he made answer in a long speech, that ended in a peremptory refusal. And so retaining still the title of Protector, he took upon him the government according to certain articles contained in the said petition.

B.

What made him refuse the title of King?

A.

Because he durst not take it at that time; the army being addicted to their great officers, and amongst their great officers many hoping to succeed him, and, the succession having been promised to Major-General Lambert, would have mutinied against him. He was therefore forced to stay for a more propitious conjuncture.

B.

What were those articles?

A.

The most important of them were: 1. That he would exercise the office of chief-magistrate of England, Scotland, and Ireland, under the title of Protector, and govern the same according to the said petition and advice: and that he would in his life-time name his successor.

B.

I believe the Scots, when they first rebelled, never thought of being governed absolutely, as they were by Oliver Cromwell.

A.

That he should call a Parliament every three years at farthest. 3. That those persons which were legally chosen members, should not be secluded without consent of the House. In allowing this clause, the Protector observed not that the secluded members of this same Parliament, are thereby re-admitted. 4. The members were qualified. 5. The power of the other House was defined. 6. That no law should be made but by act of Parliament. 7. That a constant yearly revenue of a million of pounds should be settled for the maintenance of the army and navy; and 300,000l. for the support of the government, besides other temporary supplies as the House of Commons should think fit. 8. That all the officers of state should be chosen by the Parliament. 9. That the Protector should encourage the ministry. Lastly, that he should cause a profession of religion to be agreed on and published. There are divers others of less importance. Having signed the articles, he was presently with great ceremony installed anew.

B.

What needed that, seeing he was still but Protector?

A.

But the articles of this petition were not all the same with those of his former instrument. For now there was to be another House; and whereas before, his council was to name his successor, he had power now to do it himself; so that he was an absolute monarch, and might leave the succession to his son if he would, and so successively, or transfer it to whom he pleased.

The ceremony being ended, the Parliament adjourned to the 20th of January following; and then the other House also sat with their fellows.

The House of Commons being now full, took little notice of the other House, wherein there were not of sixty persons above nine lords; but fell a questioning all that their fellows had done, during the time of their seclusion; whence had followed the avoidance of the power newly placed in the Protector. Therefore, going to the House, he made a speech to them, ending in these words; By the living God, I must, and do dissolve you.

In this year, the English gave the Spaniard another great blow at Santa Cruz, not much less than they had given him the year before at Cadiz.

About the time of the dissolution of this Parliament, the royalists had another design against the Protector; which was, to make an insurrection in England, the King being in Flanders ready to second them with an army thence. But this also was discovered by treachery, and came to nothing but the ruin of those that were engaged in it; whereof many in the beginning of the next year were by a High Court of Justice imprisoned, and some executed.

This year also was Major-General Lambert put out of all employment, a man second to none but Oliver in the favour of the army. But because he

expected by that favour, or by promise from the Protector, to be his successor in the supreme power, it would have been dangerous to let him have command in the army; the Protector having designed for his successor his eldest son Richard.

In the year 1658, September the 3rd, the Protector died at Whitehall; having ever since his last establishment been perplexed with fear of being killed by some desperate attempt of the royalists.

Being importuned in his sickness by his privy-council to name his successor, he named his son Richard; who, encouraged thereunto, not by his own ambition, but by Fleetwood, Desborough, Thurlow, and other of his council, was content to take it upon him; and presently, addresses were made to him from the armies in England, Scotland and Ireland. His first business was the chargeable and splendid funeral of his father.

Thus was Richard Cromwell seated on the imperial throne of England, Ireland, and Scotland, successor to his father; lifted up to it by the officers of the army then in town, and congratulated by all the parts of the army throughout the three nations; scarce any garrison omitting their particular flattering addresses to him.

B.

Seeing the army approved of him, how came he so soon cast off?

A.

The army was inconstant; he himself irresolute, and without any military glory. And though the two principal officers had a near relation to him; yet neither of them, but Lambert, was the great favourite of the army; and by courting Fleetwood to take upon him the Protectorship, and by tampering with the soldiers, he had gotten again to be a colonel. He and the rest of the officers had a council at Wallingford House,

where Fleetwood dwelt, for the dispossessing of Richard; though they had not yet considered how the nations should be governed afterwards. For from the beginning of the rebellion, the method of ambition was constantly this, first to destroy, and then to consider what they should set up.

B.

Could not the Protector, who kept his court at Whitehall, discover what the business of the officers was at Wallingford House, so near him?

A.

Yes, he was by divers of his friends informed of it; and counselled by some of them, who would have done it, to kill the chief of them. But he had not courage enough to give them such a commission. He took, therefore, the counsel of some milder persons, which was to call a Parliament. Whereupon writs were presently sent to those, that were in the last Parliament, of the other House, and other writs to the sheriffs for the election of knights and burgesses, to assemble on the 27th of January following. Elections were made according to the ancient manner, and a House of Commons now of the right English temper, and about four hundred in number, including twenty for Scotland and as many for Ireland. Being met, they take themselves, without the Protector and other House, to be a Parliament, and to have the supreme power of the three nations.

For the first business, they intended the power of that other House: but because the Protector had recommended to them for their first business an act, already drawn up, for the recognition of his Protectoral power, they began with that; and voted after a fortnight's deliberation, that an act should be made whereof this act of recognition should be part; and

that another part should be for the bounding of the Protector's power, and for the securing the privileges of Parliament and liberties of the subject; and that all should pass together.

B.

Why did these men obey the Protector at first, in meeting upon his only summons? Was not that as full a recognition of his power as was needful? Why by this example did they teach the people that he was to be obeyed, and then by putting laws upon him, teach them the contrary? Was it not the Protector that made the Parliament? Why did they not acknowledge their maker?

A.

I believe it is the desire of most men to bear rule; but few of them know what title one has to it more than another, besides the right of the sword.

B.

If they acknowledged the right of the sword, they were neither just nor wise to oppose the present government, set up and approved by all the forces of the three kingdoms. The principles of this House of Commons were, no doubt, the very same with theirs that began the rebellion; and would, if they could have raised a sufficient army, have done the same against the Protector; and the general of their army would, in like manner, have reduced them to a Rump. For they that keep an army, and cannot master it, must be subject to it as much as he that keeps a lion in his house. The temper of all the Parliaments, since the time of Queen Elizabeth, has been the same with the temper of this Parliament; and

shall always be such, as long as the Presbyterians and men of democratical principles have the like influence upon the elections.

A.

After, they resolved concerning the other House, that during this Parliament they would transact with it, but without intrenching upon the right of the peers, to have writs sent to them in all future Parliaments. These votes being passed, they proceed to another, wherein they assume to themselves the power of the militia. Also to show their supreme power, they delivered out of prison some of those that had been, they said, illegally committed by the former Protector. Other points concerning civil rights and concerning religion, very pleasing to the people, were now also under their consideration. So that at the end of this year the Protector was no less jealous of the Parliament, than of the council of officers at Wallingford House.

B.

Thus it is when ignorant men will undertake reformation. Here are three parties, the Protector, the Parliament, and the Army. The Protector against Parliament and army, the Parliament against army and Protector, and the army against Protector and Parliament.

A.

In the beginning of 1659 the Parliament passed divers other acts. One was, to forbid the meetings in council of the army-officers without order from the Protector and both houses. Another, that no man shall have any command or trust in the army, who did not first, under his hand, engage himself never to interrupt any of the members, but that they might freely

meet and debate in the House. And to please the soldiers, they voted to take presently into their consideration the means of paying them their arrears. But whilst they were considering this, the Protector, according to the first of those acts, forbad the meeting of officers at Wallingford House. This made the government, which by the disagreement of the Protector and army was already loose, to fall in pieces. For the officers from Wallingford House, with soldiers enough, came over to Whitehall, and brought with them a commission ready drawn, giving power to Desborough to dissolve the Parliament, for the Protector to sign; which also, his heart and his party failing him, he signed. The Parliament nevertheless continued sitting; but at the end of the week the House adjourned till the Monday after, being April the 25th. At their coming on Monday morning, they found the door of the House shut up, and the passages to it filled with soldiers, who plainly told them they must sit no longer. Richard's authority and business in town being thus at an end, he retired into the country; where within a few days, upon promise of the payment of his debts, which his father's funeral had made great, he signed a resignation of his Protectorship.

B.

To whom?

A.

To nobody. But after ten days' cessation of the sovereign power, some of the Rumpers that were in town, together with the old Speaker Mr. William Lenthal, resolved amongst themselves, and with Lambert, Hazlerig, and other officers, who were also Rumpers, in all forty-two, to go into the House; which they did, and were by the army declared to be the Parliament.

There were also in Westminster Hall at that time, about their private business, some few of those whom the army had secluded in 1648, and were called the secluded members. These knowing themselves to have been elected by the same authority, and to have the same right to sit, attempted to get into the House, but were kept out by the soldiers. The first vote of the Rump reseated was, that such persons as, heretofore members of this Parliament, have not sitten in this Parliament since the year 1648, shall not sit in this House till further order of the Parliament. And thus the Rump recovered their authority May the 7th 1659, which they lost in April 1653.

B.

Seeing there had been so many shiftings of the supreme authority, I pray you, for memory's sake, repeat them briefly in times and order.

A.

First, from 1640 to 1648, when the King was murdered, the sovereignty was disputed between King Charles I and the Presbyterian Parliament. Secondly, from 1648 to 1653, the power was in that part of the Parliament which voted the trial of the King, and declared themselves, without King or House of Lords, to have the supreme authority of England and Ireland. For there were in the Long Parliament two factions, the Presbyterian and Independent; the former whereof sought only the subjection of the King, not his destruction directly; the latter sought directly his destruction; and this part is it, which was called the Rump. Thirdly, from April the 20th to July the 4th, the supreme power was in the hands of a council of state constituted by Cromwell. Fourthly, from July the 4th to December the 12th of the same year, it was in the hands of men called unto it by Cromwell, whom he termed men of

fidelity and integrity, and made them a Parliament; which was called, in contempt of one of the members, Barebone's Parliament. Fifthly, from December the 12th 1653 to September the 3rd 1658, it was in the hands of Oliver Cromwell, with the title of Protector. Sixthly, from September the 3rd 1658 to April the 25th 1659, Richard Cromwell had it as successor to his father. Seventhly, from April the 25th 1659 to May the 7th of the same year, it was nowhere. Eighthly, from May the 7th 1659, the Rump, which was turned out of doors in 1653, recovered it again; and shall lose it again to a committee of safety, and again recover it, and again lose it to the right owner.

B.

By whom, and by what art, came the Rump to be turned out the second time?

A.

One would think them safe enough. The army in Scotland, which when it was in London had helped Oliver to put down the Rump, submitted now, begged pardon, and promised obedience. The soldiers in town had their pay mended, and the commanders everywhere took the old engagement, whereby they had acknowledged their authority heretofore. They also received their commissions in the House itself from the speaker, who was generalissimo. Fleetwood was made lieutenant-general, with such and so many limitations as were thought necessary by the Rump, that remembered how they had been served by the general, Oliver. Also Henry Cromwell, lord-lieutenant of Ireland, having resigned his commission by command, returned into England.
But Lambert, to whom, as was said, Oliver had promised the succession, and who as well as the Rump knew the way to the

Protectorship by Oliver's own footsteps, was resolved to proceed in it upon the first opportunity; which presented itself presently after. Besides some plots of royalists, whom after the old fashion they again persecuted, there was an insurrection made against them by Presbyterians in Cheshire, headed by Sir George Booth, one of the secluded members. They were in number about 3,000, and their pretence was for a free Parliament. There was a great talk of another rising, or endeavour to rise, in Devonshire and Cornwall at the same time. To suppress Sir George Booth, the Rump sent down more than a sufficient army under Lambert; which quickly defeated the Cheshire party, and recovered Chester, Liverpool, and all the other places they had seized. Divers also of their commanders in and after the battle were taken prisoners, whereof Sir George Booth himself was one.

This exploit done, Lambert, before his return, caressed his soldiers with an entertainment at his own house in Yorkshire, and got their consent to a petition to be made to the House, that a general might be set up in the army; as being unfit that the army should be judged by any power extrinsic to itself.

B.

I do not see that unfitness.

A.

Nor I. But it was, as I have heard, an axiom of Sir Henry Vane's. But it so much displeased the Rump, that they voted, that the having of more generals in the army than were already settled, was unnecessary, burthensome, and dangerous to the commonwealth.

B.

This was not Oliver's method; for though this Cheshire victory had been as glorious as that of Oliver at Dunbar, yet it was not the victory that made Oliver general, but the resignation of Fairfax, and the proffer of it to Cromwell by the Parliament.

A.

But Lambert thought so well of himself, as to expect it. Therefore, at his return to London, he and the other officers assembling at Wallingford House, drew their petition into form, and called it a representation; wherein the chief point was to have a general, but many others of less importance were added; and this they represented to the House, October the 4th, by Major-General Desborough. And this so far awed them, as to teach them so much good manners as to promise to take it presently into debate. Which they did; and October the 12th, having recovered their spirits, voted "that the commissions of Lambert, Desborough, and others of the council at Wallingford House, should be void: item, that the army should be governed by a commission to Fleetwood, Monk, Hazlerig, Walton, Morley, and Overton, till February the 12th following." And to make this good against the force they expected from Lambert, they ordered Hazlerig and Morley to issue warrants to such officers as they could trust, to bring their soldiers next morning into Westminster; which was done somewhat too late. For Lambert had first brought his soldiers thither, and beset the House, and turned back the Speaker, which was then coming to it; but Hazlerig's forces marching about St. James's park-wall, came into St. Margaret's churchyard; and so both parties looked all day one upon another, like enemies, but offered not to fight: whereby the Rump was put out of possession of the House; and the officers continued their meeting as before, at Wallingford House.

There they chose from among themselves, with some few of the city, a committee, which they called a committee of safety, whereof the chief were Lambert and Vane; who, with the advice of a general council of officers, had power to call delinquents to trial, to suppress rebellions, to treat with foreign states, &c. You see now the Rump cut off, and the supreme power, which is charged with salus populi, transferred to a council of officers. And yet Lambert hopes for it in the end. But one of their limitations was, that they should within six weeks present to the army a new model of the government. If they had done so, do you think they would have preferred Lambert or any other to the supreme authority therein, rather than themselves?

B.

I think not. When the Rump had put into commission, amongst a few others, for the government of the army, that is to say, for the government of the three nations, General Monk, already commander-in-chief of the army in Scotland, and that had done much greater things in this war than Lambert, how durst they leave him out of this committee of safety? Or how could Lambert think that General Monk would forgive it, and not endeavour to fasten the Rump again?

A.

They thought not of him; his gallantry had been shown on remote stages, Ireland and Scotland. His ambition had not appeared here in their contentions for the government, but he had complied both with Richard and the Rump. After General Monk had signified by letter his dislike of the proceedings of Lambert and his fellows, they were much surprised, and began to think him more considerable than they had done; but it was too late.

B.

Why? His army was too small for so great an enterprise.

A.

The general knew very well his own and their forces, both what they were then, and how they might be augmented, and what generally city and country wished for, which was the restitution of the King: which to bring about, there needed no more but to come with his army, though not very great, to London: to the doing whereof, there was no obstacle but the army with Lambert. What could he do in this case? If he had declared presently for the King or for a free Parliament, all the armies in England would have joined against him, and assuming the title of a Parliament would have furnished themselves with money.

General Monk, after he had thus quarrelled by his letter with the council-officers, secured first those officers of his own army, which were Anabaptists and therefore not to be trusted, and put others into their places; then drawing his forces together, marched to Berwick. Being there, he indicted a convention of the Scots, of whom he desired that they would take order for the security of that nation in his absence, and raise some maintenance for his army in their march. The convention promised for the security of the nation their best endeavour, and raised him a sum of money, not great, but enough for his purpose, excusing themselves upon their present wants. On the other side, the committee of safety with the greatest and best part of their army sent Lambert to oppose him; but at the same time, by divers messages and mediators urged him to a treaty; which he consented to, and sent three officers to London to treat with as many of theirs. These six suddenly concluded, without power from the general, upon these articles: that the King be

excluded; a free state settled; the ministry and universities encouraged; with divers others. Which the general liked not, and imprisoned one of his commissioners for exceeding his commission. Whereupon another treaty was agreed on, of five to five. But whilst these treaties were in hand, Hazlerig, a member of the Rump, seized on Portsmouth, and the soldiers sent by the committee of safety to reduce it, instead of that, entered into the town and joined with Hazlerig. Secondly, the city renewed their tumults for a free Parliament. Thirdly, the Lord Fairfax, a member also of the Rump, and greatly favoured in Yorkshire, was raising forces there behind Lambert, who being now between two armies, his enemies would gladly have fought with the general. Fourthly, there came news that Devonshire and Cornwall were listing of soldiers. Lastly, Lambert's army wanting money, and sure they should not be furnished from the council of officers, which had neither authority nor strength to levy money, grew discontented, and for their free quarters were odious to the northern countries.

B.

I wonder why the Scots were so ready to furnish General Monk with money; for they were no friends to the Rump.

A.

I know not; but I believe the Scots would have parted with a greater sum, rather than the English should not have gone together by the ears amongst themselves. The council of officers being now beset with so many enemies, produced speedily their model of government; which was to have a free Parliament, which should meet December the 15th, but with such qualifications of no King, no House of Lords, as made the city more angry than before. To send soldiers into the west to suppress

those that were rising there, they durst not, for fear of the city; nor could they raise any other for want of money. There remained nothing but to break, and quitting Wallingford House to shift for themselves. This coming to the knowledge of their army in the north, they deserted Lambert; and the Rump, the 26th of December, repossessed the House.

B.

Seeing the Rump was now reseated, the business pretended by General Monk for his marching to London, was at an end.

A.

The Rump, though seated, was not well settled, but in the midst of so many tumults for a free Parliament had as much need of the general's coming up now as before. He therefore sent them word, that because he thought them not yet secure enough, he would come up to London with his army; which they not only accepted, but also intreated him to do, and voted him for his services 1000l. a year.
The general marching towards London, the country every where petitioned him for a free Parliament. The Rump, to make room in London for his army, dislodged their own. The general for all that, had not let fall a word in all this time that could be taken for a declaration of his final design.

B.

How did the Rump revenge themselves on Lambert?

A.

They never troubled him; nor do I know any cause of so gentle dealing with him: but certainly Lambert was the ablest of any officer they had to do them service, when they should have means and need to employ him.
After the general was come to London, the Rump sent to the city for their part of a tax of 100,000l. a month, for six months, according to an act which the Rump had made formerly before their disseisin by the committee of safety. But the city, who were adverse to the Rump, and keen upon a free Parliament, could not be brought to give their money to their enemies and to purposes repugnant to their own. Hereupon the Rump sent order to the general to break down the city gates and their portcullises, and to imprison certain obstinate citizens. This he performed, and it was the last service he did them.
About this time the commission, by which general Monk with others had the government of the army put into their hands by the Rump before the usurpation of the council of officers, came to expire; which the present Rump renewed.

B.

He was thereby the sixth part of the general of the whole forces of the commonwealth. If I had been as the Rump, he should have been sole general. In such cases as this, there cannot be a greater vice than pinching. Ambition should be liberal.

A.

After the pulling down of the city gates, the general sent a letter to the Rump, to let them know that that service was much against his nature, and to put them in mind how well the city had served the Parliament throughout the whole war.

B.

Yes. But for the city the Parliament never could have made the war, nor the Rump ever have murdered the King.

A.

The Rump considered not the merit of the city, nor the good-nature of the general. They were busy. They were giving out commissions, making of acts for abjuration of the King and his line, and for the old engagement, and conferring with the city to get money. The general also desired to hear conference between some of the Rump and some of the secluded members, concerning the justice of their seclusion, and of the hurt that could follow from their readmission: and it was granted, after long conference. The general finding the Rump's pretences unreasonable and ambitious, declared himself with the city for a free Parliament, and came to Westminster with the secluded members, (whom he had appointed to meet and stay for him at Whitehall), and replaced them in the House amongst the Rumpers; so that now the same cattle that were in the House of Commons in 1640, except those that were dead and those that went from them to the late King at Oxford, are all there again.

B.

But this, methinks, was no good service to the King, unless they had learned better principles.

A.

They had learned nothing. The major part was now again Presbyterian. It is true they were so grateful to General Monk as to make him general of all the forces in the three nations. They did well also to make void the engagement; but it was because those acts were made to the prejudice of their party; but recalled none of their own rebellious ordinances, nor did anything in order to the good of the present King; but on the contrary, they declared by a vote, that the late King began the war against his two Houses.

B.

The two Houses considered as two persons, were they not two of the King's subjects? If a king raise an army against his subject, is it lawful for that subject to resist with force, when, as in this case, he might have had peace upon his submission?

A.

They knew they had acted vilely and sottishly; but because they had always pretended to greater than ordinary wisdom and godliness, they were loath to confess it. The Presbyterians now saw their time to make a Confession of their Faith, and presented it to the House of Commons to show they had not changed their principles; which, after six readings in the House, was voted to be printed, and once a year to be read publicly in every church.

B.

I say again, this re-establishing of the Long Parliament was no good service to the King.

A.

Have a little patience. They were re-established with two conditions; one to determine their sitting before the end of March; another to send out writs before their rising for new elections.

B.

That qualifies.

A.

That brought in the King: for few of this Long Parliament, the country having felt the smart of their former service, could get themselves chosen again. This New Parliament began to sit April the 25th 1660. How soon these called in the King; with what joy and triumph he was received; how earnestly his Majesty pressed the Parliament for the act of oblivion, and how few were excepted out of it; you know as well as I.

B.

But I have not yet observed in the Presbyterians any oblivion of their former principles. We are but returned to the state we were in at the beginning of the sedition.

A.

Not so: for before that time, though the Kings of England had the right of the militia in virtue of the sovereignty, and without dispute, and without any particular act of Parliament directly to that purpose; yet now, after this bloody dispute, the next, which is the present, Parliament, in proper and express terms hath declared the same to be the

right of the King only, without either of his Houses of Parliament; which act is more instructive to the people, than any arguments drawn from the title of sovereign, and consequently fitter to disarm the ambition of all seditious haranguers for the time to come.

B.

I pray God it prove so. Howsoever, I must confess that this Parliament has done all that a Parliament can do for the security of our peace: which I think also would be enough, if preachers would take heed of instilling evil principles into their auditory. I have seen in this revolution a circular motion of the sovereign power through two usurpers, from the late King to this his son. For (leaving out the power of the council of officers, which was but temporary, and no otherwise owned by them but in trust) it moved from King Charles I to the Long Parliament; from thence to the Rump; from the Rump to Oliver Cromwell; and then back again from Richard Cromwell to the Rump; thence to the Long Parliament; and thence to King Charles II, where long may it remain.

A.

Amen. And may he have as often as there shall be need such a general.

B.

You have told me little of the general till now in the end: but truly, I think the bringing of his little army entirely out of Scotland up to London, was the greatest stratagem that is extant in history.

The Translations

The Old Grammar Hall, Magdalen College, part of the original Magdalen Hall site — where Hobbes was educated at Oxford.

Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War

MOLESWORTH 1840 EDITION

In 1610 Hobbes became a companion to the younger William Cavendish, 2nd Earl of Devonshire. He served at Chatsworth House as his private tutor for many years and they both took part in a grand tour of Europe. Hobbes was exposed to European scientific and critical methods during the tour, in contrast to the scholastic philosophy that he had learned in Oxford. His scholarly efforts at the time were aimed at a careful study of classic Greek and Latin authors. In 1628, he released his translation of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, the first translation in English from the classical Greek.

Divided into eight books, the text provides a historical account of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), which was fought between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens). Thucydides was an Athenian historian, who also happened to serve as an Athenian general during the war. His account of the conflict is widely considered to be a classic and is widely regarded as one of the earliest scholarly works of history.



William Cavendish, 2nd Earl of Devonshire, c. 1590

CONTENTS

ADVERTISEMENT.
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM CAVENDISH, KNIGHT OF THE BATH, BARON OF HARDWICK, AND EARL OF DEVONSHIRE.
TO THE READERS.
OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE THIRD BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE FIFTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE SEVENTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.



Plaster cast bust of Thucydides in the Pushkin Museum, based on an early fourth-century BC Greek original

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE MERIT OF Hobbes' translation of Thucydides lies principally in the simplicity and force of the language: bearing in that respect some affinity to the original. Viewed merely as a translation, it will be found to contain, owing partly to the corrupt state of the Greek text of his day, partly to his habitual disregard of minute details so that accuracy were attained in essentials, manifold errors and omissions. As these defects disfigure the narrative, and sometimes perplex the reader, it has been considered worth while to attempt, by short notes, something towards their removal: without however affecting to offer a translation either critically correct or even free from many errors. In the performance of this task the interpretations of Goeller, Arnold, Thirlwall and others, have been followed wheresoever they were available: where such help failed, the editor had to rely on his own imperfect resources.

To render the work more useful to the English reader and those not deeply versed in Grecian history, some historical notes have been added, drawn for the most part in substance from Mueller's history of the Dorians, Hermann's Grecian Antiquities, Thirlwall's history of Greece, Niebuhr's history of Rome, &c. Wheresoever Aristotle is cited, his Politics will be understood to be the work referred to.

Several phrases having been marked by Hobbes himself with square brackets, to designate them as interpolations, the same marks have been added for the same purpose to other words and passages.

Those corrections of the Greek text by Bekker and others only have been noticed, which serve to explain the cause of Hobbes' departure in those

instances from the right interpretation.

It has been considered useless to reprint the maps belonging to the original edition, and referred to in the Epistle to the Reader. These were unavoidably rude and imperfect, and have been long superseded both by the more general maps to be found in any modern Atlas, and the numerous maps and plans which have been published of late years for the particular illustration of this history. It has however been thought useful to append Goeller's map of the siege of Syracuse, which is accessible only in his edition of the text.

E. G.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM CAVENDISH, KNIGHT OF THE BATH, BARON OF HARDWICK, AND EARL OF DEVONSHIRE.

RIGHT HONOURABLE, I take confidence from your Lordship's goodness in the very entrance of this Epistle, to profess, with simplicity and according to the faith I owe my master now in heaven, that it is not unto yourself, but to your Lordship's father that I dedicate this my labour, such as it is. For neither am I at liberty to make choice of one to whom I may present it as a voluntary oblation; being bound in duty to bring it in as an account to him, by whose indulgence I had both the time and ammunition to perform it. Nor if such obligation were removed, know I any to whom I ought to dedicate it rather. For by the experience of many years I had the honour to serve him, I know this: there was not any, who more really, and less for glory's sake favoured those that studied the liberal arts liberally, than my Lord your father did; nor in whose house a man should less need the university than in his. For his own study, it was bestowed, for the most part, in that kind of learning which best deserveth the pains and hours of great persons, history and civil knowledge: and directed not to the ostentation of his reading, but to the government of his life and the public good. For he read, so that the learning he took in by study, by judgment he digested, and converted into wisdom and ability to benefit his country: to which also he applied himself with zeal, but such as took no fire either from faction or ambition. And as he was a most able man, for soundness of advice and clear expression of himself, in matters of difficulty and consequence, both in public and private: so also was he one whom no man was able either to draw or justle

out of the straight path of justice. Of which virtue, I know not whether he deserved more by his severity in imposing it (as he did to his last breath) on himself, or by his magnanimity in not exacting it to himself from others. No man better discerned of men: and therefore was he constant in his friendships, because he regarded not the fortune nor adherence, but the men; with whom also he conversed with an openness of heart that had no other guard than his own integrity and that nil conscire. To his equals he carried himself equally, and to his inferiors familiarly; but maintaining his respect fully, and only with the native splendour of his worth. In sum, he was one in whom might plainly be perceived, that honour and honesty are but the same thing in the different degrees of persons. To him therefore, and to the memory of his worth, be consecrated this, though unworthy, offering.

And now, imitating in this civil worship the religious worship of the gentiles; who, when they dedicated any thing to their gods, brought and presented the same to their images: I bring and present this gift of mine, the history of thucydides, translated into English with much more diligence than elegance, to your Lordship; who are the image of your father, (for never was a man more exactly copied out than he in you), and who have in you the seeds of his virtues already springing up: humbly intreating your Lordship to esteem it amongst the goods that descend upon you, and in your due time to read it. I could recommend the author unto you, not impertinently, for that he had in his veins the blood of kings; but I choose rather to recommend him for his writings, as having in them profitable instruction for noblemen, and such as may come to have the managing of great and weighty actions. For I may confidently say, that notwithstanding the excellent both examples and precepts of heroic virtue you have at home, this book will confer not a little to your institution; especially when you come to the years to frame your life by your own observation. For in history, actions of honour and dishonour do appear plainly and distinctly,

which are which; but in the present age they are so disguised, that few there be, and those very careful, that be not grossly mistaken in them. But this, I doubt not, is superfluously spoken by me to your Lordship. Therefore I end with this prayer: that it will please God to give you virtues suitable to the fair dwelling he hath prepared for them, and the happiness that such virtues lead unto both in and after this world.

Your Lordship's most humble servant,

Tho: Hobbes.

TO THE READERS.

THOUGH THIS TRANSLATION have already past the censure of some, whose judgments I very much esteem: yet because there is something, I know not what, in the censure of a multitude, more terrible than any single judgment, how severe or exact soever, I have thought it discretion in all men, that have to do with so many, and to me, in my want of perfection, necessary, to bespeak your candour. Which that I may upon the better reason hope for, I am willing to acquaint you briefly, upon what grounds I undertook this work at first; and have since, by publishing it, put myself upon the hazard of your censure, with so small hope of glory as from a thing of this nature can be expected. For I know, that mere translations have in them this property: that they may much disgrace, if not well done; but if well, not much commend the doer.

It hath been noted by divers, that Homer in poesy, Aristotle in philosophy, Demosthenes in eloquence, and others of the ancients in other knowledge, do still maintain their primacy: none of them exceeded, some not approached, by any in these later ages. And in the number of these is justly ranked also our Thucydides; a workman no less perfect in his work, than any of the former; and in whom (I believe with many others) the faculty of writing history is at the highest. For the principal and proper work of history being to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future: there is not extant any other (merely human) that doth more naturally and fully perform it, than this of my author. It is true, that there be many excellent and profitable histories written since: and in some of them

there be inserted very wise discourses, both of manners and policy. But being discourses inserted, and not of the contexture of the narration, they indeed commend the knowledge of the writer, but not the history itself: the nature whereof is merely narrative. In others, there be subtle conjectures at the secret aims and inward cogitations of such as fall under their pen; which is also none of the least virtues in a history, where conjecture is thoroughly grounded, not forced to serve the purpose of the writer in adorning his style, or manifesting his subtlety in conjecturing. But these conjectures cannot often be certain, unless withal so evident, that the narration itself may be sufficient to suggest the same also to the reader. But Thucydides is one, who, though he never digress to read a lecture, moral or political, upon his own text, nor enter into men's hearts further than the acts themselves evidently guide him: is yet accounted the most politic historiographer that ever writ. The reason whereof I take to be this. He filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, and ordereth them with that judgment, and with such perspicuity and efficacy expresseth himself, that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh his auditor a spectator. For he setteth his reader in the assemblies of the people and in the senate, at their debating; in the streets, at their seditions; and in the field, at their battles. So that look how much a man of understanding might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings, and familiar with the men and business of the time: so much almost may he profit now, by attentive reading of the same here written. He may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself, and of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat.

These virtues of my author did so take my affection, that they begat in me a desire to communicate him further: which was the first occasion that moved me to translate him. For it is an error we easily fall into, to believe that whatsoever pleaseth us, will be in like manner and degree acceptable to all: and to esteem of one another's judgment, as we agree in the liking or

dislike of the same things. And in this error peradventure was I, when I thought, that as many of the more judicious as I should communicate him to, would affect him as much as I myself did. I considered also, that he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own tongues: notwithstanding that he be not very much beholden for it to his interpreters. Of whom (to speak no more than becomes a candidate of your good opinion in the same kind) I may say this: that whereas the author himself so carrieth with him his own light throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before him, and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow; I found it not so in them. The cause whereof, and their excuse, may be this: they followed the Latin of Laurentius Valla, which was not without some errors; and he a Greek copy not so correct as now is extant. Out of French he was done into English (for I need not dissemble to have seen him in English) in the time of King Edward the Sixth: but so, as by multiplication of error he became at length traduced, rather than translated into our language. Hereupon I resolved to take him immediately from the Greek, according to the edition of Æmilius Porta: not refusing or neglecting any version, comment, or other help I could come by. Knowing that when with diligence and leisure I should have done it, though some error might remain, yet they would be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless I can discover none, and hope they be not many. After I had finished it, it lay long by me: and other reasons taking plaee, my desire to communicate it ceased.

For I saw that, for the greatest part, men came to the reading of history with an affection much like that of the people in Rome: who came to the spectacle of the gladiators with more delight to behold their blood, than their skill in fencing. For they be far more in number, that love to read of great armies, bloody battles, and many thousands slain at once, than that mind the art by which the affairs both of armies and cities be conducted to

their ends. I observed likewise, that there were not many whose ears were well accustomed to the names of the places they shall meet with in this history; without the knowledge whereof it can neither patiently be read over, perfectly understood, nor easily remembered: especially being many, as here it falleth out. Because in that age almost every city both in Greece and Sicily, the two main scenes of this war, was a distinct commonwealth by itself, and a party in the quarrel.

Nevertheless I have thought since, that the former of these considerations ought not to be of any weight at all, to him that can content himself with the few and better sort of readers: who, as they only judge, so is their approbation only considerable. And for the difficulty arising from the ignorance of places, I thought it not so insuperable, but that with convenient pictures of the countries it might be removed. To which purpose, I saw there would be necessary especially two: a general map of Greece, and a general map of Sicily. The latter of these I found already extant, exactly done by Philip Cluverius; which I have caused to be cut, and you have it at the beginning of the sixth book. But for maps of Greece, sufficient for this purpose, I could light on none. For neither are the tables of Ptolomy, and descriptions of those that follow him, accommodate to the time of Thucydides; and therefore few of the places by him mentioned, therein described: nor are those that be, agreeing always with the truth of history. Wherefore I was constrained to draw one as well as I could myself. Which to do, I was to rely for the main figure of the country on the modern description now in reputation: and in that, to set down those places especially (as many as the volume was capable of) which occur in the reading of this author, and to assign them that situation, which, by travel in Strabo, Pausanias, Herodotus, and some other good authors, I saw belonged unto them. And to shew you that I have not played the mountebank in it, putting down exactly some few of the principal, and the rest at adventure,

without care and without reason, I have joined with the map an index, that pointeth to the authors which will justify me where I differ from others. With these maps, and those few brief notes in the margin upon such passages as I thought most required them, I supposed the history might be read with very much benefit by all men of good judgment and education, (for whom also it was intended from the beginning by Thucydides), and have therefore at length made my labour public, not without hope to have it accepted. Which if I obtain, though no otherwise than in virtue of the author's excellent matter, it is sufficient.

OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

WE READ OF divers men that bear the name of Thucydides. There is Thucydides a Pharsalian, mentioned in the eighth book of this history; who was public host of the Athenians in Pharsalus, and chancing to be at Athens at the time that the government of the four hundred began to go down, by his interposition and persuasion kept asunder the factions then arming themselves, that they fought not in the city to the ruin of the commonwealth. There is Thucydides the son of Milesias, an Athenian, of the town of Alope, of whom Plutarch speaketh in the life of Pericles; and the same, in all probability, that in the first book of this history is said to have had the charge of forty galleys sent against Samos, about twenty–four years before the beginning of this war. Another Thucydides the son of Ariston, an Athenian also, of the town of Acherdus, was a poet; though of his verses there be nothing extant. But Thucydides the writer of this history, an Athenian, of the town of Halimus, was the son of Olorus (or Orolus) and Hegesypele. His father's name is commonly written Olorus, though in the inscription on his tomb it was Orolus. Howsoever it be written, it is the same that was borne by divers of the kings of Thrace; and imposed on him with respect unto his descent from them. So that though our author (as Cicero saith of him, lib. ii. De Oratore,) had never written an history, yet had not his name not been extant, in regard of his honour and nobility. And not only Plutarch, in the life of Cimon, but also almost all others that have touched this point, affirm directly that he was descended from the Thracian kings: adducing this for proof, that he was of the house of Miltiades, that famous general of the Athenians against the Persians at Marathon; which

they also prove by this, that his tomb was a long time extant amongst the monuments of that family. For near unto the gates of Athens, called Melitides, there was a place named Coela; and in it the monuments called Cimoniana, belonging to the family of Miltiades, in which none but such as were of that family might be buried. And amongst those was the monument of Thucydides; with this inscription, Thucydides Oroli Halimusius. Now Miltiades is confessed by all, to have descended from Olorus king of Thrace; whose daughter another Miltiades, grandfather to this, married and had children by. And Miltiades, that won the memorable victory at Marathon, was heir to goodly possessions and cities in the Chersonnesus of Thrace; over which also he reigned. In Thrace lay also the possessions of Thucydides, and his wealthy mines of gold: as he himself professeth in his fourth book. And although those riches might come to him by a wife (as is also by some affirmed) which he married in Scapte–Hyle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth, that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there unknown. But in what degree of kindred Miltiades and he approached each other, is not anywhere made manifest. Some also have conjectured that he was of the house of the Peisistratides: the ground of whose conjecture hath been only this, that he maketh honourable mention of the government of Peisistratus and his sons, and extenuateth the glory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; proving that the freeing of the state of Athens from the tyranny of the Peisistratides was falsely ascribed to their fact, (which proceeded from private revenge in a quarrel of love), by which the tyranny ceased not, but grew heavier to the state, till it was at last put down by the Lacedæmonians. But this opinion, as it is not so well–grounded, so neither is it so well received as the former.

Agreeable to his nobility, was his institution in the study of eloquence and philosophy. For in philosophy, he was the scholar (as also was Pericles and Socrates) of Anaxagoras; whose opinions, being of a strain above the

apprehension of the vulgar, procured him the estimation of an atheist: which name they bestowed upon all men that thought not as they did of their ridiculous religion, and in the end cost him his life. And Socrates after him for the like causes underwent the like fortune. It is not therefore much to be regarded, if this other disciple of his were by some reputed an atheist too. For though he were none, yet it is not improbable, but by the light of natural reason he might see enough in the religion of these heathen, to make him think it vain and superstitious; which was enough to make him an atheist in the opinion of the people. In some places of his history he noteth the equivocation of the oracles; and yet he confirmeth an assertion of his own, touching the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction. He taxeth Nicias for being too punctual in the observation of the ceremonies of their religion, when he overthrew himself and his army, and indeed the whole dominion and liberty of his country, by it. Yet he commendeth him in another place for his worshipping of the gods, and saith in that respect, he least of all men deserved to come to so great a degree of calamity as he did. So that in his writings our author appeareth to be, on the one side not superstitious, on the other side not an atheist.

In rhetoric, he was the disciple of Antiphon; one (by his description in the eighth book of this history) for power of speech almost a miracle, and feared by the people for his eloquence. Insomuch as in his latter days he lived retired, but so as he gave counsel to, and writ orations for other men that resorted to him to that purpose. It was he that contrived the deposing of the people, and the setting up of the government of the four hundred. For which also he was put to death, when the people again recovered their authority, notwithstanding that he pleaded his own cause the best of any man to that day.

It need not be doubted, but from such a master Thucydides was sufficiently qualified to have become a great demagogue, and of great

authority with the people. But it seemeth he had no desire at all to meddle in the government: because in those days it was impossible for any man to give good and profitable counsel for the commonwealth, and not incur the displeasure of the people. For their opinion was such of their own power, and of the facility of achieving whatsoever action they undertook, that such men only swayed the assemblies, and were esteemed wise and good commonwealth's men, as did put them upon the most dangerous and desperate enterprizes. Whereas he that gave them temperate and discreet advice, was thought a coward, or not to understand, or else to malign their power. And no marvel: for much prosperity (to which they had now for many years been accustomed) maketh men in love with themselves; and it is hard for any man to love that counsel which maketh him love himself the less. And it holdeth much more in a multitude, than in one man. For a man that reasoneth with himself, will not be ashamed to admit of timorous suggestions in his business, that he may the stronglier provide; but in public deliberations before a multitude, fear (which for the most part adviseth well, though it execute not so) seldom or never sheweth itself or is admitted. By this means it came to pass amongst the Athenians, who thought they were able to do anything, that wicked men and flatterers drave them headlong into those actions that were to ruin them; and the good men either durst not oppose, or if they did, undid themselves. Thucydides therefore, that he might not be either of them that committed or of them that suffered the evil, forbore to come into the assemblies; and propounded to himself a private life, as far as the eminency of so wealthy a person, and the writing of the history he had undertaken, would permit.

For his opinion touching the government of the state, it is manifest that he least of all liked the democracy. And upon divers occasions he noteth the emulation and contention of the demagogues for reputation and glory of wit; with their crossing of each other's counsels, to the damage of the

public; the inconsistency of resolutions, caused by the diversity of ends and power of rhetoric in the orators; and the desperate actions undertaken upon the flattering advice of such as desired to attain, or to hold what they had attained, of authority and sway amongst the common people. Nor doth it appear that he magnifieth anywhere the authority of the few: amongst whom, he saith, every one desireth to be the chief; and they that are undervalued, bear it with less patience than in a democracy; whereupon sedition followeth, and dissolution of the government. He praiseth the government of Athens, when it was mixed of the few and the many; but more he commendeth it, both when Peisistratus reigned, (saving that it was an usurped power), and when in the beginning of this war it was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles. So that it seemeth, that as he was of regal descent, so he best approved of the regal government. It is therefore no marvel, if he meddled as little as he could in the business of the commonwealth; but gave himself rather to the observation and recording of what was done by those that had the managing thereof. Which also he was no less prompt, diligent, and faithful by the disposition of his mind, than by his fortune, dignity, and wisdom able, to accomplish. How he was disposed to a work of this nature, may be understood by this: that when being a young man he heard Herodotus the historiographer reciting his history in public, (for such was the fashion both of that, and many ages after), he felt so great a sting of emulation, that it drew tears from him: insomuch as Herodotus himself took notice how violently his mind was set on letters, and told his father Olorus. When the Peloponnesian war began to break out, he conjectured truly that it would prove an argument worthy of his labour: and no sooner it began, than he began his history; pursuing the same not in that perfect manner in which we see it now, but by way of commentary or plain register of the actions and passages thereof, as from time to time they fell out and came to his

knowledge. But such a commentary it was, as might perhaps deserve to be preferred before a history written by another. For it is very probable that the eighth book is left the same as it was when he first writ it: neither beautified with orations, nor so well cemented at the transitions, as the former seven books are. And though he began to write as soon as ever the war was on foot; yet began he not to perfect and polish his history, till after he was banished.

For notwithstanding his retired life upon the coast of Thrace, where his own possessions lay, he could not avoid a service to the state which proved to him afterwards very unfortunate. For whilst he resided in the isle Thasos, it fell out that Brasidas the Lacedæmonian besieged Amphipolis; a city belonging to the Athenians, on the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, distant from Thasos about half a day's sail. To relieve which, the captain thereof for the Athenians sent to Thucydides, to levy a power and make haste unto him: for Thucydides was one of the Strategi, that is, had authority to raise forces in those parts for the service of the commonwealth. And he did accordingly; but he came thither one night too late, and found the city already yielded up. And for this he was afterwards banished; as if he had let slip his time through negligence, or purposely put it off upon fear of the enemy. Nevertheless he put himself into the city of Eion, and preserved it to the Athenians with the repulse of Brasidas; which came down from Amphipolis the next morning, and assaulted it. The author of his banishment is supposed to have been Cleon; a most violent sycophant in those times, and thereby also a most acceptable speaker amongst the people. For where affairs succeed amiss, though there want neither providence nor courage in the conduction; yet with those that judge only upon events, the way to calumny is always open, and envy, in the likeness of zeal to the public good, easily findeth credit for an accusation.

After his banishment he lived in Scapte–Hyle, a city of Thrace before mentioned, as Plutarch writeth; but yet so, as he went abroad, and was present at the actions of the rest of the war; as appeareth by his own words in his fifth book, where he saith, that he was present at the actions of both parts, and no less at those of the Peloponnesians, by reason of his exile, than those of the Athenians. During this time also he perfected his history, so far as is now to be seen; nor doth it appear that after his exile he ever again enjoyed his country. It is not clear in any author, where, or when, or in what year of his own age he died. Most agree that he died in banishment: yet there be that have written, that after the defeat in Sicily the Athenians decreed a general revocation of all banished persons, except those of the family of Peisistratus; and that he then returned, and was afterwards put to death at Athens. But this is very unlikely to be true, unless by after the defeat in Sicily, be meant so long after, that it was also after the end of the Peloponnesian war; because Thucydides himself maketh no mention of such return, though he outlived the whole war, as is manifest by his words in the fifth book. For he saith he lived in banishment twenty years after his charge at Amphipolis; which happened in the eighth year of this war: which, in the whole, lasted but twenty–seven years complete. And in another place he maketh mention of the razing of the long walls between Peiræus and the city; which was the last stroke of this war. They that say he died at Athens, take their conjecture from his monument which was there. But this is not a sufficient argument; for he might be buried there secretly, (as some have written he was), though he died abroad: or his monument might be there, and (as others have affirmed) he not buried in it. In this variety of conjecture, there is nothing more probable than that which is written by Pausanias, where he describeth the monuments of the Athenian city; and saith thus: “The worthy act of Œnobius in the behalf of Thucydides, is not without honour”: meaning that he had a statue. “For

Œnobius obtained to have a decree passed for his return; who returning was slain by treachery; and his sepulchre is near the gates called Melitides." He died, as saith Marcellinus, after the seven and fiftieth year of his age. And if it be true that is written by A. Gellius, of the ages of Hellanicus, Herodotus, and Thucydides, then died he not before the sixty–eighth year. For if he were forty when the war began, and lived (as he did certainly) to see it ended, he might be more when he died, but not less than sixty–eight years of age. What children he left, is not manifest. Plato in Menone, maketh mention of Milesias and Stephanus, sons of a Thucydides of a very noble family; but it is clear they were of Thucydides the rival of Pericles, both by the name Milesias, and because this Thucydides also was of the family of Miltiades, as Plutarch testifieth in the life of Cimon. That he had a son, is affirmed by Marcellinus out of the authority of Polemon; but of his name there is no mention, save that a learned man readeth there in the place of θεο .... (which is in the imperfect copy), Timotheus. Thus much of the person of Thucydides.

Now for his writings, two things are to be considered in them: truth and elocution. For in truth consisteth the soul, and in elocution the body of history. The latter without the former, is but a picture of history; and the former without the latter, unapt to instruct. But let us see how our author hath acquitted himself in both. For the faith of this history, I shall have the less to say: in respect that no man hath ever yet called it into question. Nor indeed could any man justly doubt of the truth of that writer, in whom they had nothing at all to suspect of those things that could have caused him either voluntarily to lie, or ignorantly to deliver an untruth. He overtasked not himself by undertaking an history of things done long before his time, and of which he was not able to inform himself. He was a man that had as much means, in regard both of his dignity and wealth, to find the truth of what he relateth, as was needful for a man to have. He used as much

diligence in search of the truth, (noting every thing whilst it was fresh in memory, and laying out his wealth upon intelligence), as was possible for a man to use. He affected least of any man the acclamations of popular auditories, and wrote not his history to win present applause, as was the use of that age: but for a monument to instruct the ages to come; which he professeth himself, and entitleth his book ΚΤΗΜΑ ΕΣ ΑΕΙ, a possession for everlasting. He was far from the necessity of servile writers, either to fear or flatter. And whereas he may peradventure be thought to have been malevolent towards his country, because they deserved to have him so; yet hath he not written any thing that discovereth such passion. Nor is there any thing written of them that tendeth to their dishonour as Athenians, but only as people; and that by the necessity of the narration, not by any sought digression. So that no word of his, but their own actions do sometimes reproach them. In sum, if the truth of a history did ever appear by the manner of relating, it doth so in this history: so coherent, perspicuous and persuasive is the whole narration, and every part thereof.

In the elocution also, two things are considerable: disposition or method, and style. Of the disposition here used by Thucydides, it will be sufficient in this place briefly to observe only this: that in his first book, first he hath, by way of exordium, derived the state of Greece from the cradle to the vigorous stature it then was at when he began to write: and next, declared the causes, both real and pretended, of the war he was to write of. In the rest, in which he handleth the war itself, he followeth distinctly and purely the order of time throughout; relating what came to pass from year to year, and subdividing each year into a summer and winter. The grounds and motives of every action he setteth down before the action itself, either narratively, or else contriveth them into the form of deliberative orations in the persons of such as from time to time bare sway in the commonwealth. After the actions, when there is just occasion, he giveth his judgment of

them; shewing by what means the success came either to be furthered or hindered. Digressions for instruction's cause, and other such open conveyances of precepts, (which is the philosopher's part), he never useth; as having so clearly set before men's eyes the ways and events of good and evil counsels, that the narration itself doth secretly instruct the reader, and more effectually than can possibly be done by precept.

For his style, I refer it to the judgment of divers ancient and competent judges. Plutarch in his book, De gloria Atheniensium, saith of him thus: "Thucydides aimeth always at this; to make his auditor a spectator, and to cast his reader into the same passions that they were in that were beholders. The manner how Demosthenes arranged the Athenians on the rugged shore before Pylus; how Brasidas urged the steersman to run his galley aground; how he went to the ladder or place in the galley for descent; how he was hurt, and swooned, and fell down on the ledges of the galley; how the Spartans fought after the manner of a land–fight upon the sea, and the Athenians of a sea–fight upon land: again, in the Sicilian war, how a battle was fought by sea and land with equal fortune: these things, I say, are so described and so evidently set before our eyes, that the mind of the reader is no less affected therewith than if he had been present in the actions." There is for his perspicuity. Cicero in his book entitled Orator, speaking of the affection of divers Greek rhetoricians, saith thus: "And therefore Herodotus and Thucydides are the more admirable. For though they lived in the same age with those I have before named," (meaning Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and Theodorus), "yet were they far from this kind of delicacy, or rather indeed foolery. For the one without rub, gently glideth like a still river; and the other" (meaning Thucydides) "runs stronglier, and in matter of war, as it were, bloweth a trumpet of war. And in these two (as saith Theophrastus) history hath roused herself, and adventured to speak, but more copiously, and with more ornament than in those that were before them." This

commends the gravity and the dignity of his language. Again in his second book, De Oratore, thus: “Thucydides, in the art of speaking, hath in my opinion far exceeded them all. For he is so full of matter, that the number of his sentences doth almost reach to the number of his words; and in his words he is so apt and so close, that it is hard to say whether his words do more illustrate his sentences, or his sentences his words.” There is for the pithiness and strength of his style. Lastly, for the purity and propriety, I cite Dionysius Halicarnassius: whose testimony is the stronger in this point, because he was a Greek rhetorician for his faculty, and for his affection, one that would no further commend him than of necessity he must. His words are these: “There is one virtue in eloquenee, the chiefest of all the rest, and without which there is no other goodness in speech. What is that? That the language be pure, and retain the propriety of the Greek tongue. This they both observe diligently. For Herodotus is the best rule of the Ionic, and Thucydides of the Attic dialect.” These testimonies are not needful to him that hath read the history itself; nor at all, but that this same Dionysius hath taken so much pains, and applied so much of his faculty in rhetoric, to the extenuating of the worth thereof. Moreover, I have thought it necessary to take out the principal objections he maketh against him; and without many words of mine own to leave them to the consideration of the reader. And first, Dionysius saith thus: “The principal and most necessary office of any man that intendeth to write a history, is to choose a noble argument, and grateful to such as shall read it. And this Herodotus, in my opinion, hath done better than Thucydides. For Herodotus hath written the joint history both of the Greeks and barbarians, to save from oblivion, &c. But Thucydides writeth one only war, and that neither honourable nor fortunate; which principally were to be wished never to have been; and next, never to have been remembered nor known to posterity. And that he took an evil argument in hand, he maketh it manifest in his proeme, saying: that many

cities were in that war made desolate and utterly destroyed, partly by barbarians, partly by the Greeks themselves: so many banishments, and so much slaughter of men, as never was the like before, &c. so that the hearers will abhor it at the first propounding. Now by how much it is better to write of the wonderful acts both of the barbarians and Grecians, than of the pitiful and horrible calamities of the Grecians; so much wiser is Herodotus in the choice of his argument than Thucydides."

Now let any man consider whether it be not more reasonable to say: That the principal and most necessary office of him that will write a history, is to take such an argument as is both within his power well to handle, and profitable to posterity that shall read it, which Thucydides, in the opinion of all men, hath done better than Herodotus: for Herodotus undertook to write of those things, of which it was impossible for him to know the truth; and which delight more the ear with fabulous narrations, than satisfy the mind with truth: but Thucydides writeth one war; which, how it was carried from the beginning to the end, he was able certainly to inform himself: and by propounding in his proeme the miseries that happened in the same, he sheweth that it was a great war, and worthy to be known; and not to be concealed from posterity, for the calamities that then fell upon the Grecians; but the rather to be truly delivered unto them, for that men profit more by looking on adverse events, than on prosperity: therefore by how much men's miseries do better instruct, than their good success; by so much was Thucydides more happy in taking his argument, than Herodotus was wise in choosing his.

Dionysius again saith thus: "The next office of him that will write a history, is to know where to begin, and where to end. And in this point Herodotus seemeth to be far more discreet than Thucydides. For in the first place he layeth down the cause for which the barbarians began to injure the Grecians; and going on, maketh an end at the punishment and the revenge

taken on the barbarians. But Thucydides begins at the good estate of the Grecians; which, being a Grecian and an Athenian, he ought not to have done: nor ought he, being of that dignity amongst the Athenians, so evidently to have laid the fault of the war upon his own city, when there were other occasions enough to which he might have imputed it. Nor ought he to have begun with the business of the Corcyræans, but at the more noble acts of his country, which they did immediately after the Persian war: which afterward in convenient place he mentioneth, but it is but cursorily, and not as he ought. And when he had declared those with much affection, as a lover of his country, then he should have brought in, how that the Lacedæmonians, through envy and fear, but pretending other causes, began the war: and so have descended to the Corcyræan business, and the decree against the Megareans, or whatsoever else he had to put in. Then in the ending of his history, there be many errors committed. For though he profess he was present in the whole war, and that he would write it all: yet he ends with the naval battle at Cynos–sema, which was fought in the twenty–first year of the war. Whereas it had been better to have gone through with it, and ended his history with that admirable and grateful return of the banished Athenians from Phile; at which time the city recovered her liberty."

To this I say, that it was the duty of him that had undertaken to write the history of the Peloponnesian war, to begin his narration no further off than at the causes of the same, whether the Grecians were then in good or in evil estate. And if the injury, upon which the war arose, proceeded from the Athenians; then the writer, though an Athenian and honoured in his country, ought to declare the same; and not to seek nor take, though at hand, any other occasion to transfer the fault. And that the acts done before the time comprehended in the war he writ of, ought to have been touched but cursorily, and no more than may serve for the enlightening of the history to

follow, how noble soever those acts have been. Which when he had thus touched, without affection to either side, and not as a lover of his country but of truth; then to have proceeded to the rest with the like indifferency. And to have made an end of writing, where the war ended, which he undertook to write; not producing his history beyond that period, though that which followed were never so admirable and acceptable. All this Thucydides hath observed.

These two criminations I have therefore set down at large, translated almost verbatim, that the judgment of Dionysius Halicarnassius may the better appear concerning the main and principal virtues of a history. I think there was never written so much absurdity in so few lines. He is contrary to the opinion of all men that ever spake of this subject besides himself, and to common sense. For he makes the scope of history, not profit by writing truth, but delight of the hearer, as if it were a song. And the argument of history, he would not by any means have to contain the calamities and misery of his country; these he would have buried in silence: but only their glorious and splendid actions. Amongst the virtues of an historiographer, he reckons affection to his country; study to please the hearer; to write of more than his argument leads him to; and to conceal all actions that were not to the honour of his country. Most manifest vices. He was a rhetorician; and it seemeth he would have nothing written, but that which was most capable of rhetorical ornament. Yet Lucian, a rhetorician also, in a treatise entitled, How a history ought to be written, saith thus: “that a writer of history ought, in his writings, to be a foreigner, without country, living under his own law only, subject to no king, nor caring what any man will like or dislike, but laying out the matter as it is.”

The third fault he finds is this: that the method of his history is governed by the time, rather than the periods of several actions: for he declares in order what came to pass each summer and winter, and is thereby forced

sometimes to leave the narration of a siege, or sedition, or a war, or other action in the middest, and enter into a relation of somewhat else done at the same time, in another place, and to come to the former again when the time requires it. This, saith he, causes confusion in the mind of his hearer, so that he cannot comprehend distinctly the several parts of the history.

Dionysius aimeth still at the delight of the present hearer; though Thucydides himself profess that his scope is not that, but to leave his work for a perpetual possession for posterity: and then have men leisure enough to comprehend him thoroughly. But indeed, whosoever shall read him once attentively, shall more distinctly conceive of every action this way than the other. And the method is more natural; forasmuch as his purpose being to write of one Peloponnesian war, this way he has incorporated all the parts thereof into one body; so that there is unity in the whole, and the several narrations are conceived only as parts of that. Whereas the other way, he had sewed together many little histories, and left the Peloponnesian war, which he took for his subject, in a manner unwritten: for neither any part nor the whole could justly have carried such a title.

Fourthly, he accuseth him for the method of his first book: in that he deriveth Greece from the infancy thereof to his own time: and in that he setteth down the narration of the quarrels about Corcyra and Potidæa, before he entreateth of the true cause of the war; which was the greatness of the Athenian dominion, feared and envied by the Lacedæmonians.

For answer to this, I say thus. For the mentioning of the ancient state of Greece, he doth it briefly, insisting no longer upon it than is necessary for the well understanding of the following history. For without some general notions of these first times, many places of the history are the less easy to be understood; as depending upon the knowledge of the original of several cities and customs, which could not be at all inserted into the history itself, but must be either supposed to be foreknown by the reader, or else be

delivered to him in the beginning as a necessary preface. And for his putting first the narration of the public and avowed cause of this war, and after that the true and inward motive of the same; the reprehension is absurd. For it is plain, that a cause of war divulged and avowed, how slight soever it be, comes within the task of the historiographer, no less than the war itself. For without a pretext, no war follows. This pretext is always an injury received, or pretended to be received. Whereas the inward motive to hostility is but conjectural; and not of that evidence, that a historiographer should be always bound to take notice of it: as envy to the greatness of another state, or fear of an injury to come. Now let any man judge, whether a good writer of history ought to handle, as the principal cause of war, proclaimed injury or concealed envy. In a word, the image of the method used by Thucydides in this point, is this: “The quarrel about Corcyra passed on this manner; and the quarrel about Potidæa on this manner”: relating both at large: “and in both the Athenians were accused to have done the injury. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians had not upon this injury entered into a war against them, but that they envied the greatness of their power, and feared the consequence of their ambition.” I think a more clear and natural order cannot possibly be devised.

Again he says, that he maketh a funeral oration (which was solemnly done on all occasions through the war) for fifteen horsemen only, that were slain at the brooks called Rheiti: and that for this reason only, that he might make it in the person of Pericles, who was then living, but before another the like occasion happened was dead.

The manner of the Athenians was, that they that were slain the first in any war, should have a solemn funeral in the suburbs of the city. During this war, they had many occasions to put this custom in practice. Seeing therefore it was fit to have that custom and the form of it known, and that once for all, the manner being ever the same; it was the fittest to relate it on

the first occasion, what number soever they were that were then buried: which nevertheless is not likely to have been so few as Dionysius saith. For the funeral was not celebrated till the winter after they were slain: so that many more were slain before this solemnity, and may all be accounted amongst the first. And that Pericles performed the office of making their funeral oration, there is no reason alledged by him why it should be doubted.

Another fault he finds, is this: that he introduceth the Athenian generals, in a dialogue with the inhabitants of the Isle of Melos, pretending openly for the cause of their invasion of that isle, the power and will of the state of Athens; and rejecting utterly to enter into any disputation with them concerning the equity of their cause, which, he saith, was contrary to the dignity of the state.

To this may be answered, that the proceeding of these generals was not unlike to divers other actions, that the people of Athens openly took upon them: and therefore it is very likely they were allowed so to proceed. Howsoever, if the Athenian people gave in charge to these their captains, to take in the island by all means whatsoever, without power to report back unto them first the equity of the islanders' cause; as is most likely to be true; I see then no reason the generals had to enter into disputation with them, whether they should perform their charge or not, but only whether they should do it by fair or foul means; which is the point treated of in this dialogue. Other cavils he hath touching the matter and order of this history, but not needful to be answered.

Then for his phrase, he carpeth at it in infinite places, both for obscure and licentious. He that will see the particular places he reprehendeth, let him read Dionysius himself, if he will: for the matter is too tedious for this place. It is true, that there be some sentences in him somewhat long: not obscure to one that is attentive: and besides that, they are but few. Yet is this

the most important fault he findeth. For the rest, the obscurity that is, proceedeth from the profoundness of the sentences; containing contemplations of those human passions, which either dissembled or not commonly discoursed of, do yet carry the greatest sway with men in their public conversation. If then one cannot penetrate into them without much meditation, we are not to expect a man should understand them at the first speaking. Marcellinus saith, he was obscure on purpose; that the common people might not understand him. And not unlikely: for a wise man should so write, (though in words understood by all men), that wise men only should be able to commend him. But this obscurity is not to be in the narrations of things done, nor in the descriptions of places or of battles, in all which Thucydides is most perspicuous: as Plutarch in the words before cited hath testified of him. But in the characters of men's humours and manners, and applying them to affairs of consequence: it is impossible not to be obscure to ordinary capacities, in what words soever a man deliver his mind. If therefore Thucydides in his orations, or in the description of a sedition, or other thing of that kind, be not easily understood; it is of those only that cannot penetrate into the nature of such things, and proceedeth not from any intricacy of expression. Dionysius further findeth fault with his using to set word against word: which the rhetoricians call antitheta. Which, as it is in some kind of speech a very great vice, so is it not improper in characters: and of comparative discourses, it is almost the only style.

And whereas he further taxeth him for licentiousness in turning nouns into verbs, and verbs into nouns, and altering of genders, cases, and numbers; as he doth sometimes for the more efficacy of his style, and without solœcism; I leave him to the answer of Marcellinus: who says, "That Dionysius findeth fault with this, as being ignorant" (yet he was a professed rhetorician) "that this was the most excellent and perfect kind of speaking."

Some man may peradventure desire to know, what motive Dionysius might have to extenuate the worth of him, whom he himself acknowledgeth to have been esteemed by all men for the best by far of all historians that ever wrote, and to have been taken by all the ancient orators and philosophers for the measure and rule of writing history. What motive he had to it, I know not: but what glory he might expect by it, is easily known. For having first preferred Herodotus, his countryman, a Halicarnassian, before Thucydides, who was accounted the best; and then conceiving that his own history might perhaps be thought not inferior to that of Herodotus: by this computation he saw the honour of the best historiographer falling on himself. Wherein, in the opinion of all men, he hath misreckoned. And thus much for the objections of Denis of Halicarnasse.

It is written of Demosthenes, the famous orator, that he wrote over the history of Thucydides with his own hand eight times. So much was this work esteemed, even for the eloquence. But yet was this his eloquence not at all fit for the bar; but proper for history, and rather to be read than heard. For words that pass away (as in public orations they must) without pause, ought to be understood with ease, and are lost else: though words that remain in writing for the reader to meditate on, ought rather to be pithy and full. Cicero therefore doth justly set him apart from the rank of pleaders; but withal, he continually giveth him his due for history, (lib. ii. De Oratore): “What great rhetorician ever borrowed any thing of Thucydides? Yet all men praise him, I confess it, as a wise, severe, grave relator of things done: not for a pleader of causes at the bar, but a reporter of war in history. So that he was never reckoned an orator: nor if he had never written a history, had his name therefore not been extant, being a man of honour and nobility. Yet none of them imitate the gravity of his words and sentences; but when they have uttered a kind of lame and disjointed stuff, they presently think themselves brothers of Thucydides.” Again, in his book De Optimo

Oratore, he saith thus: “But here will stand up Thucydides: for his eloquence is by some admired; and justly. But this is nothing to the orator we seek: for it is one thing to unfold a matter by way of narration; another thing to accuse a man, or clear him by arguments. And in narrations, one thing to stay the hearer, another to stir him.” Lucian, in his book entitled How a history ought to be written, doth continually exemplify the virtues which he requires in an historiographer by Thucydides. And if a man consider well that whole discourse of his, he shall plainly perceive that the image of this present history, preconceived in Lucian’s mind, suggested unto him all the precepts he there delivereth. Lastly, hear the most true and proper commendation of him from Justus Lipsius, in his notes to his book De Doctrina Civili in these words: “Thucydides, who hath written not many nor very great matters, hath perhaps yet won the garland from all that have written of matters both many and great. Everywhere for elocution grave; short, and thick with sense; sound in his judgments; everywhere secretly instructing and directing a man’s life and actions. In his orations and excursions, almost divine. Whom the oftener you read, the more you shall carry away; yet never be dismissed without appetite. Next to him is Polybius, &c.”

And thus much concerning the life and history of Thucydides.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE ESTATE OF Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. — The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidæa. — The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion. — The degrees by which that dominion was acquired. — The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta. — The demands of the Lacedæmonians. — The obstinacy of the Athenians; and their answer by the advice of Pericles.

To make it appear that this war was greater than any before it, the author showeth the imbecility of former times; describing three periods: 1. From the beginning of the Grecian memory to the war of Troy. 2. The war itself. 3. The time from thence to the present war which he writeth.

Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot; with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it: conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians, and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more

ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

The state of Greece before the Trojan war.

For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas, was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches, and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day: they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia; and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home; and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is that Attica, from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people. And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the

city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as Attica, being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

The original of the name of Hellas. The name of Hellenes not given to all the Grecians in the time that Homer wrote his poems. The Trojan war was the first enterprise where the Grecians combined their forces.

And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes: and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general; nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called: but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part of Greece had now received.

Minos, king of Creta, the first that had a navy.

For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea; and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

A digression touching the piracies and robberies of old time; with other notes of savageness. Robbing had in honour.

For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolæ, the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

Continual wearing of armour in fashion. The Athenians grew first civil.

For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe; and accustomed

themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom, the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years, laid away upon the same delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games, stripped themselves naked and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.

The cities of Greece, how seated, and for what causes.

As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea], both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well

in the islands as in the continent. For others also that dwelt on the sea–side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.

The Carians and Phœnicians were those that committed the most robberies.

But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands inhabited; a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians, when in this present war they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians; known so to be, both by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea–coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.

The action of Troy. Peloponnesus, so called from Pelops. The increase of the power of the Pelopians. Atreus king of Mycenæ after the death of Pelops.

And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tindareus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts of the Peloponnesians, say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power

amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Euristheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleides, Atreus, that was his uncle by the mother, and was then abiding with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus, and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides. To which greatness Agamemnon succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient); who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him, "of many isles and of all Argos King." Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

Mycenæ, though no great city, yet was of great power. The city of Sparta less, and the city of Athens greater, than for the proportion of their power. A survey of the fleetsent to Troy.

Now seeing Mycenæ was but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be. For if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would

breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts of Peloponnesus it possess two, and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy], nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels; those that were of Bœotians carrying one hundred and twenty men a–piece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth that they who were in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.

The poverty of the Greeks was the cause why the Trojans could so long hold out.

And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest; for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise; but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report, which by means of the poets now goeth of it.

The state of Greece after the Trojan war. A. C. 1124. A. 1m. Ol. 347. Bœotia, more anciently Cadmeis. A. C. 1104. A. 1m. Ol. 327. The Ionians were the colonies of the Athenians.

For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions; and those which were driven out, built cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which

now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy). And in the eightieth year, the Dorians together with the Heracleides seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

The difference between tyranny and regal authority. At Corinth were made the first triremes, or gallies of three tire of oars one above another. A. C. 704. Olym. 1. A. C. 667. Olym. 2. The means of the wealth of Corinth. Corinth surnamed the rich. The Ionians had a navy in Cyrus' time. Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had a navy in the time of Cambyses. About A. C. 600. Olym.

But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies: (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary): and the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first gallies of all Greece. Now it is well known that Aminocles, the ship–wright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos: and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans; and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; (because the Grecians of old,

from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians' territory); and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates; and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy; and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The Phocæans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

The shipping of Greece very mean before this war. A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.

These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Medan war and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina and the Athenians had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars a–piece; and that so lately, as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.

The causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in any great action.

Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all: and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.

The Ionians kept down by the Persians.

As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Crœsus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea–side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent: and Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

C. 548. Ol. 58. 1.

And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time hindered, that neither

jointly it could do anything remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.

The Lacedæmonians put down the tyrants through all Greece. A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2. A. C. 804. A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 3. Olym. 1. All Greece divided into two leagues; the Lacedæmonians and their league, and the Athenians and their league.

But after that the tyrants, both of Athens and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants: for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that, came the barbarian with the great fleet into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship–board and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest; for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile: for afterwards the

Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance, warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much, that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] somtimees in peace sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert; because their practice was with danger.

The manner how the Lacedæmonians dealt with their confederates. The manner how the Athenians handled their confederates.

The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned over them, and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means, their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

Such then I find to have been the state of things past; hard to be believed, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For men receive the report of things, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.

Digression to show how negligently men receive the fame of things past, by the example of their error touching the story of Hippias the son of Pisistratus: which it seems he willingly mentions, both here and hereafter, on light occasion. A. C. 514. Ol. 46. 2.

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: and know not that Hippias had

the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their complices had that day, and at that instant, discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single, but double votes: and that Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there; whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

Now he, that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose–writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned.

The diligence of the author in the inquiry of the truth of what he wrote: both touching the orations and the actions.

What particular persons have spoken when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it, were hard for me to remember exactly; whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at

the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum of the truth of all that had been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty; because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner; but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember.

The use of this history.

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find enough herein to make him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession, than to be rehearsed for a prize.

The greatness of the present war. Earthquakes, eclipses, famine, pestilence, concomitants of this war. A. C. 415. Ol. 83. 3. The causes of the war. Fear necessitates the war in the Lacedæmonians.

The greatest action before this was that against the Medes; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians and what by the Greeks warring on one another; (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants); nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition, as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in

fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part, the plague. All these evils entered together with this war: which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which immediately after the conquest of Eubœa had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced, were these.

The first pretext. A. C. 627. Ol. 38. 2.

Epidamnus is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris. This was planted by the Corcyræans; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians, brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner,

sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

The Epidamnians neglected by their mother city Corcyra, procure the protection of the Corinthians. A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1. A. C. 436. Ol. 85. 4./86. 1.

The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders, and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city to them, and declared how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyræans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyræans; who being their colony yet contemned them, and allowed them not their due honour in public meetings, nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money, and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaces, who flourished in glory of naval affairs: which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves

of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

The Corinthians send inhabitants to Epidamnus. A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1. The Corcyræans angry at the aids sent by the Corinthians, make war on Epidamnus. A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1. The Corcyræans besiege Epidamnus.

The Corinthians therefore having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia. The Corcyræans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty–five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished, (for these banished men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulcres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyræans to restore them), and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce), and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

The Corinthians send an army to relieve it.

The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army: and at the same time caused a

proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges with those that were there before: and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid them with some galleys: who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five: the citizens of Hermione, one: the Trœzenians, two: the Leucadians, ten: the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money: of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms.

C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræans offer to stand to arbitrement. The Corinthians unwilling to accept it, and not without cause.

The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them; and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony, to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi: that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better friends than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before

Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter: for before they could not honestly do it; because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corinthian fleet. A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræan fleet. The Corcyræans have the victory at sea, and on the same day take the city.

The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy–five galleys and two thousand men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him), in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent a herald to them at Actium, to forbid their coming on; and in the meantime manned out their fleet; and having repaired and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard. The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail, (for forty attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea, and arranging themselves came to a battle: in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that

besieged Epidamnus had the same rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræans masters of the sea. A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.

The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony; and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till such time as in the beginning of the summer following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis: and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lyen quietly opposite all the summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

C. 434. 3. Ol. 86. 3. 4. The Corinthians prepare a greater navy. Both Corcyræans and Corinthians send their ambassadors to Athens. A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corinthians, being vexed at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear; and

(because they had never been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians) thought it best now to send to Athens, to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyræans spake to this effect.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. oration of the ambassadors of corcyra. A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

"Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same: and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and

the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece: it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

"Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence on our part of need will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befal you, than that that power, which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it. If any here think, that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error, and seeth not how the Lacedæmonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize, assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your part,

we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

“If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure, that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

“As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And if they impute it to you as a fault, that you grant our request; we shall take it for a greater, that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your

states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities, as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest; that whereas they are your enemies, (which is manifest enough), and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay rather, your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but yourselves; or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

"If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken: let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (considering the present state of affairs), that makes a question, whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot, he should join unto it or not that city, which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily, that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus thither: and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not, by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league

with us, you shall, with your fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone."

Thus spake the Corcyræans: and after them the Corinthians, thus.

oration of the ambassadors of corinth. A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

"The Corcyræans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness; as being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point; that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame, when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their honesty appear. 38. But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For

being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt; but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again, that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them, and to be regarded by them as is fit. For our other colonies both honour and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had colour to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

"They say now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment, as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he, that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put it up. And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get in you; into their confederacy? no; but into their conspiracy; and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you, that never partaked of their power, must impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should

communicate their power before hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

“Thus it appears, that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right; whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles, that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either; but only for those, that having revolted from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise) that receive them. For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly, to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyræans; (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyræans you never had so much as a truce); and not to constitute a new law, of receiving one another’s rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion; but plainly alleged, that it was reason, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so much against us, as against yourselves.

C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. A. C. 491. Ol. 72. 2.

“These are the points of justice we had to show you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such

friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but of victory. For even a man's domestic affairs are ordered the worse, through eagerness of present contention.

C. 433. Ol.86.3.4.

"Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most, wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power, than that addition of strength, which, puffed up with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.

"And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that

have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering, that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy: and that you will not receive these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs."

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

C. 433. Ol.86.3.4. A league defensive made between the Athenians and Corcyræans.

Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans. But in the latter they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other; (for then, if the Corcyræans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians); but made it only defensive, that if any one should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

They aid Corcyra with ten galleys. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyræans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius the son of

Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles; and had order not to fight with the Corinthians, unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs: which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

The Corinthian fleet. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty–seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas, and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra, in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elæatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine; betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came the Corinthians, and encamped.

The Corcyræan fleet.

The Corcyræans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota: and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand

men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have been evermore their friends.

The Corinthians set forward. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days' provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own, were divided into three commands, under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyræans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.

The battle. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Corinthians have the better. The Athenians and Corinthians fight. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

The standard being on either side lift up, they joined battle; having on both parts both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought; near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages through each other they made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill. Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder: in which the Athenian galleys, being

always, where the Corcyræans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress; for the Corcyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyræans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyræans were in distress, now aided them manifestly; whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

Sybota of the continent, a haven. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. A supply of twenty sail from Athens.

The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans to the shore, they

returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead; which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land–forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves, and made again to the Corcyræans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys, sent from Athens to second the former ten; for fear lest the Corcyræans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

The Corinthians fall off. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyræans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern; till at last some that saw them, said they were enemies; and then retired also the Corcyræans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended in night. The Corcyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcases and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyræans in Leucimna. The Corcyræans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they anchored there.

The Corcyræans offer battle again. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Corinthians expostulate with the Athenians, to sound their purpose. The answer of the Athenians.

The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet repaired; but took thought rather how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace for already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. 53. They therefore thought good to send afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this manner: "Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us: if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies." Thus said they: and the Corcyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: "Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyræans: if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not; but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not suffer you."

The Corinthians go home. Both the Corcyræans and Corinthians challenge the victory, and both set up trophies. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy of the enemies' galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty galleys of the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them: and lastly, for that when they went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

The Corinthians in their way home, take Anactorium, and keep two hundred and fifty of the best men prisoners, being Corcyræans, and use them well. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit; (this town was common to them and to the Corcyræans); and having put into it Corinthians only, departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans, eight hundred that were servants, they sold; and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour, that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians; the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely,

because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

The second pretext of the war: Potidæa suspected. Potidæa commanded to give hostages, and to pull down part of their wall. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 2.

56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi, (magistrates so called), which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth; fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas and of the Corinthians they should revolt, and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

The Athenians give orders to the generals they were sending against Perdiccas, to secure their cities in those parts. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

57. These things against the Potidæans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred upon them. And the cause why he did so was, that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war, and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa. And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans, to revolt with them: for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war

would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms, under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas), both to receive hostages of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not.

The Potidæans seek the protection of the Lacedæmonians. The revolt of Potidæa, Bottiæa, and Chalcidice, from the Athenians. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

58. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them; by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedæmon, dealt with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia: and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa, to invade Attica: then at last they revolted, and together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and that one city to make strong: and unto those that removed, gave part of his own, and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.

The Athenian fleet, finding Potidæa and other cities already lost, go into Macedonia.

59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet

conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out; and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from above.

The Corinthians send their forces to Potidæa to defend it.

60. In the meantime after Potidæa was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city, and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidæa forty days.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Athenians send forces against Potidæa. Veria.

61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys, under the conduct of Callias the son of Calliades. These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme, and were now besieging the city of Pydna; and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition; and having made a necessary league with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhœa, they attempted to take it: but when they could not do it, they turned back, and marched towards Potidæa by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their

galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Athenians and those with Aristeus prepare themselves for battle. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The victory falleth to the Athenians. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

62. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto Olynthus, and had the market kept for them without the city. And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas: for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans. The purpose of Aristeus was, to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus, and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians; and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town; and then dislodging marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come on as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did the like; and not long after they joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them, and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated, and fled into the city. 63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidæa. In the end he resolved of the shortest way, and with his soldiers about him ran as

hard as he was able into Potidæa; and with much ado got in at the pier through the sea, cruelly shot at, and with the loss of a few, but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began, they that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs off, and in sight), advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle, to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken down, they retired again; they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred; and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.

The Athenians begin to besiege Potidæa. The Athenians send Phormio with sixteen hundred men of arms to Potidæa. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Potidæa straightly besieged on all sides.

64. Presently upon this, the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part towards the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison; but the part to Pallene–ward they left unwalled. For they thought themselves too small a number, both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene; fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidæa was unwalled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius: who arriving in Pallene, left his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides

strongly besieged; and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys, that came up and rode before it.

The advice of Aristeus, to carry all the people but five hundred men out of the city, that their victual might the better hold out, refused. Aristeus getteth out of the city, unseen of the Athenians. And staying in Chalcidice, slew certain of the city of Sermylius by ambushment. Phormio wasteth the territories of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans.

65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business, and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard; and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush before Sermylius and slew many of that city, and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, and some small towns he took in.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The solicitation of the war by the Corinthians and other confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Complaints exhibited against the Athenians in the council of Sparta. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

66. These were the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians, for besieging Potidæa, and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians, for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for that they had come thither, and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth

as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians. 67. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for their men's sakes that were within, and also for fear to lose the place, they could no longer hold. But out of hand, they procured of their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alledging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles they ought to have been. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council of their own state commanded them to speak. Then presented every one his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedæmonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.

oration of the ambassadors of corinth. A. C. 432. Ol 87. 1.

68. "Men of Lacedæmon, your own fidelity, both in matter of estate and conversation, maketh you the less apt to believe us, when we accuse others of the contrary. And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us a mischief; yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now when the evil is already

upon us. Before whom our speech must be so much the longer, by how much our objections are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others, and especially against our confederates; and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For else they would never have taken Corcyra, and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa; whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

69. “And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city, and again afterwards to raise their long walls; whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same, is most truly said to do it; especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece [as you do]. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question should not have been put, whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours, but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they

are the less bold: but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still defend others, not with your forces, but with promises; and you are also the only men, that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth, but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report to be sure; but yet it is more in fame that, than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Persian came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth, before you encountered him as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion, than to invade them; and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we know that the barbarian's own error, and in our war against the Athenians, their own oversights, more than your assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some, that relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice, but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

70. "Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it; especially on so great quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem to have any feeling, nor to consider what manner of men, and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be, that you are to contend withal. For they love innovation, and are swift to devise, and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own; not devise any thing new, nor scarce to attain what is necessary. They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best.

Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even what your judgment assures; and being in a danger, never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your own. They, when they overcome their enemies advance the farthest, and when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain any thing, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present, and enter presently into other hopes. For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive, through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more: nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves, nor suffer others, is to say the truth. 71. Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time; not knowing, that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still, who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same condition. But, as we have before declared,

your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them. Here therefore give a period to your slackness; and by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest: lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to their cruelest enemies; and lest we and others be driven through despair to seek out some other league. Which to do were no injustice, neither against the Gods, judges of men's oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them. For not they break the league, who being abandoned have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners, than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well of these points; and take such a course, that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate, than it was left unto you by your progenitors."

The Athenian ambassadors residing in Lacedæmon upon their business, desire to make answer to the oration of the Corinthians. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedæmon upon their business, when they heard of this oration, thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedæmonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general, that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city; to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what

they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not: supposing, that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly; who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect.

oration of the ambassadors of athens. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

73. “Though our embassage was not to this end, that we should argue against our confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the criminations of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges either of them or us), but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates, in matters of so great importance: and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess, we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay, than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance, so must we have ours (if that be any benefit) in the commemoration. And we shall make recital of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea

at Salamis; which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste city after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself; who when his fleet was overcome, and that he had no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

74. “Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things of most advantage; namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two–thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait, whereby he clearly saved the whole business, and whom, though a stranger, you your selves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other, in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods; and even in that estate, not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them; and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. So that we may say, that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and to the end you might still keep them so; and when you were afraid, not of our danger, but your own. Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves into danger for a city hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in part, and ourselves. But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others

did) to have our territories wasted; or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea, because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Atheniaus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians. A. C. 432 Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians.

75. “Therefore, men of Lacedæmon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been, but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course, laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. For the revolts from us, would all have been made to you. Now it is no fault for men in danger, to order their affairs to the best. 76. For you also, men of Lacedæmon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously, or to have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it

hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity; a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength, ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural inclination of man in desiring rule over others, are juster than for their own power they need. And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt rather than commendation. 77. For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them considering that others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. For they that have the power to compel, need not at all to go to law. And yet these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice, than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine; and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. Therefore when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion, they bore it; but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason; for to men in subjection, the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you

would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us, if you should do again as you did for a while, when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece. 78. Deliberate therefore of this a great while, as of a matter of great importance; and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter, how unexpected the chances of war be. For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity, from which we are equally far off; and whether part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness, that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us."

The Lacedæmonians amongst themselves take counsel how to proceed.

79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians' answer, they put them every one out of the court, and consulted of the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this; that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.

oration of archidamus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of

Archidamus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.

80. “Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like; insomuch as you cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of, will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal strength, and can quickly be upon them; yet against men whose territory is remote, and are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides; and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak: and if we will provide and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute. 81. But it may be, some rely on this; that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue, whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour for us, when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. As for the hope, that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end; let that never lift us up: for I fear we shall transmit it

rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth; nor as men without experience, to be astonished at the war. 82. And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them; but only not yet to take up arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance: and in the mean time to make our provision, and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money; (nor are they to be blamed, that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only, but also barbarians for their safety); and withal to set forth our own. If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation, and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner; especially having their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may; lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory; consider if in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again. 83. Now let no man think it cowardice, that being many cities, we go not presently and invade that one city. For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money, by means whereof arms are useful; especially when it is a war of land–men

against sea–men. And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money, and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them. 84. As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will be the longer before you end it, for that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of: and this which they object, is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is, that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers, and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame: good counsellors, in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws, and by severity more modestly than to disobey them: and also in that, we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly; but do think our neighbour’s cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech; and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy, as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man; but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties. 85. Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men’s lives, of much money, of many cities, and much

honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure; the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidæa; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they be content to refer the cause to judgment; and one that offereth himself to judgment, may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy."

Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner:

oration of sthenelaidas. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Sthenelaidas.

86. "For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment; because they are not good as they were, and because they are evil as they were not. Now are we the same we were; and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to repair them; for the harm they suffer, is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be defended with words, (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lancedæmon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet

greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice."

The Lacedæmonians by question conclude that the Athenians had broken the peace. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern whether was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes viva voce, and not with balls), and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war, he put it unto them again, and said, "to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder," and withal he showed them a certain place: "and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side". So they arose and the room was divided; wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.

Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong: but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again; that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent. This done, their confederates went home: and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had dispatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years, for which a peace had been formerly concluded after the actions past in Eubœa.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The true cause of this war being the fear the Lacedæmonians had of the power of Athens, the author digresseth to show how that power grew first up.

88. The Lacedæmonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates, as

for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

The means by which the Athenians came to have the command of the common forces of Greece against the Persian, by which they raised their empire. The Athenians return to their city. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. They repair their city, and wall it.

89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves, was this. After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale were there also utterly overthrown; Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, staid behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians. And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the body of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also, and fetched thither their wives and children, and such goods as they had, from the places where they had been put out to keep; and went about the reparation of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

The Lacedæmonians advise them to the contrary for their own ends, pretending the common good. Themistocles adviseth them to build on. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. His subtilty in deluding the Lacedæmonians. The building hastened. Themistocles goeth to Lacedæmon ambassador. He adviseth the Lacedæmonians to send ambassadors to see if the wall went up or not. A. C.

432. Ol. 87. 1. He sendeth letters to Athens secretly, to have those ambassadors stayed till the return of himself and his fellows from Lacedæmon. And hearing that the walls were finished, he justifies it. A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3. The Lacedæmonians dissembled their dislike.

90. The Lacedæmonians hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors, partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls; but principally as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians: and entreated them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing: not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians; but pretending this, that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer; that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height; and that all the men in the city, in the mean time, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work, but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon he went not to the state, but delaying the time excused himself; and when any of those that were in

office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, “that he stayed for his fellow–ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already”. 91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up, and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and having informed themselves would relate the truth: which they also did. And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men, to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned: (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height): for he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his audience before the Lacedæmonians, said plainly, “that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within: and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys, he said, they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them: and in common counsel, the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in

strength unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore, said he, either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us." The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians; (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall; besides they bare them affection then, for their courage shown against the Medes); yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.

The walls of Athens built in haste. A. C. 473. Ol. 76. 4. Themistocles author to the Athenians of assuming the dominion of the sea, and of fortifying Piræus. A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4. The reason why Themistocles was most addicted to affairs by sea. A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3.

93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls; the structure itself making manifest the haste used in the building. For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts; and those in some places unwrought, and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres, and polished stones were piled together amongst the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piræus; for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens; as conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed the first man that durst tell them, that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel also it was, that they built the wall of that breadth about Piræus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it

was made all of great stones, cut square and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth; and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea, because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Piræus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed by land, they should go down thither, and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.

Pausanias sent general of the Greeks, to pursue the relics of the Persian war. A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3. Pausanias growing insolent, the Ionians offended desire the protection of the Athenians. Pausanias sent for home to answer to certain accusations. A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3. In his absence, the Grecians give the Athenians the leading of them. Pausanias acquit, but sent general no more. The Grecians refuse the command of Dorcis, sent from Sparta to be their general.

94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedæmon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus; with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates; and making war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium, which they besieged and won. 95. But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians, and especially the Ionians, who had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came unto the Athenians, and requested them for consanguinity's sake to become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias.

The Athenians accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best unto themselves. In the mean time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny, than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though he were censured for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit; especially of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more; but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; whose command the confederates refused; and they finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedæmonians sent no more; because they feared lest such as went out, would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias; and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.

C. 477. Ol. 75. 4. The Athenians assess their confederates for the sustaining of the war. A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. The original of the tribute paid to the Athenians.

96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command, by the confederates' own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order, which cities should contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of Treasurers of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute; for so they called this money contributed. And

the first tribute that was taxed, came to four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. The history of the time between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, pretermitted by other writers, briefly delivered by Thucydides.

97. Now using their authority, at first, in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. Which also I have therefore written, both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me: (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the times): and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up.

The steps of the Athenians towards their great dominion. The Athenians take Eion: A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. and Scyros: and Carystus: A. C. 467. Ol. 78. 2. and Naxos, their confederate. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.

98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege, and carried away the inhabitants captives. Then the isle Scyros, in the *Æ*gean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives, and planted therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Eubœans; and those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate

city, which contrary to the ordinance they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.

The cause of revolts from the Athenians. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.

99. Amongst other causes of revolts, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars. For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms; and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For through this refusal to accompany the army, the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to: by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates; and themselves unprovided and without means to make war, in case they should revolt.

The Athenians defeat the Persian upon the river of Eurymedon. They war on Thasos. A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4. They take Amphipolis, and afterwards receive a great overthrow at Drabescus in Thrace. A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4. The Lacedæmonians intending to invade Attica, are hindered by an earthquake. A. C. 465. A. C. 463. Ol. 79. 1. 2. Thasos rendered to the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians send for aid to the Athenians, in their war against Ithome. A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4. The first dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. The Athenians being had in suspicion by the Lacedæmonians, join with the Argives. A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4.

100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had

victory in both; and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this again happened the revolt of Thasos, upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace. And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people unto the river of Strymon, for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine–ways, now Amphipolis; they won the said Nine–ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new–built town of the Nine–ways. 101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica: which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots, and of neighbouring towns the Thuriatæ and Æthæans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into servitude in former times; whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lacedæmonians now a war at Ithome. The Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to the Athenians, upon condition to raze their walls; to deliver up their galleys; to pay both the money behind and for the future, as much as they were wont; and to quit both the mines and the continent. 102. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that

kind; whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force. And upon this journey, grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race, might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they staid, dismissed them alone of all the confederates; not discovering their jealousy, but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving that they were not sent away upon good cause, but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedæmonians' hands, as soon as they were gone, left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.

The Helots in Ithome, after ten years' siege, compound and quit Peloponnesus. A. C. 455. Ol. 81. 1. 2. The Athenians receive them, and place them in Naupactus. Megara revolteth from the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians.

103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and whosoever should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedæmonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians

and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians; who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly, that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.

C. 460. Ol. 80. 1. The Athenians send an army into Egypt, to aid the rebels against the king of Persia. Cairo. The Athenians fight by land, against the Corinthians and Epidaurians. A. C. 458. Ol. 80. 2. 3. After that, against the Peloponnesians. Then against the Æginetæ. The Peloponnesians aid Ægina. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4. The Corinthians receive a great loss in Megaris. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.

104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African, king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus, after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part, called the White–Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest. 105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias, and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Æginetæ, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Ægina, the confederates of

both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city, under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Strœbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over into Ægina itself three hundred men of arms, of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara; supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina, but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again, with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout, both slew those that were setting up the trophy, and charging the rest got the victory. 106. The Corinthians being overcome, went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them at the place by which they entered with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians; but the rest of their army got home again.

The Athenians build their long walls from both sides of the city to the sea. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4. The Lacedæmonians fight with the Athenians at

Tanagra. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 4. A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The Athenians overthrow the Bœotians at Œnophyta, [that is to say, the vineyards], and subdue Bœotia and Phocis. Ægina yielded to the Athenians. The Athenians sail round Peloponnesus, and waste it.

107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Peiræus. The Phoceans also making war upon Bœum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians, of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias, who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisæan Gulf, the Athenians going about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always guarded by the Athenians. They thought good therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst they were there, there wanted not some Athenians, that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government, and to have demolished the long walls then building. But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city, and a thousand Argives, and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them: for there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians. 108. They

fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the Lacedæmonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians entering into the territories of Megara, and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. Upon the two–and–sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Bœotians and overthrew them at Œnophyta, and brought the territories of Bœotia and Phocis under their obedience; and withal razed the walls of Tanagra, and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages; and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down, and should deliver up their galleys, and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians' navy, took Chalcis a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.

C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The end of the Athenian forces in Egypt. A supply of Athenians going to Egypt, defeated by the forces of the king. A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4.

109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt, and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt: and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia. And then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis. There he besieged them a year and a

half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers. 110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years' war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene: but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtæus, that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans, and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt, for a supply of those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest: and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.

The Athenians invade Thessaly. A. C. 454. Ol. 81. 2. 3. The Athenians under Pericles besiege Œniades.

111. Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Bœotians and Phoceans, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army, (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling); but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for, but came back again without effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the gallies that lay at Pegæ, (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians), under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia, and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made

head; and then presently took up forces in Achaia; and putting over made war on Œnias, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. Nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.

Truce for five years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Athenians war on Cyprus. Cimon dieth. A. C. 449. Ol. 82. 3. 4. The Holy War. A. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1. The Athenians recover Chæroneia, taken by the Bœotian outlaws A. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1. The Athenians defeated at Coroneia by the outlaws, lose Bœotia Eubœa revolteth from the Athenians. A. C. 446. Ol. 83. 2. 3. Megara revolteth Ol. 83. 3. A. C. 445 Ol. 83. 3. Eubœa subdued by the Athenians Peace for thirty years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1. The Athenians war upon Samos. A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1. A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1. Samos yielded to the Athenians. A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

112. Three years after this, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war; and with two hundred galleys, part their own, and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army, they left Citium; and when they had passed Salamis in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gotten victory in both returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war called the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phoceans. 113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Bœotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chæroneia and certain other places of

Bœotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæroneia, they carried away the inhabitants captives, and leaving a garrison in the city departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus, and the Eubœan outlaws, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia, and overcoming the Athenians in battle some they slew and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own laws. 114. Not long after revolted Eubœa from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted, and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica; and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward brake into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusine and Thriasium, under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and came no farther on, but so went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa, and totally subdued it: the Hestiæans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands; but ordered the rest of Eubœa according to composition made. 115. Being returned from Eubœa, within a while after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years; and rendered Nisæa, Achaia, Pegæ, and Trœzene, (for these places the Athenians held of theirs), to the Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians, concerning Priene; and the Milesians

being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; which when they had put into Lemnos, and set a guard upon them, they came home. But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening, and first set upon the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines. 116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use; (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos); but with the forty–four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought with seventy galleys of the Samians, (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers), as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty–five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city; which they inclosed with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already

gone out of Samos, and others out of other places, to meet the Phœnicians. 117. In the mean time, the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians, which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame the rest in fight; insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this, there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded, with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

The business about Corcyra and Potidæa, before related. Between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, fifty years. The oracle consulted by the Lacedæmonians, encourageth them to the war. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4. Consultation of the Peloponnesians in general, whether they should enter into a war or not. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4. / 87. 1.

118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever other intervenient pretext of this war. These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time, the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates, and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little;

but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them: till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed, and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer; but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly: and also having sent to Delphi, and enquired of Apollo, whether they should have the better in the war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: "That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory, and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled". 119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, "whether they should make war or not". And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect.

oration of the ambassadors of corinth. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

120. "Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, they having both decreed the war themselves, and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common

business. And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of them: yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to make account, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us; and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong; yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition: and neither to swell with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success, observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill advised, come to good effect against enemies worse advised; yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies. For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear. 121. As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number; and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both

out of every one's particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic: whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief. 122. We have also many other ways of war; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper, standeth the firmest; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know, that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it)

brings with it no less than manifest servitude: which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored: whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.

C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

123 "But to what end should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present, labour for the future: for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom: for there is no reason that what was gotten in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war, as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself: and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit, are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1./86. 4. Oration of the Corinthians.

124. "So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same; and seeing also that both to the

cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans; who are Dorians, and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians; nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay, when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity, and that this is the best advice: and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war groweth the confirmation of peace; yet for love of ease to refuse the war, doth not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigneth over some already, and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war; and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude." Thus said the Corinthians.

The war decreed by all the confederates.

125. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least: and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently, because they were unprovided, and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary; yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.

The Lacedæmonians send embassages to the Athenians about expiation of sacrileges, only to pick better quarrels for the war. A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1. A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1. A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.

126. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations, to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they

might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva for pollution of sanctuary. Which polution was thus. There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the God answered, that on the greatest festival day he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having gotten forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus, with intention to take upon him the tyranny: esteeming the feast of Jupiter to be the greatest, and to touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest. For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and is celebrated without the city; wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place. But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away; and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes, with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes. Now those that were besieged with Cylon, were for want of both victual and water in very evil estate; and therefore Cylon and a

brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe Goddesses, as they were going away. And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes, a Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition, banished them afterwards again: and not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again; and there are of their race in the city unto this day.

C. 612. Ol. 42. 1. Pericles always adverse to the Lacedæmonians.

127. This pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city of: principally forsooth, as taking part with the gods; but knowing withal, that Pericles the son of Xantippus, was by the mother's side one of that race. For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city; as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedæmonians; not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way, but inciting them to the war.

The Athenians require the Lacedæmonians to expiate the violation of sanctuary also on their parts. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3. The occasion and manner of the death of Pausanias in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca. A. C. 470. Ol. 77. 3. Pausanias practiseth with the king of Persia against the state of Greece. A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3. The Letter of Pausanias to the king.

128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was, that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca; which was thus. After that Pausanias the Lacedæmonian was recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedæmonians; to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negociate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium; when he was there the first time, (which being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: “Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men, whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels

with thee. If therefore any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the sea–side, by whose mediation we may confer together."

C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3. The Letter of Xerxes to Pausanias.

129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea–side, with commandment to take the government of the province of Dascylis, and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before: and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium, and to show him the seal, and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; wherein was written this answer: "Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered for ever: and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come. But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both."

Pausanias groweth proud upon the receipt of these letters. A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.

130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority for his conduct at Platæa, became now many degrees more elevated; and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his

purpose; but in trifles made apparent beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access; and would be in such choleric passions toward all men indifferently, that no man might endure to approach him; which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

C. 470. Ol. 77. 3. A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. Pausanias his ambition, in dedication of the Tripode at Delphi. A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

131 When the Lacedæmonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonæ in the country of Troy, practising still with the barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose: then the ephori forebore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale, commanding him not to depart from the officer; and in case he refused, denounced war against him. But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward; (for the ephori have power to do this to their king); but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth, and exhibited himself to justice against such as had any thing to allege against him. 132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in great authority: (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas, being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin–german, had the tuition of him yet): by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the

present state. They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse:

Pausanias, Greek General,
Having the Medes defeated,
To Phœbus in record thereof
This gift hath consecrated.

Pausanias accused of practice with the Helots. He sends letters to the king, which are opened by the way. Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. Pausanias by the art of the ephori made to betray himself.

But the Lacedæmonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripode, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so. This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in. They had information farther, that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had: for he promised them, not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him and co–operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon some appeachment of the Helots, would they proceed against him, but kept the custom which they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion and most faithful to him: who being terrified with the cogitation, that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter anything in

the letter, it might not be discovered), and opened the letter; wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered. 133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth; the man being upon design gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him, and from point to point discovered all the practice: saying, that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. He flieth into sanctuary. Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way; and knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him, what they came for: and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple of Pallas Chalciœca, and got in before they overtook him; (now the temple itself was hard by); and entering into a house belonging to the temple, to avoid the injury of the open air, there staid. They that pursued him, could not then overtake him: but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of

the house, and watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up, and leaving a guard there famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was, out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæada, where they use to cast in malefactors: yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterward, both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died; (so that he lies now in the entry of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar); and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciœca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias. 135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedæmonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. Themistocles in the same treason Themistocles, pursued by the Athenians and Peloponnesians, flieth to Corcyra. Thence is put over to the main land, and goeth to the king of the Molossians. Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 3.

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedæmonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias; and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism, and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedæmonians, who were willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him. 136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of Peloponnesus

into Corcyra; to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not keep him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in unto Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife; and by her was instructed to take their son with him, and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired him, that though he had opposed him in some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight: saying, that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger; whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms: and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him bade him arise, together with his son whom he held as he sat: which is the most submiss supplication that is.

Thence he is conveyed to Pydna. A. C. 466. Ol. 77. 3. In danger to be cast upon the Athenian fleet at Naxos, he maketh himself known to the master of the ship. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3. He arriveth at Ephesus. His Letter to Artaxerxes.

137. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not, but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea, (a city belonging to Alexander), because his purpose was to go to the king: where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was, and for what he fled; and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him

to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet of the Athenians, he arrived afterwards at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries, and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: "I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more, after once I with safety, he with danger was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me", (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians' departure out of Salamis, and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself), "and at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. But I desire to have a year's respite, that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself."

Post A. C. 466. The praise of Themistocles. His death. Post A. C. 464.

138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before; both for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he promised to bring into his subjection; but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something

worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation the best discerner, and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate: and what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life: some say, he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia in Asia, in the market–place: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents by the year, for his bread; and Lampsacus for his wine, (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine); and the city of Myus for his meat. His bones are said by his kindred, to have been brought home by his own appointment, and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians: for it was not lawful to bury one there, that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian; the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

139. And this is that which the Lacedæmonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassage, touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.

The Lacedæmonians by ambassadors command the abrogation of the act against the Megareans. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The last ambassadors from Lacedæmon require the Athenians to lay down their dominion. The Athenians consult what to answer.

After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidæa and to suffer Ægina to be free; but principally and most plainly telling them, that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans: by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act: but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds; and for receiving of their slaves that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, that "the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws": the Athenians called an assembly, and propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth.

Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.

140. "Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnessians; (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events); but also I see, that I must now

advise the same things, or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place, that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent; or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty: which is also the cause, that when any thing happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles], that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess; they never yet sought any such trial themselves, nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war, rather than by words: and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidæa, and to restore the Æginetæ to the liberty of their own laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last, command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concerning Megara; (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay); nor retain a scruple in your minds, as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial, you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality. 141. Resolve therefore from this occasion, either to yield them obedience before you receive damage; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For a

great and a little claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command, hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour, without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience; for that the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armies by land very often; because they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be maintained, and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour, are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent; especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, every one will press his particular interest; whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy, and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And every one supposeth, that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt, and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good: not observing how by these thoughts of every one in several, the common business is jointly ruined.

142. But their greatest hindrance of all, will be their want of money; which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay; which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner; much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory: yet would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet; which is the thing wherein our strength lieth. For we have more experience in land–service by use of the sea, than they have in sea–service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men: but awed by many, they will not stir that way; and not applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended at idle times and on the by; but requiring rather, that whilst it is a–learning, nothing else should be done on the by. 143. But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet; this indeed, if going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell amongst us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own

citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial would be found content to fly his own country, and withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days' increase of wages, take part with the other side.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.

"In this manner, or like to this, seemeth unto me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and hath many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica; yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us, there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages; and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more: and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men's bodies: for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves; and show the Peloponnesians, that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles. A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.

144. " There be many other things that give hope of victory, in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and

undergo other voluntary dangers; (for I am afraid of our own errors, more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time, in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: ‘that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers’: for neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbidden in the articles: ‘also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good: also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but be revenged on those that shall’. For this is both just, and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies; and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies; and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity.”

The answer of the Athenians to the ambassadors of Lacedæmon.

145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken, and generally, “that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrement”. So the ambassadors went home; and after these there came no more.

146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side, before the war: which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles, and matter of the war to follow.

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE ENTRY OF the Theban soldiers into Platæa by the treason of some within. — Their repulse and slaughter. — The irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica. — The wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet. — The public funeral of the first slain. — The second invasion of Attica. — The pestilence in the city of Athens. — The Ambraciotes war against the Amphilochi. — Platæa assaulted: besieged. — The Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the Gulf of Crissa. — The same fleet repaired and reinforced; and beaten again by Phormio before Naupactus. — The attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis. — The fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the war.

Year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now from the time they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it they warred without intermission. And it is written in order by summers and winters, according as from time to time the several matters came to pass.

Year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Platæa surprised by the Thebans by treason. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans execute not the design of the traitors: but offer composition.

The peace, which after the winning of Eubœa, was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years. But in the fifteenth year, being the forty–eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis in Argos: *Æ*nesias being then ephor at Sparta,

and Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his government to come: in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and odd Thebans, led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, Bœotian rulers, about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Platæa, a city of Bœotia and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in, and the gates opened unto them, by Naucleides and his complices, men of Platæa, that for their own private ambition intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupate Platæa, which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace and the war not openly on foot. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making a stand in their arms in the market–place, they did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adversaries; but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation, and to induce the city to composition and friendship. And the herald proclaimed, “that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Bœotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he should come and bring his arms to theirs”: supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side.

The Platæans accept it. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Platæans take heart: and unite themselves by digging through the common walls of their houses. They assault the Thebans. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans fly, but cannot get out. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans penned up in a house, which they entered into by mistaking the door for the city gate. They yield to discretion.

The Platæans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered and had surprised the city, through fear, and opinion that more were entered than indeed were, (for they could not see them in the night), came to composition, and accepting the condition rested quiet; and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm. But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many; and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Platæan commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter; and they united themselves by digging through the common walls between house and house, that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew them, to serve them instead of a wall; and every other thing they put in readiness, as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprise. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards the enemies; taking their time whilst it was yet night, and a little before break of day; because they would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified, and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly up to hand strokes. 4. And the Thebans seeing this, and finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure, and beat them back in that part where the assault was made: and twice or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the Platæans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses, and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them; the night having been also very wet; they were afraid, and turned their backs and fled here and there about the city; ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which they should have been saved; (for this accident fell out upon the

change of the moon); and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in: insomuch as the greatest part of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a certain Platæan shut up again with the head of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt: so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves out, and for the most part died. Some came to a desert gate of the city, and with a hatchet given them by a woman cut the staple, and got forth unseen: but these were not many; for the thing was soon discovered. Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the wall; the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Platæans seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were, by firing the house, or else resolve of some other punishment. At length both these, and all the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city, agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Platæans at discretion. And this success had they that entered into Platæa.

The whole power of Thebes come to rescue their fellows. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans seek to intercept the Platæans in the villages. The Platæans send to the Thebans to be gone, and promise to release their prisoners. The Thebans go off, and the Platæans fetch in their men and goods, and kill their prisoners. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

But the rest of the Thebans, that should with their whole power have been there before day, for fear the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the news of what was done by the way. Now Platæa is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. For

the river Asopus was swollen so high, that it was not easily passable. So that what by the foulness of the way, and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till their men were already some slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Platæans as were without: (for there were abroad in the villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil happening unexpectedly and in time of peace): desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Platæans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done, and fearing their case without, sent a herald unto the Thebans: whom they commanded to say, that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly; and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive; which, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto them. Thus the Thebans say; and that the Platæans did swear it. But the Platæans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently, but upon treaty if they should agree; and deny that they swore it. Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory; and the Platæans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had practised, was one. 6. When they had done they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead; and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The Athenians lay hands on such Bœotians as were in Attica. They victual Platæa, and put a garrison into it, and take their unnecessary people.

The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Bœotians then in Attica; and sent an officer to Platæa, to forbid their farther proceeding with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should have advised of the matter: for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second, when they were overcome and taken prisoners: but of what followed after they knew nothing. So that the Athenians when they sent, knew not what was done; and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Platæa, victualled it and left a garrison in it; and took thence both the women and children, and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.

Preparation of both sides for the war. year 1. A. C 431. Ol. 87 1. Prophecies and oracles preceding the war. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

7. This action falling out at Platæa, and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king, and to other barbarians, wheresoever they had hope of succours; and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedæmonians besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail, and to provide a sum of money assessed; and in other things not to stir farther, but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley at once, till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates, and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; knowing that as long as these were their friends, they might with the more security

make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus. 8. Neither side conceived small matters, but put their whole strength to the war: and not without reason. For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two principal states in combat; but many prophecies were told, and many sung by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to war and in others. There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos, which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before; and was interpreted for, and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after.

The affections of the Grecians towards the combatant states.

But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedæmonians; and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the Grecians' liberty. And every man, both private and public person, endeavoured as much as in them lay both in word and deed to assist them; and thought the business so much hindered, as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians; some for desire to be delivered from under their government, and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war.

Year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The confederates of the Athenians.

9. But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began it, were these. The Lacedæmonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans: (for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; but afterwards all the rest did so likewise): and without Peloponnesus, the

Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping: the Bœotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen: and the rest of the cities footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The Athenian confederates were these. The Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries amongst those nations; also that part of Caria which is on the sea–coast, and the Dorians adjoining to them; Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace; all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans found galleys; the rest footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.

Year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Lacedæmonian league meet in the isthmus.

10. The Lacedæmonians, after the business of Platæa, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus, and to their confederates without, to have in readiness their forces, and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the isthmus at a day appointed, two–thirds of the forces of every city. When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities, and such as were in authority and most worthy to be present; and spake unto them as followeth:

the oration of archidamus. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.

11. “Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only our fathers have had many wars, both within and without Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as at this present. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army, that invade; but the state also is puissant that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our fathers, nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion, observing us: and through their hatred to the Athenians, do wish that we may accomplish whatsoever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army, and to have much assurance that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared; but of every city as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain; and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts, yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy, and more safety in fighting with him. But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city every way well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though not now, because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their possessions. For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider, with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in the others; for they think themselves

worthy to have the command of others, and to invade and waste the territories of their neighbours, rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore, as being to war against a great city, and to procure both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good or bad as shall be the event; follow your leaders in such sort, as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness. For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe, than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order."

Archidamus sends before him an ambassador to the Athenians; and tries all other means to right his country, before war. The ambassador from Archidamus convoyed back without conference. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Archidamus marcheth forward.

12. Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens, to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor presented him to the state: for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive from the Lacedæmonians neither herald nor ambassador, as long as their army was abroad. Therefore they sent him back without audience, with commandment to be out of their borders the self–same day; and that hereafter if they would any thing with them, they should return every one to his home, and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country, to the end that no man should confer with him; who, when he came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words: "This day is the beginning of much evil unto the Grecians"; and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged and marched on with his army into their territory. The Bœotians with their

appointed part and with horsemen aided the Peloponnesians; but with the rest of their forces went and wasted the territory of Platæa.

Pericles imagining Archidamus might spare his grounds, promiseth, if he did, to give them to the state. The speech of Pericles to the assembly at Athens, touching the means of the war, &c. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The treasure of the people of Athens. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The length of the walls to which the watchmen were appointed. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Their galleys.

13. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march, before they brake into Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others was general of the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the Lacedæmonians to bring him into jealousy, (as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, “that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state; and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth”; and therefore desired “that for this he might not be suspected”. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand the same things he had done before; “that they should make preparations for the war, and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle, but come into the city and guard it; that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates”: telling them, “how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and store of money”. Farther he bade them be confident, “in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents; and remaining yet then in the citadel six

thousand talents of silver coin:" (for the greatest sum there had been, was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred: out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate–houses of the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of Potidæa): "besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings; and all the dedicated vessels belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents". He added farther, that "much money might be had out of other temples without the city, which they might use; and if they were barred the use of all these, they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself;" and said that "the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold, and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety", he said, "they were to make restitution of the like quantity again". Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. "Men of arms", he said, "they had thirteen thousand; besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls." For so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy, young and old together, and strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty–five furlongs; and that part of the circumference which was guarded, (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long wall and the Phalerian), was forty–three furlongs. And the length of the long walls down to Piræus, (of which there was a watch only on the outmost), was forty furlongs. And the whole compass of Piræus together with Munychia, was sixty furlongs; whereof that part that was watched, was but half. He said farther, "they had of horsemen, accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; and sixteen hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred." All this and no less had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was

first in hand, and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.

The Athenians fetch in their wives and children and substance into the city.

14. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words; and fetched into the city their wives and children, and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Eubœa, and into the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.

The Athenians accustomed ever to live in the country. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Theseus first brought the inhabitants of Attica to make Athens their capital city. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

15. This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians, than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings, down to Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs, and therein their common halls and their governors; and, unless they were in fear of some danger, went not to the king for advice, but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars; as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the country in other respects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall and one council–house, brought them all to cohabit in the city that now is; and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And

from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess, and call it Synœcia. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An argument whereof is this; that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself; or if without, yet in that quarter: as that of Jupiter Olympius, and of Apollo Pythius, and of Tellus, and of Bacchus in Limnæ; (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as the Ionians who are derived from Athens, do still observe them); besides other ancient temples situate in the same part. Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain, which, now the Nine–pipes, built so by the tyrants, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called the city.

The Athenians remove out of the borough towns into the city unwillingly. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Athens thronged with the coming in of the country. An old prophecy against dwelling in the Pelasgicum. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

16. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own country towns; and after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time as since till the Persian war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially for that since the Persian war they had already repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It pressed them likewise, and was heavily taken, besides their houses to leave the things that pertained to their religion, (which, since their old form of government, were become patrial), and to change their manner of life, and to be no better than banished every man his city. 17. After they came into Athens, there was

habitation for a few, and place of retire, with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city, and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes; saving in such as were in the citadel, and the Eleusinium, and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicum also under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words: Best is the Pelasgicum empty: was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for. For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there: which war the oracle not naming, foretold only that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately.

The Athenians make ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus.

Many also furnished the turrets of the walls, and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all: but afterwards they had the long walls divided amongst them, and inhabited there, and in most parts of Piræus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates, and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.

The Peloponnesian army assault Œnoe, a frontier town of Attica, in vain.

18. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward, came first to Œnoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in; and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall. For Œnoe lying on the confines between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it, for defence of the country when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made

preparation for the assault of it; and also spent much time about it otherwise.

Archidamus taxed of backwardness and favour to the Athenians. year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Archidamus with his army entereth into Attica: and comes to Acharnas, and stays there long, cutting down their corn and trees.

And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed, as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war, and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Œnoe. For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought, that the Peloponnesians marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without. So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before Œnoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand. 19. But after, when they had assaulted Œnoe, and tried all means, but could not take it; and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them; then at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans that entered Platæa, the summer and corn being now at the highest, they fell into Attica, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the plain of Thriasia; and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti. After this, leaving the Ægaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia, till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi; and pitching there, both fortified their camp, and staid a great while wasting the country thereabout.

Year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The design of Archidamus in staying so long at Acharnas. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

20. Archidamus was said to have staid so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array, and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign, with this intention. He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and therefore seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas. Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans being a great piece of the city, (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country, and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men: but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.

The Athenians hardly contain themselves from going out to fight. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. A skirmish between the Athenian and Bœotian horse. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

21. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thrius, and as long as they had any hope it would come on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, when fourteen years before this war he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther; (for which he was also banished Sparta, as thought to have gone back for money); they stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer to

be endured; and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely) in their sight: which the younger sort had never seen before, nor the elder but in the Persian war; it was taken for a horrible matter, and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally, and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, every one made the interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult, and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them; but reviled him, for that being their general he refused to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all their evil. 22. But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill advised, and being confident he was in the right touching not sallying, assembled them not nor called any council, for fear lest being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error: but looked to the guarding of the city, and as much as he could to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen, to keep the scouts of the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Bœotians. Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse, till such time as the Bœotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms; and then they were put to flight, and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain; whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day without leave of the enemy. And the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an ancient league with the Athenians, and consisted of

Larissæans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. The leaders of the Larissæans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city: of the Pharsalians, Meno: and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

Archidamus removes from Acharnas. The Athenians send a hundred galleys to infest the sea coast of Peloponnesus. The Peloponnesians go home. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

23. The Peloponnesians seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas, wasted certain other villages between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus. Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus; the commanders whereof were Charcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes; who thus furnished, weighed anchor and went their way. The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Bœotia, not the way they came in; but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens. And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and went every man to his own city.

The Athenians set by 1000 talents and 100 galleys, for defence against an invasion by sea.

24. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war: and made a decree, to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel and set it by, so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other moneys; and made it capital for any man to move or give his vote for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city, for necessity of that defence.

Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best, and captains to be appointed over them; which were to be employed for no other use than the money was, and for the same danger, if need should require.

25. The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, and with them the Corcyræans with the aid of fifty sail more, and certain others of the confederates thereabout, amongst other places which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of Laconia; and assaulted it, as being but weak and few men within. But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts; and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred men of arms. Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields, directly towards the town, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country, and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the Lower Elis, together with other Eleians thereabouts, that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising, and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked, and sailed about the promontory called Icthys into the haven of Pheia. But the Messenians, and certain others that could not get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it. And when they had done, the galleys, that now were come about, took them in, and leaving Pheia put forth to sea again. By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it; but the Athenians were now gone away, and wasting some other territory.

26. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris; which were to serve also for a watch about Eubœa. Of these,

Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct; and landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast, and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages: and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.

The inhabitants of Ægina removed by the Athenians: and received by the Peloponnesians. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

27. The same summer, the Athenians put the Æginetæ, man, woman and child, out of Ægina; laying to their charge that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Ægina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the Æginetæ were thus banished, the Lacedæmonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in, and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it to live on: both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received at the hands of the Æginetæ in the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helotes. This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and reacheth to the sea–side. So some of them were placed there: and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece.

Eclipse of the sun: and stars discerned.

28. Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the moon, (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon happened an eclipse of the sun. The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent, and withal some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness.

The Athenians seek the favour of Sitalces, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. Sadocus the son of Sitalces, king of Thrace, made free of Athens.

29. The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of Pythos, of the city of Abdera, (whose sister was married to Sitalces, and that

was of great power with him), their host, though before they took him for an enemy; and sent for him to Athens, hoping by his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, was no kin to this Teres, nor of the same part of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. And the fact of the women concerning Itys, was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man, for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other, that was so many days' journey off as Odrysæ. And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on the kingdom of Odrysæ. Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league, that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be of their party. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces, to be made free of Athens; and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targettiers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcideans. Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the Athenians.

Year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The Athenians take Solium and A stacus, and the island of Cephalonia.

30. The Athenians being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and

put the Palærenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the possession both of the town and territory. Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they drave him thence, and joined the place to their league. From thence they sailed to Cephalonia, and subdued it without battle: (this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas; and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii, Samæi, and Pronæi:) and not long after returned with their fleet to Athens.

The Athenians invade Megaris. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The Athenians' greatest army. The Athenians duly once a year invade Megaris.

31. About the end of the autumn of this summer, the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Ægina, hearing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before; the city being now in her strength, and the plague not yet amongst them. For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidæa: and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, and accompanied them in this invasion, were no fewer that three thousand men of arms more; besides other great numbers of light–armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year during this war, the Athenians often invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisæa.

The end of the first summer.

32. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then; for a garrison against thieves,

which passing over from Opus and other parts of Locris might annoy Eubœa. These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

Year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. Euarchus the tyrant recovereth Astacus.

33. The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevaileth with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms, to re–establish him; to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they had re–established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the sea–coast of Acarnania; but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disbarked in the territory of the Cranii; where, under colour of composition, they were deceived, and lost some part of their forces. For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they got off with much ado, and went home.

The manner of the Athenians in burying the bones of the first slain in the wars. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

34. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war, in this manner. Having set up a tent, they put into it the bones of the dead three days before the funeral: and every one bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own. When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over, for such as appear not, nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether

citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial, lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a public monument, which standeth in the fairest suburbs of the city; in which place they have ever interred all that died in the wars, except those that were slain in the field of Marathon; who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were therefore buried thereright. And when the earth is thrown over them, some one thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration, wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit: which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial: and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same. For these first, the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles the son of Xantippus: who when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit, to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner:

the funeral oration made by pericles. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

35. “Though most that have spoken formerly in this place, have commended the man that added this oration to the law, as honourable for those that die in the wars; yet to me it seemeth sufficient, that they who have showed their valour by action, should also by an action have their honour, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state; and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one, to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter: and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed. The favourable hearer, and he that knows what was done, will perhaps think what is spoken short of what he would have it, and what it was: and he that is ignorant, will find somewhat on the other side which he will think too much extolled; especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For to hear another man praised finds patience so

long only, as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as far forth as I can.

Year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles. He glanceth at the Lacedæmonians, because they ever looked sourly on soft and loose behaviour. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles. year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

36. “I will begin at our ancestors: being a thing both just and honest, that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this kind. For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region, by their valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity, hitherto in the state of liberty. For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more: for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own they have purchased this our present dominion, and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a great part also we ourselves, that are yet in the strength of our age here present, have enlarged; and so furnished the city with every thing, both for peace and war, as it is now all–sufficient in itself. The actions of war whereby all this was attained, and the deeds of arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass over. But by what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to these men’s praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand, and profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related. 37. We have a form of

government, not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighbouring states; (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us); which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few, but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies; yet in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the reputation, not of his house, but of his virtue; and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person, as long as he can do good service to the commonwealth. And we live not only free in the administration of the state, but also one with another void of jealousy touching each other's daily course of life; not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public; and are obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are written for protection against injury, and such unwritten, as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors. 38. We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour, by public institution of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year, with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by private men; by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness. We have this farther by the greatness of our city, that all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither; whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations, than our own. 39. Then in the studies of war, we excel our enemies in this. We leave our city open to all men; nor was it ever seen, that by banishing of strangers we denied them the learning or sight of any of those things, which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by; not relying on secret preparation and deceit, but upon our own courage in the action. They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their youth

with laborious exercise; and yet we that live remissly, undertake as great dangers as they. For example; the Lacedæmonians invade not our dominion by themselves alone, but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground, against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once; both because we apply ourselves much to navigation, and by land also send many of our men into divers countries abroad. But when fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And yet when from ease rather than studious labour, and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we have this odds by it, that we shall not faint beforehand with the meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling; 40. procuring admiration to our city as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation: and hold it not a shame to confess poverty, but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men, a care both of their own and the public affairs; and a sufficient knowledge of state matters, even in those that labour with their hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein, to be a man, not that meddles with nothing, but that is good for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds; not accounting words for a hindrance of action, but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel others; daring to undertake as much as any, and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men, ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards. And they are most rightly reputed valiant, who

though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty. For we purchase our friends, not by receiving, but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn, is ever the most constant friend; because he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit, is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour, but for a debt. So that we only do good to others, not upon computation of profit, but freeness of trust.

Year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

41. “In sum it may be said, both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have, every one in particular, his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion, than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions we have obtained, maketh evident. For it is the only power now, found greater in proof than fame; and the only power, that neither grieveth the invader, when he miscarries, with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the subjected states to murmur, as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration, for a power not without testimony, but made evident by great arguments; and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it, or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands, and set up eternal monuments on all sides, both of the evil we have done to our enemies, and the good we have done to our friends.

“Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, valiantly fighting have died. And it is fit that every man of you that be left, should be like minded to undergo any travail for the same. 42. And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general, as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such, are not equal; as also to make known by effects, the worth of these men I am to speak of; the greatest part of their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of the city, hath by these, and such as these, been achieved. Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in many other of the Grecians, as they do in these: the present revolution of these men’s lives seeming unto me an argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof, and in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse than the rest, do nevertheless deserve, that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their country they should be preferred before the rest. For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the further fruition of his wealth, was thereby grown cowardly; or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length and to attain to riches, did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For their principal desire was not wealth, but revenge on their enemies; which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to purchase wealth withal; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope; but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon themselves in the action; and therein choosing rather to fight and die, than to shrink and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and so in a moment, whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear, but in opinion of victory.

43. “Such were these men, worthy of their country. And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy; not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may recount, to you that know as well as he, the many commodities that arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies; but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day performed, and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then, that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight; and by such men, as though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For having every one given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulchre; not wherein they are buried so much, as wherein their glory is laid up, upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered for ever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre: and their virtues shall be testified, not only by the inscription in stone at home, but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any monument will remain with every one for ever. In imitation therefore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men, are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal of their lives; but rather such men, as if they live, may expect a change of fortune, and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit, death, which is without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as after a tender life to be brought into misery.

44. “Wherefore I will not so much bewail, as comfort you, the parents, that are present, of these men. For you know that whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calamities. Whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die honourably, as these have done: and to whom it hath been granted, not only to live in prosperity, but to die in it. Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for the loss of that, which the happiness of others, wherein you also when time was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring into your remembrance; (for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted, but for the privation of a good we have been used to); yet such of you as are of the age to have children, may bear the loss of these in the hope of more. For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are slain, and also doubly conduce to the good of the city, by population and strength. For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to the state, that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it. As for you that are past having of children, you are to put the former and greater part of your life to the account of your gain; and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same. For the love of honour never groweth old: nor doth that unprofitable part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of wealth, so much as it doth in being honoured. 45. As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you shall have a difficult task of emulation. For every man useth to praise the dead; so that with odds of virtue you will hardly get an equal reputation, but still be thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but to stand out of their way, is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition. And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue, for you that are now widows, I shall express it in this short admonition. It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex: and to give as

little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good or evil, as you can.

Year i. A. C 431. Ol. 87. 2.

46. “Thus also have I, according to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; and those that are here interred, have in fact been already honoured; and further, their children shall be maintained till they be at man’s estate at the charge of the city; which hath therein propounded both to these, and them that live, a profitable garland in their matches of valour. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest men. So now having lamented every one his own, you may be gone.”

47. Such was the funeral made this winter; which ending, ended the first year of this war.

Year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. The second invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians. The plague at Athens. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. It began in Æthiopia. The Peloponnesians supposed to have poisoned their wells. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. The author sick of this disease.

In the very beginning of summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the conduct of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamas, king of Lacedæmon: and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them. They had not been many days in Attica, when the plague first began amongst the Athenians, said also to have seized formerly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos and elsewhere; but so great a plague and mortality of men was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first neither were the physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of what it was, but died fastest themselves, as being the men that most approached the sick; nor any other art of man availed whatsoever. All supplications to the gods, and enquiries of oracles, and whatsoever other means they used of

that kind, proved all unprofitable; insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over. 48. It began, by report, first in that part of Æthiopia that lieth upon Egypt; and thence fell down into Egypt and Africa, and into the greatest part of the territories of the king. It invaded Athens on a sudden; and touched first upon those that dwelt in Peiræus; insomuch as they reported that the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their wells; (for springs there were not any in that place). But afterwards it came up into the high city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak according to his own knowledge. For my own part, I will deliver but the manner of it, and lay open only such things, as one may take his mark by to discover the same, if it come again; having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick of the same.

The description of the disease: ache of the head: redness of the eyes: sore throat: unsavoury breath: vomitings: hickyexe: year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. livid pustules: extreme heat of their bodies: insatiate thirst: want of sleep: after seven or ten days, death: disease in the belly: looseness: year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. loss of the parts where the disease brake out: oblivion of all things done before their sickness: birds and beasts perished that fed on carcases.

49. This year, by confession of all men, was of all other, for other diseases, most free and healthful. If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this; if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding and being in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache in their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly, their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their breath noisome and unsavoury. Upon this followed a sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after the pain, together with a mighty cough, came down into the breast.

And when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit, and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation that physicians ever named. Most of them had also the hickyexe, which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased quickly, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor pale; but reddish, livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks; but so burned inwardly, as not to endure any the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them, nor anything but mere nakedness; but rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water. And many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate thirst, ran unto the wells; and to drink much or little was indifferent, being still from ease and power to sleep as far as ever. As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment beyond all expectation; insomuch as the most of them either died of their inward burning in nine or seven days, whilst they had yet strength; or if they escaped that, then the disease falling down into their bellies, and causing there great exulcerations and immoderate looseness, they died many of them afterwards through weakness. For the disease, which took first the head, began above, and came down and passed through the whole body; and he that overcame the worst of it, was yet marked with the loss of his extreme parts; for breaking out both at their privy members, and at their fingers and toes, many with the loss of these escaped: there were also some that lost their eyes. And many, that presently upon their recovery were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, as they neither knew themselves nor their acquaintance. 50. For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression of words, and both exceeded human nature in the cruelty wherewith it handled each one; and appeared also otherwise to be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that use to feed on human flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied,

either came not at them, or tasting perished. An argument whereof as touching the birds, is the manifest defect of such fowl; which were not then seen, neither about the carcases or any where else. But by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was seen much clearer.

Year ii. A C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. Want of attendance. Dejection of mind. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. No man sick of it mortally the second time.

So that this disease, (to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had differently from others), was in general such as I have shown; and for other usual sicknesses, at that time no man was troubled with any. Now they died, some for want of attendance, and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any, to say certain medicine, that applied must have helped them; for if it did good to one, it did harm to another. Nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness, that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all, was the dejection of mind in such as found themselves beginning to be sick: (for they grew presently desperate, and gave themselves over without making any resistance): as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation; for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forebore to visit them for fear, then they died forlorn; whereby many families became empty, for want of such as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the honestest men. For out of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto their friends; especially after it was come to this pass, that even their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died, and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered, had much compassion both on them that died, and on them that lay sick; as having both known the misery themselves, and now no more subject to the

danger. For this disease never took any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy; and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.

Men died in the streets. Disorder in their funerals. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. Licentiousness of life justified. Neglect of religion and law. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses, but dwelling at that time of the year in stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; and dying men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men half–dead about every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents, were all full of the dead that died within them. For oppressed with the violence of the calamity, and not knowing what to do, men grew careless both of holy and profane things alike. And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals, were all now broken; every one burying where he could find room. And many for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him would throw on his dead, and give it fire. And when one was in burning, another would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again. 53. And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely; seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates. Insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods, even for their pleasure; as men that thought they held their lives but by the day. As for

pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any; because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man: not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that alike they all perished: nor the latter, because no man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought, there was now over their heads some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.

Predictions called to mind.

Such was the misery, into which the Athenians being fallen were much oppressed; having not only their men killed by the disease within, but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages without. In this sickness also, (as it was not unlikely they would), they called to mind this verse, said also of the elder sort to have been uttered of old:

A Doric war shall fall,

And a great plague withal.

An ambiguous prophecy expounded by the event. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not λοιμός that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but λιμός. But upon the present occasion the word λοιμός deservedly obtained. For as men suffered, so they made the verse to say. And I think, if after this there shall ever come another Doric war, and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There was also reported by such as knew, a certain answer given by the oracle to the Lacedæmonians, when they inquired whether they should make this war or not: that if they warred with all their

power, they should have the victory; and that the God himself would take their parts. And thereupon they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, but the sickness presently began; and never came into Peloponnesus, to speak of, but reigned principally in Athens, and in such other places afterwards as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.

Pericles with 100 sail of Athenians about Peloponnesus. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champagne country, they fell upon the territory called Paralos, as far as to the mountain Laurius, where the Athenians had silver mines; and first wasted that part of it which looketh towards Peloponnesus, and then that also which lieth toward Andros and Eubœa. And Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle. 56. Whilst they were yet in the plain, and before they entered into the maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about Peloponnesus, and as soon as they were ready, put to sea. In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms; and in vessels then purposely first made to carry horses, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with him with fifty galleys. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in Paralia; and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they wasted much of the country thereabout, and assaulting the city had a hope to take it, though it succeeded not. Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories about of Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione, places all on the sea–coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasiæ, a small maritime city of Laconia; and both wasted the territory about it, and took and razed the town itself. And having done this, came home, and found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.

The Peloponnesians depart out of Attica.

All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness, both in the army and city, destroyed many; insomuch as it was said that the Peloponnesians fearing the sickness, (which they knew to be in the city, both by fugitives and by seeing the Athenians burying their dead), went the sooner away out of the country. And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done any time before; and wasted even the whole territory: for they continued in Attica almost forty days.

Year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. The Athenian fleet returned from Peloponnesus, go to Potidæa with ill success by reason of the sickness.

The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, who were joint commanders with Pericles, with that army which he had employed before, went presently and made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace, and against Potidæa, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently applied engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but neither the taking of the city, nor any thing else, succeeded worthy so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them, afflicted them mightily indeed, and even devoured the army. And the Athenian soldiers which were there before and in health, catched the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his sixteen hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcideans. And Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having of four thousand men in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty of the plague. But the soldiers that were there before, stayed upon the place and continued the siege of Potidæa.

The Athenian people vexed at once both with the war and pestilence, grow impatient toward Pericles. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians having their fields now the second time wasted, and both the sickness and war falling upon them at once, changed their minds, and accused Pericles as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the Lacedæmonians; to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but they returned without effect. And being then at their wits' end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he seeing them vexed with their present calamity and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for he was yet general) with intention to put them again into heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less dismayed temper. And standing forth, he spake unto them in this manner:

Oration of Pericles. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. Oration of Pericles. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. Oration of Pericles.

"Your anger towards me cometh not unlooked for; for the cause of it I know. And I have called this assembly therefore, to remember you, and reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry with me, or given way to your adversity, without reason. For I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men, than if the private men themselves were in prosperity and the public wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth, shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and every one cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why should not every one strive to defend it: and not, as you now, astonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety, and fall a censuring both me that counselled the war, and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I? And it is I you are angry withal: one, as I think myself, inferior to none, either in

knowing what is requisite, or in expressing what I know, and a lover of my country and superior to money. For he that hath good thoughts and cannot clearly express them, were as good to have thought nothing at all. He that can do both, and is ill affected to his country, will likewise not give it faithful counsel. And he that will do that too, yet if he be superable by money, will for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me somewhat above the rest, there is sure no reason that I should now be accused of doing you wrong. 61. For though to such as have it in their own election, (being otherwise in good estate), it were madness to make choice of war; yet when we must of necessity either give way, and so without more ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by danger; he is more to be condemned that declineth the danger, than he that standeth to it. For mine own part, I am the man I was, and of the mind I was; but you are changed, won to the war when you were entire, but repenting it upon the damage, and condemning my counsel in the weakness of your own judgment. The reason of this is, because you feel already every one in particular that which afflicts you; but the evidence of the profit to accrue to the city in general, you see not yet. And your minds dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot constantly maintain what you have before resolved. For that which is sudden and unexpected, and contrary to what one hath deliberated, enslaveth the spirit; which by this disease principally, in the neck of the other incommodities, is now come to pass in you. But you that are born in a great city, and with education suitable, how great soever the affliction be, ought not to shrink at it and eclipse your reputation; (for men do no less condemn those that through cowardice lose the glory they have, than hate those that through impudence arrogate the glory they have not); but to set aside the grief of your private losses, and lay your hands to the common safety.

62. “As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long and we in the end never the nearer to victory, though that may suffice which I have demonstrated at other times touching your causeless suspicion that way; yet this I will tell you moreover, touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem ever to have thought on, nor I touched in my former orations; nor would I also have spoken it now, but that I see your minds dejected more than there is cause for. That though you take your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and the sea, you are of one of them entire masters; both of as much of it as you make use of, and also of as much more as you shall think fit yourselves. Neither is there any king or nation whatsoever of those that now are, that can impeach your navigation with the fleet and strength you now go. So that you must not put the use of houses and lands, wherein now you think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter, into the balance with such a power as this, nor take the loss of these things heavily in respect of it; but rather set little by them, as but a light ornament and embellishment of wealth; and think that our liberty as long as we hold fast that, will easily recover unto us these things again; whereas subjected once to others, even that which we possess besides will be diminished. Show not yourselves both ways inferior to your ancestors; who not only held this, (gotten by their own labours, not left them), but have also preserved and delivered the same unto us: (for it is more dishonour to lose what one possesseth, than to miscarry in the acquisition of it): and encounter the enemy not only with magnanimity, but also with disdain. For a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous ignorance; but he that is confident upon judgment to be superior to his enemy, doth also disdain him; which is now our case. And courage, in equal fortune, is the safer for our

disdain of the enemy, where a man knows what he doth: for he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, and more to judgment upon certainties, wherein there is a more sure foresight. 63. You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten for her dominion, in which you all triumph: and either not decline the pains, or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only. Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted by offence given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over: (if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter): for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it, or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved, if it be not ranged with the active life: nor is it a life conducible to a city that reigneth, but to a subject city, that it may safely serve. 64. Be not therefore seduced by this sort of men, nor angry with me, together with whom yourselves did decree this war, because the enemy invading you hath done what was likely he would, if you obeyed him not. And as for the sickness, the only thing that exceeded the imagination of all men, it was unlooked for: and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that; but unjustly, unless when anything falleth out above your expectation fortunate, you will also dedicate unto me that. Evils that come from heaven, you must bear necessarily; and such as proceed from your enemies, valiantly; for so it hath been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to reverse. Knowing that this city hath a great name amongst all people for not yielding to adversity, and for the mighty power it yet hath after the expense of so many lives and so much labour in the war: the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry, (for all things are made with this law, to

decay again), will remain with posterity for ever. How that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have abidden the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city. Now this, he with the quiet life will condemn; the active man will emulate; and they that have not attained to the like, will envy. But to be hated and to displease, is a thing that happeneth for the time to whosoever he be that hath the command of others; and he does well, that undergoeth hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasteth not; and is recompensed both with a present splendour and an immortal glory hereafter. Seeing then you foresee both what is honourable for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no more heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor let them know the evil present does any way afflict you; for they whose minds least feel, and whose actions most oppose a calamity, both among states and private persons are the best."

Pericles fined in a sum of money. Athens at the greatest in the time of Pericles. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. The death of Pericles. Sept A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The commendation of Pericles. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

65. In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself, and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction. But they, though for the state in general they were won, and sent to the Lacedæmonians no more, but rather inclined to the war; yet they were every one in particular grieved for their several losses: the poor, because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; but the greatest matter of all was, that they had war instead of peace. And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first fined him in a sum of money. Nevertheless, not long

after (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again, and committed the whole state to his administration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled; and for the need of the commonwealth, they prized him more than any other whatsoever. For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he governed the same with moderation, and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death. For he told them, that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion, nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all: and in such other things besides as seemed not to concern the war, managed the state, according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well, the honour and profit of it came most to private men; and what miscarried, was to the city's detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controled the multitude; and was not so much led by them, as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name, a state democratical; but in fact, a government of the principal man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied themselves to the people and let go the care of the commonwealth. From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant

city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily; which was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against, as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army, and then also first troubled the state at home with division. Being overthrown in Sicily, and having lost, besides other ammunition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition; yet they held out three years, both against their first enemies and the Sicilians with them, and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the king's son, who took part with, and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet; and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war.

The Lacedæmonians war against Zacynthus.

66. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island laying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were a colony of Achæans of Peloponnesus, but confederates of the people of Athens. There went in this fleet a thousand men of arms, and Cnemus a Spartan for admiral; who landing, wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.

C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. The Lacedæmonian ambassadors taken by the Athenian ambassadors in Thrace, and sent to Athens. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. The Athenians put them to death

67. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus of Corinth, and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagorus of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and Pollis of Argos, a private man, as they were travelling

into Asia to the king, to get money of him and to draw him into their league, took Thrace in their way, and came unto Sitalces the son of Teres, with a desire to get him also, if they could, to forsake the league with Athens, and to send his forces to Potidæa, which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer: and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other side of the Hellespont, to go, as they intended, to Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, who would convoy them to the king. But the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they might not go to the king, and do hurt to the city whereof he himself was now a member. Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace to take ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them before they got to the ship by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameiniades, with command to deliver them into their hands. And they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians, fearing Aristeus, lest escaping he should do them further mischief, (for he was manifestly the author of all the business of Potidæa and about Thrace), the same day put them all to death, unjudged and desirous to have spoken, and threw them into the pits; thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedæmonians that began it, and had slain and thrown into pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates, whom they took sailing in merchant–ships about the coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians or neutral, all alike.

The Ambraciotes war on Acarnania. year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. The end of the second summer.

68. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciotes, both they themselves and divers barbarian nations by them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia, and against the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives, arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, after the Trojan war; who at his return, misliking the then state of Argos, built this city in the Gulf of Ambracia, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciotes, bordering upon Amphilochia: and then they first learned the Greek language now used from the Ambraciotes that lived among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were barbarians. Now the Ambraciotes in process of time drave out the Argives, and held the city by themselves. Whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians; who sent thirty galleys to their aid, and Phormio for general. Phormio being arrived, took Argos by assault, and making slaves of the Ambraciotes, put the town into the joint possessions of the Amphilochians and Acarnanians. And this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciotes therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, came in with an army, partly of their own, and partly raised amongst the Chaonians and other neighbouring barbarians, now in this war. And coming to Argos, were masters of the field; but when they could not take the city by assault, they returned, and disbanding went every nation to his own. These were the acts of the summer.

Year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3.

69. In the beginning of the winter, the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio; who coming to lie at Naupactus, guarded the passage, that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crisæan gulf. And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander, they sent into Caria and Lycia; as well to gather tribute in those parts, as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates, lying on those coasts, from molesting the navigation of such merchant–ships as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phœnicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander, landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he had aboard, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of a part of his army.

C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. Potidæa rendered to the Athenians. year ii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

70. The same winter, the Potidæans unable any longer to endure the siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise, and seeing their victual failed, and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food, to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleidas, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by laying in that cold place, and that the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege, accepted of it. The conditions agreed on were these: “to depart, they and their wives and children, and their auxiliar soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes, and every woman with two; and to take with them every one a certain sum of money for his charges by the way.” Hereupon a truce was granted them to depart; and they went, some to the Chalcideans, and others to other places, as they could get to. But the people of Athens called the commanders in question for

compounding without them; conceiving that they might have gotten the city to discretion: and sent afterwards a colony to Potidæa of their own citizens. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war, written by Thucydides.

Year iii. The siege of Platæa. The Platæans' Speech to Archidamus. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Platæans' speech to Archidamus. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Answer of Archidamus to the Platæans. The Reply of the Platæans. The Answer of Archidamus to their Reply. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Platæans reply again, and desire to know the pleasure of the people of Athens. The Athenians' message to the Platæans. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Platæans' last Answer to Archidamus from the wall. Archidamus' Protestation.

71. The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not into Attica, but turned their arms against Platæa, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Platæans sent ambassadors presently unto him, with words to this effect: "Archidamus, and you Lacedæmonians, you do neither justly, nor worthy yourselves and ancestors, in making war upon Platæa. For Pausanias of Lacedæmon, the son of Cleombrotus, having, together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market–place of Platæa to Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates, and granted to the Platæans this privilege: that their city and territory should be free: that none should make any unjust war against them, nor go about to subject them: and if any did, the confederates then present should to their utmost ability revenge their quarrel. These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the clean contrary; for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your and our country, we require

you, that you do no damage to the territory of Platæa, nor violate those oaths; but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias." 72. The Platæans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: "Men of Platæa, if you would do as ye say, you say what is just. For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you free; and help to set free the rest, who having been partakers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war, is only for the deliverance of them and others; of which if you will especially participate, keep your oaths; at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet, and enjoy your own in neutrality; receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of faction." Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Platæa, when they had heard him, returned to the city: and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus: "that what he had advised, was impossible for them to perform without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were their wives and children; and that they feared also for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands; or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it." But Archidamus to encourage them, made this answer: "Deliver you unto us Lacedæmonians your city and your houses, show us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered: and depart yourselves whither you shall think good, as long as the war lasteth: and when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again. In the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice for your maintenance." 73. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and having consulted with the people, made answer "that they would first

acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would consent, they would then accept the conditions: till then, they desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory wasted." Upon this he granted them so many days truce, as was requisite for their return: and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Platæan ambassadors were arrived at Athens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: "The Athenians say thus: that neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injuries of any; nor will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us by the oath of our fathers, not to make any alienation touching the league." 74. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Platæans resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians; but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes, and to suffer whatsoever misery could befall them; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make this answer: "that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians had required." When they had answered so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and heros of the country, saying thus: "All ye Gods and Heros, protectors of Platæis, be witnesses, that we neither invade this territory (wherein our fathers after their vows unto you overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in) unjustly now in the beginning; because they have first broken the league they had sworn: nor what we shall further do, will be any injury; because, though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused: assent ye also to the punishment of the beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms." 75. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war.

A mount raised against Platæa. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Platæans raise their wall higher against the mount by a frame of timber, in

which they laid their bricks. The Platæans' device to draw the earth from the mount, thro' the wall. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Peloponnesians remedy that evil. The Platæans fetch the earth away from under the mount by a mine. The Platæans make another wall within that which was to the mount. The Peloponnesians assault the wall with engines year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Platæans' defence against the engines. The Peloponnesians throw faggots and fire into the town from the mount. A great fire. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisado about the town, that none might go out. That done, he raised a mount against the wall, hoping with so great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down wood in the hill Cithæron, they built a frame of timber, and wattled it about on either side, to serve instead of walls, to keep the earth from falling too much away; and cast into it stones, and earth, and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up. Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work between them for rest in such manner, as some might be carrying, whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedæmonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities, and had the charge of the work. The Platæans seeing the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which having placed on the wall of the city in the place where the mount touched, they built it within full of bricks, taken from the adjoining houses, for that purpose demolished; the timber serving to bind them together, that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and quilts, both to keep the timber from shot of wildfire, and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast on the other. The Platæans used also this device; they brake a hole in their own wall where the mount joined, and drew the earth from it into the city. 76. But the Peloponnesians,

when they found it out, took clay, and therewith daubing hurdles of reeds, cast the same into the chink; which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it away. The Platæans excluded here, gave over that plot; and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city by conjecture, fetched away the earth again; and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being drawn away below and settling over the part where it was voided. The Platæans nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further. They gave over working at the high wall against the mount, and beginning at both ends of it where the wall was low, built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might resist, and put the enemy to make another mount; and by coming further in, to be at double pains, and withal more encompassable with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the rising of their mount, brought to the city their engines of battery. One of which, by the help of the mount, they applied to the high wall; wherewith they much shook it, and put the Platæans into great fear. And others to other parts of the wall; which the Platæans partly turned aside by casting ropes about them; and partly with great beams, which, being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two other great beams, jetting over and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart, and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains and letting their hands go, they let fall with violence, to break the beak of it. 77. After this the Peloponnesians, seeing their engines availed not, and thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege it. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it: for there was no way they did not think on, to have gained it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought faggots, they cast them from the mount into the space between it

and their new wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled; and then into as much of the rest of the city, as at that distance they could reach: and throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before made by the hand of man. For as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attrition, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one; and the Platæans that had escaped other mischiefs, wanted little of being consumed by this. For near the wall they could not get by a great way: and if the wind had been with it, (as the enemy hoped it might), they could never have escaped. It is also reported, that there fell much rain then with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished, and the danger ceased by that.

In the beginning of September the siege laid to Platæa.

78. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army, and dismissing the rest, enclosed the city about with a wall; dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it, out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus, they left a guard for one half of the wall; (for the other was guarded by the Bœotians); and departed with the rest of their army, and were dissolved according to their cities. The Platæans had before this sent their wives and children, and all their unserviceable men, to Athens. The rest were besieged, being in number, of the Platæans themselves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to dress their meat. These were all, when the siege was first laid; and not one more, neither free nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the city besieged.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Athenians send an army against the Chalcideans. The Athenians foughten with by the Chacideans at Spartolus: year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. and overthrown, with the loss of three commanders.

79. The same summer, at the same time that this journey was made against Platæa, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others. These coming before Spartolus in Bottiæa, destroyed the corn; and expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of some within. But such as would not have it so having sent for aid to Olynthus before, there came into the city for safeguard thereof a supply both of men of arms and other soldiers from thence. And these issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves into order of battle under the town itself. The men of arms of the Chalcideans, and certain auxiliaries with them, were overcome by the Athenians, and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcideans and their light–armed soldiers, overcame the horsemen and light–armed of the Athenians; but they had some few targettiers besides of the territory called Crusis. When the battle was now begun, came a supply of other targettiers from Olynthus. Which the light–armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength, and also as having had the better before, with the Chalcidean horse and this new supply charged the Athenians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with the carriages. And as oft as the Athenians charged, the Chalcideans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with their shot. Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up, and charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn their backs; and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidæa; and having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, when they had

set up a trophy and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went every one to his city.

The Ambraciotes invade Acarnania, together with the Lacedæmonians. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The army of the Ambraciotes and their confederates. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. They go toward Stratus: the greatest city of Acarnania.

80. Not long after this the same summer, the Ambraciotes and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania; saying, that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, the Acarnanians of the sea–coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest, having easily gained Acarnania they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephalonia, and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus; and that there was a hope beside to take Naupactus. The Peloponnesians assenting, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet admiral, with his men of arms in a few galleys immediately; and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciotes, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciotes, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea undescried of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, but were led by Photius and Nicanor, which

two being of the families eligible had now the annual government. With the Chaonians came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king. The Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. The Parauæans were led by their king Orœdus; and under Orœdus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last were not yet arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march, without staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argeia, they destroyed Limnæa, a town unwalled. From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania; conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come easily in.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Wariness of the Grecians. Rashness of the Chaonians. Stratagem of the Stratians. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes retire without effect.

81. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour Stratus, but guarded every one his own, and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them, that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians, to the end that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other barbarians in the middle; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on the right hand; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes on the left; each army at great distance, and sometimes out of sight of one another. The Grecians in their march kept their order; and went warily on, till they had gotten a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians confident of themselves,

and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for a camp; but carried furiously on together with the rest of the barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour, and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this whilst they were yet in their way, and imagining, if they could overcome these thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city; and when the enemies approached, fell upon them both from the city and from the ambushes at once; and putting them into affright, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place: and the rest of the barbarians seeing these to shrink, stayed no longer, but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far before to choose (as they then thought) a commodious place to pitch in. But when the barbarians came back upon them running, they received them, and joining both camps together stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians; but used their slings against them, and troubled them much that way: (for without their men of arms there was no stirring for them): and in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent. 82. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army to the river Anapus, from Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched off the dead bodies upon truce the next day. And whereas the city Œniadæ was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours; and from thence went every one home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the barbarians.

Phormio with twenty galleys of Athens, overcometh forty–seven of the Peloponnesian galleys. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The order of the Peloponnesian galleys. The order of the Athenian galleys and the stratagem

of Phormio. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Peloponnesans fly. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

83. In the meantime the fleet of Corinth and the other confederates, that was to set out from the Crisæan gulf and to join with Cnemus, to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with Phormio and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set upon them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea, but furnished rather for the land–service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys durst fight with theirs, that were seven–and–forty. Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them on the other; and that now when they went off from Patræ in Achaia to go over to Acarnania in the opposite continent, the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and also knew that they had come to anchor there the night before: they found they were then to fight of necessity directly against the mouth of the strait. The commanders of the fleet, were such as the cities that set it forth had severally appointed; but of the Corinthians, these; Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in such manner as they made thereof a circle, as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able, with the stems of their galleys outward, and sterns inward; and into the midst thereof received such small vessels as came with them, and also five of their swiftest galleys; the which were at narrow passages to come forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge. 84. But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file, went round them and shrunk them up together, by wiping them ever as they past and putting them in expectation

of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight, till he himself had given them the signal. For he hoped that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land; but that the galleys would fall foul of one another, and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the middest. And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, he made account they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it was in his own election, and would be most opportune on that occasion. When this wind was up, and the galleys of the Peloponnesians, being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled, by the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered them; and when one galley fell foul of another, and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles, and through the noise they made, keeping off and reviling each other, heard nothing neither of their charge nor of the galleys' direction; and through want of skill unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galley untractable to him that sat at the helm: then and with this opportunity he gave the signal. And the Athenians charging, drowned first one of the admiral–galleys, and divers others after it in the several parts they assaulted; and brought them to that pass at length, that not one applying himself to the fight they fled all towards Patræ and Dyme, cities of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased them, and taken twelve galleys, and slain most of the men that were in them, fell off and went to Molycreium; and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet, went presently along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas, and with him

those galleys that were there, and with which this other fleet should have been joined.

Preparation for another fight. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Twenty sail of Athenians, sent to aid Phormio, stay in Crete. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

85. After this the Lacedæmonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council, with command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason; and that it was not so much a defect of the fleet, as of their courage: never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion. Who being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys, and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory; and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready; because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys; but commanded him that had the charge of them, to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia; telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy: which he did to gratify the Polichnitæ, that bordered upon the Cydonians. Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete, and together with the Polichnitæ wasted the territory of the Cydonians; where also, by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.

The Peloponnesians sail by the coast of Panormus. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

86. In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind–bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of battle sailed along the

coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land–forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycricum, and anchored without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crisæan gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia with seventy–seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain six or seven days one against the other, meditating and providing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had suffered by it before; nor the other to enter the strait, because to fight within they thought to be the enemy's advantage. At last Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together; and seeing the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:

The Oration of Cnemus. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Oration of Cnemus.

87. "Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For you know, we were inferior to them then in preparation; and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things; and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness. So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice: nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event: but we must think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man

can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in any thing by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant. And yet you are not so much short of their skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage, will not be without a memory also, to put what they know in execution; yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage availeth nothing. To their odds therefore of skill, oppose your odds of valour; and to the fear caused by your overthrow, oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater fleet, and to fight on your own shore with your aids at hand of men of arms: and for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular, why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this, will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every man in his order, not forsaking the place assigned him. And for us, we shall order the battle as well as the former commanders; and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment; and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit."

88. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but faint–hearted, and observing they had consultations apart and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told them, and predisposed their minds to an opinion, that there was no number of galleys so great, which setting upon them they ought not to undertake; and [also] most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves, that being Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians: yet when

he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their courage, and having assembled the Athenians, said thus:

the oration of phormio. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Oration of Phormio. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Oration of Phormio.

89. “Soldiers, having observed your fear of he enemy’s number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys, for that they were overcome before, and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up: wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea. But in reason the odds must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not: and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be bold now than they. And the Lacedæmonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us) against their wills. For else they would never have undertaken a new battle, after they were once so clearly overthrown. Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you, is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would go about to resist, unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them. For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength: but they that are much the fewer, must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained. Wherewith these men now amazed, fear us more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness, and some also by timorousness; both

which we ourselves are free from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf, nor go in thither: seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy afar off; or if he be himself over–pressed, again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea–fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land, wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this, I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily; and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. In the fight, have in great estimation order and silence, as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea; and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts. You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies, or to bring the fear of the sea nearer home to the Athenians. Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once already; and men once overcome, will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before."

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The stratagem of the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians give the onset. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

90. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast within the gulf; leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing. In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys, to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to

Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression, but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides. Phormio fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore, with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly every one as fast as he could, upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. The rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, sunk them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew; and the galleys, some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already taken. But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them; and fighting from the decks recovered them again, after they were already towing away.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Athenians have the victory. Timocrates, a Lacedæmonian commander, slayeth himself. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The end of the third summer.

91. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory, and overcame the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys, which had avoided them when they turned, and were gotten into the open sea. These flying toward Naupactus, arrived there before the enemies, all save one; and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak–heads and put themselves in readiness for defence, in case the enemy should follow them

to the land. But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were pæanising as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas, being far before the rest, gave chase to one Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea a certain ship at anchor, to which the Athenian galley first coming fetched a compass about her, and came back full butt against the Leucadian galley that gave her chase, and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident they began to fear; and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water and hindered the way of their galleys, (a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy was so near), and staid for more company: and some of them, through ignorance of the coast, ran upon the shelves. 92. The Athenians seeing this took heart again, and together with one clamour set upon them; who resisted not long, because of their present errors committed and their disarray; but turned, and fled to Panormus from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed, and took from them six galleys that were hindmost, and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk by the shore and tied astern of theirs. Of the men, some they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates, a Lacedæmonian, who, when the galley was lost, ran himself through with his sword; and his body drave into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory; and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk by the shore; and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crisæan gulf and to

Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus. And the summer ended.

The Peloponnesians resolve to attempt the surprise of Peiræus. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Peloponnesians dare not execute their design, but turn to Salamis. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

93. But before the fleet, gone into the Crisæan gulf and to Corinth, was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make an attempt upon Peiræus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar; and that upon very good cause, considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar, his cushion, and one thong for his oar to turn in, should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens; and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisæa, the arsenal of the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into Peiræus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them: for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been discovered. As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward; and arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisæa, and set sail; not now towards Peiræus, as they intended, fearing the danger, (and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a promontory of Salamis, lying out towards Megara. Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys, that kept watch to hinder the importation and exportation of any thing to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away

after them: and being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island. 94. By this time the fires signifying the coming of enemies, were lifted up towards Athens; and affrighted them more than any thing that had happened in all this war. For they in the city, thought the enemies had been already in Peiræus: and they in Peiræus, thought the city of the Salaminians had been already taken, and that the enemy would instantly come into Peiræus; which, had they not been afraid, nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole strength of the city into Peiræus, and launched their galleys, and embarking in haste and tumult set sail toward Salamis, leaving for the guard of Peiræus an army of foot. The Peloponnesians upon notice of these succours, having now overrun most of Salamis, and taken many prisoners and much other booty, besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisæa. And somewhat they feared the more, for that their galleys had lain long in the water, and were subject to leaking. And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, went home; and from that time forward looked better to Peiræus, both for the shutting of the ports and for their diligence otherwise.

The king of Thrace maketh war on the king of Macedon. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

95. About the same time in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace; upon two promises; one of which he required to be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself. For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him, for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war; and for not restoring his brother Philip to

the kingdom, that was his enemy: which he never paid him. And Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them, that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcideans of Thrace. For these causes therefore he made this expedition; and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip, (with purpose to make him king of Macedonia), and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and Agnon the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the Chalcideans, both with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.

The description of Thrace. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

96. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those Thracians that inhabit on this side the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Hæmus he levied the Getes, and all the nations between Ister and the Euxine Sea. The Getes and the people of those parts, are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scythians are; all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains and are free states, all sword–men, and are called Dii; the greatest part of which are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some went as voluntaries. He levied also the Agrianes and Lans, and all other the nations of Pæonia in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the Graæans and Lans, nations of Pæonia, and to the river Strymon; which rising out of the mountain Scomius passeth through the territories of the Graæans and Lans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward Pæonia, and are subject only to their own laws. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Treres make the bound of his dominion, and the Tilatæans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius, and reach westward as far as to

the river Oscius; which cometh out of the same hill Nestus and Hebrus doth; a great and desert hill, adjoining to Rhodope.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The great power of the Scythians.

97. The dimensions of the dominion of the Odrysians by the sea–side, is from the city of the Abderites to the mouth of Ister in the Euxine Sea; and is, the nearest way, four days' and as many nights' sail for a round ship, with a continual fore wind. By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the mouth of Ister eleven days' journey for an expedite footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea. Now for the continent; from Byzantium to the Lans and to the river Strymon, (for it reacheth this way farthest into the main land), it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey. The tribute they received from all the barbarian nations and from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalces, and made the most of it), was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents by year. And presents of gold and silver came to as much more: besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not only to him, but also to all the men of authority and Odrysian nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give: and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and go without. Nevertheless they held this custom long, by reason of their power: for without gifts, there was nothing to be gotten done amongst them. So that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power. For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians. For there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but neither of Asia, that are comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are able, one

nation to one, to stand against the Scythians. And yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not like to other men.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

98. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army, and when all was ready, set forward and marched towards Macedonia: first, through his own dominion; then over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Pæonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly made with timber, when he made war against the Pæonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Pæonians, and on the left the Sintians and Medes; and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus in Pæonia. His army, as he marched, diminished not any way, except by sickness; but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace, that came in uncalled in hope of booty. Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than a hundred and fifty thousand men: whereof the most were foot; the horse being a third part, or thereabouts. And of the horse, the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves; and the next most, the Getes. And of the foot, those sword–men, a free nation that came down to him out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.

The beginning of the kingdom of Macedonia. The Macedonian kings descended of the Temenidæ, a family in Argos of the Peloponnesians. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

99. Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas. For there are in Macedonia, the Lyncestians and the Elimeiotæ, and other highland nations, who though they be confederates and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now

Macedonia which lieth toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who came out of Argos, were the first possessors and reigned in the same; having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians, which afterwards seated themselves in Phagres, and other towns beyond Strymon, at the foot of Pangæum; (from which cause that country is called the Gulf of Pieria to this day, which lieth at the foot of Pangæum and bendeth toward the sea); and out of that which is called Bottia, the Bottiæans, that now border upon the Chalcideans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Pæonia near unto the river Axius, reaching from above down to Pella and to the sea. Beyond Axius, they possess the country called Mygdonia as far as to Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore, they drave the Eordians out of the territory now called Eordia; (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca); and the Almopians out of Almopia. The same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold them yet; as Anthemus, Crestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia; and was the kingdom of Perdiccas the son of Alexander, when Sitalces came to invade it.

The Macedonians retire into their walled towns. Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, the ninth king of Macedon, of the family of the Temenidæ. year iii. A C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

100. The Macedonians unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired all within their strongholds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded: which were not many then; but were built afterwards by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out the highways straight, and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings that were before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, invaded

that territory first which had been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyntas the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also assaulted Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the right hand of Pella and Cyrrhus; but within these, into Bottiæa and Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them with their foot, but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience. And where they charged, none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen and well armed with breastplates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemies, they fought against manifest odds of number: so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

Year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. Sitalces and Perdiccas come to a conference about the motives of the war. The Grecians, at the coming of this army, stand upon their guard, fearing they were called in by the Athenians to subdue them. year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Seuthes corrupted by Perdiccas, persuadeth Sitalces to return.

101. After this, Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas, touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey, but had sent ambassadors to him with presents), he sent a part of his army against the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, wherewith having compelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians, and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians, and all the Grecians as far as to Thermopylæ, were afraid he would have turned his

forces upon them; and stood upon their guard. And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely the Panæans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersæans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose by virtue of their league. But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiæan, and Macedonian territories; and when he could not effect what he came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his cousin–german, and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage, and money with her: and Sitalces at the persuasion of him, after the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea, retired with his army with all speed into his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

C. 428. Ol. 87. 4. Phormio putteth suspected persons out of Stratus and Coronta. year iii. A. C 428. Ol. 87. 4. The course of the river Achelons. The fable of Alcmæon. year iii. A. C. 428. Ol. 87. 4. Acarnania whence so called.

102. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus, under the conduct of Phormio, sailed along the coast to Astacus, and disbarking marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys, and four hundred more Messenians. With these he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places, all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought

they should not be able to make war against the Œniades (who only of all Acarnania are the Athenians' enemies) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelöus, springing out of the mountain Pindus, and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and through most part of the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Œniades, which also it moateth about with fens, by the abundance of water maketh it hard lying there for an army in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinades lie just over against Œnia, hard by the mouth of Achelöus. And the river, being a great one, continually heapeth together the gravel, insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already, and the like in short time is expected by the rest. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous, but also the islands themselves stand thick, and because the gravel cannot pass, are joined one to another; lying in and out, not in a direct line, nor so much as to give the water his course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert, and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmæon the son of Amphiareus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother; telling him, "that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him, till he had found out and seated himself in such a land, as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted by him." Hereupon being at a nonplus, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelöus, and thought there was enough cast up to serve his turn, already, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore seating himself in the places about the Œniades, he reigned there, and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it concerning Alcmæon.

The end of the third year of the war.

103. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus, in the very beginning of the spring came back to Athens; and brought with them such galleys as they had taken, and the freemen they had taken prisoners in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.

THE THIRD BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

ATTICA INVADED BY the Peloponnesians. — The Mytilenæans revolt, and are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league. — The Athenians send Paches to Mytilene, to besiege it. — Part of the besieged Platæans escape through the fortifications of the enemy. — The commons of Mytilene armed by the nobility for a sally on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians. — The residue of the Platæans yield to the besiegers, and are put to the sword. — The proceedings upon the Mytilenæans, and their punishment. — The sedition in Corcyra. — Laches is sent by the Athens into Sicily: and Nicias into Melos. — Demosthenes fighteth against the Ætolians unfortunately; and afterwards against the Ambraciotes fortuately. — Pythadorus is sent into Sicily, to receive the fleet from Laches. — This in other three years of this war.

Year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Peloponnesians invade Attica. year iv. A C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

The summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and there set them down and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where they thought fit, and kept back the multitude of light–armed soldiers from going out before the men of arms, and infesting the places near the city. And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they returned; and were dissolved according to their cities.

The revolt of Lesbos. The intention of the Lesbians to revolt discovered to the Athenians. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians; which though they would have done before the war, and the Lacedæmonians would not then receive them, yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they stayed to have first straitened the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnæans, and of the Mytilenæans themselves certain particular men upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them that the Lesbians were forced to go all into Mytilene; that by the help of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred the Bœotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt; and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be lost.

The Athenians send forty galleys to Lesbos. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Athenians imprison such of Mytilene as were at Athens, and stay their galleys

The Athenians, afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot and at the hottest, thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos, which had a navy and was of strength entire, should thus be added to the rest of their enemies; and at first received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned because they would not have them true. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mytilene, and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves and undo their preparation, they then feared the worst, and would have prevented them: and to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty galleys made ready for Peloponnesus, with Cleïppedes and two other commanders. For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of

Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city, and that to the celebration thereof the Mytilenæans were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they might command the Mytilenæans to deliver up their galleys, and to demolish their walls; or they might make war against them, if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mytilene which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league, to aid them, the Athenians stayed; and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the meantime a certain man went from Athens into Eubœa by sea, and then by land to Geræstus; and finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mytilene three days after he set forth from Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis, as was expected, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.

The Athenians give the Mytilenæans time to purge themselves at Athens.

When the Athenians not long after arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mytilenæans what they had in charge: which not hearkened unto, they presently fell to the war. The Mytilenæans, unprovided and compelled to a war on such a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight: but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley; desiring, if they could upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island.

Year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans sent to Lacedæmon for aid. The Mytilenæan ambassadors speed not at Athens. They sally out upon the Athenians, but without success. They lie still, expecting help from Peloponnesus. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Athenians send for the aids of their confederates.

When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mytilenæans amongst others sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design, and had repented him after of the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedæmon, undiscovered of the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at anchor in Malea to the north of the city; being without any confidence of their success at Athens. And these men, after an ill voyage through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedæmon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence. 5. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mytilenæans and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for these together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, aided the Athenians), prepared themselves for the war. And the Mytilenæans with the whole strength of the city made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and came to a battle: wherein though the Mytilenæans had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst trust to their strength; but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces, as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city one Meleas a Laconian and Hermiondas a Theban, who having been sent out before the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle entered the haven in a galley, and persuaded them to send another galley along with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta; which they did. 6. But the Athenians much confirmed by this the Mytilenæans' cessation, called in their confederates: (who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than was thought they would have done): and riding at anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their galleys before both the ports, and so quite excluded the Mytilenæans from the use of the sea. As for the land, the

Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much; and the Mytilenæans and other Lesbians, that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys, and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mytilene.

The Athenians send Asopius the son of Phormio, with twenty galleys about Peloponnesus. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Asopius slain.

7. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys into Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Asopius the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio, for general, into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia; and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself with twelve galleys went on to Naupactus. And afterwards having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Œniades, and both entered with his galleys into the river of Achelöus, and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the Œniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and sailed with his galleys to Leucas, and landed his soldiers of the territory of Neritum; but in going off was by those of the country that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison soldiers there, both himself and part of his company slain. And having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bodies, they went their ways.

The Mytilenæan ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon, are appointed to attend the general assembly of the Grecians at Olympia. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans, that went out in the first galley, having been referred by the Lacedæmonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end they might determine of them together with the rest of the confederates, went to Olympia accordingly. It

was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor. And when after the solemnity they were set in council, the ambassadors spake unto them in this manner:

oration of the ambassadors of mytilene.

9. “Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians. For they that take into league such as revolt in the wars and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason, when they that revolt, and they from whom the revolt is made, are mutually like–minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger. 10. For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever, without a mutual opinion of each other’s honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherwise: for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions.

Year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

“As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business. Yet we entered not such a league, as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes. And as long as they led us as equals, we

followed them with much zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes, and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct counsels unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell all but ourselves and the Chians into their subjection. And we having still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable, when they had subdued those whom together with us they took into league, but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest. 11. It is true that if we were now in liberty all, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill, to deal on equal terms with us alone, and the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals. Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues. For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. Now the reason why they have left us yet free, is no other, but that they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest; and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy, than by force. For therein they made use of us for an argument, that having equal vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars, if those against whom they led us, had not done the injury: and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by removing the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear; lest united and added to yours or to any other, it

might have created them some danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons, and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out. 12. What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this, when we received each other with alienated affections: when whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us; and when they had peace, we for fear courted them: and whereas in others good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear? So it was more for fear than love, that we remained their confederates; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or other to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly, to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them, and again to defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.

13. Upon these pretensions therefore and causes, Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we have revolted; the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright, and compel us to take some course for our own safety: which we would have done before, when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Bœotians invited us to it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free; and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not

staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the speedier aid; thereby the better, at once both to defend those you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present. For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed, and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours; it is not likely they should have many galleys spare, in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and land; but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or be forced to come off from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive, that you shall herein at your own danger defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica; but there, from whence cometh the profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates; which if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt; and all that is ours will accrue unto them; and we shall be worse handled besides, than those that were under them before. But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of; and also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates, because every one will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed. In reverence therefore of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mytilenæans into league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who (though, as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own) shall bring a common

profit to all Greece, if we prosper, and a more common detriment to all the Grecians, if through your inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men such as the Grecians esteem you, and our fears require you to be."

Year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans taken into the Lacedæmonian league. The Lacedæmonians prepare for the invasion of Attica, both by sea and land.

15. In this manner spake the Mytilenæans. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose, the Lacedæmonians appointed their confederates there present, to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in of their fruits, and weary of warfare.

The Athenians to make show of their power, and to deter the enemy from their enterprize, send 100 galleys, not so much to waste Peloponnesus, as to confute the opinion which the Lesbian ambassadors had put into the Lacedæmonians of their weakness. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

16. The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made upon an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see they were deceived, as being able, without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out a hundred galleys, and embarked therein generally, both citizens (except those of the degree of Pentacosiomedimni and Horsemen) and also strangers that dwelt amongst them: and sailing to the isthmus, made a show of their strength,

and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.

The greatness of the Athenian navy, and occasion of their great expense of money

17. About the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most galleys (besides the beauty of them) together in action in these employments; yet in the beginning of the war, they had both as good, and more in number. For a hundred attended the guard of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis; and another hundred were about Peloponnesus; besides those that were at Potidæa and other places: so that in one summer, they had in all two hundred and fifty sail. And this, together with Potidæa, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the men of arms that besieged the city, had each of them two drachmes a day, one for himself and another for his man: and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first and remained to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred more, that went with Phormio and came away before the town was won. And the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money consumed, and so many galleys employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

Year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans go with a power to Methymne, hoping to have it betrayed. The Athenians send Paches with 1000 men of arms to Mytilene. year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

18. About the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the isthmus, the Mytilenæans marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries, against Methymne, in hope to have had it betrayed unto them: and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus: and after they had settled the affairs of those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnæans likewise made war upon Antissa; but beaten by the Antisæans and some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the Mytilenæans were masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with a thousand men of arms of their own city: who, supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mytilene, and ingirt it with a single wall: save that in some places, stronger by nature than the rest, they only built turrets, and placed guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly besieged, both by sea and land; and the winter began.

The end of the fourth summer.

19. The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves, and sent thither two hundred talents of this their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and four others with twelve galleys, to levy money amongst the confederates. But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Mæander in Caria as far as to the hill Sandius, was set upon there by the Carians and Anæitans; and himself with a great part of his soldiers slain.

C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. The escape of 212 men out of Platæa, through the works of the enemy. year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. They make the length of their ladders by conjecture upon counting the lays of brick. The description

of the fortification of the Peloponnesians about Platæa. year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. The description of the Platæans going over the enemy's walls. year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

20. The same winter the Platæans, (for they were besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians), pressed now with want of victual and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out, and if they could, to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt, were Theænetus the son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas the son of Daïmachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards, by one means or other, for the greatness of the danger shrunk from it again: but two hundred and twenty or thereabouts voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner. They made them ladders, fit for the height of the enemy's wall; the wall they measured by the lays of brick, on the part toward the town where it was not plastered over; and divers men at once numbered the lays of bricks, whereof though some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just; especially, numbering them so often, and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied; and so by guess of the thickness of one brick, took the measure of their ladders. 21. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built. It consisted of a double circle, one towards Platæa, and another outward, in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen foot: and that sixteen foot of space which was betwixt them, was disposed and built into cabins for the watchmen, which were so joined and continued one to another, that the whole appeared to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower, of a just breadth to comprehend both walls, and reach from the outmost to the inmost front of the whole; so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but through

the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm of rain, they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to watch under the towers: as being not far asunder, and covered beside overhead. Such was the form of the wall wherein the Peloponnesians kept their watch. 22. The Platæans, after they were ready, and had attended a tempestuous night, and withal moonless, went out of the city; and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to the wall of the enemy, who, because it was dark, could not see them coming; and the noise they made as they went could not be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms; and were but lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot, for the more steadiness in the wet. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders, and placed them to the wall: then twelve lightly armed, only with a dagger and a breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the son of Corœbus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him, went up into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that carried the darts, for whom they that came after carried targets at their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up; which targets they were to deliver to them, when they came to the enemy. At length, when most of them were ascended, they were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers. For one of the Platæans taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, which made a noise in the fall. And presently there was an alarm; and the army ran to the wall. For in the dark and stormy night, they knew not what the danger was; and the Platæans that were left in the city, came forth withal, and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to that where their men went over. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several

places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred that were appointed to assist the watch upon all occasions of need, went without the wall and made towards the place of the clamour. They also held up the fires by which they used to make known the approach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Platæans likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy insignificant; and that the Thebans apprehending the matter otherwise than it was, might forbear to send help till their men were over and had recovered some place of safety. 23. In the meantime those Platæans, which having scaled the wall first and slain the watch were now masters of both the towers, not only guarded the passages by standing themselves in the entries, but also applying ladders from the wall to the towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot both from above and below. In the mean space, the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many ladders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite over between the towers. And ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without, and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then last of all, and with much ado, came they also down to the ditch which were in the two towers. And by this time, the three hundred that were to assist the watch, came and set upon them, and had lights with them; by which means the Platæans that were on the further brink of the ditch, discerned them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts: for standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Platæans the less discernible; insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north. And

the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had very much increased the water; which they waded through with scarce their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.

Year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

24. From the ditch the Platæans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand the temple of Juno built by Androcrates, both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way, which by Mount Cithæron and the Oak–heads led to Athens, The Platæans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythræ and Hysiæ; and having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater number. For some of them returned into the city before the rest went over; and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Platæans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Platæa passed through the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.

Salæthus a Lacedæmonian, entereth secretly into Mytilene, and confirmeth them with hope of speedy aid. year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

25. About the end of the same winter Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, was sent in a galley to Mytilene; and coming first to Pyrrha, and thence going to Mytilene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And

he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded, and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming; and that himself was sent afore, both to let them know it, and withal to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mytilenæans grew confident, and hearkened less to composition with the Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Attica the fourth time invaded. Pausanias king of Lacedæmon.

26. In the beginning of the summer, after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty–two galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mytilene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica; to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mytilene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet in minority, and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted: and this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second. For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing their corn failed, they retired again, and were dissolved according to their cities.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Salæthus arms the commons for a sally. They mutiny, and give up the town. Some of the Mytilenæans fearing the worst take sanctuary: whom Paches persuadeth to rise: year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. and sendeth them to be in custody at Tenedos.

27. The Mytilenæans in the meantime, seeing the fleet came not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this

occasion. Salæthus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city, who were before unarmed, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians. But they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates; but holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich men either to bring their corn to light and divide it amongst them all, or else, they said, they would make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians. 28. Those that managed the state perceiving this and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army with these conditions: “to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens, and to receive the army into the city; and that the Mytilenæans should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business: and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mytilenæan”. This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mytilenæans as had principally practised with the Lacedæmonians, being afraid of themselves, when the army was entered the city durst not trust to the conditions agreed on, but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa, and took in that town; and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

The voyage of Alcidas with forty galleys into Ionia. Alcidas with his fleet, at Embatus is assured of the loss of Mytilene. The advice of Teutiaplus in the council of war. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The advice of certain outlaws of Ionia and Lesbos. The cowardly resolution of Alcidas. He killeth his prisoners. The Samians sharply reprehend him. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Alcidas maketh haste from Ephesus homeward. year v. A.

C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Paches pursueth the Peloponnesians, and is glad he overtaketh them not.

29. In the meantime those forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which should have made all possible haste, trifled away the time about Peloponnesus; and making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconus, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mytilene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus in Erythræa. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mytilene, that they arrived at Embatus; where understanding the certainty, they went to council about what they were to do upon the present occasion; and Teutiaplus, an Eleian, delivered his opinion to this effect: 30. "Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are, before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded, and to the sea (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger, if we but think this: that all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which if a commander avoid in himself, and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success." 31. Thus said he; but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel, that seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume in Æolia; that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt; whereof there was

hope, because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there: and if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue, and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides, that they thought they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion, that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus. 32. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to Myonnesus of the Teians, and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus: and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anæa, and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty, to kill such as had not lift up their hands against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians, but confederates to the Athenians by constraint; and that unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends, but many now friends to become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors he set the Chians and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty. For when men saw their fleet, they never fled from it, but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia. 33. From Ephesus Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralus, (which by chance were then in their course for Athens), whilst he lay at anchor about Claros; and fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea; meaning by his good will to touch no land till he came into Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches from divers places, especially from Erythræa. For the cities of Ionia being unwalled, were afraid extremely lest the Peloponnesians sailing by, without intention to stay, should have pillaged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralus having seen him at Claros, brought the news themselves. And Paches thereupon made great

haste after, and followed him as far as Latmos the island. But when he saw he could not reach him, he came back again; and thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those galleys upon the wide sea, that the same were not compelled, by being taken in some place near land, to fortify themselves, and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

Paches restoreth Notium to the Colophonians, driven out by sedition. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Paches parleyeth with Hippias: his equivocation with Hippias, whom he put to death contrary to promise.

34. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited, after the town above, through their own sedition, was taken by Itamanes and the barbarians. (This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians). They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians and barbarians, of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and there, with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered with them, they governed the city at their pleasure: and the other part, which went out from these and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He, when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again; and Hippias was thereupon come to him: committed him to custody, but without bonds; and withal assaulting the wall on a sudden, when they expected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and barbarians as were within: and when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had promised; but after he had him there, laid hold on him and caused him to be shot to death: and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had medized. Afterwards the

Athenians sent governors to Notium of their own; and having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

Paches taketh Pyrrha, and Eressus: he apprehendeth Salæthus in Mytilene. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The Athenians slay Salæthus, though he offer to withdraw the Peloponnesians from the siege of Platæa. The cruel decree of the Athenians in their passion against the Mytilenæans. The Athenians repent of their decree, and consult anew. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Cleon most popular and most violent.

35. Paches, when he came back to Mytilene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus: and having found Salæthus the Lacedæmonian hidden in Mytilene, apprehended him, and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army; and with the rest stayed and settled the state of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought convenient. 36. These men, and Salæthus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Athenians slew Salæthus presently; though he made them many offers, and amongst other, to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from before Platæa; for it was yet besieged. But upon the rest they went to council; and in their passion decreed to put them to death, not only those men there present, but also all the men of Mytilene that were of age; and to make slaves of the women and children: laying to their charge the revolt itself, in that they revolted not being in subjection as others were: and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst enter into Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree, with command to put the Mytilenæans presently to death. But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves; and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that

not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans that were there present, and such Athenians as favoured them, understood, they wrought with those that bare office, to bring the matter again into debate; wherein they easily prevailed, forasmuch as to them also it was well known, that the most of the city were desirous to have means to consult of the same anew. The assembly being presently met, amongst the opinions of divers others Cleon also, the son of Cleænetus, who in the former assembly had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and said in this manner:

the oration of cleon. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon.

37. “I have often on other occasions thought a democracy uncapable of dominion over others; but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mytilenæans. For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in your confederates; and consider not, that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth, not to the winning of the affections of your confederates: nor do you consider, that your government is a tyranny, and those that be subject to it are against their wills so, and are plotting continually against you; and obey you not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you exceed them in strength, and for no good will. But the worst mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree shall stand firm, and that we will not know, that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws, when they be not binding; and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty, is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance; and that the more ignorant sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser. For these love to appear wiser than the laws, and in all public debatings to carry the victory,

as the worthiest things wherein to show their wisdom; from whence most commonly proceedeth the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another: and so making themselves equal judges rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part well. We therefore should do the like; and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such counsel to your multitude as in our own judgments we think not good.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon. The nature of the multitude in council, lively set forth. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of of Cleon. Aggravation of the revolt of the Mytilenæans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon.

38. “For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the Mytilenæans in question again, and thereby caused delay, which is the advantage only of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas revenge, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows presently. I do wonder also, what he is that shall stand up now to contradict me, and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the Mytilenæans are good for us, or that our calamities are any damage to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence, to make you believe that that which was decreed, was not decreed; or moved with lucre, must with some elaborate speech endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the prizes to others; but the danger that hence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words, and hearers of actions; beholding future actions in the words of them that speak well, as possible to come to pass; and actions already past in the orations of such as make the most of them,

and that with such assurance, as if what you saw with your eyes were not more certain than what you hear related. You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things usual. You would every one chiefly give the best advice, but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come after with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the contentions of sophisters, than to men that deliberate of the state of a commonwealth. 39. To put you out of this humour, I say unto you, that the Mytilenæans have done us more injury than ever did any one city. For those that have revolted through the over–hard pressure of our government, or that have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon them. But they that were islanders and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our enemies but only by sea; in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys; and they that were permitted to have their own laws and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus; what have they done but conspired against us, and rather warred upon us than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffer violence), and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing of their own power. But these men would neither take example by their neighbour’s calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us; nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery: but being bold against future events, and aiming at matters above their strength,

though below their desires, have taken arms against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the victory, but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity, it is usual to turn insolent: whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to the course of reason, is more firm than that which cometh unhoped for; and such cities, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mytilenæans than to the rest of our confederates; for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to contemn those that observe them, and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now therefore let them be punished according to their wicked dealing; and let not the fault be laid upon a few, and the people be absolved. For they have all alike taken arms against us: and the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the few, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration your confederates: and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence; seeing that speeding they win their liberty, and failing their case is not incurable? Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard, both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success, we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it; but miscarrying, we add these enemies to our former, and must spend that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed to employ against the enemies we have already.

40. “We must not therefore give our confederates hope of pardon, either impetrable by words or purchaseable by money, as if their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly, but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I maintain, that you ought not to alter your former decree, nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire, pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As for pity, it is just to show it on them that are like us, and will have pity again; but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great damage, but they for their well speaking must well have. Lastly for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter, rather than towards such, as being suffered to live, will still be as they are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do that which is both just in respect of the Mytilenæans, and profitable for yourselves: whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against reason punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good without danger. But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment; nor be less sensible, you that have escaped, than they that have conspired; especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without precedent cause, persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to; as jealous of the danger his remaining

enemy may create him: for he that is wronged without cause, and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not therefore betray ourselves, but in contemplation of what you were near suffering, and how you once prized above all things else to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the danger that hung over our own heads so lately. Give not only unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest of our confederates a clear example, that death is their sentence whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies, and fight against your own confederates."

41. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mytilenæans to death, stood forth and spake as followeth.

the oration of diodotus. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1 2. Oration of Diodotus. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus.

42. "I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mytilenæans to be again debated, nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, haste and anger: whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness, and the other with want of judgment. And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise, or doth it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future, and not apparent things, may be demonstrated otherwise than by words: interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter, and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumniation. But they of all others are most intolerable, that when men give public advice, will

accuse them also of bribery. For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance, when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place he is still suspected; and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool, but also void of honesty. The commonwealth gets no good by such courses: for through fear hereof it will want counsellors. And the state would do their business for the most part well, if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking; for they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him, but rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a wise state ought not either to add unto, or on the other side, to derogate from the honour of him that giveth good advice; nor yet punish, nay nor disgrace the man whose counsel they receive not. And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice, deliver anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further honour and to please the auditory; nor he that doth not, covet thereupon, by gratifying the people some way or other, that he also may endear them. 43. But we do here the contrary: and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy, for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth. And our custom is to hold good counsel, given suddenly, no less suspect then bad: by which means, as he that gives the most dangerous counsel, must get the same received by fraud; so also he that gives the most sound advice, is forced by lying to get himself believed. So that the commonwealth is it alone, which by reason of these suspicious imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst these jealousies do give our advice,

have need to foresee further than you, that look not far; and the rather, because we stand accountable for our counsel, and you are to render no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you, when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.

44. “For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction in the business of the Mytilenæans, nor to accuse any man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have them put to death, unless it be for our profit; [nor yet would I pardon them,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the commonwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future, rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon contendeth, that it will be profitable for the future, to put them to death, in that it will keep the rest from rebelling: I contending likewise for the future, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice for the fair pretexts of his; which agreeing more with your present anger against the Mytilenæans, may quickly perhaps win your consent. We plead not judicially with the Mytilenæans so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them, which way we may serve ourselves of them to our most advantage hereafter. 45. I say therefore, that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not so great, but far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves: nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice, which he knew he could not go through with. And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better furnished, either of

themselves or by their confederates, than it is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand. They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors. And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old, even upon the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress. And therefore either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But hope and desire work this effect in all estates. And this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprize, that suggesting the success, are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as anything else. For presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose; and specially cities, because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and amongst a generality, every one, though without reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in particular. In a word, it is a thing impossible, and of great simplicity to believe, when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing, that by force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus.

46. “We must not therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst against them, nor make them desperate, as if

there were no place to repent, and as soon as they can, to cancel their offence. For observe: if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound, whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did; and endure the siege to the very last, if to compound late and soon be all one? And how can it be but detriment to us, to be at charge of long sieges through their obstinacy, and when we have taken a city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to be exact judges in the punition of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws, but by the providence of our own actions. But we to the contrary, when we recover a city, which having been free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them. Whereas we ought rather, not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to look to it before it revolt, and to prevent the intention of it; but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can. 47. Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your cities the commonalty are now your friends, and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt: whereby when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mytilenæans, which did neither partake of the revolt, and as soon as they were armed presently delivered the city into your hands: you shall first do unjustly, to kill such as have done you service; and you shall effect a work besides, which the great men do everywhere most desire. For when

they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people presently on their side; you having foreshewn them by the example, that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas indeed though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it; to the end that the only party now our friend, may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up an injury, than justly to destroy such as we should not. And that same both justice and profit of revenge, alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together in the same thing.

48. “You therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course, not upon compassion or lenity, (for neither would I have you won by that), but upon consideration of what hath been advised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both good for the future, and also of present terror to the enemy. For he that consulteth wisely, is a sorer enemy than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.”

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The sentence of Diodotus taketh place. A galley sent out after the former, with a sentence of mercy. The speed of this latter galley to overtake the former that carried the decree of death. The commons of Mytilene very near destruction

49. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the other, the Athenians were at contention which they should decree; and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal: but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not arriving before the former they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mytilenæan ambassadors having furnished this latter with wine and barley cakes, and promised them

great rewards if they overtook the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their oars, and taking their refection of the said barley cakes steeped in wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept, and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against them; and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an errand, whereas the former proceeded in the manner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much as Paches had read the sentence, and prepared to execute what they had decreed. But presently after came in the other galley, and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the Mytilenæans to the danger.

About a thousand principal authors of the revolt executed. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

50. But those whom Paches had sent home as most culpable of the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death; being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also razed the walls of Mytilene, and took from them all their galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnæans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods. And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess it; of whom the Lesbians at the rent of two minæ of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns also, as the Mytilenæans were masters of in the continent; which were afterwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

Nicias taketh Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

51. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it, and served

themselves of the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island, as being nearer, and no more at Budorum and Salamis; to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried, nor send out pirates, as they had formerly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisæa, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes; for it was not far distant from the main land. And, that being in few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army back.

The Platæans yield the city. The Lacedæmonians refuse to take Platæa by force, but will have it by voluntary surrender. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Unjust proceedings of the Lacedæmonians.

52. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Platæans, having spent their victual and being unable longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but they within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Lacedæmonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force; (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedæmon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians, with conditions of mutual restitution of such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Platæa, as having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable); but sent a herald to them, who demanded whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald: and they (for

they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Platæans food for certain days, till the judges, which were five, should arrive from Lacedæmon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited; but calling them man by man, they asked of every one only this question: whether they had done to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this war any good service. But the Platæans having sued to make their answer more at large, and having appointed Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus (who had been heretofore the host of the Lacedæmonians) for their speakers, said as followeth:

the oration of the platæans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Platæans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Platæans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Platæans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Platæans.

53. “Men of Lacedæmon, relying upon you we yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal manner of proceeding; and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others, (as now we do), but of yourselves only; conceiving we should so obtain the better justice. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you the judges partial: gathering so much both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer; and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such, as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves, and be easily convinced, if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to try what we can obtain by pleading. For, for men in our case, the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side. For if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony in

things you knew not. Whereas now, all that we shall say, will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear, not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves, to make that a crime; but lest you bring us to a judgment already judged, to gratify somebody else. 54. Nevertheless, we will produce our reasons of equity against the quarrel of the Thebans, and withal make mention of our services done both to you and to the rest of Greece; and make trial, if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory, whether we have any way done good in this present war to the Lacedæmonians aud their confederates, or not: if you ask us as enemies, we say, that if we have done them no good, we have also done them no wrong: if you ask us as friends, then we say, that they rather have done us the injury, in that they made war upon us. But in the time of the peace, and in the war against the Medes, we behaved ourselves well: for the one we brake not first, and in the other, we were the only Bœotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece. For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at Artemisium; and in the battle fought in this our own territory, we were with you; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength. And unto you, Lacedæmonians, in particular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the Helotes and seizing of Ithome, we sent the third part of our power to assist you; which you have no reason to forget. 55. Such then we showed ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is true, we have been your enemies since; but for that, you are to blame yourselves. For when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us; and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off. Nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor were to have suffered at our hands any thing that misbecame us. And if we denied to revolt from the Athenians when you bade us, we did you no injury in it. For they both aided us against

the Thebans, when you shrunk from us; and it was now no more any honesty to betray them; especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought their league, and being made denizens also of their city. Nay, we ought rather to have followed them in all their commands with alacrity. When you or the Athenians have the leading of the confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable, but you that lead to the evil.

56. “The Thebans have done us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon the day of our novilunial sacrifice, had surprised our city; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing enemy; and therefore there is no reason you should punish us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by your and their present benefit in the war, it will manifestly appear, that you are not judges of the truth, but respecters only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more profitable to you then, when you were in greater danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side, when you invade others; yet at that time when the barbarian came in to impose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that with our present offence (if we have committed any) you compare our forwardness then; which you will find both greater than our fault, and augmented also by the circumstance of such a season, when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes’ power; and when they were most commended, not that with safety helped to further his invasion, but that adventured to do what was most honest, though with danger. But we being of that number, and honoured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction; as having

chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But you should ever have the same opinion in the same case; and think this only to be profitable, that doing what is useful for the present occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue of your good confederates. 57. Consider also, that you are an example of honest dealing to the most of the Grecians. Now if you shall decree otherwise than is just, (for this judgment of yours is conspicuous, you that be praised, against us that be not blamed), take heed that they do not dislike that good men should undergo an unjust sentence, though at the hands of better men; or that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service, should be dedicated in their temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter, that Platæa should be destroyed by Lacedæmonians; and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi, should now blot it out of all Greece, to gratify the Thebans. For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes had prevailed, we must have perished then; and now the Thebans have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest friends; and have put us to two great hazards, one before, of famishing if we yielded not, and another now, of a capital sentence. And we Platæans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned and left unrelieved by them all. 58. But we beseech you for those gods' sakes, in whose names once we made mutual league, and for our valour's sake shown in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us; and, if at the persuasion of the Thebans you have determined aught against us, to change your minds, and reciprocally to require at the hands of the Thebans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest benefit in recompense of a wicked one; and not to bestow pleasure upon others, and receive wickedness upon yourselves in exchange. For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet

to make the infamy of it cease will be work enough. For being none of your enemies, but well–willers, and such as have entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our persons; and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and with hands upheld, (and it is the law among Grecians, not to put such to death), besides that we have from time to time been beneficial to you. For look upon the sepulchres of your fathers, whom, slain by the Medes and buried in this territory of ours, we have yearly honoured at the public charge both with vestments and other rites, and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land, and confederates, use to do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by a wrong sentence, you shall do the contrary of this. For consider this. Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground, and amongst their friends. But you, if you slay us, and of Platæis make Thebais, what do you but leave your fathers and kindred, deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover, put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty? And make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes? And destroy the patrial sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Platæans.

“These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedæmon; nor to violate the common institutions of Greece and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service for the hatred of another, when you have received no injury from us yourselves: but to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion, in contemplation not only of the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that must suffer, and of the

uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly. Which we, as becometh us and our need compelleth us to do, cry aloud unto the common gods of Greece to persuade you unto; producing the oath sworn by your fathers, to put you in mind; and also we become here sanctuary men at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out upon the dead, not to suffer themselves to be in the power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies; remembering them of that day, upon which though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking, (which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after), for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans that we rendered our city, (for we would rather have died of famine, the most base perdition of all other), but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in, and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also we require you, men of Lacedæmon, not only not to deliver us Platæans, who have been most zealous in the service of the Grecians, especially being sanctuary men, out of your own hands and your own trust into the hands of our most mortal enemies the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians."

Thus spake the Platæans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedæmonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said, that since the Platæans had had the liberty of a longer speech, (which they thought they should not), than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to speak; and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:

the oration of the thebans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans.

“If these men had answered briefly to the question, and not both turned against us with an accusation, and also out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged, made much apology and commendation of themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak. But as it is, we are to the one point to answer, and to confute the other, that neither the fault of us, nor their own reputation may do them good; but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this; that when we had built Platæa last of all the cities of Bœotia, together with some other places which, having driven out the promiscuous nations, we had then in our dominion, they would not (as was ordained at first) allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of all the Bœotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country, when they should have been compelled to their duty they turned unto the Athenians, and together with them did us many evils; for which they likewise suffered as many from us. 62. But when the barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Bœotians only also medized not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves, and most detract from us. Now we confess they medized not; because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless, when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Bœotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration withal, what form of government we were in both the one and the other, when we did this. For then had we our city governed, neither by an oligarchy with laws common to all, nor by a democracy; but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under and furthered the coming in of the barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it deserve to be upbraided

with what it did when they had no laws [but were at the will of others]. But when the Medes were gone and our city had laws, consider now, when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had gotten many places already, whether by giving them battle at Coroneia and defeating them, we delivered not Bœotia from servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest, and find not more horses and more provision of war than any of the confederates besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our medizing.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans.

"And we will endeavour to prove now, that the Grecians have been rather wronged by you, and that you are more worthy of all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens, for to be righted against us. Against us then only the Athenians should have come with you, and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest; especially when if the Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you had the league of the Lacedæmonians made with you against the Medes, which you so often object, to have resorted unto; which was sufficient not only to have protected you from us, but, which is the main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you rather chose to follow the Athenians. And you say, it had been a dishonest thing to have betrayed your benefactors. But it is more dishonest, and more unjust by far, to betray the Grecians universally, to whom you have sworn, than to betray the Athenians alone; especially when these go about to deliver Greece from subjection, and the other to subdue it. Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable, nor free from dishonesty. For you, as you say yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you against injuries; and

you cooperate with them in injuring others. And howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited, as to make such a requital, as though justly due cannot be justly done. 64. But you have made it apparent, that even then it was not for the Grecians' sake that you alone of all the Bœotians medized not, but because the Athenians did not; yet now you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the Grecians did, claim favour of these, for what you did for the others' sake. But there is no reason for that: but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you in this trial. And produce not the oath of the former league, as if that should save you now. For you have relinquished it: and contrary to the same, have rather helped the Athenians to subdue the Æginetæ and others, than hindered them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily, and having laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it, as there did us; but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the shutting up of your city, to quietness and neutrality. Who can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general, than you, that pretend honesty to their ruin? And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be none of yours, and made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary medizing, and your voluntary atticizing.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Thebans.

"And for this last injury you charge us with, namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace and of your new–moon sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we had done unjustly, if we had assaulted your city or wasted your territory as enemies, of our own accord; yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to discharge you

of foreign league, and conform you to the common institutions of all Bœotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress, rather than they that follow. But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates and took us into the city as friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill–affected from being worse, and to do right to the good: taking upon them to be moderators of your councils; and not to deprive the city of your persons, but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your kindred; and not to engage you in hostility with any, but to settle you in peace with all. 66. And for an argument that we did not this as enemies; we did harm to no man, but proclaimed, that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the common form of all Bœotia, he should come to us. And you came willingly at first, and were quiet. But afterwards, when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit to do without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate nothing in fact, and then with words persuade us to go forth again; but contrary to the composition, assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much; for they suffered by a kind of law. But to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this a horrible cruelty? You committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of another; first the breach of the composition, then the death that followed of our men, and thirdly the falsifying of your promise to save them, if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in the fields. And yet you say that we are the transgressors; and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. But it is otherwise. And if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your crimes at once.

67. “We have herein, men of Lacedæmon, been thus large both for your sakes and ours: for yours, to let you see, that if you condemn them, it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better appear. Be not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had; which though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their offence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion, when they cry out upon your fathers’ sepulchres and their own want of friends. For we on the other side affirm, that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them: and their fathers, partly slain at Coroneia in bringing Bœotia to your confederation, and partly alive and now old and deprived of their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly; but on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends, they may thank themselves. For of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law hath been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully rather than judicially; in which point we shall now come short of requiting them: for they shall suffer legally, and not, as they say they do, with hands upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon trial by consent. Maintain therefore, ye Lacedæmonians, the law of the Grecians against these men that have transgressed it; and give unto us, that have suffered contrary to the law, the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you; but set up an example to the Grecians, by presenting [unto these men] a trial, not of words, but of facts; which, if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, compt orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority, as you have now, would collect the matter to a head, and according as any man should make answer

thereunto, so proceed to sentence, men would be less in the search of fair speeches, wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions."

The Lacedæmonians proceed with their question. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The Platæans are put to death: twenty–five Athenians slain with them. Platæa pulled down. The Lacedæmonians in their sentence upon the Platæans have more respect to their own profit, than to the merit of the cause. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

68. Thus spake the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand well, namely, whether they had received any benefit by them or not, in this present war: for they had indeed intreated them both at other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Medan war, to stand neutral; and also a little before the siege the Platæans had rejected their proposition, of being common friends to both sides according to the same league: taking themselves, in respect of these their just offers, to be now discharged of the league, and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth, and having asked them again the same question, whether they had any way benefited the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this present war or not; as they answered Not, led them aside and slew them, not exempting any. Of the Platæans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; of the Athenians who were besieged with them, twenty–five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for a habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own, and to all those Platæans which, living, were of the Theban faction. But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foundation, they built a hospital in the place, near the temple of Juno, of two hundred foot diameter, with chambers on every side in circle both above and below; using therein the roofs and doors of the Platæans' buildings. And of the rest of the stuff that was in the city–wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads, and

dedicated them to Juno; to whom also they built a stone chapel of a hundred foot over. The land they confiscated, and set it to farm afterwards for ten years to the Thebans. So far were the Lacedæmonians alienated from the Platæans, especially, or rather altogether for the Thebans' sake, whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Platæa, in the fourscore and thirteenth year after their league made with the Athenians.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The 40 galleys, with Alcidas, come weather–beaten home.

69. The forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which having been sent to aid the Lesbians fled, as hath been related, through the wide sea, chased by the Athenians and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed into Peloponnesus: and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the haven of Cyllene, with Brasidas the son of Tellis, come hither to be of council with Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined with their fleet augmented to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition; (there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus); to the end they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

The sedition of Corcyra occasioned by the captives that come from Corinth: who persuade the renouncing of their league with Athens. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Peithias, one of the Athenian faction, accused and absolved, accuseth some of the other faction. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Peithias and others slain in the senate. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

70. The sedition in Corcyra began upon the coming home of those captives, which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus, and released afterwards by the Corinthians, at the ransom, as was voiced, of eighty talents, for which they had given security to their hosts; but in fact, for that

they had persuaded the Corinthians, that they would put Corcyra into their power. These men going from man to man, solicited the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyræans upon audience of them both, decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates on articles agreed on; but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host of the Athenians, and that had been principal magistrate of the people. Him these men called into judgment, and laid to his charge a practice to bring the city into the servitude of the Athenians. He again, being acquit, called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men, saying, they had cut certain stakes in the ground belonging to the temples both of Jupiter and of Alcinus; upon every of which there lay a penalty of a stater. And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples, to the end, the sum being great, they might pay it by portions [as they should be taxed]. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the senate, and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest, and armed with daggers suddenly brake into the senate–house, and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty persons; only a few of those of Peithias his faction, escaped in the Athenian galley that lay yet in the harbour. 71. When they had done this, and called the Corcyræans to an assembly, they told them, that what they had done was for the best, and that they should not be now in bondage to the Athenians: and for the future they advised them to be in quiet, and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once, and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly. They also presently

sent ambassadors to Athens, both to show that it was fit for them to do what they had done, and also to dissuade such Corcyræans as were fled thither of the other faction, from doing any thing to their prejudice, for fear the matter should fall into a relapse.

The Lacedæmonian faction assail the commons The commons overcome the oligarchicals. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

72. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those Corcyræans whom they had there prevailed with; and sent them to custody in Ægina. In the meantime, upon the coming in of a galley of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedæmon, those that managed the state assailed the commons, and overcame them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled into the citadel and the higher parts of the city; where they rallied themselves and encamped, and made themselves masters of the haven called the Hillaique haven. But the nobility seized on the marketplace, (where also the most of them dwelt), and on the haven on the side toward the continent. 73. The next day they skirmished a little with shot; and both parts sent abroad into the villages to solicit the slaves with promise of liberty, to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons; and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent. 74. The next day but one they fought again, and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of places and in number of men. And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult even beyond the condition of their sex. The few began to fly about twilight, and fearing lest the people should even with their shout take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire on the houses in circle about the market–place and upon others near it. Much goods of merchants was hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had

been in danger to have been destroyed. When the people had gotten the victory, the Corinthian galley stole away; and most of the auxiliaries gat over privily into the continent.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

75. The next day Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian men of arms from Naupactus; and both negociated a reconciliation, and induced them (to the end they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition, (who presently fled), and to let the rest alone, with articles both between themselves and with the Athenians, to esteem friends and enemies the same the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone; but the people persuaded him before he went, to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyræans and send with him. To this he agreed; and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies. But these, fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux. But Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them, and spake to them to put them into courage. But when he could not prevail, the people, arming themselves, on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention, took away their arms out of their houses; and would also have killed some of them such as they chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hindered them. Others also when they saw this, took sanctuary in the temple of Juno; and they were in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise: and conveying them into the island that lieth over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.

Alcidas and the Peloponnesians arrive and fight at sea against the Corcyræans. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

76. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after the putting over of these men into the island arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage of Ionia they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty sail. Alcidas had the command of these, as before; and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came on the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra. 77. The Corcyræans, being in great tumult and fear both of the seditious within and of the invasion without, made ready threescore galleys; and still as any of them were manned, sent them out against the enemy: whereas the Athenians had advised them to give leave to them to go forth first, and then the Corcyræans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned to the enemy; and in others, they that were aboard were together by the ears amongst themselves: and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyræans with twenty galleys only; the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salaminia and the Paralus were two. 78. The Corcyræans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were on their part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number, and doubting to be environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick, nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst, but charged one end of them, and drowned one of their galleys. And when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it, endeavouring to put them into disorder. Which they that were fighting against the Corcyræans perceiving, and fearing such another chance as befel them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid; and uniting themselves, came upon the

Athenians all together. But they retiring rowed astern, intending that the Corcyræans should take that time to escape in; they themselves in the meantime going as leisurely back as was possible, and keeping the enemy still a–head. Such was this battle, and it ended about sunset.

Alcidas a coward

79. The Corcyræans, fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory should have come directly against the city, or take aboard the men which they had put over into the island, or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men into the temple of Juno again, and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet durst not invade the city; but having taken thirteen of the Corcyræan galleys, went back into the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not unto the city, no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright, and though also Brasidas (as it is reported) advised Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority; but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna, and wasted their territory.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Threescore sail of Athenians come to aid the Corcyræan commons. The Peloponnesians depart with their fleet. The people, upon the coming in of the Athenians, most cruelly put to death whomsoever they can of the contrary faction. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Description of the behaviour of the people in this sedition. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The manners of the seditious. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

80. In the meantime the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those in sanctuary and with the rest, about how the city might be preserved, but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition they manned thirty galleys, in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered. But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting of their fields till it was about noon, went their ways again. Within night the Corcyræans had notice by fires of threescore Athenian galleys coming toward them

from Leucas; which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them, under the conduct of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. 81. The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, keeping still the shore, and causing their galleys to be carried over at the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not come in sight as they went about. But the people of Corcyra hearing of the Attic galleys coming in, and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those Messenians which before were without, and appointing the galleys which they had furnished, to come about into the Hillaique haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on; and also afterwards threw overboard, out of the same galleys, all those they had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence. And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary, to refer themselves to a legal trial; all which they condemned to die. But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those that were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done, killed one another there–right in the temple; some hanged themselves on trees, every one as he had means made himself away. And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty galleys, the Corcyræans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be their enemies; laying to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government. Amongst whom, some were slain upon private hatred, and some by their debtors, for the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen; and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened at any time, happened also then, and more. For the father slew his son; men were dragged out of the temples, and then slain hard by; and some immured in the temple of Bacchus, died within it. So cruel was this sedition; and seemed so the more, because it was of these the first. 82. For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion;

and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to bring in the Lacedæmonians. Now in time of peace, they could have had no pretence, nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war, and confederates to be had for either party, both to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration easily got them to come in. And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before, and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same, yet they are more calm, and of different kinds, according to the several conjunctures. For in peace and prosperity, as well cities as private men are better minded, because they be not plunged into necessity of doing any thing against their will. But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master, and conformeth most men's passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore being now in sedition, and those that fell into it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true–hearted manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re–advise for the better security, was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce, was always trusty; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he. But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, was

commended. To be kin to another, was not to be so near as to be of his society: because these were ready to undertake any thing, and not to dispute it. For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit, but for rapine, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law, as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions, to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconcilement, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power; but upon opportunity, he that first durst thought his revenge sweeter by the trust, than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course, but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able, than simple men honest: and men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride in the other.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

The cause of all this is desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition; and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one the political equality of the multitude, the other the moderate aristocracy; though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention: and striving by whatsoever means to overcome, both ventured on most horrible outrages, and prosecuted their revenges still farther, without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite: and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence, or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that

neither side made account to have any thing the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended, that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions; partly because they would not side with them, and partly for envy that they should so escape.

In seditions and confusion, they that distrust their wits, suddenly use their hands, and defeat the stratagems of the more subtle sort.

83. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down: and it was far the best course, to stand diffidently against each other, with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all of them, the more they considered, the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success: for both their own defect, and the subtlety of their adversaries, putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in pre–insidiation, by their enemies' great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them with deeds. Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived, and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain.

Year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

84. In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first; and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed with pride rather than modesty by those on whom they take revenge, were like to commit in taking it; or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty, out of covetousness, chiefly to have their neighbours' goods, would contrary to justice give their voices to: or which men, not for

covetousness, but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above the law, showed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence, nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for the laws common to all men in such cases, (which, as long as they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury), men desire not to leave them standing against the need a man in danger may have of them, but by their revenges on others to be beforehand in subverting them.

The Athenian fleet goes away. Five hundred of the nobility that escaped, seize on such places as belonged to the Corcyræans in the continent. They come over and fortify themselves in Istone. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

85. Such were the passions of the Corcyræans, first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city: and Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards, such of the Corcyræans as had fled, (for there escaped about five hundred of them), having seized on the forts in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the other side, and from thence came over and robbed the islanders and did them much hurt; and there grew a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth, concerning their reduction; and when they could get nothing done, having gotten boats and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed, awhile after, to the number of about six hundred into the island. Where when they had set fire on their boats, that they might trust to nothing but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up into the hill Istone; and having there fortified themselves with a wall, infested those within, and were masters of the territory.

C. 427. Ol. 88. 2. The Athenians send twenty galleys into Sicily, in pretence to aid the Leontines, but with intention to hinder the coming of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and to spy out the possibility of subduing that island. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2. The end of the fifth summer.

86. In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty galleys into Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charœadas the son of Euphiletus: for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities, except the Camarinæans; which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedæmonians, but had not yet aided them in the war. The confederates of the Leontines, were the Chalcidique cities together with Camarina. And in Italy, the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also for that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys; for that the Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity, but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and also to test the possibility of taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving at Rhegium in Italy, joined with the confederates and began the war. And so ended this summer.

The plague again at Athens.

88. The next winter, the sickness fell upon the Athenians again, (having indeed never totally left the city, though there was some intermission); and continued above a year after; but the former lasted two years: insomuch as nothing afflicted the Athenians, or impaired their strength more than it. For the number that died of it, of men of arms enrolled were no less than four

thousand four hundred; and horsemen, three hundred; of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and Eubœa, and also amongst the Bœotians; and in Bœotia, chiefly at Orchomenus.

The Athenians invade the Liparæans, and islands called the isles of Æolus. year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2.

88. The Athenians and Rhegians that were now in Sicily, made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Æolus, with thirty galleys. For in summer, it was impossible to war upon them for the shallowness of the water. These islands are inhabited by the Liparæans, who are a colony of the Cnidians, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara; and thence they go forth and husband the rest, which are Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion, that in Hiera Vulcan exerciseth the craft of a smith. For it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the day time, and of smoke in the night. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi and Messanians, but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come in, they put off again and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter, and the fifth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88.2. 3. Earthquakes about Eubœa, and inundations. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The natural cause of inundations given by the author.

89. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, intending to have invaded Attica; but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time, (Eubœa being then troubled with earthquakes), the sea came in at Orobiæ on the part which then was land, and being impetuous withal,

overflowed most part of the city, whereof part it covered, and part it washed down, and made lower in the return; so that it is now sea which before was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta, on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians' fort there; and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising of the water, but it brake not in: and a part of the wall, the town–house, and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the earthquakes. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that the earthquake, where it was very great, did there send off the sea; and the sea returning on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake such an accident could never happen.

90. The same summer divers others, as they had several occasions, made war in Sicily: so also did the Sicilians amongst themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things, as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians, or against the Athenians by the enemy.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The Athenians win Mylæ. and Messana.

Charœades the Athenian general being slain by the Syracusians, Laches, who was now sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates made war on Mylæ, a town belonging to Messana. There were in Mylæ two companies of Messanians in garrison, the which also laid a certain ambush for those that came up from the fleet. But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush, with the slaughter of the most of them; and also assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to render the citadel, and to go along with them against Messana. After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their

confederates, the Messanians compounded likewise; and gave them hostages, and such other security as was requisite.

The Athenians send Demosthenes with thirty galleys about Peloponnesus: and Nicias with sixty galleys into the island of Melos. The army of Nicias, and another army from the city of Athens, meet upon a sign given at Tanagra in Bœotia. They overcome the Tanagrians in battle. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

91. The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alkisthenes, and Proclus the son of Theodorus; and sixty galleys more with two thousand men of arms, commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus, into Melos. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians were islanders, and yet would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to subdue them. But when upon the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus in the opposite continent. Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys, and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Bœotia. To which place, upon a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city of Athens came also forth with their whole forces, led by Hipponnicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, and joined with them; and pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and lay there the night following. The next day, they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians as came out against them, and also certain succours sent them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain and erected a trophy, they returned back; the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris and wasted it, came home likewise.

The Lacedæmonians build the city Heracleia. The commodious seat of this new city for the war. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

92. About the same time, the Peloponnesians erected the colony of Heracleia in Trachinia, with this intention. The Melians in the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, Hierans, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians being afflicted with war from the Œtæans their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful unto them, they sent to Lacedæmon; choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother nation to the Lacedæmonians, sent their ambassadors likewise with him with the same requests: for they also were infested with war from the same Œtæans. Upon audience of these ambassadors the Lacedæmonians concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians; and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the Athenians; inasmuch as they might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but short, against Eubœa; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place.

First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi. And the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants thither, both of their own people and of the neighbours about them; and gave leave also to any that would, to go thither, out of the rest of Greece, save only to the Ionians, Achæans, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedæmonians; Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Who taking it in hand, built the city which is now called Heracleia, from the very foundation; being distant from Thermopylæ forty furlongs, and from the sea twenty. Also they made houses for galleys to lie under, beginning close to Thermopylæ against the very strait, to the end to have them the more defensible.

The Thessalians infest the new city with continual war, for fear they should be too great. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The severity of of the

Lacedæmonian government dispeopled the city of Heracleia, and frightened men from it. The Lacedæmonians always severe, not always just.

93. The Athenians, when this city was peopled, were at first afraid, and thought it to be set up especially against Eubœa; because from thence to Cenæum, a promontory of Eubœa, the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined; for they had no great harm by it: the reason whereof was this. That the Thessalians who had the towns of those parts in their power, and upon whose ground it was built, afflicted these new planters with a continual war, till they had worn them out: though they were many indeed in the beginning. For being the foundation of the Lacedæmonians, every one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one. And chiefly the governors themselves sent hither from Lacedæmon, undid the business, and dispeopled the city by frighting most men away; for that they governed severely, and sometimes also unjustly: by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

Demosthenes warreth on Leucas. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. Demosthenes invadeth Ætolia at the persuasion of the Messenians. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The ambition of Demosthenes the chief cause of his unfortunate enterprise in Ætolia. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garrison–soldiers in Ellomenus, a place of Leucadia, by ambushment. But afterwards with a greater fleet, and with the whole power of the Acarnanians; who followed the army, all (but the Œniades) that could bear arms; and with the Zacynthians, and Cephalonians, and fifteen galleys of the Corcyræans, made war against the city itself of Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted by them, both without the isthmus and within, where the city of Leucas standeth and the temple of Apollo; yet they durst not stir, because the

number of the enemy was so great. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expugned by a siege, and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so great an army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Ætolians; principally, as being enemies to Naupactus: and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged, that though the nation of the Ætolians were great and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages unwalled, and those at great distances; and were but light–armed, and might therefore, with no great difficulty, be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after them the Eurytanians; (which are the greatest part of Ætolia, of a most strange language, and that are reported to eat raw flesh); for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow. 95. But he, induced by the Messenians, whom he favoured, but especially because he thought, without the forces of the people of Athens, with the confederates only of the continent and with the Ætolians to invade Bœotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolæ, and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand till the descent thereof into the territory of the Phoceans; which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be forced; and upon the Phoceans bordereth Bœotia: putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed unto Solium by the shore. And there having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of it because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephalonians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenians the soldiers of his own fleet, (for

the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away) warred on the Ætolians; having Œneon, a city of Locris, for the seat of his war. Now these Locrians called Ozolæ, were confederates of the Athenians; and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For being confiners on the Ætolians, and using the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be a matter of great utility in the war to have them in their army; for that they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the country.

Hesiod the poet said to have died in this temple of Jupiter Nemeius. The Ætolians unite against the invasion of Demosthenes.

96. Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter Nemeius, (wherein the poet Hesiodus is reported by them that dwell thereabout to have died, foretold by an oracle, that he should die in Nemea), in the morning betimes he dislodged, and marched into Ætolia. The first day he took Potidania; the second day, Crocyleium; the third, Teichium. There he stayed, and sent the booty he had gotten to Eupalium in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards (if they submitted not) in his return to Naupactus. But the Ætolians knew of this preparation when it was first resolved on. And afterwards, when the army was entered, they were united into a mighty army to make head: insomuch as that the farthest off of the Ophionians, that reach out to the Melian Gulf, the Bomians and Callians, came in with their aids.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The Ætolians give Demosthenes a great overthrow.

97. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that they had done before; and alleging that the conquest of the Ætolians would be but easy, willed him to march with all speed against them, village after village, and not to stay till they were all united and in order of battle against him,

but to attempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded by them and confident of his fortune, because nothing had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that should have come in with their aids, (for his greatest want was of darters light–armed), marched to Ægitium: which approaching he won by force, the men having fled secretly out, and encamped themselves on the hills above it: for it stood in a mountainous place, and about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Ætolians (for by this time they were come with their forces to Ægitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates; and running down upon them, some one way and some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight, for a good while, was nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians had the worst in both.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. Demosthenes afraid to come home.

98. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows, and were able to use them, (for the Ætolians, by reason they were not armed, were put back still with the shot), they held out. But when upon the death of their captain the archers were dispersed, and the rest were also wearied, having a long time continued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Ætolians continually afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at length to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue, and into places they were not acquainted withal, were destroyed. For Chromon a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Ætolians pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them quickly whilst they fled, being swift of foot and without armour. But the most of them missing their way and entering into a wood which had no passage through, the Ætolians set it on fire and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained, with much

ado got to the sea and to Œneon, a city of Locris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men: these men of the very best died in this war. Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Ætolians under truce, and were gotten again to Naupactus, they returned with the fleet to Athens. But they left Demosthenes about Naupactus and those parts; because he was afraid of the Athenian people for the loss that had happened.

The Athenian fleet in Sicily sail to Locris and take Peripolium.

99. About the same time, the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily, sailed unto Locris, and landing overcame such as made head; and took in Peripolium, situate on the river Halex.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The Ætolians and Peloponnesians make a journey against Naupactus.

100. The same summer, the Ætolians having sent their ambassadors, Tolophus an Ophionian, Boryades an Eurytanian, and Tisander an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus: for that it harboured the Athenians against them. And the Lacedæmonians, towards the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heracleia, the new–built city of Trachinia. The general of the army was Eurylochus a Spartan; with whom Macarius and Menedæus went also along, Spartans likewise. 101. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolæ, both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians, the Amphissians co–operated with him most, as standing most in fear for the enmity of the Phoceans. And they first giving hostages, induced others who likewise were afraid of the coming in

of the army, to do the like: the Myoneans first, being their neighbours; for this way is Locris of most difficult access: then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Œantheans. All these went with them to the war. The Olpæans gave them hostages, but followed not the army. But the Hyæans would give them no hostages, till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. Demosthenes relieveth Naupactus. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The end of the sixth summer.

102. When every thing was ready, and he had sent the hostages away to Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched, he took Œneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium; because they refused to yield unto him. When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the *Æ*tolians being there already to join with them, they wasted the fields about; and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycreium, a colony of the Corinthians, but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes the Athenian, (for ever since the *Æ*tolian business he abode about Naupactus), having been pre–advertised of this army and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians, and with much ado, because of his departure from before Leucas, persuaded them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys a thousand men of arms. Which entering, were the preservation of the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make them good. Eurylochus and those that were with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence, not into Peloponnesus, but to *Æ*olis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron and other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in *Æ*tolia. For the Ambraciotes coming to them, persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the

enterprise against Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania; saying withal, that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the league of the Lacedæmonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assented; and dismissing the Ætolians lay quiet in those parts with his army, till such time as the Ambraciotes being come with their forces before Argos he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.

C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenians in Sicily assault Nessa.

103. The Athenians that were in Sicily, in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league, and as many of the Siculi, as having obeyed the Syracusans by force, or being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa, a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusans. And they assaulted the same; but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat, the Syracusans that were in the citadel, sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians; and charging, put a part of the army to flight, and killed not a few. After this, Laches and the Athenians landed some time at Locris; and overcame in battle by the river Caicinus about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus the son of Capaton came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

Delos hallowed. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. An edict, that none should be suffered to be born or die in Delos. Rheneia an island, tied to Delos with a chain, and dedicated to Apollo of Delos. The Athenians institute the quinquennial games at Delos.

104. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before; not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple. But now they hallowed it all over in this manner. They took away all sepulchres whatsoever of such as had died there before; and for the future, made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor

any woman to bring forth child in the island; but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other] they should be carried over into Rheneia. This Rheneia is so little a way distant from Delos, that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rheneia dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with a chain. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the keeping, every fifth year, of the Delian games.

There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about. For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus. There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities did severally set forth dances. Which things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:

But thou, Apollo, takest most delight
In Delos. There assemble in thy sight
The long–coat Ions, with their children dear
And venerable bedfellows; and there
In matches set of buffets, song, and dance,
Both show thee pastime and thy name advance.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

That there were also matches of music, and that men resorted thither to contend therein, he again maketh manifest in these verses of the same hymn. For after he hath spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he endeth their praise with these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of himself:

But well: let Phœbus and Diana be
Propitious; and farewell you, each one.

But yet remember me when I am gone:
And if of earthly men you chance to see
Any toil'd pilgrim, that shall ask you, Who,
O damsels, is the man that living here
Was sweet'st in song, and that most had your ear?
Then all, with a joint murmur, thereunto
Make answer thus: A man deprived of seeing;
In the isle of sandy Chios is his being.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time, have continued still to send dancers along with their sacrificers; but the games and things of that kind were worn out, as is likely, by adversity: till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added the horse race, which was not before.

The Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians make war against the Acarnanians and Amphilochians unfortunately. They take Olpæ. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Acarnanians make Demosthenes their general. The Ambraciotes at Olpæ send to the Ambraciotes at home, to come to their aid. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. Demosthenes chosen general. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The battle between the Ambraciotes and Acarnanians. The Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians fly. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

105. The same winter the Ambraciotes, according to their promise made to Eurylochus when they retained his army, made war upon Argos in Amphilochia with three thousand men of arms: and invading Argeia they took Olpæ, a strong fort on a hill by the sea–side, which the Acarnanians had fortified and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of

justice, and is distant from the city of Argos, which stands also on the sea–side, about twenty–five furlongs. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos; and with the rest they encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is called Crenæ, to watch the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, that they might not pass through to the Ambraciotes without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Ætolians, to come to them and be their general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys, that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciotes that were at Olpæ sent a messenger to the city of Ambracia, willing them to come to their aid with their whole power; as fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to fight alone, or else have an unsafe retreat. 106. But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon as they understood that the Ambraciotes were come to Olpæ, dislodging from Proschion went with all speed to assist them: and passing over the river Achelöus, marched through Acarnania, which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now disfurnished. On their right hand they had the city of Stratus, and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phytia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon; then through Limnæa; then they went into the territory of the Agræans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends: and getting to the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it, and came down into Argeia when it was now night; and passing between the city of the Argives and the Arcarnanians that kept watch at [the] Wells, came unseen and joined with the Ambraciotes at Olpæ. 107. When they were altogether, they sat down about break of day at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And the Athenians not long after

with their twenty galleys arrived in the Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives: to whom also came Demosthenes, with two hundred Messenian men of arms and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea, before the hill upon which the fort of Olpæ standeth. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilochians (for the greatest part of them the Ambraciotes kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle; and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for general of the whole league. He, when he had brought them up near unto Olpæ, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow. And for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for the battle. The army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater; but Demosthenes, fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow way and fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred; which, in that part where the number of the enemies overreached, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush and charge them on their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes, with the Messenians and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians (as they could one after another be put in order) and those Amphilochian darters which were present, made up the other. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes were ranged promiscuously, except only the Mantineans, who stood together most of them in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it; for Eurylochus and those that were with him made the extremity of the left wing, against Demosthenes and the Messenians. 108. When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with that wing overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming in at their backs, charged them and put them to flight: in such sort as they endured not the first brunt; and

besides, caused the greatest part of the army through affright to run away. For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus, which was the best of their army, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes, pursuing them, dispatched the greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciotes that were in the right wing, on that part had the victory, and chased the enemy unto the city of Argos. But in their retreat, when they saw that the greatest part of the army was vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpæ in safety. And many of them were slain, whilst they ran into it out of array and in disorder; save only the Mantineans: for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

Demosthenes suffereth the principal Peloponnesians to retire from Olpæ secretly; to disguard the Ambraciotes of their aid, and procure the Peloponnesians the hatred of the nations thereabouts. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

109. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain) taking the command upon him, and not finding how, if he stayed, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land and also with those Attic galleys by sea, or if he should depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure and for the receiving of the bodies of the slain. And they delivered unto them their dead; and having erected a trophy took up their own dead, which were about three hundred. But for their departure they would make no truce openly [nor] to all: but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow–commanders made a truce with the Mantineans, and with Menedaius and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as

they could; with purpose to disguard the Ambraciotes and multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those parts, as men that had treacherously advanced their particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as they could; and such as had leave, consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

Demosthenes sendeth part of his army to lie in ambush by the ways by which the Ambraciote supplies were to come from the city.

110. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciotes from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent to them before from Olpæ [which was that they should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their aid], were already on their march (ignorant of what had passed here) to join with those at Olpæ. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth, to beset the ways with ambushment, and to pre–occupate all places of strength; and prepared withal to encounter with the rest of his army.

The Mantineans retire from Olpæ. The Ambraciotes go after them, and are slain to the number of two hundred. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The rest escape to Salynthius, king of the Agræans.

111. In the meantime, the Mantineans and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather potherbs and firewood, stole away by small numbers: and as they went, did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were gotten far from Olpæ, they went faster away. But the Ambraciotes and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops, seeing the others go quite away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran outright, as desiring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without a truce alike, and pursued the Peloponnesians: and threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them and for saying that they went away under truce, as

thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciotes only. And there was much contention and ignorance, of which was an Ambraciote and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them; and the rest escaped into Agraïs, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans and their friend, received them.

Demosthenes goeth out to meet the supply of Ambraciotes that came from the city. The Ambraciotes surprised in their lodgings. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Ambraciotes put to flight.

112. The Ambraciotes out of the city of Ambracia were come as far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills; to the greater whereof, came first undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent afore from the camp, and seized it: but the Ambraciotes got first to the lesser, and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof himself took with him for the assault of the camp, and the other half he sent about through the mountains of Amphilochia. And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciotes whilst they were yet in their lodgings and knew not what was the matter, but thought rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them to speak unto them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to make the sentinels secure; especially, seeing their faces could not be discerned, for it was yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciotes to flight at the first onset, and slew many upon the place: the rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Amphilochians being well acquainted with their own territory and armed but lightly, against men in armour unacquainted and utterly ignorant which way to take; they lit into hollow ways and to the places forelaid with ambushes, and perished. And having been put to all

manner of shifts for their lives, some fled towards the sea; and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore, (this accident concurring with their defeat), swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear, to be killed of those in the galleys, than by the barbarians and their most mortal enemies the Amphilochians. The Ambraciotes with this loss came home, a few of many, in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians, having taken the spoil of the dead and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.

Year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The conference of the herald from the Ambraciotes in Agraïs, with one of Demosthenes his army, about the number of the slain. The Acarnanians will not let the Athenians subdue the Ambraciotes utterly, because they thought the Ambraciotes better neighbours than the Athenians. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

113. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciotes which fled from Olpæ into Agraïs, to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead which were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciotes that came from the city, he wondered at the number: for he knew nothing of this last blow, but thought they had been armours of those with them. Then one asked him, what he wondered at, and how many he thought were slain: for he that asked him the question, thought, on the other side, that he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene. And he answered, about two hundred. Then he that asked, replied and said: “then these are not the armours of them; but of above a thousand”.— “Then,” said he again, “they belong not to them that were in battle with us”. The other answered: “yes, if you fought yesterday in Idomene.”— “But we fought not yesterday at all, but the other day in our retreat.”— “But we yet fought yesterday with those Ambraciotes that came from the city to aid the rest.” When the herald heard that, and knew that the aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into Aimees: and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his

errand, and required the dead bodies no farther. For this loss was greater than, in the like number of days, happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written the number of the slain; because it was said to be such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know: that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of their voices. But they feared now, that if the Athenians possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours unto them than the other.

114. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians' part was lost by sea. For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes [himself]; and he brought them away with him. His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in Ætolia. And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to Naupactus.

League for a hundred years between the Ambraciotes and Acarnanians. year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the Œniades to those Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius and the Agræans, to retire; the Œniades being gone over to Salynthius, and the Agræans likewise. And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a league with the Ambraciotes for a hundred years, upon these conditions: "That neither the Ambraciotes with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians; nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciotes against the Athenians: that they should give mutual aid to one another's country: that the Ambraciotes should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields they held of the Amphilochians: and that they should at no

time aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with the Acarnanians". And upon this composition, the war ended. After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the conduct of Xenocleides the son of Euthycles; who with much difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the business in Ambracia.

C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenian fleet in Sicily invade Himeræa. Pythodorus sent to take the fleet from Laches. year vi. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

115. The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily, invaded Himeræa by sea, aided by the Sicilians that invaded the skirts of the same by land. They sailed also to the islands of Æolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, [with certain galleys], come to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusans were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send into Sicily, conceiving that the war there would the sooner be at an end, and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the command of Laches his fleet, sailed in the end of winter unto a certain garrison of the Locrians which Laches had formerly taken; and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.

The fire breaketh out of Ætna, and burneth the fields of Catana.

116. The same spring, there issued a great stream of fire out of the mountain Ætna, as it had also done in former times; and burned part of the

territory of the Catanæans, that dwell at the foot of Ætna, which is the highest mountain of all Sicily. From the last time that the fire brake out before, to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And it hath now broken out thrice in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war written by Thucydides.

THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE ATHENIANS TAKE and fortify Pylus in Messenia. — The Lacedæmonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria: whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedæmonian fleet, do there besiege. — The Athenians and Syracusans fight in the Strait of Messana. — Cleon engageth himself rashly to take or kill the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria within twenty days: and by good fortune performeth it. — The sedition ceaseth in Corcyra. — Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus. — The Sicilians agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing upon that coast with their fleet. — The Athenians take Nisæa, but fail of Megara. — The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium. — The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedæmonians. — Truce for a year. — And this in three years more of the same war.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Messana revolteth from the Athenians. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Locrians waste the territory of Rhegium.

The spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the place to be commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of their war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from thence; but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians and desirous to

make war upon them on both sides. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power; both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messanians, and because they were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition, and were unable for the present to give them battle: for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their landforces; but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.

The fifth invasion of Attica. The Athenians send forty galleys into Sicily: year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. who are to put in by the way at Corcyra, being still in sedition, the outlaws holding the field, and the commons the city.

About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, invaded Attica; and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose; and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyræans that were in the city, and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain; who because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state. To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

Demosthenes urgeth to put in at Pylus. The fleet driven into Pylus by weather. The commodity of Pylus. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The

Athenians build the fort of Pylus.

As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance. And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally strong, and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs, in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasion. But they answered him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places; because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedæmonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence, and be also faithful guardians of the place. 4. When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies, he gave it over; till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling; making all possible haste to

prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Lacedæmonians at home regard the taking of Pylus but lightly. The Lacedæmonian army and Agis take it more to heart.

The Lacedæmonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news, did set lightly by it; conceiving, that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone, or easily take the place by force. Somewhat also they were retarded, by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it, and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily. 6. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home: for the Lacedæmonians and Agis their king took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season. So as for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest: for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

The Athenians take Eion in Thrace, and lose it again.

7. About the same time, Simonides an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, that was their enemy, by treason: but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, that came to succour it: and lost many of his soldiers.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Lacedæmonians by sea and land seek to recover Pylus. Demosthenes sends to call back the fleet to help him. The Lacedæmonians prepare themselves to assault the fort. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The situation of the isle of Sphacteria. The Lacedæmonians put over four hundred and twenty men of arms, besides their servants, into the isle of Sphacteria over against Pylus. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

8. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta, and of other the neighbouring towns, went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedæmonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus, to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus; and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra: which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him, for as much as the place was in danger to be lost. And according as Demosthenes his message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land; hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour. For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the entries straight; one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden; in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak–heads outward, to stop up the entries of

the haven. And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same, and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows: and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place; seeing there was no provision of victual within it, and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms, out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns: but they which went over now last and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes prepareth himself to keep the Lacedæmonians from landing on the shore. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

9. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedæmonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, unto the land, he placed them athwart the fort; and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had, they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light–horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength, and commanded them to make good the place against the landforces, if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms

chosen out of the whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort to the sea–side, in that part where he most expected their landing; which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong; and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms; and encouraged them with words to this effect:

the oration of demosthenes. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Oration of Demosthenes.

10. “You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise, and reckon every peril that now besetteth us; but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope, and look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For I make account, the difficulty of their landing makes for us: which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us: but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough. For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disbarking being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few, for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land, is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number.

And for you, that be Athenians, and by experience of disbarking against others know, that if a man stand it out, and do not for fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground, and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort."

The Athenians take heart. The Lacedæmonians assault the fort by land, and seek to force landing from their galleys. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The valour of Brasidas. Brasidas swooneth by reason of his wounds. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

11. Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart, and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedæmonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of three–and–forty galleys; in which was admiral Thrasymelidas the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected him. So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians dividing their galleys into small numbers, because they could not come near with many at once, and resting between, assailed them by turns; using all possible valour and mutual encouragement, to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas. For having the command of a galley, and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen, (the place being hard of access), when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and tender of breaking their galleys; he would cry out unto them, saying, "they did not well, for sparing of wood to let the enemy fortify in their country": and [to the Lacedæmonians] he gave advice to force landing with the breaking of their galleys; and prayed the confederates, that in requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedæmonians, and running

them ashore to use any means whatsoever to land, and to get into their hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort. 12. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by the Athenians put back; and after he had received many wounds, swooned; and falling upon the ledges of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea. Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconique land, against the Lacedæmonians in galleys; and the Lacedæmonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot; and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled.

The Lacedæmonians, after three days' assault without effect, give over that course. The Athenian fleet return from Zacynthus to aid the Athenians in Pylus. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenians overcome the Peloponnesian fleet in the haven of Pylus. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenians getting the victory besiege the men cut off from the army in the island.

13. This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults; and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine, for timber wherewith to make engines: hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looketh into the haven; which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the meantime arrive the forty Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus, and four of Chios. And when they saw both the

continent and the island full of men of arms, and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth; not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present to the isle Prote, being near and desert; and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again with purpose to offer them battle, if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined; but lying still on the shore manned out their galleys, and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one. 14. The Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedæmonian galleys, which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to flight: and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them, and took five, whereof one with all her men in her: and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore. And the galleys which were but in manning out, were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys, and towed them away empty. Which the Lacedæmonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid [from the land]; and entering armed into the sea took hold of the galleys with their hands, to have pulled them back again: every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse, wherein himself was not present. So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedæmonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea–fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land–fight from their galleys. But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedæmonians recovered all their galleys, save only

those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck; and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians in the meantime, that were in the continent and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.

The magistrates of Sparta come to view the state of the camp, and conclude there to send to Athens about peace. Truce between the armies, till ambassadors might be sent to Athens. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

15. As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp, to determine, upon view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done. These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men, and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content; and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could. 16. The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made in this manner:

the articles of the truce. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The articles of the truce.

That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up, not only those galleys wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylus and put into the Athenians' hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building were anywhere else in Laconia: that they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land. — That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians that were in the continent, to send over to those in the island a portion of ground

corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic chœnickes of meal, and two cotyles of wine, and a piece of flesh; and to every of their servants, half that quantity: that they should send this the Athenians looking on; and not send over any vessel by stealth. — That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding of the island, provided that they landed not in it; and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea. — That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce was then immediately to be void; otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens. — That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back. — That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received them.

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about three score: and the ambassadors were sent away; who arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

the oration of the lacedæmonians. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Oration of the Lacedæmonians. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Oration of the Lacedæmonians.

17. “Men of Athens, the Lacedæmonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more, when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance. But the words we shall use, we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant; but for a remembrance to you of what you know, that you may deliberate wisely therein. It is now in your power

to assure your present good fortune with reputation, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides: and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success; who through hope aspire to greater fortune, because the fortune they have already came unhoped for. Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all reason to be. 18. Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us; who being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that, which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give. And yet we are not brought to this through weakness, nor through insolence upon addition of strength; but because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should; which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive, that for your power and purchases, fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity; and not think that war will so far follow and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also seldom miscarrying, because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over, when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us; and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry, (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune: whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Oration of the Lacedæmonians. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

19. “The Lacedæmonians call you to a peace and end of the war; giving you peace, and alliance, and much other friendship and mutual familiarity;

requiring for the same [only] those their men that are in the island; though also we think it better for both sides, not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege should be more in your power than they be. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better in the war, brings him through necessity to take an oath, and to make peace on unequal terms; but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions. For in this case, his enemy being obliged, not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And naturally, to those that relent of their own accord, men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant, they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak. 20. But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred; and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour, and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians; who will acknowledge it rather from you, than us. For they make war, not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedæmonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it, and are therein not forced, but gratified. Wherein consider how many commodities

are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree."

The insolent demand of the people of Athens, by the advice of Cleon. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

21. Thus spake the Lacedæmonians; thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace, and been hindered of it by them; and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure, and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon the son of Cleænetus, a popular man at that time, and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: "That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedæmonians would make restitution of Nisæa, and Pegæ, and Trœzen, and Achaia", — the which they had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when the Athenians being in distress, and at that time in more need of peace than now [yielded them up into their hands]— "then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good".

The Lacedæmonians desire to speak before a private committee.

22. To this answer they replied nothing; but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alternate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon came mightily upon them, saying, he knew before that they had no honest purpose; and that the same was now manifest, in that they refused to speak before the people, but sought to sit in consultation only with a few: and willed them, if they had aught to say that was real, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedæmonians finding that although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it

would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

The ambassadors return without effect, and the truce endeth. The Athenians cavil, and keep the galleys of the Lacedæmonians. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The war at Pylus goes on.

23. Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; and the Lacedæmonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them: standing upon this, that it was said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedæmonians denying it, and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their power: the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the open sea; and that, only when it was windy; (from Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to guard the island; so that they were in the whole threescore and ten): and the Lacedæmonians made assaults upon the fort, and watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their men in the island.

The Syracusians and Athenians fight in the strait between Messana and Rhegium. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

24. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messana; instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they

had also invaded with their whole forces by land: and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present, and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by sea. For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium both with their land–forces on the field side and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands, and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium a promontory of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor there against them, and make themselves masters of the strait. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is nearest to the continent; and is that which is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have passed through. Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.

The Syracusians and Athenians fight at sea. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

25. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea–fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium: and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley, and went speedily each [side] to their own camp at Messana and Rhegium; and the night overtook them in the action. After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians; and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to an anchor at Peloris, and had their land–forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them, and finding their galleys empty of men fell in amongst them; and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they lost that galley, but the men swam out. Upon this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed

along the shore towards Messana, the Athenians came up to them again; and the Syracusians opening themselves, charged first and sunk another of their galleys. So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore and in the sea–fight, which were both together in such manner as is declared.

The Messanians war on the city of Naxos, and receive a great loss. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenians and Leontines attempt to take Messana.

The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their borderer. The first day having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine, which spoiled the country [as it went up the river]; and with their landforces assaulted the city. In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their assistance against the Messanians: which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines, and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city and charged upon the Messanians, and put them to flight with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers; and the rest hardly escaping home. For the barbarians fell upon them, and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at Messana, not long after divided themselves, and went to their several homes. Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened; and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven, and the land–forces at the wall to the field. But the Messanians, and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth

and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight, and slew many. But the Athenians seeing that, disbarked and relieved them; and coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.

The Athenians much troubled to watch the island. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The shift of the Lacedæmonians to relieve the besieged with victual. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

26. All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedæmonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch was exceedingly painful to the Athenians, in respect of the want they had both of corn and water: for there was no well but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylus, and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel, and drank such water as they were like to find there. They were also scanted of room for their camp; and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns, some to stay ashore, and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was, the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done; for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and having nothing to drink but salt water. The cause hereof were the Lacedæmonians, who had proclaimed that any man that would, should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege, into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver: and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual; but especially the Helotes, who putting off from all parts of Peloponnessus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from

the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily: for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore; for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money: and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm, were intercepted. There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed: whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art: one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians are angry that their army is detained so long in the siege of the island. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. Cleon to avoid the envy of hindering the peace, engageth himself, ere he was aware, to fetch those that were besieged in the island home to Athens. Cleon undertaketh to fetch those in the island prisoners to Athens. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. Cleon taken at his word, would have declined the employment, but cannot. A glorious boast of Cleon well taken. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

27. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it, and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege; fearing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie at anchor in against them; but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape, or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that

brought them meat. But that which they feared most was, that the Lacedæmonians seemed to have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said, that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated, or saying the contrary be proved a liar: he advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men: and glanced at Nicias the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach: saying it was easy, if the leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it. 28. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not presently put it in practice; and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would that they could give him, and undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back; and said, that not he, but Nicias was general; being now indeed afraid, and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it, and gave over his command [to him] for so much as concerned Pylus; and called the Athenians to witness it. They, (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to

him, and cried out upon Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage; and stood forth, saying, that he feared not the Lacedæmonians, and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those targettiers that were come to them from Ænus, and four hundred archers out of other places: and with these he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out; either to be rid of Cleon, (which was their greatest hope), or if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedæmonians into their hands.

The reason why Demosthenes durst not land in the island to subdue the besieged by fight. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The wood of the island burnt by accident. Cleon arriveth at Pylus.

29. Now when he had dispatched with the assembly, and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea. He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion, because he heard that he also of himself and a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army having suffered much by the straitness of the place, and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle: confirmed therein the more, for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood, and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they were before [the more] afraid, and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood, and their preparation could not so well have been

discerned: whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight: so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly, in what part soever they had pleased; because the onset had been in their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedæmonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it; because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another. 30. These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Ætolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident, Demosthenes the better discerning that the Lacedæmonians were more than he had imagined, having before by victual sent unto them thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise, as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care, and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had; and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also with those forces which he had required unto Pylus.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians invade the island:

When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent, to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war. 31. Which when

they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms; and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedæmonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch, were about thirty men of arms: the middest and evenest part of the island, and about the water, was kept by Epitadas their captain with the greatest part of the whole number: and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff, and least assailable by land. For there was also a certain fort which was old, and made of chosen [not of hewn] stones; which they thought would stand them in stead in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.

and kill those that were in the first and most remote watch from Pylus. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians divide themselves into many troops against the main body of the Lacedæmonian soldiers. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The fight between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians in the middle of the island.

32. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins, and as they were taking arms. For they knew not of their landing; but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii; eight hundred archers; targetiers as many; all the Messenians that came to aid them; and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposing his army by two hundred and more in a

company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds; to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do, or against what part to set themselves in battle, and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light–armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings; who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action. 33. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went towards the men of arms of the Athenians with intent to charge them: for these were opposed to them in front, and the light–armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join with them, nor any way make use of their skill. For both the light–armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not. Where the light–armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back; but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert; so that the Lacedæmonians in their armour could not follow them.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Lacedæmonians retire to the fort, where the last guard was placed. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians assault them there. Some of the Athenians climb up behind the Lacedæmonians unseen, and appear at their backs. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

34. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light–armed soldiers seeing them less earnest in chasing them, and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedæmonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them; and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air; so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedæmonians' side: for their jacks now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown stuck broken in them; so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for the greater noise of the enemy; but danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting. 35. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the last guard of the island, and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground, then were the light–armed soldiers much more confident than before, and pressed upon them with a mighty noise: and as many of the Lacedæmonians as they could intercept in their retreat, they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort, and together with the watch of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place; but assaulting them in the face, sought only

how to put them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the sun: one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedæmonians defended themselves easilier now than before, because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks. 36. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes, that they spent their labour there in vain: and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light–armed soldiers, to get up by such a way as he himself should find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedæmonians, that he might not be discovered; making his approach under the cliffs of the island, where they were continual; in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch; and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them: and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. And the Lacedæmonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylæ. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path: and these now being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer; but fighting few against many, and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground: and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

The Lacedæmonians yield. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88 4. The Lacedæmonians yield up their arms, and are carried prisoners to Athens. The number of the slain, and of the prisoners. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

37. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back, the faster they would be killed by their army, staid the fight and held in the soldiers: with desire to carry them alive to Athens, in case their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this misery, as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed, that they should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them should seem good. 38. Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads; signifying their acceptation of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the other side. For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law, in case the others should miscarry. Styphon, and those that were with him, said they would send over to the Lacedæmonians in the continent, to know what they there would advise them to. But the Athenians letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent: and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedæmonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: The Lacedæmonians bid you take advice touching yourselves, such as you shall think good; provided you do nothing dishonourably. Whereupon having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms. And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch: but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone; and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedæmonians sent over a herald, and took up the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island, was thus. There went over into the island in all, four hundred and

twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive, three hundred wanting eight; and the rest slain. Of those that lived, there were of the city itself of Sparta, one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many; for it was no standing fight.

39. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy–two days; of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth; and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he needed to have done. So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as it was, took effect: for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.

The yielding of the Lacedæmonians was contrary to the opinion had of their virtue. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

40. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedæmonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able: and would not believe that those that yielded, were like to those that were slain. And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were valiant men: he answered, that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate, if it could know what was a good man; signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

The Lacedæmonian prisoners kept in bonds at Athens to be made use of in making the peace, or else upon the first invasion of Attica to be slain. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

41. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country; (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians); infested Laconia with robberies, and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedæmonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.

Nicias warreth in the territory of Corinth with good fortune. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Corinthians hearing of their coming, assemble their forces to hinder their landing. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians and Corinthians fight. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Corinthians are put to flight. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

42. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of

their confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias the son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him. Betimes in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on that shore above which standeth the hill Solygeius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Æolians, and upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia and Leucadia: all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians, where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen, and that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia, lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made haste to meet them. 43. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two of them present at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly landed, before Chersonesus: and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and at hand–strokes. And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians: and with much ado drave them back. But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Pæan, came again close to them; whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at handstrokes.

But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing, put the right wing of the Athenians to flight, and chased them to the sea–side: but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the Athenians: for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia. 44. So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put to flight, and retired to the hill: where they laid down their arms and descended no more, but there rested. In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain, and amongst others Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill and there sat down. The Athenians seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy, and took up their own; and presently erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia, to watch the Athenians that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid. So did also the old men of Corinth from the city, when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys; carrying with them the booty, and the bodies of their dead; all save two, which not finding they left. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side: and from thence sent a herald, and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind. There were slain in this

battle, Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.

The Athenians waste other parts of the same coast. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

45. The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs: where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys: and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzen; and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Trœzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

The execution of the Corcyræan banished men, and end of that sedition. Truce granted to the banished men, with condition that the same should be void if any of them offered to make an escape. The fraud of the Corcyræans to entrap the banished men. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The truce broken and the outlaws put into the hands of the commons. The Corcyræans take the outlaws out by scores, and make them pass the pikes. The outlaws refuse to go out to execution. year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. They kill themselves. The miserable end of the banished men, which was also the end of the sedition.

46. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyræans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city: and having assaulted their fortification, took it.

But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their composition; which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce, and transported them to the island of Ptychia, to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this plot. To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends, and instruct them to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away; and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyræan people. 47. When they were persuaded to do so, and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of the Corcyræans. It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out that they were nothing pleased that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Corcyræans having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice: from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time, and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips. 48. They had taken out of the room in this manner, and slain, to the number of three–score, before they that remained knew it; who thought they were but removed, and carried to

some other place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and said, that if they would themselves kill them they should do it; and refused any more to go out of the room: nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyræans any purpose to force entrance by the door: but getting up to the top of the house uncovered the roof, and threw tiles and shot arrows at them. They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but many also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room, and with ropes made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having continued most part of the night (for night overtook them in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they [all] perished. When day came, the Corcyræans laid them one across another in carts, and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they made bondwomen. In this manner were the Corcyræans that kept the hill, brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this far–spread sedition, for so much as concerned this present war: for of other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation. And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians take Anactorium from the Corinthians, and put it into the hands of the Acarnanians. The end of the seventh summer.

49. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus, went forth with an army and took the city of Anactorium, belonging to the Corinthians and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a

colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this summer ended.

Artaphernes, an ambassador from the king of Persia to the Lacedæmonians, intercepted, and brought to Athens, and his letters read. The king of Persia's letters to the Lacedæmonians translated into Greek, and read at Athens.

50. The next winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedæmon. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language into Greek, and read them: wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedæmonians, the principal was this: "that he knew not what they meant; for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same thing: if therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian". But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. And there encountering the news, that king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about that time he died), they returned home.

Year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4. The Chians are suspected and forced to pull down their new–built walls.

51. The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new wall by command of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they intended some innovation; notwithstanding they had given the Athenians their faith and the best security they could, to the intent they should let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter; and the seventh year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4.

52. The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change in the moon the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month, happened an earthquake.

The Lesbian outlaws make war upon the Athenian dominions in the continent near Lesbos. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4.

At this time the Mytilenæan and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them residing in the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhœteium; and for two thousand Phocæan staters render it again, without doing them other harm. After this they came with their forces to Antander, and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Act, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenæans, but subject to the Athenians: but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten, (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber; and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Æolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.

The Athenians led by Nicias, subdue Cythera, an island over against Laconia and inhabited by Lacedæmonians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4. The Cythereans yield to Nicias, referring themselves to the people of Athens for any thing but death. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians remove them from their seats. The Lacedæmonians begin to be dejected with their great losses. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians waste the coast of Laconia. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians burn Thyrea, slay and make prisoners of all the inhabitants being Æginetæ. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 88. 4. Tantalus a Lacedæmonian captain carried prisoner to Athens. The decree of the Athenian people concerning

the Cythereans, the Æginetæ taken in Thyrea, and Tantalus a Lacedæmonian that was amongst them. The Æginetæ put to death.

53. The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedæmonians, of the same that dwell about them. And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate called Cytherodikes. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time, to lie in the garrison there; and took much care of the place. For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief. For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas. 54. The Athenians arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians took a town lying to the sea, called Scandeia; and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea. The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resistance; but soon after turned their backs, and fled into the higher part of the city; and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow–commanders, that the Athenians should determine of them whatsoever they thought good, but death. Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before; which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards, were both the sooner and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did but remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay in

that manner upon the coast of Laconia. After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea–side. And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together. 55. The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera, and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory, to guard it wheresoever there was need: and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state; as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war. In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now: because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted. Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them. And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle; and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing. 56. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country, and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and as being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia, and frighted in the straggling rabble of light–armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received

them, it retired again with the loss of a few; whom they also rifled of their arms: and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera. From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera; and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea; which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argeia and Laconia. The Lacedæmonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the Æginetæ, after they were driven out of Ægina; both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedæmonians. 57. When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Æginetæ left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea–side; and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with them one of those garrisons, which the Lacedæmonians had distributed into the several parts of the country: and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter with them into the town, though the Æginetæ entreated them; apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as finding themselves too weak to give them battle. In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea; and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Æginetæ, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens; amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patroclus, captain of such Lacedæmonians as were amongst them, was wounded and taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the islands: and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents should inhabit their own

territory: that the Æginetæ, as many as they had taken, (out of former inveterate hatred), should be put to death: and that Tantalus should be put in bonds, amongst those Lacedæmonians that were taken in the island.

C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Sicilians make a general peace by advice of Hermocrates, and so dismiss the Athenians, that waited to take advantage of their discord.

58. In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinæans and the Geloans: but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves for making of a peace. Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. the oration of hermocrates for peace. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

59. “Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war, that am now to speak, and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war; nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out, that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss. But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable; and will be very much worth to us, if we will follow them at this present. For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure

their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well, that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again. 60. Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace than any words of mine; who having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage. For if we enter into a war, and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges, and withal cut out for them the dominion here; it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet, and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection. 61. Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours, than for the impairing of what we already have: and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself. In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man, and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent, to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves, in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans. For though they never received any

aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound unto. Indeed the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject: for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way, and to be shy of such as assail. We are to blame, that know this and do not provide accordingly, and make it our first care of all, to take good order against the common fear. Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves: (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble: and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

62. “And thus much for the profit that will be found, by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both: or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope: knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting,

by some strength they have had, to take away another's right; have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done, it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure, because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune, that is most predominant in things to come; which though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence. 63. Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us; and make an eternal peace amongst ourselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this: that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm: whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not.

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

"For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies, as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite will I look to be followed as absolute in my will, and master of fortune, which I cannot

command; but will also give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian; and one Chalcidean of another of his own race; or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace by our own selves. But when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us to encounter them; inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians and of domestic war, for the present; and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty, and less insidiated by others, for the time to come."

The substance of the conditions of the peace in Sicily. The Athenians depart Sicily, and their commanders punished as suspected to have left Sicily for a bribe. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

65 Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice; and agreed amongst themselves, that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantina, paying for the same unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound, and be comprehended in the same peace. And the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles; and laid a fine upon the third, which was Eurymedon: as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was

their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could cross them; but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprises, with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength unto their hope.

The Athenians attempt to take Megara by treason. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The heads of the commons, to hinder the return of the outlaws, plot the betraying of the city to the Athenians. The plot laid by the traitors for the putting of the Athenians into the town. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The plot of the traitors, to give the Athenians the long walls. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Athenians win the long walls. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The traitors give advice to open the gates and give battle. The treason discovered.

66. The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara: pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegæ, who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies: began to talk one to another, how it was fit to call them home again, and not to let their city by both these means to be ruined. The friends of those without perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly now than before, required to have it brought to council. But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry it against the other side, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenian army, to deliver them the city; as esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed, that first the Athenians should possess themselves of the long–walls, (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisæa their haven); thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, in which (the

better to assure Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but they: and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above; which would the more easily succeed, if that were effected first. 67. The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides, and every thing ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates; and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander Demosthenes, light–armed Platæans and others called peripoli, lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night. When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus. They had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty, with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand; and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea–side in a cart, and in a cart to bring it back again and set it within the gates: to the end that the Athenians which lay in Minoa, might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according to custom as for the boat. And the Athenians seeing it, (for so it was agreed on), arose from their ambush, and ran with all speed to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open. And first those Platæans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes, ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant; and fighting presently within the gates, (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir), the Platæans overcame those that resisted; and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after. 68. After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one to the wall. And a few of the

Peloponnesians that were of the garrison, made head at first and fought, and were some of them slain; but the most of them took their heels; fearing in the night, both the enemy that charged them, and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them. It chanced also that the Athenian herald of his own discretion made proclamation, that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer: but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into Nisæa. As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened, and to go out and give the enemy battle. Now it was agreed on between them, that when the gates were open, the Athenians should rush in: and that themselves would be easily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them; for that they would besmear themselves with some ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety: for the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appointment were to come to them, having marched all night were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight; for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so: or to put the city into so manifest danger: and said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be thereright. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they stayed at the gates, insomuch as the traitors could not perform what they intended.

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Athenians failing of Megara take Nisæa, and demolish the long walls.

69. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of Nisæa with a wall: which if they could take before aid came, they thought Megara would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons, and whatsoever else was necessary. And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side Nisæa: and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was defective with a strong palisado. The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought: the next day about evening they had within very little finished. But then they that were in Nisæa, seeing themselves to want victual, (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above), and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them; conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies; compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedæmonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the city of Megara, and taken in Nisæa, prepared for what was further to be done.

Year viii A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas saveth Megara from being rendered to the Athenians. Brasidas desireth to put himself into the city. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas goeth back to Tripodiscus. The Bœotians come with their forces, and join with Brasidas. The Bœotian and Athenian horse skirmish. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

70. Brasidas the son of Tellus, a Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing of an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be won, sent unto the Bœotians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris so called at the foot of the hill Geraneia; and marched presently himself with two thousand seven hundred men of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius, six hundred of Sicyon, and those of his own all that he had yet levied; thinking to have found Nisæa yet untaken. When he heard the contrary, (for he set forth towards Tripodiscus in the night), with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the Athenians that lay by the sea–side to the city of Megara; pretending in word, and intending also in good earnest if he could have done it, to attempt upon Nisæa; but desiring to get into Megara to confirm it; and required to be let in, for that he was, he said, in hope to recover Nisæa. 71. But the Megarean factions being afraid, one, lest he should bring in the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons out of this very fear should assault them; whereby the city being at battle within itself, and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost: received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still and attend the success. For both the one faction and the other expected, that the Athenians and these that came to succour the city would join battle: and then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side, turn unto them that had the victory. And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army. 72. Betimes in the morning arrived the Bœotians, having also intended to come to the aid of Megara before Brasidas sent, as esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and were then with their whole forces come forward as far as Platæa. But when they had received also this message, they were a great deal the more encouraged: and sent two

thousand two hundred men of arms and two hundred horse to Brasidas, but went back with the greater part of their army. The whole army being now together of no less than six thousand men of arms; and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order about Nisæa and the sea–side, but the light–armed straggling in the plains: the Bœotian horsemen came unexpectedly upon the light–armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea; for in all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the Megareans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side that held long; wherein both sides claimed the victory. For the Athenians slew the general of the Bœotian horse and some few others, and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to Nisæa: and having these dead bodies in their power they restored them upon truce, and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assurance; but parting asunder, the Bœotians went to the army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

The whole army on either side face one another, but neither side willing to begin. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Megareans receive Brasidas and his army. The Megarean outlaws recalled, and sworn to forget former quarrel. year viii. A C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The outlaws being in authority, put to death a hundred of the adverse faction.

73. After this, Brasidas with his army came down nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara: and having seized on a place of advantage, set his army in battle array and stood still. For they thought the Athenians would be assailants, and knew the Megareans stood observing whether side should have the victory: and that it must needs fall out well for them both ways; first, because they should not be the assailant, and voluntarily begin the battle and danger; since having showed themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour: and next

it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans; for if they should not have come in sight, the matter had not been any longer in the power of fortune, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived of the city, as men conquered: whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without stroke stricken: which also indeed came to pass. For the Megareans — when the Athenians went out and ordered their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still: their commanders likewise considering, that if they should begin the battle against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprise was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard: and so for a while affronted each other, and, neither doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisæa, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set forth — then, I say, the Megareans, such as were the friends of the outlaws, taking heart because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities; and when they were in, (those that had practised with the Athenians being all the while in a great fear), they went to council. 74. Afterwards Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former purpose to levy an army for Thrace. Now the Megareans that were in the city, (when the Athenians also were gone home), all that had chief hand in the practice with the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipt away: but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recalled them from Pegæ, upon great oaths administered unto them, no more to remember former quarrels,

but to give the city their best advice. These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms; and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city, picked out of their enemies, and of those that seemed most to have co–operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons; and having constrained the people to give their sentence upon them openly, when they were condemned slew them; and established in the city the estate almost of an oligarchy. And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

The Mytilenæan outlaws lose the city of Antandros: which they had intended to fortify and make the seat of their war. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Lamachus loseth his ten galleys by a sudden landflood in Pontus.

75. The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the Mytilenæans as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont, (for Lamachus that was the third in that commission, was gone with ten galleys into Pontus), having notice of the preparation made in that place; and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there as it had done in Anæa over against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea by sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city and entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched to it: and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recovered the place again. And not long after, Lamachus that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calex in the territory of Heracleia, much rain having fallen above in the country and the stream of a land flood coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys; and came himself and his army through the territory of the Bithynians (who are Thracians dwelling in Asia on the other side) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus, by land.

Demosthenes goeth to Naupactus upon design against the Bœotians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The plot laid between certain Bœotians and the Athenians, how to bring Bœotia into the power of the Athenians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

76. The same summer likewise Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys, presently after his departure out of Megaris, sailed to Naupactus. For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Bœotian government, and to turn it into a democracy according to the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates to betray unto him the estates of Bœotia; induced thereunto principally by Ptœodorus, a Theban outlaw: and they ordered the design thus. Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphæ: (Siphæ is a city of the territory of Thespiæ, standing upon the sea–side in the Crissæan gulf): and Chæroneia, which was a town that paid duties to Orchomenus, (called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Bœotia), some others of Orchomenus were to surrender into their hands. And the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this, and were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This Chæroneia is the utmost town of Bœotia towards Phanotis in the country of Phocis; and some Phoceans also dwelt in it. [On the other side], the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place consecrated to Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, on the part toward Eubœa. All this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, to the end that the Bœotians might not oppose them with their forces united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own. And if the attempt succeeded, and that they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Bœotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that it could not stand long at a stay; but that the Athenians joining with such of them as rebelled, and the

Bœotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid. 77. And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphæ to receive it by treason. And a day was set down betwixt them, on which these things should have been done together. Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Œniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation, and had himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first upon Salynthius and the Agræans; and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to Siphæ.

Brasidas passeth through Thessaly with seventeen hundred men of arms, to aid the Chalcideans that deliberated a revolt. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The soft answer of Brasidas, notwithstanding he was resolved to pass. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas goeth apace through Thessaly. The cause why Perdiccas and the Chalcideans called in the Lacedæmonians into those parts. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The cause why the Lacedæmonians so willingly sent an army to them. An impious policy of the Lacedæmonians in destroying their Helotes. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The praise of Brasidas.

78. About the same time of this summer, Brasidas marching towards the cities upon Thrace with seventeen hundred men of arms, when he came to Heracleia in Trachinia sent a messenger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to be guides unto him and to his army. And when there were come unto him Panærus and Dorus and Hippolochidas and Torylaus and Strophacus, who was the public host of the Chalcideans; all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia; he marched on. There were

other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly without a guide howsoever, but especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave, is a thing that all Grecians alike are jealous of. Besides, that the people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. Insomuch, as if by custom the government of that country had not been lordly rather than a commonwealth, he could never have gone on. For also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others of a contrary mind to the former, that forbade him; and told him that he did unjustly to go on without the common consent of all. But those that convoyed him answered, that they would not bring him through against their wills: but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas himself said, he came thither a friend both to the country and to them; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians their enemies; and that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, whereby they might not use one another's ground; and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he; but [only] entreated them not to stop him. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying nowhere by the way. And the same day he set forth from Melitia, he reached Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus: from thence he went to Phacium: from thence into Peræbia. The Peræbians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians situate at the foot of Olympus on the side towards Thessaly. 79. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him; and came into the territory of the Chalcideans, and to Perdiccas. For Perdiccas and the Chalcideans, all that had revolted from the Athenians,

when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear: the Chalcideans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on them first, as having been also incited thereto by those cities amongst them that had not revolted; and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels; but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncesteans. And the ill success which the Lacedæmonians in these times had, was a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily. 80. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular territory Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to maintain the army; having called it thither to help the Chalcideans in their revolt. And because also they desired a pretence to send away part of their Helotes; for fear they should take the opportunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylus, to innovate. For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes: for the Lacedæmonians had ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars, should be made free; feeling them in this manner, and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away: and no man knew how they perished. And now at this time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men along with Brasidas. The rest of the army were mercenaries, hired by Brasidas out of

Peloponnesus. [But] Brasidas himself the Lacedæmonians sent out, chiefly because it was his own desire: 81. notwithstanding the Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in Sparta every way an active man. And when he was out, he did the Lacedæmonians very great service. For by showing himself at that present just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt; and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass, that if the Lacedæmonians pleased to come to composition, (as also they did), they might have towns to render and receive reciprocally. And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas showed now, to some known by experience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedæmonians. For being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points for a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

Brasidas joined with Perdiccas marcheth towards Lyncus. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas refusing to make war on Arrhibæus: for the offer of Arrhibæus: and through the advice of the Chalcideans: giveth therein distaste to Perdiccas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas cometh before Acanthus:

82. Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this expedition; and reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts. 83. Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, marched presently against Arrhibæus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncesteans, a people of Macedonia, confining on Perdiccas his dominion; both for a quarrel they had against him, and also as desiring to subdue him. When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to the place where they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibæus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedæmonians. For Arrhibæus

had also made some proffer by a herald, to commit the matter to Brasidas' arbitrement. And the Chalcidean ambassadors being present, gave him likewise advice not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, to the end they might have him more prompt in their own affairs. Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedæmon, had spoken there, as if they had meant to bring [as] many of the places about him [as they could] into the Lacedæmonian league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibæus for the public good of their own state. But Perdiccas said, that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should show him: and that it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army, for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibæus. Nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibæus; by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army. But from that time forward Perdiccas instead of half, paid but a third part of his army; as conceiving himself to have been injured.

Founded A. C. 656. and is received without his army

84. The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcideans, marched to Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. And there arose sedition about receiving him, between such as had joined with the Chalcideans in calling him thither, and the common people. Nevertheless for fear of their fruits, which were not yet gotten in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the multitude, (for he was not uneloquent, though a Lacedæmonian), he spake to this effect:

the oration of brasidas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

85. “Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedæmonians have sent me and this army abroad, is to make good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians: which was, that we meant to make a war for the liberties of Greece. But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there in the opinion we had, that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not welcome. For we Lacedæmonians have undergone this great danger, of passing many days’ journey through the territory of strangers, and showed all possible zeal, because we imagined that we went to such confederates, as before we came had us present in their hearts and were desirous of our coming. And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded, and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians’ liberty; not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom I go to will be the less willing to come in; making difficulty, because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city and being esteemed wise, have refused us. For which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to come weak and without power to maintain you against the Athenians. And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisæa, though more in number they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number against you, as they had in their fleet there at Nisæa. 86. I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians: and I have the Lacedæmonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths, that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws; and that we shall not hold you as confederates to us brought in either by force or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates

to you that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me, (especially having given you so good assurance), or think me unable to defend you; but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me. And if any man be unwilling so to do through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him cast away that fear: for I came not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here I should enthral either the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude. For to be governed so, were worse than the domination of a foreigner: and there would result from it to us Lacedæmonians, not thanks for our labours; but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those crimes for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in us, than in them, that never pretended the virtue. For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud, than by open violence. For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by fortune; but the other, with the treachery of a wicked conscience. 87. But besides the oath which they have sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have, is this: that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe that it is to our profit to do as I have told you. But if after these promises of mine you shall say, you cannot; and yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us; or shall say, that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any: then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this place, that my counsel which you refuse was for your good; and will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to it. Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong; but have reason for it for two necessities: one of the Lacedæmonians, lest whilst they have your affections and not your society, they should receive hurt from your contributions of money to

the Athenians; another of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their liberty by your example. For otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we Lacedæmonians to set any at liberty against their wills, if it were not for some common good. We covet not dominion [over you]; but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other states in general we should tolerate you to cross us. Deliberate well of these things: strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece; to get yourselves eternal glory; to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most honourable title."

The revolt of Acanthus. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The revolt of Stageirus. The end of the eighth summer.

88. Thus spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had effectually spoken, and partly for fear of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians; having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedæmonian magistrates took when they sent him out, namely, that what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedæmonians should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. And not long after revolted Stageirus, another colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

Demosthenes approacheth Siphæ by sea to take it by treason, but failed. The treason detected. Hippocrates marcheth to Delium: year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. he fortifieth Delium. The army of the Athenians, having taken Delium, begin to retire.

89. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Bœotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians; and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to Delium: having mistaken the days on which they should

have both set forward, Demosthenes went to Siphæ first, and having with him the Acarnans and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, [yet] lost his labour. For the treason was detected by one Nicomachus, a Phocean of the town of Phanotis, who told it unto the Lacedæmonians, and they again unto the Bœotians. Whereby the Bœotians concurring universally to relieve those places, (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own several territories), preoccupied both Siphæ and Chæroneia. And the conspirators knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further. 90. But Hippocrates having raised the whole power of the city of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them, and all strangers that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium when the Bœotians were now returned from Siphæ; and there stayed and took in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a wall in this manner. Round about the temple and the whole consecrated ground they drew a ditch; and out of the ditch, instead of a wall they cast up the earth; and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings: and by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon the same. There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens; and wrought all the same day and all the fourth, and the fifth day till dinner. And then being most part of it finished, the camp came back from Delium about ten furlongs homewards. And the light–armed soldiers went most of them presently away; but the men of arms laid down their arms there, and rested. Hippocrates stayed yet behind, and took order about the garrison, and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

The Bœotians follow them. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

91. The Bœotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra: and when all the forces were come in that from every city were expected, and when they understood that the Athenians drew homewards; though the rest of the Bœotian commanders, which were eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Bœotia, (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were in the confines of Oropia); yet Pagondas the son of Aioladas, being the Bœotian commander for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was, together with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling them unto him every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Bœotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner:

the oration of pagondas to his soldiers. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Pagondas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Pagondas.

92. “Men of Bœotia, it ought never to have so much as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders, that because we find not the Athenians now in Bœotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Bœotia and fortified in it, with intent to waste it: and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come doing the acts of hostility. But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own, as may be used by them, who retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge voluntarily invade the estate of another. And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and on your neighbour’s ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians, when they be borderers. For liberty with all men, is nothing else but to be a match for the

cities that are their neighbours. With these then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? We have for example the estate that the Eubœans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in under them. And you must know, that though others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished, shall have but one bound amongst us all: so that we shall no more quarrel about limits. For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians, than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories: whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when opportunity serveth. We have experience hereof in these same men. For after we had overcome them at Coroneia, at what time through our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Bœotia: which lasted till this present. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there; and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses: but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him appearing fair, to march against them; and let them see, that though they may gain what they covet when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten."

Year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The order of the army of the Bœotians. The order of the army of the Athenians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

93. Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Bœotians to march against the Athenians, and making them rise led them speedily on; for it was drawing towards night. And when he was near to their army, in a place from whence by the interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand he put his army into order and prepared to give battle. When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Bœotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army, commanding them to be put in array. And not long after he came himself: having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place if it should be assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Bœotians when they were in fight. But for these, the Bœotians appointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all was as it should be, they showed themselves from the top of the hill, where they sat down with their arms in the same order they were to fight in: being about seven thousand men of arms, of light–armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targetiers. Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers; in the middle battle were the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and the rest that dwell about the lake; in the left were the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light–armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twenty–five in file; but the rest, every one as it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Bœotians. 94. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout: their horse they placed on either wing. But for light–armed soldiers armed as was fit, there were none; nor was there any in the city. Those that went out, followed the camp for the most part without arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, there stayed few behind. When they were now in their order and

ready to join battle, Hippocrates the general came into the army of the Athenians, and encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

the oration of hippocrates to his soldiers.

95. “Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with valiant men it hath as much force as a longer; and is for a remembrance rather than a command. Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that we therefore precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did not concern us. For in the territory of these men, you fight for your own. If we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the Bœotian horsemen. So that in one battle, you shall both gain this territory, and free your own. Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becometh the dignity, both of his natural city, which he glorieth to be chief of all Greece; and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Œnophyta under the conduct of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Bœotia.”

The Bœotians interrupt the year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Athenians fly. Dispute about giving leave to the Athenians to take up their dead. the message of the bœotians to the athenians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. the message of the athenians to the bœotians by a friend of their own. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. the reply of the bœotians. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

96. Whiles Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it over half the army, but [could proceed] no further, the Bœotians (for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation and had there sung the Pæan) came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, [so fast that] they met together running. The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both, by one and the same cause: for certain currents of water kept them asunder. But the rest made sharp battle; standing close, and striving to put by each others’

bucklers. The left wing of the Bœotians, to the very middle of the army, were overthrown by the Athenians: who in this part had to deal, amongst others, principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were placed within the same wing, gave back, and were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those Thespians that were slain were hewed down in the very fight. Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with inclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Bœotians were overcome in this part; and fled to the other part where they were yet in fight. But the right wing wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians; and by little and little forced them to give ground, and followed upon them from the very first. It happened also that Pagondas, whilst the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill; whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put into affright: and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident and by the Thebans that continually won ground and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight. Some fled toward Delium and the sea; and some towards Oropus; others toward the mountain Parnethus; and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Bœotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came in after the enemy was already defeated, followed killing them. But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the easier saved. The next day those that were gotten to Oropus and Delium went thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium: which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained. 97. The Bœotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra; and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made on Delium. In the meantime, a herald sent from the Athenians to require the bodies, met with a herald by the way sent by the

Bœotians: which turned him back, by telling him he could get nothing done till himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered unto them what the Bœotians had given him in charge: namely, “that they had done injustly to transgress the universal law of the Grecians; being a constitution received by them all, that the invader of a another’s country should abstain from all holy places in the same: that the Athenians had fortified Delium and dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places profane; and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice: that therefore the Bœotians, both in the behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the interessed spirits, did warn them to be gone and to remove their stuff out of the temple.” 98. After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Bœotians: “denying that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already, or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter: for neither did they at first enter into it to such intent; but to requite the greater injuries which had been done unto them: as for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other but that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also; and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can: for also the Bœotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others and make them their own: that therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it; and for the part they were now in, they were in it with a good will and would not out of it, as being their own: that for the water, they meddled with it upon necessity; which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting against the Bœotians that had invaded their territory first, they were forced to use it; for whatsoever is forced by war or danger, hath in reason a kind of pardon even with the god himself: for the altars, in cases of

involuntary offences, are a refuge; and they are said to violate laws that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress: that the Bœotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive: and they bade him say plainly: that they would not depart out of the Bœotian territory, for that they were not now in it; but in a territory which they had made their own by the sword: and nevertheless, required truce according to the ordinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead." 99. To this the Bœotians answered: "that if the dead were in Bœotia, they should quit the ground and take with them whatsoever was theirs: but if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do." For they thought that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay, (for the battle was fought in the border between Attica and Bœotia), by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them off by force; and for truce that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none: but conceived it was a handsome answer, to say, "that if they would quit the ground they should obtain whatsoever they required." Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

The form of an engine, wherewith they set the wall on fire. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Delium recovered by the Bœotians.

100. The Bœotians presently sent for darters and slingers from [the towns on] the Melian gulf; and with these, and with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and with the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisæa, and with the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium and assaulted the wall. And when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, wherewith they also took it, made in this manner. Having slit in two a great

mast, they made hollow both the sides, and curiously set them together again in the form of a pipe. At the end of it in chains they hung a cauldron: and into the cauldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout of iron; having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the wood. They carried it to the wall, being far off, in carts; to that part, where it was most made up with the matter of the vineyard and with wood. And when it was to, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew. The blast passing narrowly through into the cauldron, in which were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire: so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same and betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means taken. Of the defendants, some were slain, and two hundred taken prisoners: the rest of the number recovered their galleys, and got home.

The Bœotians deliver to the Athenians their dead.

101. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald, which not long after was sent again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing it: the Bœotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. In the battle there died, Bœotians, few less than five hundred: the Athenians, few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general; but of light–armed soldiers and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number.

Demosthenes landing in Sicyonia, is beaten back by the inhabitants. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Sitalces king of Thrace, dieth: and Seuthes his brother’s son succeedeth him.

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, that had been with his army at Siphæ, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agræans and four hundred men of arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already

landed, and chased them back to their galleys; having also slain some, and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead. About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. And Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his brother's son, succeeded him in the kingdom, both of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace as much as was before subject to Sitalces.

Brasidas goeth to Amphipolis. The original of Amphipolis. A. C. 498. Ol. 70. 3. Agnon founder of Amphipolis. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

102. The same winter, Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace made war upon Amphipolis; a colony of the Athenians, situated on the river Strymon. The place whereon the city now standeth, Aristagoras of Miletus had formerly attempted to inhabit, when he fled from king Darius: but was beaten away by the Edonians. Two–and–thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same; and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many as would go: and these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus. In the twenty–ninth year after, conducted by Agnon the son of Nicias, the Athenians came again; and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine–ways. His army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the seaside subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the river Strymon; five–and–twenty furlongs from the city. Agnon named this city Amphipolis, because it was surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken it in with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about both to the sea and land.

The Argilians conspire to betray Amphipolis. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Argilus revolteth Brasidas winneth the bridge, and is master of all

between it and the city. The Amphipolitans send for aid to Thucydides, the author of this history. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

103. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from Arnæ in Chalcidea. Being about twilight come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe entereth into the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. The weather was foul, and a little it snowed; which also made him to march the rather, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city, (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians), and others, that contrived this, induced thereunto some by Perdiccas, and some by the Chalcideans. But above all the Argilians, being of a city near unto it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered and Brasidas arrived, (who had also long before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis, to betray it), both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night as far as to the bridge of the river. The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the bridge then, as there is now; but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge, and was presently master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had that dwelt without. 104. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of those without being slain, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in very great confusion at it: and the rather, because they were jealous one of another. And it is said, that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was, that he pitched there, and fell upon those without; and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still upon the place. But the contrary faction to the traitors being superior in

number, whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town, sent unto the other general, Thucydides the son of Olorus, the writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace, and was now about Thasos, (which is an island, and a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requiring him to come and relieve them. When he heard the news, he went thitherwards in all haste with seven galleys, which chanced to be with him at that time. His purpose principally was, to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis; but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion [before Brasidas his coming].

Brasidas, fearing to be prevented by Thucydides, hasteth by easy conditions to procure the town to yield. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Amphipolis yielded. Thucydides cometh too late to relieve Amphipolis, and putteth himself into Eion:

105. Brasidas in the meantime, fearing the aid of the galleys to come from Thasos, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hasted by all means to get Amphipolis before he should arrive; lest otherwise at his coming the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates both from the sea–side and in Thrace, and relieve them, should thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end offered them a moderate composition: causing to be proclaimed, "that whosoever, Amphipolitan or Athenian, would, might continue to dwell there and enjoy his own, with equal and like form of government; and that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone and carry away his goods." 106. When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kinsmen of those that were taken without, flocked together within. And in respect of

their fear, they all thought the proclamation reasonable: the Athenians thought it so, because they were willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest; and withal, not expecting aid in haste: and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger, and withal to retain their city with the equal form of government. Insomuch that they which conspired with Brasidas now openly justified the offer to be reasonable: and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned, and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed received him. Thus did these men deliver up the city: Thucydides with his galleys arrived in the evening of the same day at Eion. Brasidas had already gotten Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also: for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had been had.

and defendeth it against Brasidas. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Greatinclination of the people of those parts to come in to Brasidas.

107. After this Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it such as, according to the proclamation made, came down from Amphipolis. Brasidas with many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion, and attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river: he assayed also the same at the same time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary. Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis, and by Braures his own wife. And not long after Gapselus also, and Œsyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also, after the taking of these places, came to him, and helped him in assuring of the same.

The Athenians begin to fear. year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Athenians send garrisons to the places thereabouts. Brasidas envied at home.

108. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear; especially, for that it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys, and in revenue of money; and because also, though the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further: which now they thought they might easily do; and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech, that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece. And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation; and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than safe forecast: it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing to reject. Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Bœotians, and because Brasidas had said, (not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them), that when he was at Nisæa the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. But the greatest cause of all was, that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and for that they were to make

trial of the Lacedæmonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit. And Brasidas sent unto Lacedæmon, to demand greater forces; and in the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The Megareans demolish their long walls.

109. The same winter the Megareans, having recovered their long walls holden by the Athenians, razed them to the very ground.

Year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas invadeth the territory of Acte, where Athos standeth. Torone revolteth to Brasidas. The manner how the town was betrayed. year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The town taken.

Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confederates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. This Acte is that prominent territory, which is disjoined from the continent by a ditch made by the king: and Athos a high mountain in the same, determineth at the Ægean sea. Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the said ditch on the part which looketh to the sea towards Eubœa: the rest are Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion; and are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages. Some few there are also of the Chalcidean nation; but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations that once inhabited Athens and Lemnos; and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians; and dwell in small cities. The most of which yielded to Brasidas: but Sane and Dion held out; for which cause he stayed with his army and wasted their territories. 110. But seeing they would not hearken unto him, he led his army presently against Torone of Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. He was called in by the few,

who were ready withal to deliver him the city: and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from the city. So that to the rest of the city and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the traitors knowing he was to come, (some few of them being also privily gone to him), attended his approach: and when they perceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men armed only with daggers; (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, seven only had the courage to go in; and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus); which getting over the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and having slain the watchmen brake open the postern gate towards Canastræa. 111. Brasidas this while with the rest of his army lay still, and then coming a little forward, sent a hundred targetiers before, who when the gates should be opened and sign agreed on be set up, should run in first. These men, expecting long and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronæans within, which helped the men that entered to perform the enterprise, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading to the market–place opened likewise by cutting asunder the bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side: and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the market–place. 112. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise; and with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered into the city running. Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared timber–trees, which lay at the wall (which having been lately down was now again in building) for the drawing up of stone. Brasidas therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest

places of the city, to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places of advantage. But the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there without difference.

The Athenians escape into a castle of the same, called Lecythus. year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. brasidas his speech to the toronæans. year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas taketh Lecythus. year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

113. When the town was taken, the most of the Toronæans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves presently with those that entered. The Athenians, (of which there were about fifty men of arms asleep in the market–place), when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain upon the place, some by land, some by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus; which was a fort which they themselves held, cut off from the rest of the city to the seaward in a narrow isthmus. And thither also fled all such Toronæans as were affected to them. 114. Being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made, that those Toronæans which were fled with the Athenians might come back, as many as would, to their own, and inhabit there in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart out of Lecythus under truce with all that they had, as a place that belonged to the Chalcideans. The Athenians denied to quit the place; but the truce they desired for one day, for the taking up of their dead. And Brasidas granted it for two: in which two days he fortified the buildings near; and so also did the Athenians theirs. He also called an assembly of the Toronæans, and spake unto them as he had done before to the Acanthians: adding, “that there was no just cause, why either they that had practised to put the city into his hands should be the worse thought of, or accounted traitors for it; seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were hired

thereunto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city: or that they which were not made acquainted with it, should think that themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; for he came not to destroy either city or man: but had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians, because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, they would show as much good will also unto them, or rather more, inasmuch as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only upon want of trial. Withal he wished them to prepare themselves to be true confederates for the future; and from henceforward, to look to have their faults imputed: for, for what was past he thought they had not done any wrong, but suffered it rather from other men that were too strong for them; and therefore were to be pardoned, if they had in aught been against him." 115. When he had thus said and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one, and from the houses such as had battlements: and for the first day kept them off. But the next day, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they intended to cast fire upon their wooden fences; and that the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted: the Athenians, having upon the top of the building erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and many men being also gone up into it, the building overcharged with weight fell suddenly to the ground; and that with so huge a noise, that though those which were near and saw it were grieved more than afraid, yet such as stood further off, especially the furthest of all, supposing the place to be in that part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea and went aboard their galleys. 116. Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned

and saw what had happened, came on with his army and presently got the fort; and slew all that he found within it. But the rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with their boats and galleys put themselves into Pallene.

There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva. And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had made proclamation, that whosoever first scaled the wall, should have thirty minæ of silver for a reward. Brasidas now conceiving that the place was won by means not human, gave those thirty minæ to the goddess to the use of the temple. And then pulling down Lecythus, he built it anew, and consecrated unto her the whole place.

The rest of this winter he spent in assuring the places he had already gotten, and in contriving the conquest of more. Which winter ending, ended the eighth year of this war.

Year ix. Truce for a year, the motives to truce on either side. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

117. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, in the spring of the summer following, made a cessation of arms presently for a year: having reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and that if this suspension liked them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time: the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the willinger to compound, and with the restitution of their men to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they would fain have recovered their men, whilst Brasidas his good fortune continued; and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas prospering, and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out upon even terms, and get the victory. Whereupon a suspension of arms

was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

the articles of the truce.

118. “Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it seemeth good unto us, that whosoever will, may without fraud and without fear ask counsel thereat, according to the laws of his country. The same also seemeth good to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates here present; and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Bœotians and Phoceans, and do their best to persuade them to the same. That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you, proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our several states: and that whosoever else will, may do the same, every one according to the law of his own country.

“If the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the confederates touching the same think good thus:

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The articles of the truce.

“That the Lacedæmonians in Coryphasium stay within the mountains of Buphras and Tomeus; and the Athenians in Cythera without joining together in any league, either we with them or they with us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the gate of Megara near the temple of Nisus leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straightforward to the bridge that lies over into Minoa: that the Megareans pass not the same highway, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken; neither having commerce with other. That the Megareans keep what they now possess in Trœzen, and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and have free navigation, both upon the coasts of their own territories and their confederates.

“That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall pass the seas not in a long ship, but in any other boat rowed with oars of burden not exceeding five hundred talents.

“That the heralds and ambassadors, that shall pass between both sides for the ending of the war or for trials of judgment, may go and come without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land.

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The articles of the truce.

“That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another’s fugitives, free nor bond.

“That you to us, and we to you shall afford law according to the use of our several states; to the end our controversies may be decided judicially without war.

“This is thought good by the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair or of more equity than these, then shall you go and declare the same at Lacedæmon. For neither shall the Lacedæmonians nor their confederates refuse anything, that you shall make appear to be just. But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us. — That this truce shall be for a year.”

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

“The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the assembly. Phænippus the scribe. Niciades overseer, and Laches pronounced these words: ‘With good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms is concluded, according as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates have agreed’. And they consented before the people, ‘that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion: in which time the ambassadors and heralds, going

from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars: and that the commanders of the army and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council, touching the manner of embassage for ending of the war, first: and the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year' ".

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

119. The same articles the Lacedæmonians propounded, and the confederates agreed unto, with the Athenians and their confederates in Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month Gerastion. The men that agreed upon these articles, and sacrificed, were these, viz. Of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenæus the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas. Of the Corinthians, Æneas the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. Of the Sicyonians, Damotimos the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus the son of Megacles. Of the Megareans, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. Of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas. Of the Athenians, the generals [themselves], Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. This was the truce: and during the same they were continually in treaty about a longer peace.

The revolt of Scione. Brasidas goeth over in a boat, but with a galley before him: and his reason. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. brasidas his speech to the scionæans. The honour done to Brasidas by the Scionæans. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas receiveth news of the suspension of arms. Difference between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians about the restitution of Scione, which revolted after the truce made, but before the Lacedæmonians knew of it. The Athenians prepare to war on Scione. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Decree of the Athenians against Scione.

120. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionæans say, that they be Pallenians descended of those of Peloponnesus; and that their ancestors passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the Achæans up and down, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. Brasidas, upon their revolt, went over into Scione by night: and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself followed aloof in a light–horseman. His reason was this: that if his light–horseman should be assaulted by some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that such a one would not assault his boat, but rather the galley, whereby he might in the meantime go through in safety. When he was over and had called the Scionæans to assemble, he spake unto them as he had done before to them of Acanthus and Torone: adding, "that they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended, inasmuch as Pallene, being cut off in the isthmus by the Athenians that possess Potidæa, and being no other than islanders, did yet of their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not through cowardliness till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good: which was an argument, that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter, to have their state ordered to their minds: and that he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the Lacedæmonians, and also otherwise do them honour." 121. The Scionæans were erected with these words of his; and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war: and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and crowned him with a crown of gold in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands and came to him, as they use to do to a champion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back; and not long

after carried over a greater army, with design by the help of those of Scione to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidæa. For he thought the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island; and desired to prevent them. Withal, he had in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended, ready to undertake that enterprise. 122. But in the meantime came unto him in a galley, Aristonymus for the Athenians, and Athenæus for the Lacedæmonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone: and these men related unto Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians in Thrace approved of what was done: and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction. But for the Scionæans, whose revolt by computation of the days he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce: and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The Lacedæmonians in the meantime sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to tell them that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce; and, upon Brasidas his word, challenged the city to belong unto them, offering themselves to the decision of law. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment; but meant with all the speed they could make to send an army against it: being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt, and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land. Besides, touching [the time of] the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves alleged: for the revolt of the Scionæans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree, to take them by force and to put them all to the sword. And, forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

The revolt of Mende.

123. In the meantime revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection: holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce: and somewhat there was also which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendæans had also been the bolder, as sure of the intention of Brasidas: which they might guess at by Scione, inasmuch as he could not be gotten to deliver it. Withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who being once about it, would by no means give it over; but fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclination to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both: and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans into Olynthus in Chalcidea, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms and three hundred Chalcidean targetiers, and for commander of them all Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Mende joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Perdiccas and Brasidas jointly invade Arrhibæus. The Lyncesteans fly. Perdiccas expecteth mercenary aid out of Illyris. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The Illyrians come: and turn to Arrhibæus. The Macedonians upon a sudden fear run away, and desert Brasidas. Brasidas his retreat. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

124. In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibæus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of the Macedonians his subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcideans, Acanthians, and the rest, according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of

arms were about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcideans, somewhat less than a thousand; but the other rabble of barbarians was great. Being entered the territory of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncesteans encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both. But afterwards, the men of arms of the Lyncesteans coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncesteans to flight: many of which being slain, the rest retired to the hill–top and lay still. After this they erected a trophy, and stayed two or three days, expecting the Illyrians who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire: and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibæus one after another, and to have sitten still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on Mende, lest if the Athenians came thither before his return it should receive some blow; seeing withal that the Illyrians came not; had no liking to do so, but rather to retire. 125. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arrhibæus. So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of these who were a warlike people; but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by reason of their variance. The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians (as it is usual with great armies, to be terrified upon causes unknown) being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their camps being far asunder), to be gone also. Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away

without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form, and receiving the multitude of his light–armed into the middest, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy, when they charged the army anywhere [with shot]; and he himself with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy fighting, if they came close up. But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

the oration of brasidas to his soldiers. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

126. “Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians, and that the barbarians which come upon you are many, that you were afraid, I should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I do. But now against this desertion of your companions and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the full. For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come from a city where the many bear rule over the few, but the few over the many; and have gotten this for power by no other means than by overcoming in fight. And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Macedonians, and also by what I myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no great danger in them. For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden the other side: whereas against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the

boldest when he knoweth the least. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible offers: for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to this, when with such as stand them they come to blows. For fighting without order they will quit their place without shame, if they be once pressed; and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away, their valours are never called in question: and a battle wherein every one may do as he list, affords them a more handsome excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and terrifying us afar off, than in coming to hands with us: for else they would rather have taken that course than this. And you see manifestly, that all that was before terrible in them, is in effect little; and serves only to urge you to be going with their show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter, that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the battle: but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous where they may do it safely."

Brasidas draweth away his army, and the barbarians follow him. The Illyrians pursue the Macedonians, leaving part of their army to follow Brasidas.

127. When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led away his army. And the barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them [did so, and] met them which way soever they came on; and that Brasidas himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged close, and endured the first brunt beyond their expectation; and seeing also

that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased the other retired: then at length the greatest part of the barbarians forbore the Grecians, that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians which were fled, of whom as many as they overtook they slew; and withal prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him to have cut him off.

Brasidas seizeth the top of the hill by which he was to pass. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The spite of Brasidas' soldiers against the Macedonians for abandoning them. Perdiccas and Brasidas fall out.

128. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him, to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easliest get up to, and try if they could drive down those barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with and overcame those barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched the more easily to the top. For this beating of them from the vantage of the hill, made the barbarians also afraid; so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal that they were now at the confines, and already escaped through. Brasidas, having now gotten the hills and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa, of the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves, being angry with the Macedonians for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen, or fardles fallen from any man, (as was likely to happen in a retreat made in fear and in the night), they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces, and took the fardles to themselves. And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Brasidas as his

enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake; but being utterly fallen out with him about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these, and be disleagued from the other.

Year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2. The Mendæans encamp without the city. Nicias wounded. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2. Sedition in Mende. The gates opened to the Athenians upon sedition. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2. Mende pillaged by the Athenians. The Athenians lead their army against Scione.

129. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Mende: and therefore staying there, (for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene and to recover Mende), he kept good watch upon Torone. For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyncesteans, the Athenians, after all was in readiness, set sail for Mende and Scione with fifty galleys, (whereof ten were of Chios), and a thousand men of arms of their own city, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targetiers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes. These launching from Potidæa with their galleys, and putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched presently against the Mendæans. The Mendæans with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that came to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred men of arms, and Polydamidas their commander, were encamped upon a strong hill without the city. Nicias with a hundred and twenty light–armed soldiers of Methone, and sixty chosen men of arms of Athens, and all his archers, attempting to get up by a path that was in the hill's side, was wounded in the attempt, and could not make his way by force. And Nicostratus with all the rest of the army, going another way further about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was quite disordered; and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited.

So for this day, seeing the Mendæans and their confederates stood to it, the Athenians retired and pitched their camp: and at night the Mendæans retired into the city. 130. The next day the Athenians sailing about unto that part of the city which is towards Scione, seized on the suburbs; and all that day wasted their fields, no man coming forth to oppose them: (for there was also sedition in the city): and the three hundred Scionæans the night following went home again. The next day Nicias, with the one half of the army, marched to the confines and wasted the territory of the Scionæans; and Nicostratus at the same time, with the other half, sat down against the city before the higher gates towards Potidæa. Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendæans and their aids had their arms lying within the wall in this part) set his men in order for the battle, and encouraged the Mendæans to make a sally. But when one of the faction of the commons in sedition said to the contrary, that they would not go out, and that it was not necessary to fight; and was upon this contradiction by Polydamidas pulled and molested: the commons in passion presently took up their arms, and made towards the Peloponnesians and such other with them as were of the contrary faction; and falling upon them put them to flight, partly with the suddenness of the charge, and partly through the fear they were in of the Athenians, to whom the gates were at the same time opened. For they imagined that this insurrection was by some appointment made between them. So they fled into the citadel, as many as were not presently slain; which was also in their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and at the town–side) rushed into the city with the whole army, and rifled it; not as opened to them by agreement, but as taken by force; and the captains had much ado to keep them that they also killed not the men. After this, they bade the Mendæans use the same form of government they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they thought the principal authors of the revolt, amongst themselves. Those that were in the citadel, they shut

up with a wall reaching on both sides to the sea; and left a guard to defend it. And having thus gotten Mende, they led their army against Scione. 131. The Scionæans and the Peloponnesians, coming out against them, possessed themselves of a strong hill before the city: which if the enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the city with a wall. The Athenians having strongly charged them [with shot] and beaten the defendants from it, encamped upon the hill: and after they had set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the city. Not long after, whilst the Athenians were at work about this, those aids that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch by the sea–side, came by night: and escaping most of them through the camp before Scione, put themselves into that city.

Perdiccas maketh peace with the Athenians. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2. The Lacedæmonians make young men governors of cities.

132. As they were enclosing of Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian commanders and concluded a peace with the Athenians, upon hatred to Brasidas about the retreat made out of Lyncus: having then immediately begun to treat of the same. For it happened also at this time that Ischagoras a Lacedæmonian was leading an army of foot unto Brasidas. And Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing the peace was made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and partly because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians should come any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts in Thessaly, having in that kind ever used the prime men, and so stopped the army and munition as they would not so much as try the Thessalians [whether they would let them pass or not]. Nevertheless Ischagoras, and Ameinias, and Aristeus themselves went on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedæmonians to view the state of affairs there: and also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth, to make them governors of cities, rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. And

Clearidas the son of Cleonymus, they made governor of Amphipolis; and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

C. 423. Ol. 89. 2. The walls of Thespiæ demolished by the Thebans. The temple of Juno in Argos burnt by negligence of an old woman priest. year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 2. Phaeinis priest of Juno in the place of Chrysis. Siege laid to Scione. The end of the ninth summer.

133. The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians, laying Atticism to their charge. And though they had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier, because the flower of their youth was slain in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who having set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep: insomuch as all was on fire and flamed out before she knew. Chrysis the same night for fear of the Argives fled presently to Phlius: and they, according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in her room, called Phaeinis. Now when Chrysis fled, was the eighth year of this war ended, and half of the ninth. Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed; and the Athenians having left a guard there, went home with the rest of their army.

Battle between the Mantineans and the Tegeatæ.

134. The winter following nothing was done between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the truce. But the Mantineans and the Tegeatæ, with the confederates of both, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Orestis, wherein the victory was doubtful: for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent of their spoils unto Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatæ lodged all night in the place, and erected their trophy then presently; whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion, and set up their trophy afterwards.

C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. Brasidas attempteth Potidæa. year ix. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. The end of the ninth year.

135. The same winter ending and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidæa. For coming by night, he applied his ladders: and was thitherto undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders when the bell passed by, and before he that carried it to the next returned. Nevertheless being discovered he scaled not the wall, but presently again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. So ended this winter: and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.

THE FIFTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE FORMER YEAR'S truce ended, Cleon warreth on the Chalcidic cities, and recovereth Torone. — Phæax is sent by the Athenians to move a war amongst the Sicilians. — Cleon and Brasidas, who were on both sides the principal maintainers of the war, are both slain at Amphipolis. — Presently after their death a peace is concluded: and after that again, a league between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. — Divers of the Lacedæmonian confederates hereat discontented, seek the confederacy of the Argives. These make league, first with the Corinthians, Eleians, and Mantineans: then with the Lacedæmonians: and then again, by the artifice of Alcibiades, with the Athenians. — After this the Argives make war upon the Epidaurians: and the Lacedæmonians upon the Argives. — The Athenian captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue touching the yielding of Melos: which the Athenians afterwards besiege and win. — These are the acts of almost six years more of the same war.

Year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. The truce for a year expired. year x. A. C. 422. Ol 89. 2. 3. The Delians removed out of Delos upon superstition. The Delians seat themselves in Adramyttium.

The summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last till the Pythian holidays, expired. During this truce, the Athenians removed the Delians out of Delos, because [though they were consecrated, yet] for a certain crime committed of old they esteemed them polluted persons: because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purgation of the island; in the purging whereof, as I declared before, they thought they did well to take up the sepulchres of the dead. These Delians

seated themselves afterwards, every one as he came, in Adramyttium in Asia, a town given unto them by Pharnaces.

Cleon goeth out with an army into the parts upon Thrace: he assaulteth Torone. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Pasitelidas with the garrison of the town endeavoureth to defend it. Cleon taketh Torone. Pasitelidas, a Lacedæmonian captain, taken alive. Seven hundred men sent prisoners to Athens. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Panactum taken by the Bœotians.

After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace. He had with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms and three hundred horsemen; of confederates more; and thirty galleys. And first arriving at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men of arms of those that kept the siege; and sailed into the haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of Torone. And there having heard by fugitives that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his army to the city, and sent ten of his galleys about into the haven. And first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about the city to take in the suburbs: making a breach in the old wall, that the whole might be one city. 3. And Pasitelidas, a Lacedæmonian, captain of the town, with the garrison there present came to the defence, and fought with the Athenians that assaulted it. But being oppressed, and the galleys which were before sent about being by this time come into the haven, Pasitelidas was afraid lest those galleys should take the town, unfurnished of defendants, before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side should win the wall, and he be intercepted between them both: and thereupon abandoned the wall, and ran back into the city. But the Athenians that were in the galleys having taken the town before he came, and the land–army following in after him without resistance and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans

on the place, and some others, amongst whom was the captain Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone: but advertised by the way that it was already lost, went back again; being about forty furlongs short of preventing it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another at the wall. The women and children of the Toronæans, they made slaves; but the men of Torone and the Peloponnesians, and such Chalcideans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent away prisoners to Athens. The Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed; the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians, by exchange of man for man.

About the same time the Bœotians took Panactum, a fort of the Athenians standing in their confines, by treason.

Cleon goeth to Amphipolis.

Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in Torone, went thence by sea about the mountain Athos [to make war] against Amphipolis.

Phæax sent ambassador to the Sicilians. The Leontine commons driven out of the city by the Syracusians. The Leontine nobility become Syracusians, and go to Syracuse to dwell. The Leontines make war on the Syracusians. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Phæax moveth the Sicilians to war upon the Syracusians. The Gelans stop the motion made by Phæax. Phæax maketh peace with the Locrians.

About the same time Phæax the son of Erasistratus, who with two others was sent ambassador into Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with two galleys. For the Leontines, after the Athenians upon the making of the peace were gone out of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of their city: and the commons had a purpose also to have made division of the land. But the great men perceiving it, called in the Syracusians, and drave the commons out: and they wandered up and down, every one as he chanced; and the great men, upon conditions agreed on with the

Syracusians, abandoning and deserting that city, went to dwell with the privilege of free citizens in Syracuse. After this again, some of them upon dislike relinquished Syracuse, and seized on Phoceæ, a certain place part of the city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinniæ, a castle in the Leontine territory. Thither also came unto them most of the commons that had before been driven out: and settling themselves, made war from those places of strength. Upon intelligence hereof the Athenians sent Phæax thither, to persuade their confederates there, and, if they could, all the Sicilians jointly, to make war upon the Syracusians, that were now beginning to grow great; to try if they might thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phæax arriving, prevailed with the Camarinæans and Agrigentines: but the business finding a stop at Gela, he went unto no more, as conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. So he returned through the cities of the Siculi unto Catana, having been at Bricinniæ by the way and there encouraged them to hold out: and from Catana he set sail and departed. 5. In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he went by with sundry cities also of Italy, to enter into friendship with the Athenians. He also lighted on those Locrians, which having dwelt once in Messana, were afterwards driven out again; being the same men, which after the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Messana, wherein one of the factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit there, [and now were sent away again]: for the Locrians held Messana for a while. Phæax therefore chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own city, did them no hurt: because the Locrians had been in speech with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of all the confederates refused to make any peace at all with the Athenians. Nor indeed would they have done it now, but that they were constrained thereunto by the war they had with the Itoneans and Melæans, their own colonies and borderers. And Phæax after this returned to Athens.

Year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Cleon maketh war on Amphi polis. Galepsus taken by Cleon. Brasidas sitteth down over against Cleon at Cerdylium The forces of Brasidas. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon goeth up to Amphipolis against his own mind.

6. Cleon, who was now gone from Torone and come about to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted the city of Stageirus, a colony of the Andrians; but could not take it: but Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by assault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, to will him to come to him with his forces according to the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace unto Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up as many mercenary Thracians as he could; he lay still in Eion to expect their coming. Brasidas upon notice hereof, sat down over against him at Cerdylium. This is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing high and beyond the river, not far from Amphipolis; and from whence he might discern all that was about him. So that Cleon could not but be seen, if he should rise with his army to go against Amphipolis; which he expected he would do, and that in contempt of his small number he would go up with the forces he had then present. Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and took unto him all his Edonians, both horsemen and targetiers. He had also of Myrcinians and Chalcideans a thousand targetiers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for men of arms, his whole number was at the most two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas and sat down at Cerdylium: the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas their captain, within Amphipolis.

Cleon, not expecting a sally, vieweth the situation of the town. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Brasidas putteth himself into Amphipolis. A stratagem of Brasidas.

7. Cleon for a while lay still; but was afterwards forced to do as was expected by Brasidas. For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting with themselves what a command his would be, and with what

ignorance and cowardice against what skill and boldness of the other, and how they came forth with him against their wills: he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling to offend them with so long a stay in one place, dislodged and led them forward. And he took the same course there, which having succeeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to think himself to have some judgment. For he thought not that any body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out he went up principally to see the place: and stayed for greater forces, not to secure him in case he should be compelled to fight, but that he might therewith environ the city on all sides at once, and in that manner take it by force. So he went up and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon and the situation of the city towards Thrace: and thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, without battle. For neither did any man appear upon the walls, nor come out of the gates: which were all fast shut. Insomuch as he thought he had committed an error in coming without engines: because he thought he might by such means have won the city, as being without defendants. 8. Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians remove, came down also from Cerdylium and put himself into Amphipolis. He would not suffer them to make any sally, nor to face the Athenians in order of battle, mistrusting his own forces, which he thought inferior, not in number (for they were in a manner equal) but in worth: (for such Athenians as were there were pure, and the Lemnians and Imbrians which were amongst them were of the very ablest): but prepared to set upon them by a wile. For if he should have showed to the enemy both his number and their armour, such as for the present they were forced to use, he thought that thereby he should not so soon get the victory, as by keeping them out of sight and out of their contempt till the very point. Wherefore choosing to himself a hundred and fifty men of arms, and committing the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set suddenly

upon them before they should retire: as not expecting to take them so alone another time, if their succours chanced to arrive. And when he had called his soldiers together to encourage them and to make known unto them his design, he said as followeth:

the oration of brasidas to his soldiers. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Oration of Brasidas. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Oration of Brasidas.

9. “Men of Peloponnesus, as for your country, how by valour it hath ever retained her liberty, and that being Dorians you are now to fight against Ionians, of whom you were ever wont to get the victory, let it suffice that I have touched it thus briefly. But in what manner I intend to charge, that I am now to inform you of: lest the venturing by few at once, and not altogether, should seem to proceed from weakness, and so dishearten you. I do conjecture that it was in contempt of us, and as not expecting to be fought withal, that the enemy both came up to this place, and that they have now betaken themselves carelessly and out of order to view the country. But he that best observing such errors in his enemies, shall also to his strength give the onset, not always openly and in ranged battle, but as is best for his present advantage, shall for the most part attain his purpose. And these wiles carry with them the greatest glory of all, by which, deceiving most the enemy, a man doth most benefit his friends. Therefore whilst they are secure without preparation, and intend, for aught I see, to steal away rather than to stay: I say, in this their looseness of resolution, and before they put their minds in order, I for my part with those I have chosen will, if I can, before they get away fall in upon the midst of their army running. And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to have charged and, as it is probable, to have put them into affright, take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans and all the rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates run out upon them, and with all possible speed come up to stroke of hand. For there is great hope this way to terrify them; seeing they which

come after, are ever of more terror to the enemy than those that are already present and in fight. And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a Spartan: and you, confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the parts of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and obedience to his leaders; and that this day you shall either gain yourselves liberty by your valour, and to be called confederates of the Lacedæmonians, or else not only to serve the Athenians yourselves, and at the best, if you be not led captives, nor put to death, to be in greater servitude than before, but also to be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at stake: and I, for my part, will make it appear that I am not more ready to persuade another, than to put myself into action."

Brasidas prepareth to assault the army of the Athenians. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon is admonished of a sally towards: and leadeth his army back. Brasidas taketh this opportunity for his sally. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Brasidas is wounded and falleth. Cleon flieth, and is slain. Brasidas his army getteth the victory. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Brasidas liveth only so long as to know he had the victory.

10. When Brasidas had thus said, he both prepared to go out himself, and also placed the rest that were with Clearidas before the gates called the Thracian gates, to issue forth afterwards as was appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight when he came down from Cerdylium, and again when he sacrificed in the city, by the temple of Pallas, which place might be seen from without; it was told Cleon [whilst Brasidas was ordering of his men] (for he was at this time gone off a little to look about him), that the whole army of the enemies was plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet of many men and horses, ready to come forth, might be discerned from under the gate. Hearing this, he came to the place: and when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight until his aids arrived, and yet making no

other account but that his retreat would be discovered, he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat, and that as they went the left wing should march foremost, which was the only means they had to withdraw towards Eion. But when he thought they were long about it, causing the right wing to wheel about and lay open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he led away the army himself. Brasidas at the same time, having spied his opportunity and that the army of the Athenians removed, said to those about him and the rest: “these men stay not for us; it is apparent by the wagging of their spears and of their heads: for where such motion is, they use not to stay for the charge of the enemy: therefore open me some body the gates appointed, and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them”. Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and which was the first gate of the long wall, which then was standing; and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by the strongest part of the town, there standeth now a trophy: and charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified both with their own disarray and the valour of the man, forced them to fly. And Clearidas, as was appointed, having issued out by the Thracian gates, was withal coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden attempt, were on both sides in confusion: and the left wing which was next to Eion, and which indeed was marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of the army and fled. When that was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there wounded. The Athenians saw not when he fell: and they that were near took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it: and though Cleon himself presently fled, (as at first he intended not to stay), and was intercepted by a Myrcinian targetier and slain, yet his men of arms casting themselves into a circle on the [top of a little] hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas: and shrunk not at all, till begirt with the Myrcinian and Chalcidean horse and with the targetiers, they were put to

flight by their darts. Thus the whole army of the Athenians, getting away with much ado over the hills and by several ways, all that were not slain upon the place or by the Chalcidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion. The other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and having so long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city: and he knew that his side had gotten the victory, but expired shortly after. When Clearidas with the rest of the army were returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled those that were slain, and erected a trophy.

The honour done to Brasidas after his death. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

11. After this the confederates, following the corpse of Brasidas all of them in their arms, buried him in the city at the public charge; in the entrance of that which is now the market–place. And the Amphipolitans afterwards, having taken in his monument with a wall, killed unto him as to a hero, honoured him with games and anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their colony unto him as to the founder; pulling down the edifices of Agnon, and defacing whatsoever monument might maintain the memory of his foundation. This they did both for that they esteemed Brasidas for their preserver; and also because at this time, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedæmonians for a league. As for Agnon, because of their hostility with the Athenians, they thought it neither expedient for them to give him honours, nor that they would be acceptable unto him if they did. The dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians: of whom there were slain about six hundred, and but seven of the other side, by reason that it was no set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and precedent affright. After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went home by sea; and Clearidas and those with him stayed to settle the estate of Amphipolis.

Supplies going to Brasidas stay by the way at Heracleia. The end of the tenth summer.

12. About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were leading a supply towards the parts upon Thrace of nine hundred men of arms: and when they were come to Heracleia in Trachinia, they stayed there to amend such things as they thought amiss. Whilst they stayed, this battle was fought: and the summer ended.

The supplies going to Brasidas, hearing of his death, return to Lacedæmon. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians incline to peace. The causes why the Athenians desired peace. The causes why the Lacedæmonians desired peace. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

13. The next winter, they that were with Ramphias went presently forward, as far as [the hill] Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians forbidding them to go on, and Brasidas, to whom they were carrying this army, being dead, they returned homewards: conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both because the Athenians were upon this overthrow gone away, and for that they themselves were unable to perform any of those designs which the other had intended. But the principal cause of their return was this: that they knew at their coming forth, that the Lacedæmonians had their minds more set upon a peace than war. 14. Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and return of Rhamphias out of Thessaly, it fell out that neither side did any act of war, but were inclined rather to a peace: the Athenians for the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little after at Amphipolis; and because they had no longer that confident hope in their strength, on which they relied when formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived upon their present success that they should have had the upper hand; also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest emboldened by these losses of theirs they should more and more revolt; and repented that they made not the peace after their happy

success at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have done it honourably: and the Lacedæmonians on the other side did desire peace, because the war had not proceeded as they expected; for they had thought they should in a few years have warred down the power of Athens, by wasting their territory; and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the like whereof had never happened unto Sparta before; because also their country was continually ravaged by those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helotes continually fled to the enemy; and because they feared lest those which remained, trusting in them that were run away, should in this estate of theirs raise some innovation, as at other times before they had done. Withal it happened, that the thirty years' peace with the Argives was now upon the point of expiring; and the Argives would not renew it without restitution made them of Cynuria: so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives: as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

15. These things considered, it was by both parts thought good to conclude a peace; but especially by the Lacedæmonians, for the desire they had to recover their men taken in the island. For the Spartans that were amongst them, were both of the prime men of the city, and their kinsmen. And therefore they began to treat presently after they were taken: but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing they would be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which they were to meet and consult about a longer time.

Year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon and Brasidas opposers of the peace for several ends. Pleistoanax and Nicias persuaders to peace. Nicias his ends in seeking peace. The reason why Pleistoanax desired the peace. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Pleistoanax banished for withdrawing his army out of Attica.

16. But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain: the which on either side were most opposite to the peace; the one, for that he had good success and honour in the war; the other, because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniations be the less believed: those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go forward. Nicias, because he was desirous, having hitherto never been overthrown, to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had the same desire, because of the imputation laid upon him about his return from exile by his enemies, that suggested unto the Lacedæmonians upon every loss they received, that the same befel them for having, contrary to the law, repealed his banishment. For they charged him further, that he and his brother Aristocles had suborned the prophetess of Delphi, to answer the deputies of the Lacedæmonians, when they came thither, most commonly with this: “that they should bring back the seed of the semigod, the son of Jupiter, out of a strange country into his own: and that if they did not, they should plough their land with a silver plough”: and so at length to have made the Lacedæmonians nineteen years after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of Lacedæmon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their kings, to fetch him home again; who lived in the meantime in exile in the mountain Lycæum, in a house whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the

Lacedæmonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw his army out of Attica. 17. Being troubled with these imputations, and considering with himself, there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace, and the Lacedæmonians thereby recovering their men, that he also should cease to be obnoxious to the calumniations of his enemies; whereas in war, such as had charge could not but be quarrelled upon their losses: he was therefore forward to have the peace concluded.

The Lacedæmonians desiring the peace, make show of war. Peace concluded year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megareans, refuse to be comprehended.

And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacedæmonians braved them with a preparation already making against the spring, sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if they meant to fortify in Attica: to the end that the Athenians might give them the better ear. When after many meetings and many demands on either side, it was at last agreed that peace should be concluded, each part rendering what they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisæa: (for when they [likewise] demanded Platæa, and the Thebans answered that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but rendered voluntarily, the Athenians said that they also had Nisæa in the same manner): the Lacedæmonians calling together their confederates; and all but the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megareans, (for these disliked it), giving their votes for the ending of the war; they concluded the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians with sacrifice, and swore it, and the Athenians again unto them, upon these articles:

the articles of the peace between the athenians and the lacedæmonians.

18. “The Athenians, and Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, have made peace, and sworn it city by city, as followeth:

“Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will, to sacrifice in them, and to have access unto them, and to ask counsel of the oracles in the same, and to send their deputies unto them, according to the custom of his country, securely both by sea and land.

“The whole place consecrate and temple of Apollo in Delphi, and Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory, according to the institution of the place.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“ The peace shall endure between the Athenians with their confederates, and the Lacedæmonians with their confederates, for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud and without harmdoing.

“It shall not be lawful to bear arms with intention of hurt, neither for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates against the Athenians, nor for the Athenians and their confederates against the Lacedæmonians, by any art or machination whatsoever: if any controversy shall arise between them, the same shall be decided by law and by oath, in such manner as they shall agree on.

“The Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall render Amphipolis to the Athenians: the inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedæmonians shall render unto the Athenians, shall be at liberty to go forth whither they will with bag and baggage.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“ Those cities which paid the tribute taxed in the time of Aristides, continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws. And now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the Athenians or their confederates to bear arms against them, or to do them any hurt, as long as

they shall pay the said tribute: the cities are these: Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus; and they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedæmonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities unto it, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians to have them for confederates, having gotten their consent.

"The Mecybernæans, Sanæans, and Singæans, shall inhabit their own cities on the same conditions with the Olynthians and Acanthians.

"The Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall render Panactum unto the Athenians.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

" And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante: they shall likewise deliver whatsoever Lacedæmonians are in the prison of Athens, or in any prison of what place soever in the Athenian dominion: and dismiss all the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all that Brasidas did there put in, and whatsoever confederates of the Lacedæmonians are in prison, either at Athens or in the Athenian state.

"And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall deliver whomsoever they have in their hands of the Athenians or their confederates, in the same manner.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

"Touching the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermylians, and whatsoever other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with them what they think fit.

"The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, city by city; and that oath shall be the greatest that in each city is in use. The thing that they shall swear shall be this: I stand to these

articles and to this peace, truly and sincerely. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall take the same oath to the Athenians. This oath they shall on both sides every year renew, and shall erect pillars [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia, and in the Isthmus; at Athens, within the citadel; and at Lacedæmon, in the Amyclæum.

"And if anything be on either side forgotten, or shall be thought fit upon good deliberation to be changed; it shall be lawful for them to do it, in such manner as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians shall think fit, jointly.

19. "This peace shall take beginning from the 24th of the month Artemisium, Pleistolas being ephore at Sparta, and the 15th of Elaphebolium, after the account of Athens, Alcæus being archon.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

"They that took the oath and sacrificed, were these. Of the Lacedæmonians: Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians these: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

The true way of accounting the years of this war.

20. This peace was made in the very end of winter, and the spring then beginning, presently after the City Bacchanals, and [full] ten years and some few days over, after the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war. But now for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the times themselves: and not trust to the account of the names of such as in the several places bare chief offices, or for some honour to themselves had their names ascribed for marks to the actions foregoing. For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who in the midst, or how

he was, when anything fell out. But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they are written, he shall find by the two half years which make the whole, that this first war was of ten summers and as many winters continuance.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Lacedæmonians begin to perform the articles, and presently deliver their prisoners. The Amphipolitans refuse to render themselves under the Athenians. Clearidas endeavoureth to dissolve the peace. year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Lacedæmonians make league with the Athenians.

21. The Lacedæmonians (for it fell unto them by lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they had then in their hands, and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, into the parts upon Thrace, with command to Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to accept of the peace in such manner as was for every of them accorded. But they would not do it, because they thought it was not for their advantage: and Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcideans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could not do it whether they would or not. And coming away soon after with those ambassadors to Lacedæmon, both to purge himself, if he should be accused by those with Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, and also to try if the peace might by any means be shaken: when he found it firm, he himself being sent back by the Lacedæmonians with command principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that, then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians that were in it, immediately took his journey. 22. But the confederates chanced to be present themselves in Lacedæmon: and the Lacedæmonians required such of them as formerly refused, that they would accept the peace. But they, upon the same pretence on which they had rejected it before, said, that unless it were more reasonable they would not accept it. And the Lacedæmonians, seeing they refused, dismissed them, and by themselves

entered with the Athenians into a league: because they imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace, (because they had refused it before when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos, and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians): and also conceived, that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir; for if they could, they would turn to the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then present, and conference had, they agreed; and the oath and league was concluded on in the terms following:

the articles of the league between the lacedæmonians and the athenians.

23. "The Lacedæmonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for fifty years.

"If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians and do the Lacedæmonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedæmonians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly: but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by them both; and both cities shall again lay down the war jointly: and this is to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

"And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians, and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedæmonians shall aid the Athenians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly: but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by both; and both the cities shall again lay down the war together: and this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

Year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the league between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians.

"If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their strength possible.

“These things shall be sworn unto by the same men on either side that swore the peace, and shall be every year renewed by the Lacedæmonians [at their] coming to the Bacchanals at Athens; and by the Athenians [at their] going to the Hyacinthian feast at Lacedæmon; and either side shall erect a pillar, [inscribed with this league], one at Lacedæmon, near unto Apollo in the Amyclæum, another at Athens, near Minerva in the citadel.

“If it shall seem good to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians to add or take away anything touching the league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly.”

“24. Of the Lacedæmonians took the oath, these: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.”

The Athenians deliver the prisoners taken at Pylus. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

This league was made not long after the peace: and the Athenians delivered to the Lacedæmonians the men they had taken in the island; and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. And hitherto hath been written these ten years, which this first war continued without intermission.

The Lacedæmonians slack in performance of the articles of the peace.

25. After the peace and league made between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, after the ten years’ war, Pleistolas being ephore at Lacedæmon and Alcæus archon of Athens; though there were peace to those that had accepted it; yet the Corinthians and some cities of Peloponnesus endeavoured to overthrow what was done, and presently arose another stir by the confederates against Lacedæmon. And the Lacedæmonians also after

a while became suspect unto the Athenians, for not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. And for six years and ten months they abstained from entering into each other's territories with their arms: but the peace being weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could; and in the end were forced to dissolve the peace made after those ten years, and fell again into open war.

From the beginning to this end of the war, twenty–seven years. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The time of this peace not to be esteemed peace. The number of years which the whole war lasted. Thucydides, for his ill success at Amphipolis, banished Athens for twenty years.

26. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by summers and winters, as everything came to pass, until such time as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates had made an end of the Athenian dominion, and had taken their long walls and Pieræus. To which time from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty–seven years. As for the composition between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. For let him look into the actions that passed as they are distinctly set down; and he shall find that that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in which they neither rendered all, nor accepted all, according to the articles. Besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and in other actions, it was on both sides infringed: moreover, the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in hostility as before: and the Bœotians had but a truce from one ten days to another. So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed after it, a man shall find, counting by the times, that it came to just so many years and some few days: and that those who built upon the prediction of the oracles, have this number only to agree. And I remember yet, that from the very beginning of this war and so on till the end, it was uttered by many that it should be of thrice nine years' continuance. And for

the time thereof I lived in my strength, and applied my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was banished my country for twenty years, after my charge at Amphipolis: whereby being present at the affairs of both, and especially of the Lacedæmonians by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrels therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those ten years, and that which followed, according as from time to time the war was carried, I will now pursue.

Year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Corinthians contrive with the Argives to make a league in Peloponnesus without the Lacedæmonians.

27. After the concluding of the fifty years' peace and the league which followed, and when those ambassadors which were sent for out of the rest of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were departed from Lacedæmon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities) turning first to Argos, entered into treaty with some of the Argive magistrates to this purpose: — that the Lacedæmonians having made a peace and league with the Athenians, their hitherto mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them to consider of a course for the safety of the same: and to make a decree, that any city of the Grecians that would, and were a free city, and admitted the like and equal trials of judgment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives for the one mutually to aid the other: and to assign them a few men with absolute authority from the state, to treat with: and that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end, that if the multitude would not agree to it, it might be unknown that ever they had made such a motion: — affirming, that many would come into this confederacy upon hatred to the Lacedæmonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went home.

Year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Twelve men chosen at Argos to treat about a league.

28. These men of Argos having heard them, and reported their proposition both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives ordered the same accordingly: and elected twelve men, with whom it should be lawful for any Grecian to make the league that would, except the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, with neither of which they were to enter into any league without the consent of the Argive people. And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well for that they saw the Lacedæmonians would make war upon them; (for the truce between them was now upon expiring); as also because they hoped to have the principality of Peloponnesus. For about this time Lacedæmon had but a bad report, and was in contempt for the losses it had received. And the Argives in all points were in good estate, as not having concurred in the Attic war, but rather been at peace with both, and thereby gotten in their revenue. Thus the Argives received into league all such Grecians as came unto them.

Year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The rest of Peloponnesus incline to the same league. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The article of adding and altering misliked.

29. First of all therefore, came in the Mantineans and their confederates: which they did for fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come under the obedience of the Mantineans; over which they thought the Lacedæmonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any longer to command: and therefore they willingly joined with the Argives, as being, they thought, a great city, ever enemy to the Lacedæmonians, and governed as their own by democracy. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter amongst themselves, that it was fit for them to do the like: conceiving that there was somewhat in it more than they knew, that made the Mantineans to

turn; and were also angry with the Lacedæmonians, amongst many other causes, for that it was written in the articles of the Attic peace, that it should be lawful to add unto or take away from the same, whatsoever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians, and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might have a purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring them into subjection: for in justice, the power of changing the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the confederates in general. Whereupon, many fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

The Lacedæmonians expostulate with the Corinthians about this league with Argos. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The apology of the Corinthians, for their refusing the peace. Their answer touching their league with Argos. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Eleians make a league first with Corinth, then with Argos. Quarrel of the Eleians against the Lacedæmonians. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Corinthians and the towns upon Thrace enter into the league with Argos.

30. The Lacedæmonians perceiving this stir to begin in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it, and entered themselves also into the league with Argos, sent ambassadors unto Corinth, with intention to prevent the sequel of it: and accused them, both for the whole design, and for their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make from them to the league of the Argives; saying that they should therein infringe their oath, and that they had already done unjustly, to refuse the peace made with the Athenians; forasmuch as it is an article of their league, that what the major part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hindered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But the Corinthians, those confederates which had refused the peace as well as they being now at Corinth, (for they had sent for them before), in their answer to

the Lacedæmonians did not openly allege the wrongs they had received; as that the Athenians had not restored Solium nor Anactorium, nor anything else they had in this war lost: but pretended not to betray those of Thrace; for that they had in particular taken an oath to them, both when together with Potidæa they first revolted, and also another afterwards. And therefore, they said, they did not break the oath of their league by rejecting the peace with Athens. For having sworn unto them by the gods, they should in betraying them offend the gods. And whereas it is said, unless some god or hero hinder it, this appeareth to be a divine hindrance. Thus they answered for their old oath. Then, for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer: that when they had advised with their friends, they would do afterwards what should be just. And so the ambassadors of Lacedæmon went home. At the same time were present also in Corinth the ambassadors of Argos, to invite the Corinthians to their league, and that without delay. But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next sitting. 31. Presently after this came unto them an ambassage also from the Eleians: and first they made a league with the Corinthians; and going thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the declaration before mentioned. The Eleians had a quarrel with the Lacedæmonians concerning Lepreum. For the Lepreates having heretofore warred on certain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleians into their confederacy with condition to give the moiety of the land [to be won from them], when the war was ended, the Eleians gave unto the Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to Jupiter Olympian: which they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war. But afterwards upon pretence of that war giving over the payment, the Eleians would have forced them to it again. The Lepreates for help having recourse to the Lacedæmonians: and the cause being referred to their decision, the Eleians afterwards, upon suspicion that the

Lacedæmonians would not do them right, renounced the reference, and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless gave sentence, that the Lepreates should be at liberty to pay it or not, and that the Eleians did the injury: and because the Eleians had not stood to the reference, the Lacedæmonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. The Eleians taking this as if the Lacedæmonians had received their revolted city, and producing the article of their league, "that what every one possessed when they entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess when they gave it over"; revolted to the Argives as wronged, and entered league with them as is before related. After these came presently into the Argive league the Corinthians, and the Chalcideans upon Thrace. The Bœotians also and Megareans threatened as much: but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them, who were governed according to the government of the Lacedæmonians, by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.

The Athenians recover Scione. The Delians replanted in Delos. Phocis and Locris in war.

32. About the same time of this summer the Athenians expugned Scione, slew all that were within it at man's estate, made slaves of the women and children, and gave their territory to the Platæans. They also replanted the Delians in Delos, both in consideration of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also because the oracle at Delphi had commanded it. The Phoceans and Locrians also began a war at that time against each other.

The Corinthians seek to turn the cities of Pelopon– year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. nesus and other confederates from the Lacedæmonians to the Argives. The Corinthians seek the ten days' truce with Athens, as the Bœotians had it. The Bœotians take time to answer concerning a league

with Argos. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. 4. The Athenians deny the ten days' truce to the Corinthians.

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went to Tegea to cause it to revolt from the Lacedæmonians, conceiving it to be an important piece [of Peloponnesus], and making account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become enemies to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, grew less violent: and were afraid that no more of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they went to the Bœotians, and solicited them to enter into league with them and the Argives, and to do as they did. And the Corinthians further desired the Bœotians to go along with them to Athens, and to procure for them the like ten days' truce, to that which was made between the Athenians and Bœotians presently after the making of the fifty years' peace, on the same terms as the Bœotians had it: and if the Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs, and make no more truces hereafter without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this request, the Bœotians willed them, touching the league with the Argives, to stay a while longer, and went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days' truce: the Athenians answering, that if the Corinthians were confederates with the Lacedæmonians, they had a peace already. Nevertheless the Bœotians would not relinquish their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians both required the same, and affirmed that it was so before agreed on. Yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratification.

The Lacedæmonians demolish the fort of Cypsela.

33. The same summer the Lacedæmonians with their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans; partly as called in by occasion of sedition, and partly because

they intended, if they could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had built and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians towards Sciritis of Laconia. The Lacedæmonians therefore wasted the territory of the Parrhasians. And the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody of the Argives, came forth to aid the Parrhasians their confederates: but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the Lacedæmonians, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortification, went home likewise.

The Lacedæmonians put a garrison into Lepreum of men newly enfranchised. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. 4. The Lacedæmonians disable those that were taken in Sphacteria to bear office or to make bargain. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

34. The same summer, when those soldiers which went out with Brasidas, and of which Clearidas after the making of the peace had the charge, were returned from the parts upon Thrace: the Lacedæmonians made a decree, that those Helotes which had fought under Brasidas should receive their liberty, and inhabit where they thought good. But not long after they placed them, together with such others as had been newly enfranchised, in Lepreum; a city standing in the confines between Laconia and the Eleians, with whom they were now at variance. Fearing also lest those citizens of their own, which had been taken in the island and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should upon apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they disabled them [though] some of them were in office already. And their disablement was this: “that they should neither bear office, nor be capable to buy and sell”. Yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

The Dictideans take Thyssus from the Athenians. Jealousy between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. Amphipolis not yet rendered, nor the peace accepted in the parts about Thrace, nor by the Bœotians and Corinthians. The Athenians refuse to render Pylus. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. The apology of the Lacedæmonians for not performing the articles. The Athenians draw the Messenians and Helotes out of Pylus. The end of the eleventh summer

35. The same summer also the Dictideans took Thyssus, a town in Mount Athos, and confederate of the Athenians. This whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians: nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, to have each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution first, had not rendered Amphipolis and the other cities, nor had caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Bœotians nor Corinthians: though they had ever professed, that in case they refused they would join with the Athenians to bring them to it by force; and had prefixed a time, (though not by writing), within the which such as entered not into this peace were to be held as enemies unto both. The Athenians therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, suspected that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon refused to render Pylus when they required it: nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island; and detained the rest of the towns they then held, till the Lacedæmonians should have performed the conditions on their part also. The Lacedæmonians to this alleged, “that they had done what they were able to do; for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts upon Thrace, and whatsoever else was in their own power to perform: but Amphipolis, they said, was not in

their power to surrender: that they would endeavour to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia to be sent home: and therefore desired them to make restitution of Pylus, or, if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helotes, as they for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns upon Thrace; and if they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of Athenians". After divers and long conferences had this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians at the last, as they drew thence all the Messenians and Helotes, and all other Laconian fugitives: and placed them in Cranii, a city of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace, and free passage from one to another.

The Lacedæmonian ephores endeavour to dissolve the peace. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. A proposition of a league between the Lacedæmonians, Argives, Bœotians, and Corinthians.

36. In the beginning of winter, (for now there were other ephores in office; not those in whose time the peace was made, but some of them that opposed it), ambassadors being come from the confederates, and the Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being [already] there, and having had much conference together but concluded nothing, Cleobulus and Xenares, ephores that most desired the dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, entered into private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, exhorting them to run both the same course: and advised the Bœotians to endeavour first to make a league themselves with the Argives, and then to get the Argives together with themselves into a league with the Lacedæmonians: for that they might by this means avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens: for the Lacedæmonians would more regard the friendship and league of the Argives, than the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athenians: for they knew the Lacedæmonians had ever desired to have Argos their

friend upon any reasonable conditions; because they knew that their war without Peloponnesus would thereby be a great deal the easier. Wherefore they entreated the Bœotians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians: to the end, that if they could get Pylus for it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians the more commodiously.

The Argives propound a league to the Bœotians and Corinthians: year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. and promise to send ambassadors into Bœotia to that purpose. The Bœotians propound an oath between themselves, the Corinthians, Chalcideans, and Megareans, of mutual assistance. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. The Argive league with the Bœotians falleth off. year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

37. The Bœotians and Corinthians being dismissed by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedæmonians of that faction, with these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to their several cities. And two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having waited for and met with them by the way, entered into a treaty with them about a league between the Argives and the Bœotians, as there was between them and the Corinthians and the Eleians and Mantineans already: “for they thought, if it succeeded, they might [the more] easily have either war or peace, (forasmuch as the cause would now be common), either with the Lacedæmonians or whomsoever else it should be needful”. When the Bœotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased. For as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedæmon had been sent to procure of the Argives. These men therefore of Argos, when they saw that the Bœotians accepted of the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the Bœotians about it; and so departed. When the Bœotians were come home, they related there what they had heard both at Lacedæmon and by the way from the Argives. The governors of Bœotia were glad thereof; and much more forward in it now than

formerly they had been; seeing that not only their friends in Lacedæmon desired, but the Argives themselves hastened to have done the self–same thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from Argos, to solicit the dispatch of the business before propounded: but the governors of Bœotia commended [only] the proposition, and dismissed them with promise to send ambassadors about the league to Argos. 38. In the meantime the governors of Bœotia thought fit, that an oath should first be taken by themselves, and by the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the confederates upon Thrace, to give mutual assistance upon any occasion to them that should require it, and neither to make war nor peace without the common consent: and next that the Bœotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same course) should make a league with the Argives. But before this oath was [to be] taken, the governors of Bœotia communicated the business to the four Bœotian councils, in the which the whole authority of the state consisteth: and withal presented their advice, that any city that would, might join with them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition; because they feared to offend the Lacedæmonians, in being sworn to the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. For the governors of Bœotia had not reported unto them what had passed at Lacedæmon, how Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephores, and their friends there, had advised them to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards to make the same league with the Lacedæmonians: for they thought that the councils, though this had never been told them, would have decreed it no otherwise than they upon premeditation should advise. So the business was checked: and the ambassadors from Corinth and from the cities upon Thrace departed without effect. And the governors of Bœotia, that were before minded, if they had gotten this done, to have leagued themselves also with the Argives, made no mention of the Argives in the councils at all, nor

sent the ambassadors to Argos, as they had before promised: but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

C. 421. 0. Ol. 89. 4. Mecyberne taken from the Athenians by assault.

39. The same winter the Olynthians took Mecyberne, held with a garrison of the Athenians, by assault.

Year xi. A. C. 421. 0. Ol. 89. 4. The Lacedæmonians enter into a league with the Bœotians, knowing it to be against justice. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

After this the Lacedæmonians, (for the conferences between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about restitution reciprocal continued still), hoping that if the Athenians should obtain from the Bœotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylus, sent ambassadors to the Bœotians, with request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners might be put into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, that they might get Pylus restored in exchange. But the Bœotians answered, that unless the Lacedæmonians would make a particular league with them as they had done with the Athenians, they would not do it. The Lacedæmonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the Athenians; for that it was said in the articles, that neither party should make either league or war without the other's consent; yet such was their desire to get Panactum to exchange it for Pylus, and withal they that longed to break the peace with Athens were so eager in it, that at last they concluded a league with the Bœotians, winter then ending and the spring approaching: and Panactum was presently pulled down to the ground. So ended the eleventh year of this war.

Year xii. The Argives seek peace with the Lacedæmonians. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The territory of Cynuria, ground of the quarrels between Lacedæmon and Greece. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. An odd condition of a truce. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

40. In the spring following, the Argives, when they saw that the ambassadors which the Bœotians promised to send unto them came not, and

that Panactum was razed, and that also there was a private league made between the Bœotians and the Lacedæmonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the Lacedæmonians. For they apprehended that the Bœotians had been induced both to raze Panactum, and also to enter into the Athenians peace, by the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians were privy to the same: so that now they had no means to make league with the Athenians neither; whereas before they made account, that if their truce with the Lacedæmonians continued not, they might upon these differences have joined themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at a stand, and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeats, Bœotians, and Athenians, [as] having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedæmonians, and imagined to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and Æson, persons as they thought most acceptable unto them, with this cogitation, that by compounding with the Lacedæmonians as well as for their present estate they might, howsoever the world went, they should at least live at quiet. 41. When these ambassadors were there, they fell to treat of the articles upon which the agreement should be made. And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred, either to some private man or to some city, concerning the territory of Cynuria: about which they have always differed, as lying on the borders of them both; (it containeth the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedæmonians). But afterwards, the Lacedæmonians not suffering mention to be made of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it did before, they might, the Argive ambassadors got them to yield to this: “that for the present an accord should be made for fifty years; but withal, that it should be lawful nevertheless, if one challenged the other thereunto, both for Lacedæmon and Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, so that there were in

neither city a plague nor a war to excuse them": as once before they had done, when, as both sides thought, they had the victory: "and that it should not be lawful for one part to follow the chace of the other, further than to the bounds either of Lacedæmon or Argos." And though this seemed to the Lacedæmonians at first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards, because they desired by all means to have friendship with the Argives, they agreed unto it, and put into writing what they required. Howsoever, before the Lacedæmonians would make any full conclusion of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos, and to make the people acquainted with it; and then, if it were accepted, to return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these departed.

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors require Pylus in exchange for Panactum. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The Athenians take in evil part, both the razing of Panactum, and the league made with the Bœotians.

42. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromedes and Phædimus and Antimenidas, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Bœotians to render them to the Athenians, found that Panactum was demolished, and that their pretext was this: that there had been anciently an oath, by occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that neither part should inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. But for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Bœotians had, they that were with Andromedes received, convoyed, and delivered them unto the Athenians: and withal told them of the razing of Panactum, alleging it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter: for that they conceived that the Lacedæmonians had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down and should have been rendered standing; and because also they had heard of the private league made with the Bœotians, whereas they had promised to join with the

Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as had refused it. Withal they weighed whatsoever other points the Lacedæmonians had been short in, touching the performance of the articles; and thought themselves abused: so that they answered the Lacedæmonian ambassadors roughly, and dismissed them.

The Argives make league with Athens by means of Alcibiades. The cause why Alcibiades desireth to break with the Lacedæmonians. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. Alcibiades sendeth for the Argives to Athens to make a league.

43. This difference arising between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired to have the peace dissolved. Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, though young in years, yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much as any man of what city soever. Who was of opinion, that it was better to join with the Argives; not only for the matter itself, but also out of stomach labouring to cross the Lacedæmonians: because they had made the peace by the means of Nicias and Laches, without him; whom for his youth they had neglected, and not honoured as for the ancient hospitality between his house and them had been requisite: which his father had indeed renounced, but he himself, by good offices done to those prisoners which were brought from the island, had a purpose to have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first; alleging that the Lacedæmonians would not be constant, and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by that means away from them, and afterwards to invade the Athenians again when they should be destitute of their friends: and also as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself, willing them with all speed to come to Athens, as being thereunto invited, and to bring with them the Eleians and

Mantineans to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving, and promising that he would help them all he could.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The Lacedæmonian ambassadors come in haste to Athens, to prevent their league with the Argives.

44. The Argives having heard the message, and knowing that the Athenians had made no league with the Bœotians, and that they were at great quarrel with the Lacedæmonians, neglected the ambassadors they had then in Lacedæmon, whom they had sent about the truce, and applied themselves to the Athenians, with this thought: that if they should have war, they should by this means be backed with a city that had been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a league: and together with theirs went also the ambassadors of the Eleians and Mantineans. Thither also with all speed came the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious with the Athenians; for fear, lest in their passion they should make a league with the Argives, and withal to require the restitution of Pylus for Panactum; and to excuse themselves concerning their league with the Bœotians, as not made for any harm intended to the Athenians.

Alcibiades persuadeth the Lacedæmonian ambassadors to deny before the people that they had power to conclude. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. Alcibiades inveigheth against the Lacedæmonians.

45. Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear: lest, if they should say the same before the people, the multitude would be drawn unto their side, and so the Argive league fall off. But Alcibiades deviseth against them this plot. He persuaded the Lacedæmonians not to confess their plenary power before the people: and giveth them his faith, that then Pylus

should be rendered, (for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it as much as he now opposed it), and that the rest of their differences should be compounded. This he did to alienate them from Nicias: and that by accusing them before the people as men that had no true meaning nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league with the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans. And it came to pass accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to the question, whether they had full power of concluding, had, contrary to what they had said in council, answered No, the Athenians would no longer endure them; but gave ear to Alcibiades, that exclaimed against the Lacedæmonians far more now than ever: and were ready then presently to have the Argives and those others with them brought in, and to make the league: but an earthquake happening before anything was concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

Nicias endeavoureth to have the peace go on with the Lacedæmonians. Nicias is sent ambassador to Lacedæmon to get satisfaction about performance of the articles. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

46. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedæmonians had been abused, and he himself also deceived, touching their coming with full power to conclude; yet he persisted to affirm, that it was their best course to be friends with the Lacedæmonians, and to defer the Argives' business till they had sent to the Lacedæmonians again to be assured of their intention: saying, that it was honour unto themselves, and dishonour to the Lacedæmonians to have the war put off. For, for themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as they might: whereas to the other side, who were in evil estate, it should be in place of gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof himself was one: to require the Lacedæmonians, if they meant sincerely, to render Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; and if the Bœotians would not accept of the peace,

then to undo their league with them; according to the article, that the one should not make league with any without the consent of the other. They willed him to say further; “that they themselves also, if they had had the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Argives, who were present then at Athens for the same purpose.” And whatsoever they had to accuse the Lacedæmonians of besides, they instructed Nicias in it: and sent him and the other his fellow–ambassadors away. When they were arrived, and had delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all; “that the Athenians would make league with the Argives, unless the Lacedæmonians would renounce their league with the Bœotians, if the Bœotians accepted not the peace”: the Lacedæmonians denied to renounce their league with the Bœotians; for Xenares the ephore, and the rest of that faction, carried it: but at the request of Nicias they renewed their former oath. For Nicias was afraid he should return with nothing done, and be carped at (as after also it fell out) as author of the Lacedæmonian peace.

At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was effected at Lacedæmon, they grew presently into choler: and apprehending injury, (the Argives and their confederates being there present, brought in by Alcibiades), they made a peace and a league with them in these words:

the articles of the league between the athenians and the argives.

47. “The Athenians and Argives and Mantineans and Eleians, for themselves and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an accord for one hundred years, without fraud or damage, both by sea and land. It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleians nor Mantineans, nor their confederates, to bear arms against the Athenians, or the confederates under the command of the Athenians, or their confederates, by any fraud or machination whatsoever.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“ And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans, have made league with each other for one hundred years on these terms:

“If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans shall go unto Athens to assist them, according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy after he have spoiled the territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives, Eleians, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all those cities: and it shall not be lawful for any of those cities to give over the war, without the consent of all the rest.

“And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives, or of the Eleians, or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come unto Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, to assist them, in such sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back; then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians, and also to the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and war shall be made against it by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city, without the consent of all the rest.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the dominions either of themselves, or of any the confederates under their several commands, to make war in any place whatsoever, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, their passage be allowed.

“To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which sendeth them, shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive in the city that sent for them; and the like at their going away: but if they will use the army for a longer time, then the city that sent for them shall find them

maintenance, at the rate of three oboles of Ægina a day for a man of arms, and of a drachma of Ægina for a horseman.

“The city which sendeth for the aids, shall have the leading and command of them, whilst the war is in their own territory: but if it shall seem good unto these cities to make a war in common, then all the cities shall equally participate of the command.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“ The Athenians shall swear unto the articles, both for themselves and for their confederates: and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the confederates of these, shall every one swear unto them city by city. And their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several cities is used, and with most perfect hosts, and in these words: I will stand to this league according to the articles thereof, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by any art or machination whatsoever.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“This oath shall be taken at Athens by the senate and the officers of the commons; and administered by the Prytanes. At Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty, and by the Artynæ; and administered by the council of eighty. At Mantineia it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the senate, and by the rest of the magistrates; and administered by the theori and by the tribunes of the soldiers. At Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the officers of the treasury, and by the council of six hundred; and administered by the procurators of the people, and by the keepers of the law.

“This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis, and to Mantineia, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympian games; and by

the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens, ten days before the Panathenæan holydays.

“The articles of this league and peace and the oath shall be inscribed in a pillar of stone by the Athenians in the citadel: by the Argives in their market–place within the precincts of the temple of Apollo: and by the Mantineans in their market–place within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. And at the Olympian games now at hand, there shall be jointly erected by them all, a brazen pillar in Olympia [with the same inscription].

“If it shall seem good to any of these cities to add anything to these articles; whatsoever shall be determined by them all in common council, the same shall stand good.”

The Corinthians still refuse the peace with Athens, and incline again to the Lacedæmonians. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

48. Thus was the league and the peace concluded: and that which was made before between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, was notwithstanding by neither side renounced. But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league: nay, though there were made a league before this between [them and] the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, that where one, there all, should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it; but said that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend each other, but not to take part one with another in invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates, and inclined again to the Lacedæmonians.

The Olympian games Ol. 90. 1. The Lacedæmonians forbidden the exercises: and why. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1. Contention between the Lacedæmonians and Eleians before the Grecians at Olympia, about a mulct set upon the Lacedæmonians by the Eleians, for breaking the Olympic truce.

49. This summer were celebrated the Olympian games; in which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, was the first victor in the exercise called Pancratium. And the Lacedæmonians were by the Eleians prohibited the temple there; so as they might neither sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes amongst the rest: for that they had not paid the fine set upon them, according to an Olympic law, by the Eleians; that laid to their charge, that they had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum, in the time of the Olympic truce. The fine amounted unto two thousand minæ, which was two minæ for every man of arms, according to the law. But the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither, made answer, that they had been unjustly condemned; alleging that the truce was not published in Lacedæmon when their soldiers were sent out. To this the Eleians said again, that the truce was already begun amongst themselves; who used to publish it first in their own dominion: and thereupon, whilst they lay still and expected no such matter, as in time of truce, the Lacedæmonians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedæmonians hereunto replied, that it was not necessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedæmon at all, if they thought themselves wronged already: but rather, if they thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do it by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them afterwards. The Eleians stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would never be persuaded but injury had been done them: but were nevertheless contented, if they would render Lepreum, both to remit their own part of the money, and also to pay that part for them which was due unto the god.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1. Lichas a Lacedæmonian whipped upon the Olympic race. year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1.

50. When this would not be agreed unto, they then required this: not that they should render Lepreum, unless they would; but that then they should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, seeing they desired to have free use

of the temple, and there before the Grecians to take an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the Lacedæmonians refused that also, they were excluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games; and sacrificed at home: but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted to be spectators. Nevertheless, the Eleians fearing lest they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a guard there of their youngest men in arms: to whom were added Argives and Mantineans, of either city one thousand, and certain Athenian horsemen, who were then at Argos waiting the celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the assembly, lest the Lacedæmonians should come upon them with an army: and the rather, because Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, had been whipped by the serjeants upon the race: for that when his chariot had gotten the prize, after proclamation made that the chariot of the Bœotian state had won it, (because he himself was not admitted to run), he came forth into the race and crowned his charioteer, to make it known that the chariot was his own. This added much unto their fear, and they verily expected some accident to follow. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians stirred not: and the feast passed over.

Year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1. The twelfth summer.

After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians into their league. And the Lacedæmonian ambassadors chanced to be there also: and after much conference, and nothing concluded, upon occasion of an earthquake they brake off the conference, and returned every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

51. The next winter, the men of Heracleia in Trachinia fought a battle against the Ænianians, Dolopians, Melians, and certain Thessalians. For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as built to the prejudice only of

them; and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could; and also in this battle overcame them, and slew Xenares a Lacedæmonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

Year xiii. A. C. 419. Ol. 90. 1. year xiii. A. C. 419. Ol. 90. 1.

52. In the very beginning of the next summer, the Bœotians took Heracleia, miserably afflicted, into their own hands, and put Hegesippidas, a Lacedæmonian, out of it for his evil government. They took it, because they feared, lest whilst the Lacedæmonians were troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in by the Athenians. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians were offended with them for doing it. The same summer Alcibiades the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, by the practice of the Argives and their confederates, went into Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men at arms and archers of Athens, and some of the confederates which he took up there, as he passed through the country with his army, both ordered such affairs by the way concerning the league as was fit; and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to build their walls down to the sea–side, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and hindered him.

War between the Epidaurians and Argives.

53. The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives; the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in consideration of their pastures to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it: the Argives being the principal owners of the temple. But Alcibiades aad the Argives had indeed determined to take in the city, though without pretence at all; both that the Corinthians might not stir, and also that they might bring the Athenian succours from Ægina into those

parts, a nearer way than by compassing the promontory of Scyllæum. And therefore the Argives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by invasion.

Year xiii. A. C. 419. Ol. 90. 1. year xiii. A. C. 419. Ol. 90. 1.

54. About the same time also the Lacedæmonians, with their whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory towards Lycæum, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. No man knew against what place they intended the war; no not the cities themselves, out of which they were levied. But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage the tokens observed were unlucky, they went home again; and sent word about to their confederates, (being now the month Carneius), to prepare themselves after the next feast of the new moon, (kept by the Dorians), to be again upon their march. The Argives, who set forth the twenty–sixth day of the month before Carneius, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time they continued invading and wasting Epidauria. And the Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them: whereof some excused themselves upon the quality of the month; and others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and there stayed.

C. 419. Ol. 90. 2. Ambassadors meet about peace, but cannot agree.

55. Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the ambassadors of divers cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantineia, where in a conference amongst them Euphamidas of Corinth said: “that their actions agreed not with their words; forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians with their confederates and the Argives stood armed, in the meantime, against each other in order of battle: that it was therefore fit, that somebody should go first unto the armies from either side, and dissolve them; and then come again and dispute of peace”. This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives from

Epidauria. And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for all that agree: and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria.

The end of the thirteenth summer.

The Lacedæmonians also drew forth their army against Caryæ: but then again their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind, they returned. And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and Alcibiades their commander: but these hearing that the Lacedæmonians were in the field, and seeing now there was no longer need of them, departed. And so ended this summer.

Year xiii. A. C. 419. 8. Ol. 90. 2. The Argives acknowledge the sea on their own coast to be of the dominion of Athens.

56. The next winter the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, put three hundred garrison soldiers under the command of Agesippidas into Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians, that whereas it was written in the articles of the league, that no enemy should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea: and said they had wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the Messenians and Helotes into Pylus against the Lacedæmonians. Hereupon the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote upon the Laconian pillar, [under the inscription of the peace], that the Lacedæmonians had violated their oath: and they drew the Helotes out of Cranii, and put them again into Pylus, to infest the territory with driving off booties; but did no more.

C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. year xiii. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2.

All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle: but only ambushes and skirmishes, wherein were slain on both sides such as it chanced. But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives came to Epidaurus with

ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the war, thinking to have won it by assault: but returned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter; and the thirteenth year of this war.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3. Preparation of the Lacedæmonians against Argos.

57. In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedæmonians seeing that the Epidaurians their confederates were tired, and that of the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted, and others were but in evil terms; and apprehending that if they prevented it not, the mischief would spread still further: put themselves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. The Tegeats went also with them, and of the rest of Arcadia all that were in the Lacedæmonian league. But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were to meet together at Phlius: that is to say, of the Bœotians five thousand men of arms and as many light–armed, five hundred horse, and to every horseman another man on foot, [which holding the horse's mane ran by with equal speed]: of Corinthians two thousand men of arms, and of the rest more or less as they were: but the Phliasians, because the army was assembled in their own territory, put forth their whole power.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates meet at Phlius. The Argives go to meet them at the forest of Nemea. The Lacedæmonians come into the plains before Argos. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3. The Argives enclosed between the Lacedæmonians and the Bœotians: and the Lacedæmonians enclosed between the army of the Argives and their city.

58. The Argives, having had notice both formerly of the preparation of the Lacedæmonians, and afterward of their marching on to join with the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates, and three thousand men of arms of the Eleians: and marching forward, met the Lacedæmonians at

Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedæmonians, whilst they were single. But Agis, dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the confederates, unseen. Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning retired first to Argos, and afterwards to the forest of Nemea, by which they thought the Lacedæmonians and their confederates would fall in. But Agis came not the way which they expected: but with the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass, and came down into the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pellenians and Phliasians, marched another troublesome way. [Only] the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to come down by the way of the forest of Nemea, in which the Argives were encamped; to the end that if the Argives should turn head against the Lacedæmonians, these might set upon them at the back with their horse. Thus ordered, Agis entered into the plains, and spoiled Saminthus and some other towns thereabouts. 59. Which when the Argives understood, they came out of the forest somewhat after break of day to oppose them; and lighting among the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many. The Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, marched forward towards Nemea, and found that the Argives were departed: for when they came down and saw their country wasted, they put themselves into order of battle. And the Lacedæmonians on the other side did the same; and the Argives stood intercepted in the middest of their enemies. For in the plain between them and the city, stood the Lacedæmonians and those with them; above them, were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and towards Nemea, were the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had none: for the Athenians alone of all their confederates were not yet come.

Propositions of peace made by two private men of Argos:

Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was; but rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own: and that the Lacedæmonians were intercepted, not only in the Argives' territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of Argos, Thrasyllus, one of the five commanders of the army, and Alciphron, entertainer of the Lacedæmonians, when the armies were even ready to join, went unto Agis, and dealt with him to have the battle put off: forasmuch as the Argives were content and ready both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators, in whatsoever the Lacedæmonians should charge them withal; and in the meantime to have peace with them solemnly confirmed.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3. and accepted by Agis, without the knowledge of the rest of the commanders. Agis withdraweth his army, and is censured for it by the confederates. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3.

60. This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the generality. And Agis, of himself likewise, accepting their proposition without deliberation had with the major part, and having communicated it only to some one or more of those that had charge in the army, made truce with them for four months; in which space they were to perform the things agreed upon betwixt them: and then presently he withdrew his army without giving account to any of the rest of the league why he did so. The Lacedæmonians and the confederates followed Agis, according to the law, as being their general; but among themselves taxed him exceedingly: for that having a very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being inclosed on all sides both by their horse and foot, he yet went his way doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made. For this was, in very truth, the fairest army that ever the Grecians had in the field unto this day. But it was most to be seen, when they were all together in the forest of Nemea: where

the Lacedæmonians were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and these all chosen men of their several cities, and such as were thought a match, not only for the league of the Argives, but for such another added to it. The army thus offended with Agis, departed; and were dissolved every man to his home.

Thrasyllus punished for propounding the peace.

The Argives were much more offended with those of their city, which without the consent of the multitude had made the truce: they also supposing, that the Lacedæmonians had escaped their hands in such an advantage as they never had the like before; in that the battle was to have been fought under the city walls, and with the assistance of many and good confederates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum; the place where the soldiers, before they enter into the city from warfare, use to have their military causes heard. But he flying to the altar saved himself: nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

The Athenians instigate the Argives to break the truce. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Argives break the truce, and besiege Orchomenus. Orchomenus yielded. The Argives go next against year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. Tegea: which displeaseth the Eleians, and they go home.

61. After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men of arms and three hundred horse under the conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians) willed them to be gone again: and when they desired to treat, would not present them to the people till such time as the Mantineans and Eleians, who were not yet gone, forced them unto it by their importunity. Then the Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades that was ambassador there, spake unto the Argives and their confederates; saying “that the truce was unduly made without the assent of the rest of

their confederates, and that now (for they were come time enough) they ought to fall again to the war": and did by their words so prevail with the confederates, that they all, save the Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus of Arcadia. And these, though satisfied, stayed behind at first, but afterwards they also went; and sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly besieged and assaulted the same; desiring to take it in as well for other causes, as chiefly for that the hostages which the Arcadians had given to the Lacedæmonians were there in custody. The Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of their walls, and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief could arrive, yielded up the town on conditions: "to be received into the league, give hostages for themselves, and to surrender the hostages held there by the Lacedæmonians into the hands of the Mantineans". 62. The confederates after this, having gotten Orchomenus, sat in council about what town they should proceed against next. The Eleians gave advice to go against Lepreum: but the Mantineans against Tegea. And the Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with the Mantineans. But the Eleians, taking it in evil part that they did not decree to go against Lepreum, went home. But the rest prepared themselves at Mantineia to go against Tegea, which also some within had a purpose to put into their hands.

The Lacedæmonians question their king for suffering the Argives to go off unfoughten.

63. The Lacedæmonians, after their return from Argos with their four months' truce, severely questioned Agis, for that upon so fair an opportunity as they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the state: for so many and so good confederates would hardly be gotten together again at one time. But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was their indignation much greater: and they presently resolved, contrary to their own custom, in their passion, to raze his house, and fine him in the

sum of ten thousand drachmes. But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet: and promised that, leading out the army again, he would by some valiant action cancel those accusations; or, if not, they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatsoever they thought good. So they forbore both the fine and the razing of his house: but made a decree for that present, such as had never been before: that ten Spartans should be elected and joined with him as councillors, without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army into the field.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians put their army into the field to rescue Tegea. The Lacedæmonians waste the territory of Mantineia.

64. In the meantime came news from their side in Tegea; that, unless they came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and their confederates; and that they wanted little of being revolted already. Upon this, the Lacedæmonians with speed levied all their forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, in such number as they had never done before, and marched unto Oresteium in Mænalia: and appointed the Arcadians, such as were of their league, to assemble and follow them at the heels to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians being come entire to Oresteium, from thence sent back the sixth part of their army, in which they put both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of the city; and with the rest marched on to Tegea: and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia. They also sent to Corinth, and to the Bœotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, to come with their aids with all speed to Mantineia. But these had too short a warning; nor was it easy for them, unless they came all together and stayed for one another, to come through the enemy's country, which lay between and barred them of passage. Nevertheless, they made what haste they could. And the Lacedæmonians, taking with them their Arcadian

confederates present, entered into the territory of Mantineia; and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Argives come down from their advantage to seek the enemy. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians put themselves in order hastily.

65. The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in sight, seized on a certain place fortified by nature and of hard access, and put themselves into battle array. And the Lacedæmonians marched presently towards them; and came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the ancient men of the army cried out unto Agis, (seeing him to go on against a place of that strength), that he went about to amend one fault with another: signifying, that he intended to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was questioned for, with his now unseasonable forwardness. But he, whether it were upon that increpation, or some other sudden apprehension of his own, presently withdrew his army before the fight began; and marching unto the territory of Tegea, turned the course of the water into the territory of Mantineia: touching which water, because into what part soever it had his course it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeans were at wars. Now his drift was, by the turning of that water to provoke those Argives and their confederates which kept the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose them; that so they might fight with them in the plain. And by that time he had stayed about the water a day, he had diverted the stream. The Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them: and knew not what to make of it. But when after the retreat they returned no more in sight, and that they themselves, lying still on the place, did not pursue them: then began they anew to accuse their commanders, both for suffering the Lacedæmonians to depart formerly, when they had them inclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos; and now again, for not

pursuing them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, and betraying the army. The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat: but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain, encamped as to go against the enemy. 66. The next day, the Argives and their confederates put themselves into such order as, if occasion served, they meant to fight in: and the Lacedæmonians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceived the enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come down already from the hill. Certainly the Lacedæmonians were more affrighted at this time, than ever they had been to their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare themselves, was exceedingly short: and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his own rank, Agis the king commanding all according to the law. For whilst the king hath the army in the field, all things are commanded by him: and he signifieth what is to be done to the polemarchi, they to the lochagi, these to the pentecontateres, and these again to the enomotarchi; who lastly make it known, every one to his own enomotia. In this manner, when they would have anything to be done, their commands pass through the army, and are quickly executed. For almost all the Lacedæmonian army, save a very few, are captains of captains: and the care of what is to be put in execution lieth upon many.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The order of the battle of the Argives. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3.

67. Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritæ, which amongst the Lacedæmonians have ever alone that place. Next to these were placed the Brasideian soldiers lately come out of Thrace, and with them those that had been newly made free. After them in order the rest of the Lacedæmonians, band after band; and by them Arcadians, first the Heræans, after these the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeats, and a few Lacedæmonians

in the point of the same wing. And upon the outside of either wing, the horsemen. So stood the Lacedæmonians. Opposite to them, in the right wing stood the Mantineans; because it was upon their own territory; and with them such Arcadians as were of their league. Then the thousand chosen Argives, which the city had for a long time caused to be trained for the wars at the public charge: and next to them the rest of the Argives. After these, the Cleonæans and Orneates, their confederates. And lastly, the Athenians, with the horsemen (which were also theirs) had the left wing. 68. This was the order and preparation of both the armies. The army of the Lacedæmonians appeared to be the greater. But what the number was, either of the particulars of either side or in general, I could not exactly write. For the number of the Lacedæmonians, agreeable to the secrecy of that state, was unknown; and of the other side, for the ostentation usual with all men touching the number of themselves, was unbelieved. Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedæmonians may be attained by computing thus. Besides the Sciritæ, which were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments, in every regiment were four companies, in each company were four enomotiæ, and of every enomotia there stood in front four: but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the captains of bands thought it necessary; but the army in general was so ordered, as to be eight men in depth. And the first rank of the whole, besides the Sciritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty–eight soldiers.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The hortative to the Argives and their confederates. The Lacedæmonians encourage one another.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The fight.

69. Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made their hortatives, every one to those that were under his own command. To the Mantineans it was said, “that they were to fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude; that the former might not be taken

from them, and that they might not again taste of the latter." The Argives were admonished, "that whereas anciently they had the leading of Peloponnesus, and in it an equal share, they should not now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; and that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a city, their neighbour and enemy." To the Athenians, it was remembered, "how honourable a thing it would be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior to none of them; and that if they had once vanquished the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured, and the larger by it; and that no other would invade their territory hereafter." Thus much was said to the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedæmonians encouraged one another, both of themselves, and also by the manner of their discipline in the wars; taking encouragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what they already knew; as being well acquainted, that a long actual experience conferred more to their safety than any short verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered. 70. After this followed the battle. The Argives and their confederates marched to the charge with great violence and fury. But the Lacedæmonians slowly and with many flutes, according to their military discipline; not as a point of religion, but that, marching evenly and by measure, their ranks might not be distracted; as the greatest armies, when they march in the face of the enemy, use to be.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians have the disadvantage for order, but advantage of valour year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians have the victory.

71. Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis the king thought of this course. All armies do thus. In the conflict they extend their right wing, so as it cometh in upon the flank of the left wing of the enemy: and this happeneth, for that every one, through fear, seeketh all he can to cover his

unarmed side with the shield of him that standeth next to him on his right hand; conceiving, that to be so locked together is their best defence. The beginning hereof, is in the leader of the first file on the right hand: who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy, the rest upon like fear follow after. And at this time, the Mantineans in the right wing had far encompassed the Sciritæ: and the Lacedæmonians on the other side, and the Tegeats, were come in yet further upon the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and supposing the Mantineans to be come in far, signified unto the Sciritæ and Brasideians to draw out part of their bands, and therewith to equalise their left wing to the right wing of the Mantineans; and into the void space, he commanded to come up Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two colonels, with their bands out of the right wing, and to fall in there and make up the breach: conceiving that more than enough would still be remaining in their right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger. 72. But it happened, (for he commanded it in the very onset and on the sudden), both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to go to the place commanded; (for which they were afterwards banished Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice); and that the enemy had in the meantime also charged: and when those which he commanded to go to the place of the Sciritæ went not, they could no more reunite themselves nor close again the empty space. But the Lacedæmonians, though they had the worst at this time in every point for skill, yet in valour they manifestly showed themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, notwithstanding that the right wing of the Mantineans did put to flight the Sciritæ and Brasideians, and that the Mantineans together with their confederates and those thousand chosen men of Argos, falling upon them in flank by the breach not yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedæmonians, and put to flight and chased them to their

carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left there for a guard; so as in this part the Lacedæmonians were overcome: yet with the rest of the army, and especially the middle battle where Agis was himself, and those which are called the three hundred horsemen about him, they charged upon the eldest of the Argives, and upon those which are named the five cohorts, and upon the Cleonæans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst them; and put them all to flight: in such sort as many of them never struck stroke, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians charged gave ground presently; and some for fear to be overtaken were trodden under foot.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians pursue not the enemy far.

73. As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground, they began also to break on either side. The right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeats had now with their surplusage of number hemmed the Athenians in, so as they had the danger on all hands; being within the circle, pent up, and without it, already vanquished. And they had been the most distressed part of all the army, had not their horsemen come in to help them. Withal it fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing of his own army to labour, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go and relieve the part overcome. By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as, together with them, were overlaid, whilst the army passed by and declined them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Mantineans with their confederates, and those chosen Argives, had no more mind now of pressing upon their enemies: but seeing their side was overcome and the Lacedæmonians approaching them, presently turned their backs. Of the Mantineans the greatest part were slain; but of those chosen Argives, the most were saved; by reason the flight and going off was neither hasty nor

long. For the Lacedæmonians fight long and constantly, till they have made the enemy to turn his back: but that done, they follow him not far.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. Number of the dead.

74. Thus, or near thus, went the battle; the greatest that had been of a long time between Grecians and Grecians; and of two the most famous cities. The Lacedæmonians laying together the arms of their slain enemies, presently erected a trophy, and rifled their dead bodies. Their own dead they took up, and carried them to Tegea, where they were also buried: and delivered to the enemy theirs under truce. Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonæans were slain seven hundred: of the Mantineans, two hundred: and of the Athenians with the *Æ*ginetæ, likewise two hundred, and both the captains. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians were never pressed, and therefore their loss was not worth mentioning: and of the Lacedæmonians themselves, it is hard to know the certainty; but it is said, there were slain three hundred.

The Lacedæmonians recover their reputation.

75. When it was certain they would fight, Pleistoanax the other king of the Lacedæmonians, and with him both old and young, came out of the city to have aided the army: and came forth as far as Tegea, but being advertised of the victory they returned. And the Lacedæmonians sent out to turn back also those confederates of theirs, which were coming to them from Corinth and from without the isthmus. And then they also went home themselves; and having dismissed their confederates, (for now were the Carneian holidays), celebrated that feast. Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the Grecians: for they had been taxed both with cowardice for the blow they received in the island, and with imprudence and slackness on other occasions. But after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune,

and for their minds they were esteemed to have been ever the same they had been.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Epidaurians enter the territory of Argos. The Athenians build a fort before Epidaurus The end of the twelfth summer.

The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being emptied much of men: and whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend it. Also three thousand men of Elis and a thousand Athenians, besides those which had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epidaurus; and lay before it all the while the Lacedæmonians were celebrating the Carneian holidays: and assigning to every one his part, began to take in the city with a wall. But the rest gave over: only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification, (which was their task), wherein stood the temple of Juno. In it amongst them all they left a garrison; and went home every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

Peace concluded between the Argives and Lacedæmonians. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3.

76. In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedæmonians, presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew out their army into the field: and being come to Tegea, sent certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There were, before this time, many citizens in Argos well affected to the Lacedæmonians, and that desired the deposing of the Argive people: and now after the battle they were better able by much to persuade the people to composition than they formerly were. And their design was, first, to get a peace made with the Lacedæmonians, and after that a league; and then at last to set upon the commons.

There went thither Lichas the son of Archesilaus, entertainer of the Argives in Lacedæmon, and brought to Argos two propositions: one of war, if the war were to proceed; another of peace, if they were to have peace. And after much contradiction, (for Alcibiades was also there), the Lacedæmonian faction, that boldly now discovered themselves, prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace; which was this.

the articles.

77. “It seemeth good to the council of the Lacedæmonians to accord with the Argives on these articles:

“The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchomenians their children, and unto the Mænalians their men, and unto the Lacedæmonians those men that are at Mantineia: they shall withdraw their soldiers from Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there.

“And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus [likewise], they shall be held as enemies both to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and also to the confederates of them both.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The Articles.

“ If the Lacedæmonians have any men of theirs in custody, they shall deliver them every one to his own city.

“And for so much as concerneth the god, the Argives shall accept composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath which they shall swear, touching that controversy; and the Argives shall give the form of that oath.

“All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free according to their patrial laws.

“If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought reasonable.

“The confederates of the Lacedæmonians without Peloponnesus, shall have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and of the Lacedæmonians have; every one holding his own.

“This composition is to hold from the time, that they shall both parts have showed the same to their confederates, and obtained their consent.

Year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3.

“ And if it shall seem good to either part to add or alter anything, their confederates shall be sent unto, and made acquainted therewith.”

78. These propositions the Argives accepted at first; and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned from Tegea to their own city. But shortly after, when they had commerce together, the same men went further; and so wrought, that the Argives renouncing their league with the Mantineans, Eleians, and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedæmonians in this form.

the league between the argives and lacedæmonians.

79. “It seemeth good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty years on these articles:

“That either side shall allow unto the other equal and like trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.

“That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and alliance comprehending also them) shall be free both from the laws and payments of any other city than their own; holding what they have, and affording equal and like trials of judgment according to the form used in their several cities.

“That every of the cities confederate with the Lacedæmonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the Lacedæmonians: and the confederates of the Argives, in the same with the Argives: every one holding his own.

“That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be taken in common, the Lacedæmonians and the Argives shall consult thereof, and decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates. And that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, they also shall decide it.

“That if any confederate city be at contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think most indifferent: but the particular men of any one city shall be judged according to the law of the same.”

The Argives and Lacedæmonians make an order that the Athenians shall quit the fort. They solicit the towns upon Thrace to revolt from the Athenians. year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. Demosthenes being sent to fetch their soldiers from the fort, delivereth the same by a wile to the Epidaurians.

80. Thus was the peace and league concluded: and whatsoever one had taken from the other in the war, or whatsoever one had against another otherwise, was all acquitted. Now, when they were together settling their business, they ordered that the Argives should neither admit herald nor ambassage from the Athenians till they were gone out of Peloponnesus, and had quit the fortification: nor should make peace or war with any without consent of the rest. And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they sent ambassadors from both their cities to the towns lying upon Thrace and unto Perdiccas: whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it: because he saw the Argives had done so; and was himself also anciently descended out of Argos. They likewise renewed their old oath with the Chalcideans; and took another besides it. The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to abandon the fortification they had made against Epidaurus. And the Athenians considering that the soldiers they had

in it were few in respect to the many others that were with them in the same, sent Demosthenes to fetch them away. He, when he was come, and had exhibited for a pretence a certain exercise of naked men without the fort, when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates: and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

C. 417. Ol. 90. 3. The Mantineans forsake the league of Athens. year xiv. A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 3. Sicyon and Argos reduced to oligarchies.

81. After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood it at first, yet being too weak without the Argives, made their peace with the Lacedæmonians; and laid down their command over the other cities. And the Lacedæmonians and Argives with a thousand men of either city having joined their arms, the Lacedæmonians first, with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller number; and then they both together dissolved the democracy at Argos. And the oligarchy was established conformable to the state of Lacedæmon.

These things passed in the end of winter, and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

Year xv. The Dictideans revolt from Athens: Achaia oligarchized: Argos relapseth into a democracy

82. The next summer the Dictideans seated in Mount Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans.

Year xv. A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 4. The Argives come again to the league of Athens, and with long walls take in a way from their city to the sea. The end of the fifteenth summer.

And the Lacedæmonians ordered the state of Achaia after their own form, which before was otherwise. But the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled themselves and recovered heart, taking the time when the Lacedæmonians were celebrating their exercises of the naked youth,

assaulted the few; and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had the victory; and some they slew, others they drave into exile. The Lacedæmonians, though those of their faction in Argos sent for them, went not a long time after: yet at last they adjourned the exercises, and came forth with intention of giving them aid. But hearing by the way at Tegea, that the few were overcome, they could not be entreated by such as had escaped thence, to go on: but returning, went on with the celebration of their exercises. But afterwards, when there came ambassadors unto them, both from the Argives in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side: they concluded at last, that those in the city had done the wrong, and decreed to go against Argos with their army; but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. In the meantime the common people of Argos, fearing the Lacedæmonians, and regaining the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would turn to their very great advantage, raise long walls from their city down to the sea–shore: to the end, that if they were shut up by land, they might yet with the help of the Athenians bring things necessary into the city by sea. And with this their building, some other cities of Peloponnesus were also acquainted. And the Argives universally, themselves and wives and servants, wrought at the wall: and had workmen and hewers of stone from Athens. So this summer ended.

The Lacedæmonian army comes to Argos, and razeth the walls which they were building. year xv. A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 4. They take Hysiæ, a town in Argeia. The Argives spoil the territory of Phliasia.

83. The next winter the Lacedæmonians, understanding that they were fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their confederates all but the Corinthians: and some practice they had beside within the city itself of Argos. The army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. But those things which were practising in Argos and

supposed to have been already mature, did not then succeed. Nevertheless they took the walls that were then in building, and razed them to the ground: and then, after they had taken Hysiæ, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home, and were dissolved every one to his own city. After this, the Argives went with an army into Phliasia: which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it, because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws: for there the greatest part of them dwelt.

The Athenians quarrel Perdiccas, and bar him the use of the sea.

The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia [from the use of the sea]: objecting, that he had sworn the league of the Argives and Lacedæmonians; and that when they had prepared an army, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, to go against the Chalcideans upon Thrace and against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and him, and by his departure was the principal cause of the dissolution of that army; and was therefore an enemy. And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

Year xvi. Alcibiades fetcheth away three hundred citizens of Argos for Lacedæmonism.

84. The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with twenty galleys; and took thence the suspected Argives, and such as seemed to savour of the Lacedæmonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and put them into the nearest of the islands subject to the Athenian state.

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. The Athenians war against the island of Melos.

The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own, twelve hundredmen of arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback: and of their confederates and islanders, about fifteen

hundred men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians, and therefore refused to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, unto the Athenians; but rested at the first neutral; and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it by wasting of their land, they entered into open war.

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, being encamped upon their land with these forces, before they would hurt the same sent ambassadors to deal with them first by way of conference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude; but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few: and they accordingly said as followeth:

dialogue between the athenians and melians. year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

85. Athenians. "Since we may not speak to the multitude, for fear lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable arguments all at once in a continued oration, they should chance to be seduced; (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us to audience before the few); make surer yet that point, you that sit here: answer you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but presently interrupting us, whensoever anything shall be said by us which shall seem unto you to be otherwise. And first answer us, whether you like this motion or not?"

86. Whereunto the council of the Melians answered: "The equity of a leisurely debate is not to be found fault withal; but this preparation of war, not future but already here present, seemeth not to agree with the same. For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference: and that the issue of it, if we be superior in argument and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war; and if we yield, servitude."

87. Ath. "Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions of what may be, or to any other purpose than to take advice upon what is present

and before your eyes, how to save your city from destruction, let us give over. But if this be the point, let us speak to it."

88. Mel. "It is reason, and pardonable for men in our cases, to turn both their words and thoughts upon divers things. Howsoever, this consultation being held only upon the point of our safety, we are content, if you think good, to go on with the course you have propounded."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

89. Ath. "As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences; as, that having defeated the Medes, our reign is therefore lawful, or, that we come against you for injury done; make a long discourse without being believed: so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying, either that you therefore took not our parts because you were a colony of the Lacedæmonians, or that you have done us no injury. But out of those things which we both of us do really think, let us go through with that which is feasible; both you and we knowing, that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

90. Mel. "Well then, (seeing you put the point of profit in the place of justice), we hold it profitable for ourselves, not to overthrow a general profit to all men, which is this: that men in danger, if they plead reason and equity, nay, though somewhat without the strict compass of justice, yet it ought ever to do them good. And the same most of all concerneth you: forasmuch as you shall else give an example unto others of the greatest revenge that can be taken, if you chance to miscarry."

91. Ath. “As for us, though our dominion should cease, yet we fear not the sequel. For not they that command, as do the Lacedæmonians, are cruel to those that are vanquished by them; (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedæmonians); but such as having been in subjection, have assaulted those that commanded them and gotten the victory. But let the danger of that be to ourselves. In the meantime we tell you this: that we are here now both to enlarge our own dominion, and also to confer about the saving of your city. For we would have dominion over you without oppressing you, and preserve you to the profit of us both.”

92. Mel. “But how can it be profitable for us to serve; though it be so for you to command?”

93. Ath. “Because you by obeying, shall save yourselves from extremity; and we not destroying you, shall reap profit by you.”

94. Mel. “But will you not accept, that we remain quiet and be your friends, (whereas before we were your enemies), and take part with neither?”

95. Ath. “No. For your enmity doth not so much hurt us, as your friendship will be an argument of our weakness, and your hatred of our power, amongst those we have rule over.”

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

96. Mel. “Why? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most part have been your own colonies, and some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same consideration?”

97. Ath. “Why not? For they think they have reason on their side, both the one sort and the other; and that such as are subdued, are subdued by force, and such as are forborne, are so through our fear. So that by subduing you, besides the extending of our dominion over so many more subjects, we

shall assure it the more over those we had before; especially being masters of the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued already."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

98. Mel. "Do you think then, that there is no assurance in that which we propounded? For here again, (since driving us from the plea of equity you persuade us to submit to your profit), when we have shewed you what is good for us, we must endeavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it shall be good for you also. As many therefore as now are neutral, what do you but make them your enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings, they look that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon them? And what is this, but to make greater the enemies you have already, and to make others your enemies, each against their wills, that would not else have been so?"

99. Ath. "We do not think that they shall be ever the more our enemies, who inhabiting anywhere in the continent, will be long ere they so much as keep guard upon their liberty against us. But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders offended with the necessity of subjection which they are already in: these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both themselves and us into apparent danger."

100. Mel. "If you then to retain your command, and your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost of danger: would it not in us, that be already free, be great baseness and cowardice, if we should not encounter anything whatsoever rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into bondage?"

101. Ath. "No; if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms, wherein to forfeit your honour; but rather a

consultation upon your safety, that you resist not such as be so far your overmatches."

102. Mel. "But we know that, in matter of war, the event is sometimes otherwise than according to the difference of number in sides: and that if we yield presently, all our hope is lost; whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves up."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

103. Ath. "Hope, the comfort of danger, when such use it as have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not. But to such as set their rest upon it, (for it is a thing by nature prodigal), it at once by failing maketh itself known; and known, leaveth no place for future caution. Which let not be your own case, you that are but weak, and have no more but this one stake. Nor be you like unto many men: who though they may presently save themselves by human means, will yet, when upon pressure of the enemy their most apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones; as divination, oracles, and other such things which with hopes destroy men."

104. Mel. "We think it, you well know, a hard matter for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on equal terms. Nevertheless we believe that, for fortune, we shall be nothing inferior; as having the gods on our side, because we stand innocent against men unjust: and for power, what is wanting in us will be supplied by our league with the Lacedæmonians, who are of necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity's sake and for their own honour, to defend us. So that we are confident, not altogether so much without reason as you think."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

105. Ath. “As for the favour of the gods, we expect to have it as well as you: for we neither do, nor require anything contrary to what mankind hath decreed, either concerning the worship of the gods, or concerning themselves. For of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men, that for certain by necessity of nature they will every where reign over such as they be too strong for. Neither did we make this law, nor are we the first that use it made: but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so also we use it: knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same. So that forasmuch as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedæmonians, in that you believe they will help you for their own honour: we bless your innocent minds, but affect not your folly. For the Lacedæmonians, though in respect of themselves and the constitutions of their own country they are wont for the most part to be generous; yet in respect of others, though much might be alleged, yet the shortest way one might say it all thus: that most apparently of all men, they hold for honourable that which pleaseth, and for just that which profiteth. And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd means of safety.”

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

106. Mel. “Nay, for this same opinion of theirs, we now the rather believe that they will not betray their own colony, the Melians; and thereby become perfidious to such of the Grecians as be their friends, and beneficial to such as be their enemies.”

107. Ath. “You think not then, that what is profitable must be also safe, and that which is just and honourable must be performed with danger; which commonly the Lacedæmonians are least willing of all men to undergo [for others].”

108. Mel. “But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us, rather than for any other; and that they think that we will be more assured unto them, than unto any other: because for action, we lie near to Peloponnesus, and for affection, are more faithful than others for our nearness of kin.”

109. Ath. “The security of such as are at wars, consisteth not in the good will of those that are called to their aid, but in the power of those means they excel in. And this the Lacedæmonians themselves use to consider more than any; and therefore, out of diffidence in their own forces, they take many of their confederates with them, though to an expedition but against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an island.”

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

110. Mel. “Yea, but they may have others to send: and the Cretic sea is wide, wherein to take another is harder for him that is master of it, than it is for him that will steal by, to save himself. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against your own territory, or those of your confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trouble yourselves, no more about a territory that you have nothing to do withal, but about your own and your confederates.”

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

111. Ath. “Let them take which course of these they will, that you also may find by experience, and not be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet gave over siege for fear of any diversion upon others. But we observe that, whereas you said you would consult of your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said anything, which a man relying on could hope to be preserved by: the strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; and your present power is too short to defend you against the forces already

arranged against you. You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless excluding us you make amongst yourselves some more discreet conclusion: for [when you are by yourselves], you will no more set your thoughts upon shame; which, when dishonour and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth them. For many, when they have foreseen into what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible word, dishonour, that that which is but called dishonour, hath caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities; and so to draw upon themselves really, by their own madness, a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune. Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of; and not think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions, as of league and of enjoying your own under tribute: and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of peevishness take the worse. For such do take the best course, who though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors; and towards their inferiors use moderation. Consider of it therefore, whilst we stand off; and have often in your mind, that you deliberate of your country; which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one consultation."

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.

112. So the Athenians went aside from the conference; and the Melians, after they had decreed the very same things which before they had spoken, made answer unto them in this manner: "Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what you have heard before; nor will we, in a small portion of time, overthrow that liberty, in which our city hath remained for the space of seven hundred years since it was first founded. But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved it hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is, of the Lacedæmonians, we will do our best to maintain the same. But

this we offer: to be your friends; enemies to neither side; and you to depart out of our land, after agreement such as we shall both think fit."

The Athenians and Melians agree not. The city of Melos besieged.

113. Thus the Melians answered. To which the Athenians, the conference being already broken off, replied thus: "You are the only men, as it seemeth to us, by this consultation, that think future things more certain than things seen; and behold things doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedæmonians, and to fortune and hopes, so will you be the most deceived". 114. This said, the Athenian ambassadors departed to their camp. And the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out, fell presently to the war: and dividing the work among the several cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own and of their confederates, for a guard both by sea and land: and with the greatest part of their army went home. The rest that were left, besieged the place.

The Argives lose eighty men by an ambushment of the Phliasians. The Athenians in Pylus infest Laconia. year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1. The Corinthians war on the Athenians.

115. About the same time the Argives, making a road into Phliasia, lost about eighty of their men, by ambush laid for them by the men of Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And the Athenians that lay in Pylus, fetched in thither a great booty from the Lacedæmonians. Notwithstanding which, the Lacedæmonians did not war upon them, [as] renouncing the peace: but gave leave by edict only, to any of their people that would to take booties reciprocally in the territory of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war upon the Athenians: but it was for certain controversies of their own: and the rest of Peloponnesus stirred not.

The Melians relieve their town. The end of the fifteenth summer

The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market–place: and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both corn and other provision, whatsoever they could buy for money: and so returned and lay still. And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer ended.

116. The winter following, the Lacedæmonians being about to enter with their army into the territory of the Argives, when they perceived that the sacrifices which they made on the border for their passage were not acceptable, returned. And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion in regard of this design of the Lacedæmonians, apprehended some of them; and some escaped.

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the wall of the Athenians; they that kept the siege being then not many. But this done, there came afterwards some fresh forces from Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates the son of Demeas. And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within some that practised to have it given up, they yielded themselves to the discretion of the Athenians: who slew all the men of military age, made slaves of the women and children; and inhabited the place with a colony sent thither afterwards of five hundred men of their own.

THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

SICILY DESCRIBED. — The causes and pretences of the Sicilian war: with the consultation and preparation for the same. — Alcibiades, one of the generals of the army, accused of defacing the images of Mercury, is suffered for that present to depart with the army. — The Athenian army cometh to Rhegium: thence to Catana. — From thence Alcibiades is sent for home to make answer to his accusations: and by the way escaping, goeth to Lacedæmon. — Nicias encampeth near Syracuse: and having overcome the army of the Syracusians in battle, returneth to Catana. — The Syracusians procure aids amongst the rest of the Sicilians. — Alcibiades instigateth and instructeth the Lacedæmonians against his country. — Nicias returneth from Catana to Syracuse: and encamping in Epipolæ, besiegeth the city: and beginneth to enclose them with a double wall, which was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the eighteenth year of this war.

Year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1. The Athenians resolve to invade Sicily. year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1. The greatness of Sicily and the inhabitants.

The same winter the Athenians, with greater forces than they had before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon, resolved to go again into Sicily; and if they could, wholly to subdue it: being for the most part ignorant both of the greatness of the island, and of the multitude of people, as well Greeks as barbarians, that inhabited the same; and that they undertook a war not much less than the war against the Peloponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a ship; and though so great, is yet divided with no more than twenty furlongs, sea measure, from the continent.

Cyclopes and Læstrigones. Sicanians. Sicania, Trinacria. Trojans. Siculi.

It was inhabited in old time, thus; and these were the nations that held it. The most ancient inhabitants in a part thereof, are said to have been the Cyclopes and Læstrigones: of whose stock, and whence they came or to what place they removed, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice which the poets have spoken, and which every particular man hath learned of them. After them, the first that appear to have dwelt therein, are the Sicanians, as they say themselves; nay, before the other, as being the natural breed of the island. But the truth is, they were Iberians; and driven away by the Ligyans from the banks of Sicanus, a river on which they were seated in Iberia. And the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was before Trinacria. And these [two] inhabit yet in the western parts of Sicily. After the taking of Ilium certain Trojans, escaping the hands of the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily: and having planted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both the nations in one were called Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phoceans, who coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Afric, and thence into Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy, (for there they inhabited), flying from the Opici, having, as is most likely and as it is reported, observed the strait, and with a fore wind gotten over in boats which they made suddenly on the occasion, or perhaps by some other means.

There is at this day a people in Italy called Siculi. And Italy itself got that name after the same manner, from a king of Arcadia called Italus. Of these a great army crossing into Sicily, overthrew the Sicanians in battle, and drave them into the south and west parts of the same; and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called Sicilia: and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred years after their going over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. And till now they possess the midland and north parts of the island.

Phœnicians.

Also the Phœnicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides, having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phœnicians abandoned most of their former habitations: and uniting themselves dwelt in Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, upon the borders of the Elymi; as relying upon their league with the Elymi, and because also from thence lay the shortest cut over unto Carthage. These were the barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

Chalcideans. About A. C. 759. Ol. 5. 2. Corinthians.

Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcideans, under Thucles their conductor, going from Eubœa, built Naxos, and the altar of Apollo Archegetes, now standing without the city: upon which the ambassadors employed to the oracles, as often as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the Herculean family, carried a colony from Corinth, and became founder of Syracuse: where first he drave the Siculi out of that island in which the inner part of the city now standeth; not now environed wholly with the sea, as it was then. And in process of time, when the city also that is without was taken in with a wall, it became a populous city. In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcideans, going from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the Siculi; and after that Catana: but they that went to Catana, chose Euarchus for their founder.

Megareans. A. C. 728. Ol. 13. 1. A. C. 628. Ol. 38. 1. A. C. 713. Ol. 16. 4. Rhodians and Cretans. Zanc first built by pirates of Cume. Eubœans. Samians and other Ionians.

About the same time in Sicily arrived also Lamis, with a colony from Megara; and first built a certain town called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacius; where for a while after he governed the estate of his colony in

common with the Chalcideans of Leontium. But afterwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had builded Thapsus, he died; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called Megara–Hyblæa. And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty–five years, they were by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city and territory. But before they were driven thence, namely one hundred years after they had built it, they sent out Pammilus and built the city of Selinus. This Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city: and so together with them founded Selinus. Gela was built in the forty–fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, that brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entymus, that did the like out of Crete, jointly. This city was named after the name of the river Gela; and the place where now the city standeth, and which at first they walled in, was called Lindii. And the laws which they established were the Doric. About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of Gela built the city of Acragante, calling the city after the name of the river: and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, and gave unto them the laws of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates that came from Cume, a Chalcidean city in Opicia: but afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to people it, out of Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa; and their conductors were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of Cume, the other of Chalcis. And the name of the city was at first Zancle, so named by the Sicilians because it hath the form of a sickle; and the Sicilians call a sickle zanclon. But these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence by the Samians and other people of Ionia; that in their flight from the Medes, fell upon Sicily. After this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drave out the Samians; and peopling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead of Zancle called the place by the name of his own country from whence he was anciently descended, Messana.

Acræ, Casmenæ. Camarina. A. C. 483. Ol. 74. 2. A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 4.

After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, Simus, and Sacon; the most of which colony were Chalcideans; but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidæ. Their language grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric: but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed. Acræ and Casmenæ were built by the Syracusians: Acræ, twenty years after Syracuse; and Casmenæ, almost twenty after Acræ. Camarina was at first built by the Syracusians, very near the hundred and thirty–fifth year of their own city; Dascon and Menecolus being the conductors. But the Camarinæans having been by the Syracusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time, taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became their founder, and placed them in Camarina again. After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they were planted the third time in the same city.

The cause and pretence of the Athenians to invade it. year xvi. A. C. 416. Ol. 91. 1.

These were the nations, Greeks and barbarians, that inhabited Sicily. And though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their subjection; which was the true motive; but as having withal this fair pretext, of aiding their kindred and new confederates. But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of Egesta, who were at Athens and earnestly pressed them thereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about certain things concerning marriage, and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And the Selinuntians having leagued themselves with the Syracusians, infested them with war both by sea and by land. Insomuch as the Egestæans, putting the Athenians in mind of their former league with the Leontines made by Laches, prayed them to send a

fleet thither in their aid; alleging, amongst many other things, this as principal: that if the Syracusians, who had driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerous lest hereafter some time or other, being Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians for affinity, and being a colony of the Peloponnesians join with the Peloponnesians that sent them out, to pull down the Athenian empire: that it were wisdom, therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head against the Syracusians; and the rather, because for the defraying of the war the Egestæans would furnish money sufficient of themselves. Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Egestæan ambassadors and of their advocates and patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta; to see first, whether there were in their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there was, and to bring word in what terms the war stood between that city and the Selinuntians. And ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly.

C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The Lacedæmonians waste part of Argolica, and put the outlaws of Argos into Orneæ. The Athenians war upon Macedonia. year xvi. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

The same winter the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields, and carried away certain cart–loads of their corn. Thence they went to Orneæ, and having placed there the Argive outlaws, left with them a few others of the rest of the army: and then making a composition for a certain time, that they of Orneæ and those Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their army home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their whole power, and

joining with them, sat down betimes in the morning before Orneæ. But when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out; and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneæ to the ground, and went home. And so also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their own, and part Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into Methone, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the Lacedæmonians sent unto the Chalcideans upon Thrace, who held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, appointing them to aid Perdiccas. But they refused. And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year xvii. The Athenians decree the voyage of Sicily: and Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus for generals. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta with them: and brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty galleys, which they would entreat the Athenians to send thither. And the Athenians having called an assembly, and heard both from the Egestæan and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive but untrue allegations, touching their money, how they had great store ready both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty galleys into Sicily, and Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes, for commanders with authority absolute: the which were to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians, and withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew in their city; and to order all other the affairs of Sicily as they should think most for the profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the people assembled again, to consult of the means how most speedily to put this armada in readiness; and to decree such things as the

generals should further require for the expedition. But Nicias having heard that himself was chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the state had not well resolved, but affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter, upon small and superficial pretences, stood forth, desiring to have altered this the Athenians' purpose, and spake as followeth:

the oration of nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

9. "Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation, and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily: yet to me it seemeth, that we ought rather once again to consult, whether it be not better not to send it at all; than upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair, and upon the credit of strangers, to draw upon ourselves an impertinent war. For my own part, I have honour by it: and for the danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men: (not but that I think him a good member of the commonwealth, that hath regard also to his own person and estate; for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper for his own sake): but as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak anything that is against my conscience, for gaining to myself a pre–eminence of honour: but that only which I apprehend for the best. And although I am sure, that if I go about to persuade you to preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against your humour: yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to be achieved. 10. For I say, that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw hither. You perhaps think that the league will be firm, that you have made with the Lacedæmonians; which, though as long as you

stir not, may continue a league in name, (for so some have made it of their own side), yet if any considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, as having made the peace constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves: besides, in the league itself we have many things controverted. And some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of the weakest: whereof some are now in open war against us, and others, because the Lacedæmonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days, and so are contented yet to hold their hands. But peradventure, when they shall hear that our power is distracted, which is the thing we now hasten to do, they will be glad to join in the war with the Sicilians against us; the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued above many other. It behoveth us therefore to consider of these things, and not to run into new dangers, when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already have. For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet unreduced: and from others in divers parts of the continent, we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egestæans, being forsooth our confederates and wronged, they in all haste must be aided: though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer. 11. And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans into subjection, we could easily also keep them so: but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many and far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep; and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again. As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the Syracusians, than they are now: and yet this is it that the Egestæans would most affright us with. For now the states of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in favour of the

Lacedæmonians, to take part against us: whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would hazard with us state against state. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that the Peloponnesians would subvert theirs. The Grecians there will fear us most, if we go not at all; next, if we but show our forces and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us, and join with the Grecians here to invade us. For we all know, that those things are most admired which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of them. And this, Athenians, is your own case with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates: whom because beyond your hope you have overcome in those things for which at first you feared them, you now in contempt of them turn your arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies: but to be confident then only, when we have mastered their designs. Nor ought we to think that the Lacedæmonians set their minds on anything else, but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow: and the rather, because they have so much and so long laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour. The question with us therefore, if we be well advised, will not be of the Egestæans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy. 12. We must remember also that we have had now some short recreation from a late great plague and great war, and thereby are improved both in men and money; which it is most meet that we should spend here upon ourselves, and not upon those outlaws which seek for aid: seeing it maketh for them, to tell us a specious lie; who contributing only words whilst their friends bear all the danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if ill, undo their friends for company. Now if there be any man here, that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general, especially being yet too young to

have charge in chief, shall advise the expedition, to the end he may have admiration for his expense upon horses, and help from his place to defray that expense: suffer him not to purchase his private honour and splendour with the danger of the public fortune. Believe rather that such men, though they rob the public, do nevertheless consume also their private wealth. Besides, the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand. 13. And I seeing those now sit by and abet the same man, am fearful of them: and do on the other side exhort the elder sort, (if any of them sit near those other), not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely, as fearing that if they gave their voice against the war they should be esteemed cowards; nor to doat (as they do) upon things absent; knowing that by passion the fewest actions, and by reason the most do prosper: but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast into greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other side, and decree: “that the Sicilians, within the limits they now enjoy, not misliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the shore in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound their differences between themselves”. And for the Egestæans, to answer them in particular, thus: “that as without the Athenians they had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it: and that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our confederates, as when they do injury, we must maintain it, and when we require their assistance, cannot have it”. 14. And you the president, if you think it your office to take care of the commonwealth, and desire to be a good member of the same, put these things once more to the question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of the assembly) that before so many witnesses, it will not be made a crime: but that you shall be rather thought a physician of your country, that hath swallowed down evil counsel. And he truly

dischargeth the duty of a president, who laboureth to do his country the most good, or at least will not willingly do it hurt."

Motives of Alcibiades to further his voyage. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

15. Thus spake Nicias. But the most of the Athenians that spake after him, were of opinion that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree already made not to be reversed: yet some there were that said to the contrary. But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also for that he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration: but principally for that he affected to have charge, hoping that himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens: and withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. For being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of horses and other his expenses, was meet: which proved afterwards none of the least causes of the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and form of life, and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy. And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state. Alcibiades at this time stood forth, and spake to this effect.

the oration of alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades.

16. "Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto me more than to any other to have this charge: and withal I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as having been touched by Nicias) to be worthy of the same. For those

things for which I am so much spoken of, do indeed purchase glory to my progenitors and myself: but to the commonwealth they confer both glory and profit. For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above the truth, by reason of my brave appearance at the Olympic games: whereas before they thought easily to have warred it down. For I brought thither seven chariots, and not only won the first, second, and fourth prize, but carried also in all other things a magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. And in such things as these, as there is honour to be supposed according to the law; so is there also a power conceived upon sight of the thing done. As for my expenses in the city upon setting forth of shows, or whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an argument of our greatness. Now, it is no unprofitable course of life, when a man shall at his private cost not only benefit himself, but also the commonwealth. Nor doth he that beareth himself high upon his own worth, and refuseth to make himself fellow with the rest, wrong the rest: for if he were in distress, he should not find any man that would share with him in his calamity. Therefore, as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery; so let them likewise be content to be contemned of us when we flourish; or if they require equality, let them also give it. I know that such men, or any man else that excelleth in the glory of anything whatsoever, shall as long as he liveth be envied, principally of his equals, and then also of others amongst whom he converseth: but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed of them, though there be none; and his country will boast of him, not as of a stranger or one that had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen and one that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. This being the thing I aim at, and for which I am renowned, consider now whether I administer the public the worse for it or not. For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus without much either danger or cost, I compelled the

Lacedæmonians to stake all that ever they had upon the fortune of one day of Mantineia.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades.

17. And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been very madness, with familiar and fit words wrought upon the power of the Peloponnesians: and shewing reason for my passion, made my madness now no longer to be feared. But as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate, make you use of both our services. And abrogate not your decree touching the voyage into Sicily, as though the power were great you are to encounter withal. For the number wherewith their cities are populous, is but of promiscuous nations, easily shifting and easily admitting new comers; and consequently not sufficiently armed, any of them, for the defence of their bodies, nor furnished, as the custom of the place appointeth, to fight for their country. But what any of them thinks he may get by fair speech, or snatch from the public by sedition, that only he looks after; with purpose, if he fail, to run the country. And it is not likely, that such a rabble should either with one consent give ear to what is told them, or unite themselves for the administration of their affairs in common: but if they hear of fair offers, they will one after one be easily induced to come in; especially if there be seditions amongst them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast of; nor doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there in all, as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own number. Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in all this war past. So that the business there, for all that I can by fame understand, is even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall have many of the barbarians, upon hatred of the Syracusians, to take our parts against them there: and if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder us at home. For

our ancestors having the same enemies, which they say we leave behind us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Persian besides, did nevertheless erect the empire we now have by our only odds of strength at sea. And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now it is, though their power were also as great as ever: for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not into Sicily; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave a navy sufficient to oppose theirs behind us.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades.

18. “What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness: or what can we pretend unto our confederates, for denying them assistance? Whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them, without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league, that they should come hither with their aids: but that by troubling our enemies there, they might hinder them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby we, and whosoever else hath dominion, hath gotten it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that required it, whether they were Greeks or barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were fit to be assisted and which not, we should have little under our government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers, how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those that are: lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected unto them. Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do, unless also the institution of this state were like unto that of other states. Let us

rather make reckoning, by enterprising abroad to increase our power at home, and proceed on our voyage; that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians, and show them the contempt and slight account we make of our present ease, by undertaking this our expedition into Sicily. Whereby, either conquering those states we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away if otherwise, our galleys will afford it. For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians together were against it.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Alcibiades.

"Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness, and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert you from it: but with the same decency wherewith your ancestors, consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together, is it that doth the greatest good; and that a state as well as any other thing will, if it rest, wear out of itself; and all men's knowledge decay; whereas by the exercise of war experience will continually increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, this is my opinion: that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change: and that they of all men are most surely planted, that with most unity observe the present laws and customs, though not always of the best."

19. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when they had heard him together with the Egestæans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present entreated, and objecting to them their oath begged their help in form of

suppliants, were far more earnestly bent upon the journey than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution with his oration, but thought he might perhaps put them from it by the greatness of the provision, if he should require it with the most, stood forth again and said in this manner.

the oration of nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

20. “Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you violently bent on this expedition, such effect may it take as is desired. Nevertheless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet standeth. As far as we understand by report, we set out against great cities, not subject one to another, nor needing innovation, whereby they should be glad, out of hard servitude, to admit of easier masters; nor such as are likely to prefer our government before their own liberty; but many, (as for one island), and those Greek cities. For besides Naxos and Catana, (which too I hope will join with us for their affinity with the Leontines), there are other seven, furnished in all respects after the manner of our own army; and especially those two against which we bend our forces most, Selinus and Syracuse. For there are in them many men of arms, many archers, many darters, besides many galleys and a multitude of men to man them. They have also store of money, both amongst private men and in their temples. This have the Selinuntians. The Syracusians have a tribute beside, coming in from some of the barbarians. But that wherein they exceed us most, is this: that they abound in horses, and have corn of their own, not fetched in from other places. 21. Against such a power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and with it a small army; but there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do anything worthy of our design, and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing; especially if the cities there, terrified

by us, should now hold all together, and none but the Egestæans prove our friends and furnish us with a cavalry to resist them. And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse, or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we go far from home, and are to make war in a place of disadvantage, and not as when we went as confederates to aid some of our subjects here at home, where we had easy bringing in of necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends. But we go far off, and into a country of none but strangers, and from whence in winter there can hardly come a messenger unto us in so little as four months. 22. Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with us many men of arms, of our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects: and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get, either for love or money: and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist their cavalry; and much spare shipping, for the more easy bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean, wheat and barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships; and bakers from the mills, hired, and made to work by turns, that the army, if it chance to be weather–bound, may not be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must as much as we can provide them ourselves, and not rely on others. Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can: for as for that which is said to be ready at Egesta, think it ready in words, but not in deeds. 23. For although we go thither with an army not only equal unto theirs, but also (excepting their men of arms for battle) in everything exceeding it: yet so shall we scarce be able both to overcome them, and withal to preserve our own. We must also make account, that we go to inhabit some city in that foreign and hostile country, and either the first day we come thither to be presently masters of the field, or failing, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Which fearing, and

knowing that the business requires much good advice and more good fortune, (which is a hard matter, being we are but men), I would so set forth as to commit myself to fortune as little as I may, and take with me an army that in likelihood should be secure. And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in general, and the safest for us that go the voyage. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my place."

The Athenians upon this speech, made to desire them from the. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. enterprise, are the more encouraged to it. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

24. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would, upon the multitude of the things required, abandon the enterprise; or if he were forced to go, he might go with the more security. But the Athenians gave not over the desire they had of the voyage for the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more inflamed thereby to have it proceed; and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected. For they approved his counsel, and thought now there would be no danger at all. And every one alike fell in love with the enterprise: the old men, upon hope to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so great a power could not miscarry; and the young men, upon desire to see a foreign country, and to gaze, making little doubt but to return with safety. As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account to gain by it not only their wages for the time, but also so to amplify the state in power, as that their stipend should endure for ever. So that through the vehement desire thereunto of the most, they also that liked it not, for fear if they held up their hands against it to be thought evil affected to the state, were content to let it pass. 25. And in the end a certain Athenian stood up, and calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to shift off nor delay the business any longer; but to declare there before them all, what forces he would have the Athenians to decree him. To which unwillingly he answered and said, he would consider of it first with his

fellow–commanders. Nevertheless, for so much as he could judge upon the sudden, he said there would need no less than one hundred galleys; whereof for transporting of men of arms, so many of the Athenians' own as they themselves should think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their confederates: and that of men of arms in all, of their own and of their confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand; but rather more, if they could be gotten, and other provision proportionable. As for archers, both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it themselves and take it with them.

26. When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching the greatness of the preparation and the whole voyage, to do therein as should seem best unto them for the commonwealth. And after this, they went in hand with the preparation accordingly; and both sent unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness and from their continual wars, both in number of men fit for the wars, grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in store of money gathered together by means of the peace: whereby they made their provisions with much ease. And thus were they employed in preparation for the voyage.

The faces of all the images of Mercury. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. throughout Athens pared plain.

27. In the meantime the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of Athens, (now there were many of these of square stone set up by the law of the place, and many in the porches of private houses and in the temples), had in one night most of them their faces pared. And no man knew who had done it: and yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded to the discoverers; and a decree made, that if any man knew of any other

profanation, he might boldly declare the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact exceedingly to heart, as ominous to the expedition, and done withal upon conspiracy for alteration of the state and dissolution of the democracy.

Alcibiades accused for having in mockery acted the celebration of the mysteries of their religion. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. He desires to come to his trial before his going forth: but is not suffered. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

28. Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the city, and certain serving–men, revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the paring of the statues of some other of the gods, committed formerly through wantonness and too much wine by young men; and withal, how they had in private houses acted the mysteries of their religion in mockery: amongst whom they also accused Alcibiades. This they that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in the way that they could not constantly bear chief sway with the people, making account to have the primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of and exceedingly aggravated; exclaiming, that both the mockery of the mysteries and the paring of the Mercuries tended to the deposing of the people, and that nothing therein was done without him; alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate. 29. He at that present made his apology, and was there ready, if he had done any such thing, to answer it before he went the voyage, (for by this time all their preparation was in readiness), and to suffer justice if he were guilty, and if absolved to resume his charge: protesting against all accusations to be brought against him in his absence, and pressing to be put to death then presently if he had offended; and saying, that it would not be discreetly done, to send away a man accused of so great crimes with the charge of such an army before his trial. But his enemies, fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should have had the

favour of his army, and lest the people, which loved him because the Argives and some of the Mantineans served them in this war only for his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter off and hastened his going out, by setting on other orators to advise, that for the present he should go, and that the setting forward of the fleet should not be retarded, and that at his return he should have a day assigned him for his trial: their purpose being, upon further accusation, which they might easily contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his answer. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

The Athenian fleet putteth to sea. The description of the setting forth of the fleet. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

30. After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates, and the ships that carried their corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet [upon a day set] at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. But the Athenians themselves, and as many of their confederates as were at Athens, upon the day appointed, betimes in the morning came down into Peiræus and went aboard to take sea. With them came down in a manner the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants as strangers: the inhabitants to follow after such as belonged unto them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some their children, filled both with hope and lamentations; hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation, as being in doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering what a way they were to go from their own territory: (and now when they were to leave one another to danger, they apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done before when they decreed the expedition: nevertheless their present strength, by the abundance of everything before their eyes prepared for the journey, gave them heart again in beholding it): but the

strangers and other multitude came only to see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible design.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

31. For this preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went out of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the most glorious of all that ever had been sent forth before it to that day. Nevertheless for number of galleys and men of arms, that which went forth with Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Agnon carried with him to Potidæa, was not inferior to it. For there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys, out of Athens itself; and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him in the voyage. But they went not far, and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should have occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land–soldiers. For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the captains of galleys and of the city. For the state allowed a drachma a day to every mariner: the empty galleys which they sent forth, being of nimble ones sixty, and of such as carried their men of arms forty more: and the captains of galleys both put into them the most able servants; and besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called the] Thranitæ, and to the servants, gave somewhat of their own; and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon his own galley, both in the badges and other rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament and also in swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the land forces, they were levied with exceeding great choice, and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the bravery of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person. Insomuch as amongst themselves, it begat quarrel about precedency: but amongst other Grecians,

a conceit that it was an ostentation rather of their power and riches, than a preparation against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public, as of private men that went the voyage; namely, of the public, what was spent already in the business, and what was to be given to the commanders to carry with them; and of private men, what every one had bestowed upon his person, and every captain on his galley, besides what every one was likely, over and above his allowance from the state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what the merchant carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents. And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to go, for the strange boldness of the attempt and gloriousness of the show, than it was for the excessive report of their number, for the length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so vast future hopes in respect of their present power.

32. After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; and after the wine had been carried about to the whole army, and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk a health to the voyage, they made their prayers, such as by the law were appointed for before their taking sea, not in every galley apart, but all together, the herald pronouncing them. And the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had sung the Pæan and ended the health, they put forth to sea: and having at first gone out in a long file, galley after galley, they after went a vie by Ægina. Thus hasted these to be at Corcyra: to which place also the other army of the confederates were assembling.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The Syracusians, upon the fame of their coming, do some believe it, and some not.

At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voyage from divers places: nevertheless it was long ere anything would be believed. Nay, an assembly

being there called, orations were made such as follow on both parts: as well by them that believed the report touching the Athenian army to be true, as by others that affirmed the contrary. And Hermocrates the son of Hermon, as one that thought he knew the certainty, stood forth and spake to this effect:

the oration of hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

33. “Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be thought, as well as other men, to deliver a thing incredible; and though I know, that such as be either the authors or relaters of matter incredible, shall not only not persuade, but be also accounted fools: nevertheless, I will not for fear thereof hold my tongue, as long as the commonwealth is in danger; being confident that I know the truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do. The Athenians are bent to come even against us, (which you verily wonder at), and that with great forces both for the sea and land: with pretence indeed to aid their confederates the Egestæans and replant the Leontines; but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and especially of this city of ours; which obtained, they make account to get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will presently be upon us, advise with your present means, how you may with most honour make head against them; that you may not be taken unprovided through contempt, nor be careless through incredulity; and that such as believe it, may not be dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they are not more able to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them. Neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage unto us: nay, it will be much the better for us, in respect of the rest of the Sicilians. For being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish, or repulse them without obtaining what they came for, (for I fear not at all the effecting of their purpose); verily it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion not

unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or barbarians, sent far from home, that have not prospered ill. Neither are these that come against us, more in number than ourselves and the neighbouring cities: for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. And if for want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it will be left to us against whom they bend their councils, though the greatest cause of their overthrow should consist in their own errors. Which was also the case of these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the misfortune of the Medes; (though it happened for the most part contrary to reason); because in name they went only against the Athenians. And that the same shall now happen unto us, is not without probability.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

34. “Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our own forces; let us send to the Siculi, to confirm those we have, and to make peace and league with others; and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily, to show them that it is a common danger; and into Italy, to get them into our league, or at least that they receive not the Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage: for even they are not without expectation of the same danger. Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will bring war upon them also, even to their city. So that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the trouble will come home to their own door, they will perhaps, either secretly or openly, or some way assist us. And of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they please. For they have the most gold and silver: by which the wars and all things else are the best expedited. Let us also send to Lacedæmon and to Corinth, praying them not only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on

foot the war there. But that which I think the best course of all, though through an habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you what it is. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all yet if we and most of the rest, should draw together our whole navy, and with two months' provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia; and let them see, that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily: it would both terrify them the most, and also put them into a consideration, that we, as the watchmen of our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory, (for we shall be received at Tarentum), whereas they themselves have a great deal of sea to pass with all their preparations, and cannot keep themselves in their order for the length of the voyage: and that for us, it will be an easy matter to assail them, coming up slowly as they do and thin. Again, if lightening their galleys, they shall come up to us more nimbly and more close together, we shall charge upon them already wearied, or we may, if we please, retire again into Tarentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of victuals in those desert parts; and either staying be there besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities whether they will receive them or not. I am therefore of opinion, that dismayed with this reckoning they will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to explore how many and in what place we are, the season will be lost and winter come; or deterred with our unlooked–for opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather, for that as I hear the man of most experience amongst their commanders hath the charge against his will; and would take a light occasion to return, if he saw any considerable stop made by us in the way. And I am very sure, we should be voiced amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are men's

minds; and they fear more such as they hear will begin with them, than such as give out that they will no more but defend themselves: because then they think the danger equal. Which would be now the case of the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will not fight: deservedly contemning us, because we joined not with the Lacedæmonians to pull them down. But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness than with the truth of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore, principally to dare to do this; or if not this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war; and every man to remember, that though to show contempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest, that are made with fear and opinion of danger. As for the Athenians, they come; and I am sure are already in the way, and want only that they are not now here."

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

35. Thus spake Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves: some contending, that the Athenians would by no means come, and that the reports were not true; and others, that if they came they would do no more harm than they were likely again to receive. Some contemned and laughed at the matter: but some few there were that believed Hermocrates, and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and at that time most powerful with the commons, spake as followeth:

the oration of athenagoras. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Athenagoras. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Athenagoras. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Athenagoras.

36. "He is either a coward or not well affected to the state, whosoever he be, that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad as coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that report such things as these and put you into

fear, though I wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they think their ends not seen. For they that are afraid of anything themselves, will put the city into affright, that they may shadow their own with the common fear. And this may the reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but framed on purpose by such as always trouble the state. But if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reckoning by the reports of these men, but by that which wise men and men of great experience, such as I hold the Athenians to be, are likely to do. For it is not probable, that leaving the Peloponnesians and the war there not yet surely ended, they should willingly come hither to a new war no less than the former: seeing, in my opinion, they may be glad that we invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are. 37. And if indeed they come, as these men say they will: I think Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished; and that this our own city is much stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they neither bring horses with them nor can they get any here, save only a few from the Egestæans, nor have men of arms so many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea. For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though they carried no men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessaries; which cannot be small against so great a city. So that I am so far from the opinion of these others, that I think the Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able to escape from being destroyed, every man of them; much less now, when all Sicily is their enemy. For in their camp, fenced with their galleys, they shall be cooped up, and from their tents, and forced munition, never be able to stir far abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. In short, I think they shall never be able to get landing: so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

38. “But these things, as I said before, the Athenians considering, I am very sure will look unto their own; and our men talk here of things that neither are, or ever will be: who I know have desired, not only now but ever, by such reports as these or by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear, that they themselves might rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it often, they may one day effect it: and for us, we are too poor–spirited either to foresee it ere it be done, or foreseeing to prevent it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition and contention, not so much against the enemy as within itself; and sometimes also to tyranny and usurpation. Which I will endeavour (if you will second me) so to prevent hereafter, as nothing more of this kind shall befall you: which must be done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots, not only when I find them in the action, (for it will be hard to take them so), but also for those things which they would and cannot do. For one must not only take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath already done, but strike him first for his evil purpose; for if a man strike not first, he shall first be stricken. And as for the few, I shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them, and in somewhat advise them. For this, I think, will be the best course to avert them from their bad intentions. Tell me forsooth, (I have asked this question often), you that are the younger sort, What would you have? Would you now bear office? The law allows it not: and the law was made because ye are not [now] sufficient for government, not to disgrace you when you shall be sufficient. But forsooth, you would not be ranked with the multitude! But what justice is it, that the same men should not have the same privileges? 39. Some will say, that the democracy is neither a well–governed nor a just state: and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best government. But I answer first, democracy is a name of the whole; oligarchy, but of a part.

Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure: yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude upon hearing the best judge. Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and severally, participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy, they allow indeed to the multitude a participation of all dangers: but in matters of profit, they not only encroach upon the multitude, but take from them and keep the whole. Which is the thing that you the rich and the younger sort affect: but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, O ye the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know; or, ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it you dare do this: 40. yet I say, inform yourselves better, or change your purpose and help to amplify the common good of the city, making account that the good amongst you shall not only have an equal, but a greater share therein than the rest of the multitude; whereas if you will needs have all, you shall run the hazard of losing all. Away therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not allowed. For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to defend itself with honour. And we have generals to look to that matter. And if they come not, (which I rather believe), it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders, and cast itself into voluntary servitude: but taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words virtually as facts, and will not upon words let go her present liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same actually to your discretion."

41. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of their generals rising up, forbade any other to stand forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand to this effect:

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. the speech of one of the syracusian generals.

“It is no wisdom, neither for the speakers to utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how we may in the best manner, both every one in particular and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they come. And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city with horses and arms and other habiliments of war, can do us no hurt. As for the care hereof and the musters, we will look to it: and will send men abroad both to the cities and for spials: and do whatsoever else is requisite. Somewhat we have done already: and what more we shall hereafter find meet, we will from time to time report unto you.”

Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved the assembly.

The Athenians put out from Corcyra. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The quantity of the army. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

42. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their confederates. And first the generals took a view of the whole army, and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor and make their naval camp: and having divided them into three squadrons, to each squadron they assigned a captain by lot, to the end that being at sea they might not come into want of water, or harbours, or any other necessaries, where they chanced to stay; and that they might otherwise be the more easy to be governed, when every squadron had his proper commander. After this they sent before them three galleys into Italy and Sicily, to bring them word what cities in those parts would receive them: whom they appointed to come back and meet them, that they might know whether they might be received or not before they put in. 43. This done, the Athenians with all their provisions put out from Corcyra towards Sicily; having with them in all one hundred and thirty–four galleys, and two Rhodian long–boats of fifty oars a–piece. Of these, a hundred were of Athens itself: whereof sixty were

expedite, the other forty for transportation of soldiers: the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians and other the confederates. Of men of arms, they had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these, there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred enrolled, and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, hired for defence of the galleys. The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their subjects: of Argives there were five hundred: of Mantineans and mercenaries, two hundred and fifty. Their archers in all, four hundred and eighty: of which eighty were Cretans. Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of light–armed Megarean fugitives, one hundred and twenty: and in one vessel made for transportation of horses, thirty horsemen.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

44. These were the forces that went over to the war at first. With these went also thirty ships carrying necessaries, wherein went also the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all tools of use in fortification: and with these thirty ships went one hundred boats by constraint; and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for trade: which then passed all together from Corcyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to Tarentum, and such other places as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, neither received of the states there into any city nor allowed any market, having only the liberty of anchorage and water, (and that also at Tarentum and Locri denied them), till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again, and settled their camp in the temple of Diana (for neither there were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt with the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to aid the Leontines, Chalcideans likewise. To which was answered, that they would

take part with neither; but what the rest of the Italians should conclude, that also they would do. So the Athenians lay still, meditating on their Sicilian business, how they might carry it the best; and withal expected the return from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them, desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported by their messengers at Athens.

The Syracusians certainly knowing of their coming, prepare for their defence.

45. The Syracusians in the meantime from divers parts, and also from their spies, had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium: and therefore made their preparations with all diligence, and were no longer incredulous; but sent unto the Siculi, to some cities men to keep them from revolting; to others, ambassadors; and into such places as lay upon the sea, garrisons: and examined the forces of their own city by a view taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or not; and ordered all things as for a war at hand, and only not already present.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The hope of the Athenians of money from Egesta frustrated. The fraud of the Egestæans. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The several opinions of the generals, touching how to proceed.

46. The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; and brought word, that for the rest of the money promised there was none, only there appeared thirty talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged; both because this first hope was crossed; and because also the Rhegians, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines and always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now refused. And though to Nicias this news from the Egestæans was no more than he expected, yet to the other two it was extreme strange. But the Egestæans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their

treasure, had thus deceived them. They brought them into the temple of Venus in Eryx, and showed them the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity; which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above their true value in money. Then they feasted such as came with them, in their private houses; and at those feastings exhibited all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, either in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow in other as well Phœnician as Grecian cities, for their own. So all of them in a manner making use of the same plate, and much appearing in every of those houses, it put those which came with the ambassadors into a very great admiration: insomuch as at their return to Athens, they strove who should first proclaim what wealth they had seen. These men, having both been abused themselves and having abused others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta, were much taxed by the soldiers. But the generals went to counsel upon the business in hand.

The opinion of Nicias.

47. Nicias was of this opinion: that it was best to go presently with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth; and if the Egestæans would furnish them with money for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon the occasion; if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, and staying with them by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace: and thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a show of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates; and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought–of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league: and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

The opinion of Alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

48. Alcibiades said, it would not do well to have come out from Athens with so great a power, and then dishonourably without effect to go home again: but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse, and assay to make the Siculi revolt from the Syracusians, and others to enter league with the Athenians, that they might aid them with men and victual: and first to deal with the Messanians, as being seated in the passage, and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in, and having a port and harbour sufficient for their fleet: and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were to have in the war, then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus, unless these would agree with the Egestæans and the other suffer the Leontines to be replanted.

The opinion of Lamachus. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

49. But Lamachus was of opinion, that it was best to go directly to Syracuse, and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city, whilst they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first: but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits, and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if it come upon them suddenly while they expect it with fear, it would the more easily get the victory, and everything would affright them; as the sight of it (for then they would appear most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially the danger of a present battle. And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being master of the field and sitting down before the city, could want no money: and the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguing with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and spying who should have the better. And for a place to retire unto and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit: being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

Alcibiades seeketh league with the Messanians, but is denied. The Athenians go with part of their fleet to Naxos: and to Catana. They send ten galleys to view Syracuse and the havens. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

50. Lamachus said this: but came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades with his own galley having passed over to Messana, and propounded to them a league and not prevailed, they answering that they would not let the army in but allow them only a market without the walls, returned back to Rhegium. And presently the generals having out of the whole fleet manned threescore galleys, and taken provision aboard, went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the coast to Catana. But the Catanæans receiving them not, (for there were some within that favoured the Syracusians), they entered the river of Terias; and having stayed there all that night, went the next day towards Syracuse leisurely with the rest of their galleys; but ten they sent before into the great haven, [not to stay, but] to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from their galleys, that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines on their own, according to league and affinity, and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians as to their friends and benefactors. And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city, and the havens, and the region where they were to seat themselves for the war, they returned to Catana.

Catana surprised.

51. An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to receive the army they admitted the generals, and willed them to speak their minds. And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration and the citizens at the assembly, the soldiers having secretly pulled down a little gate which was but weakly built, entered the city, and were walking up and down in the market. And

the Catanæans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not many. The rest concluded the league with the Athenians, and willed them to fetch in the rest of the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians went back to Rhegium: and rising from thence, came to Catana with their whole army together.

The Athenians go to Camarina, but are not received. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

52. Now they had news from Camarina, that if they would come thither, the Camarinæans would join with them; and that the Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse; where not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina. And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto them. But the Camarinæans would not receive the army; alleging that they had taken an oath, not to receive the Athenians with more than one galley, unless they should have sent for more of their own accord. Having lost their labour, they departed; and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and had gotten some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming out, and killing some stragglers of the light–armed, they returned again to Catana.

Alcibiades called home to answer about the Mercuries. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2.

53. Here they find the galley called Salaminia, come thither from Athens, both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come home to purge himself of such things as were laid to his charge by the state, and also for other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the mysteries, and some also for the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, proceeded nevertheless in the search of those that were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries. And making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, upon the reports of evil men

apprehended very good citizens and cast them into prison: choosing rather to examine the fact and find the truth by torments, than that any man, how good soever in estimation, being once accused should escape unquestioned. For the people, having by fame understood that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end; and withal, that neither themselves nor Harmodius, but the Lacedæmonians overthrew it: were ever fearful, and apprehended every thing suspiciously.

Digression touching the deposing of the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons. A. C. 514. Ol. 66. 3. A. C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

54. For the fact of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was undertaken upon an accident of love: which unfolding at large, I shall make appear that neither any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report any certainty either of their own tyrants or of the fact. For the old Peisistratus dying in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, as the most think, but Hippias, who was his eldest son, succeeded in the government. Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was in the power of one Aristogeiton, a citizen of a middle condition that was his lover. This Harmodius having been solicited by Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same unto Aristogeiton. He apprehending it (as lovers use) with a great deal of anguish, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by force, fell presently, as much as his condition would permit, to a contriving how to pull down the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, having again attempted Harmodius and not prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some disgrace. For neither was the government otherwise heavy till then, but carried without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their religion worthily. In other points

they were governed by the laws formerly established, save that these took a care ever to prefer to the magistracy men of their own adherence. And amongst many that had the annual office of archon, Peisistratus also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his grandfather; who also, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the market–place, and that other in the temple of Apollo Pythius. And though the people of Athens, amplifying afterwards that altar which was in the market–place, thereby defaced the inscription: yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius, is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these words:

Peisistratus the son of Hippias
Erected this to stand
I'th' Temple of Apollo Pythius,
Witness of his command.

C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

55. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than other men: and it may be known also by this. It appears that of all the legitimate brethren, this only had children: as is both signified by the altar, and also by that pillar, which for a testimony of the injustice of the tyrants was erected in the Athenian citadel. In which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechidas: for it is probable that the eldest was first married. And in the forepart of the pillar, his name after his father's was the first: not without reason, as being both next him in age, and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed could Hippias have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if his brother had died seised of the tyranny, and he been the same day to settle it on himself. Whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both for the customary fear in the

people and diligence in the guard; and was not to seek like a younger brother, to whom the government had not continually been familiar. But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfortune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards that he was also tyrant.

C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

56. This Harmodius therefore that denied his suit, he disgraced as he before intended. For when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to be present to carry a little basket in a procession, they rejected her again when she came: and said that they had never warned her at all, as holding her unworthy the honour. This was taken heavily by Harmodius; but Aristogeiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, he made all things ready for the execution of the design. Only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the Great Panathenæa, upon which day only such citizens as lead the procession might, without suspicion, be armed in good number. And they were to begin the fact themselves; but the rest were to help them against the halberdiers. Now the conspirators, for their better security, were not many; for they hoped that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it once undertaken, being upon this occasion armed, would assist in the recovery of their own liberty.

C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

57. When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the place called Cerameicum with his guard of halberdiers, and was ordering the procession how it was to go. And Harmodius and Aristogeiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the fact. But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias, (for Hippias was very affable to all men), they were afraid, and believed that they were discovered and must presently have been apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged first upon him that had done them the wrong,

and for whose sake they had undergone all this danger; and, furnished as they were, ran [furiously] into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium, without all regard of themselves fell upon him, and with all the anger in the world, one upon jealousy, the other upon disgrace, struck and slew him. Aristogeiton, for the present, by means of the great confluence of people, escaped through the guard; but taken afterwards, was ungently handled; but Harmodius was slain upon the place. 58. The news being brought to Hippias in the Cerameicum, he went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but presently unto those that were armed for the solemnity of the shows and were far off, that he might be with them before they heard of it: and composing his countenance [as well as he could] to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place, and commanded them to repair thither without their arms. Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them somewhat. But having commanded his guard to take those arms away, he then fell presently to picking out of such as he meant to question, and whosoever else was found amongst them with a dagger. For with shields and spears to be in [the head of] the procession, was of custom.

C. 514–10.

59. Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon quarrel of love, and then upon a sudden fear followed this unadvised adventure of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. And after this time the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been before. And Hippias standing more in fear, not only put many of the citizens to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad, to see if he might get any security from them in this alteration at home. He therefore afterwards (though an Athenian and to a Lampsacen) gave his daughter Archedice unto Æantidas the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus; knowing that the Lampsacens were in great favour with King Darius. And her sepulchre is yet to be seen with this inscription:

Archedice, the daughter of King Hippias,
Who in his time
Of all the potentates of Greece was prime,
This dust doth hide.
Daughter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was,
Yet free from pride.

C. 510. A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 2.

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens, and was in the fourth deposed by the Lacedæmonians and the exiled Alcmæonides, went under truce to Sigeium, and to Æantidas at Lampsacus, and thence to King Darius: from whence, twenty years after in his old age, he came to Marathon with the Medan army.

C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The jealousy and passionate fury of the people in inquiry after the authors of the offences touching the mysteries and Mercuries. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. One of the prisoners is persuaded by a fellow–prisoner to appeach some man, whether true or not true: and doth so. Divers men accused of the paring of the Mercuries. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

60. The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering all they had heard concerning them, were extremely bitter and full of jealousy towards those that had been accused of the mysteries: and thought all to have been done upon some oligarchical or tyrannical conspiracy. And whilst they were passionate upon this surmise, many worthy men had already been cast in prison: and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily more savage, and sought to apprehend more still. Whilst they were at this pass, a prisoner that seemed most to be guilty, was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to accuse somebody, whether it were true or not true: (for it is but conjectural on both sides; nor was there ever, then or after, any man that could say certainly who it was that did the deed): who

brought him to it by telling him, that though he had not done it, yet he might be sure to save his own life, and should deliver the city from the present suspicion: and that he should be more certain of his own safety by a free confession than by coming to his trial if he denied it. Hereupon, he accused both himself and others for the Mercuries. The people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before to think that the conspirators should never [perhaps] be discovered to their multitude, presently set at liberty the accuser, and the rest with him whom he had not appeached: but for those that were accused, they appointed judges, and all they apprehended they executed: and having condemned to die such as fled, they ordained a sum of money to be given to those that should slay them. And though it were all this while uncertain whether they suffered justly or unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a manifest ease for the present.

Presumptions against Alcibiades. Alcibiades sent for home. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2. Alcibiades flieth. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2.

61. But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took it extreme ill through the instigation of his enemies, the same that had opposed him before he went. And seeing it was certain, as they thought, for the Mercuries; the other crime also concerning the mysteries, whereof he had been accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him upon the same reason and conspiracy against the people. For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about this, that an army of the Lacedæmonians was come as far as the isthmus upon some design against the Bœotians. These therefore they thought were come thither, not against the Bœotians, but by appointment of him; and that if they had not first apprehended the persons appeached, the city had been betrayed. And one night they watched all night long in their arms in the temple of Theseus within the city. And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos were at the same time suspected of a purpose to set

upon the people there: whereupon the Athenians also delivered unto the Argive people those hostages which they held of theirs in the islands, to be slain. And there were presumptions against Alcibiades on all sides. Insomuch, as purposing by law to put him to death, they sent, as I have said, the galley called Salaminia into Sicily, both for him, and the rest with him that had been accused: but gave command to those that went, not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them to make his purgation; because they had a care not to give occasion of stir either amongst their own or their enemy's soldiers; but especially, because they desired that the Mantineans and the Argives, who they thought followed the war by his persuasion, might not depart from the army. So he and the rest accused with him in his own galley, in company of the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thurii they followed no further, but left the galley and were no more to be found: fearing indeed to appear to the accusation. They of the Salaminia made search for Alcibiades and those that were with him, for a while: but not finding him, followed on their course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a small boat from Thurii into Peloponnesus; and the Athenians proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned both him and them to death.

The Athenian generals in Sicily go to Selinus and Egesta. They take Hyccara. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2. The end of the seventeenth summer.

62. After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily, having divided the army into two, and taken each his part by lot, went with the whole towards Selinus and Egesta: with intention, both to see if the Egestæans would pay them the money, and withal to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians and learn the state of their controversy with the Egestæans. And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the only

Grecian city in that part of Sicily: which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of the Sicanians enemy to the Egestæans, and a sea–town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the Egestæans, whose horseforces were there with them. Thence the Athenians with their landsmen returned through the territory of the Siculi to Catana; and the galleys went about with the captives. Nicias going with the fleet presently from Hyccara to Egesta, when he had dispatched with them his other business, and received thirty talents of money, returned to the army. The captives they ransomed; of which they made one hundred and twenty talents more. Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi, appointing them to send their forces: and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it not. And so ended this summer.

C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusians contemn the Athenians.

63. The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make preparation for their journey against Syracuse: and the Syracusians, on the other side, prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the Athenians had not presently, upon the first fear and expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day more and more heart. And because they went far from them into those other parts of Sicily, and assaulting Hybla could not take it, they contemned them more than ever: and prayed their commanders, (as is the manner of the multitude, when they be in courage), seeing that the Athenians came not unto them, to conduct them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, which were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns asked them, whether they came not rather to dwell in the land of another than to restore the Leontines to their own.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. Nicias his stratagem to get easy landing and encamping by Syracuse. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

64. The Athenian generals having observed this, and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the meantime without impeachment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many would greatly annoy the light–armed and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there: whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place, where the horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of, (now the Syracusian outlaws that were with them, had told them of a place near the temple Olympieium, which also they seized): I say, the Athenian generals, to bring this their purpose to effect, contrived the matter thus. They send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian commanders no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanæan, and said he came from Catana, from such and such, whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well–willers in that city. He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town, and far from their arms; and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed betimes in a morning they would come to their camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in and set on fire their galleys; by which means, the Syracusians assaulting the pallisado, might easily win the camp: and that the Catanæans that were to help them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for it.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. The Athenians land, pitch their camp, and entrench themselves, ere the Syracusians return. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusian army cometh back.

65. The Syracusian commanders, having been also otherwise encouraged, and having intended a preparation to go against Catana though this messenger had not come, did so much the more unadvisedly believe the

man; and straightways being agreed of the day on which they were to be there, sent him away. These commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians and some other their confederates were come in) appointed the Syracusians universally to set forwards by a day. And when all their necessaries were in readiness, and the day at hand on which they were to be there, they set forwards towards Catana, and encamped the night following upon the banks of the river Simæthus in the territory of the Leontines. The Athenians upon advertisement that they were set forth, rising with their whole army, both themselves and such of the Siculi and others as went with them, and going aboard their galleys and boats in the beginning of the night set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes the Athenians disbarked over against Olympieium, to make their camp. And the Syracusian horsemen, who were at Catana before the rest, finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told them: whereupon they went all together back to the aid of the city. 66. In the meantime, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage: wherein it was in their own power to begin battle when they list, and where both in and before the battle the Syracusian horsemen could least annoy them. For on one side there were walls, and houses, and trees, and a lake that kept them off; on the other side steep rocks: and having felled trees hard by and brought them to the sea–side, they made a pallisado both before their galleys and towards Dascon. And on that part that was most accessible to the enemy, they made a fort with stone, (the best they could find, but unwrought), and with wood; and withal pulled down the bridge of the river Anapus. Whilst this was doing, there came none to empeach them from the city. The first that came against them were the Syracusian horsemen; and by and by after, all the foot together. And though at first they came up near unto the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out

against them, they retired again; and crossing to the other side of the Helorine highway, stayed there that night.

The Athenians and Syracusians prepare to fight. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

67. The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight, and were ordered thus. The Argives and the Mantineans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half of the army which stood foremost, was ordered by eight in file: the other half towards their tents, ordered likewise by eights, was cast into the form of a long square, and commanded to observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress, and to make specially thither. And in the middest of these so arranged, were received such as carried the weapons and tools of the army.

The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syracusians of all conditions and as many of their confederates as were present, by sixteens in file: (they that came to aid them, were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two hundred; and of the Camarinæans, about twenty horsemen and fifty archers): the cavalry they placed in the right point of the battle, being in all no less than a thousand two hundred, and with them the darters. But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down the army, from one nation to another: to whom and to all in general he spake to this effect:

the oration of nicias to his army. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Nicias.

68. “What need I, sirs, to make a long exhortation, when this battle is the thing for which we all came hither? For in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to give you encouragement, than any oration how well soever made, if with a weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we choose

among so many and good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory: especially against tag and rag, and not chosen men, as we are ourselves, and against Sicilians, who though they contemn us, cannot stand against us; their skill not being answerable to their courage? It must be remembered also that we be far from our own, and not near to any amicable territory but such as we shall acquire by the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to theirs, 'You are to fight for your country'. I say to you, You are to fight out of your country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away; for many horsemen will be upon us. Remember therefore every man his own worth, and charge valiantly: and think the present necessity and strait we are in, to be more formidable than the enemy."

The battle between the Athenians and Syracusians.

69. Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant: and the city being near, some of them were gone away; and some for haste came in running; and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was the greatest number. For they wanted neither willingness nor courage, either in this or any other battle; being no less valiant, so far forth as they had experience, than the Athenians: but the want of this made them, even against their wills, to abate also somewhat of their courage. Nevertheless though they thought not the Athenians would have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight upon a sudden, yet they resumed their arms, and came presently forward to the encounter.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

And first, the casters of stones and slingers and archers of either side, skirmished in the middest between the armies, mutually chasing each other, as amongst the light–armed was not unlikely. After this, the soothsayers

brought forth their sacrifices according to the law of the place; and the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the battle. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country and their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the future: on the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another and make it their own, and not to weaken their own by being vanquished: the Argives and other free confederates, to help the Athenians to conquer the country they came against, and to return to their own with victory: and their subject confederates came also on with great courage, principally for their better safety, as desperate if they overcame not; and withal upon the by, that by helping the Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. The Athenians have the victory. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

70. After they were come to hand–strokes, they fought long on both sides. But in the meantime there happened some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning, together with a great shower of rain: insomuch as it added to the fear of the Syracusians, that were now fighting their first battle and not familiar with the wars; whereas to the other side that had more experience, the season of the year seemed to expound that accident; and their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians to give ground, and after them the Athenians had also done the like to those that were arranged against them: then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently broken and put to flight. But the Athenians pursued them not far; because the Syracusian horsemen, being many and unvanquished, whensoever any men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them, and still drave them in again: but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again and erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied

themselves in the Helorine way, and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent a guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should take the treasure there: and returned with the rest of the army into the city. 71. The Athenians went not to assault the temple; but gathering together their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and stayed that night upon the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty: and gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty. And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana. For it was now winter; and to make war there, they thought it yet unpossible before they had sent for horsemen to Athens, and levied other amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over–mastered in horse; and before they had also both levied money there and received more from Athens, and made league with certain cities, which they hoped after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto; and before they had likewise provided themselves of victuals and other things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse again. 72. With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana.

Hermocrates encourageth the Syracusians: year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

The Syracusians after they had buried their dead, called an assembly: and Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement, and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. “Their courage,” he said, “was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not so far inferior, as it was likely they would have been: especially being (as one may say) home–bred artificers, against the most

experienced in the war of all the Grecians. That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders," — for there were fifteen that commanded in chief— "and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice: and both of these would still grow greater; skill, by practising with danger; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill. And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them, to let them lead the army wheresoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed, and all things would be put in readiness with order and less tergiversation."

and is chosen general with two more. The Syracusians send for aid into Peloponnesus. year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

73. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised: and elected three generals, him, Heracleides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Exekestus. They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as well to obtain a league with them, as also to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make a hotter war against the Athenians, and to declare themselves in the quarrel of the Syracusians: thereby either to withdraw them from Sicily, or to make them the less able to send supply to their army which was there already.

The Athenians attempt Messana, but fail.

74. The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messana, to receive it by treason of some within: but the plot came not to effect. For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, being resolved to fly, and knowing

what was to be done, discovered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messana: who with those of their faction slew such as were accused, and being armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to have the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians, after thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also failing and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxos: and having fortified their camp with a pallisado, they wintered there; and dispatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen, to be with them early in the spring.

C. 415. 4. Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusians enlarge the compass of their walls year xvii. A. C. 415 4. Ol. 91. 2. and burn the tents of the Athenians by Catana. Ambassadors both from the Athenians and Syracuse unto Camarina, for the friendship of that city.

75. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city, all the length of the side towards Epipolæ including Temenites: to the end, if they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily enclosed as when they were in a narrower compass. And they put a guard into Megara, and another into Olympieium; and made pallisadoes on the seaside at all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with all the power of the city unto Catana: and after they had wasted the territory, and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before, returned home. And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina, according to a league made before in the time of Laches, to try if they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the Camarinæans had sent those succours in the former battle, with no great good will: and that now they would take part with them no longer, seeing the Athenians had the better of the day, but would rather join with the Athenians upon the former league. Hermocrates therefore and others being come to Camarina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the

assembly was met, Hermocrates desiring to increase their envy to the Athenians, spake unto them to this effect:

the oration of hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Hermocrates.

76. “Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that the forces of the Athenians here present may affright you: but lest their speeches which they are about to make, may seduce you, before you have also heard what may be said by us. They are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed, which you hear given out, but with that intention which we all suspect: and to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines, but rather our supplantation. For surely it holdeth not in reason, that they who subvert the cities yonder, should come to plant any city here: nor that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because Chalcideans, for kindred’s sake, when they keep in servitude the Chalcideans themselves of Eubœa, of whom these here are but the colonies. But they both hold the cities there, and attempt those here, in one and the same kind. For when the Ionians, and the rest of the confederates their own colonies, had willingly made them their leaders in the war to avenge them of the Medes, the Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, to some the not sending of their forces, to some their war amongst themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable criminations they could get, subdued them all to their obedience. And it was not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head against the Medes: but the Athenians did it to make them serve, not the Medes, but them, and the Grecians to change their master, as they did, not for one less wise, but for one worse wise.

Year xvii A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Hermocrates.

77. “But in truth we come not to accuse the Athenian state, though it be obnoxious enough, before you that know sufficiently the injuries they have done, but far rather to accuse ourselves: who though we have the examples before our eyes of the Grecians there brought into servitude for want of defending themselves, and though we see them now, with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred, and aiding of their confederates the Egestæans, prepare to do the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better courage make them to know that we be not Ionians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, that changing serve always the Mede or some other master, but that we are Dorians and freemen, come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city, when we know that that only way we are conquerable: and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other out with war upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others by other fit language, they may have the power to do us hurt? But we think, though one of the same island perish, yet if he dwell far off, the danger will not come to us; and before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that suffereth before us. 78. If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he, but the Syracusian that is the Athenian’s enemy; and thinketh it a hard matter that he should endanger himself for the territory that is mine: I would have him to consider, that he is to fight not chiefly for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety for that I am not destroyed before and he thereby destitute of my help, but stand with him in the battle. Let him also consider that the Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me to make himself the stronger by your friendship. If any man here envieth, or also feareth us, (for the strongest are still liable unto both), and would therefore wish that the Syracusians might be weakened to make them more modest,

but not vanquished for their own safety's sake: that man hath conceived a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not reasonable that the same man should be the disposer both of his desires and of his fortune. And if his aim should fail him, he might, deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to enjoy my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to him that shall abandon me, and not undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet in effect the same that I do. For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your own safety you defend. And you men of Camarina, that are borderers and likely to have the second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this, and not have aided us so dully. You should rather have come to us: and that which, if the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you should in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should now also have been seen equally to hearten us withal, to keep us from yielding. But as yet, neither you nor any of the rest have been so forward. 79. Perhaps upon fear, you mean to deal evenly between us both, and allege your league with the Athenians. You made no league against your friends, but against your enemies, in case any should invade you: and by it you are also tied to aid the Athenians, when others wrong them; but not when, as now, they wrong their neighbour. For even the Rhegians, who are also Chalcideans, refuse to help them in replanting the Leontines; though these also be Chalcideans. And then it were a hard case, if they suspecting a bad action under a fair justification, are wise without a reason; and you, upon pretence of reason, should aid your natural enemies, and help them that most hate you to destroy your more natural kindred.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Hermocrates. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2.

"But this is no justice; to fight with them is justice, and not to stand in fear of their preparation. Which, if we hold together, is not terrible: but is, if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be disunited. For neither when they

came against us, being none but ourselves, and had the upperhand in battle, could they yet effect their purpose; but quickly went their ways. 80. There is no reason therefore we should be afraid, when we are all together, but that we should have the better will to unite ourselves in a league: and the rather, because we are to have aid from Peloponnesus, who every way excel these men in military sufficiency. Nor should you think that your purpose to aid neither, as being in league with both, is either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves: for it is not so just in substance, as it is in the pretence. For if through want of your aid, the assailed perish and the assailant become victor: what do you by your neutrality, but leave the safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil? Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged and with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily, and keep the Athenians, as your friends, from an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that to demonstrate plainly, to you or to any other, the thing you already know, is no hard matter: but we pray you, and withal if you reject our words we protest, that whereas the Ionians, who have ever been our enemies, do take counsel against us, you, that are Dorians as well as we, betray us. And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet they only shall have the honour of it: and for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but even the authors of their victory: but if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty. Consider therefore now and take your choice, whether you will have the servitude without the present danger: or saving yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master, and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting."

81. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus:

the oration of euphemus. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus.

82. “Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing we are touched by the Syracusian, it will be necessary we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself given; in that he said, the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. And it is true. For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some means or other, how best to free ourselves from subjection to the Peloponnesians that are Dorians, more in number than we and dwelling near us. After the Medan war, having gotten us a navy, we were delivered thereby from the command and leading of the Lacedæmonians: there being no cause why they should rather be leaders of us than we of them, save only that they were then the stronger. And when we were made commanders of those Grecians which before lived under the king, we took upon us the government of them: because we thought, that having power in our hands to defend ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponnesians. And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders (whom the Syracusians say we brought into bondage being our kindred) not without just cause: for they came with the Medes against ours, their mother city: and for fear of losing their wealth durst not revolt, as we did, that abandoned our very city. But as they were content to serve, so they would have imposed the same condition upon us. 83. For these causes, we took upon us our dominion over them; both as worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians, whereas they, with the like promptness in favour of the Medes, did us hurt; and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength against the Peloponnesians. And follow any other we will not, seeing we alone have pulled down the barbarian, and therefore have right to command; or at least have put ourselves into danger more for the liberty of

the Peloponnesians, than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides. Now to seek means for one's own preservation, is a thing unblameable. And as it is for our own safety's cause that we are now here, so also we find that the same will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain from those very things which they accuse, and you, as most formidable, suspect us of: being assured, that such as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an oration, yet when the matter comes to performance, will then do as shall be most for their turn.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus.

"We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; and that upon the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our friends to assure the cities here; and not to bring you into subjection, but rather to keep you from it. 84. And let no man object, that we be solicitous for those that are nothing to us: for as long as you be preserved, and able to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending of forces to the Peloponnesians. And in this point you are very much unto us. For the same reason, it is meet also that we replant the Leontines; not to subject them, as their kindred in Eubœa, but to make them as puissant as we can: that being near, they may from their own territory weaken the Syracusians in our behalf. For as for our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies without their help; and the Chalcidean (whom having made a slave yonder, the Syracusian said, we absurdly attempt to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there without arms, paying money only; but the Leontines, and other our friends here, are the most profitable to us when they are most in liberty.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus.

85. “Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, nothing can be thought absurd if profitable; nor any man a friend, that may not be trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, according to the several occasions. But here it is for our benefit not to weaken our friends, but by our friends’ strength to weaken our enemies. This you must needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command over our confederates, as every of them may be most useful to us: the Chians and Methymnæans redeem their liberty with providing us some galleys; the most of the rest, with a tribute of money somewhat more pressing. Some again of our confederates are absolutely free, notwithstanding that they be islanders, and easy to be subdued: the reason whereof is this; they are situate in places commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable therefore, that here also we will so order our affairs as shall be most for our own turn, and most according to our fear, as we told you, of the Syracusians. For they affect a dominion over you; and having by advantage of your suspicion of us drawn you to their side, will themselves by force, or (if we go home without effect) by your want of friends, have the sole command of Sicily: which, if you join with them, must of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy for us to bring so great forces again together: nor will the Syracusians want strength to subdue you, if we be absent. Him that thinketh otherwise, the thing itself convinceth. 86. For when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you pretended was only this: that if we neglected you, the Syracusians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the danger. And it were unjust, that the argument you would needs have to prevail then with us, should now have no effect with yourselves; or that you should be jealous of the much strength we bring against the power of the Syracusians, when much rather you should give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here without you: and if becoming perfidious we should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold them: both in respect of the length of the voyage, and

for want of means of guarding them; because they be great, and provided after the manner of the continent. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater power than this of ours, will be always watching their advantages against you: and when an opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they have already made to appear, both in their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we, on the other side, invite you to a far more real safety; and pray you, not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from one another at this present, but to consider, that they by their own number have way to you always, though without confederates; whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can no more do you good.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Euphemus.

87. “But, Camarinæans, be neither you nor others moved with their calumnies. We have told you the very truth, why we are suspected: and summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We say, we command yonder, lest else we should obey; and we assert into liberty the cities here, lest else we should be harmed by them: many things we have to be doing, because many things we are forced to beware of: and both now and before, we came not uncalled; but called as confederates to such of you as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of what we do, nor go about as censors (which were now hard to do) to divert us; but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for your own service, so far take and use it: and think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that the

greatest part of the Grecians have good by it. For in all places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that looketh to be wronged, and he that contriveth to do the wrong, by the obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid, and of the fear that the other hath of their own danger, if we should come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against his will, the other into safety without his trouble. Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us that require it, and to yourselves. But do as others use to do; come with us: and instead of defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your turn once, and put them to their guard as they have done you."

The resolution of the Camarinæans for neutrality year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2.

88. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinæans stood thus affected. They bare good will to the Athenians, save that they thought they meant to subjugate Sicily: and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians, that were near them, might as well get the victory as the other, they had both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the future to help the Syracusians, but underhand and as sparingly as possible: and withal that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal answer unto both. So after deliberation had, they answered thus: "That forasmuch as they that warred, were both of them their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to neither". And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways.

And the Syracusians made preparations for the war by themselves.

The Athenians seek to win the Siculi: they bring their fleet to Catana: year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. they send for aid to Carthage, and into Hetruria: year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. and prepare to besiege Syracuse.

The Athenians being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi, to procure as many of them as they might to their side. Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the Syracusians, for the most part held off: but they that dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, presently agreed with the Athenians; and brought corn into the army, and some of them also money. To those that held off, the Athenians went with their army: and some they forced to come in, and others they hindered from receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians. And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana, and re–erected their camp formerly burnt by the Syracusians. They sent a galley also to Carthage, to procure amity and what help they could from thence: and into Hetruria, because some cities there had of their own accord promised to take their parts. They sent likewise to the Siculi about them and to Egesta, appointing them to send in all the horse they could: and made ready bricks, and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as intending to fall in hand with the war early the next spring.

The Syracusians pray aid of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Alcibiades at Lacedæmon instigateth the Lacedæmonians against his country.

The ambassadors of Syracuse which were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as they sailed by endeavoured also to move the Italians to a regard of this action of the Athenians. Being come to Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid upon the title of consanguinity. The Corinthians having forthwith, for their own part, decreed cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these to Lacedæmon: to help them to persuade the Lacedæmonians, both to make a more open war against the Athenians at home, and to send some forces also

into Sicily. At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow–fugitives: who presently upon their escape passed over from Thurii first to Cyllene, the haven of the Eleians, in a ship, and afterwards went thence to Lacedæmon, sent for by the Lacedæmonians themselves, under public security. For he feared them for his doings about Mantineia. And it fell out, that in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians, and Alcibiades made all of them the same request. Now the ephores and magistrates, though intending to send ambassadors to Syracuse to hinder them from compounding with the Athenians, being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades stood forth and sharpened the Lacedæmonians: inciting them with words to this effect:

the oration of alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades.

89. “It will be necessary that I say something first concerning mine own accusation, lest through jealousy of me, you bring a prejudicate ear to the common business. My ancestors having on a certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving you, I was the man that restored the same again; and showed you all possible respect, both otherwise, and in the matter of your loss at Pylus. Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to make a peace at Athens, by treating the same with my adversaries you invested them with authority, and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in applying myself afterwards to the Mantineans and Argives, or in anything else I did you hurt, I did it justly: and if any man here were causelessly angry with me, then when he suffered, let him be now content again, when he knows the true cause of the same. Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let him acknowledge that therein also he is offended without a cause. For we have been always enemies to tyrants; and what is contrary to a tyrant, is called the people: and from thence hath continued

our adherence to the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it was necessary in most things to follow the present course; nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth with the now headstrong humour of the people. But others there have been, both formerly and now, that have incited the common people to worse things than I: and they are those that have also driven out me. But as for us, when we had the charge of the whole, we thought it reason, by what form it was grown most great and most free, and in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though such of us as have judgment, do know well enough what the democracy is, and I no less than another, (insomuch as I could inveigh against it; but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new), yet we thought it not safe to change it, when you our enemies were so near us.

Year xvii. A. C. 415. 4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades.

90. “Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know anything which you yourselves do not, hear it now. We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians; after them the Italians; after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself. If these or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we should have undertaken Peloponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek forces there, and with many mercenary barbarians, Iberians and others of those parts, confessed to be the most warlike of the barbarians that are now. We should also have built many galleys besides these which we have already, (there being plenty of timber in Italy); with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof with our land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land, some by assault and some by siege, we hoped easily to have debelled it and afterwards to have gotten the dominion of all Greece. As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we

should have conquered there, besides what here we should have found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades.

91. “Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is the design of the fleet now gone; and which the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Understand next, that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly hold out. For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite may well subsist: but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten, and withal kept from the use of the sea, should withstand the forces of the Athenians already there, is a thing impossible. And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and soon after Italy also: and the danger from thence which I foretold you, would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only, but also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed. Let the army you send be of such, as being aboard may row, and landing presently be armed: and (which I think more profitable than the army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there, and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good to make war more openly upon them here: that the Syracusians seeing your care may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send supply to their army. You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most, is to know certainly what he most feareth, and to bring the same upon him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most, as having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the commodities which yourselves shall reap,

and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying; letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal, will come most of it unto you, partly taken, and partly of its own accord. The revenue of the silver mines in Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they have from their land or from their courts of justice, will presently be lost: and, which is worse, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in their revenue: and will care little for the Athenians, if they believe once that you follow the war to the utmost. That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, men of Lacedæmon, it resteth only in yourselves: for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are possible to be done.

Year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades. year xvii. A. C. 415–4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Alcibiades.

92. “Now I must crave this: that I be neither the worse esteemed, for that having once been thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same against it; nor yet mistrusted, as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of them that drave me out, I shall not, if you take my counsel, fly your profit. Nor are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies, as they are, that have made enemies of friends. I love not my country, as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it. Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine; but that I far rather seek to recover the country I have not. And he is truly a lover of his country, not that refuseth to invade the country he hath wrongfully lost: but that desires so much to be in it, as by any means he can he will attempt to recover it. I desire you therefore, Lacedæmonians, to make use of my service in whatsoever danger or labour confidently: seeing you know, according to the common saying, if I did hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend. And so much the more, in that I know the state of Athens, and but conjectured at yours. And considering you are now in deliberation upon a

matter of so extreme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army both into Sicily and Attica: as well to preserve the great matters that are there with the presence of a small part of your force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians both present and to come: and afterwards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece; not forced, but voluntary and with their good affection."

The Lacedæmonians resolve to send Gylippus into Sicily.

93. Thus spake Alcibiades. And the Lacedæmonians, though before this they had a purpose of their own accord to send an army against Athens, but had delayed and neglected it: yet when these particulars were delivered by him, they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving that what they had heard was from one that evidently knew it. Insomuch as they had set their minds already upon the fortifying of Deceleia, and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily, for the present. And having assigned Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, unto the Syracusian ambassadors for chief commander, they willed him to consider, both with them and the Corinthians, how best for their present means, and with greatest speed, some help might be conveyed unto them in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve. This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenians resolve to send provision and horsemen. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

In the meantime the galley arrived at Athens, which the generals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and horsemen to the army. So the winter ended: and the seventeenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

The Athenians burn the fields of certain towns of the Siculi and take Centoripa. They receive money and horsemen from Athens.

94. In the very beginning of the next spring the Athenians in Sicily departed from Catana, and sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily. The inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out, and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here, they wasted the fields: and having assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not taking it, they went presently back, part by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the same and burnt up their corn: and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them; and having set up a trophy, went all again on board their galleys. Thence they returned to Catana, and took in victual: then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the Siculi; which yielding on composition, they departed, and in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessæans and the Hyblæans. Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the furniture, supposing to have horses there: and thirty archers on horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.

The Lacedæmonians invade Argeia. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. The Argives take a great booty in Thyreatis. The commons of Thespiæ set upon the few, but with ill success.

95. The same spring the Lacedæmonians led forth their army against Argos, and went as far as to Cleonæ: but an earthquake happening, they went home again. But the Argives invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their own; and took a great booty from the Lacedæmonians, which they sold for no less than twenty–five talents.

Not long after, the commons of Thespiæ set upon them that had the government; but not prevailing, were part apprehended, and part escaped to Athens, the Athenians having also aided them.

Epipolæ a high ground before the city of Syracuse. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Diomilus slain. The Athenians fortify Labdalum.

96. The Syracusians the same summer, when they heard that the Athenians had horsemen sent to them from Athens, and that they were ready now to come against them, conceiving that if the Athenians gat not Epipolæ, a rocky ground and lying just against the city, they would not be able, though masters of the field, to take in the city with a wall: intended therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a guard. For the rest of the place is to the outside high and steep, falling to the city by degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the eye. And it is called by the Syracusians, Epipolæ, because it lieth above the level of the rest. The Syracusians, coming out of the city with their whole power into a meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fellow–commanders had already received their charge), were there taking a view of their arms: but first they had set apart seven hundred men of arms, under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolæ, and to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of their service. 97. The Athenians the day following, having been already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces, and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, unperceived, and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is almost an island, lying out into the sea and joined to the land with a narrow isthmus; not far from Syracuse, neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a pallisado across the said isthmus, lay there quiet. But the land soldiers marched at high speed towards Epipolæ, and gat up by Euryelus before the Syracusians could come to them from out of the meadow, where they were mustering. Nevertheless they

came on, every one with what speed he could, not only Diomilus with his seven hundred, but the rest also. They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty–five furlongs, before they could reach the enemy. The Syracusians therefore coming up in this manner, and thereby defeated in battle at Epipolæ, withdrew themselves into the city. But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce; and came down the next day to the city. But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again; and built a fort upon Labdalum, in the very brink of the precipices of Epipolæ, on the side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to keep their utensils and money in when they went out either to fight or to work.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

98. Not long after, there came unto them from Egesta three hundred horsemen: and from the Siculi, namely the Naxians and some others, about one hundred: and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty; for which they had horses, part from the Egestæans and Catanæans, and part they bought. So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca, and raised there a wall in circle very quickly; so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who therefore coming forth, intended to have given them battle, and no longer to have neglected the matter. But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusian generals perceiving their own to be in disarray, and not easily to be embattled, led them again into the city, save only a certain part of their horsemen; which staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone and straggling far abroad from their camp. But the Athenians with one squadron of men of arms, together with their whole number of horse,

charged the horsemen of the Syracusians and put them to flight: of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle of horse.

The Athenians begin to build on the north side of the fortification wherein they lay the wall wherewith to begirt the city. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusians make a cross wall in their way.

99. The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall, to the north side of their circular wall: some building, and some fetching stone and timber, which they still laid down toward the place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power against the Athenians any more: but thought fit rather, in the way where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a counter–wall; which, if they could but do before the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their further building: and if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it, they might send part of the army to defend it, and pre–occupate the accesses to it with a pallisado: and if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore they came out; and beginning at their own city, drew a cross–wall beneath the circular fortifications of the Athenians; and set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Syracusians were masters of the places near the sea; and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

100. The Syrcusians, when they thought both their pallisado and wall sufficient; and considering that the Athenians came not to impeach them in

the work, as they that feared to divide their army and to be thereby the more easy to be fought withal, and that also hasted to make an end of their own wall wherewith to encompass the city, left one squadron for a guard of their works, and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town. And having observed also, that about noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and that such as were remaining at the pallisado kept but negligent watch; they commanded three hundred chosen men of arms, and certain other picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly to that counter–wall of the Syrasians. The rest of the army divided in two, went one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city; and the other with the other general to the palisado next to the gate [of the counter–wall]. The three hundred assaulted and took the pallisado; the guard whereof forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground: and with them entered also their pursuers; but after they were in were beaten out again by the Syracusians, and some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then the whole army went back together, and pulled down the wall and plucked up the pallisado: the pales whereof they carried with them to their camp, and erected a trophy.

The Athenians build from their own fortification to the crags towards the great haven. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. The Athenians take their palisado again. Lamachus slain. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Nicias, assaulted in his camp, defendeth it. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

101. The next day, the Athenians beginning at their circular wall, built onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of Epipolæ looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the haven, for their wall to come through the plain and marsh, was the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again and made another pallisado, beginning at

the city, through the middle of the marsh; and a ditch at the side of it, to exclude the Athenians from bringing their wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their work as far as to the crag, assaulted the pallisado and trench of the Syracusians again. And having commanded their galleys to be brought about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syracuse, about break of day went straight down into the plain; and passing through the marsh, where the ground was clay and firmest, [and partly] upon boards and planks, won both the trench and pallisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morning; and the rest not long after. And here also they fought; and the victory fell to the Athenians: the Syracusians, those of the right wing, fled to the city; and they of the left, to the river. The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge. But the Syracusians fearing to be prevented, (for most of the horsemen were in this number), set upon these three hundred: and putting them to flight, drave them upon the right wing of the Athenians, and following affrighted also the foremost guard of the wing. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the left wing of their own, and with [all] the Argives: and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was deserted and slain with some six or seven more. These the Syracusians hastily snatched up, and carried into a place of safety beyond the river: and when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them, they departed. 102. In the meantime, they that fled at first to the city, seeing how things went, took heart again; and re–embattled themselves against the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before; and withal sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolæ; supposing to find it without defendants, and so to take it. And they took and demolished the outworks ten plethers in length: but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it for infirmity. For he commanded his

servants to set fire on all the engines, and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall: knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves for want of men. And it fell out accordingly: for by reason of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were coming up to relieve the circle: and their galleys withal (as is before mentioned) were going about from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they and the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city: with opinion that they could no longer hinder them, with the strength they now had, from bringing their wall through unto the sea.

103. After this the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians their dead under truce: and they on the other side delivered to the Athenians the body of Lamachus and of the rest slain with him. And their whole army, both land and sea forces, being now together, they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall from Epipolæ and the rocks unto the sea–side. The necessaries of the army were supplied from all parts of Italy. And many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athenians; to whom came also three penteconteri [long boats of fifty oars a–piece] from Hetruria; and divers other ways their hopes were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from Peloponnesus, made no longer account to subsist by war; but conferred, both amongst themselves and with Nicias, of composition: for Lamachus being dead, the sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing were concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before) were propounded unto Nicias, and more amongst themselves. And the present ill success had also spread some jealousy amongst them, one of another. And they discharged the generals under whose conduct this happened, as if their

harm had come either from their unluckiness or from their perfidiousness: and chose Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias in their places.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Gylippus despaireth of Sicily, and seeks to save Italy. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Nicias despiseth the coming of Gylippus.

104. Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedæmon and the Corinthian galleys were already at Leucas, purposing with all speed to go over into Sicily. But when terrible reports came unto them from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that Syracuse was already quite enclosed, Gylippus had hope of Sicily no longer; but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen a Corinthian, with two Laconic and two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the Ionic sea to Tarentum: and the Corinthians were to man ten galleys of their own, two of Leucas, and three of Ambracia, and come after. Gylippus went first from Tarentum to Thurii, as ambassador, by his father's right, who was free of the city of Tarentum: but not winning them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along the coast of Italy. Passing by the Terinæan gulf, he was put from the shore by a wind which in that quarter bloweth strongly against the north, and driven into the main sea; and after another extreme tempest brought in again into Tarentum: where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather, and repaired them. Nicias, hearing that he came, contemned the small number of his galleys, as also the Thurians had before, supposing them furnished as for piracy: and appointed no watch for them yet.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

105. About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians invaded the territory of Argos, they and their confederates: and wasted a great part of their land. And the Athenians aided the Argives with thirty galleys: which most apparently broke the peace between them and the

Lacedæmonians. For before, they went out from Pylus with the Argives and Mantineans, but in the nature of freebooters; and that also not into Laconia, but other parts of Peloponnesus. Nay, when the Argives have often entreated them but only to land with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their territory to return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Læspodius, and Demaratus, they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera, and in Prasiæ, and there and in other places wasted the country: and gave unto the Lacedæmonians a most justifiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their galleys, and the Lacedæmonians gone likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia: and when they had wasted part of their territory, and killed some of their men, returned.

THE SEVENTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

GYLIPPUS ARRIVETH AT Syracuse: checketh the fortune of the Athenians: and cutteth off their works with a counter–wall. — The Lacedæmonians invade Attica and fortify Deceleia. — The confederates of each side are solicited for supplies to be sent to Syracuse. — Two battles fought in the great haven: in the first of which the Syracusians are beaten, in the second superior. — Demosthenes arriveth with a new army: and attempting the works of the enemy in Epipolæ by night, is repulsed with great slaughter of his men. — They fight the third time: and the Syracusians having the victory, block up the haven with boats. — A catalogue of the confederates on each side. — They fight again at the bars of the haven: where the Athenians losing their galleys, prepare to march away by land. — In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally subdued by the Syracusians. — The death of Nicias and Demosthenes, and misery of the captives in the quarry. — Which happened in the ninteenth year of this war.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol 91. 3. Gylippus and Pythen resolve to go to Syracuse. They took the aid of the men of Himera. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

Gylippus and Pythen, having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrii. And upon certain intelligence now, that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but coming with an army there was entrance still by Epipolæ; they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on their right hand, and adventure into the town by sea; or on the left, and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as many other as they could get to their side, to go into it by land. And it was

resolved to go to Himera: the rather, because the four Attic galleys, which Nicias, though he contemned them before, had now when he heard they were at Locri sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. Having prevented this guard, they crossed the strait: and touching at Rhegium and Messana by the way, came to Himera. Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeræans, that they not only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with armour such of Gylippus and Pythen's mariners as wanted: for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land. They likewise sent to the Selinuntians, to meet them at a place assigned with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other of the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many: being much the willinger to come to the side, both for that Archonidas was lately dead, (who reigning over some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to the Athenians), and also for that Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedæmon with a good will to the business. Gylippus, taking with him of his own mariners and sea–soldiers, for whom he had gotten arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeræans with armour and without in the whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and some light–armed Selinuntians, with some few horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi in all about one thousand, marched with these towards Syracuse.

The Corinthian galleys left by Gylippus, make haste after him: and Gongylus arriving first, keepeth the Syracusians from compounding. Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

In the meantime, the Corinthians with the rest of their galleys putting to sea from Leucas, made after [as they were] every one with what speed he could: and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last that set forth, arrived first at Syracuse with one galley, and but a little before the coming of Gylippus. And finding them ready to call an assembly about an end of the war, he hindered them from it, and put them into heart:

relating, how both the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus the son of Cleandridas for general, sent unto them by the Lacedæmonians. With this the Syracusians were re–confirmed, and went presently out with their whole army to meet him: for they understood now that he was near. He, having taken Iegas, a fort, in his way, as he passed through the territory of the Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolæ: and getting up by Euryelus, where also the Athenians had gotten up before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven; save only a little next the sea, which they were yet at work on. And on the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus and the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready upon the place: and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger that Syracuse was now brought into.

Gylippus offereth the Athenians five days' truce to be gone in. The Syracusians win Labdalum. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though somewhat troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them; saying, that if they would abandon Sicily within five days with bag and baggage, he was content to give them truce. Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer. After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one against another: but Gylippus finding the Syracusians troubled, and not easily falling into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification. And Gylippus seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into the top called Temenites; where he lodged all night. The next day, he drew out the greater part of his army, and embattled them before the fortification of the Athenians, that they might not send succour to any other place; but a

part also they sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those they found within it: for the place was out of sight to the Athenians. The same day the Syracusians also took an Athenian galley, as it entered into the great haven.

The Syracusians build a wall upwards through Epipolæ, to stop the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians. The Athenians fortify Plemmyrium. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Nicias sendeth twenty galleys to lie in wait for the aid coming from Peloponnesus.

After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a wall through Epipolæ, from the city towards the single cross wall upwards: that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be excluded from bringing their own wall any further on. And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to the sea, were come up again: and Gylippus (for some part of the wall was but weak) rising with his army by night, went to assault it. But the Athenians also knowing it, (for they lodged all night without the wall), went presently to relieve it: which Gylippus perceiving, again retired. And the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part themselves: and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their confederates. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called Plemmyrium. It is a promontory over against the city, which shooting into the entrance of the great haven straiteneth the mouth of the same: which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For by this means, their galleys might ride nearer to the haven of the Syracusians: and not upon every motion of the navy of the enemies, to be to come out against them, as they were before, from the bottom of the [great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea: seeing his hopes by land diminished since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage; and where now also lay at

road both his great vessels of carriage, and the nimblest of his galleys. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out also to fetch in wood, they were continually intercepted by the Syracusian horsemen, that were masters of the field. For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a little town called Olympieium, to keep those in Plemmyrium from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the Corinthian galleys: and sent out a guard of twenty galleys, with order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium, and the passage there into Sicily.

Gylippus goeth on with his wall, and fighteth with the Athenians twice: and in the latter battle having the victory, he finished his wall, and utterly excluded the year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. proceeding of the wall of the Athenians.

Gylippus in the meantime went on with the wall through Epipolæ, using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians; and withal drew out the Syracusians and their confederates beyond the point of the same, and ever as he brought them forth put them into their order; and the Athenians, on the other side, embattled themselves against them. Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the battle: and being come to hands, they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates had no use at all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and the Athenians having given them truce to take up their dead and erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army, and told them, that this was not theirs, but his own fault; who by pitching the battle so far within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters; and that therefore he meant to bring them on again: and wished them to consider, that for forces they were nothing inferior to the enemy; and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured, that being

Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master and drive out of the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought out the army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall in hand: (for by this time it wanted but little of passing the point of theirs, and proceeding, would give the enemy advantage, both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless he listed): did therefore also set forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms farther without the walls than he had done before, gave the onset. His horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians, in ground enough, to which neither of their walls extended. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left wing of the Athenians next them, put them to flight: by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome likewise, and driven headlong within their fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians brought up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so as they could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose the city.

The rest of the galleys come in from Peloponnesus, unseen of the Athenians that were set to watch them.

After this, the other twelve galleys of the Corinthians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians, undescried of the Athenian galleys that lay in wait for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian: and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained to the cross wall.

Gylippus goeth about Sicily, and sendeth into Peloponnesus for more aid. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily, raising forces both for sea and land, and soliciting to his side all such cities as formerly either had not been forward, or had wholly abstained from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to procure new forces to be transported either in ships or boats, or how they could; because the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the like. In the meantime, the Syracusians both manned their navy, and made trial of themselves, as intending to take in hand that part also: and were otherwise exceedingly encouraged.

Nicias writeth to Athens for supply, and to be eased of his charge.

Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action that passed: and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of safety. And fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or judgment, or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter: conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds. With these letters, and other their instructions, the messengers took their journey. And Nicias in the meantime having a care to the well guarding of his camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

The Athenians besiege Amphipolis. The end of the eighteenth summer.

In the end of this summer, Euetion, general for the Athenians, with Perdiccas, together with many Thracians warring against Amphipolis, took not the city; but bringing his galleys about into Strymon, besieged it from the river, lying at Imeræum. And so this summer ended.

The next winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens; and having spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such questions as they were asked, they presented the letter: which the clerk of the city, standing forth, read unto the Athenians, containing as followeth:

the letter of nicias to the people of athens. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Letter of Nicias. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Letter of Nicias. year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Letter of Nicias.

“Athenians, you know by many other my letters what hath passed formerly: nor is it less needful for you to be informed of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it, at this present. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, came Gylippus a Lacedæmonian, with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of the cities of Sicily; and in the first battle was overcome by us: but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving over our walling up of the city for the multitude of our enemies, we now sit still. Nor can we indeed have the use of our whole army, because some part of the men of arms are employed to defend our walls. And they have built a single wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to enclose it, except one should come with a great army and win that cross wall of theirs by assault. And so it is, that we who seemed to besiege others, are besieged ourselves for so much as concerneth the land: for we cannot go far abroad by reason of their cavalry. 12. They have also sent ambassadors for another army into Peloponnesus: and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both to solicit such to join with him in the war as have not yet stirred, and of others to get, if he can, both more land–soldiers and more munition for their navy. For they intend, as I have been informed, both to assault our wall by land with their army, and to make trial what they are able to do with their

navy by sea. For though our fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous at first, both for soundness of the galleys and entireness of the men: yet our galleys are now soaked with lying so long in the water, and our men consumed. For we want the means to haul a–land our galleys, and trim them: because the galleys of the enemy, as good as ours and more in number, do keep us in a continual expectation of assault, which they manifestly endeavour. And seeing it is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have therefore liberty to dry their galleys at their pleasure: for they lie not, as we, in attendance upon others. 13. Nay, we could hardly do it, though we had many galleys spare, and were not constrained, as now, to keep watch upon them with our whole number. For should we abate though but a little of our observance, we should want provision: which as we are, being to pass so near their city, is brought in with difficulty. And hence it is, that our mariners both formerly have been, and are now wasted. For our mariners, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen: and our slaves, now we are on equal terms, run over to the enemy. As for strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint, return presently to their cities; and others having been levied at first with great wages, thinking they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their expectation and especially with their navy, partly take pretext to be gone that they may serve the enemy, and partly, Sicily being large, shift themselves away every one as he can. Some there are also, who having bought here Hyccarian slaves, have gotten the captains of galleys to accept of them in the room of themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength. 14. To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet continueth in the height of vigour: and how few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley and how to contain the oar. But of all, my greatest trouble is this: that being general, I can neither make them

do better, (for your natures are hard to be governed), nor get mariners in any other place, (which the enemy can do from many places), and must of necessity have them from whence we brought both those we have and those we have lost. For our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us. Had the enemy but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy that now send us provision, seeing what estate we are now in and you not help us, would turn to them, the war were at an end and we expugned without another stroke.

Year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

"I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these, but not more profitable: seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here, when you go to council upon them. Withal, because I know your natures to be such, as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards when things fall not out accordingly you will call in question them that write it, I thought best to write the truth for my own safety's sake. 15. And now think thus: that though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably; yet since all Sicily is united against us, and another army expected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are not enough for the enemy's present forces) either to send for these away, or to send hither another army, both of land and sea–soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a little; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone [in the kidneys]. I must crave your pardon. I have done you many good services in the conducts of your armies, when I had my health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have furnished himself of his Sicilian aids: and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look not

to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as before, and partly by preventing you with speed."

The Athenians conclude to send a new army to Syracuse.

16. These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present, till such time as others chosen to be in commission might arrive, they joined with him two of those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon: to the end that he might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his sickness. They concluded likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athenians enrolled and of their confederates. And for fellow–generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily about the time of the winter solstice, with ten galleys and twenty talents of silver, to tell them there that aid was coming, and that there was care taken of them. 17. But Demosthenes staying, made preparation for the voyage to set out early the next spring: and sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and galleys and men of arms.

They send twenty galleys to year xviii. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. Naupactus, to keep the Corinthians from transporting their forces into Sicily.

The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch that none should go over into Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them and had brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that they had sent thither those other galleys before: but now they were encouraged a great deal more, and prepared men of arms to be transported into Sicily in ships; and the Lacedæmonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians manned five–and–twenty galleys, to present battle to the fleet

that kept watch at Naupactus: that the ships with the men of arms, whilst the Athenians attended these galleys so embattled against them, might pass by unhindered.

The Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Attica and fortify Deceleia, supposing the Athenians to have broken the peace. year xviii. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

18. The Lacedæmonians, as they intended before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily prepared likewise to invade Attica; thereby to divert them. And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Deceleia, and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedæmonians were heartened thereunto principally, because they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against them and another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled down: and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in themselves. For in the former war, the injury proceeded from their own side: in that the Thebans had entered Platæa in time of peace; and because also, whereas it was inserted in the former articles, that arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause: remembering amongst others, the calamity at Pylus. But when the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus, and of Prasiæ and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in the country about; and seeing that as often as there arose any controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedæmonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it: then indeed, the Lacedæmonians conceiving the Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter, they sent about unto their confederates to make ready

iron, and all instruments of fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves, and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by Thucydides.

Year xix. The Peloponnesians invade Attica, and fortify Deceleia. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The Peloponnesians send away their men of arms for Sicily.

19. The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever before, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates entered with their army into Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, their king. And first they wasted the champagne country; and then went in hand with the wall at Deceleia, dividing the work amongst the army, according to their cities. This Deceleia is from the city of Athens, at the most, but one hundred and twenty furlongs: and about as much or a little more from Bœotia. This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica, went on with their fortification. They in Peloponnesus, sent away their ships with the men of arms about the same time into Sicily: of which the Lacedæmonians, out of the best of their Helotes and men made newly free, sent in the whole six hundred, and Eccritus a Spartan for commander: and the Bœotians three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. And these set forth first, and put to sea at Tænarus in Laconia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, and part mercenary Arcadians; and Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from Corinth, and Sargeus a Sicyonian for captain. Now the twenty–five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter, lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus, till such time as the men of

arms in the ships from Peloponnesus might get away: for which purpose they were also set out at first, that the Athenians might not have their minds upon these ships so much as upon the galleys.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The Athenians send out Demosthenes towards Sicily.

20. In the meantime also the Athenians, whilst Deceleia was fortifying, in the beginning of the spring, sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus; with order when he came to Argos, to take aboard the men of arms which the Argives were to send them, according to league: and sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with threescore galleys of Athens and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred men of arms of the roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they could get, provided by their subject confederates of all other necessaries for the war. But he had order to join first with Charicles, and help him to make war first upon Laconia. So Demosthenes went to Ægina, and stayed there both for the remnant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles till he had taken aboard the Argives.

Gylippus persuadeth the Syracusians to fight by sea. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

21. In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had dealt withal as great forces as severally he could get from them. And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to man as many galleys as they could, and make trial of a battle by sea: and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of the war, which should be worthy the danger. Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting them to undertake the Athenians with their navy: who told them, “that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary, or from everlasting; but were

more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the Medes: and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them; for wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the advantage of power, but boldness of enterprizing, with the same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies". "He knew it," he said, "certainly, that the Syracusians by their unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more advantage in respect of the fear it would cause, than the Athenians should endamage them by their odds of skill." He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy, and to be afraid no longer. The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others if any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea: and presently manned their galleys.

The Syracusians win Plemmyrium, but are beaten by sea. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The Syracusians win the works of the Athenians in Plemmyrium. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The Athenians get the victory by water.

22. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself and assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium: withal the galleys of the Syracusians, by appointment, thirty–five of them came up towards it out of the great haven; and forty–five more came about out of the little haven, where also was their arsenal, with purpose to join with those within, and to go together to Plemmyrium, that the Athenians might be troubled on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys to oppose them; with twenty–five of them they fought with the thirty–five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those that came about from the little haven. And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven, and held each other to it for a long time; one side endeavouring to force, the other to defend the entrance. 23. In the meantime, Gylippus (the

Athenians in Plemmyrium being now come down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight of the galleys) betimes in the morning, and on a sudden assaulted the fortifications before they could come back again to defend them; and possessed first the greatest, and afterwards the two lesser: for they that watched in these, when they saw the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that fled upon the losing of the first wall, and put themselves into boats and into a certain ship, got hardly into the camp: for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the better in the fight upon the water, they gave them chase with one nimble galley. But by that time that the other two walls were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were overcome: and the Athenians which fled from those two walls got to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven's mouth, having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder; and falling foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians: who put to flight not only them, but also those other by whom they had before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of the Syracusians and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the men of three galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own galleys they lost only three. When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys, and erected a trophy in the little island over against Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

24. The Syracusians, though such were their success in the battle by sea, yet they won the fortification in Plemmyrium; and set up three trophies, for every wall one. One of the two walls last taken, they demolished: but two they repaired, and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these walls, many men were slain, and many taken alive: and their goods, which altogether was a great matter, were all taken. For the Athenians using these works for

their storehouse, there was in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants, and much unto captains of galleys. For there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other furniture; and three galleys drawn to land. And this loss of Plemmyrium, was it that most and principally impaired the Athenians' army. For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe; for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys, kept them out, and nothing could be brought in unto them but by fight: and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

25. After this the Syracusians sent out twelve galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusian. Of which one carried ambassadors into Peloponnesus, to declare what hope they had now of their business, and to instigate them to a sharper war in Attica. The other eleven went into Italy, upon intelligence of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenian army: which also they met with, and destroyed most of them; and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready framed, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went to Locri: and riding here, there came unto them one of the ships that carried the men of arms of the Thespians, whom the Syracusians took aboard, and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara, took one of them, and the men that were in her; but could not take the rest: so that they escaped through to Syracuse. There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old harbour, to the end that the galleys might ride within, and the Athenians not annoy them by assault. The Athenians having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness, fortified with wooden turrets and covered against fire, caused certain men with [little] boats to go and fasten cords unto the piles, and so broke them up

with craning. Some also the divers did cut up with saws. In the meantime the Syracusians from the harbour, and they from the great ship, shot at each other: till in the end the greatest part of the piles were by the Athenians gotten up. But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles which lay hidden. For some of them they had so driven in, as that they came not above the water: so that he that should come near, was in danger to be thrown upon them as upon a rock. But these also for reward, the divers went down and sawed asunder. But the Syracusians continually drave down other in their stead. Other devices they had against each other, as was not unlikely between armies so near opposed: and many light skirmishes passed, and attempts of all kinds were put in execution. The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciotes, and some Lacedæmonians, unto the cities about them: to let them know that they had won Plemmyrium; and that in the battle by sea, they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but by their own disorder; and also to show what hope they were in in other respects, and to entreat their aid both of sea and land forces: forsomuch as the Athenians expecting another army, if they would send aid before it came whereby to overthrow that which they had now there, the war would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of Sicily.

Demosthenes in his way to Sicily fortifieth a neck of land in Laconia.

26. Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were gotten together, put to sea from Ægina, and sailing into Peloponnesus joined with Charicles and the thirty galleys that were with him. And having taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, came to Laconia; and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera. From thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against the island Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo, they wasted a part of the country: and fortified an isthmus there, both that the Helotes might have a refuge in it running away from the Lacedæmonians, and that freebooters

from thence, as from Pylus, might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining. As soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on to Corcyra, to take up the confederates there, with intent to go thence speedily into Sicily. And Charicles having stayed to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens: and the Argives also went home.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The aids of the Thracians come too late to go into Sicily. The incommodities which befell the Athenians by the fortification in Deceleia. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

27. The same winter also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred targetiers, of those called Machærophori of the race of them that are called Dii: and were to have gone with Demosthenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians resolved to send them back again into Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to entertain them only for the war in Deceleia: for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day. For Deceleia being this summer fortified first by the whole army, and then by the several cities maintained with a garrison by turns, much endamaged the Athenians; and weakened their estate, both by destroying their commodities and consuming of their men, so as nothing more. For the former invasions, having been short, hindered them not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time. But now, the enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with greater forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison making incursions and fetching in booty, Agis the king of Lacedæmon being always there in person and diligently prosecuting the war: the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted. For they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest part were artificers: besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. And by the continual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to Deceleia and defending the

country, their horses became partly lamed through incessant labour in rugged grounds, and partly wounded by the enemy. 28. And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Eubœa by Oropus the shortest way, through Deceleia by land, they were now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost about the promontory of Sunium. And whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without, it now wanted: and instead of a city was become as it were a fort. And the Athenians watching on the battlements of the wall, in the day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at once (except the horsemen), part at the walls and part at the arms, were quite tired. But that which pressed them most, was that they had two wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so great, as no man would have believed till now they saw it. For being besieged at home from the fortification of the Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined that they should not only not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens: and therein so much have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the Grecians both in power and courage, (who in the beginning of this war conceived, that if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some of them, that they might hold out two years, others three, no man more), as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded they should have undertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being every way weakened already by the former war, have undergone another, not inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians. Now their treasure being by these wars, and by the detriment sustained from Deceleia, and other great expenses that came upon them, at a very low ebb, about this time they imposed on such as were under their dominion, a twentieth part of all goods passing by sea for a tribute; by this means to improve their comings in. For their expenses were not now as before; but so much greater, by how much the war was greater: and their revenue besides cut off.

The Thracians sent back, in their way sack the city of Mycalessus. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The barbarous cruelty of the Thracians. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

29. The Thracians, therefore, that came too late to go with Demosthenes, they presently sent back, as being unwilling to lay out money in such a scarcity: and gave the charge of carrying them back to Diitrephes, with command as he went along those coasts, (for his way was through the Euripus), if occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy. He accordingly landed them by Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some small booty. Then going over the Euripus from Chalcis in Eubœa, he disbarked again in Bœotia and led his soldiers towards Mycalessus; and lay all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, which is distant from Mycalessus about sixteen furlongs. The next day he cometh to the city, being a very great one, and taketh it: for they kept no watch, nor expected that any man would have come in and assaulted them so far from the sea. Their walls also were but weak, in some places fallen down, and in others low–built: and their gates open through security. The Thracians entering into Mycalessus, spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people, without mercy on old or young, but killed all they could light on, both women and children; yea, and the labouring cattle, and whatsoever other living thing they saw. For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extreme bloody, equal to any of the barbarians. Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other disorder, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined: they likewise fell upon the school–house, which was in the city a great one, and the children newly entered into it; and killed them every one. And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also was it more unexpected and more bitter. 30. The Thebans hearing of it, came out to help them: and overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, both recovered the booty, and chased them to the Euripus and to the sea, where

the galleys lay that brought them. Some of them they killed: of those most in their going aboard; for swim they could not; and such as were in the [small] boats, when they saw how things went a–land, had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus. In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved themselves not unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they were charged first: but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, defended themselves well, and lost but few men in that action. But some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they stayed behind for pillage. But in the whole of thirteen hundred there were slain [only] two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, there were slain, horsemen and men of arms, one with another about twenty; and amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of Bœotia: and of the Mycallesians there perished a part. Thus went the matter at Mycalessus: the loss which it received being, for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any that happened in the whole war.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. Eurymedon cometh to Demosthenes out of Sicily, and telleth him of the taking of Plemmyrium. Demosthenes and Eurymedon levy forces for Sicily.

31. Demosthenes going from Corcyra after his fortifying in Laconia, found a ship lying in Pheia of Elis, and in her certain men of arms of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. The ship he sunk: but the men escaped, and afterwards getting another ship went on in their voyage. After this, Demosthenes being about Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard their men of arms, and sent to Naupactus for the Messenians. From thence he crossed over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzea and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athenians. Whilst he was in these parts, he met with Eurymedon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter unto the army with commodities: who told him amongst other things, how he had heard by the

way after he was at sea, that the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium. Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them, and related that the twenty–five galleys of Corinth that lay before Naupactus would not give over war and yet delayed to fight: and therefore desired to have some galleys sent him, as being unable with his eighteen to give battle to twenty–five of the enemy. Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten galleys more to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Conon himself: and went themselves about furnishing of what belonged to the army. Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra, and having appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied men of arms: for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him in the charge of general: and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in the parts about Acarnania.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. Nicias overthroweth the new supply going to Syracuse from the neighbouring cities, and killeth eight hundred of them.

32. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which after the taking of Plemmyrium had been sent unto the cities about, having now obtained and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to Syracuse. But Nicias, upon intelligence thereof, sent unto such cities of the Siculi as had the passages and were their confederates, the Centoripines, Halicyæans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to go by, but to unite themselves and stop them: for that they would not so much as offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had already denied them. When the Sicilians were marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had desired them, put themselves in ambush in three several places: and setting upon them unawares and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them, and all the ambassadors save only one, a Corinthian: which conducted the rest that escaped, being about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse. 33. About the same time came unto them also

the aid of the Camarinæans, five hundred men of arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them men for five galleys, besides four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen. For now all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral; but all the rest, who before stood looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against the Athenians. [Nevertheless], the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held their hands; and assaulted not the Athenians for a while.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the continent with the whole army to the promontory of Iapygia. From thence they went to the Chœrades, islands of Iapygia: and here took in certain Iapygian darters to the number of two hundred and fifty, of the Messapian nation. And having renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned there and granted them those darters, they went thence to Metapontum, a city of Italy. There by virtue of a league, they got two galleys and three hundred darters: which taken aboard, they kept along the shore till they came to the territory of Thurii. Here they found the adverse faction to the Athenians to have been lately driven out in a sedition. And because they desired to muster their army here, that they might see if any were left behind; and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war, and, as things stood, to have for friends and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians: they stayed about that in the territory of the Thurians.

The battle by sea before Naupactus between the Corinthians and Athenians. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

34. The Peloponnesians and the rest, who were at the same time in the twenty–five galleys that for safeguard of the ships lay opposite to the

galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle, and with more galleys, so as they were little inferior in number to those of the Athenians, went to an anchor under Irineus of Achaia in Rhypica. The place where they rode was in form like a half moon; and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and other their confederates of those parts, embattled upon the points of the promontory; and their galleys made up the space between, under the command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians came up with thirty–three galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians at first lay still; but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they charged the Athenians, and the fight began. They held each other to it long. The Athenians sunk three galleys of the Corinthians: and though none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which having encountered the Corinthian galleys a–head, were torn on both sides between the beaks and the oars by the beaks of the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same purpose. After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides challenged the victory; though yet the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to renew the fight; they at length parted. There was no chasing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either side; because the Peloponnesians and Corinthians fighting near the land easily escaped, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians presently set up a trophy as victors; in regard that more of the Athenian galleys were made unserviceable, than of theirs; and thought themselves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the Corinthians think they have the better, when they have not much the worse: and the Athenians think they have the worse, when they have not much the better. And when the Peloponnesians were

gone and their army by land dissolved, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as if the victory had been theirs; distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians rode, about twenty furlongs. This was the success of that battle by sea.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon come along the shore of Italy, and take up forces. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

35. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put in readiness to go with them seven hundred men of arms and three hundred darters, commanded their galleys to go along the coast to Croton; and conducted their land soldiers, having first taken a muster of them all upon the side of the river Sybaris, through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river Hylias, upon word sent them from the men of Croton, that if the army went through their territory it should be against their will, they marched down to the seaside and to the mouth of the river Hylias; where they stayed all that night, and were met by their galleys. The next day embarking, they kept along the shore and touched at every town saving Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

The Syracusians make ready their galleys to fight with the Athenians there before the supply came. Their manner of strengthening their galleys. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

36. The Syracusians in the meantime, upon intelligence of their coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy; and with their new supply of landmen, which they had gotten together on purpose to fight with the Athenians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon should arrive. And they furnished their navy, both otherwise and according to the advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger; and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six cubits long: in such manner as the

Corinthians had armed their galleys a–head, to fight with those before Naupactus. For the Syracusians made account, that against the Athenian galleys not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy a–head as upon the side by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better; and that to fight in the great haven many galleys in not much room, was an advantage to them: for that using the direct encounter, they should break with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies; and that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would want means both to go about and to go through them, which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could: and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting a–head, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters [to do otherwise], was it they would now principally make use of: for in this would be their principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off and little in compass, near their own camp: and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters. And the enemy being pressed, could not choose, thronging together into a little room and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another: which was indeed the thing, that in all their battles by sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt; having not, as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire unto. And to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set upon them from the main sea, and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able; especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

The Athenians and Syracusians fight. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

37. The Syracusians having devised thus much over and above their former skill and strength, and far more confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and with their navy at

once. The landmen from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp upon the side toward the city: and from Olympieium, the men of arms all that were there, and the horsemen and light armed of the Syracusians came up to the wall on the other side. And by and by after, came sailing forth also the galleys of the Syracusians and their confederates. The Athenians, that thought at first they would have made the attempt only with their landmen, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion; and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls, against those that came from the city: and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters, that were coming in great numbers and with speed from Olympieium and the parts without: others again went aboard, and withal came to aid those ashore. But when the galleys were manned they put off, being seventy–five in number; and those of Syracuse about eighty. 38. Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the Syracusians sunk a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted again: and the land soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The next day the Syracusians lay still, without showing any sign of what they meant to do. Yet Nicias seeing that the battle by sea was with equality, and imagining that they would fight again, made the captains to repair their galleys, such as had been torn: and two great ships to be moored without those piles which he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres' breadth asunder: to the end, if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in and again go safely out at leisure. In performing of this, the Athenians spent a whole day from morning until night.

The Athenians and Syracusians fight again. The stratagem of Ariston, a master of a galley. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol.

91. 4.

39. The next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again with the same forces, both by sea and land, that they had done before; but begun earlier in the morning; and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day, now again as before, in attempting upon each other without effect. Till at last Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most expert master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, persuaded the commanders in the navy to send to such in the city as it belonged to, and command that the market should be speedily kept at the sea–side, and to compel every man to bring thither whatsoever he had fit for meat, and there to sell it: that the mariners disbarking, might presently dine by the galleys' side, and quickly again unlooked–for assault the Athenians afresh the same day. 40. This advice being liked, they sent a messenger, and the market was furnished. And the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern towards the city; and disbarking, dined there right on the shore. The Athenians, supposing they had retired towards the city as vanquished, landed at leisure: and amongst other business went about the dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to have fought again the same day. But the Syracusians suddenly going aboard, came towards them again: and the Athenians, in great tumult and for the most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them. For a while they held their hands on both sides, and but observed each other. But anon after, the Athenians thought not fit, by longer dallying, to overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to fight as soon as they could; and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and the fight began. The Syracusians received [and resisted] their charge; and fighting, as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with those of the Athenians, and provided with beaks for the purpose, brake the galleys of the Athenians very much between the heads of the galleys and the oars. The Athenians were also

annoyed much by the darters from the decks; but much more by those Syracusians, who going about in small boats passed under the rows of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence.

The Syracusians have the victory.

41. The Syracusians having fought in this manner with the utmost of their strength, in the end gat the victory: and the Athenians, between the [two] ships, escaped into their harbour. The Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those ships: but the dolphins hanging from the masts over the entrance of the harbour, forbade them to follow any further. Yet there were two galleys, which upon a jollity after victory approached them, but both were lost: of which one with her men and all was taken. The Syracusians, after they had sunk seven galleys of the Athenians and torn many more, and of the men had taken some alive and killed others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies: and had already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also made account to subdue the army by land. And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon with a new army arrive at Syracuse. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Demosthenes attempteth to win the wall which the Syracusians had built through Epipolæ to exclude the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

42. In the meantime Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian supply; being about seventy–three galleys, and men of arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand; besides darters, as well barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates, to see no end of their danger; and that, notwithstanding the fortifying in Deceleia, another army should come now

equal and like unto their former; and that their power should be so great in every kind. And on the other side, it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before. Demosthenes, when he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into Nicias his case: — for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt, and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus: the which, if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for: for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak, and the city been enclosed with a wall; whereby, though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did: — Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of the army. And having observed that the cross wall of the Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single; and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolæ, and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken, (for none would have stood against them): hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the dispatching of the war. For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army, and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him and the whole state. The Athenians therefore went out, and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus; and were the stronger, as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympieium. 43. After this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which the Athenians had built to enclose the city withal, with engines. But seeing the engines were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, and

that having assaulted it in divers parts with the rest of his army, he was notwithstanding put back, he resolved to spend the time no longer; but having gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest in commission thereunto, to put in execution his design for Epipolæ, as was before intended. By day, it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in their approach or in their ascent. Having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of casting weapons, and whatsoever they might need, if they overcame, for fortification: he and Eurymedon and Menander, with the whole army, marched about midnight to Epipolæ, leaving Nicias in the camp. Being come to Epipolæ at Euryelus, where also the army went up before, they were not only not discovered by the Syracusians that kept the watch, but ascending took a certain fortification of the Syracusians there, and killed part of them that kept it. But the greatest number escaping, ran presently to the camps, of which there were in Epipolæ three walled about without the city, one of Syracusians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates, and carried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six hundred Syracusians that kept this part of Epipolæ at the first; who presently went forth to meet them. But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they fought valiantly, put them to flight; and presently marched on, making use of the present heat of the army to finish what he came for before it were too late: and others [going on] in their first course took the cross–wall of the Syracusians, they flying that kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The Syracusians, and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with him, came out to meet them from their camps: but because the attempt was unexpected and in the night, they charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, [chiefly] as having already gotten the victory, but desiring also quickly to pass through all that remained yet

unfoughten with, lest through their remissness in following they might again rally themselves; the Bœotians withstood them first, and charging forced them to turn their backs.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians fly. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

44. And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed: so that it hath been very hard to be informed of any side, in what manner each thing passed. For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto himself: how then in a battle by night, (the only one that happened between great armies in all this war), can a man know anything for certain? For though the moon shined bright, yet they saw one another no otherwise than as by the moonlight was likely: so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were a friend or not. And the men of arms on both sides, being not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the Athenians, some were already overcome, others went on in their first way. Also a great part of the rest of the army was already, part gotten up, and part ascending, and knew not which way to march. For after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was in confusion; and it was hard to distinguish of anything for the noise. For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each other and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts: (for they had no other means in the night to express themselves): and the Athenians sought each other, and took for enemies all before them, though friends and of the number of those that fled; and by often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction, all asking at once they both made a great deal of stir amongst themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy. But they did not in like manner know the word of the Syracusians; because these, being victorious and undistracted, knew one another better: so that when they lighted on any

number of the enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped as knowing the watchword; but they, when they could not answer, were slain. But that which hurt them most was the tune of the Pæan: which being in both armies the same, drave them to their wits' end. For the Argives and Corcyræans, and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Pæan, terrified the Athenians on one side: and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side. Wherefore at the last, falling one upon another in divers parts of the army, friends against friends, and countrymen against countrymen, they not only terrified each other, but came to hand–strokes and could hardly again be parted. As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolæ by which they were to go back being but strait, many of them threw themselves down from the rocks, and died so. And of the rest that gat down safely into the plain, though the greatest part, and all that were of the old army by their knowledge of the country, escaped into the camp: yet of these that came last, some lost their way; and straying in the fields, when the day came on were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen that ranged the country about.

45. The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies; one in Epipolæ at the ascent, and another where the first check was given by the Bœotians. The Athenians received their dead under truce. And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their confederates: but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain. For of such as were forced to quit their bucklers and leap down from the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that escaped.

The Syracusians send for more supplies, and hope to win the Athenian camp.

46. After this, the Syracusians having by such unlooked–for prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, being in sedition; to bring that city, if they could, to their

obedience. And Gylippus went again to the Sicilian cities by land, to raise yet another army, as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolæ.

The Athenian year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. commanders take council what to do. The advice of Demosthenes.

47. In the meantime the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow, and present general weakness of the army. For they saw not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying. For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause; this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome: and all things else appeared desperate. Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer; and since the execution of his design at Epipolæ had failed, delivered his opinion for going out of the haven, whilst the seas were open, and whilst, at least with this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the enemy. “For it was better,” he said, “for the city to make war upon those which fortify against them at home, than against the Syracusians; seeing they cannot now be easily overcome: and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying before the city.” This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

The opinion of Nicias. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

48. Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness discovered; and by decreeing of their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege; especially being already

masters of the sea, far and near, with their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse, that desired to betray the state into their hands: and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered him not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did yet consider; nevertheless openly in his speech, he was against the withdrawing of the army: and said, "that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill, if he went thence without their order: for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done, rather than upon the report of calumniators; but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their misery, will there cry out on the contrary; and say the generals have betrayed the state, and come away for a bribe. That he would not therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly, and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians, rather than, if he must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own adventure. And yet," he said, "the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own. For paying much money to strangers, and laying out much more on forts [without and about the city]; having also had a great navy a year already in pay; they must needs want money at last, and all these things fail them. For they have spent already two thousand talents, and are much in debt besides. And whensoever they shall give over this course and make pay no longer, their strength is gone; as being auxiliary, and not constrained to follow the war, as the Athenians are. Therefore it was fit," he said, "to stay close to the city; and not to go away as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior."

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

49. Nicias, when he spake this, assured them of it, as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely and their want of money; and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians, and sent him word not to go. Withal he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as being before overcome, he had not. As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it. But if the army might not be carried away without order from the Athenians, but must needs stay in Sicily; then, he said, they might go to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by their landmen they might invade and turn much of the country to them and wasting the fields of the enemies, weaken the Syracusians; and be to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow, (which is the advantage of the enemy), but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs; and where they should not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In sum he said, he by no means liked to stay where they were: but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless, upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth and procrastination in the business; and a suspicion withal, that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest. And thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence, and stayed upon the place.

Gylippus returneth with another army from the cities of Sicily. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians out of superstition forbear to remove, because of an eclipse of the moon. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

50. In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus returned unto Syracuse. Sicanus without his purpose at Agrigentum; for whilst he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the Syracusians was turned into friendship: but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus

in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Afric. For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyrenæans having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitæ besieged by the Africans; and having overcome the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians; where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's sail over; and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus. As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. The Athenian generals seeing them have another army, and their own not bettering, but every day growing worse than other, but especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before: and Nicias being now no longer against it as he was, but desirous only that it might not be concluded openly, gave order unto all as secretly as was possible to put forth of the harbour, and to be ready when the sign should be given. But when they were about it, and everything was ready, the moon happened to be eclipsed: for it was full moon. And not only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said that it should come no more into debate whether they should go or not, till the three times nine days were past, which the soothsayers appoint in that behalf. And the Athenians, though upon going, stayed still for this reason.

The Syracusians assault the Athenian camp with their landsoldiers. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Syracusians overcome the Athenians again by sea.

51. The Syracusians also having intelligence of this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more: for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and land; for else they

would never have sought to have run away. Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their galleys; and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates: and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them back into the camp. But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost; and men of arms some, but not many. 52. The next day they came out with their galleys, seventy–six in number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eighty–six; and being come together, they fought. Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians; and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own galleys in length more towards the shore; and was cut off by the Syracusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athenians, from the rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the haven; and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him lost. And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

53. Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the enemy vanquished, and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army to the pier to kill such as landed, and to cause that the Syracusians might the easier pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof themselves were masters. But the Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians, seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head: and charging these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help

them, then also the Athenians, to help the Tuscans, and for fear to lose their galleys, fought with them; and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many of their men of arms, but also saved the most of their galleys, and brought them back into the harbour. Nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the men taken in them. And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and brands set on fire, to burn them. The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire: and having quenched the flame and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

54. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of those footmen which the Tuscans drave into the marsh, and for those which they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

The Athenians dejected, repent of the voyage. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

55. When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet; (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes); the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage. For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own, and governed by the people as well as themselves, and which had a navy and horses and greatness; seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government, to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs; they were then at their wits' end:

but now, when they were also vanquished by sea, (which they would never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.

The Syracusians intend to keep in the Athenians, and reckon upon the glory of a full victory. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The nations that were at the wars of Syracuse on the one side or other.

56. The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear, and meditated how to shut up the same: that the Athenians might not steal away without their knowledge, though they would. For now they studied not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was at this present the greater; and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter: for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them afterwards. And they being reputed the authors of it, should be had in admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery; both for the causes shewn, and also for that they became victors not of the Athenians only, but many others their confederates; nor again they themselves alone, but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by sea performed the greatest part themselves. The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedæmon, were together at this one city.

Athenians. Lemnians. Imbrians. Æginetæ. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Hestiæans of Eubœa. Eretrians. Chalcideans. Styrians. Carystians. Ceians. Andrians. Tenians. Milesians. Samians. Chians. Methymnæans. Tenedians.

Ænians. Platæans. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Rhodians and Cythereans. Cephallenians. Zacynthians. Corcyræans. Messenians. Megareans. Argives. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Mantineans and other Arcadians. Cretans. Ætolians. Acarnanians. Thurians. Metapontians. Naxians. Catanæans. Egestæans. Tuscans. Iapygians.

57. And this number on both sides, against Sicily and for it, some to help win, and some to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse: not on any pretence of right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians being Ionic, went against the Syracusians that be Doric, voluntarily. With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and Imbrians, and the Æginetæ that dwelt in Ægina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves: also the Hestiæans of Eubœa. Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects, and some as their free confederates; and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries: as the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Eubœa: Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands: Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians; except only the Carystians, that are of the nation of the Dryopes. And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians. Besides these there went with them Æolians: namely, the Methymnæans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money but of galleys; and the Tenedians and Ænians, tributaries. Now here, Æolians were constrained to fight against Æolians; namely, against their founders the Bœotians, that took part with the Syracusians. But the Platæans, and only they, being Bœotians, fought against Bœotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cythereans, Doric both, by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the Lacedæmonians, with the Athenians against the

Lacedæmonians that were with Gylippus; and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians: not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea. And the Corcyræans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one, and of kin to the other: which they did necessarily, (to make the best of it); but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians now so called, in Naupactus, were taken along to this war; and the Messenians at Pylus, then holden by the Athenians. Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary. The Argives not so much for the league, as for their enmity against the Lacedæmonians and their present particular spleen, followed the Athenians to the war though Ionic, against Dorians. And the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries went with them, as men accustomed ever to invade the enemy shewed them: and now for gain had for enemies, as much as any, those other Arcadians which went thither with the Corinthians. The Cretans and Ætolians were all mercenary: and it fell out, that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire. And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain: but most of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of seditious times, there went with them to this war the Thurians and Metapontians: of Greek

Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanæans. Of barbarian, the Egestæans, who also drew with them the most of those Greek Sicilians. Without Sicily, there went with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels between them and the Syracusians; and some Iapygian mercenaries. These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Syracusians. Camarinæans. Himeræans. Siculi. Lacedæmonians. Corinthians. Leucadians. Ambraciotes. Arcadian mercenaries. Sicyonians.

58. On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinæans their borders: and beyond them again the Geloans: and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric. Then the Himeræans, on the side that lieth on the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided them. These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily; all Dorians and free states. Then of the barbarians there, they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athenians. For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helotes and the rest freedmen. Then aided them both with galleys and with land–men, the Corinthians only; and for kindred's sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes: out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians: and Sicyonians on constraint: and from without Peloponnesus, the Bœotians. To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every kind than as much again: for they got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, great store, and other number in abundance. And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may say, about as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Syracusians shut up the haven.

59. These were the succours assembled on either part, and which were then all there: and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the other. No marvel then, if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already gotten they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so great as it was; and hinder their escape both by sea and land. Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid cross and lighters and boats upon their anchors: and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary in case the Athenians would hazard another battle; meditating on no small matters in anything.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

60. The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it. And the generals and commanders of regiments having met and considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present, (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy got the upper hand: they resolved to abandon their camp above, and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys, with a wall; and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable and less serviceable: and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy.

As they had concluded, so they did. For they both came down to the shore from their camp above: and also manned every galley they had, and

compelled to go aboard every man of age of any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was manned to the number of one hundred and ten galleys: upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided according to their means and purpose. And Nicias, when almost everything was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together, and encouraged them then the first time with words to this effect:

the oration of nicias. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias

61. “Soldiers, Athenians and other our confederates, [though] the trial at hand will be common to all alike, and will concern the safety and country no less of each of us than of the enemy: (for if our galleys get the victory, we may every one see his native city again): yet ought we not to be discouraged like men of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suitable to their misfortunes. But you Athenians here present, having had experience already of many wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war than one would think: and in hope that fortune will once also be of our side, prepare yourselves to fight again in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see yourselves to be. 62. What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there, and against the provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all; and as well as our present means will permit, made them ready. For many archers and darters shall go aboard: and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in

the main sea we would not have used, because by slugging the galleys it would take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a landfight from our galleys. We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for in the building of our galleys, against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels: whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back again. For we are brought to a necessity now, of making it a land–fight upon the water: and it will be the best for us neither to fall back ourselves, nor to suffer the enemy to do so; especially when, except what our men on land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile. 63. Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost, and not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore: but when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make you part, unless you have first beaten off the men of arms of the enemy from their decks. And this I speak to you rather that are the men of arms, than to the mariners: inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight above; and in you it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part with the landmen. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them, not to be too much daunted with the losses past; having now both a greater number of galleys, and greater forces upon the decks. Think it a pleasure worth preserving, that being taken, by your knowledge of the language and imitation of our fashions, for Athenians (though you be not so), you are not only admired for it through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter of profit, no less than ourselves; and for awfulness to the nations subject and protection from injury, more. You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion, cannot with any justice betray the same. In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was at the best durst never so

much as stand us, repel them: and make it appear that your knowledge even with weakness and loss, is better than the strength of another with fortune. 64. Again, to such of you as are Athenians, I must remember this: that you have no more such fleets in your harbours, nor such able men of arms; and that if aught happen to you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home; and those at home will be unable to defend themselves, both against those that shall go hence, and against the enemy that lieth there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what intent you came hither: and the other part which is at home, shall fall into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them, be therefore valiant now if ever: and bear in mind every one of you, that you that go now aboard, are the land forces, the sea forces, the whole estate and great name of Athens. For which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can never shew it more opportunely than now, when he may both help himself with it and the whole."

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

65. Nicias having thus encouraged them, commanded presently to go aboard. Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians meant to fight, by seeing their preparation. Besides, they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels into their galleys; and as for everything else, so also for that they had made provision. For they covered the fore–part of their galleys, and also the decks for a great way, with hides: that the grapnels cast in might slip, and not be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylippus likewise and the other commanders used unto their soldiers this hortative:

the oration of gylippus and the syracusian generals. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Gylippus and the Syracusian generals. year xix. A. C.

413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Gylippus and the Syracusian generals.

66. “That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are to fight now also for further honour, men of Syracuse and confederates, the most of you seem to know already; for else you never would so valiantly have undergone it: and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we will make it appear unto him better. For whereas the Athenians came into this country, with design first to enslave Sicily, and then if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and whereas already they had the greatest dominion of any Grecians whatsoever, either present or past: you, the first that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were everywhere masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed, become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves than they would have been if they had never thought so: and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come short also in courage of the true strength of their forces. And this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians. 67. Whereas with us it falleth out, that our former courage, wherewith though unexperienced we durst stand them, being now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the stronger, giveth to every one of us a double hope. And in all enterprises, the greatest hope conferreth for the most part the greatest courage. As for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are acquainted withal, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for them. But they, when they shall have many men of arms upon their decks, being not used to it; and many, as I may term them, land–darters, both Acarnanians and others, who would not be able to direct their darts though they should sit; how can they choose but put the galleys into danger, and be all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion not their own? As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing: if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against

odds in number. For many in little room are so much the slower to do what they desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our munition. But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof we suppose we have most certain intelligence. Overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate; not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may; that so they may either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

68. “Against such confusion, therefore, and against the fortune of our greatest enemies now betraying itself into our hands, let us fight with anger: and with an opinion, not only that it is most lawful to fulfil our hearts’ desire upon those our enemies, that justified their coming hither as a righting of themselves against an assailant; but also, that to be revenged on an enemy, is both most natural, and, as is most commonly said, the sweetest thing in the world. And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well enough know; seeing them come hither into our dominion to bring us into servitude. Wherein if they had sped, they had put the men to the greatest tortures, the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and the whole city to the most ignominous name in the world. In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so tender, as to think it gain if they go away without putting you to further danger; for so they mean to do, though they get the victory: but effecting (as it is likely we shall) what we intend, both to be revenged of these, and to deliver unto all Sicily their liberty, which they enjoyed before, but now is more assured. Honourable is that combat, and rare are those hazards, wherein the failing bringeth little loss, and the success a great deal of profit.”

1st September. Nicias encourageth his soldiers anew. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. He prepareth to fight. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians and Syracusians fight. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

69. When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they presently put their men on board; perceiving the Athenians to do the same. Nicias perplexed with this present estate, and seeing how great and how near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from the harbour; and doubting, as in great battles it falleth out, that somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him again all the captains of galleys, and spake unto them every one by their fathers, their tribes, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that had reputation in any kind, not to betray the same; and those whose ancestors were eminent, not to deface their hereditary virtues; remembering them of their country's liberty, and the uncontrolled power of all men to live as they pleased: and saying whatsoever else in such a pinch men are accustomed, not out of their store, to utter things stale, and in all occasions the same, touching their wives, children, and patrial gods, but such things as being thought by them available in the present discouragement, they use to cry into their ears. And when he thought he had admonished them, not enough, but as much as the time would permit him, he went his way, and drew out those forces that were to serve on land on the sea–side: and embattled them so as they might take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby so much the more to confirm the courage of them that were aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus, (for those of the Athenian commanders went aboard), putting forth of the harbour, went immediately to the lock of the haven, and to the passage that was left open, with intention to force their way out. 70. But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with the same number of galleys they had before, disposed part of them to

the guard of the open passage, and the rest in circle about the haven; to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land–forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syracusian navy commanded Sicanus and Agatharchus, each of them over a wing; and Pythen, with the Corinthians, had the middle battle. After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open the bars thereof. But when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them from every side, they fought not at the lock only, but also in the haven itself: and the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their galleys to any part they were bidden, was very great, and great was the plotting and counterplotting, and contention one against another of the masters: also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could be used upon the decks: and every man, in the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass, (for they were the most galleys that in any battle they had used, and fought in the least room: being little fewer on the one side and the other than two hundred), they ran against each other but seldom, because there was no means of retiring nor of passing by, but made assaults upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul. And as long as a galley was making up, they that stood on the decks used their darts and arrows and stones in abundance: but being once come close, the soldiers at hand–strokes attempted to board each other. And in many places it so fell out, through want of room, that they which ran upon a galley on one side, were run upon themselves on the other; and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of one; and that the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place only,

but in many together, how to defend on the one side, and how to offend on the other: and the great noise of many galleys fallen foul of one another, both amazed them and took away their hearing of what their directors directed. For they directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art required, but out of their present eagerness: the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now if ever valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their country; and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how. honourable a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape, and by this victory to improve every man the honour of his own country. Moreover, the commanders of either side, where they saw any man without necessity to row a–stern, would call unto the captain of the galley by his name, and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend than the sea, which they had so long been masters of: the Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to fly, they would nevertheless fly from the flyers.

The diversity of passion of them that beheld the year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. fight from the shore. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians fly.

71. Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the land–men had a conflict, and sided with them in their affections: they of the place, contending for increase of the honours they had already gotten; and the invaders, fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in the like: and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the water with very different passions. For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety: and they that saw them have the worse, not only lamented, but shrieked outright; and had their minds more

subdued by the sight of what was done, than they that were present in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on every occasion agreeable to their expectation, passed the time in a miserable perplexity. For they were ever within a little either of escaping, or of perishing. And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was indifferent, at one and the same time lamentations, shouts that they won, that they lost: and whatsoever else a great army in great danger is forced differently to utter. They also that were aboard suffered the same: till at last the Syracusians and their confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them with great clamour and encouragement of their own to the shore. And the sea–forces making to the shore, some one way and some another, except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped into the harbour. And the army that was upon the land, no longer now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence, all with shrieks and sighs unable to sustain what befel, ran part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the camp: and the residue, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best way to save himself. And this was the time wherein of all other they stood in greatest fear, and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to suffer before at Pylus. For the Lacedæmonians then, besides the loss of their fleet, lost the men which they had set over into the island: and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were out of all hope to save themselves by land.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The stratagem of Hermocrates, to hinder the escape of the Athenians. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

2d September. Gylippus goeth out with his forces, and besets the way. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

72. After this cruel battle, and many galleys and men on either side consumed, the Syracusians and their confederates, having the victory, took up the wreck and the bodies of their dead: and returning into the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought upon asking leave to take up their dead or wreck: but fell immediately to consultation how to be gone the same night. And Demosthenes coming unto Nicias, delivered his opinion for going once again aboard, and forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet remaining and serviceable were more than those of the enemy: for the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. But when Nicias approved the advice, and would have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard: as being not only dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upperhand any more. Whereupon they now resolved all to make their retreat by land. 73. But Hermocrates of Syracuse suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous that so great an army, going away by land and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates: and admonished them, that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways, (alleging what he thought best to the purpose); but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and fortify in their way, and prepossess all the narrow passages with a guard. Now they were all of them of the same opinion no less than himself, and thought it fit to be done: but they conceived withal, that the soldier now joyful and taking his ease after a sore battle, being also holiday, (for it was their day of sacrifice to Hercules), would not easily be brought to obey. For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, being holiday, be drinking; and look for anything rather than to be persuaded at this time to take up arms again and go out. But seeing the magistrates upon

this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates not prevailing, of his own head contrived this. Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the night, and so at ease out–go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp: who approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians; (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence); and bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night, for that the Syracusians had beset the ways; but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away. 74. Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving all things else behind them save what was necessary for their bodies. But Gylippus and the Syracusians, with their land forces, went out before them: and not only stopped up the ways in the country about by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians, and towed their galleys away from the shore. Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to have done: but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city.

3rd September. The Athenians march away from before Syracuse by land. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

75. After this, when everything seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day from their fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead

of their great hopes they had endangered both themselves and the state: but also for the dolorous objects which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular, in the leaving of their camp. For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. But the living that were sick or wounded, both grieved them more than the dead, and were more miserable. For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades, and following as far as they were able: and when the strength of their bodies failed, that they could go no further, with ah–mes! and imprecations were there left. Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute, could hardly get away; though the place were hostile, and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with tears could be expressed: but hung down their heads, and generally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else but even the people of some great city expugned by siege, and making their escape. For the whole number that marched, were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use; but also the men of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want and partly for distrust of their servants, who from time to time ran over to the enemy; but at this time went the greatest number. And yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn: for not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of others, and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it, in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather, because they considered from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed before, into how low an estate they were now fallen. For never Grecian army so differed from itself. For whereas they

came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledictions; and whereas they came out seamen, they departed landmen, and relied not upon their naval forces but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable.

76. Nicias, perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that was in it, came up to the ranks, and encouraged and comforted them as far as for the present means he was able. And as he went from part to part he exalted his voice more than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation, and because also he desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might be.

the oration of nicias to his afflicted army year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias

77. “Athenians and confederates, we must hope still, even in our present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater dangers than these are. Nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of you in strength of body, (you see how I am in my sickness), nor am I thought inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of mine own private person or otherwise, am nevertheless now in as much danger as the meanest of you. And yet I have worshipped the gods frequently according to the law, and lived justly and unblameably towards men. For which cause my hope is still confident of the future: though these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our desert, do indeed make me fear. But they may perhaps cease. For both the enemies have already had sufficient fortune: and the gods, if any of them have been displeased with our voyage, have already sufficiently punished us. Others

have invaded their neighbours as well as we: and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so their punishment also hath been tolerable. And we have reason now, both to hope for more favour from the gods; (for our case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred); and also not to despair of ourselves, seeing how good and how many men of arms you are, marching together in order of battle. Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves you are a city: such as not any other in Sicily can either easily sustain, if you assault, or remove, if you be once seated. Now for your march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves; making no other account any of you, but what place soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he win it, must be his country and his walls. March you must with diligence, both night and day alike, for our victual is short: and if we can but reach some amicable territory of the Siculi, (for these are still firm to us for fear of the Syracusians), then you may think yourselves secure. Let us therefore send before to them, and bid them meet us, and bring us forth some supplies of victual. In sum, soldiers, let me tell you it is necessary that you be valiant; for there is no place near, where being cowards you can possibly be saved: whereas if you escape through the enemies at this time, you may every one see again whatsoever anywhere he most desires; and the Athenians may re–erect the great power of their city, how low soever fallen. For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, are the city."

The Athenians march, and the year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Syracusians assault them always as they go. 4th September. 5th September. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. 6th September. 7th September. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

78. Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal about the army, and where he saw any man straggle and not march in his rank, he brought him about and set him in his place. Demonsthenes having spoken to the same or

like purpose, did as much to those soldiers under him. And they marched forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion, and then those with Demosthenes in the rear. And the men of arms received those that carried the baggage, and the other multitude, within them. When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against them on the bank: but these they put to flight, and having won the passage marched forward. But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light–armed plied them with their darts, in the flank. This day the Athenians marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, they marched forwards about twenty furlongs; and descending into a certain champaign ground, encamped there, with intent both to get victual at the houses, (for the place was inhabited), and to carry water with them thence: for before them in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs together there was but little to be had. But the Syracusians in the meantime got before them, and cut off their passage with a wall. This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with steep and rocky banks: and it is called Acræum Lepas. The next day the Athenians went on: and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great number of both, pressed them so with their horses and darts, that the Athenians after long fight were compelled to retire again into the same camp; but now with less victual than before, because the horsemen would suffer them no more to straggle abroad. 79. In the morning betimes they dislodged, and put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to the hill which the enemy had fortified; where they found before them the Syracusian foot embattled in great length above the fortification [on the hill's side]: for the place itself was but narrow. The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall: but the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the hill, (for they could easily cast home

from above), making them unable to take it, they retired again and rested. There happened withal some claps of thunder and a shower of rain, as usually falleth out at this time of the year, being now near autumn: which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this did tend to their destruction. Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of their army to raise a wall at their backs, in the way they had come: but this the Athenians hindered, by sending against them part of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into a more champaign ground, lodged there that night: and the next day went forward again. And the Syracusians with their darts, from every part round about, wounded many of them; and when the Athenians charged, they retired, and when they retired, the Syracusians charged; and that especially upon the hindmost, that by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army. And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them: and afterwards, being gotten five or six furlongs forward, they rested in the plain: and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

Nicias and Demosthenes rise in the night, and march a contrary way: Nicias foremost, and in order; but Demosthenes in the rear, slower and more in disorder. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. 8th September.

80. This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their army, and the want already of all necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults of the enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as they possibly could: not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea; which was the contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, Camarina and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as barbarian, that way. When they had made many fires accordingly, they marched in the night: and (as usually it falleth out in all armies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright and terror,

especially marching by night and in hostile ground, and the enemy near) were in confusion. The army of Nicias leading the way, kept together and got far afore; but that of Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed from the rest and marched more disorderly. Nevertheless, by the morning betimes they got to the sea–side, and entering into the Helorine way they went on towards the river Cacyparis, to the end when they came thither to march upwards along the river's side through the heart of the country. For they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would meet them. When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with piles. When they had quickly forced this guard, they passed the river, and again marched on to another river, called Erineus: for that was the way which the guides directed them.

Demosthenes overtaken by the enemy, resisteth as long as he can, and is taken. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Demosthenes yieldeth.

81. In the meantime the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared, and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way, which they easily understood they were gone; and about dinner time overtook them. When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost, and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up into a narrow compass, the more easily now, because they were divided from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty furlongs further on. For he led away the faster, because he thought not that their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily; but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only

fighting when they could not choose. But Demosthenes was both in greater and more continual toil, in respect that he marched in the rear, and consequently was pressed by the enemy: and seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed, and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had a way [open] amongst abundance of olive trees; they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's shot. For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon very good reason. For to hazard battle against men desperate, was not so much for theirs, as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat; because they were loth to wear themselves out before the end of the business; and thought by this kind of fight to subdue and take them alive. 82. Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates all day long from every side with shot, and saw that with their wounds and other annoyance they were already tired: Gylippus and the Syracusians and their confederates first made proclamation, that if any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at liberty. And the men of some few cities went over. And by and by after, they made agreement with all the rest that were with Demosthenes; that they should deliver up their arms, and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds, nor by want of the necessities of life. And they all yielded, to the number of six thousand men: and the silver they had, they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets; and filled with the same four targets. And these men they carried presently into the city.

9th September. The offer of Nicias to redeem his army not accepted. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. 10th September. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. 10th September. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

Nicias, and those that were with him, attained the same day to the river Erineus; which passing, he caused his army to sit down upon a certain ground more elevate than the rest. 83. Where the Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those with Demosthenes had yielded themselves; and willed him to do the like. But he, not believing it, took truce for a horseman to enquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians: saying, that he was content to compound on the part of the Athenians, to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to depart; and that till payment of the money were made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated as a talent. But Gylippus and the Syracusians refusing the condition, charged them; and having hemmed them in, plied them with shot, as they had done the other army, from every side till evening. This part of the army was also pinched with the want both of victual and other necessaries. Nevertheless observing the quiet of the night, they were about to march. But no sooner took they their arms up, than the Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians finding themselves discovered, sat down again: all but three hundred, who breaking by force through the guards, marched as far as they could that night. 84. And Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward; the Syracusians and their confederates still pressing them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them from every side. The Athenians hasted to get the river Asinarus; not only because they were urged on every side by the assault of the many horsemen and other multitude, and thought to be more at ease when they were over the river, but out of weariness also and desire to drink. When they were come unto the river, they rushed in without any order, every man striving who should first get over. But the pressing of the enemy, made the passage now more difficult. For being forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and

trampled one another under their feet; and falling amongst the spears and utensils of the army, some perished presently; and others catching hold one of another, were carried away together down the stream. And [not only] the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, being a steep one, killed the Athenians with their shot from above, as they were many of them greedily drinking, and troubling one another in the hollow of the river: but the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their swords, and those especially that were in the river. And suddenly the water was corrupted: nevertheless they drunk it, foul as it was with blood and mire; and many also fought for it. 85. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if any gat away) by the horsemen; Nicias yielded himself unto Gylippus, (having more confidence in him than in the Syracusians): to be for his own person at the discretion of him and the Lacedæmonians, and no further slaughter to be made of the soldiers. Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners. So the residue, except such as were hidden from them, (which were many), they carried alive into the city. They sent also to pursue the three hundred which brake through their guards in the night; and took them. That which was left together of this army to the public, was not much; but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many: and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken, as those with Demosthenes were, by composition. Besides, a great part [of these] were slain; for the slaughter [at this time] was exceeding great, none greater in all the Sicilian war. They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in their march. Nevertheless many also escaped, some then presently, and some by running away after servitude; the rendezvous of whom was Catana.

86. The Syracusians and their confederates being come together, returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil, into the city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athenians and their confederates, they put them into the quarries, as the safest custody. But Nicias and Demosthenes they killed, against Gylippus his will. For Gylippus thought the victory would be very honourable, if, over and above all his other success, he could carry home both the generals of the enemy to Lacedæmon. And it fell out that one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest enemy, for the things he had done in the island and at Pylus; and the other, upon the same occasion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners which were taken in the island, to be set at liberty; by persuading the Athenians to the peace. For which cause the Lacedæmonians were inclined to love him: and it was principally in confidence of that, that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear (because they had been tampering with him) lest being put to the torture he might bring them into trouble, whereas now they were well enough; and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes near unto these, was he put to death: being the man that, of all the Grecians of my time, had least deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

87. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians handled them at first but ungently. For in this hollow place, first the sun and suffocating air (being without roof) annoyed them one way: and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, put them, by reason of the alteration, into strange diseases: especially doing all things, for want of

room, in one and the same place; and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds, or change [of air] or other like accident, lying together there on heaps. Also the smell was intolerable: besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. For for eight months together, they allowed no more but to every man a cotyle of water by the day, and two cotyles of corn. And whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may suffer, they suffered. Some seventy days they lived thus thronged. Afterwards, retaining the Athenians, and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the army with them, they sold the rest. How many were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly: but they were seven thousand at the fewest. And this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, or at all, that we have heard of amongst the Grecians: being to the victors most glorious, and most calamitous to the vanquished. For being wholly overcome in every kind, and receiving small loss in nothing, their army, and fleet, and all [that ever they had], perished (as they use to say) with an universal destruction. Few of many returned home. And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.

THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

THE REVOLT OF the Athenian confederates and the offers made by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the lower Asia, draw the Lacedæmonians to the war in Ionia and Hellespont. — First in Ionia, and the provinces of Tissaphernes: who, by the counsel of Alcibiades and connivance of Astyochus, hindereth their proceedings. — Alcibiades in the meanwhile, to make way for his return into his country, giveth occasion of sedition about the government: whence ensued the authority of the four hundred, under the pretext of the five thousand: the recalling of Alcibiades by the army: and at length, by his countenance, the deposing again of the four hundred, and end of the sedition. — But in the meantime they lose Eubœa. — Mindarus, the successor of Astyochus, finding himself abused by Tissaphernes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus into Hellespont: and there presently loseth a battle to the Athenians before Abydos, being then summer and the twenty–first year of the war.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The fear and sorrow of the Athenians upon hearing of the news. The Athenians resolve to stand it out. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The end of the nineteenth summer.

When the news was told at Athens, they believed not a long time, though it were plainly related and by those very soldiers that escaped from the defeat itself, that all was so utterly lost as it was. When they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators that furthered the voyage: as if they themselves had never decreed it. They were angry also with those that gave out prophecies, and with the soothsayers: and with whosoever else had at first by any divination put them into hope that Sicily should be subdued.

Every thing, from every place, grieved them; and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they were in, beset them round. For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in particular and the whole city sustained, of so many men of arms, horsemen, and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw was not left: but seeing they had neither galleys in their haven, nor money in their treasury, nor furniture in their galleys, were even desperate at that present of their safety; and thought the enemy out of Sicily would come forthwith with their fleet into Peiræus, especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy; and that the enemy here would surely now, with double preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land, and be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to stand it out; and getting materials and money where they could have it, to make ready a navy, and to make sure of their confederates, especially those of Eubœa; and to introduce a greater frugality in the city, and to erect a magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should be offered to preconsult of the business that passed. And they were ready, in respect of their present fear, (as is the people's fashion), to order every thing aright. And as they resolved this, so they did it. And the summer ended.

The Grecians take part all of them against the Athenians. The hopes of the Lacedæmonians. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them. Those who before were confederates of neither side, thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord; as having not only every one severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily they would afterwards have come upon them also, but imagined withal that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate. And such of them as were confederates

of the Lacedæmonians, longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt; as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with victory. But the Lacedæmonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring. And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to fall close to the war: making account, if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put them into; and also having pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

Agis levieth money. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Lacedæmonians appoint a fleet of a hundred galleys to be made ready amongst the cities of league.

Whereupon Agis their king went out with a part of his army the same winter from Deceleia, and levied money amongst the confederates for the building of a navy: and turning into the Melian gulf, upon an old grudge took a great booty from the Œtæans, which he made money of; and forced those of Pthiotis being Achaians, and others in those parts subjects to the Thessalians, (the Thessalians complaining and unwilling), to give them hostages and money. The hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into the league. And the Lacedæmonians imposed upon the states confederate, the charge of building one hundred galleys: that is to say, on their own state and on the Bœotians, each twenty–five; on the Phoceans and Locrians, fifteen; on the Corinthians, fifteen; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; and on the Megareans, Trœzenians, and

Hermionians, ten. And put all things else in readiness presently with the spring to begin the war.

The Athenians build their navy, and contract their charges.

The Athenians also made their preparations, as they had designed; having gotten timber and built their navy this same winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium that their cornboats might come about in safety. Also they abandoned the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they went by for Sicily. And generally where there appeared expense upon anything unuseful, they contracted their charge.

The Eubœans year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. offer to revolt to Agis. The Lesbians offer to revolt to Agis. The Chians and Erythræans desire to revolt. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Tissaphernes, lieutenant of the lower Asia, laboureth to have the Lacedæmonians come unto him.

Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, there came unto Agis about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Eubœans. Accepting the motion, he sent for Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas and for Melanthus from Lacedæmon, to go commanders into Eubœa. Whom, when he was come to him with about three hundred freedmen, he was now about to send over. But in the meantime came the Lesbians, they also desiring to revolt: and by the means of the Bœotians Agis changed his former resolution, and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Eubœa; and assigned them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Eubœa, for their governor: and the Bœotians promised them ten galleys, and Agis other ten. Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of Lacedæmon. For Agis, as long as he was about Deceleia with the power he had, had the law in his own hands, to send what army and whither he listed, and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this time, the confederates of him (as I may call them) did better obey him, than the confederates of the Lacedæmonians did them at home: for having the power

in his hands, he was terrible wheresoever he came. And he was now for the Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythræans, they also desiring to revolt, went not to Agis, but to the Lacedæmonians in the city: and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant to king Darius in the low countries of Asia. For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians, and promised to pay their fleet. For he had lately begged of the king the tribute accruing in his own province; for which he was in arrearage, because he could receive nothing out of any of the Greek cities by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians, to receive his tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king: and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive Amorges, Pissuthnes his bastard son, who was in rebellion against him about Caria. The Chians therefore and Tissaphernes followed this business jointly.

Year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Pharnabazus, lieutenant of Hellespont, laboureth the like for himself. year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

Calligeitus the son of Laophon, a Magarean, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own cities and abiding with Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same time to Lacedæmon; sent by Pharnabazus to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and be the first to draw the Lacedæmonians into league with the king: just the same things that were desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, there was great canvassing at Lacedæmon, between the one side that persuaded to send to Ionia and Chios, and the other that would have the army and fleet go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedæmonians indeed approved best by much of the business of the Chians and of Tissaphernes. For with these co–operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend of Endius the ephore of

that year in the highest degree: insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, Alcibiades his family received a Laconic name. For Endius was called Endius Alcibiadis. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians sent first one Phrynis, a man of those parts, to Chios, to see if the galleys they had were so many as they reported, and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be. And when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said was true, they received both the Chians and the Erythræans presently into their league: and decreed to send them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from such places as the Chians named, no less than sixty already. And of these at first they were about to send out ten, with Melancridas for admiral: but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for Melancridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten galleys they went about the making ready of five only in Laconia. So the winter ended: and nineteenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. The Lacedæmonians send to Corinth to hasten away the fleet to Chios. The confederates in council at Corinth set down year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. an order for the war following, with which to begin and which to follow. The Athenians understand the purpose of the Chians to revolt. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4.

In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed to have the galleys sent away, and feared lest the Athenians should get notice what they were doing; (for all their ambassadors went out by stealth); the Lacedæmonians send away to Corinth three Spartans, to will them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos as the rest: the number of the galleys of the league which were then there, being forty wanting one. 8. But Calligeitus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios; nor would deliver the money, twenty–five talents, which they had brought with them, to pay for their setting forth, but made account to go out

with another fleet afterwards by themselves. When Agis saw that the Lacedæmonians meant to send first to Chios, he resolved not of any other course himself; but the confederates assembling at Corinth went to council upon the matter, and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the five galleys at Laconia; and then to Lesbos under the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be sent thither by Agis; and lastly into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, should have the command; and concluded to carry over the isthmus first the one half of their galleys, and that those should presently put to sea, that the Athenians might have their minds more upon those, than on the other half to be transported afterwards. For they determined to pass that sea openly; contemning the weakness of the Athenians, in respect they had not any navy of importance yet appearing. As they resolved, so presently they carried over one and twenty galleys. 9. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling to go along before they should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis was content, that they for their parts should observe the Isthmian truce; and he therefore to take the fleet upon himself as his own. But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time passing away, the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the practice of the Chians: and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, to accuse them of it. The Chians denying the matter, he commanded them for their better credit to send along with him some galleys for their aid due by the league: and they sent seven. The cause why they sent these galleys, was the many not acquainted with the practice; and the few and conscious not willing to undergo the enmity of the multitude without having strength first, and their not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedæmonians, because they had so long delayed them.

The Athenians drive the Peloponnesian galleys into Peiræus, a desert haven, and there besiege them. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4.

In the meantime the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the Athenians (for they had word sent them of it) came and saw; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. After they went thence, they took order presently that the fleet might not pass from Cenchreiæ undiscovered. And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chios under the conduct of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first with equal number came up to them, and endeavoured to draw them out into the main sea: but seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another way, the Athenians went also from them. For the seven galleys of Chios, which were part of this number, they durst not trust. But afterwards having manned thirty–seven others, they gave chase to the enemy by the shore, and drave them into Peiræus in the territory of Corinth: (this Peiræus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the confines of Epidauria). One galley that was far from land, the Peloponnesians lost; the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athenians charging them by sea with their galleys, and withal setting their men a–land, mightily troubled and disordered them: brake their galleys upon the shore, and slew Alcamenes their commander. And some they lost of their own.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. The voyage of Chalcideus and Alcibiades to Chios.

The fight being ended, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of the enemy, and the rest to lie under a little island not far off: in which also they encamped, and sent to Athens for a supply. For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys, the Corinthians the next day: and not long after, divers others of the inhabitants thereabouts. But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place would be painful, they knew not what course to take; and once they thought to

have set the galleys on fire: but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land, and guard them with their landmen till some good occasion should be offered for their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a Spartan. The Lacedæmonians having been advertised of the departure of these galleys from the isthmus, (for the ephores had commanded Alcamenes, when he put to sea to send them word by a horseman), were minded presently to have sent away also the five galleys also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him Alcibiades. But afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the galleys chased into Periæus: which so much discouraged them, in respect they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they purposed now, not only not to send away those galleys of their own, but also to call back again some of those that were already at sea.

When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with Endius and the rest of the ephores again, not to fear the voyage: alleging that they would [make haste, and] be there before the Chians should have heard of the misfortune of the fleet; and that as soon as he should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities there to revolt, by declaring unto them the weakness of the Athenians and the diligence of the Lacedæmonians; wherein he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other. Moreover to Endius he said, that it would be an honour in particular to him, that Ionia should revolt and the king be made confederate to the Lacedæmonians by his own means, and not to have it the mastery of Agis: for he was at difference with Agis. So having prevailed with Endius and the other ephores, he took sea with five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedæmon; and made haste.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. Sixteen galleys of Peloponnesus, intercepted and hardly handled in their return from Sicily by the Athenians, arrive in Corinth. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4.

About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which, having aided Gylippus in that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia and evil entreated by twenty–seven galleys of Athens, that watched thereabouts under the command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as should return out of Sicily. For all the rest, saving one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Corinth before.

Chios and Erythræ revolt. Clazomenæ revolteth. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every man they met with by the way; to the end that notice might not be given of their passage. And touching first at Corycus in the continent, where also they dismissed those whom they had apprehended; after conference there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the Chians suddenly and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment: but the few had so ordered the matter beforehand, that an assembly chanced to be holden at the same time. And when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same; and told them that many galleys were coming to them, but not that those other galleys were besieged in Peiræus; the Chians first, and afterwards the Erythræans, revolted from the Athenians. After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenæ, and made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent, and there fortified Polichna: lest they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying, and making of preparation for the war.

The Athenians abrogate the decree touching the thousand talents reserved for the extremities of state, and furnish out a fleet with the money. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4.

This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians; who conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evident danger, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city to revolt, would be no longer quiet, in this their present fear decreed that those thousand talents, which through all this war they had affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages to stir it, should now be used, and therewith galleys not a few manned. They decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus, eight galleys of the number of those that besieged the enemy at Peiræus; the which, having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now returned: and shortly after also to send Thrasycles to help them with twelve galleys more, which also had departed from the same guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peiræus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the bondmen that served in them their liberty, and the chains to those that were free. And instead of all those galleys that kept guard upon the galleys of the Peloponnesians, they made ready other with all speed in their places; besides thirty more, which they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great was their diligence; and nothing was of light importance that they went about for the recovery of Chios.

Teos revolteth.

Strombichides in the meantime arrived at Samos: and taking into his company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos, and entreated them not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty–three galleys from Chios: and with him also the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans. Whereof Strombichides having been advertised, he put forth again before his arrival; and standing off at sea, when he saw the many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos, they following him.

The land forces, the Teians would not at the first admit: but after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. And these for the most part held their hands for a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from the chase: but when he stayed somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians towards the continent; wherein they were also helped by some few barbarians, that came down thither under the leading of Tages, deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. Miletus revolteth.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios; instead of whom they manned with mariners of Chios both those and twenty galleys more: and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For the intention of Alcibiades, that was acquainted with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus, and to turn these cities first; that the honour of it might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) to Endius that set them out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt with the forces of the Chians only and of those galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these, for the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and arriving not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasycles, (who now chancing to be present with [those] twelve galleys from Athens followed them with Strombichides), caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them at the heels with nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lada, an island over against the city.

Presently upon the revolt of Miletus was made the first league between the king and the Lacedæmonians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as followeth:

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. League between Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians.

“The Lacedæmonians and their confederates have made a league with the king and Tissaphernes on these articles:

“Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth, and his ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the king’s.

“Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athenians from their cities, the king and the Lacedæmonians are jointly to hinder, so as the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money nor other thing.

“The king, and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without consent of both parts it shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the Athenians, neither for the king, nor for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.

“If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates: and if any shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the king.”

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. Lebedos and Eræ revolt.

This was the league. Presently after this the Chians set out ten galleys more, and went to Anæa: both to hearken what became of the business at Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand with his army, they went thence to the temple of Jupitor. [Being there] they descried sixteen galleys more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon after the putting to sea of those with Thrasycles: upon sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took, but empty, the men having gotten on shore: the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the Athenians

went away again towards Samos. The Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet and with the land forces, caused first Lebedos to revolt, and then Eræ: and afterwards returned, both with their fleet and landmen, every one to his own.

The Peloponnesians in Peiræus escape. Astyochus admiral of the Peloponnesians. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 91. 4. Tissaphernes razeth the remainder of the Athenian wall at Teos.

About the same time, the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus, which the Athenians had formerly chased into Peiræus, and against whom they now lay with a like number, suddenly forced their passage; and having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys; and going to Cenchreiæ, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time there came also unto them from Lacedæmon for commander, Astyochus; who was now admiral of the whole navy. When the landmen were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came thither with his forces; and he also demolished the wall as much as was left standing, and went his way again. Not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten galleys of Athens. And having made a truce with the Teians, that he also might be received, he put to sea again, and kept the shore to Eræ, and assaulted it; but failing to take it, departed.

It fell out about the same time that the commons of Samos, together with the Athenians who were there with three galleys, made an insurrection against the great men; and slew of them in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred more, and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses, (the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty), they administered the affairs of the city from that time forward by themselves, no more communicating with the Geomori, nor permitting any of the common people to marry with them.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Chians endeavour to turn Lesbos from the Athenians to the Lacedæmonians with their single power: and cause first Methymna, then Mytilene to revolt.

After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun, persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even without the Lacedæmonians, [with their single forces], and desiring to make as many fellows of their danger as they were able, made war by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos: which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedæmonians, namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence into the Hellespont. And withal the land forces, both of such Peloponnesians as were present and of their confederates thereabouts, went along by them to Clazomenæ and Cyme: these under the command of Eualas a Spartan, and the galleys, of Deiniades a man of the parts thereabouts. The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first. . . . . .

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians recover Mytilene Astyochus seeing he could do no good at Lesbos, returned to Chios. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians recover Clazomenæ.

Now Astyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral, having set forth as he intended from Cenchreiæ, arrived at Chios. The third day after his coming thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos with twenty–five galleys of Athens: for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens afterwards. Astyochus in the evening of the same day, taking with him one galley more of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos, to help it what he could: and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressos. Here he heard that Mytilene was taken by the Athenians, even with the shout of their voices. For the Athenians coming unexpected, entered the haven: and having beaten the galleys of the Chians, disbarked and overcame those that made head against them, and won the city. When Astyochus heard this, both from

the Eressians and from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus; which having been left there before, as soon as Mytilene was lost fled, and three of them chanced to meet with him, (for one was taken by the Athenians); he continued his course for Mytilene no longer: but having caused Eressos to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, made them to march toward Antissa and Methymna by land, under the conduct of Eteonicus; and he himself with his own galleys and those three of Chios, rowed thither along the shore, hoping that the Methymnæans, upon sight of his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re–embarked his army and returned to Chios. And the landmen that were aboard, and should have gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this came to them six galleys to Chios, of those of the confederate fleet at Cenchreiæ. The Athenians, when they had reestablished the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent; and brought them all back again into the city which is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; for these got away to Daphnus. And Clazomenæ returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

Chalcideus slain.

The same summer, those Athenians that with twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian commander, that came out against them but with a few; and set up a trophy, and the third day after departed. But the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were not masters.

The Athenians make sharp war upon Chios. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Praise of the Chians.

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea from the isles called Œnussæ, which lie

before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum (forts they held in Erythræa), and from Lesbos. They that were aboard were men of arms of the roll, compelled to serve in the fleet. With these they landed at Cardamyle; and having overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy all the places of that quarter. And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight: by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory, excellently well furnished. For except it were the Lacedæmonians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of, that had joined advisedness to prosperity; and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it. Nor ventured they now to revolt, (lest any man should think that, in this act at least, they regarded not what was the safest), till they had many and strong confederates with whose help to try their fortune; nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens (as they themselves could not deny) to have their estate after the defeat in Sicily reduced to extreme weakness. And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in aught, they erred with many others: who in like manner had an opinion, that the state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown.

Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some within undertook to make the city return unto the Athenians. Which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred not; but having received Astyochus into the city with four galleys that were with him from Erythræ, they took advice together, how by taking hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them give over the conspiracy. Thus stood the business with the Chians.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians fight with the Milesians, and begin to besiege the city. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

In the end of this summer a thousand five hundred men of arms of Athens, and a thousand of Argos, (for the Athenians had put armour upon five hundred light–armed of the Argives), and of other confederates a thousand more, with forty–eight galleys, reckoning those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides, came in to Samos, and crossing over to Miletus encamped before it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men of arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus and some auxiliar strangers with Tissaphernes (Tissaphernes himself being also there with his cavalry): and fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Argives, who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the rest and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy, as being Ionians and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians overcome: and lost no less than three hundred of their men. But the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians, and then beaten back the barbarians and other multitude, and not fought with the Milesians at all, (for they, after they were come from the chase of the Argives and saw their other wing defeated, went into the town), sat down with their arms, as being now masters of the field, close under the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that on both sides the Ionics had the better of the Dorics. For the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians; and the Milesians, the Argives. The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being an isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a wall: supposing if they got Miletus, the other cities would easily come in.

The Athenians rise from Miletus upon the coming of fifty–five galleys from Peloponnesus. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

In the meantime it was told them about twilight, that the five and fifty galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by, and only not already

come. For there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, twenty galleys of Syracuse and two of Selinus: and the galleys that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus the admiral: and they put in first at Eleus, an island over against Miletus. And being advertised there that the Athenians lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of Iasus, to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibiades coming a horseback to Teichiussa of the territory of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys lay at anchor, they were informed by him of the battle: for Alcibiades was, with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes, present in it. And he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose what they had in Ionia and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed, and not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall. 27. According to this, they concluded to go the next morning and relieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself, nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy, and with what additions to their own, sufficiently and at leisure made ready, they might do it; he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness, (for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way upon occasion; but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten), be swayed to hazard battle against reason, and not only to dishonour the state, but also to cast it into extreme danger; seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity, to undertake, how then without constraint to seek out voluntary,

dangers? Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded, and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought with them; but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the enemy, to the end that their galleys might be the lighter: and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should be offered. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution: and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards; nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

The Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes take Iasus: wherein was Amorges, rebel to the king, whom they take prisoner. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The end of the twentieth summer.

28. The Peloponnesians setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus; and stayed there one day. The next day they took with them those galleys of Chios, which had formerly been chased together with Chalcideus; and meant to have returned to Teichiussa, to take aboard such necessaries as they had left ashore. But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to them with his landmen, and persuaded them to set upon Iasus, where Amorges the king's enemy then lay. Whereupon they assaulted Iasus upon a sudden: and they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the Athenians, took it. The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes, to carry him if he would to the king, as he had order to do. The city they pillaged; wherein, as being a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great quantity of money. The auxiliary soldiers of Amorges, they received without doing them hurt, into their own army; being for the most

part Peloponnesians. The town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free as bond; upon composition with him, at a Daric stater by the poll. And so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent hither to be governor of Chios, to Erythræ; and with him, the bands that had aided Amorges by land; and made Philip governor there in Miletus. And so this summer ended.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

29. The next winter Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into Iasus, came to Miletus: and for one month's pay, which was promised on his part at Lacedæmon, he gave unto the soldiers through the whole fleet after an Attic drachma a man by the day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but three oboles, till he had asked the king's pleasure: and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma. Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermocrates, general of the Syracusians, (for Theramenes was but slack in exacting pay, as not being general, but only to deliver the galleys that came with him to Astyochus), it was agreed that but for the five galleys that were over and above, they should have more than three oboles a man. For to fifty–five galleys he allowed three talents a month; and to as many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion.

The Athenians send part of the fleet against Chios, and part against Miletus. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

30. The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos, (for there were now come in thirty–five galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders), having gathered together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios as all the rest, concluded, distributing to every one his charge by lot, to go lie before Miletus with a

fleet; but against Chios, to send out both a fleet and an army of landmen. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys and part of those thousand men of arms that went to Miletus, which they carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers, according to their lot went to Chios: and the rest remaining at Samos with seventy–four galleys, were masters of the sea, and went to Miletus.

Astyochus goeth from Chios to Clazomenæ: thence to Phocæa and Cume. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Lesbians offer to turn to Astyochus.

31. Astyochus, who was now in Chios requiring hostages in respect of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes, and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes were mended, gave over that business: and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus and ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum; but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomenæ. There he summoned those within to yield: with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians, that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus. And Tamos the deputy lieutenant of Ionia, offered them the same. But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault upon the city, being unwalled: but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself carried to Phocæa and Cume; but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and Drimyssa, islands that lie over against Clazomenæ. After they had stayed there eight days in regard of the winds, spoiling and destroying, and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocæa and Cume to Astyochus. 32. While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came unto him, desiring to revolt from the Athenians. And as for him, they prevailed with him: but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were unwilling in respect of their former ill success there, he put to sea for Chios. Whither after a great tempest his galleys, some from

one place and some from another, at length arrived all. After this, Pedaritus, who was now at Erythræ, whither he was come from Miletus by land, came over with his forces into Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers which were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcideus and were left there, to the number of five hundred; and armour to arm them.

Astyochus and I'edaritus, the governor of Chios, disagree.

Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Astyochus communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt; for that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians. But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him [plainly] he should have none of them. 33. Whereupon Astyochus taking with him five galleys of Corinth, a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought with him, went towards Miletus to his charge: mightily threatening the Chians, in case they should need him, not to help them.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

When he was come to Corycus in Erythræa, he stayed there. And the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the point, the one not knowing that the other was so near. Astyochus, upon a letter sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that there were come certain Erythræan captives dismissed from Samos with design to betray Erythræ, went presently back to Erythræ: so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus also went over to him; and having narrowly enquired touching these seeming traitors, and found that the whole matter was but a pretence which the men had used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them,

and departed one to Chios, the other, as he was going before, towards Miletus.

The Athenian galleys tossed with tempest. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians take the galleys of the Peloponnesians, sent to waft in the ships of corn from Ægypt to Cnidus.

34. In the meantime, the army of the Athenians being come about by sea from Corycus to Arginum, lighted on three long–boats of the Chians; which when they saw, they presently chased. But there arose a great tempest; and the long–boats of Chios with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of Chios; and the men that were aboard them were part taken, and part slain. The rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phœnicus, under the hill Mimas: from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos, and there fortified.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

35. The same winter Hippocrates setting out from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus the son of Diogoras with two others, and with one galley of Laconia and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidus. This city was now revolted from Tissaphernes: and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus hearing of it, commanded that, the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of Cnidus, the other half should go about Triopium, and help to bring in the ships which were to come from Ægypt. This Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidus, lying out in the sea and consecrated to Apollo. The Athenians, upon advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos, took those galleys that kept guard at Triopium: but the men that were in them escaped to land. After this they went to Cnidus, which they assaulted; and had almost taken, being without wall. And the next day they assaulted it again; but being less able to hurt it now than

before, because they had fenced it better this night, and the men also were gotten into it that fled from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded and wasted the Cnidian territory; and so went back to Samos.

They assault the city of Cnidus, but cannot win it.

36. About the same time, Astyochus being come to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had plenty of all things for the army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iasus. And the Milesians underwent the war with a good will. Nevertheless the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes seemed defective, and not so advantageous to them as to him. Whereupon they agreed to new ones, in the presence of Tissaphernes, which were these:

37. “The agreement of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates with king Darius and his children, and with Tissaphernes, for league and amity according to the articles following:

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

“Whatsoever territories and cities do belong unto king Darius, or were his father’s or his ancestors’, against these shall neither the Lacedæmonians go to make war, nor any way to annoy them: neither shall the Lacedæmonians nor their confederates exact tribute of any of those cities. Neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon or any way annoy the Lacedæmonians, or any of the Lacedæmonian confederates.

“If the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall need anything of the king, or the king of the Lacedæmonians or of their confederates: what they shall persuade each other to do, that if they do it, shall be good.

“They shall both of them make war jointly against the Athenians and their confederates: and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do

it jointly.

"Whatsoever army shall be in the king's country, sent for by the king, the king shall defray.

"If any of the cities comprehended in the league made with the king, shall invade the king's territories, the rest shall oppose them and defend the king to the utmost of their power. If any city of the king's, or under his dominion, shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates, the king shall make opposition and defend them to the utmost of his power."

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Theramenes goeth to sea in a light–horseman, and is cast away.

38. After this accord made, Theramenes delivered his galleys into the hands of Astyochus: and putting to sea in a light–horseman, is no more seen.

The Chians in distress, send for aid to Astyochus. Astyochus refuseth to aid them, and is complained of by Pedaritus his letters to the state.

The Athenians that were now come with their army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the land–ward, and that had also a harbour for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been disheartened in divers former battles, and otherwise not only not mutually well affected, but jealous one of another; (for Tydeus and his accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in awe, but by force, and for a time); stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned, not conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochus. Which when he denied them, Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedæmon complaining of the wrong. Thus proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the

fleet of the enemy at Miletus: but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter them, they returned to Samos and lay still.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The galleys that were provided for Pharnabazus set forth toward Ionia. Antisthenes and eleven other Spartans sent with absolute authority into Ionia. They arrive at Caunus in Asia.

39. The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty–seven galleys, which at the procurement of Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus were made ready by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes a Spartan: with whom the Lacedæmonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council with Astyochus; whereof Lichas the son of Arcesilaus was one. These had commission, that when they should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general care to order everything to the best, they should send away these galleys, either the same or more or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they so thought fit; and to appoint Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, that went along in them, for commander: and that the same eleven, if they thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his charge, and ordain Antisthenes in his place: for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus. These galleys holding their course from Malea through the main sea, and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten galleys of the Athenians: whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. After this, because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos should give notice of their coming to those in Samos, (as also it fell out), they changed their course and went towards Crete: and having made their voyage the longer that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus in Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

Year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. The Chians desire help of Astyochus. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

40. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding [their former repulse, and] that Astyochus was still backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help them, being besieged: and not to suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians having many slaves, more than any one state except that of the Lacedæmonians, whom for their offences they the more ungently punished because of their number; many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran over presently to them; and were they, that knowing the territory so well, did it the greatest spoil. Therefore the Chians said he must help them, whilst there was hope and possibility to do it: Delphinium being still in fortifying and unfurnished, and greater fences being in making both about their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to have relieved them.

Astyochus is diverted from helping the Chians, and goeth to waft in the twenty–seven galleys of Peloponnesus that lay at Caunus. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

41. But in the meantime came the messenger from the twenty–seven galleys, and from the Lacedæmonian counsellors, that were come to Caunus. Astyochus therefore esteeming the wafting in of these galleys, whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe coming in of those Lacedæmonians, who were to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred above all other, presently gave over his journey for Chios, and went towards Caunus. As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being unwalled, and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the greatest verily in man’s memory; and rifled it, the inhabitants being fled into the mountains: and overrunning the country,

made booty of all that came in his way, saving of freemen; and those he dismissed. From Cos he went by night to Cnidus: but found it necessary, by the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow as he was after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for those twenty–seven galleys that were come from Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus himself was going to convoy in. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Miletus of their coming: and Charminus was lying for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia: for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus. 42. Astyochus, therefore, desiring to outgo the report of his coming, went as he was to Syme; hoping to find those galleys out from the shore. But [a shower of] rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their course in the dark, and disordered them.

A fight between the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets: wherein the Athenians had the worse.

The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet about the island. And thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with twenty galleys, supposing they had been the same galleys they were watching for from Caunus: and presently charging, sunk three of them and hurt others, and were superior in the fight, till such time as, contrary to their expectation, the greater part of the fleet came in sight, and enclosed them about. They then betook themselves to flight: and with the loss of six galleys the rest escaped into the island of Teuglussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidus, and joining with those seven–and–twenty galleys that came from Caunus, went all together to Syme: and having there erected a trophy, returned again and lay at Cnidus.

43. The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme. But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidus, nor the navy there against them. Whereupon they took up the furniture of their galleys at Syme, and assaulted Loryma, a town in the continent; and so returned to Samos.

Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians disagree about the articles of their league. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being at Cnidus, was [now] in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted: and withal those eleven Lacedæmonians conferred with Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching such things as they disliked in the articles before agreed on, and concerning the war, how it might be carried for the future in the best and most advantageous manner for them both. But Lichas was he that considered the business more nearly; and said, that neither the first league, nor yet the later by Theramenes, was made as it ought to have been: and that it would be a very hard condition, that whatsoever territories the king and his ancestors possessed before, he should possess the same now; for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and the sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Bœotia; and the Lacedæmonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty, should put them into subjection to the rule of the Medes. Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and not to stand to these: as for pay, in the new articles they would require none. But Tissaphernes chafing at this, went his way in choler: and nothing was done.

Rhodes revolteth to the Peloponnesians. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

44. The Peloponnesians solicited by messengers from the great men of Rhodes, resolved to go thither: because they hoped it would not prove impossible, with their number of seamen and army of land soldiers, to bring that island into their power; and withal supposed themselves able, with their

present confederates, to maintain their fleet without asking money any more of Tissaphernes. Presently therefore, the same winter, they put forth from Cnidus: and arriving in the territory of Rhodes, at Cameirus, first frighted the commons out of it, that knew not of the business; and they fled. Then the Lacedæmonians called together both these, and the Rhodians of the two cities Lindus and Iëlysus; and persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time, hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them: and were seen in the main sea, too late, though not much. For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to Samos; but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and made war against Rhodes, from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians, but levy money amongst them to the sum of thirty–two talents: and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there, having their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not.

C. 412. Alcibiades flieth to Tissaphernes, and crosseth the business of the Peloponnesians. He adviseth Tissaphernes to shorten their pay: year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. and to corrupt the captains. The integrity of Hermocrates. Alcibiades answereth in Tissaphernes' name to the cities that call upon him for money, and puts them off. He counselleth Tissaphernes to prolong the war, and afflict both sides. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. He adviseth him, of the two, to favour the Athenians the rather, as fitter to help subdue the Grecians.

45. In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and battle at Miletus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having received letters from them from Lacedæmon to put him to death; (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not well trusted): retired to Tissaphernes first, for fear; and afterwards to his power

hindered the affairs of the Peloponnesians. And being in everything his instructor, he not only cut shorter their pay, insomuch as from a drachma he brought it to three oboles, and those also not continually paid; advising Tissaphernes to tell them, how that the Athenians, men of a long continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to their own, not so much for want of money, but lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent by superfluity, should disable their bodies by spending their money on such things as would weaken them, and others should quit the galleys with the arrear of their pay in their captains' hands for a pawn: but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of the galleys and to the generals of the several cities, save only those of Syracuse, to give way unto it. For Hermocrates [the general of the Syracusians] was the only man, that in the name of the whole league stood against it. And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back himself, and answer them in Tissaphernes his name; and say, namely to the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the Grecian states and preserved by strangers, to expect nevertheless that others, for their liberty, should not only venture their persons, but maintain them with their purses: and to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not to bestow as much or more now upon themselves: and told them, that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own charges, had reason to be sparing; but when money should come down from the king he would give them their full pay, and assist the cities as should be fit. 46. Moreover, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the Phœnician fleet which was making ready, nor take more men into pay, whereby to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one: but to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other: whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one,

he will want by whom to pull down those that hold it, unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself: but thus the danger would be less chargeable, he being but at a small part of the cost; and he should wear out the Grecians one against another, and himself in the meantime remain in safety. He said further, that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the other; for that they were less ambitious of power by land; and that their speeches and actions tended more to the king's purpose: for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves as touching the dominion by sea, and for the king as touching the Grecians in the king's territories: whereas the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, were come to set them free: and it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians, will, if they overcome the Athenians, deliver them also from the barbarians. He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both; and then, when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country.

Tissaphernes, guided by the counsel of Alci– year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. biades, hindereth the success of the Peloponnesians.

And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly; as far as by his actions can be conjectured. For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades, as his best counsellor in these affairs: and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages, nor would suffer them to fight by sea: but pretending the coming of the Phœnician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings, and abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant; and was in all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.

Alcibiades aimeth at his return to Athens by making show of his power with Tissaphernes. Motion made for the recalling of Alcibiades, and deposing of the people. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

47. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this, whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the best course; but partly also, to make way for his own return into his country: knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day come that he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this: to make it appear unto them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with him, the captains of galleys and principal men there: partly upon Alcibiades his own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them, that they should remember him to the best sort, and say that he desired to come home, so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil persons nor yet of the multitude that cast him out; and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, [and to war on their side]: but chiefly of their own accords, had their minds inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

Conspiracy in the army at Samos against the democracy of Athens.

48. This business was set on foot first in the camp; and from thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos, and had conference with him. And when he had undertaken to bring to their friendship first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in case the government were taken from the people: for then, he said, the king might the better rely upon them: they that were of most power in the city, who also were the most toiled out, entered into great hope both to have the ordering of the state at home themselves, and victory also over the enemy. And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves: and to the multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades might be recalled and the people put from the government, the king would turn their friend and furnish them with money.

Though the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the present, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay they stirred not. But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration, anew and with more of their complices, of the things spoken by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy, and worthy to be believed: but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not; but thought, as the truth was, that Alcibiades cared no more for the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it, but only by altering the government that then was to be called home by his associates: and said, "they were especially to look to this, that they did not mutiny for the king, who could not very easily be induced (the Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the Athenians, whom he trusted not; and to trouble himself, when he might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him hurt: as for the confederate cities to whom they promise oligarchy, in that they themselves do put down the democracy," he said, "he knew full well, that neither those which were already revolted would the sooner return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby: for they would never be so willing to be in subjection either to the few or to the people, as they would be to have their liberty, which side soever it were that should give it them: but would think, that even those which are termed the good men, if they had the government, would give them as much to do as the people, being contrivers and authors to the people of doing those mischiefs against them, out of which they make most profit unto themselves: and that if the few had the rule, then they should be put to death unheard, and more violently than by the former; whereas the people is their refuge, and moderator of the others' insolence. This," he said, "he was

certain that the cities thought; in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves: and that therefore what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no means approved." 49. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander and others ambassadors to Athens: to negociate concerning the reduction of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the democracy, and the procuring unto the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

The treason of Phrynichus against the state, for fear of Alcibiades. He writes secret letters to Astyochus. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Astyochus appeacheth him to Alcibiades. Phrynichus sends to Astyochus again, and offers to put the whole army into his hands. The device of Phrynichus to avoid the danger. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

50. Now Phrynichus knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for the restoring of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would embrace it; and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief (in regard he had spoken against it) as one that would have hindered the same: betook himself to this course. He sends secret letters to Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian general, who was yet about Miletus, and advertised him that Alcibiades undid their affairs, and was procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians: writing in plain terms the whole business, and desiring to be excused if he rendered evil to his enemy with some disadvantage to his country. Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibiades, especially when he was not in his own hands. And going to him to Magnesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them what advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself the appeacher. For he adhered, as was said, to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, both in this and in divers other matters: which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement was made, he was not so stout in

opposing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sendeth letters presently to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done, and requiring to have him put to death. Phrynichus perplexed with this discovery, and brought into danger indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what was past as not well concealed: and promised now to be ready to deliver unto him the whole army at Samos to be destroyed: writing from point to point, (Samos being unwalled), in what manner he would do it; and saying, that since his life was brought in danger, they could not blame him though he did this or any other thing, rather than be destroyed by his most deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed unto Alcibiades. 51. But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come, he anticipates the news himself: and tells the army, that whereas Samos was unwalled and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour: that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city, and to put garrisons into other places thereabouts. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done. They then fell to walling; whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled in. Not long after came letters from Alcibiades, that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purposed to invade the harbour where they lay. But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

Alcibiades endeavoureth to turn Tissaphernes to the part of the Athenians. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

52. After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians. For though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet was greater than that of the Athenians; yet if he had been able, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him; especially in his anger against the Peloponnesians, after the dissension at Cnidus, about the league made by Theramenes; (for they were already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in Rhodes). Wherein that which had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the coming of the Lacedæmonians was to restore all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Lichas; in that he said, it was an article not to be suffered, that the king should hold those cities which he and his ancestors then or before had holden. Alcibiades therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to Tissaphernes.

Pisander getteth the Athenians to be content with the oligarchy, and to give him and others commission to treat with Alcibiades. year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Phrynichus accused by Pisan– year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.
der, and discharged of his command.

53. The Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the people: and related unto them summarily the points of their business, and principally this; “that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the victory of the Peloponnesians”. Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy; and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal, that it would be a horrible thing he should return by forcing the government, when the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces bare witness against him concerning the mysteries for which he fled, and prohibited his return under their curse: Pisander, at this great opposition and querimony, stood out, and going amongst them took out one by one those

that were against it, and asked them; “whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with money by the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any other hope to save their state but by persuading the king to come about to their side”. And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain terms he said unto them: “This you cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation, and bring the power into the hands of a few, that the king may rely upon us. And we deliberate at this time, not so much about the form, as about the preservation of the state; for if you mislike the form, you may change it again hereafter. And let us recall Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring this to pass.” The people hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously at first: but when Pisander had proved evidently, that there was no other way of safety, in the end, partly for fear and partly because they hoped again to change the government, they yielded thereunto. So they ordered, that Pisander and ten others should go and treat both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, as to them should seem best. Withal, upon the accusation of Pisander against Phrynichus, they discharged both Phrynichus and Scironides, his fellow–commissioner, of their command: and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and said he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, was only this: he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades.

Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations, (which were in the city before, for obtaining of places of judicature and of command), exhorting them to stand together and advise about deposing the democracy; and when he had dispatched the rest of his business, so as there should be no more cause for him to stay there: took sea with those other ten to go to Tissaphernes.

C. 411. Leon and Diomedon war upon the Peloponnesian navy at Rhodes.

55. Leon and Diomedon arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes; and finding there the Peloponnesian galleys drawn up to land, disbarked and overcame in battle such of the Rhodians as made head; and then put to sea again and went to Chalce. After this they made sharper war upon them from Cos. For from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy when it should put off from the land.

Year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Chios distressed, and Pedaritus the captain slain.

In this while there arrived at Rhodes Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, to advertise them that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished: and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, the state of Chios must utterly be lost. And it was resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus in the meantime, with the whole power both of his own auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy: part whereof he won, and had gotten some galleys that were drawn a–land. But the Athenians issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians, and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pedaritus: and slew Pedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians prisoners and much armour. 56. After this the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly: and great famine was in the city.

Alcibiades unable to make good his word, about bringing Tissaphernes to the Athenians' side, demands excessive conditions, to make the breach ap– year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. pear to proceed from the Athenians, and to save his own credit. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Pisander, and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement. But

Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear too much of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to weaken both sides [yet more]), betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should break off the treaty by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing: Tissaphernes for fear; and Alcibiades, for that when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, [though the offers were never so great], he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could not persuade him to it, but rather that he was already persuaded and willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he were also present, made unto them such excessive demands, that though the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been attributed to them that the treaty went not on. For they demanded, first, that all Ionia should be rendered: then again, the adjacent islands and other things: which the Athenians stood not against. In fine, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word, he required, that they should suffer the king to build a navy, and sail up and down by their coast wheresoever and with what number soever of galleys he himself should think good. Upon this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming the conditions intolerable and that Alcibiades had abused them, and so went away in a chafe to Samos.

Tissaphernes hearkeneth again to the Peloponnesians.

57. Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus, with intent both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and also, (as soon as he should have agreed unto new articles, such as he could get), to give the fleet their pay; and not to fall directly out with them: for fear lest so many galleys wanting maintenance, should either be forced by the Athenians to fight and so be overcome, or, emptied of men, the business

might succeed with the Athenians according to their own desire without him. Besides he was afraid, lest looking for maintenance they should make spoil in the continent. In consideration and foresight of all which things, he desired to counterpoise the Grecians. And sending for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay; and now made the third league, as followeth:

The third league between Tissa– year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. phernes and the Peloponnesians.

58. “In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas being ephor in Lacedæmon, agreement was made in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their confederates on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king, and of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.

“That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king, shall be the king’s still: and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he shall think meet.

“That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall not invade any the territories of the king to harm them; nor the king, the territories of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates.

“If any of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall invade the king’s country to do it hurt, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall oppose it: and if any of the king’s country shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.

“That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on, maintain the present fleet till the king’s fleet arrive.

Year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

“That when the king’s navy shall be come, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall maintain their own navy themselves, if they please: or if

they will have Tissaphernes to maintain it, he shall do it; and that the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him.

"When the king's galleys shall be arrived, both they and the galleys of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall seem good: and if they will give over the war against the Athenians, they shall give it over in the same manner."

59. Such were the articles. After this Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phœnician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever else he had undertaken: desiring to have it seen, at least, that he went about it.

Oropus taken by treason. year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

60. In the end of this winter, the Bœotians took Oropus by treason. It had in it a garrison of Athenians. They that plotted it, were certain Eretrians and some of Oropus itself; who were then contriving the revolt of Eubœa. For the place being built to keep Eretria in subjection, it was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having Oropus in their hands already, they came to Rhodes to call the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios now distressed: and putting to sea, departed out of Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the main sea going from Chalce. And neither side assaulting other, they put in, the one fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus: for the Peloponnesians saw they could not pass to relieve Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter; and the twentieth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Year xxi. The Chians fight against the Athenians that besieged them. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

61. The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan was sent by land into Hellespont with a small army, to work the revolt of Abydos, a colony of the Milesians. And the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at a stand how to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. Now whilst Astyochus lay at Rhodes, they had received into the city of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon a Spartan, that came along with Antisthenes as a private soldier: and with him twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anæa, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a certain place of strength: and put forth thirty–six galleys against thirty–two of the Athenians, and fought. After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not the worst, and when it began to be dark, they retired again into the city.

Abydos and Lampsacus revolt. Strombichides recovereth Lampsacus.

62. Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived now in Hellespont from Miletus by land, Abydos revolted to him and to Pharnabazus: and two days after revolted Lampsacus. Strombichides having intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios with four–and–twenty sail of Athenians: those being also of that number which transported his men of arms. And when he had overcome the Lampsacenes that came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout of their voices, and made prize of all the goods they found and of the slaves, he placed the freemen there again: and went against Abydos. But when that city neither yielded nor could be taken by assault, he crossed over from Abydos to the opposite shore: and in Sestos, a city of Chersonesus, possessed heretofore by the Medes, he placed a garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.

63. In the meantime not only the Chians had the sea at more command, but Astyochus also and the army at Miletus, having been advertised of what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those galleys with him were gone away, took heart. And Astyochus going to Chios with two galleys, fetched away the galleys that were there: and with the whole fleet now together went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came not against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it was about this time that the democracy was put down at Athens.

The democracy at Athens put down by Pisander and his fellows. The authors of the oligarchy resolve to leave out Alcibiades, and to govern the state with their private means for themselves. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

For after that Pisander and his fellow–ambassadors that had been with Tissaphernes, were come to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet better in the army, and also provoked the principal men of the Samians to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy; though there were then an insurrection amongst them against the oligarchy. And withal the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let him alone; for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy: but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business from a relapse, and withal to sustain the war, and to contribute money and whatsoever else was needful with alacrity, out of their private estates; and no more to toil for other than themselves. 64. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the ambassadors presently home, to follow the business there; with command to set up the oligarchy in all the cities they were to touch at by the way: the other half they sent about, some to one part [of the state] and some to another. And they sent away Diotrephes to his charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace.

The Athenians having set up the oligarchy in Thasos, it presently revolteth from them.

He, when he came to Thasos, deposed the people. And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians fortified their city: as needing no longer an aristocracy with the Athenians, but expecting liberty every day by the help of the Lacedæmonians. For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athenians: and these practised with such in the city as were for their purpose, to receive galleys into it and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for them just as they would have it: that that estate of theirs was set up without their danger, and that the people was deposed that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasos it fell out contrary to what those Athenians thought, which erected the oligarchy: and so, in my opinion, it did in many other places of their dominion. For the cities now grown wise, and withal resolute in their proceedings, sought a direct liberty; and preferred not before it that outside of a well–ordered government, introduced by the Athenians.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The proceeding of Pisander in setting up the oligarchy. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

65. They with Pisander, according to the order given them, entering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies: and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they came to Athens: and found the business, for the greatest part, dispatched to their hands by their accomplices before their coming. For certain young men combining themselves, had not only murdered Androcles privily, a principal patron of the popular government, and one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades: (whom they slew for two causes; for the sway he bare amongst the people; and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return and get them the friendship of Tissaphernes): but had also made

away divers men unfit for their design in the same manner. They had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in public, wherein they said, that there ought none to receive wages but such as served in the wars, nor to participate of the government more than five thousand; and those, such as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the commonwealth. 66. And this with the most carried a good shew: because they that would set forward the alteration of the state, were to have the managing of the same. Yet the people and the Council of the Bean met still; but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit: nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before what they were to say. Nor would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, because they saw the combination was great: and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means or other; and no inquiry made after the deed–doers, nor justice prosecuted against any that was suspected. But the people were so quiet and so afraid, that every man thought it gain to escape violence, though he said never a word. Their hearts failed them, because they thought the conspirators more indeed than they were: and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city and for that they knew not one another, they were unable. For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it, to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired: for he must have told his mind, either to one he knew not, or to one he knew and trusted not. For the populars approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them, as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy: and those were they that caused in the many that diffidence; and by strengthening the jealousy of the populars one against another, conferred most to the security of the few.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The form of the new oligarchy.

67. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were with him, coming in fell in hand presently with the remainder of the business. And first they assembled the people, and delivered their opinion, for ten men to be chosen with power absolute to make a draught of laws; and having drawn them, to deliver their opinion at a day appointed before the people, touching the best form of government for the city. Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to Colonus: which is a place consecrated to Neptune without the city, about two furlongs off. And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this: That it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion he pleased; imposing of great punishments upon whosoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating the laws, or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded, "that not any magistracy of the form before used, might any longer be in force, nor any fee belong unto it: but that five Prytanes might be elected, and these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three others: and these four hundred entering into the council–house, might have absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best, and to summon the five thousand as oft as to them it should seem good".

Pisander a principal man of the oligarchals. Antiphon another setter up of the few. The praise of Antiphon. Phrynichus an– year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. other author of the oligarchy.

68. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander: who was also otherwise openly the forwardest to put down the democracy. But he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon: a man for virtue not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man both to devise well, and also to express well what he had devised: and though he came not into the assemblies of the people, nor willingly to any other debatings, because the multitude had him in jealousy

for the opinion they had of the power of his eloquence; yet when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of justice or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to help him most. The same man, when afterwards the government of the four hundred went down and was vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, when his life was in question for that business, the best of any man to this day. Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, and that more earnestly than any other; because he feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus; and thought in all probability, that he would never return to live under the government of the few. And this man, in any matter of weight, appeared the most sufficient to be relied on. Also Theramenes the son of Agnon, an able man both for elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew the democracy.

So that it is no marvel if the business took effect, being by many and wise men conducted, though it were a hard one. For it went sore with the Athenian people, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of their liberty: having not only not been subject to any, but also for the half of this time been inured to dominion over others.

The Four Hundred enter upon the senate and dismiss the senate of five hundred called. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. the Council of the Bean. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

69. When the assembly, after it had passed these things no man contradicting, was dissolved; then afterwards they brought the four hundred into the council–house in this manner. The Athenians were evermore partly on the walls, and partlyat their arms in the camp, in regard of the enemy that lay at Deceleia. Therefore on the day appointed, they suffered such as knew not their intent, to go forth as they were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy, they quietly gave order not to go to the camp itself, but to

lag behind at a certain distance: and if any man should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They to whom this charge was given, were [the] Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Ægina which the Athenians had sent thither to inhabit, as came on purpose to this action with their own arms. These things thus ordered, the four hundred, with every man a secret dagger, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece, whom they used for occasions of shedding of blood, came in upon the Counsellers of the Bean, as they sat in the councilhouse, and commanded them to take their salary and be gone: which also they brought ready with them, for the whole time they were behind, and paid it to them as they went out. 70. And the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet.

Agis, in hope that the city was in sedition, cometh to assault it, but is repulsed. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The Four Hundred send to Lacedæmon to procure a peace.

The four hundred being now entered into the council–house, created Prytanes amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance upon the government. And afterwards receding far from that course which in the administration of the state was used by the people, saving that for Alcibiades his sake they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the commonwealth imperiously: and not only slew some, though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and imprisoned some, and confined others to places abroad; but also sent heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was then at Deceleia, signifying that they would come to composition with him; and that now he might better treat with them, than he might before with the unconstant people. 71. But he, not imagining that the city was yet in quiet nor willing so soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather that if they saw him approach with great forces they would be in

tumult, not yet believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave no answer at all to those that came from the four hundred, touching the composition: but having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the army at Deceleia and those new comers, to the Athenian walls: hoping that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at the very first shout of their voices, in respect of the tumult that in all likelihood was to happen both within and without the city. For, as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them. But when he came near, and the Athenians were without any the least alteration within; and had with their horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men of arms and of their light–armed and of their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near, and gotten some arms and bodies of the slain: rectified thus, he withdrew his army again. And himself, and such as were with him before, stayed in their places at Deceleia; but as for those that came last, after they had stayed awhile in the country, he sent them home again. After this the four hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse, sent ambassadors unto Agis anew: and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors also to Lacedæmon about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

They sent to Samos, to excuse their doings to the army. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to satisfy the army: and to tell them, “that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state: and that they which had their hands in it were five thousand, and not four hundred only; notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of warfare and employment abroad, never assembled, of how great consequence soever was the matter to be handled,

so frequent as to be five thousand there at once". And having in other things instructed them how to make the best of the matter, they sent them away immediately after the government was changed: fearing, as also it fell out, lest the seafaring multitude would not only not continue in this oligarchical form themselves, but the mischief beginning there would depose them also.

The oligarchy assaulted at Samos by the populars. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

73. For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy already: and this that followeth, happened about the same time that the four hundred were set up in Athens. Those Samians that had risen against the nobility, and were of the people's side, turning when Pisander came thither, at the persuasion of him and of those Athenians in Samos that were his accomplices, conspired together to the number of three hundred, and were to have assaulted the rest as populars. And one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow, who, not for any fear of his power or for any dignity, but for wickedness of life and dishonour he did the city, had been banished by ostracism, they slew: abetted therein both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that were amongst them, who had given them their faith. And together with these, they committed other facts of the same kind: and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side. But they having gotten notice thereof, made known the design both to the generals, Leon and Diomedon; (for these being honoured by the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly); and also to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whereof one was captain of a galley, and the other captain of a band of men of arms, and to such others continually as they thought stood in greatest opposition to the conspirators: and required of them that they would not see them destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians, by the only means of which their dominion had till this time kept itself in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to the soldiers, and exhorted them one by one not to suffer it;

especially to the Paralians, who were all Athenians and freemen, come thither in the galley called Paralus, and had always before been enemies to the oligarchy. And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left them certain galleys for their guard: so that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upperhand: and of the three hundred slew thirty. Three of the chief authors they banished: and burying in oblivion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a democracy.

The army send to Athens to signify their doings against the oligarchy at Samos: not knowing that the oligarchy was then in authority at Athens. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The democracy re–established in the army. year xxi. A C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

74. The Paralus, and in it Chæreas the son of Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the Samians and the soldiers dispatched presently away to Athens, to advertise them of what was done: for they knew not yet, that the government was in the hands of the four hundred. When they arrived, the four hundred cast some two or three of these of the Paralus into prison: the rest, after they had taken the galley from them and put them aboard another military galley, they commanded to keep guard about Eubœa. But Chæreas, by some means or other getting presently away, seeing how things went, came back to Samos; and related to the army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost: as that they punished every man with stripes, to the end that none should contradict the doings of those that bore rule; and that their wives and children at home were abused; and that they had an intention further to take and imprison all that were of kin to any of the army which was not of their faction, to the intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their authority. And many other things he told them, adding lies of

his own. 75. When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such of the rest as were partakers of it. Yet afterwards, being hindered by such as came between and advised them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their galleys to assault them; they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these were the principal authors of the change), determining now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could devise: both that they should be subject to the democracy and agree together; and also that they should zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians; and withal be enemies to the four hundred, and not to have to do with them by ambassadors. The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age; and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers: for whom and for themselves, they made account there was no refuge of safety; but that if either the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must needs perish.

The army encourageth itself against the city and state at home by comparison of their strength. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. year xxi. A C 411. Ol. 92. 1.

76. So there was a contention at this time: one side compelling the city to a democracy; the other, the army to an oligarchy. And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called: wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as they had in suspicion, of their charge; and chose others, both captains of galleys and commanders, in their places; of which Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise, and with this: “that they had no cause to be dejected for the city’s revolting from them; for they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken them, who were not only the

greater part, but also every way the better provided. For they having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities subject unto them to pay in their money as well now, as if they were to set out from Athens itself. And that they also had a city, namely Samos, no weak one; but even such a one, as when they were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion of the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of the war, was the same it was before; and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in the city. And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiræus, both formerly by the favour of them at Samos: and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they shall again be brought to that pass, that those at Samos shall be better able to bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle and worth nothing, which was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city; and a small matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had neither any more silver to send them, (for the soldiers shifted for themselves), nor yet good direction, which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that in this point they erred which were at Athens; in that they had abrogated the laws of their country: whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves, and endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise. So that such of them in the camp as should give good council, were as good as they in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their confederate. And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they might find both city and territory."

77. When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly and encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was necessary for the war. And the ten ambassadors which were sent to Samos

from the four hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already, stayed still there.

Upon the murmur of the soldiers against Astyochus, he goeth to Samos to offer the Athenians battle:

78. About the same time also, the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves, that Astyochus and Tissaphernes overthrew the state of their affairs. Astyochus in refusing to fight; both before, when their own fleet was stronger, and that of the Athenians but small; and also now, whilst they were said to be in sedition, and their fleet divided; and in expecting the Phœnician fleet, in fame, not in fact to come from Tissaphernes: and Tissaphernes, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of his, but also impaired theirs by not giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually: and that they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. who refuse it. The Athenians offer battle to the Peloponnesians, and they refuse it.

79. Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur, and had in council resolved to fight, especially after they were informed that Samos was in a tumult: putting forth with their whole fleet to the number of one hundred and twelve sail, with order given to the Milesians to march by land to the same place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians, being come out from Samos with their fleet of eighty–two galleys, and riding now at Glauce of the territory of Mycale, ([for] in this part [toward Mycale] Samos is but a little way from the continent), when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, put in again to Samos: as not esteeming themselves a sufficient number, to hazard their whole fortune on the battle. Besides, they stayed for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid (for they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to fight) with those galleys that went from Chios against Abydos: for they had sent unto him before. So

these retired into Samos. And the Peloponnesians putting in at Mycale, there encamped: as also did the land–forces of the Milesians, and others of the country thereabouts. The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived out of Hellespont: and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these galleys, went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, intending to fight: but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to Samos.

The Peloponnesians send part of their fleet to– year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. wards the Hellespont, but there went through but only ten galleys.

80. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of galleys: sent Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys, according to the order at first from Peloponnesus, to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for, and promised to pay them: but they were advertised besides by ambassadors, that Byzantium had a purpose to revolt. Hereupon these Peloponnesian galleys having put out into the main sea, to the end that they might not be seen as they passed by; and tossed with tempests, part of them, which were the greatest number, and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again; but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land, and had the command there: and part under the charge of Helixus, a Megarean, which were ten sail, went safely through into the Hellespont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose them, and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts: and there followed a small fight between them of eight galleys to eight, before Byzantium.

Alcibiades is recalled and cometh to Samos. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. He manifesteth his power with Tissaphernes. Alcibiades general of the Athenian army. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

81. In the meantime, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed was still of the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in an assembly persuaded the soldiers to the same. And when they had decreed for Alcibiades both his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos: accounting it their only means of safety, to win Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the calamity of his own exile, and speaking much of the business of the state gave them no small hopes of the future time: hyperbolically magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to the end that both they which held the oligarchy at home might the more fear him, and so the conspiracies dissolve, and also those at Samos the more honour him and take better heart unto themselves; and withal, that the enemy might object the same to the utmost to Tissaphernes, and fall from their present hopes. Alcibiades therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him, that as long as he had anything left, if he might but trust the Athenians they should never want for maintenance; no, though he should be constrained to make money of his own bed; and that he would fetch the Phœnician fleet, now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians but to the Athenians: and that then only he would rely upon the Athenians, when Alcibiades called home should undertake for them. 82. Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently for general together with those that were before; and committed unto them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of subsisting themselves and being revenged of the four hundred, for any good in the world: and were ready even then,

upon those words of his, contemning the enemy there present, to set sail for Peiræus. But he, though many pressed it, by all means forbade their going against Peiræus, being to leave their enemies so near: but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tissaphernes first, and to dispatch such business with him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey accordingly: to the end that he might seem to communicate everything with him, and for that he desired also to be in more honour with him, and to show that he was general, and a man capable to do him good or hurt. And it happened to Alcibiades, that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians murmur against Tissaphernes aad Astyochus. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Mutiny against Astyochus. The Milesians take in the fort year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. made in their city by Tissaphernes.

83. When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus, heard that Alcibiades was gone home; whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they much more accused him. For it fell out, that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before Miletus they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment; and besides that he was hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake, the soldiers now, meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another the same matters which they had noted before, and some also, men of value and not the common soldier alone, recounted this withal; how they had never had their full stipend; that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; and that unless they either fought, or went to some other place where they might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet; and that the cause of all this was in Astyochus, who for private lucre gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes. 84. Whilst these were upon this consideration, there happened also a certain tumult about Astyochus. For

the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much they were a multitude that had greater liberty than the rest, with so much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer, but also threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers under himself, and lift up his staff against him. When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed, all at once; and were running upon Astyochus to have stricken him. But foreseeing it, he fled to an altar; and was not stricken, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it; and cast out the garrison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by the Syracusians, well approved of: but Lichas liked them not; saying, it behoved the Milesians, and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, to have obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and till such time as the war should have been well dispatched to have courted him. And the Milesians, for this and other things of this kind, were offended with Lichas: and afterwards when he died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedæmonians then present would have had him.

Mindarus successor to Astyochus, taketh charge of the army, and Astyochus goeth home. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

85. Whilst they were quarrelling about their business with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus cometh in from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet: and as soon as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent a Carian, named Gauleites, one that spake both the languages, both to accuse the Milesians about the fort, and also to make an apology for himself: knowing that the Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him; and that Hermocrates went with them, and would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For he was

continually at enmity with him about the payment of the soldiers' wages: and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the Syracusian fleet, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him being an outlaw, than before; and accused him amongst other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not have it became his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates and the Milesians went their way to Lacedæmon.

The ambassadors from the Four Hundred to excuse the change at Athens year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Alcibiades saveth the Athenian state. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos. 86. And those ambassadors of the four hundred, which had been sent out before to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos now, whilst Alcibiades was present. An assembly being called, they were offering to speak. But the soldiers at first would not hear them; but cried out to have them put to death, for that they had deposed the people: yet afterwards with much ado they were calmed, and gave them hearing. They declared, "that the change had been made for the preservation of the city, not to destroy it, nor to deliver it to the enemy; for they could have done that before now, when the enemy during their government assaulted it: that every one of the five thousand was to participate of the government in their turns: and their friends were not, as Chæreas had laid to their charge, abused; nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own." Though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed them not, but raged still; and declared their opinions, some in one sort some in another, most agreeing in this to go against Peiræus. And now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and principal man in doing service to the commonwealth. For when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade themselves: in

which case most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont: [it was thought that] he was the man that kept them from it. Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude, but himself. He both made them to desist from the voyage, and rated off from the ambassadors those that were in their own particular incensed against them. Whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: "That he opposed not the government of the five thousand, but willed them to remove the four hundred, and to establish the council that was before of five hundred: that if they had frugally cut off any expense, so that such as were employed in the wars might be the better maintained, he did much commend them for it." And withal he exhorted them to stand out, and give no ground to their enemies: for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope for them to compound; but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos or the other at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal.

There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Argives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos, to assist them. These Alcibiades commended, and appointed to be ready when they should be called for: and so dismissed them. These Argives came in with those of the Paralus, that had been bestowed formerly in the military galley by the four hundred, to go about Eubœa, and to convoy Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, ambassadors from the four hundred, to Lacedæmon. These as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors, and delivered them as principal men in deposing of the people to the Argives: and returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley they then were in to Samos, and brought with them these ambassadors from the Argives.

Tissaphernes goeth to the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

87. The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the time that the Peloponnesians were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phœnician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him: saying that he would substitute Tamos his deputy lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet whilst himself was absent.

Conjectures of divers upon his going.

This matter is diversly reported: and it is hard to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus, and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hundred and forty–seven sail of Phœnicians were come forward as far as Aspendus: but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design (as he formerly intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces: for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better, but rather worse payment than himself. Others, that having brought the Phœnicians as far as Aspendus, he might dismiss them for money: for he never meant to use their service. Some again said, it was because they exclaimed so against it at Lacedæmon: and that it might not be said he abused them, but that he went openly to a fleet really set out.

The opinion of the author. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

For my own part, I think it most clear that it was to the end to consume and to balance the Grecians, that he brought not those galleys in: consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither he made neither party the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have been sure to have done it. For if he had brought them to the Lacedæmonians, in all reason he had given them the victory, who had a navy already rather equal than inferior to that of their enemies. But that which hurt them most, was

the pretence he alleged for not bringing the fleet in. For he said, they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be gotten together. But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business, by dispatching it with less of the king's money, than by spending more. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and was with the Phœnicians: and by his own appointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedæmonian, with him with two galleys, as to take charge of the fleet.

Alcibiades, knowing that Tissaphernes would never bring on the fleet, goeth after him, to make the Peloponnesians think the fleet was stayed for his and the Athenians' sakes

88. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a safe and great benefit; which was, that he would either bring those Phœnician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians: knowing, as is likely, the mind of Tissaphernes by long acquaintance, that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he could, to procure him the ill will of the Peloponnesians for the friendship shown to himself and to the Athenians, that he might thereby the better engage him to take their part. So he presently put to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and Caunus upwards.

Year xxi. A C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Sedition at Athens about the change of the oligarchy into democracy again. Ambition of the oligarchicals amongst themselves over– year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. throweth their government.

89. The ambassadors of the four hundred being returned from Samos to Athens, and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades: how that he exhorted them to hold out, and not give ground to the enemy; and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army, and to overcome the Peloponnesians: whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented, and would gladly, if they could have done it safely,

have quitted the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their meetings apart, and did cast aspersions on the goverment; and had for their ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates the son of Scellius, and others, who though they were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at Samos; and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedæmon, because they were loth, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt the state, not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a very few: but said, that the five thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to a greater equality. And this was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred. But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that, by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly overthrown. For at once they claimed every one, not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook it. But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not like to last, was it that most evidently encouraged them: and thereupon they every one contended who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

The oligarchals year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. fortify the mouth of the haven of Peiræus. year xxi. A. C 411. Ol. 92. 1.

90. But those of the four hundred that were most opposite to such a form of government, and the principal of them; both Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and was ever since at difference with Alcibiades; and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the people both in the greatest manner and for the longest time; and Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they entered into

authority, and afterwards when the state at Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and built a wall in the place called Eetioneia: but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos, and that they saw not only the populars, but also some others of their own party thought trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedæmon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten others with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries both at home and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the Lacedæmonians on any tolerable conditions, whatsoever or howsoever: and in this time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by Theramenes [the son of Agnon], was not so much to keep out those of Samos, in case they should attempt by force to enter into Peiræus, as at their pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land–forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia is the pier of the Peiræus, close unto which is the mouth of the haven. And therefore they built this wall so to another wall that was built before to the continent, that a few men lying within it might command the entrance. For the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the [very] mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the continent as of the new which was built within it to the water. They built also an open ground–gallery, an exceeding great one and close to their new wall within Peiræus: and were masters of it, and constrained all men as well to bring thither their corn which they had already come in, as to unload there whatsoever should come in afterward; and to take and sell it from thence.

Theramenes murmureth against their fortifying in Eetioneia. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The scope of the oligarchicals. Phrynichus murdered. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Theramenes and his faction set themselves against

the rest of the Four Hundred. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The soldiers pull down the wall they had built in Eetioneia.

91. These things Theramenes murmured at long before: and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedæmon without compounding for them all in general, he gave out that this wall would endanger the undoing of the city. For at this very instant there happened to be riding on the coast of Laconia forty–two galleys, amongst which were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and some Sicilians; set out from Peloponnesus at the instance of the Eubœans, bound for Eubœa and commanded by Hegesandridas the son of Hegesander, a Spartan. And these Theramenes said were coming, not so much towards Eubœa, as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia: and that if they were not looked to, they would surprise the city. Now some matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were accused: so that it was not a mere slander. For their principal design was, to retain the oligarchy with dominion over their confederates: but if they failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys and of the fortification, to have subsisted free themselves: if barred of that, then rather than to be the only men to suffer death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy; and without either navy or fortification to have let what would have become of the city, and to have compounded for the safety of their own persons. 92. Therefore they went diligently on with the fortification, wherein were wickets and entries and backways for the enemy: and desired to have it finished in time. And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedæmonian ambassage, was by a certain watchman wounded treacherously in the market–place when it was full, as he went from the council–house, and not far from it fell instantly dead, and the murtherer gone; and that one of his complices, an Argive, taken by the four hundred and put to the torture, would confess no man of those named

to him, nor anything else saving this, that many men used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch and at other houses: then at length, because this accident bred no alteration, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many other, either of the four hundred or out of that number, as were of the same faction, proceeded more boldly to assault the government. For now also the fleet being come about from Laconia, and lying upon the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon Ægina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged, that it was improbable that those galleys holding their course for Eubœa, would have put in at Ægina and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent for by such men as he had ever accused of the same: and that therefore there was no reason any longer to sit still. And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches, they fell upon the state in good earnest. For the soldiers that were in Peiræus employed in fortifying Eetioneia, (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his band with him), seized on Alexicles, principal commander of the soldiers under the four hundred, an eminent man of the other side: and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. As soon as the news hereof was brought unto the four hundred, who chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council–house, they were ready all of them presently to have taken arms, threatening Theramenes and his faction. He to purge himself was ready to go with them and to help to rescue Alexicles: and taking with him one of the commanders who was also of his faction, went down into Peiræus. To help him went also Aristarchus, and certain horsemen of the younger sort. Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they thought Peiræus was already taken; and him that was laid in hold, slain: and in Peiræus, they expected every hour the power of the city to come upon them. At last the ancient men, stopping them that ran up and down the city to arm themselves; and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's host, being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met,

and crying out unto them not to destroy their country when the enemy lay so near waiting for an advantage: with much ado quieted them, and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes coming into Peiræus, (for he also had command over the soldiers), made a shew by his exclaiming of being angry with them: but Aristarchus and those that were of the contrary side, were extremely angry in good earnest. Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their business, and repented not a jot of what they had done. Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought this fortification were made to any good end, and whether it were not better to have it demolished. And he answered, that if they thought good to demolish it, he also thought the same. At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers and also many others of Peiræus, and fell a digging down of the wall. Now the provocation that they used to the multitude, was in these words: "that whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, ought also to set himself to the work in hand." For notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the name of the five thousand; and not to say plainly whosoever will have the sovereignty in the people: lest the five thousand should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to some or other of them, might do hurt to the business through ignorance. And for this cause it was that the four hundred would neither let the five thousand be extant, nor yet let it be known that they were not. For to make so many participant of the affairs of state, they thought was a direct democracy: but to have it doubtful, would make them afraid of one another.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. A day appointed for an assembly, wherein to treat of agreement.

93. The next day, the four hundred, though out of order, yet met together in the councilhouse, and the soldiers in Peiræus, having enlarged Alexicles whom they had before imprisoned, and quite razed the fortification, came

into the theatre of Bacchus near to Munychia, and there sat down with their arms: and presently, according as they had resolved in an assembly then holden, marched into the city, and there sat down again in the temple of Castor and Pollux. To this place came unto them certain men elected by the four hundred, and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of the mildest temper, both to be quiet themselves and to restrain the rest: saying, that not only the five thousand should be made known who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in turns to be of the four hundred, as the five thousand should think good: and entreating them by all means that they would not in the meantime overthrow the city, and force it into the hand of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew calmer: and feared most the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed betwixt them, that an assembly should be held for making of accord in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

94. When they came to the temple of Bacchus, and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came news that Hegesandridas with his forty–two galleys came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis. And now there was not a soldier but thought it the very same thing that Theramenes and his party had before told them, “that those galleys were to come to the fortification”, and that it was now demolished to good purpose. But Hegesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast of Epidaurus and thereabouts: but it is likely that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians he stayed in those parts, with hope to take hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was, the Athenians as soon as it was told them, ran presently with all the power of the city down to Peiræus: less esteeming their domestic war than that of the common enemy, which was not now far off,

but even in the haven. And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched the rest; and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

The battle between the Athenians and the fleet of Hegesandridas at Eretria. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians defeated. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

95. But the Peloponnesian galleys being now gone by and gotten about the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasiæ, and put in afterwards at Oropus. The Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumultuary forces, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and desirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake, (for Eubœa, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they had), sent a fleet under the command of Timocharis to Eretria. Which arriving, with those galleys that were in Eubœa before, made up the number of six–and–thirty sail. And they were presently constrained to hazard battle: for Hegesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus, when he had first there dined. Now Oropus is from Eretria about three–score furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began to embark: supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near unto the galleys. But it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not in the market; (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly before they were ready, and force them to come out and fight, nothing was there to be sold); but in the utmost houses of the city. There was besides a sign set up at Eretria, to give them notice at Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athenians drawn out by this device, and fighting before the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for a while: but afterwards they turned their backs, and were chased ashore. Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, were handled most cruelly, and slaughtered by them of the

town; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved themselves: and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis.

Eubœa revolteth

The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twenty–two Athenian galleys with the men, whereof some they slew and some they took prisoners, erected a trophy: and not long after having caused all Eubœa to revolt, save only Oreus, which the Athenians held with their own forces, they settled the rest of their business there.

The lamentable estate of the Athenians upon the loss of Eubœa. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The Lacedæmonians let slip the advantage which they might have had, if in prosecution of the victory they had come to Peiræus. The Lacedæmonians commodious enemies to the Athenians.

96. When the news of that which had happened in Eubœa was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at any time so much affright them as this. For now when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition amongst themselves and in continual expectation of falling together by the ears: then in the neck of all arrived this great calamity; wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Eubœa, by which they [had] received more commodity than by Attica. How then could they choose but be dejected? But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage and come immediately into Peiræus, now empty of shipping: of which they thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already. And had they been anything adventurous, they might easily have done it: and then, had they stayed there and besieged them, they had not only increased the sedition, but also compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia to the aid of their kindred and

of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy; and in the meantime gotten the Hellespont, Ionia, the Islands, and all places even to Eubœa, and, as one may say, the whole Athenian empire into their power. But the Lacedæmonians, not only in this but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours; the one swift, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; the Lacedæmonians gave them great advantage, especially when their greatness was by sea. This was evident in the Syracusians: who being in condition like unto them, warred best against them.

The Athenians settle their government, and put an end to the sedition, by deposing the Four Hundred, and setting up the Five Thousand. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

97. The Athenians upon this news made ready, notwithstanding, twenty galleys; and called an assembly, one then presently in the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times: in which having deposed the four hundred, they decreed the sovereignty to the five thousand; of which number were all such to be, as were charged with arms: and from that time forward to salariate no man for magistracy; with a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary, to be held for an execrable person. There were also divers other assemblies held afterwards; wherein they elected law–makers, and enacted other things concerning the government. And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright: which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past made the city again to raise her head.

They recall Alcibiades.

They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, and those that were in exile with him: and sending to him and to the army at Samos, willed them to fall in hand with their business.

Most of the oligarchicals fly to the enemy. Aristarchus betrayeth Œnoe. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

98. In this change Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew themselves to Deceleia. Only Aristarchus (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers) took with him certain archers of the most barbarous, and went with all speed to Œnoe. This was a fort of the Athenians in the confines of Bœotia; and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received by the garrison of Œnoe) was by voluntary Corinthians, and by some Bœotians by them called in to aid them, now besieged. Aristarchus therefore having treated with these, deceived those in Œnoe: and told them, that the city of Athens had compounded with the Lacedæmonians, and that they were to render up the place to the Bœotians; for that it was so conditioned in the agreement. Whereupon, believing him as one that had authority over the soldiery, and knowing nothing because besieged, upon security for their pass they gave up the fort. So the Bœotians receive Œnoe: and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens cease.

C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. Mindarus with the Peloponnesian fleet, seeing Tissaphernes and the Phœnician fleet came not, resolves to go to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

99. About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom Tissaphernes at his going to Aspendus had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus, did it; and seeing neither the Phœnician fleet nor Tissaphernes came to them; and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and also another, one Hippocrates a Spartan that was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus the general, that the fleet was not to come at all and in every thing Tissaphernes abused them; seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was willing, upon the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of

the cities within his own province to revolt from the Athenians: then at length, Mindarus hoping for benefit by him, with good order and sudden warning, that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventy–three galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part of Chersonnesus. But tossed with the wind she was forced to put in at Icarus: and after he had stayed there through ill weather some five or six days, he arrived at Chios.

Mindarus stayeth by the way at Chios: Thrasyllus in the meantime outgoes him, and watches for his going by at Lesbos. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

100. Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from Miletus, he also puts to sea from Samos with five and fifty sail; hasting to be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there, he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos and in the continent over against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his knowledge: and he himself going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of meal, and other necessaries; intending, if they stayed there long, to go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eressos was revolted from Lesbos, he purposed to go thither with his fleet: if he could, to take it in. For the most potent of the Methymnæan exiles had gotten into their society about fifty men of arms out of Cume, and hired others out of the continent: and with their whole number in all three hundred, having for their leader Anaxarchus a Theban, chosen in respect of their descent from the Thebans, first assaulted Methymna. But beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against them from Mytilene, and again in a skirmish without the city driven quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eressos, and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his galleys, and to assault it.

At his coming he found Thrasybulus there also before him, with five galleys from Samos: for he had been advertised of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eressos and lay before it at anchor. Hither also came two galleys of Methymna, that were going home from the Hellespont: so that they were in all threescore and seven sail, out of which they made an army, intending with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eressos by assault.

Mindarus and his fleet steal by into the Hellespont unseen of those that watched their going in Lesbos. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

101. In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet that was at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys, and had received of the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios: and kept far from the shore, that they might not fall amongst the galleys at Eressos. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the continent side: and putting in at a haven in Craterei, belonging to the territory of Phocæa, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cume, and came to Arginusæ in the continent over against Mytilene, where they supped. From thence they put forth late in the night, and came to Harmatus, a place in the continent over against Methymna: and after dinner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to Rhœteium; this now is in Hellespont. But some of his galleys put in at Sigeium, and other places thereabouts.

The Athenians at Sestos with eighteen galleys steal out of the Hellespont: but are met by Mindarus, and four of them taken. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

102. The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestos, knew that the Peloponnesians were entering into the Hellespont by the fires, both those which their own watchmen put up, and by the many which appeared on the enemies' shore: and therefore the same night in all haste, as they

were, kept the shore of Chersonnesus towards Elæus, desiring to get out into the wide sea and to decline the fleet of the enemy: and went out unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydos, though these had warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on, to watch them narrowly that they went not out. But in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus and chased by him, they could not all escape, but the most of them got to the continent and into Lemnos; only four of the hindmost were taken near Elæus: whereof the Peloponnesians took one with the men in her, that had run herself aground at the temple of Protesilaus; and two other without the men; and set fire on a fourth, abandoned upon the shore of Imbros.

103. After this they besieged Elæus the same day, with those galleys of Abydos which were with them, and with the rest, being now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, they went away to Abydos.

The Athenians haste from Lesbos after the Peloponnesians into Hellespont.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eressos: when now they knew they were gone, immediately left Eressos and hasted to the defence of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians, that having ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians. The next day they came to Elæus, and stayed: and thither from Imbros came unto them those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy. Here they spent five days in preparation for a battle.

104. After this, they fought in this manner. The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestos. The

Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydos.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. The Athenians and Peloponnesians fight, and the Athenians get the victory.

Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the Athenians along the shore of Chersonnesus, beginning at Idacus and reaching as far as Arrhiana, threescore and six galleys: and the Peloponnesians, from Abydos to Dardanum, fourscore and six galleys. In the right wing of the Peloponnesians, were the Syracusians: in the other, Mindarus himself, and those galleys that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right: and the rest of the commanders, every one the place assigned him.

Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset, and with their left wing to over–reach the right wing of the Athenians and keep them from going out, and to drive those in the middle to the shore which was near. The Athenians, who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their way out, put forth the same way that they did, and outwent them: the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time beyond the point called Cynos–sema. By means whereof that part of the fleet which was in the middest became both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet: and the sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos–sema, took away the sight of what passed there from those that were on the other side.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

105. The Peloponnesians therefore, charging this middle part, both drave their galleys to the dry land: and being far superior in fight, went out after them and assaulted them upon the shore. And to help them neither was Thrasybulus able who was in the right wing, for the multitude of the

enemies that pressed him; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what was done for the promontory of Cynos–sema, and because also he was kept from it by the Syracusians and others, lying upon his hands no fewer in number than themselves. Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one galley some another, fell into some disorder in a part of their army. And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys sought now no more to go beyond them, turned upon them; and fighting put them presently to flight: and having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians, of that part that had the victory, as were scattered abroad, some they assaulted, but the greatest number they put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians also, whom those about Thrasyllus had already caused to shrink, when they saw the rest fly fled outright.

The courage of the Athenians erected with this victory. year xxi. A C 411. Ol. 92. 2.

106. This defeat being given, and the Peloponnesians having for the most part escaped first to the river Pydius, and afterwards to Abydos: though the Athenians took but few of their galleys, (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat), yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received by little and little and also for their great loss in Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves, or to think highly any longer of the naval power of their enemies. The galleys they took were these: eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia two, of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one a–piece. Of their own they lost fifteen.

When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynos–sema, and taken up the wrecks, and given truce to the enemies to fetch away the bodies of their dead: they presently sent away a galley with a messenger to

carry news of the victory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming in of this galley hearing of their unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss in Eubœa and after their sedition: and conceived that their estate might yet keep up, if they plied the business courageously.

The Athenians recover Cyzicus, and take eight galleys of the Peloponnesians.

107. The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in Sestos having hastily prepared their fleet, went to Cyzicus, which was revolted: and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from Byzantium riding under Harpagium and Priapus, set upon them: and having also overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took them. Then coming to Cyzicus, being an open town, they brought it again into their own power; and levied a sum of money amongst them.

Year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. The Peloponnesians recover some of their galleys taken, at Elæus. They send for the fleet with Hegesandridas out of Eubœa.

The Peloponnesians in the meantime going from Abydos to Elæus, recovered as many of their galleys [formerly] taken as remained whole: the rest, the Elæusians [had] burnt. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Eubœa, to fetch away the fleet that was there.

Alcibiades returneth from Aspendus to Samos. Hefortifieth Cos.

108. About the same time also, returned Alcibiades to Samos with his thirteen galleys from Caunus and Phaselis: reporting that he had diverted the Phœnician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians, and that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians more than he was before. Thence manning out nine galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money of the Hallicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. Being now almost autumn, he returned to Samos.

The Antandrians put out the garrison of Tissaphernes out of their citadel. year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are Æolians) received into the city men of arms from Abydos by land through mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them by Arsaces, a deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces having feigned a certain war, not declared against whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians (the which in hallowing of Delos by the Athenians were turned out, and had planted themselves in Adramyttium) to go with him to this war: and when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he observed a time when they were at dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers murdered them with darts. And therefore, for this act's sake fearing lest he might do some unlawful prank against them also, and for that he had otherwise done them injury, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

Tissaphernes goeth toward Hellespont, to recover the favour of the Peloponnesians.

109. Tissaphernes, hearing of this, being the act of the Peleponnesians as well as that at Miletus or that at Cnidus; (for in those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner); and conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, and fearing lest they should do him some other hurt; and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus should receive them, and with less time and cost speed better against the Athenians than he had done: resolved to make a journey to them in the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandros, and to clear himself of his accusations the best he could, as well concerning the Phœnician fleet as other matters. And first he put in at Ephesus, and offered sacrifices to Diana.

The end of the one–and–twentieth summer.

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the one–and–twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.

The Whole Art of Rhetoric

MOLESWORTH'S 1845 EDITION

In 1637 Hobbes anonymously published *A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique*, an abridgement that contained "the most useful part of Aristotle's Rhetoric". The Preface to the work informs us:

> "Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his Translation the Rhetoric of Aristotle, as being the most accomplish'd work on that Subject, which the World has yet seen, having been admir'd in all Ages, and in particular highly approv'd by the Father of the Roman Eloquence, a very competent Judge. To this he thought fit to add some small matter relating to that part which concern's Tropes and Figures; as also a short discovery of some little trick of false and deceitful Reasoning." (Preface).

Molesworth's 1845 edition of the text, which is featured in this collection, also provided *The Art of Rhetoric Plainly Set Forth, with Pertinent Examples for the More Easy Understanding and Practice of the Same*, which was originally ascribed to Hobbes, though today it is generally agreed to be the work of Dudley Fenner (c. 1558-1587), an English puritan divine that helped popularise Ramist logic in the English language.



Roman copy in marble of a Greek bronze bust of Aristotle by Lysippos, c. 330 BC

CONTENTS

THE ART OF RHETORIC.

PREFACE

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I. THAT RHETORIC IS AN ART CONSISTING NOT ONLY IN MOVING THE PASSIONS OF THE JUDGE, BUT CHIEFLY IN PROOFS: AND THAT THIS ART IS PROFITABLE.
CHAPTER II. THE DEFINITION OF RHETORIC.
CHAPTER III. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF ORATIONS: AND OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.
CHAPTER IV. OF THE SUBJECT OF DELIBERATIVES; AND THE ABILITIES THAT ARE REQUIRED OF HIM THAT WILL DELIBERATE OF BUSINESS OF STATE.
CHAPTER V. OF THE ENDS WHICH THE ORATOR IN DELIBERATIVES PROPOUNDETH, WHEREBY TO EXHORT OR DEHORT.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.
CHAPTER VII. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL, COMPARATIVELY.
CHAPTER VIII. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS.
CHAPTER IX. OF THE COLOURS OF HONOURABLE AND DISHONOURABLE.
CHAPTER X. OF ACCUSATION AND DEFENCE, WITH THE DEFINITION OF INJURY.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING PLEASURE.

CHAPTER XII. PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT DO IT: OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING THE APTITUDE OF PERSONS TO DO INJURY.
CHAPTER XIII. PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT SUFFER, AND FROM THE MATTER OF THE INJURY.
CHAPTER XIV. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO BE KNOWN FOR THE DEFINITION OF JUST AND UNJUST.
CHAPTER XV. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING INJURIES, COMPARATIVELY.
CHAPTER XVI. OF PROOFS INARTIFICIAL.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I. THE INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER II. OF ANGER.
CHAPTER III. OF RECONCILING, OR PACIFYING ANGER.
CHAPTER IV. OF LOVE AND FRIENDS.
CHAPTER V. OF ENMITY AND HATRED.
CHAPTER VI. OF FEAR.
CHAPTER VII. OF ASSURANCE.
CHAPTER VIII. OF SHAME.
CHAPTER IX. OF GRACE OR FAVOUR.
CHAPTER X. OF PITY OR COMPASSION.
CHAPTER XI. OF INDIGNATION.
CHAPTER XII. OF ENVY.
CHAPTER XIII. OF EMULATION.
CHAPTER XIV. OF THE MANNERS OF YOUTH.
CHAPTER XV. OF THE MANNERS OF OLD MEN.
CHAPTER XVI. OF THE MANNERS OF MIDDLE-AGED MEN.

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE MANNERS OF THE NOBILITY.
CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE MANNERS OF THE RICH.
CHAPTER XIX. OF THE MANNERS OF MEN IN POWER, AND OF SUCH AS PROSPER.
CHAPTER XX: COMMON PLACES OR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING WHAT MAY BE DONE, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, AND WHAT SHALL BE DONE; OR OF FACT POSSIBLE, PAST AND FUTURE. ALSO OF GREAT AND LITTLE.
CHAPTER XXI. OF EXAMPLE, SIMILITUDE, AND FABLES.
CHAPTER XXII. OF A SENTENCE.
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.
CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES OSTENSIVE.
CHAPTER XXV. OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES THAT LEAD TO IMPOSSIBILITY.
CHAPTER XXVI. OF THE PLACES OF SEEMING ENTHYMEMES.
CHAPTER XXVII. OF THE WAYS TO ANSWER THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ADVERSARY.
CHAPTER XXVIII. AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT ENTHYMEMES.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I. OF THE ORIGINAL OF ELOCUTION AND PRONUNCIATION.
CHAPTER II. OF THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND EPITHETS.
CHAPTER III. OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE AN ORATION FLAT.
CHAPTER IV. OF A SIMILITUDE.

CHAPTER V. OF THE PURITY OF LANGUAGE.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE AMPLITUDE AND TENUITY OF LANGUAGE.
CHAPTER VII. OF THE CONVENIENCE OR DECENCY OF ELOCUTION.
CHAPTER VIII. OF TWO SORTS OF STYLES.
CHAPTER IX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT GRACE AN ORATION, AND MAKE IT DELIGHTFUL.
CHAPTER X. IN WHAT MANNER AN ORATION IS GRACED BY THE THINGS AFORESAID.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STYLE TO BE USED IN WRITING, AND THE STYLE TO BE USED IN PLEADING.
CHAPTER XII. OF THE PARTS OF AN ORATION, AND THEIR ORDER.
CHAPTER XIII. OF THE PROEM.
CHAPTER XIV. PLACES OF CRIMINATION AND PURGATION.
CHAPTER XV. OF THE NARRATION.
CHAPTER XVI. OF PROOF OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION.
CHAPTER XVII. OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS.
CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE EPILOGUE.

THE ART OF RHETORIC

CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER V.
CHAPTER VI.
CHAPTER VII.
CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.

THE ART OF RHETORIC.

DI, MAJORUM UMBRIS tenuem, et sine pondere terram,

Spirantesque crocos, et in urna perpetuum ver,

Qui præceptorem sancti voluere parentis

Esse loco.

Juvenal, VII. 207-210.

PREFACE

TO THE READER.

ALTHOUGH THESE PIECES may appear fully to express their own real intrinsic value, as bearing the image and inscription of that great man Mr. Hobbes; yet since common usage has rendered a preface to a book as necessary as a porch to a church, and that in all things some ceremonies cannot be avoided, mode and custom in this point is dutifully to be obeyed.

That they are genuine, credible testimony might be produced, did not the peculiar fineness of thought and expression, and a constant undaunted resolution of maintaining his own opinions, sufficiently ascertain their author. Besides which, they are now published from his own true copies; an advantage which some of his works have wanted.

The first of them, being an abridgment containing the most useful part of Aristotle's rhetoric, was written some thirty years since. Mr. Hobbes in his book of Human Nature had already described man, with an exactness almost equal to the original draught of nature; and in his Elements of Law laid down the constitution of government, and shown by what armed reason it is maintained: and having demonstrated in the state of nature the primitive art of fighting to be the only medium whereby men procured their ends, did in this design to show what power in societies has succeeded to reign in its stead, I mean the art of speaking; which by use of common places of probability, and knowledge in the manners and passions of mankind, through the working of belief is able to bring about whatsoever interest.

How necessary this art is to that of politic, is clearly evident from that mighty force whereby the eloquence of the ancient orators captivated the minds of the people. Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his translation the rhetoric of Aristotle, as being the most accomplished work on that subject which the world has yet seen; having been admired in all ages, and in particular highly approved by the father of the Roman eloquence, a very competent judge. To this he thought fit to add some small matter relating to that part which concerns tropes and figures; as also a short discovery of some little tricks of false and deceitful reasoning.

The other piece is a discourse concerning the laws of England, and has been finished many years. Herein he has endeavoured to accommodate the general notions of his politic to the particular constitution of the English monarchy: a design of no small difficulty; wherein to have succeeded deserves much honour; to have perchance miscarried, deserves easy pardon. It has had the good fortune to be much esteemed by the greatest men of the profession of the law, and therefore may be presumed to contain somewhat excellent. However it is not to be expected that all men should submit to his opinions, yet it is hoped none will be offended at the present publishing of these papers; since they will not find here any new fantastic notions, but only such things as have been already asserted with strength of argument by himself and other persons of eminent learning. To the public at least this benefit may accrue, that some able pen may undertake the controversy, being moved with the desire of that reputation which will necessarily attend victory over so considerable an adversary.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I. THAT RHETORIC IS AN ART CONSISTING NOT ONLY IN MOVING THE PASSIONS OF THE JUDGE, BUT CHIEFLY IN PROOFS: AND THAT THIS ART IS PROFITABLE.

WE SEE THAT all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and exsuse: some by chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered; and to discover method is all one with teaching an art. If this art consisted in criminations only, and the skill to stir up the judge's anger, envy, fear, pity, or other affections; a rhetorician in well ordered commonwealths and states, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to shew, and the judge to give sentence on, is this only: It is so, or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the law-maker; who judging of universals and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, it is an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use.

It consisteth therefore chiefly in proofs, which are inferences: and all inferences being syllogisms, a logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain syllogism and an enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism, would make the best rhetorician. For all syllogisms and inferences belong properly to logic, whether they infer truth or probability. And because without this art it would often come to pass that evil men, by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that

are judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long scientifical proofs drawn from the principles through many syllogisms; and therefore had need to be instructed by the rhetorical and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the virtue of well expressing the mind.

CHAPTER II. THE DEFINITION OF RHETORIC.

RHETORIC IS THAT faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer.

Of those things that beget belief, some require not the help of art, as witnesses, evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require art, and are invented by us.

The belief that proceeds from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker, partly from the passions of the hearer; but especially from the proofs of what we allege.

Proofs are, in rhetoric, either examples or enthymemes; as in logic, inductions or syllogisms. For an example is a short induction, and an enthymeme a short syllogism; out of which are left, as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of public business needlessly.

CHAPTER III. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF ORATIONS: AND OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.

IN ALL ORATIONS, the hearer does either hear only, or judge also.

If he hear only, that is one kind of oration, and is called demonstrative.

If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come, or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, there is another kind of oration, and is called deliberative.

If of that which is past, then it is a third kind of oration, called judicial.

So there are three kinds of orations; demonstrative, judicial, and deliberative.

To which belong their proper times. To the demonstrative, the present; to the judicial, the past; and to the deliberative, the time to come.

And their proper offices. To the deliberative, exhortation and dehortation. To the judicial, accusation and defence. And to the demonstrative, praising and dispraising.

And their proper ends. To the deliberative, to prove a thing profitable or unprofitable. To the judicial, just or unjust. To the demonstrative, honourable or dishonourable.

The principles of rhetoric out of which enthymemes are to be drawn, are the common opinions that men have concerning profitable and unprofitable; just and unjust; honourable and dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of orations questionable. For as in logic, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the principles must be all infallible truths: so in rhetoric the principles must be common opinions,

such as the judge is already possessed with. Because the end of rhetoric is victory; which consists in having gotten belief.

And because nothing is profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust, honourable or dishonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible; and because there be degrees of profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust, honourable and dishonourable; an orator must be ready in other principles, namely, of what is done and not done, possible and not possible, to come and not to come, and what is greater and what is lesser, both in general, and particularly applied to the thing in question; as what is more and less, generally; and what is more profitable and less profitable, &c. particularly.

CHAPTER IV. OF THE SUBJECT OF DELIBERATIVES; AND THE ABILITIES THAT ARE REQUIRED OF HIM THAT WILL DELIBERATE OF BUSINESS OF STATE.

IN DELIBERATIVES THERE are to be considered the subject wherein, and the ends whereto, the orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to rhetoric, but for the most part to the politics; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.

Of levying of money. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know beforehand the revenue of the state, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth, and also how great are the necessary charges and expenses of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a man's own experience, partly by relations and accounts in writing.

Of peace and war. Concerning which the counsellor or deliberator ought to know the strength of the commonwealth, how much it both now is, and hereafter may be, and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience and relations at home, and partly by the sight of wars and of their events abroad.

Of the safeguard of the country. Wherein he only is able to give counsel, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the garrisons.

Of provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the state, what commodities they have at home growing, what they must fetch in through need, and what they may carry out through abundance.

Of making laws. To which is necessary so much political or civil philosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of governments, and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several governments in times past by history, and partly by observing the government of the times present in several nations, by travel.

So that to him that will speak in a council of state, there is necessary this; history, sight of wars, travel, knowledge of the revenue, expenses, forces, havens, garrisons, wares, and provisions in the state he lives in, and what is needful for that state either to export or import.

CHAPTER V. OF THE ENDS WHICH THE ORATOR IN DELIBERATIVES PROPOUNDETH, WHEREBY TO EXHORT OR DEHORT.

AN ORATOR, IN exhorting, always propoundeth felicity, or some part of felicity, to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in dehortation, the contrary.

By felicity is meant commonly prosperity with virtue, or a continual content of the life with surety.

And the parts of it are such things as we call good in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

Nobility, which to a state or nation is to have been ancient inhabitants; and to have had most anciently, and in most number, famous generals in the wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a family, which hath yielded most anciently, and in most number, men known to the world for virtue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.

Many and good children. Which is also public and private. Public, when there is much youth in the state endued with virtue; namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity; of the mind, valour and temperance: private, when a man hath many such children, both male and female. The virtues commonly respected in women, are of the body, beauty and stature; of the mind, temperance and housewifery without sordidness.

Riches. Which is money, cattle, lands, house-hold-stuff, with the power to dispose of them.

Glory. Which is the reputation of virtue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.

Honour. Which is the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another man's safety or riches. The parts of honour are sacrifices, monuments, rewards, dedication of places, precedence, sepulchres, statues, public pensions, adorations, presents.

Health. Which is the being free from diseases, with strength to use the body.

Beauty. Which is to different ages different. To youth, strength of body and sweetness of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the wars, and countenance sweet with a mixture of terror. To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a countenance not displeasing.

Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.

Stature. Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion.

Good old age. Which is that which comes late, and with the least trouble.

Many and good friends. Which is to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good.

Prosperity. Which is to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to fortune.

Virtue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the contraries of these.

CHAPTER VI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.

IN DELIBERATIVES, THE principles or elements from whence we draw our proofs, are common opinions concerning good and evil. And these principles are either absolute or comparative. And those that are absolute, are either disputable or indisputable.

The indisputable principles are such as these: Good, is that which we love for itself. And that for which we love somewhat else. And that which all things desire. And that to every man which his reason dictates. And that which when we have, we are well or satisfied. And that which satisfies. And the cause or effect of any of these. And that which preserves any of these. And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the good and reject the evil, is good. And to take the greater good, rather than the less; and the lesser evil rather than the greater. Further, all virtues are good. And pleasure. And all things beautiful. And justice, valour, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other like habits. And health, beauty, strength, &c. And riches. And friends. And honour and glory. And ability to say or do: also towardliness, will, and the like. And whatsoever art or science. And life. And whatsoever is just.

The disputable principles are such as follow:

That is good, whose contrary is evil. And whose contrary is good for our enemies. And whose contrary our enemies are glad of. And of which there cannot be too much. And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed. And that which many desire. And that which is praised. And that which even our enemies and evil men praise. And what good we prefer.

And what we do advise. And that which is possible, is good to undertake. And that which is easy. And that which depends on our own will. And that which is proper for us to do. And what no man else can do. And whatsoever is extraordinary. And what is suitable. And that which wants a little of being at an end. And what we hope to master. And what we are fit for. And what evil men do not. And what we love to do.

CHAPTER VII. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL, COMPARATIVELY.

THE COLOURS OF good comparatively depend, partly, upon the following definitions of comparatives.

More, is so much and somewhat besides.

Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.

Greater and more in number are said only comparatively to less and fewer in number.

Great and little, many and few, are taken comparatively to the most of the same kind. So that great and many, is that which exceeds; little and few, is that which is exceeded by, the most of the same kind.

Partly, from the precedent definitions of good absolutely.

Common opinions concerning good comparatively, then are these.

Greater good is many than fewer, or one of those many.

And greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind. And greater is that good than another good, whose kind is greater than another's kind. And greater is that from which another good follows, than the good which follows. And of two which exceed a third, greater is that which exceeds it most. And that which causes the greater good. And that which proceeds from a greater good. And greater is that which is chosen for itself, than that which is chosen for somewhat else. And the end greater than that which is not the end. And that which less needs other things, than that which more. And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another. And the beginning, than not the beginning.

(Seeing the beginning is a greater good or evil, than that which is not the beginning; and the end, than that which is not the end; one may argue from this colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the actor more to blame than the adviser; and against Callistratus, the adviser more than the actor.)

And the cause, than not the cause. And that which hath a greater beginning or cause. And the beginning or cause of a greater good or evil. And that which is scarce, greater than that which is plentiful; because harder to get. And that which is plentiful, than that which is scarce; because oftener in use. And that which is easy, than that which is hard. And that whose contrary is greater. And that whose want is greater. And virtue than not virtue, a greater good. Vice than not vice, a greater evil. And greater good or evil is that, the effects whereof are more honourable or more shameful. And the effects of greater virtues or vices. And the excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater good. And those things which may with more honour be desired. And the desire of better things. And those things whereof the knowledge is better. And the knowledge of better things. And that which wise men prefer. And that which is in better men. And that which better men choose. And that which is more, than that which is less delightful. And that which is more, than that which is less honourable. And that which we would have for ourselves and friends, a greater good; and the contrary, a greater evil. And that which is lasting, than that which is not lasting. And that which is firm, than that which is not firm. And what many desire, than what few. And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be greater, is greater. And common than not common. And not common than common. And what is more laudable. And that which is more honoured, a greater good. And that which is more punished, a greater evil. And both good and evil divided than undivided, appear greater. And compounded than simple, appear greater. And that which is done with opportunity, age,

place, time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise. And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto. And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less. And that which is nearest to the end designed. And that which is good or evil to one's self, than that which is simply so. And possible, than not possible. And that which comes toward the end of our life. And that which we do really, than that which we do for show. And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be. And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater good. And that which serves us in great necessity. And that which is joined with less trouble. And that which is joined with more delight. And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater. And that which having, we are more sensible of. And in every thing, that which we most esteem.

CHAPTER VIII. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS.

BECAUSE HORTATION AND dehortation concern the commonwealth, and are drawn from the elements of good and evil; as we have spoken of them already in the abstract, so we must speak of them also in the concrete, that is, of what is good or evil to each sort of commonwealth in special.

The government of a commonwealth is either democracy, or aristocracy, or oligarchy, or monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right are preferred to the highest magistracy by lot.

Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest magistrate is chosen out of those that have had the best education, according to what the laws prescribe for best.

Oligarchy is that, where the highest magistrate is chosen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the government of all; which government, if he limit it by law, is called kingdom; if by his own will, tyranny.

The end of democracy, or the people's government, is liberty.

The end of oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern.

The end of aristocracy, is good laws and good ordering of the city.

The end of monarchy or kings, is the safety of the people and conservation of his own authority.

Good therefore in each sort of government, is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to persuade or dissuade in matter of state. Their manners may be known by their designs; and their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the politics.

CHAPTER IX. OF THE COLOURS OF HONOURABLE AND DISHONOURABLE.

IN A DEMONSTRATIVE oration, the subject whereof is praise or dispraise, the proofs are to be drawn from the elements of honourable and dishonourable.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief; which is from the manners of the speaker. For praise, whether it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same principles; which are these:

Honourable, is that which we love for itself, and is withal laudable; and that good, which pleaseth us only because it is good; and virtue.

Virtue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is good; and the faculty of doing many and great things well.

The kinds of it are these:

Justice, which is a virtue whereby every man obtains what by law is his.

Fortitude, which is a virtue by which a man carries himself honourably and according to the laws, in time of danger.

Temperance, which is a virtue whereby a man governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the law.

Liberality, which is a virtue by which we benefit others in matter of money.

Magnanimity, which is a virtue by which a man is apt to do great benefits.

Magnificence, which is a virtue by which a man is apt to be at great cost.

Prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any good leading to felicity.

And honourable are the causes and effects of things honourable. And the works of virtue. And the signs of virtue. And those actions the reward whereof is honour. And the reward whereof is rather honour than money. And that which we do not for our sakes. And what we do for our country's good, neglecting our own. And those things are honourable which, good of themselves, are not so to the owner. And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living. And what we do for other men, especially for benefactors. And bestowing of benefits. And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of. And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of adversary.

And of the more honourable and better men, the virtues are more honourable. And more honourable are the virtues that tend to other men's benefit, than those which tend to one's own.

And honourable are those things which are just. And revenge is honourable. And victory. And honour. And monuments. And those things which happen not to the living. And things that excel. And what none can do but we. And possessions we reap no profit by. And those things which are had in honour, particularly in several places. And the signs of praise. And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanic.

And that which seems honourable; namely, such as follow: Vices confining upon virtue. And the extremes of virtues. And what the auditors think honourable. And that which is in estimation. And that which is done according to custom.

Besides, in a demonstrative oration, the orator must show that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly and willingly. And he does so, who does the same often.

Praise is speech, declaring the magnitude of a virtue, action, or work. But to praise the work from the virtue of the worker, is a circular proof.

To magnify and to praise, differ in themselves as felicity and virtue. For praise declares a man's virtue; and magnifying declares his felicity.

Praise is a kind of inverted precept. For to say, "Do it because it is good," is a precept; but to say, "He is good because he did it," is praise. An orator in praising, must also use the forms of amplification; such as these: He was the first that did it. The only man that did it. The special man that did it. He did it with disadvantage of time. He did it with little help. He was the cause that the law ordained rewards and honours for such actions.

Further, he that will praise a man, must compare him with others, and his actions with the actions of others, especially with such as are renowned.

And amplification is more proper to a demonstrative oration, than to any other. For here the actions are confessed; and the orator's part is only this, to contribute unto them magnitude and lustre.

CHAPTER X. OF ACCUSATION AND DEFENCE, WITH THE DEFINITION OF INJURY.

IN A JUDICIAL oration, which consists in accusation and defence, the thing to be proved is, that injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn are these three: —

1. The causes that move to injury.
2. The persons apt to do injury.
3. The persons obnoxious or apt to suffer injury.

An injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion.

The causes of voluntary actions are intemperance, and a vicious disposition concerning things desirable. As the covetous man does against the law out of an intemperate desire of money.

All actions proceed either from the doer's disposition, or not. Those that proceed not from the doer's disposition, are such as he does by chance, by compulsion, or by natural necessity. Those that proceed from the doer's disposition, are such as he does by custom, or upon premeditation, or in anger, or out of intemperance.

By chance are said to be done those things, whereof neither the cause nor the scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor always, nor most commonly after the same manner.

By nature are said to be done those things, the causes whereof are in the doer; and are done orderly, and always or for the most part after the same manner.

By compulsion are done those things, which are against the appetite and ordination of the doer.

By custom those actions are said to be done, the cause whereof is this, that the doer has done them often.

Upon premeditation are said to be done those things, which are done for profit, as the end or the way to the end.

In anger are said to be done those things, which are done with a purpose of revenge.

Out of intemperance are said to be done those things, which are delightful.

In sum, every voluntary action tends either to profit or pleasure.

The colours of profitable, are already set down. The colours of that which is pleasing, follow next.

CHAPTER XI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING PLEASURE.

PLEASURE IS A sudden and sensible motion of the soul, towards that which is natural. Grief is the contrary.

Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion. And to return to one's own nature. And customs. And those things that are not violent.

Unpleasant are those things which proceed from necessity, as cares, study, contentions. The contrary whereof, ease, remission from labour and care, also play, rest, sleep; are pleasant.

Pleasant also is that to which we have an appetite. Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual; as thirst, hunger, and lust. Also those things to which we have an appetite upon persuasion and reason. And those things we remember, whether they pleased or displeased then when they were present. And the things we hope for. And anger. And to be in love. And revenge. And victory: therefore also contentious games; as tables, chess, dice, tennis, &c.; and hunting; and suits in law. And honour and reputation amongst men in honour and reputation. And to love. And to be beloved and respected. And to be admired. And to be flattered. And a flatterer: for he seems both to love and admire. And the same thing often. And change or variety. And what we return to afresh. And to learn. And to admire. And to do good. And to receive good. And to help up again one that is fallen. And to finish that which is unperfect. And imitation; and therefore the art of painting; and the art of carving images; and the art of poetry; and pictures

and statues. And other men's dangers, so they be near. And to have escaped hardly.

And things of a kind please one another. And every one himself. And one's own pleases him. And to bear sway. And to be thought wise. And to dwell upon that which he is good at. And ridiculous actions, sayings, and persons.

CHAPTER XII. PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT DO IT: OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING THE APTITUDE OF PERSONS TO DO INJURY.

OF THE CAUSES which move to injury, namely, profit and pleasure, has been already spoken (chap. vi, vii, xi). It follows next, to speak of the persons that are apt to do injury.

The doers of injury are: such as think they can do it. And such as think to be undiscovered, when they have done it. And such as think, though they be discovered, they shall not be called in question for it. And such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their mulct will be less than their gain, which either themselves or their friends receive by the injury.

Able to do injury are: such as are eloquent. And such as are practised in business. And such as have skill in process. And such as have many friends. And rich men. And such as have rich friends, or rich servants, or rich partners.

Undiscovered when they have done it, are such as are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused: as feeble men, slaughter; poor and not beautiful men, adultery. And such as one would think could not chuse but be discovered. And such as do injuries, whereof there hath been no example. And such as have none or many enemies. And such as can easily conceal what they do. And such as have somebody to transfer the fault upon.

They that do injury openly are: such, whose friends have been injured. And such as have the judges for friends. And such as can escape their trial

at law. And such as can put off their trial. And such as can corrupt the judges. And such as can avoid the payment of their fine. And such as can defer the payment. And such as cannot pay at all. And such as by the injury get manifestly much, and presently; when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come. And such as get by the injury money, by the penalty shame only. And such on the contrary as get honour by the injury, and suffer the mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like. And such as have often escaped or been undiscovered. And such as have often attempted in vain. And such as consider present pleasure more than pain to come, and so intemperate men are apt to do injury. And such as consider pleasure to come more than present pain, and so temperate men are apt to do injury. And such as may seem to have done it by fortune, nature, necessity, or custom; and by error, rather than by injustice. And such as have means to get pardon. And such as want necessaries, as poor men; or unnecessaries, as rich men. And such as are of very good or very bad reputation.

CHAPTER XIII. PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT SUFFER, AND FROM THE MATTER OF THE INJURY.

OF THOSE THAT do injury, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken. Now of the persons that suffer, and of the matter wherein they suffer, the common opinions are these.

Persons obnoxious to injury are: such as have the things that we want, either as necessary, or as delightful. And such as are far from us. And such as are at hand. And such as are unwary and credulous. And such as are lazy. And such as are modest. And such as have swallowed many injuries. And such as we have injured often before; and such as never before. And such as are in our danger. And such as are ill-beloved generally. And such as are envied. And our friends; and our enemies. And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or action. And such as shall be losers by going to law: as strangers and workmen. And such as have done the injuries they suffer. And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do. And such as, by doing them an injury, we shall gratify our friends or superiors. And such whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse. And such as another would do the injury to, if we should not. And such as by injuring, we get greater means of doing good.

The matters wherein men are obnoxious to injury are: those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly. And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered. And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered. And those things wherein prosecution of injury, may be thought a love of contention.

CHAPTER XIV. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO BE KNOWN FOR THE DEFINITION OF JUST AND UNJUST.

WHEN THE FACT is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be just or unjust. For the definition of just and unjust, we must know what law is; that is, what the law of nature, what the law of nations, what the law civil, what written law, and what unwritten law is: and what persons, that is, what a public person or the city is, and what a private person or citizen is.

Unjust, in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the law of nature.

Unjust, in the opinion of all men of those nations which traffic and come together, is that which is contrary to the law common to those nations.

Unjust, only in one commonwealth, is that which is contrary to the law civil, or law of that commonwealth.

He that is accused to have done anything against the public, or a private person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.

And because the defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery; it is necessary to know the definitions of theft, adultery, and all other crimes.

What facts are contrary to the written laws, may be known by the laws themselves.

Besides written laws, whatsoever is just proceeds from equity or goodness.

From goodness proceeds, that which we are praised or honoured for.

From equity proceed those actions, which though the written law command not, yet, being interpreted reasonably and supplied, seems to require at our hands.

Actions of equity are such as these: — Not too rigorously to punish errors, mischances, or injuries. To pardon the faults that adhere to mankind. And not to consider the law, so much as the law maker's mind; and not the words, so much as the meaning of the law. And not to regard so much the fact, as the intention of the doer; nor part of the fact, but the whole; nor what the doer is, but what he has been always or for the most part. And to remember better the good received, than the ill. And to endure injuries patiently. And to submit rather to the sentence of a judge, than of the sword. And to the sentence of an arbitrator, rather than of a judge.

CHAPTER XV. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING INJURIES, COMPARATIVELY.

COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING injuries comparatively, are such as these.

Greater is the injury, which proceedeth from greater iniquity. And from which proceedeth greater damage. And of which there is no revenge. And for which there is no remedy. And by occasion of which he that hath received the injury hath done some mischief to himself.

He does greater injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few; and he that does it often.

Greater injury is that, against which laws and penalties were first made. And that, which is more brutal or more approaching to the actions of beasts. And that, which is done upon more premeditation. And by which more laws are broken. And which is done in the place of execution. And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the injury. And which is committed against well deservers. And which is committed against the unwritten law; because good men should observe the law for justice, and not for fear of punishment. And which is committed against the written law; because he that will do injury, neglecting the penalty set down in the written law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten law, where there is no penalty at all.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PROOFS INARTIFICIAL.

OF ARTIFICIAL PROOFS we have already spoken.

Inartificial proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

Laws. And those are civil or written law: the law or custom of nations; and the universal law of nature.

Witnesses. And those are such as concern matter, and such as concern manners. Also they be ancient or present.

Evidences or writings.

Question or torture.

Oaths. And those be either given or taken, or both, or neither.

For laws, we use them thus: when the written law makes against us, we appeal to the law of nature, alleging that to be greatest justice, which is greatest equity. That the law of nature is immutable, the written law mutable. That the written law is but seeming justice; the law of nature very justice; and justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be. That the judge ought to discern between true and adulterate justice. That they are better men that obey unwritten than written laws. That the law against us does contradict some other law. And when the law has a double interpretation, that is the true one which makes for us. And that the cause of the law being abolished, the law is no more of validity.

But when the written law makes for us, and equity for the adversary, we must allege: That a man may use equity, not as a liberty to judge against the law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the law. That men seek not equity because it is good simply, but because good

for them. That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the law. That as in other arts, and namely, in physic, fallacies are pernicious; so in a common-wealth it is pernicious to use pretexts against the law. And that in common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the laws is prohibited.

For witnesses, we must use them thus. When we have them not, we must stand for presumptions, and say: That in equity, sentence ought to be given according to the most probability. That presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed. That they cannot lie.

When we have witnesses against him that has them not, we must say: That presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished. That if presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous.

For writings, when they favour us, we must say: That writings are private and particular laws; and he that takes away the use of evidences, abolisheth the law. That since contracts and negociations pass by writings, he that bars their use dissolves human society.

Against them, if they favour the adversary, we may say: That since laws do not bind that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings; and that the judge being to dispense justice, ought rather to consider what is just than what is in the writing. That writings may be gotten by fraud or force, but justice by neither. That the writing is repugnant to some law, civil or natural; or to justice; or to honesty. That it is repugnant to some other writing, before or after. That it crosses some commodity of the judge; which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.

For the torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say: That it is the only testimony that is certain. But if it make for the adversary, we may say: That men enforced by torture, speak as well that which is false as that which is true. That they, who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false, to be delivered from pain.

For oaths, he that will not put his adversary to his oath, may allege: That he makes no scruple to be forsworn. That by swearing he will carry the cause, which, not swearing, he must lose. That he had rather trust his cause in the hands of the judge, than of the adversary.

He that refuseth to take the oath may say: That the matter is not worth so much. That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carried his cause. That to try it by swearing, for a religious man against an irreligious is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combat.

He that is willing to take the oath, may pretend: That he had rather trust himself, than his adversary; and that it is equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the oath. That it is his duty to take the oath, since he has required to have sworn judges.

He that offers the oath, may pretend: That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods. That he makes his adversary himself judge. That it were absurd for him not to swear, that has required the judges to be sworn.

And of these are to be compounded the forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the oath; or take and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.

But if one have sworn contrary to a former oath, he may pretend: That he was forced: that he was deceived; and that neither of these is perjury, since perjury is voluntary.

But if the adversary do so, he may say: That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth human society. And (turning to the judge): What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn that judge our cause; when we will not stand to that we swear ourselves?

And so much for proofs inartificial.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I. THE INTRODUCTION.

OF BELIEF PROCEEDING from our invention, that part which consisteth in proof is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker, the other from the passions of the hearer.

The principles, colours, or common opinions upon which a man's belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had, partly out of that which hath before been said of virtue (Book i. cha); partly out of those things which shall be said by-and-by concerning the passions. For a man is believed, either for his prudence or for his probity, which are virtues; or for good will, of which among the passions.

The principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several passions in order.

In every one of which, three things are to be considered.

1. First, how men are affected.
2. Secondly, towards whom.
3. Thirdly, for what.

CHAPTER II. OF ANGER.

ANGER IS DESIRE of revenge, joined with grief, for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be, neglected.

The object of anger is always some particular or individual thing.

In anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.

To neglect, is to esteem little or nothing; and of three kinds: 1 Contempt, 2 Crossing, 3 Contumely.

Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.

Crossing, is the hinderance of another man's will without design to profit himself.

Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.

The common opinions concerning anger are therefore such as follow. They are easily angry, that think they are neglected. That think they excel others; as the rich with the poor; the noble with the obscure,&c. And such as think they deserve well. And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted; and therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that, standing by, are not moved by their wants. And such as having expected good, find evil.

Those that men are angry with, are: such as mock, deride, or jest at them. And such as shew any kind of contumely towards them. And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon; and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein. And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends. And such as have honoured us, if

they continue not. And such as requite not our courtesy. And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors. And our friends, if they have said or done us evil, or not good. And such as give not ear to our entreaty. And such as are joyful or calm in our distress. And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled. And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces. And such as neglect us in the presence of our competitors, of those we admire, of those we would have admire us, of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us. And such as should help us, and neglect it. And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest. And such as forget us, or our names.

An orator therefore must so frame his judge or auditor by his oration, as to make him apt to anger: and then make his adversary appear such as men use to be angry withal.

CHAPTER III. OF RECONCILING, OR PACIFYING ANGER.

RECONCILIATION IS THE appeasing of anger.

Those to whom men are easily reconciled, are: such as have not offended out of neglect. And such as have done it against their will. And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done. And such as have done as much to themselves. And such as confess and repent. And such as are humbled. And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously. And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now hurt. And such as sue to them for any thing. And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition. And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those whom men are usually angry withal. And such as they fear or reverence. And such as reverence them. And such as have offended their anger.

Reconcileable are: such as are contrarily affected to those, whom we have said before to be easily angry. And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and, in sum, all that have no cause of grief. And such as have given their anger time.

Men lay down their anger for these causes. Because they have gotten the victory. Because the offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict. Because they have been revenged of another. Because they think they suffer justly. And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury. And because the offender is dead.

Whosoever therefore would assuage the anger of his auditor, must make himself appear such as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his

auditor such opinions as make him reconcileable.

CHAPTER IV. OF LOVE AND FRIENDS.

TO LOVE IS to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.

A friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.

Friends one to another, are they that naturally love one another.

A friend therefore is he; that rejoiceth at another's good. And that grieves at his hurt. And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good or hurt. And that is enemy or friend to the same man.

We love them: that have done good to us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season. That are our friends' friends. That are our enemies' enemies. That are liberal. That are valiant. That are just. And that we would have love us. And good companions. And such as can abide jests. And such as break jests. And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in ourselves. And such as are neat. And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits. And such as quickly forget injuries. And such as least observe our errors. And such as are not of ill tongue. And those that are ignorant of our vices. And such as cross us not when we are busy or angry. And such as are officious towards us. And those that are like us. And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another. And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied. And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such as the world, rather than their own consciences, condemns. And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults. And such as we would have honour us, and not envy, but imitate us. And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to ourselves.

And such as continue their friendship to the dead. And such as speak their mind. And such as are not terrible. And such as we may rely on.

The several kinds of friendship, are society, familiarity, consanguinity, affinity &c.

The things that beget love, are, the bestowing of benefits, gratis; unasked; privately.

CHAPTER V. OF ENMITY AND HATRED.

THE COLOURS OR common opinions concerning hatred, are to be taken from the contrary of those which concern love and friendship.

Hatred differs from anger in this; that anger regards only what is done to oneself; but hatred not. And in this, that anger regards particulars only; the other, universals also. And in this, that anger is curable; hatred not. And in this, that anger seeks the vexation, hatred the damage, of one's adversary. That with anger there is always joined grief; with hatred, not always. That anger may at length be satiated; but hatred never.

Hence it appears how the judge or auditor may be made friend or enemy to us, and how our adversary may be made appear friend or enemy to the judge; and how we may answer to our adversary, that would make us appear enemies to him.

CHAPTER VI. OF FEAR.

FEAR IS A trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy. Danger is the nearness of the evil feared.

The things to be feared are: such as have power to hurt. And the signs of will to do us hurt; as anger and hatred of powerful men. And injustice joined with power. And valour provoked, joined with power. And the fear of powerful men.

The men that are to be feared, are: such as know our faults. And such as can do us injury. And such as think they are injured by us. And such as have done us injury. And our competitors in such things as cannot satisfy both. And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are. And such as have destroyed greater men than we are. And such as use to invade their inferiors. And men not passionate, but dissemblers and crafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be feared, are: such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our adversary's pleasure. And such as admit either none, or not easy help. And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.

They that fear not are: such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these. And therefore men fear little in prosperity. And men fear little, that think they have suffered already.

An orator therefore that would put fear into the auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer and have suffered from those, and at those times, they least thought.

CHAPTER VII. OF ASSURANCE.

ASSURANCE IS HOPE, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.

The things therefore that beget assurance are: the remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries. And the facility of great or many helps or remedies. And neither to have done, nor received injury. And to have no competitors, or not great ones; or if great ones, at least friends, such as we have obliged, or are obliged to. And that the danger is extended to more or greater than us.

Assured or confident, are: they that have oft escaped danger. And they, to whom most things have succeeded well. And they, that see their equals or inferiors not afraid. And they, that have wherewith to make themselves feared; as wealth, strength, &c. And such as have done others no wrong. And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty. And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.

CHAPTER VIII. OF SHAME.

SHAME IS A perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a man's own, or his friends' reputation.

The things therefore which men are ashamed of, are those actions which proceed from vice: as to throw away one's arms, to run away, signs of cowardliness. To deny that which is committed to one's trust, a sign of injustice. To have lain with whom, where, and when, we ought not, signs of intemperance. To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to re-demand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise as one may be thought to ask; signs of wretchedness. To praise one to his face; to praise his virtues too much, and colour his vices; signs of flattery. To be unable to endure such labours as men endure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he; signs of effeminacy. To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholden to him; signs of pusillanimity. To speak and promise much of one's self, more than is due; signs of arrogance. To want those things which one's equals, all or most of them, have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of. And to suffer things ignominious; as to serve about another's person, or to be employed in his base actions.

In actions of intemperance, whether willingly or unwillingly committed, there is shame; in actions of force, only when they are done unwillingly.

The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as we respect: namely, those that admire us. And those whom we desire should admire us. And those whom we admire. Those that contend with us for honour. Those whose opinion we contemn not. And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence: of old and well bred men. Of those we are always to live with. Of those that are not guilty of the same fault. Of those that do not easily pardon. And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, backbiters, scoffers, comic poets. And of those before whom we have had always good success. And of those who never asked anything of us before. And of such as desire our friendship. And of our familiars, that know none of our crimes. And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.

But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not ashamed. Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence of those whom we reverence. And of those who are concerned in our own, or ancestors', or kinsfolk's, actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful. And of their rivals. And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.

The common opinions concerning impudence, are taken from the contrary of these.

CHAPTER IX. OF GRACE OR FAVOUR.

GRACE IS THAT virtue, by which a man is said to do a good turn or to do service to a man in need, not for his own, but for his cause to whom he does it.

Great grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard or difficult things that are conferred; or when the time is seasonable; or when he that confers the favour, is the only or first man that did it.

Need is a desire, joined with grief, for the absence of the thing desired. Grace therefore it is not, if it be done to one that needs not. Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a grace or favour, must show that he needeth it to whom it was done.

Grace it is not, which is done by chance. Nor which is done by necessity. Nor which has been requited. Nor that which is done to one's enemy. Nor that which is a trifle. Nor that which is nought, if the giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may go over the predicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a grace for being this, or for being so much, or for being such, or for being now, &c.

CHAPTER X. OF PITY OR COMPASSION.

PITY IS A perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself or his.

And because it appertains to pity to think that he, or his, may fall into the misery he pities in others; it follows that they be most compassionate: who have passed through misery. And old men. And weak men. And timorous men. And learned men. And such as have parents, wife and children. And such as think there be honest men.

And that they are less compassionate: who are in great despair. Who are in great prosperity. And they that are angry; for they consider not. And they that are very confident; for they also consider not. And they that are in the act of contumely; for neither do these consider. And they that are astonished with fear. And they that think no man honest.

The things to be pitied are: such as grieve, and withal hurt. Such as destroy. And calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c. And evil that arrives where good is expected. And after extreme evil, a little good. And through a man's life to have no good offer itself; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be pitied are: such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own. And such as be of our own years. Such as are like us in manners. Such as are of the same, or like stock. And our equals in dignity. Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past. And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.

CHAPTER XI. OF INDIGNATION.

OPPOSITE IN A manner to pity in good men, is indignation; which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy.

With indignation there is always joined a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy; as pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.

In wicked men the opposite of pity is envy; as also the companion thereof, delight in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called ἐπιχαιρεκακία. But of these in the next chapter.

Men conceive indignation against others, not for their virtues, as justice, &c.; for these make men worthy; and in indignation we think men unworthy: but for those goods which men indued with virtue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of. And for newly-gotten power and riches, rather than for ancient; and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by riches, command. The reason why we conceive greater indignation against new than ancient riches, is that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs, but the ancient seem to have but their own: for with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by right. And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses. And for the comparison of the inferior in the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more valiant; or whether absolutely superior, as when a good scholar is compared with a good man.

Apt to indignation are: they that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them. And they that are good. And they that are

ambitious. And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.

Least apt to indignation are, such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious nature.

Who they are, that rejoice or grieve not at the adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.

Whoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the judge, he must make him apt to indignation; and shew that his adversary is unworthy of the good, and worthy of the evil which happens to him.

CHAPTER XII. OF ENVY.

ENVY IS GRIEF for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as ourselves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.

They are apt to envy: that are within a little of the highest. And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially wisdom or good fortune. And such as would be thought wise. And such as catch at glory in every action. And men of poor spirits; for every thing appears great to them.

The things which men envy in others are: such as bring glory. And goods of fortune. And such things as we desire for ourselves. And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us, a little.

Obnoxious to envy are: men of our own time, of our own country, of our own age, and competitors of our glory; and therefore, those whom we strive with for honour. And those that covet the same things that we do. And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all. And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us. And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore; so old and decayed men envy the young and lusty. And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be derived the principles concerning joy for other men's hurt.

He therefore that would not have his enemy prevail, when he craves pity or other favour, must dispose the judge to envy; and make his adversary

appear such as are above described to be subject to the envy of others.

CHAPTER XIII. OF EMULATION.

EMULATION IS GRIEF arising from that our equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also. No man therefore emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.

Apt to emulate are: such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have. And young and magnanimous men. And such as already possess the goods for which men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having. And those that are esteemed worthy by others. And those whose ancestors, kindred, familiars, nation, city, have been eminent for some good, do emulate others for that good.

Objects of emulation are, for things; virtues. And things whereby we may profit others. And things whereby we may please others.

For persons: they that possess such things. And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto. And they whose praises fly abroad.

The contrary of emulation is contempt. And they that emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, contemn such as have them not. And thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which men honour, are nevertheless contemned.

CHAPTER XIV. OF THE MANNERS OF YOUTH.

OF PASSIONS WE have already spoken. We are next to speak of manners.

Manners are distinguished by passions, habits, ages, and fortunes.

What kind of manners proceed from passions, and from virtues and vices, which are habits, hath been already shewed. There remains to be spoken of the manners that are peculiar to several ages and fortunes.

The ages are youth, middle-age, old age. And first of youth.

Young men are: violent in their desires. Prompt to execute their desires. Incontinent. Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before. Longing mightily, and soon satisfied. Apt to anger, and in their anger violent; and ready to execute their anger with their hands. Lovers of honour and of victory more than money, as having not been yet in want. Well-natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice. Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other ages have by wine; youth being a kind of natural drunkenness; besides, hope is of the time to come, whereof youth hath much, but of the time past little. Credulous, because not yet often deceived. Easily deceived, because full of hope. Valiant, because apt to anger and full of hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off fear. Bashful, because they estimate the honour of actions by the precepts of the law. Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life. And lovers of honour more than of profit, because they live more by custom than by reason; and by reason we acquire profit, but virtue by custom. Lovers of their friends and companions. Apt to err in the excess rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for

they overdo every thing: they love too much and hate too much; because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered. Doers of injury, rather for contumely than for damage. Merciful, because, measuring others by their own innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of pity. And lovers of mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.

Jesting is witty contumely.

CHAPTER XV. OF THE MANNERS OF OLD MEN.

THE MANNERS OF old men are in a manner the contraries of those of youth. They determine nothing. They do everything less vehemently than is fit. They never say, they know; but to everything they say, perhaps and peradventure; which comes to pass from that, having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived. They are peevish, because they interpret everything to the worst. And suspicious through incredulity, and incredulous by reason of their experience. They love and hate, as if they meant to continue in neither. Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life. And covetous, as knowing how easy it is to lose, and how hard to get. And timorous, as having been cooled by years. And greedy of life; for good things seem greater by the want of them. And lovers of themselves, out of pusillanimity. And seek profit more than honour, because they love themselves; and profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for one's self. And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming. And hope little; knowing by experience that many times good counsel has been followed with ill event; and because also they be timorous. And live by memory rather than hope; for memory is of the time past, whereof old men have good store. And are full of talk, because they delight in their memory. And vehement in their anger, but not stout enough to execute it. They have weak or no desires, and thence seem temperate. They are slaves to gain. And live more by reason than custom; because reason leads to profit, as custom to that which is honourable. And do injury to endamage, and not in contumely. And are merciful by compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves; which is a kind of infirmity,

and not humanity, as in young men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer evil. And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil because of their infirmity.

Seeing then every man loves such men and their discourses which are most agreeable to their own manners; it is not hard to collect, how the orator and his oration may be made acceptable to the hearer, whether young or old.

CHAPTER XVI. OF THE MANNERS OF MIDDLE-AGED MEN.

THE MANNERS OF middle-aged men, are between those of youth and old men. And therefore they neither dare, nor fear too much; but both as is fit. They neither believe all, nor reject all; but judge. They seek not only what is honourable, nor only what is profitable; but both. They are neither covetous, nor prodigal; but in the mean. They are neither easily angry, nor yet stupid; but between both. They are valiant and withal temperate.

And in general, whatsoever is divided in youth and old men, is compounded in middle-age. And whereof the excess or defect is in youth or old men, the mediocrity is in those of middle-age.

Middle-age for the body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the mind, the nine-and-fortieth, or thereabouts.

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE MANNERS OF THE NOBILITY.

OF MANNERS THAT proceed from the several ages we have already spoken. We are next to speak of those that rise from several fortunes.

The manners of the nobility are: to be ambitious. To undervalue their ancestors' equals; for the goods of fortune seem the more precious for their antiquity.

Nobility is the virtue of a stock. And generosity, is not to degenerate from the virtue of his stock. For as in plants, so in the races of men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point; and change, viz. subtile wits into madness, and staid wits into stupidity and blockishness.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE MANNERS OF THE RICH.

RICH MEN ARE contumelious, and proud; this they have from their riches; for seeing everything may be had for money, having money they think they have all that is good. And effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their lust. And boasters of their wealth, and speak in high terms foolishly; for men willingly talk of what they love and admire, and think others affect the same that they do; and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the rich. And think themselves worthy to command, having that by which men attain command. And in general they have the manners of fortunate fools. They do injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through incontinence.

There is a difference between new and ancient riches. For they that are newly come to wealth, have the same faults in a greater degree; for new riches are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of riches.

CHAPTER XIX. OF THE MANNERS OF MEN IN POWER, AND OF SUCH AS PROSPER.

THE MANNERS OF men in power, are the same, or better than those of the rich. They have a greater sense of honour than the rich, and their manners are more manly. They are more industrious than the rich, for power is sustained by industry. They are grave, but without austereness; for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely gravity, which the Greeks call σεμνότης. When they do injuries, they do great ones.

The manners of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power; for to some of these all prosperity appertains.

Prosperity in children, and goods of the body, make men desire to exceed others in the goods of fortune.

Men that prosper have this ill; to be more proud and inconsiderate than others. And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their industry.

The manners of poor men, obscure men, men without power, and men in adversity, may be collected from the contrary of what has been said.

CHAPTER XX: COMMON PLACES OR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING WHAT MAY BE DONE, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, AND WHAT SHALL BE DONE; OR OF FACT POSSIBLE, PAST AND FUTURE. ALSO OF GREAT AND LITTLE.

WE HAVE HITHERTO set down such principles as are peculiar to several kinds of orations. Now we are to speak of such places as are common to them all; as these: possible, done, or past, future, great, small.

Possible is that: the contrary whereof is possible. And the like whereof is possible. And than which some harder thing is possible. And the beginning whereof is possible. And the end whereof is possible. And the usual consequent whereof is possible. And whatsoever we desire. And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compel or persuade. And part whereof is possible. And part of the whole that is possible. And the general, if a particular. And a particular, if the general. And of relatives, if one, the other. And that which without art and industry is possible, is much more so with art and industry. And that which is possible to worse, weaker, and more unskilful men, is much more so to better, stronger, and more skilful.

The principles concerning impossible are the contraries of these.

That has been done: than which a harder thing has been done. And the consequent whereof has been done. And that which being possible, he had a will to do, and nothing hindered. And that which was possible to him in his anger. And that which he longed to do. And that which was before upon the

point of doing. And whose antecedent has been done; or that for which it uses to be done. And if that for whose cause we do this, then this.

The principles concerning not done are the contraries of these.

That shall be done: which some man can, and means to do. And which some man can, and desires to do. And which is in the way, and upon the point to be done. And the antecedents whereof are past. And the motive whereof is past.

Of great and small, more and less, see Chapter vii. of Book i.

CHAPTER XXI. OF EXAMPLE, SIMILITUDE, AND FABLES.

OF THE PRINCIPLES, both general and special, from whence proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken. Now follow the proofs themselves, which are examples or enthymemes.

An example, is either an example properly so called, as some action past; or a similitude, which also is called a parable; or a fable, which contains some action feigned.

An example, properly so called, is this: Darius came not into Greece till he had first subdued Egypt; Xerxes also conquered Egypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont; we ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Egypt.

A similitude, or parable, is such as followeth: They who choose their magistrates by lot, are like them that choose for their champions those on whom the lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their pilot, not him that hath skill, but him whose name is drawn out of the urn.

A fable is in this manner: The horse desiring to drive out the stag from his common pasture, took a man to assist him; and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the man. So you of Himera, having, in hope to be revenged of your enemies, given unto Phalaris sovereign authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you be come his slaves presently, past recovery.

To find out examples, that is, actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power. But to find fables and similitudes, is easier; because, by conversing in philosophy, a man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.

Examples, similitudes, and fables, where enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an oration for inductions; otherwise are to be alleged after enthymemes, for testimonies.

CHAPTER XXII. OF A SENTENCE.

A SENTENCE IS an universal proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided in the actions or passions of the common life. As, A wise man will not suffer his children to be over-learned. And is to an enthymeme in rhetoric, as any proposition is to a syllogism in logic. And therefore a sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a conclusion; and both together make an enthymeme. As for example: To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that is wise will not suffer his children to be over-learned.

Of sentences there be four sorts. For they either require proofs or not, that is, are manifest or not.

Such as are manifest, are either so as soon as they are uttered; as, Health is a great good. Or as soon as they are considered; as, Men use to hate whom they have hurt.

Such as are not manifest, are either conclusions of enthymemes; as, He that is wise will not suffer his children, &c. Or else are enthymematical; that is, have in themselves the force of an enthymeme; as Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.

A sentence not manifest, ought to be either inferred or confirmed. Inferred thus: It is not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by one's fellow-citizens. A wise man, therefore, will not have his children over-learned. Confirmed thus: A wise man will not have his children over-learned; seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens.

If a reason be added to a manifest sentence, let it be short.

Sentences become not every man; but only old men, and such as be well-versed in business. For to hear a young man speak sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man speak sentences, is absurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected; because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable custom or humour may thereby be made appear in the denier.

The commodities of sentences, are two. One proceeding from the vanity of the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the hearer holds. Another is, that sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.

Thus much of sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.

SEEING AN ENTHYMEME differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the places of it, from whence a man may argue, ought to be certain and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a syllogism, rhetorical or other, should know all or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be, what and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, &c. it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.

Proper, I call those things which are least common to others: as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Diomedes; as that he was a prince, and warred against the Trojans: but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one general place; from that which is proper.

CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES OSTENSIVE.

FORASMUCH AS ENTHYMEMES either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either ostensive, or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the places of enthymemes ostensive.

An ostensive enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.

That enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility, is an enthymeme wherein from that which the adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent propositions of good, evil, just, unjust, honourable, and dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applied to particular subjects, or in concrete. Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the abstract or universal.

The first place, then, let be from contraries; which in the concrete or particulars is exemplified thus. If intemperance be hurtful, temperance is profitable: and if intemperance be not hurtful, neither is temperance profitable.

Another place may be from cognomination, or affinity of words: as in this particular. If what is just, be good; then what is justly, is well: but justly to die, is not well: therefore not all that is just, is good.

A third from relatives; as, This man has justly done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this place sometimes deceives; for a man may suffer

justly, yet not from him.

A fourth from comparison, three ways.

From the great to the less; as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.

From the less to the greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less man.

From equality: as, If captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should sophisters?

Another from the time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your country with my army, before I had aided you against the Phocæans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you.

A sixth from what the adversary says of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the army; and he answering no; What, says he, is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the army, and Aristophon not?

This place would be ridiculous, where the defendant were not in much more estimation than the accuser.

A seventh from the definition; as that of Socrates; A spirit is either God, or the creature of God; and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are spirits.

An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.

A ninth from division: as, If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the accuser charge not the defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.

A tenth from induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c.; and therefore every where.

An eleventh from authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil; for that the gods have judged it so, in excepting

themselves from mortality.

A twelfth from the consequence; as, It is not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. It is good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.

A thirteenth from two contrary consequences; as, It is not good to be an orator; because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men, if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.

Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth, you shall please men; therefore by all means be an orator.

A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.

A fifteenth from proportion: as, Seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?

A sixteenth from the similitude of consequents: as He that denies the immortality of the gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the gods: for the same consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.

A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind: as, If when we were in banishment, we fought to recover our country, why should we not fight now to retain it?

An eighteenth from a feigned end: as that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another, but as one that would partake less of the glory.

A nineteenth from the cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it.

A twentieth from that which is incredible, but true: as that laws may need a law to mend them, as well as fish bred in the salt water may need salting.

CHAPTER XXV. OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES THAT LEAD TO IMPOSSIBILITY.

LET THE FIRST place be from inspection of times, actions, or words, either of the adversary, or of the speaker, or both. Of the adversary: as, He says he loves the people, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the speaker; as, He says I am contentious, and yet I never began suit. Of both; as, He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the commonwealth; whereas I have ransomed divers citizens with mine own money.

A second is from shewing the cause which seemed amiss, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused; as, The mother that was accused of incest for being seen embracing her son, was absolved as soon as she made appear that she embraced him upon his arrival from far by way of salutation.

A third, from rendering of the cause; as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had, under the thirty tyrants, defaced the inscription, which the people had set up in a pillar, of his ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to endear himself to the tyrants by the testimony of the people's hatred.

A fourth from better counsel; as He might have done better for himself, therefore he did not this. But this place deceives, when the better counsel comes to mind after the fact.

A fifth from the incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the funeral

of Leucothea, were told that, if they thought her a goddess, they ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice.

A sixth (which is proper to judicial orations) from an inference of error; as, If he did it not, he was not wise; therefore he did it.

Enthymemes that lead to impossibility, please more than ostensive. For they compare and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to the auditor.

Of all enthymemes, they be best which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us, and makes us favourable to the speaker.

CHAPTER XXVI. OF THE PLACES OF SEEMING ENTHYMEMES.

OF SEEMING ENTHYMEMES, one place may be from the form of speaking. As when a man has repeated divers sentences, he brings in his conclusion as if it followed necessarily, though it do not.

A second from an ambiguous word.

A third from that which is true, divided, to that which is false, joined; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my father's death, and it was justice my mother should die for killing my father: therefore I justly killed my mother. Or from that which is true, joined, to that which is false, divided; as, one cup of wine, and one cup of wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of wine is hurtful.

A fourth, from amplification of the crime. For neither is the defendant likely to have committed the crime he amplifies; nor does the accuser seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his accusation.

A fifth from signs; as, when a man concludes the doing of the fact from the manner of his life.

A sixth from that which comes by chance. As if from this, that the tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude that in a free commonwealth loving of boys were profitable.

A seventh from the consequence; as, Banishment is to be desired, because a banished man has choice of places to dwell in.

An eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes' government the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the

Peloponnesian war began the plague, therefore Pericles, that persuaded that war, did ill.

A ninth from the omission of some circumstance; as, Helen did what was lawful when she ran away with Paris, because she had her father's consent to choose her own husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.

A tenth from that which is probable, in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, It is probable he foresaw that if he did it he should be suspected; therefore it is probable he did it not. From this place one may infer both ways that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected.

Upon this place was grounded the art which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse, and the worse the better.

CHAPTER XXVII. OF THE WAYS TO ANSWER THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ADVERSARY.

AN ARGUMENT IS answered by an opposite syllogism, or by an objection.

The places of opposite syllogisms are the same with the places of syllogisms, or enthymemes; for a rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme.

The places of objections are four.

First, from the same. As, to the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme, may be objected, that, No want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus, The love of Myrrha to her father was not good.

The second from contraries. As, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.

The third from similitude. As thus, if the adversary say, all men that are injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.

The fourth from the authority of famous men. As when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the act, another for the drunkenness.

And forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from probability, or example, or from a sign fallible, or from a sign infallible: an enthymeme from probability may be confuted really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but apparently or sophistically, by showing only that it

does not fall out so always; whereupon the judge thinks the probability not sufficient to ground his sentence upon. The reason whereof is this, that the judge, while he hears the fact proved probable, conceives it as true. For the understanding has no object but truth. And therefore, by-and-by, when he shall hear an instance to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false; and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is, he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.

An enthymeme, from a fallible sign, is answered by showing the sign to be fallible.

An enthymeme from an example, is answered as an enthymeme from probability; really by showing more examples to the contrary; apparently, if he bring examples enough to make it seem not necessary.

If the adversary have more examples than we, we must make it appear that they are not applicable to the case.

An enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the proposition be true, is unanswerable.

CHAPTER XXVIII. AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT ENTHYMEMES.

THE FIRST, THAT amplification and extenuation are not common places, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a fact to be great or little; and are therefore enthymemes to be drawn from common places, and therefore are not the places themselves.

The second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.

The third, that an objection is no enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an objection is no more but an opinion, example, or other instance, produced to make appear that the adversary's argument does not conclude.

Thus much of examples, sentences, enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to argumentation; from what places they may be drawn or answered.

There remain elocution and disposition to be spoken of in the next book.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I. OF THE ORIGINAL OF ELOCUTION AND PRONUNCIATION.

THREE THINGS BEING necessary to an oration, namely proof, elocution, and disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.

As for action or pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an orator may be fetched out of the book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the action of the stage. For tragedians were the first that invented such action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the magnitude, tone, and measure of the voice; a thing less subject to art, than is either proof or elocution.

And yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for poetry. But oratorical action has not been hitherto reduced to art. And orators in the beginning, when they saw that the poets in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connexion of words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse, and made choice of words. But when the poets changed their style, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and measures proper to themselves.

Seeing therefore pronunciation or action are in some degree necessary also for an orator, the precepts thereof are to be fetched from the Art of Poetry.

In the meantime this may be one general rule. If the words, tone, greatness of the voice, gesture of the body and countenance, seem to

proceed all from one passion, then it is well pronounced. Otherwise not. For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the hearer always.

CHAPTER II. OF THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND EPITHETS.

THE VIRTUES OF a word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent, that is, neither above nor below the thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine.

Perspicuous are all words that be proper.

Fine words are those, that are borrowed, or translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.

The reason why borrowed words please, is this. Men are affected with words, as they are with men; admiring in both that which is foreign and new.

To make a poem graceful, many things help; but few an oration. For to a poet it sufficeth, with what words he can, to set out his poem. But an orator must not only do that, but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas belief is the scope of his oration.

The words that an orator ought to use are of three sorts; proper, such as are received, and metaphors.

Words taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new coined, are seldom to be used.

Synonymes belong to poets, and equivocal words to sophisters.

An orator if he use proper words, and received and good metaphors, shall both make his oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a metaphor alone there is perspicuity, novity, and sweetness.

Concerning metaphors the rules are these:

He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for example, let him call a crime an error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat worse; as, calling error, crime.

A metaphor ought not to be so far-fetched, as that the similitude may not easily appear.

A metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things; as the poets do, that choose rather to say rosy-fingered, than red-fingered Aurora.

In like manner the rule of epithets is, that he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an ode in honour of the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid, called them by their name, Ἡμιόνθς, that signifies their propinquity to asses: but having received a greater reward, styles them the sons of swift-footed coursers.

CHAPTER III. OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE AN ORATION FLAT.

THE THINGS THAT make an oration flat or insipid, are four:

Words compounded. And yet a man may compound a word, when the composition is necessary for want of a simple word, and easy, and seldom used.

Foreign words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.

Long, impertinent, and often epithets.

Metaphors indecent and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far-fetched. Indecent, when they are ridiculous, as in comedies; or too grave, as in tragedies.

CHAPTER IV. OF A SIMILITUDE.

A SIMILITUDE DIFFERS from a metaphor only by such particles of comparison as these; as; even as; so; even so, &c.

A similitude therefore is a metaphor dilated; and a metaphor is a similitude contracted into one word.

A similitude does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent; for it is poetical.

An example of the similitude, is this of Pericles, that said in his oration, that the Bæotians were like so many oaks in a wood, that did nothing but beat one another.

CHAPTER V. OF THE PURITY OF LANGUAGE.

FOUR THINGS ARE necessary to make language pure.

The right rendering of those particles, which some antecedent particle does require; as to a not only, a not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.

The use of proper words, rather than circumlocutions; unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.

That there be nothing of double construction, unless there be cause to do it of purpose; as the prophets of the heathen, who speak in general terms, to the end they may be better maintain the truth of their prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, than in particulars. For it is easier to divine whether a number be even or odd, than how many; and that a thing will be, than what it will be.

Concordance of gender, number, and person; as not to say him for her, man for men, hath for have.

In sum, a man's language ought to be easy for another to read, pronounce, and point.

Besides, to divers antecedents, let divers relatives, or one common to them all, be correspondent; as, he saw the colour, he heard the sound; or he perceived both colour and sound: but by no means, he heard or saw both.

Lastly, that which is to be interposed by parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose), afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose; is vicious.

CHAPTER VI. OF THE AMPLITUDE AND TENUITY OF LANGUAGE.

A MAN SHALL add amplitude or dignity to his language, but by such means as these.

By changing the name with the definition, as occasion shall serve. As, when the name shall be indecent, by using the definition; or contrary.

By metaphors.

By using the plural number for the singular.

By privative epithets.

CHAPTER VII. OF THE CONVENIENCE OR DECENCY OF ELOCUTION.

ELOCUTIONS ARE MADE decent:

By speaking feelingly; that is, with such passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as, angerly in matter of injury.

By speaking as becomes the person of the speaker; as for a gentleman to speak eruditely.

By speaking proportionably to the matter; as of great affairs to speak in a high, and of mean, in a low style.

By abstaining from compounded, and from out-landish words: unless a man speak passionately, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his hearers; or ironically.

It confers also to persuasion very much, to use these ordinary forms of speaking; all men know, it is confessed by all, no man will deny, and the like. For the hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be esteemed the only ignorant man.

It is good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the pronunciation and countenance that to such a word belongs; that the disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well to correct himself: for he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says. But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in showing of this consideration. For the ostentation of carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily

observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required.

CHAPTER VIII. OF TWO SORTS OF STYLES.

THERE BE TWO sorts of styles. The one continued, or to be comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by periods.

The first sort was in use with ancient writers; but is now out of date. An example of this style is in the history of Herodotus; wherein there is no period till the end of the whole history.

In the other kind of style, that is distinguished by periods, a period is such a part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.

This latter kind is pleasant, the former unpleasant; because this appears finite, the other infinite. In this the hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no end, and has nothing finished to him. This may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence; which is the cause that verses be easily remembered: the other not.

Every sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interposed.

Period is either simple, or divided into parts.

Simple, is that which is indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.

A period divided, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends; seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one colon or part; and in these, seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the period.

The parts or members, and periods, of speech, ought neither be too long, nor too short.

Too long, are they which are produced beyond the expectation of the hearer. Too short, are they that end before he expects it.

Those that be too long, leave the hearer behind; like him that walking goes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that walks with him.

They that be too short, make the hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.

A period that is divided into parts, is either divided only; or has also an opposition of the parts one to another.

Divided only is such as this; This the senate knows, the consul sees; and yet the man lives.

A period with opposition of parts, called also antithesis, and the parts antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together, or also joined by a third.

Contrary parts are put together as here; The one has obtained glory, the other riches; both by my benefit.

Antitheta are therefore acceptable, because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition, but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of enthymeme, which leads to impossibility.

Parts or members of a period, are said to be equal, when they have altogether, or almost, equal number of syllables.

Parts or members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin or end alike: and the more similitudes, and the greater equality there is of syllables, the more graceful is the period.

CHAPTER IX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT GRACE AN ORATION, AND MAKE IT DELIGHTFUL.

FORASMUCH AS THERE is nothing more delightful to a man, than to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those words are most grateful to the ear, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the things signified.

And therefore foreign words are unpleasant, because obscure; and plain words, because too manifest, making us learn nothing new. But metaphors please; for they beget in us, by the genus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of science. As when an old man is called stubble; a man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth, and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to stubble and to old men.

That which a metaphor does, a similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.

Such enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.

The things that make a speech graceful, are these; antitheta, metaphors, and animation.

Of antitheta and antithesis hath been spoken in the precedent chapter.

Of metaphors, the most graceful is that which is drawn from proportion.

Aristotle, in the twelfth chapter of his Poetry, defines a metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the general to the particular. 2. From the

particular to the general. 3. From one particular to another. 4. From proportion.

A metaphor from proportion is such as this; A state without youth, is a year without a spring.

Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes. As he that said, The Athenians poured out their city into Sicily; meaning, they sent thither the greatest army they could make. And this is the greatest grace of an oration.

If therefore in the same sentence there concur both metaphor and this animation, and also antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful.

That an oration is graced by metaphor, animation, and antithesis, hath been said: but how it is graced, is to be said in the next chapter.

CHAPTER X. IN WHAT MANNER AN ORATION IS GRACED BY THE THINGS AFORESAID.

IT IS GRACED by animation, when the actions of living creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the sword is said to devour.

Such metaphors as these come into a man's mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the metaphor.

A metaphor without animation, adds grace then, when the hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.

Also paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do believe them. For they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a man's expectation.

And paragrams, that is, allusions of words, are graceful, if they be well placed, and in periods not too long, and with antithesis. For by these means the ambiguity is taken away.

And the more of these, namely, metaphor, animation, antithesis, equality of members, a period hath, the more graceful it is.

Similitudes grace an oration, when they contain also a metaphor.

And proverbs are graceful, because they are metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another.

And hyperboles, because they also are metaphors. But they are youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be

angry; and for that cause are not comely in old men.

CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STYLE TO BE USED IN WRITING, AND THE STYLE TO BE USED IN PLEADING.

THE STYLE THAT should be read, ought to be more exact and accurate. But the style of a pleader, ought to be suited to action and pronunciation.

Orations of them that plead, pass away with the hearing. But those that are written, men carry about them, and are considered at leisure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.

Written orations appear flat in pleading. And orations made for the bar, when the action is away, appear in reading insipid.

In written orations repetition is justly condemned. But in pleadings, by the help of action, and by some change in the pleader, repetition becomes amplification.

In written orations disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by action. But in pleadings it is amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.

Of pleadings, that which is judicial ought to be more accurate than that which is before the people.

And an oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to action, than a judicial.

And of judicial orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to action, which is uttered to many. As in a picture, the further he stands off that beholds it, the

less need there is that the colours be fine; so in orations, the further the hearer stands off, the less need there is for his oration to be elegant.

Therefore demonstrative orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be read.

CHAPTER XII. OF THE PARTS OF AN ORATION, AND THEIR ORDER.

THE NECESSARY PARTS of an oration are but two; propositions and proof; which are, as it were, the problem and demonstration.

The proposition is the explication or opening of the matter to be proved. And proof is the demonstration of the matter propounded.

To these necessary parts are sometimes added two other, the proem and the epilogue; neither of which is any proof.

So that in some there be four parts of an oration; the proem; the proposition, or as others call it, the narration; the proofs, which contain confirmation, confutation, amplification, and diminution; and the epilogue.

CHAPTER XIII. OF THE PROEM.

THE PROEM IS the beginning of an oration, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.

In some kinds of orations it resembles the prelude of musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended. In other kinds it resembles the prologue of a play, that contains the argument.

Proems of the first sort, are most proper for demonstrative orations; in which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist upon. And for the most part it is better not; because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, digression will seem variety; but if he have engaged himself, variety will be accounted digression.

In demonstratives, the matter of the proem consisteth in the praise or dispraise of some law or custom, or in exhortation or dehortation, or in something that serves to incline the hearer to the purpose.

Poems of the second kind are most proper for judicial orations. For as the prologue in a dramatic, and the exordium in an epic poem, setteth forth in few words the argument of the poem; so in a judicial oration, the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the mind of the hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight err or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a proem, is drawn from one of these four: from the speaker, from the adversary, from the hearer, or from the matter.

From the speaker and adversary, are drawn into proems such criminations and purgations as belong not to the cause.

To the defendant, it is necessary in the proem to answer to the accusations of his adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more

favourable entrance to the rest of his oration.

But to the plaintiff, it is better to cast his criminations all into the epilogue; that the judge may the more easily remember them.

From the hearer and from the matter, are drawn into the proem such things as serve to make the hearer favourable or angry, attentive or not attentive, as need shall require.

And hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.

But to make the hearer attentive, is not the part of the proem only, but of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than of the proem. For the hearer is everywhere more remiss than in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make appear both the probity of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great consequence; or that it concerns the hearer, or that it is new, or that it is delightful.

He that will have the hearer attentive to him, but not to the cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle without relation to the hearer, common and tedious.

That the hearer may be favourable to the speaker, one of two things is required: that he love him, or that he pity him.

In demonstrative orations, he that praises shall have the hearer favourable, if he think himself or his own manners, or course of life, or anything he loves, comprehended in the same praise.

On the contrary, he that dispraises shall be heard favourably, if the hearer find his enemies, or their courses, or anything he hates, involved in the same dispraise.

The proem of a deliberative oration is taken from the same things from which are taken the proems of judicial orations. For the matter of a

deliberative oration needeth not that natural proem, by which is shown what we are to speak of, for that is already known; the proem in these being made only for the speaker's or adversary's sake, or to make the matter appear great or little, as one would have it; and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the plaintiff or defendant, or from the hearer, or from the matter, as in orations judicial.

CHAPTER XIV. PLACES OF CRIMINATION AND PURGATION.

ONE, FROM THE removal of ill opinion in the hearer, imprinted in him by the adversary or otherwise.

Another from this: that the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.

A third from the recompense: as, I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.

A fourth from the excuse; as, It was error, mischance, or constraint.

A fifth from the intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.

A sixth from the comprehension of the accuser; as, What I have done, the accuser has done the same, or his father, kinsman, or friend.

A seventh from the comprehension of those that are in reputation; as, What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good men.

An eighth from comparison with such as have been falsely accused or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.

A ninth from recrimination; as, The accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.

A tenth from that the judgment belongs to another place, or time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this matter.

An eleventh from crimination of the crimination: as, It serves only to pervert judgment.

A twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is taken from some sign; as, Teucer is not to be believed, because his mother

was Priam’s sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his father was Priam’s enemy.

A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed; as, to praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

A fourteenth, common both to crimination and purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact. For he that purgeth himself, interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his adversary said, he chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the honour.

CHAPTER XV. OF THE NARRATION.

THE NARRATION IS not always continued, and of one piece; but sometimes, as in demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole oration.

For there being in a narration, something that falls not under art; as namely, the actions themselves, which the orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the narration of them where he best may. As for example, if being to praise a man, you would make a narration of all his acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while from some of them you praise his valour, and from others his wisdom; whereby your oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.

It is not necessary always that the narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the narration, as oft as may be, it is good to insert somewhat commendable in one's self, and blameable in one's adversary: as, I advised him, but he would take no counsel.

In narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation, &c. in the hearer beside the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The narration ought also to be in such words as argue the manners, that is some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be

not expressed; as, setting his arms a-kimbo, he answered, &c.; by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.

In an oration a man does better to shew his affection than his judgment; that is, it is better to say, I like this, than to say, this is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour follows goodness; whereas wisdom procures envy.

But if this affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, she loved her brother better than her husband or children; she added, for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For it is not easily believed that any man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.

Besides in a narration, not only the actions themselves, but the passions and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his narration a man should make himself and his adversary be considered for such and such, as soon and as covertly as he can.

A narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning. In deliberative orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come, a narration, which is always of things past, has no place. And yet things past may be recounted, that men may deliberate better of the future. But that is not as narration, but proof; for it is example.

There may also be narration in deliberatives, in that part where crimination and praise come in. But that part is not deliberative, but demonstrative.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PROOF OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION.

PROOFS ARE TO be applied to something controverted.

The controversy in judicial orations is, whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great; and whether it be just, or no.

In a question of fact, one of the parties of necessity is faulty; for ignorance of the fact is no excuse; and therefore the fact is chiefly to be insisted on.

In demonstratives, the fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the fact are to be proved.

In deliberatives, the question is, whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great; or whether it be just; or whether it be profitable.

Besides the application of the proof to the question, a man ought to observe whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause. For it is a sign he does the same in the cause.

The proofs themselves are either examples, or enthymemes.

A deliberative oration, because it is of things to come, requireth rather examples than enthymemes.

But a judicial oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one another’s force by confounding the hearer.

Nor ought a man to endeavour to prove everything by enthymeme, lest like some philosophers he collect what is known, from what is less known.

Nor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some affection. For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.

For the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would express manners.

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his manners, he may withal use sentences.

A deliberative oration is more difficult than a judicial, because it is of the future; whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely, the law; and it is easier to prove from principles, than without.

Besides, a deliberative oration wants those helps of turning to the adversary, of speaking of himself, of raising passion.

He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise. And in demonstratives, he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.

He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration.

Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear.

Confutation is also a part of proof. And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs; unless the controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before. For it is necessary to make way for

his own oration, by removing the objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man and his oration, that is damned beforehand.

If a man desire his manners should appear well, lest speaking of himself, he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous; let him introduce another person.

Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences, but such as have the same force. As here is an enthymeme: If it be then the best time to make peace, when the best conditions of peace may be had; then the time is now, while our fortune is entire. And this is a sentence of equal force to it: Wise men make peace, while their fortune is entire.

CHAPTER XVII. OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS.

THE TIMES WHEN it is fit to ask one's adversary a question, are chiefly four.

The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other.

The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred with out adding that proposition which is manifest.

The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself.

The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these: In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so.

Out of these cases, it is not fit to interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

To interrogations, which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question.

And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish.

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by jests.

The several kinds of jests are set down in the Art of Poetry. Whereof one kind is ironia, and tends to please one's self. The other is scurrility, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE EPILOGUE.

THE EPILOGUE MUST consist of one of these four things.

Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the adversary's side. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration; and how, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversary's, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

THE ART OF RHETORIC

PLAINLY SET FORTH. WITH PERTINENT EXAMPLES FOR THE MORE EASY UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE OF THE SAME.

BY THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMSBURY.

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC IS AN art of speaking finely. It hath two parts:

Garnishing of speech, called elocution;

Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called pronunciation.

Garnishing of speech is the first part of rhetoric; whereby the speech itself is beautified and made fine. It is either the fine manner of words, called a trope; or the fine shape or frame of speech, called a figure.

The fine manner of words is a garnishing of speech, whereby one word is drawn from its first proper signification to another; as in this sentence: sin lieth at the door: where sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoined unto it: lieth at the door, signifieth at hand; as that which lieth at the door, is ready to be brought in.

This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of words; afterwards confirmed by delight, because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be shamefaced, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification, than to be driven by force unto the same.

Yet sometimes this fine manner of speech swerveth from this perfection; and then it is, either the abuse of this fine speech, called katachresis, or the excess of this fineness, called hyperbole.

Be not too just nor too wicked; which speech, although it seem very hard, yet it doth, not without some fineness of speech, utter thus much; That one seek not a righteousness beyond the law of God; and that when none can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not dominion over them.

As, My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hate me are more in number than the hairs of my head. Both which do utter by an express of speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.

The abuse of speech is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and unwonted, as in the first example.

The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high and lofty, as in the second example, and Psalms vi. vii.

But the excellency or fineness of words or tropes, is most excellent, when divers are shut up in one, or continued in many.

An example of the first sort is in 2 Kings ii. 9: I pray thee, let me have a double portion of thy Spirit: where by Spirit is meant the gift of the Spirit; and by thy Spirit, the gift of the spirit like to thine.

The continuance of tropes, called an allegory, is, when one kind of trope is so continued, as, look with what kind of matter it be begun, with the same it be ended. So in Psalm xxiii. the care of God towards his church is set forth in the words proper to a shepherd. So in the whole book of Canticles, the sweet conference of Christ and his church, is set down by the words proper to the husband and the wife. So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, in Ecclesiastes xii. 5, 6.

Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a trope. Now the divers sorts do follow. They are those which note out, 1, no comparison, or are with some comparison; or, 2, no respect of division, or some respect.

The first is double: 1. The change of name, called a metonymy. 2. The mocking speech, called an irony.

The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it. It is double: 1. When the cause is put for the thing caused; and contrarywise. 2. When the thing to which anything is adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined; and contrarywise.

The change of name of the cause is when either the name of the maker, or the name of the matter, is put for the thing made.

Of the maker, when the finder out, or the author of the thing, or the instrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So Moses is put for his writings: so love is put for liberality, or bestowing benefits, the fruit of love; so (Rom. i. 8): faith, the cause, is put for religious serving of God, the thing caused. So (James iii.) the tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the speech itself. Rule thy tongue.

Of the matter: Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return; that is, one made of dust.

Now, on the other side, when the thing caused, or the effect, is put for any of these causes. So the Gospel of God is called the power of God to salvation; that is, the instrument of the power of God. So love is said to be bountiful, because it causeth one to be bountiful. St. Paul saith, The bread that we break, is it not in the communion of the body and blood of Christ? That is, an instrument of the communion of the body of Christ. So the body is said to be an earthly tabernacle; that is, a tabernacle made of earth.

The change of name, or metonymy, where the subject, or that which hath anything adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined, or adjunct. So the place is put for those, or that in the place: set thine house in order; that is, thy household matters. It shall be easier for Sodom and Gomorrha; that is, the people in Sodom and Gomorrha. So Moses' chair is put for the doctrine taught in Moses' chair. So all Jericho and Jerusalem came out; that is, all the men in Jericho and Jerusalem. So before, sin was put for the punishment of sin. Let his blood rest upon us and our children; that is, the punishment which shall follow his death. So Christ said, This is my body; that is, a sign or sacrament of my body. This wine is the new testament in my blood; that is, a sign or seal of the new testament in my blood. So John saith, I saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a dove; that is, the sign of the Spirit.

On the other side, the adjunct is put for the thing to which it is adjoined. As Christ (1 Tim. i. 1) is called our hope; that is, on whom our hope did depend. So, we are justified by faith; that is, by Christ applied by faith. So, love is the fulfilling of the law; that is, those things to which it is adjoined. Hope for the things hoped for; as Rom. viii. 24. So in the Epistle to the Ephesians, v. 16: The days are evil; that is, the manner, conversation, and deeds of men in the days.

Hitherto the metonymy, or change of name. Now followeth the mocking speech, or irony.

CHAPTER II.

THE MOCKING TROPE is, when one contrary is signified by another; as God said, Man is like to one of us. So Christ saith, Sleep on; and yet by-and-by, Arise, let us go. So Paul saith, You are wise, and I am a fool.

This trope is conceived either by the contrariety of the matter, or the manner of utterance, or both. So Elijah said to the prophets of Baal, Cry aloud, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ, Hail, King of the Jews!

Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain elegance noteth it. So Philemon 19: That I say not, thou owest thyself unto me.

Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division. Now followeth that which respecteth division, called synechdoche.

A synechdoche is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or the name of the part to the whole. And it is double. 1. When the whole is put for the member, and contrarily. 2. When the general, or whole kind, is put for the special; or contrarily.

So St. John: Not only for our sins, but for the sins of the whole world. So righteousness, a member of goodness, is put for all goodness; so unrighteousness is put for all manner of sins.

Examples of the second sort, as these: So Israel is put for those of Juda sometimes. So nations for the heathen. A minister of Christ for an apostle of Christ, as Rom. xv. 16. A minister put for a distributer, as Rom. xii. 7.

On the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort or general, in the examples following. In the Lord’s prayer, bread, one help of life, is

put for all helps; this day, one time for all times. So Solomon saith, the thing of the day in his day; that is, the thing of the time in his time.

So sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called diminution, or meiosis. As James saith to him that knoweth how to do well and doth it not, it is sin; that is a great sin. So our Saviour Christ saith, If they had not known, they had had no sin; that is, no such great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by comparison.

So Solomon saith, Receive my words, and not silver; that is, my words rather than silver. So Paul saith, I was sent to preach, and not to baptize; that is, not so much to baptize as to preach.

Hitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no comparison. Now followeth the fineness of words which noteth out comparison, called a metaphor.

CHAPTER III.

A METAPHOR IS when the like is signified by the like: as (1 Cor. iii. 13) the Apostle saith, doctrine must be tried by fire; that is, the evidence of the word, spirit, trying doctrine, as fire doth metals. So Christ is said to baptize with fire; where fire is put for the power of the Holy Ghost, purging as fire. So Christ saith, none shall enter into the kingdom of God but he that is born of the Holy Ghost and water. So Paul calleth himself the father of the Corinthians, and said, that he begat them in Christ. So he calleth Timothy and Titus his natural sons in the faith.

Hitherto of a trope or garnishing of speech in one word, where the metaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the synechdoche; and last of all, the irony. Now followeth the fine frame or shape of speech, called a figure.

A figure is a garnishing of speech wherein the course of the same is changed, from the more simple and plain manner of speaking unto that which is more full of excellency and grace. For as in the fineness of words, or a trope, words are considered asunder by themselves; so in the fine shape or frame of speech, or a figure, the apt and pleasant joining together of many words is noted.

The garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure, is garnishing of speech in words, or in a sentence.

The garnishing of speech in words, called figura dictionis, is wherein the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joined together.

This is either in the measure of sounds; or in the repetition of sounds.

The measure of sounds is belonging either to poets, with us called rhymers; or orators, with us called eloquent pleaders.

The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces; and it is either rhyme or verse.

Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of syllables ending alike; and these in the mother tongues are most fit for psalms, songs, or sonnets.

Verses are the second sort, containing certain feet fitly placed.

A foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of syllables; for the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because we have no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the large handling of them should be more curious than necessary.

The measure of sounds belonging to orators, is that which, as it is not uncertain, so it differeth altogether from rhyme and verse, and is very changeable with itself. Therefore in that eloquent speech you must altogether leave rhyme and verse, unless you allege it for authority and pleasure.

In the beginning of the sentence little care is to be had, in the middle least of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had; because the fall of the sentence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to be harsh and unpleasant both to the mind and ear, there must be most variety and change.

Now this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that must be set down in feet of two syllables.

And thus much of garnishing of speech by the measure of sounds, rather to give some taste of the same to the readers, than to draw any to the curious and unnecessary practice of it.

Now followeth the repeating of sounds.

CHAPTER IV.

REPETITION OF SOUNDS is either of the like, or the unlike sound.

Of the like, is either continued to the end of, or broken off from, the same, or a diverse sentence.

Continued to the end of the same sentence is, when the same sound is repeated without anything coming between, except a parenthesis; that is, something put in, without the which, notwithstanding, the sentence is full. And it is a joining of the same sound, as Rom. i. 29: All unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness. And in the prayer of Christ, My God, my God. From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men, &c. (Psalm xvii. 14.)

Continued in a diverse sentence is, either a redoubling, called anadyplosis; or a pleasant climbing, called climax.

Redoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former sentence, and the beginning of the sentence following. As Psalm ix. 9: The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due time. Psalm xlviii. 14: For this God is our God. But more plain in Psalm xlviii. 8: As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of our God: God will establish it for ever.

A pleasant climbing, is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or steps of the same sounds: as Rom. viii. 17: If we be children, we be heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ. Rom. viii. 30: Whom he predestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified. Also Rom. ix. 14, 15.

And hitherto of the same sound continued to the end. Now followeth the same sound broken off.

CHAPTER V.

THE SAME SOUND broken off, is a repetition of the same in the beginning or in the end.

In the beginning, it is called anaphora, a bringing of the same again; as Rom. viii. 38, 39: Nor death, nor life, nor angels, &c. nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us, &c. So likewise Ephes. iv. 11: Some to be apostles, some preachers, &c. So Galatians ii. 14: Nor Jew, Gentile, &c. So likewise Hebrews xi. 1, 2.

Repetition of the same sound in the end, is called epistrophe, a turning to the same sound in the end. So Ezekiel viii. 15: Behold greater abominations than these. Lament. iii. 41, &c. Let us lift up our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned and have rebelled; therefore thou hast not spared.

When both of these are joined together, it is called a coupling or symplote. As 2 Cor. vi. 4-11: But in all things we approve ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c. See also 2 Cor. xi. 23.

Hitherto of the repetitions in the same place. Now of those that do interchange their place.

They are either epanalepsis, which signifieth to take back; or epanados, which signifies the turning to the same tune.

The first is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the ending; as, 2 Sam. xviii. 33: My son Absolom, my son.

Epanados is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the middle, in the middle and the end. Ezekiel xxxv, 6: I will prepare thee unto

blood, and blood shall pursue thee: except thou hate blood, even blood shall pursue thee. And 2 Thes. ii. 4: So that he that doth sit as God, in the temple of God, sheweth himself that he is God.

Hitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are like. Now of those that are unlike.

CHAPTER VI.

UNLIKE; A SMALL changing of the name, as παρονομασια; a small changing of the end or case, as πολνπτωτον.

A small change of name is, when a word, by the change of one letter or syllable, the signification also is changed; as, Rom. v. 4: Patience, experience; and experience, hope. 2 Cor. x. 3: We walk after the flesh, not war in the flesh. 2 Cor. vi. 8-9: So by honour and dishonour, as unknown and yet known.

A small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning rebound by divers ends: Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness, is righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doeth righteously, is born of him. And of both these there are many in the Scripture; but the translations cannot reach them.

Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech, in words. Now followeth the garnishing of the shape of speech, in a sentence.

CHAPTER VII.

GARNISHING OF THE frame of speech in a sentence, is a garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a sort beautify the sense and very meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far surpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.

It is either the garnishing of speech alone, or with others.

The garnishing of speech alone, is when as the sentence is garnished without speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the matter; or of the person.

In regard of the matter; it is either a crying out, called exclamation; or a pulling or calling back of himself, called revocation.

A crying out, or exclamation, is the first, which is set forth by a word of calling out. Sometimes of wonder, as, Rom. xi. 33: O the depth of the judgments of God! Psal. viii. 1: O Lord, how excellent is thy name! Sometimes of pity; also these words, Behold, Alas, Oh, be signs of this figure, as, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which stonest the prophets. Sometimes of desperation; as, My sin is greater than can be forgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, &c. Sometimes of wishing: as, Psalm lxxxiv. 1: O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy tabernacles! Sometimes of disdaining: as, Rom. vii. 24: O miserable wretch that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of sin! Sometimes of mocking: as they which said to our Saviour Christ, Ah, thou that, &c. Sometimes of cursing and detestation; as in David, Let their table be made a snare, and bow down their back always.

Also when this figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voice or επιφωνημα; as when the sins of Jezebel were spoken against, this is added at the end, Seemed it a little to her to do thus and thus.

So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up his praise with this: Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory. Sometimes here is used a certain liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: as Peter (Acts iii. 12,) saith: Ye men of Israel, hear these words. And Paul, (2 Cor. xi. 1): Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishness, and indeed ye suffer me.

Thus much of crying out. Now followeth the figure of calling back, or revocation.

Revocation is when any thing is called back; and it is as it were a cooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.

And this is either a correction of one's self, called επανορθωσις; or a holding of one's peace, called αποσιωπησις.

Επανορ῾θωσις is correction, when something is called back that went before: as Paul correcteth his doubtfulness of Agrippa's belief, when he saith, Believest thou, King Agrippa? I know thou believest. So, 1 Cor. xv. 10: I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, &c.

A keeping of silence, or αποσιωπησις, is when the course of the sentence bygone is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence, not being uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ (John xii. 27) saith, My soul is heavy: what shall I say?

Thus much of a figure garnishing the speech alone, in regard of the matter. Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone, in regard of the person.

CHAPTER VIII.

GARNISHING OF THE speech alone in regard of the person, is double: either in turning to the person called apostrophe; or feigning of the person, called prosopopœia.

Apostrophe, or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to another person than the speech appointed did intend or require. And this apostrophe or turning is diversely seen, according to the diversity of persons. Sometimes it turneth to a man's person; as David in the sixth Psalm, where having gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to the wicked, saying, Away from me, all ye workers of iniquity; for the Lord hath heard the voice of my petition.

Sometimes from a man to God, as Psalm iii. 3. David being dismayed with the number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: But thou art my buckler, &c.

Sometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense; as Isaiah i. and Isaiah xxi.

Prosopopœia, or a feigning of the person, is whereby we do feign another person speaking in our speech. And it is double; imperfect and perfect.

Imperfect is when the speech of another person is set down lightly and indirectly. As in Psalm. xi. 1. David bringeth in the wicked, Who say unto my soul, fly as the bird unto yonder hill.

A perfect prosopopœia, is when the whole feigning of the person is set down in our speech, with a fit entering into the same, and a leaving it off.

So Wisdom, (Prov. viii.); where the entrance is in the first verses, her speech in the rest of the chapter.

Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone. Now follow the other, which concern the speeches of two.

CHAPTER IX.

THEY WHICH CONCERN the speeches of two, are either in asking, or in answering.

That of asking, is either in deliberation; or in preventing an objection.

Deliberation is when we do every now and then ask, as it were, reasons of our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth set down some great thing.

This deliberation is either in doubting, or in communication.

A doubting is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul (1 Philipp. i. 23,24), doubting whether it were better to die than to live, he garnisheth his speech in this manner: For I am greatly in doubt on both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.

Communication is a deliberation with others. As, Galatians iii. 1, 2: O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, &c.

And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called deliberation.

Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the preventing of an objection, or occupation.

Occupation is, when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto it. Therefore this speech between two, in the first part, is called the setting down of the objection or occupation: in the latter part, an answering of the objection or the subjection: as Rom. vi. 1: What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin, that grace may abound? In which words is set down the objection: the answering in these words, God forbid. And here this must be marked, that the objection is many times wanting, which must be wisely

supplied by considering the occasion and answer of it: as 1 Tim. v. 11,12: They will marry, having condemnation. Now lest any might say, what, for marrying? He answereth: No, for denying their first faith.

Hitherto of the figures of asking. Now followeth the figures of answering. They are either in suffering of a deed, called permission; or, granting of an argument, called concession.

Suffering of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed, being never so filthy; as Rev. xxii. 11: Let him that is filthy, be filthy still. And 1 Cor. xiv. 38: If any be ignorant, let him be ignorant.

Concession or granting of an argument is, when an argument is mockingly yielded unto, as Ecclesiastes xi. 9: Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c.

THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.

ALTHOUGH THE RULES of Sophistry be needless for them that be perfect in logic; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to the young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle arguments, and the better practising of logic and rhetoric, we have thought good to turn it into the English tongue.

Sophistry.

Sophistry is the feigned art of elenches, or coloured reasons.

A coloured reason, or elench, is a show of reason to deceive withal. It is either when the deceit lieth in the words; or in the default of logic, called a sophism.

In words, is either when the deceit lieth in one word; or in words joined together. If it were, it should be, whosoever.

In one word, is either the darkness of a word; or, the doubtfulness of a word.

The darkness of a word, or an insolence, deceiveth, when by a reason the meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the oldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort is that spoken of in 2 Peter ii. 18.

By this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side for deserving by good works.

Whosoever saith man’s merits are crowned, they say man’s works do deserve.

But the Fathers say, man’s merits are crowned.

Therefore the Fathers say, man’s works do deserve.

Where merits is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by desert or freedom of promise.

Doubtfulness of a word, likeness of name, is either called homonymia; or by a trope or fineness of speech.

The likeness of name, or homonymia, is when one word is given to signify divers things: as,

He that believeth shall be saved.

The hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself, believed,

Therefore they shall be saved.

Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.

Doubtfulness by a trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively or contrarily: As,

That which Christ saith is true.

Christ saith that bread is his body.

Therefore it is true.

Where by body is meant the sign or sacrament of his body.

Unto the first, a perfect logician would answer, that the proposition is not an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of merit. And if the word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.

To the second he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and adjunct are not joined together: which hath justifying faith, or believing sincerely, shall be saved; and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred is false.

Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true; because if the word body be taken properly, it is not then true that is

set down; but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ saith in proper words, it is my body; and then it is false.

Hitherto of the fallacies in single words. Now of those that are joined together.

It is either amphibolia, or the doubtfulness of speech: or exposition, or unapt setting down of the reason.

The first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as thus, if any obey not our word by a letter, note him: where some refer by a letter, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the latter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show that it must be referred to the first.

The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is perverted.

Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,

All sin is evil.

Every child of God doth sin.

Therefore every child of God is evil.

Here the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the assumption.

Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in words. Now of the default of logic, called sophism.

It is either general or special. The general are those which cannot be referred to any part of logic. They are either begging of the question, called the petition of the principle; or bragging of no proof.

Begging of the question, is when nothing is brought to prove but the question, or that which is doubtful: as,

That righteousness, which is both by faith and works, doth justify.

But this righteousness, is inherent righteousness: Ergo.

Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.

If together with the blood of Christ, we must make perfect satisfaction for our sins before we come to heaven; then there must be purgatory for them that die without perfection.

But the first is so: Ergo.

Where the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof, as the question.

The answer is this, out of the definition of the syllogism; that there is no new argument invented; therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.

Bragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called redounding.

It is either impertinent to another matter, called heterogenium; or a vain repetition, called tautologia.

Impertinent, or not to the purpose, is when anything is brought for a proof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand; whereunto the common proverb giveth answer, I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk.

A vain repetition, is when the same thing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after a long time of prayer say, Let us pray. And this fallacy our Saviour Christ (Matt. vi. 5) condemneth in prayer. And this is a fault in method.

Special are those, which may be referred to certain parts of logic, and they are of two sorts. Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called invention; or to judgment.

Those referred to invention, are when anything is put for a reason, which is not; as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect; and so of the rest.

In the distribution this is a proper fallacy, when anything simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not meant nor intended: as,

He that saith there are not seven sacraments, saith true.

He that saith there are only three, saith there are not seven.

Therefore he that saith there are three, saith true.

The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true; for there may be a way to say there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.

Fallacies of judgment, are those that are referred to the judgment of one sentence, or of more.

Of one sentence, either to the proprieties of an axiom, or to the sorts.

To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily: an affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of St. John, I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray, for no denial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.

To the sorts, are referred either to the simple or compound.

The first, when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So the Papists, by this fallacy, do answer to that general saying of Paul; We are justified with faith without the works of the law: which they understand of works done before faith, when that was never called in doubt.

The fallacies which are referred to a compound axiom, are those which are referred either to a disjoined, or knitting axiom. To a disjoined axiom, when the parts indeed are not disjoined: as, Solomon was either a king, or did bear rule.

To a knitting axiom, is when the parts are not necessarily knit together; as, If Rome be on fire, the Pope’s chair is burnt.

And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment. Now followeth the second.

And they be either those that are referred to a syllogism; or to method. And they again are general, and special. General, which are referred to the general properties of a syllogism. It is either when all the parts are denied; or are particular. All parts denied: as,

No pope is a devil.

No man is a devil.

Therefore no man is a pope.

And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of a negative syllogism, which must always have one affirmative.

All particular: as,

some unlawful thing must be suffered; as, namely, that which cannot be taken away,

The stews is some unlawful thing.

Therefore the stews must be suffered.

This is answered, by the definition of a special syllogism; which is, that hath one part general.

The special, are those which are simple or compound.

The simple is of two sorts. The first is more plain. The second less plain.

More plain, is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particular: as,

Every apostle may preach abroad:

Some apostle is not a pope,

Therefore some pope may not preach abroad.

Also, every pope is a lord:

Some pope may give an universal license.

Therefore every lord may give an universal license.

Less plain, hath one fallacy in common, when the proposition is special: as,

Some player is a rogue:

Every vagabond is a rogue,

Therefore every player is a vagabond.

Also, some player is a rogue:

Every vagabond is a player,

Therefore every player is a rogue.

The fallacy of the first kind, is when all the parts be affirmative: as,

All Paul's bishops were ordained for unity.

All archbishops be ordained for unity.

Therefore all archbishops are Paul's bishops.

The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: as,

Every puritan is a Christian.

No Lord Bishop is a puritan,

Therefore no Lord Bishop is a Christian.

Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple syllogism. Now follow those which are referred to a compound; which are those which are referred either to the connexive, or to the disjoined.

Of the first sort, one is when the first part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be so likewise: as,

If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the bishop's hands.

But he may not have two benefices,

Therefore he may not escape unpunished at the bishop's hands.

The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: as,

If every ignorant minister were put out of the church, and a preacher in his place, we should have good order,

But we have good order.

Therefore every ignorant minister is put out of the church, and a preacher in his place.

Of those referred to the disjoined, the first is when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: as,

Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not.

But he is not.

Therefore he is.

The second kind, is when the second part of the copulative negative axiom is denied, that the first may be so: as,

A non-resident is either a faithful, or unfaithful minister.

But he is unfaithful. Ergo, &c.

And thus much of the fallacies in a syllogism.

The fallacy in method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the beginning, the special before the general; good order be gone, confounded; and finally when darkness, length, and hardness, is laboured after.

Translation of Homer’s ‘Iliad’

1677 EDITION

CONTENTS

ADVERTISEMENT.
TO THE READER, CONCERNING THE VIRTUES OF AN HEROIC POEM.
THE LIFE OF HOMER, COLLECTED AND WRITTEN BY J. WALLIM.
HOMER’S ILIADS. TRANSLATED OUT OF GREEK BY THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.
LIB. I.
LIB. II.
LIB. III.
LIB. IV.
LIB. V.
LIB. VI.
LIB. VII.
LIB. VIII.
LIB. IX.
LIB. X.
LIB. XI.
LIB. XII.
LIB. XIII.
LIB. XIV.
LIB. XV.
LIB. XVI.

LIB. XVII.
LIB. XVIII.
LIB. XIX.
LIB. XX.
LIB. XXI.
LIB. XXII.
LIB. XXIII.
LIB. XXIV.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE TRANSLATION OF Homer was amongst the latest of Hobbes' works; a signal of retreat from those mathematical contests in which he had spent so much of his time:— "Silentibus tandem adversariis, annum agens octogesimum septimum, Homeri Odysseam edidit." — See Vita Thomæ Hobbes.

In 1673 appeared, "The travels of Ulysses, as they were related by himself in Homer's 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th books of his Odysses, to Alcinous king of Phæacia," published by Wm. Crook, in 12mo. The date of 1674, given by Anthony Wood and others, seems to be a mistake; they may perhaps have been misled by Hobbes' telling us, that he translated the Odyssey in his 87th year.

Whether Hobbes had at this time finished any other part of Homer, and put forth those four books of the Odyssey as a specimen of the performance, or to ascertain what reception might be expected from the public for the remainder of it, is unknown. In about a year afterwards (see Vita) they were followed by the translation of the entire Iliad and Odyssey. Copies are to be found of various dates; as 1676, 1677, 1684, 1686, and perhaps others: but there were but three editions, the second dated 1677, and the third, 1686. The biographers appear to have been mistaken in repeating one after the other, (see Biog. Britan., Brit. Biog., Gen. Dict., Aikin's Biog.), that in the course of ten years this translation went through three large editions.

Pope, in the preface to his translation, observes, that the poetry of Hobbes' version is "too mean for criticism." Some, however, may possibly find the unstudied and unpretending language of Hobbes convey an idea

less remote from the original, than the smooth and glittering lines of Pope and his coadjutors.

Pope's remark upon the habitual carelessness displayed in the execution of the work, is well founded. It was possibly never meant for criticism, and may be fairly looked upon, as the translator has told us in his preface, as the amusement of his old age.

The present edition is printed from that of 1677.

TO THE READER, CONCERNING THE VIRTUES OF AN HEROIC POEM.

THE VIRTUES REQUIRED in an heroic poem, and indeed in all writings published, are comprehended all in this one word — discretion.

And discretion consisteth in this, that every part of the poem be conducing, and in good order placed to the end and design of the poet. And the design is not only to profit, but also to delight the reader.

By profit, I intend not here any accession of wealth, either to the poet, or to the reader; but accession of prudence, justice, and fortitude, by the example of such great and noble persons as he introduceth speaking, or describeth acting. For all men love to behold, though not to practise virtue. So that at last the work of an heroic poet is no more but to furnish an ingenuous reader, when his leisure abounds, with the diversion of an honest and delightful story, whether true or feigned.

But because there be many men called critics, and wits, and virtuosi, that are accustomed to censure the poets, and most of them of divers judgments, how is it possible, you'll say, to please them all? Yes, very well; if the poem be as it should be. For men can judge what is good, that know not what is best. For he that can judge what is best, must have considered all those things, though they be almost innumerable, that concur to make the reading of an heroic poem pleasant. Whereof I'll name as many as shall come into my mind.

And they are contained, first, in the choice of words. Secondly, in the construction. Thirdly, in the contrivance of the story or fiction. Fourthly, in the elevation of the fancy. Fifthly, in the justice and impartiality of the poet.

Sixthly, in the clearness of descriptions. Seventhly, in the amplitude of the subject.

And, to begin with words: the first indiscretion is, the use of such words as to the readers of poesy (which are commonly persons of the best quality) are not sufficiently known. For the work of an heroic poem is to raise admiration, principally, for three virtues, valour, beauty, and love; to the reading whereof women no less than men have a just pretence, though their skill in language be not so universal; and therefore foreign words, till by long use they become vulgar, are unintelligible to them. Also the names of instruments and tools of artificers, and words of art, though of use in the Schools, are far from being fit to be spoken by a hero. He may delight in the arts themselves, and have skill in some of them, but his glory lies not in that, but in courage, nobility, and other virtues of nature, or in the command he has over other men. Nor does Homer in any part of his poem attribute any praise to Achilles, or any blame to Alexander, for that they had both learnt to play upon the guitar. The character of words that become a hero are property and significancy, but without both the malice and lasciviousness of a satyr.

Another virtue of an heroic poem is the perspicuity and the facility of construction, and consisteth in a natural contexture of the words, so as not to discover the labour, but the natural ability of the poet; and this is usually called a good style. For the order of words, when placed as they ought to be, carries a light before it, whereby a man may foresee the length of his period, as a torch in the night shows a man the stops and unevenness in his way. But when placed unnaturally, the reader will often find unexpected checks, and be forced to go back and hunt for the sense, and suffer such unease, as in a coach a man unexpectedly finds in passing over a furrow. And though the laws of verse (which have bound the Greeks and Latins to number of feet, and quantity of syllables, and the English and other nations to number

of syllables and rhyme) put great constraint upon the natural course of language, yet the poet, having the liberty to depart from what is obstinate, and to choose somewhat else that is more obedient to such laws, and no less fit for his purpose, shall not be, neither by the measure, nor by the necessity of rhyme, excused; though a translation often may.

A third virtue lies in the contrivance. For there is difference between a poem and a history in prose. For a history is wholly related by the writer; but in an heroic poem the narration is, a great part of it, put upon some of the persons introduced by the poet. So Homer begins not his Iliad with the injury done by Paris, but makes it related by Menelaus, and very briefly, as a thing notorious; nor begins he his Odysseys with the departure of Ulysses from Troy, but makes Ulysses himself relate the same to Alcinous, in the midst of his poem; which I think much more pleasant and ingenious, than a too precise and close following of the time.

A fourth is in the elevation of fancy, which is generally taken for the greatest praise of heroic poetry; and is so, when governed by discretion. For men more generally affect and admire fancy than they do either judgment, or reason, or memory, or any other intellectual virtue, and for the pleasantness of it, give to it alone the name of wit, accounting reason and judgment but for a dull entertainment. For in fancy consisteth the sublimity of a poet, which is that poetical fury which the readers, for the most part, call for. It flies abroad swiftly to fetch in both matter and words; but if there be not discretion at home to distinguish which are fit to be used and which not, which decent and which undecent for persons, times, and places, their delight and grace is lost. But if they be discreetly used, they are greater ornaments of a poem by much than any other. A metaphor also (which is a comparison contracted into a word) is not unpleasant; but when they are sharp and extraordinary, they are not fit for an heroic poet, nor for a public consultation, but only for an accusation or defence at the bar.

A fifth lies in the justice and impartiality of the poet, and belongeth as well to history as to poetry. For both the poet and the historian writeth only, or should do, matter of fact. And as far as the truth of fact can defame a man, so far they are allowed to blemish the reputation of persons. But to do the same upon report, or by inference, is below the dignity, not only of a hero, but of a man. For neither a poet nor a historian ought to make himself an absolute master of any man's good name. None of the Emperors of Rome whom Tacitus, or any other writer, hath condemned, was ever subject to the judgment of any of them; nor were they ever heard to plead for themselves, which are things that ought to be antecedent to condemnation. Nor was, I think, Epicurus the philosopher, (who is transmitted to us by the Stoics for a man of evil and voluptuous life), ever called, convented, and lawfully convicted, as all men ought to be before they be defamed. Therefore it is a very great fault in a poet to speak evil of any man in their writings historical.

A sixth virtue consists in the perfection and curiosity of descriptions, which the ancient writers of eloquence call icones, that is images. And an image is always a part, or rather a ground of the poetical comparison. As, for example, when Virgil would set before our eyes the fall of Troy, he describes perhaps the whole labour of many men together in the felling of some great tree, and with how much ado it fell. This is the image. To which if you but add these words, "So fell Troy," you have the comparison entire; the grace whereof lieth in the lightsomeness, and is but the description of all, even the minutest, parts of the thing described; that not only they that stand far off, but also they that stand near, and look upon it with the oldest spectacles of a critic, may approve it. For a poet is a painter, and should paint actions to the understanding with the most decent words, as painters do persons and bodies with the choicest colours, to the eye; which if not done nicely, will not be worthy to be placed in a cabinet.

The seventh virtue, which lying in the amplitude of the subject, is nothing but variety, and a thing without which a whole poem would be no pleasanter than an epigram, or one good verse; nor a picture of a hundred figures better than any one of them asunder, if drawn with equal art. And these are the virtues which ought especially to be looked upon by the critics, in the comparing of the poets, Homer with Virgil, or Virgil with Lucan. For these only, for their excellency, I have read, or heard compared.

If the comparison be grounded upon the first and second virtues, which consist in known words and style unforced, they are all excellent in their own language, though perhaps the Latin than the Grerk is apter to dispose itself into an hexameter verse, as having both fewer monosyllables and fewer polysyllables. And this may make the Latin verse appear more grave and equal, which is taken for a kind of majesty; though in truth there be no majesty in words, but then when they seem to proceed from a high and weighty employment of the mind. But neither Homer, nor Virgil, nor Lucan, nor any poet writing commendably, though not excellently, was ever charged much with unknown words, or great constraint of style, as being a fault proper to translators, when they hold themselves too superstitiously to their author's words.

In the third virtue, which is contrivance, there is no doubt but Homer excels them all. For their poems, except the introduction of their Gods, are but so many histories in verse: where Homer has woven so many histories together as contain the whole learning of his time (which the Greeks call cyclopædia,), and furnished both the Greek and Latin stages with all the plots and arguments of their tragedies.

The fourth virtue, which is the height of fancy, is almost proper to Lucan, and so admirable in him, that no heroic poem raises such admiration of the poet, as his hath done, though not so great admiration of the persons he introduceth. And though it be a mark of a great wit, yet it is fitter for a

rhetorician than a poet, and rebelleth often against discretion, as when he says,

Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni. that is,
The side that won the Gods approved most,
But Cato better lik'd the side that lost.

Than which nothing could be spoken more gloriously to the the exaltation of a man, nor more disgracefully to the depression of the Gods. Homer indeed maketh some Gods for the Greeks, and some for the Trojans, but always makes Jupiter impartial; and never prefers the judgment of a man before that of Jupiter, much less before the judgment of all the Gods together.

The fifth virtue, which is the justice and impartiality of a poet, is very eminent in Homer and Virgil, but the contrary in Lucan. Lucan shows himself openly in the Pompeian faction, inveighing against Cæsar throughout his poem, like Cicero against Cataline or Marc Antony, and is therefore justly reckoned by Quintilian as a rhetorician rather than a poet. And a great part of the delight of his readers proceedeth from the pleasure which too many men take to hear great persons censured. But Homer and Virgil, especially Homer, do everywhere what they can to preserve the reputation of their heroes.

If we compare Homer and Virgil by the sixth virtue, which is the clearness of images, or descriptions, it is manifest that Homer ought to be preferred, though Virgil himself were to be the judge. For there are very few images in Virgil besides those which he hath translated out of Homer; so that Virgil's images are Homer's praises. But what if he have added something to it of his own? Though he have, yet it is no addition of praise, because it is easy. But he hath some images which are not in Homer, and better than his. It may be so; and so may other poets have which never durst

compare themselves with Homer. Two or three fine sayings are not enough to make a wit. But where is that image of his better done by him than Homer, of those that have been done by them both? Yes, Eustathius, as Mr. Ogilby hath observed, where they both describe the falling of a tree, prefers Virgil's description. But Eustathius is in that, I think, mistaken. The place of Homer is in the fourth of the Iliads, the sense whereof is this:

As when a man hath fell'd a poplar tree,
Tall, straight, and smooth, with all the fair boughs on;
Of which he means a coach-wheel made shall be,
And leaves it on the bank to dry i' th' sun;
So lay the comely Simoisius,
Slain by great Ajax, son of Telamon.

It is manifest that in this place Homer intended no more than to show how comely the body of Simoisius appeared as he lay dead upon the bank of Scamander, straight and tall, with a fair head of hair, and like a straight and high poplar with the boughs still on; and not at all to describe the manner of his falling, which, when a man is wounded through the breast, as he was with a spear, is always sudden.

The description of how a great tree falleth, when many men together hew it down, is in the second of Virgil's Æneads. The sense of it, with the comparison, is in English this:

And Troy, methought, then sunk in fire and smoke,
And overturned was in every part:
As when upon the mountain an old oak
Is hewn about with keen steel to the heart,
And plied by swains with many heavy blows,
It nods and every way it threatens round,

Till overcome with many wounds, it bows,
And leisurely at last comes to the ground.

And here again it is evident that Virgil meant to compare the manner how Troy, after many battles, and after the losses of many cities, conquered by the many nations under Agamemnon in a long war, and thereby weakened, and at last overthrown, with a great tree hewn round about, and then falling by little and little leisurely.

So that neither these two descriptions, nor the two comparisons can be compared together. The image of a man lying on the ground is one thing; the image of falling, especially of a kingdom, is another. This therefore gives no advantage to Virgil over Homer. It is true, that this description of the felling and falling of a tree is exceeding graceful, but is it therefore more than Homer could have done if need had been? Or is there no description in Homer of somewhat else as good as this? Yes, and in many of our English poets now alive. If it then be lawful for Julius Scaliger to say, that if Jupiter would have described the fall of a tree, he could not have mended this of Virgil; it will be lawful for me to repeat an old epigram of Antipater, to the like purpose, in favour of Homer.

The writer of the famous Trojan war,
And of Ulysses' life, O Jove make known,
Who, whence he was; for thine the verses are,
And he would have us think they are his own.

The seventh and last commendation of an heroic poem consisteth in amplitude and variety; and in this Homer exceedeth Virgil very much, and that not by superfluity of words, but by plenty of heroic matter, and multitude of descriptions and comparisons (whereof Virgil hath translated but a small part into his Æneads), such as are the images of shipwracks,

battles, single combats, beauty, passions of the mind, sacrifices, entertainments, and other things, whereof Virgil, abating what he borrows of Homer, has scarce the twentieth part. It is no wonder therefore if all the ancient learned men both of Greece and Rome have given the first place in poetry to Homer. It is rather strange that two or three, and of late time, and but learners of the Greek tongue, should dare to contradict so many competent judges both of language and discretion. But howsoever I defend Homer, I aim not thereby at any reflection upon the following translation. Why then did I write it? Because I had nothing else to do. Why publish it? Because I thought it might take off my adversaries from showing their folly upon my more serious writings, and set them upon my verses to show their wisdom. But why without annotations? Because I had no hope to do it better than it is already done by Mr. Ogilby.

T. Hobbes.

THE LIFE OF HOMER, COLLECTED AND WRITTEN BY J. WALLIM.

HOMER, WHOSE PROPER name was Melesigenes, was born in the country of Æolia, about 160 years after the siege of Troy, which was about the year of the world 3665, of Critheis, daughter of Melanopus and Omyris, who, after her father and mother's death, was left to a friend of her father's at Cuma, who, when he found she was with child, in displeasure he sent her away to a friend's at a place nigh the River Meles; where, at a feast among other young women, she was delivered of a son, whose name she called Melesigenes, from the place where he was born. Critheis went with her son to Ismenias, and after to Smyrna, where she dressed wool to get a livelihood for herself and son. Phemius, the schoolmaster, taking a fancy to her, married her, and took her son into the school, who by his sharpness of wit outwent all the school in wisdom and learning. In a short time after, his master dying, he taught the same school, and gained great reputation by his learning, not only at Smyrna, but all the countries round about; for the merchants that did frequent Smyrna, with corn, &c. did spread his fame about; amongst which merchants, one Mentes, master of a ship of Leucadia, took that kindness for him, that he persuaded him to leave his school and travel with him, which he did, by whom he was maintained well and plentifully in his travels.

They went to Spain, from thence to Italy, and from Italy through several countries, and at last came to Ithaca, where a violent rheum fell into the eyes of Homer, that he could not travel any further, so that Mentes left him with a friend of his called Mentor, a person of great riches and honour in

Ithaca, where Homer learned the principal matters relating to Ulysses' life; but Mentes the next year came back the same way, and finding Homer recovered in his eyes, took him in his travels. They went through many countries till they came to Colophen, where he fell into his old distemper of his eyes, and there grew quite blind; after which he addicted himself to poetry; but being poor, he went to Smyrna, expecting to get better encouragement there; but being disappointed of his expectation, he went to Cuma, and as he went he rested at a town called New-wall, where he repeated some of his verses; and one Tichio, a leather-seller, took such delight to hear them, that he entertained him kindly for a long time. After, he proceeded on his journey to Cuma, and when he came there he was well received, and he had some friends in the senate that did propose to have had a maintenance settled on him for life, but it could not be carried. At this place he first received the name of Homer, from his blindness.

From Cuma he went to Phocæa, where lived one Thestorides, a schoolmaster, who invited Homer to live with him, and by that means he got some of his verses, and after went to Chios, where he taught them as his own verses, and got great reputation by them. When Homer heard that Thestorides had thus abused him, he followed him to Chios, and by the way, at a place called Bollisus, was taken up by a shepherd, as he was keeping his master's sheep; the shepherd did relieve him, and carried him to his master, where he lived some time, and taught his children; yet he could not rest till he had been at Chios to discover the cheat of Thestorides, who when he heard of Homer's coming, he left Chios, where Homer tarried some time, and taught a school, grew rich, married, and had two daughters, one of which died young, the other he married to the shepherd's master that took him in at Bollisus. When he grew old he left Chios, and went to Samos, where he staid some time singing of verses at feasts and at new moons, at the chiefest men's houses in all places where he was. From Samos he was

going to Athens, but fell sick at Ios, and there died, and was buried on the sea-shore. Long after, when his poems had gotten an universal applause, the people of Ios built him a sepulchre.

HOMER'S ILIADS. TRANSLATED OUT OF GREEK BY THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.

LIB. I.

The discontent and secession of Achilles.

GODDESS SING WHAT woe the discontent
Of Thetis' son brought to the Greeks; what souls
Of heroes down to Erebus it sent,
Leaving their bodies unto dogs and fowls;
Whilst the two princes of the army strove,
King Agamemnon and Achilles stout.
That so it should be was the will of Jove,
But who was he that made them first fall out?
Apollo; who incensed by the wrong
To his priest Chryses by Atrides done,
Sent a great pestilence the Greeks among;
Apace they died, and remedy was none.
For Chryses came unto the Argive fleet,
With treasure great his daughter to redeem;
And having in his hands the ensigns meet,
That did the priestly dignity beseem,
A golden sceptre and a crown of bays,
Unto the princes all made his request;
But to the two Atrides chiefly prays,
Who of the Argive army were the best.
sons of Atreus, may the Gods grant you
A safe return from Troy with victory;
And you on me compassion may shew,

Receive these gifts and set my daughter free;
And have respect to Jove's and Leto's son.
To this the princes all gave their consent,
Except King Agamemnon. He alone,
And with sharp language from the fleet him sent;
Old man, said he, let me not see you here
Now staying, or returning back again,
For fear the golden sceptre which you bear,
And chaplet hanging on it, prove but vain.
Your daughter shall to Argos go far hence,
And make my bed, and labour at the loom,
And take heed you no farther me incense,
Lest you return not safely to your home.
Frighted with this, away the old man went;
And often as he walked on the sand,
His prayers to Apollo up he sent.
Hear me, Apollo, with thy bow in hand,
That honour'd art in Tenedos and Chryse,
And unto whom Cylla great honour bears,
If thou accepted hast my sacrifice,
Pay th' Argives with thy arrows for my tears.
His prayer was granted by the deity;
Who with his silver bow and arrows keen,
Descended from Olympus silently
In likeness of the sable night unseen.
His bow and quiver both behind him hang,
The arrows chink as often as he jogs,
And as he shot the bow was heard to twang,
And first his arrows flew at mules and dogs.

But when the plague into the army came,
Perpetual was the fire of funerals;
And so nine days continued the same.
Achilles on the tenth for counsel calls;
And Juno 'twas that put it in his head,
Who for the Argive army was afraid:
The lords to counsel being gathered,
Up stood Achilles, and thus to them said,
We must, I think, Atrides, run from hence,
Since war and plague consume us both at once,
Let's think on how to stay the pestilence,
Or else at Troy resolve to leave our bones.
Let's with some priest or prophet here advise,
That knows the pleasure of the gods above,
Or some that at expounding dreams are wise,
For also dreams descend on men from Jove:
That we may from him know Apollo's mind,
If we for sacrifice be in arrear,
Or if he will for lambs and goats be kind,
And to destroy us from henceforth forbear.
Achilles then sat down, and Chalchas rose,
That was of great renown for augury,
And any thing was able to disclose,
That had been, is, or should hereafter be;
And guided had the Greeks to Ilium;
Achilles, said he, since you me command
To tell you why this plague is on us come,
Swear you will save me both with word and hand.
Of all the Greeks it will offend the best;

Who though his anger for awhile he smother,
Will not, I fear, long time contented rest,
But will revenged be some time or other.
Chalchas, replied Achilles, do not fear,
But what the god has told you bring to light:
By Phœbus, not a man shall hurt you here,
As long as I enjoy my life and sight;
Though Agamemnon be the man you dread,
Who is of all the army most obeyed.
The prophet by these words encouraged,
Said what before to say he was afraid.
'Tis not neglect of vow or sacrifice
That doth the God Apollo thus displease;
But that we do his priest so much despise,
As not his child for ransom to release.
And more, till she be to her father sent,
And with a hecatomb, and ransomless,
The anger of the god will not relent,
Nor will the sickness 'mongst the people cease.
This said, he sat. The king look'd furiously,
And anger flaming stood upon his eyes,
While many black thoughts on his heart did lie;
And to the prophet Chalchas thus replies:
Unlucky prophet, that didst never yet
Good fortune prophecy to me, but ill,
And ever with a mind against me set
Inventest prophecies to cross my will;
And now again you fain would have it thought,
Because I would not let Chryseis go,

The gifts refusing which her father brought,
Therefore this plague was sent amongst us now.
With Clytemnestra she may well contend,
For person, or for beauty, or for art;
Yet so, to send her home I do intend,
For of our loss I bear the greatest part.
But you must then some prize for me provide;
Shall no man unrewarded go but I?
This said, Achilles to the king replied,
Atrides, that on booty have your eye,
You know divided is, or sold the prey
Which never can resumed be again.
But send her home. When we shall have sack'd Troy,
Your loss shall be repaid with triple gain.
No, said Atrides, that I never meant;
D'ye think 'tis fit that you your shares retain?
And only mine unto the God be sent,
That unrewarded none but I remain?
I thought it reason th' Argives should collect
Amongst themselves the value (how they list)
And give it me before they did expect
This prize of mine should be by me dismist.
If they'll do that, 'tis well. If not, I'll go
To your, or Ajax, or Ulysses' tent,
And take his prize, and right myself will so,
Wherewith I think he will not be content.
But since there's time enough to speak of this,
Let's ready make a ship with able rowers,
And th' hecatomb, to go with fair Chryseis,

And, to direct, one of the counsellors;
Ajax, Idomeneus, Ulysses, or
Yourself may go, Achilles, if you please,
And do the business you are pleading for,
And, if you can, th' offended God appease.
impudence! Achilles then replied,
What other of th' Achæans willingly,
Will, when you only for yourself provide,
Go where you bid, or fight with th' enemy?
Against the Trojans I no quarrel have.
In Pthia plund'ring they were never seen,
Nor ever thence my kine or horses drave,
Nor could; the sea and great hills are between.
Only for yours and Menelaus' sake,
To honour gain for you we came to Troy,
Whereof no notice, dogs-head, now you take,
But threaten me my prize to take away;
Which by my labour I have dearly bought,
And by th' Achæans given me has been.
And when the city Troy we shall have got,
Your share will great, mine little be therein.
For though my part be greatest in the pain,
Yet when unto division we come,
You will expect the greatest part o' th' gain,
And that with little I go weary home.
Then farewell Troy. To sea I'll go again,
And back to Pthia. Then it will be seen
When you without me shall at Troy remain,
What honour and what riches you shall win.

Go when you will, said Agamemnon, fly,
I'll not entreat you for my sake to stay.
When you are gone more honour'd shall be I,
Nor Jove, I hope, will with you go away.
In you I shall but lose an enemy
That only loves to quarrel and to fight.
The Gods have given you strength I not deny.
Go 'mongst your myrmidons and use your might.
I care not for you, nor your anger fear,
For after I have sent away Chryseis,
And satisfi'd the God, I'll not forbear
To fetch away from you the fair Briseis,
And that by force. For I would have you see
How much to mine inferior is your might,
And others fear t' oppose themselves to me.
This swell'd Achilles' choler to the height,
And made him study what to do were best,
To draw his sword and Agamemnon kill,
Or take some time his anger to digest.
His sword was drawn, yet doubtful was his will.
But Juno, that of both of them took care,
Sent Pallas down, who coming stood behind
Achilles, and laid hold upon his hair.
Whereat Achilles wond'ring in his mind,
Turn'd back, and by the terror of her eyes
Knew her; but by none else perceiv'd was she.
Come you, said he, to see the injuries
That are by Agamemnon done to me?
So great, O Goddess Pallas, is his pride,

As I believe it cost him will his life.
I hither came, Athena then reply'd,
To put an end to this unlucky strife.
From heaven I hither was by Juno sent,
That loves you both, and of you both takes care,
Drawing of swords and bloodshed to prevent.
But as for evil words you need not spare.
For the wrong done you he shall trebly pay
Another time. Hold then. Your sword forbear.
I must then, said Achilles, you obey,
Tho' wrong'd. Who hears not Gods, the Gods not hear.
This said, his mighty sword again he sheath'd,
And Pallas up unto Olympus flew.
Achilles still nothing but choler breath'd,
And Agamemnon thus revil'd anew.
Dog's-face, and drunkard, coward that thou art,
That hat'st to lead the people out to fight;
Nor yet to lie in ambush hast the heart,
And painfully watch in the field all night.
But thou to take from other men their due,
Safe lying in the camp, more pleasure hast.
But fools they are that ruled are by you,
Or else this injury had been your last.
But this I'll say, and with an oath make good.
(Now by this sceptre, which hath left behind
The stock whereon it once grew in the wood,
And never more shall have nor leaf nor rind,
And by Achæan princes now is borne
By whom Jove's laws to th' people carried be.)

You hear now what a great oath I have sworn:
If ere the Acheans shall have need of me,
And Agamemnon cannot them relieve,
When Hector fills the field with bodies slain,
And Agamemnon only for them grieve,
They my assistance wish for shall in vain.
This said, Achilles threw the sceptre down
That stuck all over was with nails of gold;
And Nestor rose, of Pyle that wore the crown,
Wise and sweet orator and captain old.
His words like honey dropped from his tongue.
Two ages he in battle honour gain'd.
For all that while he youthful was and strong,
And with the third age now in Pyle he reign'd.
What grief t' Achæa coming is, said he,
Gods, what joy to Priam and his seed,
How glad will all the Trojans be to see
You two, that all the rest in pow'r exceed,
With your own hands shed one another's blood!
I elder am, do then as I advise.
For I conversed have with men as good,
That yet my counsel never did despise.
Perithous and Dryas were great men,
And Polyphemus and Exadius,
Such as for strength I ne'er shall see again;
And so were Cæneus, and Theseus,
The strongest of mankind were these, and slew
The strongest of wild beasts that haunt the wood.
These strong men I convers'd withal and knew;

And with them also I did what I could.
With these no other could contend in fight.
Yet they from Pyle thought fit to call me forth
Far off; nor ever did my counsel slight.
Think not therefore my counsel nothing worth.
Atrides take not from him, though you can,
The damsel which the Greeks have given him.
Forbear the king, Pelides. For the man
Whom Jove hath crown'd is made of Jove a limb.
Though you be strong, and on a Goddess got,
Atrides is before you in command.
Atrides, be but you to peace once brought,
T' appease Achilles I will take in hand,
Who is (while we are lying here) our wall.
To this Atrides answered again,
I nothing can deny of this at all.
But he amongst us thinks he ought to reign,
And give the law to all as he thinks fit.
But I am certain that shall never be.
He well can fight; the Gods have granted it,
But they ne'er taught him words of infamy.
Then interrupting him, Achilles said,
I were a wretch and nothing worth indeed,
If I whatever you command obey'd.
I will no more to what you say take heed.
But this I tell you, if you take away
The damsel which is mine by your own gift,
I do not mean for that to make a fray
Amongst the Greeks, or once my hand to lift.

Fetch her yourself, Atrides, but take heed
Against my will you nothing else take there.
Try; that th' Achæans may see how you speed,
And how your black blood shall run down my spear.
Thus in disorder the assembly ends.
Achilles to his own ships took his way,
Patroclus with him and his other friends.
And Agamemnon then without delay
Launched a bark, and in go row'rs twice ten.
Aboard the maid and th' hecatomb they lay.
Ulysses went commander of the men.
And swiftly then the ship cuts out her way.
And then Atrides th' army purifi'd,
And threw into the sea the purgament.
Then sacrific'd o' th' sands by the sea side
A hecatomb. To heaven up went the scent,
And busy were the people. But the king
Still on his quarrel with Achilles thought,
And how Briseis from his tent to bring.
For what he threaten'd he had not forgot.
But sent Talthybius and Eurybates
T' Achilles' tent to fetch Briseis thence.
(Two public servants of the king were these,
Ordained to carry his commandments.)
If he refuse, said he, to let her go,
I'll thither go myself with greater force
And take her thence, whether he will or no.
Which, angry as he is, will vex him worse.
The messengers, though not well pleased, went

Unto the fleet o' th' Myrmidons, and there
They found Achilles sitting by his tent.
Well pleas'd he was not. And they silent were,
And stood still, struck with fear and reverence.
Achilles seeing that, spake first, and said,
Come near. To me you have done no offence.
Go you, Patroclus, and lead forth the maid,
And give her to these men, that they may be
To Gods and men, and to th' unbridled man,
My witnesses, when they have need of me
To save th' Achæans, which he never can.
For what can he devise of any worth?
Or how can he the Greeks in battle save?
This said, Patroclus led Briseis forth,
And to Atrides' messengers her gave.
She with them went, though much against her heart.
Achilles from his friends went off and pray'd.
And sitting with his face to the sea apart
Weeping, unto his mother Thetis said,
Mother, though Jove have given me so small
A time of life, I could contented be,
Had I not been dishonoured withal,
And forc'd to bear such open injury.
Thetis in the inmost closets of the deep,
Sat with the old God Nereus, and heard.
And not enduring long to hear him weep,
Above the sea like to a mist appear'd,
And by him sat, and strok'd his head, and said,
Why weep you, child? What is't that grieves you so?

Tell me, speak out. Of what are you afraid?
Come, whatsoever 'tis let me it know.
Mother, said he, 'tis not to you unknown,
When we took Thebe, and had brought away
The captives and the riches of the town,
Chryseis fell t' Atrides for his prey.
And how her father Chryses came to th' fleet
With ransom great his daughter to redeem,
And having in his hands the ensigns meet
Which did his priestly dignity beseem,
A golden sceptre and a crown of bays,
Unto the princes all made his request.
But to the two Atrides chiefly prays,
Who of the Argive army were the best.
sons of Atreus, may the Gods grant you
A safe return from Troy with victory;
And you on me compassion may shew,
Receive these gifts, and set my daughter free;
And have respect to Jove's and Leto's son.
To this the princes all gave their consent,
Except King Agamemnon. He alone,
And with sharp language from the fleet him sent.
Away the old man goes, and as he went,
Against the Greeks he to Apollo pray'd;
Who heard him, and the plague amongst them sent,
Which daily multitudes of them destroy'd.
Of which the prophet, being ask'd the cause,
Said, 'twas for th' injury to Chryses done.
I mov'd to send her back. Then angry was

Atrides, though beside Atrides, none.
And though he too has sent her now away,
Yet what he threaten'd he has brought to pass.
His officers from me have forc'd my prey,
And Agamemnon now Briseis has.
And now, if ever, let me have your aid,
If you have holpen Jove with word or deed;
(For in my father's house you oft have said,
That heretofore you stood him in great stead,
When other Gods to bind him had decreed,
Juno and Neptune, Pallas and the rest,
You to him came and from his bonds him freed.
For up you fetch'd Briareus, the best
Of Titans all, whom men Ægæon call,
The gods Briareus, with a hundred hands,
And set him next to Jove. No God at all
Then durst to Jupiter approach with bonds);
Put Jove in mind of this, and him intreat
The Trojan hands to fortify in fight,
And to repel the Greeks with slaughter great,
That in their goodly king they may delight,
And Agamemnon count what he hath won
By doing such dishonour to the best
Of th' Argives, and that has such service done.
Ay me, said Thetis, would you could here rest
Unhurt, ungriev'd. For I have born you to
Short life. And not far from you is your fate.
And grievous 'tis to be dishonour'd too.
But I to Jove will all you say relate

When I go to Olympus. Till then stay,
And angry though you are, from war forbear.
To blackmoor-land the Gods went yesterday,
And twelve days hence again they will be there.
This said, the Goddess went away, and left
Her son Achilles with his anger striving,
For that he had been of his prize bereft.
And then Ulysses at the port arriving
Of Chryse, first his sails he furl'd, and stow'd
Them on the deck together with the mast;
And with their oars their ship ashore they row'd,
And out their anchors threw; and ty'd her fast.
And on the beach the men descending laid
The victims in good order on the sand.
When this was done, they disembark'd the maid.
And then Ulysses took her by the hand,
And brought her to the altar, where the priest
Her father stood, and to him spake, and said,
Chryses, see, Atrides hath dismiss'd
Your daughter, and this hecatomb hath paid.
By Agamemnon we are hither sent
The same to offer, and t' Apollo pray,
That he accept it will, and be content
The sickness from the Greeks to take away.
This said, he put Chryseis to his hand,
And he with great contentment her receiv'd.
Then all with salt and barley ready stand,
And Chryses pray'd with hands to heaven upheav'd.
Hear me, Apollo, with the silver bow,

That dost in Tenedos and Cylla reign,
And heardst my pray'r against the Greeks; hear now,
And from them send the pestilence again.
When Chryses had thus to Apollo pray'd,
Then pray'd they all; and salt and barley threw
Upon the victims; which they kill'd and flay'd.
But from the altar first they them withdrew.
And then the thighs cut off they alit in twain,
And round about they cover them with fat,
And one part on the other laid again.
The priest himself came when they had done that,
And burnt them on a fire of cloven wood;
And as they burning were pour'd on black wine.
Young men with spits five-branched by them stood.
When burnt the thighs were for the pow'r divine,
And entrails eaten, the rest cut in joints
Before the fire they roasted skilfully,
Pierced through with the spits that had five points;
And took it up when roasted thoroughly.
When ended was their work, began the feast;
Where nothing wanting was of what was good.
And having thirst and hunger dispossest,
And filled with sweet wine the temp'rers stood.
Then round the cups were borne; and all day long
Sitting they celebrated Phœbus' might,
And magnifi'd his goodness in sweet song,
And he in his own praises took delight.
But when the sun had borne away his light,
Upon the sands they laid them down to sleep.

And when again Aurora came in sight,
Again they launch their ship into the deep.
A good fore-wind Apollo with them sent.
Then with her breast the ship the water tore
(Which by her down on both sides roaring went)
And soon arrived at the Trojan shore.
And there they drew her up again to land,
And ev'ry man went which way he thought best.
Achilles yet not able to command
The anger that still boiled in his breast,
No longer would the Greeks at council meet,
Nor with them any more to battle come;
But sullen sat before his tent and fleet,
Wishing to see the Argives beaten home.
Twelve times the sun had risen now and set,
The Gods t' Olympus all returned were;
Thetis her son's complaints did not forget,
But up she carried them to Jupiter.
Upon the highest top alone sat he
Of the great many-headed hill, and laid
One hand on's breast, th' other on his knee.
And in that posture thus unto him said,
father Jove, if for you I have done
Service at any time by word or deed,
Repay it now I pray you to my son,
Whom Agamemnon hath dishonoured.
Short time the Fates have given him to life.
Atrides taken from him hath his prey.
Now victory unto the Trojans give

Till Agamemnon for his fault shall pay.
Thus prayed she. But Jove made no reply.
Nor took she off her hands; but pray'd anew;
Jove, my prayer grant me, or deny,
That I may know what power I have in you.
Then Jove much grieved, spake to her, and said,
'Twixt me and Juno 'twill a quarrel make.
For she before the Gods will me upbraid,
When she shall know the Trojans' part I take.
But go, lest she observe what you do here.
I'll give a nod to all that you have spoken,
That you may safely trust to and not fear.
A nod from me is an unfailing token.
This said, with his black brows he to her nodded,
Wherewith displayed were his locks divine;
Olympus shook at stirring of his Godhead;
And Thetis from it jump'd into the brine,
And Jupiter unto his house went down.
The Gods arose and waited on him thither:
But unto Juno it was not unknown
That he and Thetis had conferr'd together,
Who presently to Jove her husband went,
And angry him rebuk'd with language keen.
You that still in my absence tricks invent,
What God hath with you now in counsel been?
Though unto me you hate to tell your mind.
Juno, said Jove, you must not hope to hear
All whatsoe'er it be, I have design'd.
But what I mean shall come unto the ear

Of all the Gods, you first of all shall know.
But what from all together I shall hide
Ask me no more, I will not tell you, though
My wife you be. Juno then thus repli'd.
Harsh Chronides, what words of yours are these!
To ask you questions I'll henceforth forbear,
And quietly let you do what you please.
But one thing I must tell you that I fear.
Thetis, I fear, has gotten your consent,
For her son's sake the Argives to oppress.
Suspect you can, said Jove, but not prevent,
Which doth but give me cause to love you less.
Though it be true, 'twas I would have it so.
Therefore sit still and do as I would have you.
Lest when my mighty hands about you go,
Nor all the other Gods in heav'n shall save you.
Then Juno silent sat with grief and fear;
And all the Gods i' th' house of Jove did grieve.
But Vulcan, the renoun'd artificer,
Stood up his mother Juno to relieve.
what will this come to at last, said he,
If you for mortals thus shall be at odds!
The tumult than the cheer will greater be.
What pleasure can this be unto the Gods?
And though my mother wiser be than I,
Yet thus much I'll not doubt her to advise,
That with my father's will she would comply,
That no such quarrel may hereafter rise.
For by the roots he can the world pluck up.

Therefore I pray you mother speak him fair;
He'll soon be pleas'd. Then filled he a cup
Of nectar sweet, and bore it to her chair;
And to her said, mother, I pray you hold,
And do no more my father's choler move.
If you be beaten I shall but behold,
And grieve I am not strong enough for Jove.
I would have helpt you once, when by the foot
He threw me down to Lemnos from the sky.
All the day long I was a falling to't,
Where more than half dead taken up was I.
And there by th' Sincians I was taken up.
When Vulcan had his history told out,
His mother on him smil'd, and took the cup,
And to the Gods he nectar bore about.
And then the Gods laught all at once outright
To see the lame and sooty Vulcan skink.
And all the day from morning unto night
Ambrosia they eat, and nectar drink.
Apollo played, and alternately
The Muses to him sung. When night was come,
Then gently Sleep solicited each eye,
And to his house each God departed home.
And Jupiter went up unto the bed
Where he at other times was wont to lie
When sleep came on him, and laid down his head
To take repose; and Juno lay him by.

LIB. II.

The dream of Agamemnon. The tempting of the army, and the catalogue of ships and commanders.

THE GODS, AND princes of the Argive host
Slept all night long. Jove only waking lay,
And many projects in his mind he tost,
To grace Achilles, and the Greeks annoy.
At last a Dream he call'd. False Dream, said he,
Go, hie to Agamemnon's tent, and say,
Distinctly as you bidden are by me.
Bid him bring up his army now to Troy;
For now the time is come he shall it take.
The Gods no more thereon deliberate,
But all consented have for Juno's sake,
No longer to delay the Trojan fate.
Then with his errand went the Dream away,
And quickly was at Agamemnon's tent.
And finding him as fast asleep he lay,
Up presently unto his head he went.
And in the shape of Nestor to him spake.
Sleep you, said he, Atrides? 'Tis not fit
For him from whom the people counsel take,
That sleep all night upon his eyes should sit.
But Jove looks to you. Listen then to me.

For ’tis from Jove that I am to you come.
He bids you lead the army presently
Up every man to the walls of Ilium.
For now the time is come you shall it take.
The Gods no more thereon deliberate.
But all consented have for Juno’s sake,
No longer to delay the Trojan fate.
And therefore when you wake forget it not.
This said, the Dream departed. And the king
Believ’d it as an oracle, and thought
To take Troy now as sure as anything;
Vain man, presuming from a dream Jove’s will,
Who meant to th’ Greeks and Trojans yet much woe,
And with their carcasses the field to fill
Before the Greeks should back to Argos go.
The king awak’d, and sat upon his bed,
Puts on his coat and a great cloak upon,
Handsome and new; his dream still in his head;
The dream of Agamemnon, &c.
And then his silver-studded sword puts on.
And then he took his sceptre in his hand
Which formerly his ancestors had borne,
And went to th’ ships whereof he had command.
And to the Gods with light then came the morn.
Then Agamemnon bids to counsel call.
The cryers call’d, the Greeks together went.
But first he had with the old captains all
Consulted what to do at Nestor’s tent;
And said he dream’d that one like Nestor spake

To him and said, Atrides ’tis not fit
For one of whom the people counsel take
That sleep upon his eyes all night should sit.
But Jove secures you. Listen then to me,
For ’tis from him that I unto you come.
He bids you lead the army presently
Up every man to the walls of Ilium.
For now the time is come you shall it take,
The Gods thereon no more deliberate,
But all consented have for Juno’s sake,
No longer to delay the Trojan fate.
And therefore when you wake forget it not.
This said, the dream went off again, and I
How to th’ assault the army may be brought
As far as we can safely fain would try.
I’ll first give them advice to go away,
As if there were no hope to gain the town.
But you must then be sure to make them stay.
This said, King Agamemnon sat him down,
And Nestor rose. Captains of th’ host, said he,
This dream, had it been told b’another man,
Feigned and foolish would have seem’d to me.
But since the king is th’ author (if we can)
Let us persuade the people to take arms.
And having said, began to lead away.
And now the people coming there in swarms.
For as the bees in a fair summer’s day
Come out in clusters from the hollow rock,
And light upon the flow’rs that honey yield;

So to th' assembly did the people flock,
And bristling stood with expectation fill'd.
When they sat down, it made the ground to sigh.
The lords nine criers then amongst them sent
To make them silent, or to drown their cry,
And from the press their chairs to defend.
With much ado at last they silent were.
Then Agamemnon took into his hand
His sceptre (which was made by Mulciber
For Jove to carry when he did command.
Jove gave it afterward to Mercury;
The tempting of the army.
And Mercury to Pelops gave the same.
From Pelops it went down successively
To Atreus, and to Thyestes came.
From him it came to Agamemnon's hand,
Who many islands and all Argos sway'd.)
And leaning now upon it with his hand,
Unto the princes of the army said.
Servants of Mars, commanders of the Greeks,
what great trouble Jove involves me in!
Disgracefully to send me home he seeks,
Although he told me I the town should win,
And now (when I have lost so many men)
It seems to play with men he takes delight.
What towns has he destroy'd, and will again
Destroy still more, to exercise his might?
For both to us and our posterity
'Twill be a great disgrace to go to Troy

With so great multitudes, and baffled be,
And nothing done again to come away.
If we and they should on a truce agree,
And one by one they muster up their men;
And we should count how many tens we be,
And make one Trojan fill out wine for ten,
Many a ten would want a man to skink,
So much in number we the town exceed.
But when upon their many aids I think,
I wonder less that we no better speed.
Nine years are gone; our cordage spoiled with rain:
Our ships are rotted, and our wives at home,
And children dear expect us back again.
Nor know we of the war what will become.
Come, then, and all agree on what I say,
Let's put to sea, and back t' Achæa fly.
We shall not win the town although we stay.
This said, the army with applauses high
Consented all (save those that had been by
In council of the princes of Achæa)
And moved were like to the billows high
That rolled are by some great wind at sea.
Or as, when in a field of well-grown wheat
The ears incline by a sharp wind opprest;
So bow'd the heads in this assembly great
When their consent they to the king exprest.
Then going to the ships cry'd Ha la la!
Great dust they raised, and encouraged
Each other to the sea his ship to draw,

And cleans'd the way to th' water from each bed;
And straight unpropt their ships; and to the sky
Went up the noise. Then Juno sent away
Pallas. Pallas, quoth she, the Greeks will fly,
And Helen leave behind, for whom at Troy
So many of the Greeks their lives have lost,
And stay'd so long in vain before the town.
And then will Priam and the Trojans boast,
Unless you quickly to the ships go down.
Go quickly then, try if you can prevail,
With hopeful words to stay them yet ashore,
And take away their sudden list to sail,
And let the ships lie as they did before.
This said, the Goddess leapt down to the ground,
From high Olympus, and stood on the sand
Where lay the Greeks. Ulysses there she found
Angry to see the people go from land.
Ulysses, said she, do you mean to fly,
And here leave Helen after so much cost
Of time and blood, and show your vanity;
And leave the Trojans of their rape to boast?
Speak to each one, try if you can prevail
With hopeful words to stay them on the shore,
And take away this sudden list to sail,
And let the ships lie where they lay before.
Ulysses then ran t' Agamemnon's tent,
And took his staff (the mark of chief command)
And laying by his cloak to th' ships he went,
Amongst th' Achæans with that staff in's hand.

And when he met with any prince or peer,
He gently said, fear does not you become.
You should not only you yourself stay here,
But also others keep from flying home.
Atrides now did but the Argives try,
And those he sees most forward to be gone
Shall find perhaps least favour in his eye.
For of the secret council you were none.
Deep-rooted is the anger of a king,
To whom high Jove committed has the law,
And justice left to his distributing.
But when a common man he bawling saw,
He bang'd him with his staff, and roughly spake.
Be silent, and hear what your betters say.
For who of you doth any notice take
In council or in martial array?
Let one be king (we cannot all be kings)
To whom Jove gave the sceptre and the laws
To rule for him. Thus he the people brings
Off from their purpose, and to council draws.
Then to th' assembly back again they pass'd,
With noise like that the sea makes when it breaks
Against the shore, and quiet were at last.
Thersites only standeth up and speaks.
One that to little purpose could say much.
And what he thought would make men laugh would say.
And for an ugly fellow none was such
'Mongst all the Argives that besieged Troy.
Lame of one leg he was; and look'd asquint;

His shoulders at his breast together came;
His head went tapering up into a point,
With straggling and short hair upon the same.
Ulysses and Achilles most him hated,
For these two princes he us'd most to chide;
And Agamemnon now aloud he rated,
And thereby anger'd all the Greeks beside.
What is't, Atrides, said he, stays you here?
Your tent is full of brass; women you have
The best of all that by us taken were,
For always unto you the choice we gave.
Or look you for more gold that yet may come
For ransom of some prisoner whom I
Or other Greeks shall take at Ilium,
Or for some young maid to keep privately?
But kings ought not their private ease to buy
With public danger and a common woe.
Come, women of Achaia, let us fly,
And let him spend his gettings on the foe.
For then how much we help him he will know,
That has a better than himself disgrac'd.
But that Achilles is to anger slow,
That injury of his had been his last.
This said, Ulysses straightway to him went,
And with sour look, and bitter language said,
Prater, that to thyself seems eloquent,
How darest thou alone the king t' upbraid?
A greater coward than thou art there's none
'Mongst all the Greeks that came with us to Troy.

Else ‘gainst the king thy tongue would not so run.
Thou seek’st but an excuse to run away.
Because we know not how we shall come off
As yet from Troy, must you the king upbraid,
And at the princes of the army scoff,
As if they too much honour to him paid?
But I will tell you one thing, and will do’t.
If here again I find you fooling thus,
Then from my shoulders let my head be cut,
Or let me lose my son Telemachus,
If I not strip you naked to the skin,
And send you soundly beaten to the ships
With many stripes and ugly to be seen.
This said, he basted him both back and hips.
Thersites shrugg’d, and wept, sat down, and had
His shoulders black and blue, dy’d by the staff;
Look’d scurvily. The people that were sad
But just before, now could not choose but laugh.
And, oh, said one t’ another standing near,
Ulysses many handsome things has done,
When we in council or in battle were,
A better deed than this is he did none,
That has so silenced this railing knave,
And of his peevish humour stay’d the flood,
As he no more will dare the king to brave.
And then to speak Ulysses ready stood.
Where Pallas like a crier did appear,
And standing by him silence did command,
That also they that sat far off might hear.

Then spake he, with the sceptre in his hand.
The people, O Atrides, go about
To put you on an act will be your shame,
Forgetting what they promis'd setting out,
Not to return till Troy they overcame.
But now like widow-women they complain,
Or little children longing to go home.
To be from home a month, it is a pain
To them that to their loving wives would come.
To sea they'd go though certain to be tost
By many a sturdy wind upon the same.
But they have now lain here nine years almost;
I cannot therefore say they are to blame.
But certainly after so long a stay
'Tis very shameful empty back to go.
Let us at least abide till know we may
Whether what Chalchas said be true or no.
For this we all know and are witnesses
(Excepting only those that since are dead)
When we from Aulis went to pass the seas,
And by contrary winds were hindered,
That there we to the gods did sacrifice
Upon an altar close unto a spring,
That of a plane-tree at the root did rise;
And how we saw there a prodigious thing.
A mighty serpent with a back blood-red
From out the spring glided up to the tree,
The boughs whereof were ev'ry way far spread.
On th' utmost chanc'd a sparrow's nest to be.

Young ones were in it eight, with th’ old one nine;
The old one near the nest stay’d fluttering,
And grievously the while did cry and whine.
At last the serpent catcht her by the wing.
And when the serpent had devour’d all nine,
He presently was turn’d into a stone;
That we might see from Jove it was a sign
Of what should afterward at Troy be done.
We were amaz’d so strange a thing to see,
Till Chalchas rose and did the same explain.
This is a certain sign from Jove, said he,
That he intends to do the like again.
For as the snake devour’d nine birds in all;
So nine years long we shall make war at Troy,
And after nine years Ilium shall fall.
But in the tenth year we shall come away.
This then said Chalchas; and all hitherto
Is come to pass. Therefore Achæans stay,
Since nothing here remaineth now to do,
But overcoming the old town of Troy.
This said, the people made a mighty noise,
Which bounding from the ships was twice as great,
Sounding of nothing but Ulysses’ praise.
And up then rose old Nestor from his seat.
Fie, fie, said he, why sit we talking here?
Where are your promises, and whither gone
Our oaths and vows? To what end did we swear?
Where be the hands that we rely’d upon?
What good will’t do to sit upon the shore,

How long soever be our time to stay?
Hold fast, Atrides, as you did before
The power you have; and lead us up to Troy.
A man or two you safely may neglect,
Though they dissent and secret counsel take.
For they'll be able nothing to effect,
Before to Argos our retreat we make,
And know if Jove have spoken true or no.
For when we went aboard to go for Troy,
Jove light'ned to the right hand, which all know
A sign of granting is for what we pray.
Let none of you long therefore to be gone,
Till of some Trojan's wife he hath his will,
And ta'en a not unfit revenge upon
The Trojans that have Helen us'd as ill.
But he that for all this is fiercely bent
On going home, and thinks that counsel best,
And lays hand on his ship, let him be sent
Down into Erebus before the rest.
But you, O king, think well, and take advice
First into tribes the army to divide,
And tribes again into fraternities,
That tribe may tribe and fellow fellow aid.
The leaders and the soldiers then you'll know
Which of them merits praise, and which is naught.
And if the town you do not overthrow,
Whether on us or Jove to lay the fault.
To this Atrides answer made and said,
Nestor, father, you exceed all men

In giving counsel. Would the Gods me aid
With counsellors such as you are but ten,
The town of Priam we should quickly win.
Nor had we now so long about it staid,
If Jupiter had not engag'd me in
A quarrel with Achilles for a maid.
But if we come but once more to agree,
The evil day from Troy will not be far.
Now take your food, that we may ready be,
And able to endure the toil of war.
Let ev'ry man now sharpen well his spear,
His buckler mend, and give his horses meat,
And look well to his chariot everywhere,
That we may fight all day without retreat,
For we shall fight I doubt not all day long,
And never cease as long as we can see.
Of many a shield sweaty will be the thong,
And spear upon the hand lie heavily;
And many horses at the chariot sweat.
But he that willingly to avoid the fight
Shall stay behind, or to the ships retreat,
His body shall be food for dog and kite.
This said, the people pleas'd with what was spoken,
Approv'd the same with shouts, as loud as when
Betwixt great waves and rocks the sea is broken.
Then from the assembly they return again.
And at their ships they sacrifice and pray
Each one to th' God in whom he trusted most,
That he might by his favour come away

Alive, with whole limbs from the Trojan host.
But Agamemnon sacrific'd a steer
To Jove, of five years old, and to the feast
Call'd such as in the army princes were,
Or held to be for chivalry the best,
Nestor, Idomeneus, two Ajaces,
And the son of Tydeus Diomed,
The sixth Ulysses Laertiades,
And Menelaus thither came unbid.
For well he knew his brother would be sad.
About the victim then th' assembly stands,
And in their hands they salt and barley had.
Then pray'd Atrides holding up his hands;
Great, glorious Jove, that dwellest in the sky,
let not Phœbus carry hence the day
Till Priam's palace proud in ashes lie,
And Hector sprawling in the dust of Troy,
And many Trojans with him. So pray'd he.
And Jove was with his sacrifice content.
But unto all his pray'r did not agree,
Intending still his labour to augment.
Whan all had pray'd, they salt and barley threw
Upon the victim which they kill'd and flay'd.
But from the altar they it first withdrew.
The thighs they slit, and fat upon them laid.
And burnt them in a fire of cloven wood;
The entrails o'er the fire they broiled eat,
The rest they roast on spits that by them stood;
And when they roasted were, fell to their meat.

When the desire of meat and drink was gone,
Nestor stood up, and to Atrides said,
Let us no longer leave the work undone,
Which Jupiter himself has on us laid.
Let's call the Greeks together out of hand,
That we may make them ready for the war.
Atrides then to th' criers gave command
T' assemble them. They soon assembled are.
And then the princes went into the field,
And them in tribes and in fraternities
Distinguished. And Pallas with her shield,
(An undecaying shield and of great price,
Rais'd at the brim with orbs of beaten gold
An hundred, worth an hundred cows at least.)
With this the Goddess went, to make them bold,
Courage inspiring into ev'ry breast.
And now their hearts are all on fire to fight,
And vanish'd is the thought of their returning.
And such as of a mountain is the sight
Upon whose top a large thick wood stands burning;
Such, as they marching were, the splendour was,
And seemed to reach up unto the sky,
Reflected from so many arms of brass
Bright and new polished unto the eye.
As when of many sorts the long-neck'd fowls
Unto the large and flow'ry plain repair,
Through which Cayster's water gently rolls,
In multitudes high flying in the air,
Then here and there fly priding in their wing,

And by and by at once light on the ground,
And with great clamour make the air to ring,
And th' earth whereon they settle to resound;
So when th' Acheans went up from the fleet,
And on their march were to the town of Troy,
The earth resounded loud with hoofs and feet.
But at Scamander's flow'ry bank they stay,
In number like the flowers of the field,
Or leaves in spring, or multitude of flies
In some great dairy 'bout the vessels fill'd,
Delighted with the milk, dance, fall and rise.
The leaders then amongst them went, and brought
Them quickly into tribes and companies,
As ev'ry goat-herd quickly knows his goat
Whether it be another man's or his.
And Agamemnon there amongst the rest
Was eminent. Like Jove in hea and face;
Belted like Mars; like Neptune's was his breast.
Such beauty Jove upon the man did place.
The catalogue of ships and commanders.
Now, Muses, ye that in Olympus dwell,
(For Goddesses you are, and present were,
And all that pass'd at Troy can truly tell,
And we can nothing know but what we hear.)
Who of the Greeks at Troy commanded men?
The common soldiers you need not name,
For I should never say them o'er again,
Although I had as many tongues as Fame.
Boetia, wherein contained be

Eteonus, and Schœnus, and Scolus,
Aulis, Thespeia, Græa, Hyrie,
Harma, Eilesius, and Mycalessus,
Erythræ, Elion, Ocaliæ.
Hylæ, Eutresis, Thisbe, Peleon,
Platæa, Aliareus, and Copæ,
Coronia, Glisse, Thebe, Medeon,
Onchestus Neptune's town, Nissa divine,
And Midias, and utmost Anthedon,
And Arne that great plenty has of wine.
The which in all made fifty ships. And those
Commanded were by Archesilaus,
And Prothoenor and Peneleos,
And Leitus, and with them Clonius.
The seamen in each one to six score rose.
Aspledon and Orchomenus besides
Did set forth twenty good black ships to sea.
Ascalaphus and Ialmenus were guides,
Begot by Mars upon Astyoche.
The towns of Phocis, Crissa, Panopea,
And Cyparissus, Python, and Daulis,
And on the brook of Cephisus Lilæa,
And Anemoria, and Hyampolis,
And other towns o' th' bank of Cephisus,
Made ready forty good ships for the seas,
Ruled by Schedius and Epistraphus
The sons of Iphitus Naubolides.
The Locrians the lesser Ajax led,
Of King Oileus the valiant son.

(For he was lower more than by the head
Than t' other Ajax, son of Telamon)
A linen armour he wore on his breast.
But understood as well to use a spear,
Or better, than could any of the rest
That in the army of th' Achæans were.
There went with him from Cynus and Opus,
From Bessa, Scarphe, Thronius, Aygiæ,
Tarphe, Calliarus, Boagrius,
Forty good ships well fitted for the sea.
Th' Eubœans were by Elephenor led,
That dwell in Chalcis and Eretriæ,
Cerinthus, Dion (that holds high her head),
Carystus, Styra, and in Istiæa.
And by the name Abantes they all go,
Good men, and that in battle use the spear,
And love to pierce the armour of a foe.
And these on forty ships embarked were.
From Athens (who Erectheus' people were,
Aurora's son, by Pallas nourished
In her own temple, in which ev'ry year
Many good bulls and lambs are offered),
Under Menesteus fifty ships did pass,
Who for the ord'ring of a battle well
Of horse or foot the best of all men was,
Save Nestor, who in age did him excel.
From Salamis came to the Trojan shore,
And by the greater Ajax govern'd were,
The son of Telamon, twelve good ships more,

And lay at anchor to th’ Athenians near.
Argos, Tyrinthe, Trœzen, Asine,
And Epidaurus, and Hermione,
Mases and Ægina, and Eione,
Amongst them all put four score ships to sea.
Of which there were three captains, Diomed,
Euryalus, and Sthenelus. But they
By Diomed were chiefly governed.
For him they all commanded were t’ obey.
And from Mycenæ, Corinth, Cleonæ,
And Orthe, and Hyperesiæ,
From Sicyon, and Aræthuree,
And Gonoessa, and from Helice,
Pellenæ, Ægium, and all that shore,
An hundred ships were laid upon the sea;
And with King Agamemnon passed o’er,
And his peculiar command were these.
Amongst them he puts on his armour then,
Proud that he was of all the heroes best.
For of his own he thither brought most men,
And chief commander was of all the rest.
From Sparta, Pharæ, Messa, Brysiæ,
From about Otylus, with those from Laus,
Helos, Amyclæ, and from Aygiæ,
Went thirty good black ships with Menelaus.
Which from his brother’s forces stood apart,
And he amongst them heart’ning them to fight,
And breathing courage into every heart.
For to the Trojans he bare greatest spite.

Pylus, Arene, Cyparisseis,
Amphigenia, Æpy, and Thryus,
(Whereat a ford i' th' stream Alpheus is)
Elos, and Pteleus, and Dorius.
(Here 'twas the Muses met with Toamyris
The Thracian fiddler, which their art did slight,
And said their skill was not so good as his,
And they depriv'd him both of art and sight.)
The number of the ships those towns set forth,
In all amounted to four score and ten;
And led were by a captain of great worth.
'Twas Nestor the command had of these men.
From Phene, Ripe, and Orchomenus,
And from Enispe, and from Stratiæ,
Tege, Mantinea, Stymphalus,
And those that dwelled in Parrhasia,
(Arcadians all, and in sharp war well skill'd)
Came sixty ships by Agapenor led,
And ev'ry ship sufficiently fill'd.
But then the ships Atrides furnished.
The men of Helis, and Buprasium,
And all the ground enclos'd by Hyrmine,
Myrsinus, Olene, Alisium,
Amongst them all put forty ships to sea,
Led by Amphimachus and Thalpius,
Diores, and Polyxenus, the son
Of martial Agasthenes, and then
Ten good ships were commanded by each one.
Dulichium, and th' isles Echinades,

Sent forty ships. Messes commander went
The son of Phyleus, who for his ease
Liv'd from his father there in discontent.
Ulysses also brought out twelve good ships
From Ithaca, Neritus, Ceph'lonia,
From Same, and from Zant, and Ægylips,
And from Epirus, and Croæylia.
Th' Ætolians with Thoas Andræmon's son
Sent from Pylene, and from Chalcis, and
From Olenus, Pleuron, and Calydon
Sent forty ships, whereof the sole command
In Thoas was. For Œneus was dead,
And Meleager; all the royal race.
Andræmon's son their men to Troy to lead
By suffrage of the cities chosen was.
From Crossus, Gortys (in the isle of Crete)
Lictus, Miletus, Phæstus, Rycius,
Lycastus, and some others went a fleet
Of eighty ships with King Idomenus.
And valiant as Mars Meriones.
And nine good ships went with Tlepolemus
(That was the son of mighty Hercules)
From Lindus, Camirus, Ialissus.
For Hercules Tlepolemus begat
On Astyochia whom in war he won,
And for her many cities had laid flat.
But after Hercules was dead and gone,
Tlepolemus, now grown a man and bold,
Licymnius (his father's uncle) slew

By th' mother's side, a branch of Mars, but old.
Then cuts down trees, and rigs a navy new,
And many men together gathered,
And wandered till to Rhodes he came at last,
And there dwelt in three tribes distributed.
Fear of his kindred made him go in haste.
And mightily in little time they throve,
And ev'ry day in wealth and power grew,
And favour'd were continually by Jove.
For daily he unto them riches threw.
From Syme went with Nireus ships three,
Nireus that was the fairest man of all
(Achilles always must excepted be)
But weak was Nireus, and his number small.
From Casus, Carpathus, and Nisyrus,
Calydnæ Islands, and the Isle of Cous
Went thirty ships. Two sons of Thessalus
The son of Hercules commanded those.
And the Pelasgic Argives sent to sea
From Trechis, and from Hellas, and Halus,
From Pthia, and the port of Alope,
Commanded by the son of Peleus,
Fifty good ships of Myrmidons, which some
Achæans, others Hellens used to call.
But these would not to any battle come.
For sullen sat ashore their general,
Because Briseis they had forc'd away,
Which when he won Lyrnessus, was his prize,
And did Epistrophus and Mynes slay.

There sat he then, but shall again arise.
From Inon, Phylace, and Pyrasus,
From Pteleus, and Antron on the sea
Went forty ships, with Protesilaus,
Which he commanded while alive was he.
But he was dead. For as he leapt to land
From out his ship, he was the first man slain
Of all th' Achæans by a Trojan hand,
And left his wife to tear her hair in vain,
His house at Phylace half finished.
His soldiers chose Podarces in his place,
His younger brother, who at Troy them led.
A captain good; but th' elder better was.
And they that dwelt about Boebeis Lake,
Iaolcus, Boebe, Pheræ, Glaphyræ,
Put all together, ships eleven make.
Under Eumelus these were put to sea.
From rugged Olizon and Melibœa,
The towns Methone and Thomacia sent
Seven ships of fifty oars apiece to sea,
And Philoctetes their commander went.
But him the Achæans left in Lemnos isle,
In cruel torment bitten by a snake.
And of his ships medon took charge the while.
But better care of him the Greeks will take.
From Tricca then, and from Methone steep,
And from Oechalia (seat of Euritus),
Thirty good ships to Troy went o'er the sea,
By Machaon led and Podalirius,

Two skilful sons of Æsculapius.
From chalky Titanus Hyperia, and
Astirius, and from Ormenius,
Eurypilus did forty ships command.
And from the towns Argissa and Gyrtone,
From Oloosson, Orthe on the Hill,
With those that sent were from the town Elone,
So many went as forty ships did fill.
And had two leaders. Polypœtes one,
Son of Perithous the son of Jove,
And gotten by him was the day whereon
He and the Lapiths ‘gainst the Centaurs strove,
And drave them from the mountain Pelion.
The other leader was Leontius,
Whose father was Capaneus, who the son
Was of the valiant Lapith Cœneus.
The Ænians and Perrhibœans bold
Did two-and-twenty good black ships set out,
From hollow Cyphus, and Dodona cold,
And other habitations about
The pleasant river Titaretius,
That into Peneus runs, but doth not mix,
But glides like oil at top of Peneus,
For Titaretius is a branch of Styx.
These Gonneus led. Then the Magnesians sent
From towns upon the banks of Peneus,
And sides of Pelion mountain eminent,
Forty good ships under swift Prothous.
These were the leaders of the Achæan forces.

Goddess, tell me now who was the best
In battle of the leaders, and whose horses
In swiftness and in force excell'd the rest.
Eumelus, his two horses did surpass
(Though they were females) all the rest for speed;
Their colour, age, and stature equal was,
Sprung in Pieria from Apollo's breed,
That terror drew about as swift as wind.
'Mongst Greeks the greater Ajax had no peer.
For now Achilles had the war declin'd,
Whom none in prowess equall'd or came near,
Nor other horses could with his compare.
But at his ships he discontented stay'd,
And full of spite which he th' Atrides bare,
Whilst on the beach idle his soldiers play'd
At who could furthest throw a dart or stone.
The horses loosely wander'd here and there
Amongst the people, and had riders none,
Or upon lote and cinquefoil feeding were.
But the Achæans to Scamander march'd
Swiftly as when a fire runs o'er a plain
Which Phœbus had with a long summer parch'd,
And going made the ground to groan again,
As when Jove angry lasheth Arimy,
Which men say of Typhæus is the bed,
The earth therewith is made to groan and sigh,
So groan'd the ground when they to Troy were led.
Then Jove unto the Trojans Iris sent,
Who old and young were then at Priam's gate

Assembled with the king in parliament.
Over their heads stood Iris as they sate.
Her voice was like to that of Priam's son
Polytes, that was watching at the tomb
Of old Æsuites, there to wait upon
The coming of the Greeks to Ilium.
Old man, said she, you love to hear men preach
As in a time of peace. But now 'tis war.
The Greeks no more lie idle on the beach,
But at your gates, and numberless they are,
As sands by the sea-side, or leaves in spring.
And to the city now they bring the war.
Hector, to you this counsel now I bring.
Within the city many people are
To aid you come of divers languages.
Let them that hither led them lead them here,
Arm, and command them each one as he please.
When she had done, dismiss'd the people were.
Hector to open all the gates commands,
And with great clamour horse and foot come out.
Before the city a high pillar stands,
To which the field lies open round about;
And Battiea called was by men;
Which 'mongst the Gods another name did bear,
Myrinna's sepulchre. And there again
The Trojans and their succours muster'd were.
The Trojans were by Hector led. The best
In battle, and in number most were these,
With spear in hand, and brass on back and breast.

The Dardans were commanded by Æneas,
(Anchises' son; but Venus was his mother;
Amongst the hills of Ida got he was.)
And joint commanders with him were two other
Brave men, Archilochus and Acamas.
And of Zeleia the inhabitants,
Which of Mount Ida lieth at the foot,
And on the river of Æsopus stands,
Under command of Pandarus were put,
Son of Lycaon, and that well knew how
To make an arrow in the air fly true.
Phœbus himself had given him a bow,
And how to use the same none better knew.
Th' Adrasteians and the men of Apæsus,
Of Pityeia and Tereia hill
Were by Adrastus led and Amphius,
Two sons of Merops, that had mighty skill
In prophecy, and both of them forbad
Themselves to venture in the war at Troy.
But Fate a greater power with them had,
And made them go, but brought them not away.
The people of Percosia, and they
That dwell upon the banks of Practius,
Arisbe, Sestus, Abydus, obey
The orders of their leader Asius
The son of Hyrtacus, whose chariot
By horses great and black as any coal,
And on it he to Ilium was brought;
And of Selleis race each one a foal.

Larissa was Pelasgic by descent.
Under Pylæus and Hyppothous,
Two stout Pelasgic leaders these were sent,
Who both the grandsons were of Teutomus.
The Thracians on this side Hellespont,
Were led by Pirus and by Achamas.
O' th' Cycon who do these oppose in front
Trœzenus' son Euphemus leader was.
From Amydon that standeth on the side
Of Axius, the fairest stream that flows,
The Pœons came. Pyrechmus them did guide,
And arm'd they were with arrows and with bows.
The Enneti in Paphlagonia,
From whence proceedeth of wild mules the race,
Parthenius' brook and the town Coronia,
Cytorus, Sesamus, and the high place
Of th' Erithius, and of Ægyalus
The charge was given to Pylomenus,
And of the Halizons t' Epistrophus,
But not alone; join'd with him was Dius
Of Alybe, where is a silver mine.
The leaders of the Mysians were Chronis,
And Enomus. Both of them could divine
By flight of birds, though they foresaw not this
That in Scamander stream they both should die,
Slain by Achilles who there massacred
Many a Trojan, many a good ally,
Which to the sea the river carried.
The Phrygians from Ascania, far off,

Were led by Phorcys and Ascanius;
And battle lov'd. But the commanders of
The Mæones, Mesthles and Antiphus,
The two sons were of old Pylomenes,
Both of them born upon Gygæna lake,
(At th' foot of Tmolus dwell the Mæones.)
Amphimachus and Nastes charge did take
Of those of Caria, people of rude tongue;
And of Miletus, and the hill Phtheiron,
And of the towns that seated are among
The windings of Mæander, and upon
Mount Mycale. And Nastes carried gold
Unto the battle, like a child or sot;
Wherewith his life he did not buy but sold.
For slain he was; his gold Achilles got,
And left him lying at the river dead.
The succours by the Lycians sent to Troy,
By Glaucus were and King Sarpedon led.
Far off they dwelt, and a long march had they.

LIB. III.

The duel of Menelaus and Paris, for the ending of the war.

WHEN BOTH THE armies were prepar'd for fight,
The Trojans marched on with noise and cry.
As in the air of cackling fowl a flight,
Or like the cranes when from the north they fly,
The army of Pygmæan men to charge,
And shun the winter, with a mighty cry
Fly through the air over the ocean large;
So swiftly march'd the Greeks, but silently
Resolved one another to assist.
And such a dust between both hosts did rise,
As when upon the mountains lies a mist,
Which to a stone's cast limiteth the eyes.
(Which good for thieves is, but for shepherds not)
So great a dust the middle space possest.
When they were near to one another got,
Came Alexander forth before the rest.
A leopard's skin he wore upon his shoulders,
Two spears in hand, his sword girt at his side,
Bow at his back, and brave to the beholders;
And any of Achæan host defied.
And glad was Menelaus to see this.
As when a lion finds a lusty prey,

A wild goat or a stag well pleased is,
And hungry seizes him without delay,
Although by hunters and by hounds pursu'd;
So glad was Menelaus him to see.
And soon as he his person had well view'd,
Arm'd from his char'ot to the ground leap'd he.
Assured, as he thought, revenge to take.
But soon as Alexander once saw that,
He fled into the throng, as from a snake
Seen unawares, trembling and pale thereat.
Then Hector him with words of great disgrace
Reprov'd and said, Fine man and lover keen,
Cajoler, that confidest in thy face,
I would to God thou born hadst never been,
Or never hadst been married. For that
A great deal better had been of the twain,
Than to be scorn'd of men, and pointed at
For one that durst not his own word maintain.
how the Greeks are laughing now to see
That so absurdly they themselves mistook,
Supposing you some mighty man to be
That art worth nothing, judging by your look.
Was't you to Lacedemon pass'd the deep,
And fetch'd fair Helen thence, the bane of Troy,
And now, when it concerns you her to keep,
You dare not in her husband's presence stay?
For you would quickly know what kind of man
You have bereav'd unjustly of his wife.
Neither your cittern, nor your beauty can,

Nor other gifts of Venus save your life.
Were not the Trojans fearful more than needs,
You had a coat of stones by this time had,
A fit reward for all your evil deeds.
This answer then to Hector, Paris made.
Hector, since your reproof is just, said he,
And your hard language (as when help'd by art
A shipwright's axe strikes deep into a tree)
Like rigid steel has cut me to the heart;
If with Atrides you would have me fight,
Object not Venus' favours ('tis unfit
The gifts of the immortal Gods to slight),
But make the Greeks and Trojans both to sit.
And in the midst set me and Menelaus,
And which of us shall have the victory,
Helen be his, and all the wealth she has,
And 'twixt the Greeks and Trojans amity.
Let this be sworn to, that we may remain
At Troy in quiet, and the Greeks repass
To Argos and Achæa back again.
At this brave proffer Hector joyful was;
And stepping forth, the Trojan ranks kept in
With both his hands o' th' middle of his spear.
And to shoot at him the Greeks begin,
And many took up stones and hurling were.
But Agamemnon with a voice as high
As high as he could raise it, to the Greeks cried, hold.
Throw no more stones, let no more arrows fly;
Hector to us has somewhat to unfold.

This said, they held their hands, and silent were,
And Hector both to Greeks and Trojans spake.
May you be pleased on both sides to hear
The motion I from Alexander make.
Let arms, said he, on both sides be laid by,
And in the midst set him and Menelaus,
And which of them shall have the victory,
Be Helen his, with all the wealth she has.
And let the rest an oath on both sides take
The pacts agreed on not to violate.
When this was said, then Menelaus spake,
And both the armies with great silence sate.
Hear me too then, said Menelaus, who
By Alexander have been most offended.
If you'll do that which I advise you to,
The quarrel he began will soon be ended.
Which of us two shall fall in single fight,
Let him die only, and the rest agree.
Bring forth two lambs, one black, another white,
To t' Earth and Sun a sacrifice to be.
Another we will sacrifice to Jove.
And let the old King Priam present be,
(His proud sons think themselves all oaths above)
That what is sworn he may performed see.
No hold is to be taken of an oath
Which young men make, whose likings change like wind.
But old men can foresee what's good for both.
'Tis good for both that makes a contract bind.
These words did to both armies sweetly sound;

They thought the worst was past; and up they tied
Their horses; and their spears stuck in the ground,
With spaces left between them, but not wide.
Then Hector to the king two heralds sent,
To fetch the lambs, and Priam to implore
To take the oath. From Agamemnon went
Talthybius to the fleet to fetch two more.
Meanwhile to the fair Helen Iris came,
So like t' Antenor's wife Laodice,
King Priam's daughter, that she seem'd the same.
Quickly she found her; for at work was she
Upon a double splendid web, wherein
Many a cruel battle she had wrought
The Trojans and th' incensed Greeks between,
That for her own sake only had been fought.
Come nymph, said Iris, see one battle more
Between the gallant men of Greece and Troy.
They fight not altogether as before,
But silent sit, and from their arms away.
Shields are their cushions, planted are their spears;
Paris and Menelaus only fight.
Save these two no man any armour wears;
And you his wife are, that has greatest might.
Thus Iris said, and her inspir'd anew
With love to Menelaus as before.
Then o'er her head a milk-white scarf she threw,
And out went weeping at the chamber door,
But not alone; two maidens follow'd her,
Fair Æthre Pittheus' child, and Clymene.

And quickly at the Scæan gate they were,
Where Priam sate; and in his company
Were the old lords, Lampus and Clytius,
And Icetaon, and Ucalegon,
Antenor, Thymetes, and Panthous,
Whence both the armies they might look upon.
Old men they were, but had brave captains been,
And now for consultation prized were.
As soon as Helen came into their sight,
They whisper'd one another in the ear,
I cannot blame the man that for her strives,
Like an immortal God she is. Yet so,
Rather than we should hazard all our lives,
I should advise the king to let her go.
Thus said they one t' another. But the king
Call'd her and said, daughter, sit down by me,
(Not you, but the immortal powers bring
Upon the Trojans this calamity.)
And tell me who that great Achæan is.
I see some higher by the head than he,
But comelier man I never saw than this,
Nor liker to a king in majesty.
king, then answered Helen, to whom I
Of all men owe most reverence and fear,
Would I had rather chosen there to die,
Than to your son's ill counsel given ear,
Leaving my house, my child, and brothers two,
And all my sweet companions for his sake.
But since I cannot what is done undo,

Unto your question I'll now answer make.
The man you point to Agamemnon is,
A good king, and a valiant man in fight,
And brother to the husband is of this
Unworthy woman, me, that did him slight.
And Priam then the man admiring said,
Happy Atrides, great is thy command,
Whose soldiers though now very much decay'd,
In such great multitude before us stand.
At a great fight I was in Phrygia,
And brought to Otreus and Mygdon aid
Against the Amazons. I never saw
Till then, so many for a fight array'd,
As were the Amazons, upon the banks
Of Sangareus, and yet they fewer were,
Than are contained in the bristled ranks
Of th' armed Greeks that stand before us here.
Again Ulysses coming in his sight,
Tell me, said he, sweet daughter, who is this?
He wants the head of Agamemnon's height,
But at the breast and shoulders broader is.
His arms lie still upon the ground; but he
In no one certain place himself can keep,
But through the ranks and files runs busily,
Just as a ram runs in a fold of sheep.
To this Jove's daughter, Helen, thus replies.
Ulysses 'tis, the old Laertes' son,
Of Ithaca; to counsel and devise,
In all the army like him there is none.

Helen, said Antenor, you say right;
On your affair he once came into Troy
With Menelaus. I did them both invite
To sup with me; and in my house they lay.
I them compar'd. When at their audience
They both stood up, Atrides taller seem'd;
Sitting Ulysses won most reverence,
And was amongst the people most esteem'd.
And when they were orations to make,
Atrides' words went easily and close,
For little he, but to the purpose spake,
Though th' younger man. But when Ulysses rose,
Upon the ground a while he fix'd his eyes,
Nor ever mov'd the sceptre in his hand;
You would have thought him sullen or unwise,
That did not yet his bus'ness understand.
But when his voice was raised to the height,
And like a snow upon a winter's day
His gentle words fell from him, no man might
With him compare; so much his words did weigh.
Then Priam seeing Ajax, ask'd again,
What Greek is that, that taller by the head
And shoulders is than all the other men?
And Helen to the king thus answered,
Great Ajax; who of th' Argives is the sconce:
And he o' th' other side Idomeneus,
Who was the guest of Menelaus once,
And lodg'd at Lacedemon in his house.
And now I see the rest, and could them name.

But Castor I and Pollux cannot see.
Two princes are they, and well known by Fame,
And by one mother brothers are to me.
Did they not pass the sea? Yes sure they did
Come with the rest; but are asham'd of me.
And in the Argive fleet lie somewhere hid,
And will not in my shame partakers be.
Thus Helen said, because she could not tell
Whether her brothers were alive or dead.
But dead they were; and, where they both did dwell,
In Lacedemon they were buried.
The heralds now the two lambs had brought in,
That for their sacrifice appointed were,
And full of noble wine a great goat skin.
Idæus with the golden cups stood near,
And pray'd the king to go down to the plain.
There stay for you the Greeks and Trojans both;
A peace agreed on is; but all in vain
Unless you also go and take the oath.
For Paris must with Menelaus fight,
And he must Helen and her wealth enjoy
Upon whose side the victory shall light;
The Greeks return; and peace remain at Troy.
These words to th' old man's heart came cold as ice.
But straight he bade his coach made ready be.
The servants made it ready in a trice,
And up into 't Antenor went and he;
And pass'd the Scæan gate into the plain.
And when they came near to Scamander's banks,

From out the coach alighted they again,
And stood between the adverse armies' ranks.
Then Agamemnon and Ulysses came,
And to the contract for the Greeks did swear.
And Priam and Antenor swore the same.
The heralds mix the wine with water clear;
And poured water on the princes' hands.
Atrides at his sword a knife did wear,
And as he near unto the victims stands,
Cuts with it from their foreheads locks of hair,
Which by the heralds were distributed,
Till ev'ry leader part had of the hair.
The ceremonies being finished,
Atrides to the Gods then made this prayer.
mighty Jove, the monarch of the Gods,
glorious Sun, with thy all-seeing eye,
Streams, O Earth, O you that hold the rod
Beneath the earth, scourges of perjury,
Hear me, and be you witnesses of this.
If Menelaus be by Paris slain,
Let Helen and the wealth she has be his,
And to Achæ we return again.
If slain by Menelaus Paris be,
Let Helen with her wealth to Greece be sent
With some amends made for the injury,
To be of th' wrong done an acknowledgment.
If such amends the Trojans will not make,
I will pursue the war, and here abide,
Till I the town of Ilium shall take,

Or till the Gods the quarrel shall decide.
This said, the victims with his knife he slew.
And sprawling there upon the place they lay.
Then into golden cups the wine they drew,
And pour'd it on the lambs. Then prayed they
Both Greeks and Trojans; Jove, and pow'rs divine,
Who first to break this peace shall go about,
As poured on the victims is this wine,
So they, and their sons' brains be poured out.
Thus prayed they. But Jove that pray'r did slight.
Then Priam said, To Troy return will I.
It cannot please me to behold the fight.
For none but Gods know which of them shall die.
And then into the char'ot went again
He and Antenor, and drave t' Ilium,
And with them carried their victims slain.
Then in Ulysses and great Hector come,
And having measur'd out the lists, wherein
They were to fight, then the two lots they drew
For who to throw his spear should first begin.
And then the Greeks and Trojans pray'd anew.
glorious Jove, whom all the Gods obey,
Let him that of the war the author was
Be slain, and all the rest firm peace enjoy.
Then mighty Hector shook the skull of brass.
The lot that was the first drawn out, was that
Which gave to Paris the right to begin.
Then down upon the ground the people sate
In order as their armour plac'd had been.

And Paris arm’d himself, and first puts on
His leg-pieces of brass, and closely ties,
That silver’d over were at th’ ancle-bone.
And then his breast-plate to his breast applies.
Lycaon’s breast-plate ’twas, but ev’ry whit
As just upon him sat, as it had done
Upon Lycaon when he used it.
And next to this his good sword he puts on.
And then his broad shield and his helmet good.
And last of all a spear takes in his hand.
And in like armour Menelaus stood.
Then come they forth, and in the lists they stand.
And one did on another fiercely look.
(The people stupid sat ‘twixt hope and fear.)
And when they come were nigh, their spears they shook.
But Paris was the first to throw his spear,
And threw, and smote the shield of Menelaus,
But through the mettle tough it passed not,
But turn’d, and bended at the point it was.
Then Menelaus was to throw by lot.
But first he prayed. Grant me, O Jove, said he,
That this my spear may Alexander slay,
Who was the first that did the injury;
That they who shall be born hereafter may
Not dare to violate the sacred laws
Of hospitality. Having thus said,
He threw his spear, which Paris’ shield did pass,
And through his breast-plate quite, and there it stay’d;
But tore his coat. And there he had been dead,

But that his belly somewhat he drew back.
Then with his sword Atrides smote his head
Which arm'd was, and the sword in pieces broke.
Then Menelaus grieved at the heart,
Looking to heaven did on Jove complain.
Jove, that of the Gods most cruel art,
Broken my sword, my spear is thrown in vain.
Then suddenly laid hold on Paris' crest,
And to the Greeks to drag him did begin,
And Paris then was mightily distrest,
Choakt by the latchet underneath his chin.
And to the Greeks had dragg'd been by the head,
If Venus to his aid had not come in,
Who broke the string and him delivered.
Atrides' conquest else had famous been.
Then to the Greeks the empty cask he threw.
But Venus snatcht him from him in a mist.
And whither she convey'd him none there knew.
A God she is, and can do what she list.
When Paris to his chamber was convey'd,
His chamber which of perfumes sweetly smelt,
Then puts she on the form of an old maid
That Helen serv'd when she at Sparta dwelt.
And in that shape went to call Helen home,
That stood with other ladies of the town
Upon a tow'r. When she was to her come,
She gently with her finger stirr'd her gown.
Helen, said she, Paris has for you sent,
And on his glorious bed doth for you stay,

Not as a man that came from fight, but went
To dance, or from it were new come away.
Helen at this was mov'd, and mark'd her eyes,
And of her lovely neck did notice take,
And knew 'twas Venus though in this disguise;
And troubled as she was, thus to her spake.
Venus, why seek you to deceive me still,
Since Menelaus has the victory?
Though I have wrong'd him, he receive me will,
And you come hither now to hinder me.
Whither d'ye mean to send me further yet;
To Phrygia or to Mœonia,
That there I may another husband get?
You shall not me to Alexander draw.
Go to him you, and Heaven for ever quit;
Grieve with him; have a care the man to save,
And by his side continually to sit,
Till he his bride have made you, or his slave.
I will not to him go (for 'twere a shame)
Nor any longer meddle with his bed,
Nor longer bear the scorns, nor mocks, nor blame
Which from the wives of Troy I suffered.
Then Venus vext, Hussie, said she, no more
Provoke my anger. If I angry be,
And hate you as I loved you before,
The armies both will to your death agree.
This said, the beauteous Helen frighted was,
And with the Goddess went, who led the way,
And by the Trojan wives did quiet pass

Unto the house where Alexander lay.
I'th' rooms below at work her women were,
But up went Helen with the Goddess fair.
And when to Alexander they were near,
The Goddess unto Helen fetcht a chair.
Then sat she down, and look'd at him again.
You come from battle. I would you had there
And by my former husband's hand, been slain.
You bragg'd you were his better at a spear.
Go challenge him again, and fight anew.
But do not though, for fear you should be kill'd
But rather when you see him, him eschew,
Lest he should leave you dead upon the field.
To Helen Alexander then replied.
Forbear; though he have now the victory
By Pallas' help; there are Gods on our side,
And they another time may favour me.
Let's go to bed, and in sweet love agree.
Your beauty never did me so much move,
At Lacedemon, nor in Cranae;
Where the first blessing I had of your love.
This said, to bed they went, first he, then she.
Atrides then sought Paris in the throng
O'th' Trojans and their aids; but could not see
Nor hear of him the company among.
They would not have conceal'd him though they might;
But had to Menelaus him betray'd.
So hateful to the Trojans was his sight.
Then stood King Agamemnon up and said,

Hear me ye Trojans and your aids. ’Tis plain
That Menelaus has the victory.
Let Helen therefore rendered be again,
And pay your fine. ’Tis right, the Greeks all cry.

LIB. IV.

The articles broken by the Trojans.

MEAN WHILE THE Gods at counsel drinking sat.
Hebe the nectar carried up and down.
And Jove amongst them present was thereat,
And sitting had his eyes upon Troy town.
Then Jupiter puts out a word, to see
What Juno would unto the same reply.
Two Goddesses assistants are (said he)
To Menelaus, but sit idly by,
Pallas and Juno; but on th'other side
Venus gives Paris aid, and really
Has helpt him when he thought he should have died;
Though Menelaus have the victory.
But let us now think which the best will be,
To suffer war to make an end of Troy,
Or let Troy stand and make them to agree,
And Helen with Atrides go her way.
Juno and Pallas that together sat,
Grumble and plot; Pallas her spite kept in.
But such of Juno was the choler, that
Had she not spoke, her heart had broken been.
Harsh Jove, said she, what do you mean by this?
Shall I with so much sweat, and labour spent,

And horses tir’d, now of my purpose miss?
Do. But the other Gods will not consent.
Devil, said Jove, what hurt is done to you
By Priam and his sons, that you should so
Fiercely the ruin of the town pursue?
I think if you int’ Ilium should go,
And eat up Priam and his children all,
And every Trojan in the town beside,
Man, woman, child alive within the wall,
Your anger will at last be satisfied.
Do as you please. It shall breed no contention
‘Twixt you and me. But then remember this,
When I to raze a city have intention
That yours, and greatly in your favour is,
To let me do’t without plea or request;
Since to give you your will I lose my own.
For Ilium I love above the rest,
Though under Heaven be many a goodly town.
For I by Priam and his people still
Have honour’d been, my altars richly serv’d
With wine and sacrifices to my will,
Which is the honour to the Gods reserv’d.
To this the Goddess Juno then replied,
Three cities I prefer before the rest,
Argos, and Sparta, and Mycena wide.
Destroy you may which of them you think best,
If you see cause; I’ll not stand in your way.
Or if I do, what mends can I have so?
For since your power does mine so much outweigh,

It will be done whether I will or no.
But you ought not t'undo what I have done,
For I a Goddess am, and have the same
Parents, of whom you boast to be the son.
And further of your wife I bear the name,
Whom mortals and immortals all obey.
Then let us not in such things disagree.
But I to you, and you to me give way.
For of our two minds all the Gods will be.
Let Pallas to the army straight be sent
To make the Trojans first the peace to break.
And Jupiter to do so was content,
And did (as he was bid) to Pallas speak.
Pallas, said he, down to the armies go,
Let not this peace be by the Trojans kept.
When Pallas heard her father Jove say so,
Glad of the errand, from the sky she leapt,
Just like a falling star, which Saturn sends
To armies or unto seafaring men;
Which change of fortune, commonly portends.
The Goddess through the air descending then,
Splendid and sparkling on the ground did light.
The armies that were in the field array'd,
Both Greeks and Trojans wond'red at the sight;
And one unto another next him said,
This bloody war will sure return again,
Or else the peace be surer made than 'tis;
But which o' th' two Jove has not yet made plain,
Who both of peace and war disposer is.

Pallas the form took of Laodocus,
Antenor's son, and went into the throng
O' th' Trojans to inquire for Pandarus.
At last she found him his own troops among,
That were of Lycaonia the bands,
And from Zeleia led by Pandarus
To Ilium. There Pallas by him stands
Like to Antenor's son; and to him thus:
Lycaon's son, says she, dare you let fly
A shaft at Menelaus? For I know
The Trojans all would thank you, specially
Paris, the son of Priam, and bestow
Great presents on you if you should him kill.
Shoot at him then, and to Apollo pray,
The God of archers, that he help you will.
And vow a hecatomb of lambs to pay,
When to Zeleia safely you come home.
For there your people to Apollo vow.
When this was said, the vain man overcome,
From off his shoulders taketh down his bow,
(Which did a lusty goat's head once adorn,
Which with a shaft he killed had among
The rocks, and taken from his head the horn,
Which was no less than sixteen handfuls long.
And to a fletcher gave it to be wrought,
Shaven, and polish'd, and gilt at the hand.)
This bow he bent; and lest the foe should know't,
He crouched down, and laid it on the sand.
But lest the Greeks should rush on him, before

He ready were to shoot, they that stood near,
Before him with their bucklers stood good store.
And being now delivered of that fear,
From out the quiver takes an arrow keen,
And new, well wing'd to carry mischief true,
Which shot before that time had never been.
But yet his vow before his arrow flew.
Phœbus, said he, if I Atrides slay;
As soon as I shall to Zeleia come,
I vow unto your deity to pay
Of my first-yeaned lambs an hecatomb.
Then to his breast he drew the leather string,
And to the bow return'd the arrow head.
Out leapt the shaft, and as it went did sing
Amongst the throng, as pleas'd man's blood to shed.
And, Menelaus, now the Gods you blest,
And chiefly Pallas, that before you stood,
And turn'd the deadly arrow from your breast,
About as much as a kind mother could
From her child's face divert a busy fly;
And made it on the golden buckle fall,
Where of his breast-plate double was the ply,
And though it pass'd through buckle, plate, and all,
And girdle which his coat unto him bound,
The shaft into his body penetrated,
And made, though not a great one, yet a wound,
The force it went with being much abated;
Yet out the blood ran. As when ivory
Is stain'd with crimson, to adorn the cheeks

Of the proud steeds, and please the driver's eye,
Many a cavalier to have it seeks.
The dame that stain'd it then holds up the prize,
And keeps it by her as a precious thing;
So lovely seems the colour to her eyes,
As to be sold to none but to a king.
So look'd his body when the streams of blood
His iv'ry legs and insteps did defile.
But Agamemnon stiff with horror stood;
And so did Menelaus for a while.
But when he saw the arrow barbs appear
Above the nerve, his courage came again.
But Agamemnon, not yet out of fear,
Did of the Trojans' perjury complain.
Brother, said he, and took him by the hand,
Dear brother, 'tis the oath that has you slain,
Making you thus before the Trojans stand.
But sure I am the oath cannot be vain,
Confirmed with so great solemnity.
They shall, though late, pay for it with their lives;
(For Jove ne'er fails to punish perjury)
Both they themselves, their children, and their wives.
For I well know the fatal day will come
To Priam, and to Priam's people all.
Jove will his black shield shake o'er Ilium,
And for this ugly action make it fall.
This, Menelaus, is a thing to come.
But what if of your wound you chance to die?
The Argives straight will think of going home.

How by the Greeks then scorned shall be I!
How proud will Priam and the Trojans be,
When Argive Helen shall be left behind,
And your bones rotting in the ground they see,
Without effecting what they had design'd?
Some trampling on your grave perhaps will say,
Would Agamemnon thus would always vent
His choler, as he now has done at Troy,
Now gone with empty ships back to repent,
Leaving his brother Menelaus here.
Then should I wish the earth would swallow me.
But Menelaus, to displace that fear,
Fright not the army, brother, thus said he.
Not mortal is the wound. 'Twixt me and death
My armour and the clasps stood, all of brass;
Besides a good tough girdle underneath.
Pray God 't be true, said he to Menelaus,
But we must send for a chirurgeon,
To mitigate with lenitives the pain.
Talthybius, said he, call Machaon,
And having found him quickly come again.
Tell him he must to Menelaus come,
Who by a foe is with an arrow shot,
Trojan or Lycian, I know not whom,
That with great grief to us has honour got.
This said, the herald went and look'd about
Amongst the troops of Tricca which he led.
Nor was it long before he found him out
With many targetiers environed.

You must, said he, to Menelaus come,
Who by some foe is with an arrow shot,
Trojan or Lycian, I know not whom,
That, with great grief to us, has honour got.
'Tis Agamemnon calls you. Then they pass
Together through the host, and hastened
Till they were come where Menelaus was
With many other lords encompassed.
There Machaon the arrow first pulls out.
(The barbs were broken as they came away)
Then took he off his armour and his coat.
Then sucked he the wound the blood to stay;
And laid on unguents to allay the pain.
Meanwhile the Trojans arm'd were coming in.
And then the Greeks were forc'd to arm again.
And Agamemnon's virtue now was seen.
He did not at their coming sleep nor start,
But speedily prepared for the fight,
And of a chief commander did the part,
His own commanders first to disaffright.
His horses and his chariot he sent off.
T' Eurymeaon, the son of Ptolemy,
The son of Pirus he gave charge thereof,
The first battle.
And bad him with it always to be nigh,
To use when labour tired had his knees.
Through the great army then on foot he went,
And where them hasting to the fight he sees,
He gives them in few words encouragement.

On, Argives, and be sure Jove never fights
Against good men for such perfidious knaves,
But leave them will for food to dogs and kites,
And to their foes their wives and children slaves.
But where he saw the soldiers negligent,
His admonition was then severe.
Fie, Argives, what d' you fear? To what intent
Stand you thus staring like a herd of deer?
Just like so many deer that had been chased
O'er some great plain looking about they stay,
So stand you here like frighted deer amazed,
Till to our ships come down the troops of Troy,
To try if Jove will help you there or no.
Thus he commanding went the host throughout.
And when the martial Cretans he came to,
Where armed stood Idomeneus stout.
(Meriones the rear led, he the van)
And Agamemnon look'd on them with joy;
And to Idomeneus thus began.
Of all the Greeks that me assist at Troy
I value you the most, both in the war
And otherwise. And when at feast we drink,
Other men's cups by measure stinted are,
But yours, as mine, stands always full to th' brink.
The King of Crete replied, I shall, said he,
Continue still your good confederate,
As heretofore I promis'd you to be.
But go, and th' other leaders animate,
That we may with the Trojans quickly fight.

Then woe be to them, sure they are to die
Who of the Gods and sacred oaths make light.
Then on went Agamemnon joyfully;
And came to the quarters of the Ajaxes,
There armed both complete, and followed
With a huge multitude of Greeks he sees,
And ready to the battle to be led.
As when a shepherd from a hill espies
A full-charg'd cloud march tow'rds him in the deep,
It seems as black as pitch unto his eyes,
And makes him seek a shelter for his sheep;
So black the squadrons of the Ajaxes,
And horrible with thick and upright spears
T' Atrides seem, and well it did him please,
And both of them he thus commends and cheers.
Ajaxes, expect not I should bid
You hearten up your army for the fight;
'Tis done so well already, there's no need.
Jove, Apollo, Pallas, that I might
Find all the other leaders such as you,
We should not need from Argos long to stay
Ere we the town of Priam should subdue
And rifle. And this said, he went away,
And came to Nestor, who was ordering
His troops and bands of horse and foot, each one
Against the enemy encouraging.
And with him stood Alastor, Pelagon,
Hæmon, and Chromius, skilful men in war.
I' th' front the char'ots and the horsemen were.

The most and best infantry placed are
(A hedge unto the battle in the rear.)
The middle ranks were filled up with those,
Upon whose courage he did least rely.
For these would fight because they could not choose;
Since they could neither back nor forward fly.
And Nestor to the horsemen spake. Let none,
Said he, before another go, to shew
His manhood or his skill. But all go on
At once. To single is to weaken you.
Further, If any of you should have need
To mount into another's chariot,
There let him use his spear; but still take heed
That with the horses reins he meddle not.
Our fathers have before us us'd these laws,
And thereby many cities level laid.
Thus Nestor taught them. Glad Atrides was,
And with great approbation to him said,
Nestor, that your arms were but as strong
As is your mind! But they're decay'd by age.
Or could you give your age to some man young,
And with the youngest of the foes engage.
Atrides, then said Nestor, so wish I.
Would I were as when Eruthalyon
I slew. But Gods' gifts come successively.
I then was young; and age is now come on.
But as I am I'll ride amongst my horse,
And as becomes an old man, give advice,
While they that may presume upon their force,

With spear in hand charge on their enemies.
Atrides pass'd on to th' Athenians
That by Menestheus commanded were.
And by these stood the Cephalonians
Ulysses' bands. Neither of these did hear
The clamour of the battle new begun,
But stood unmoved, because they did expect
Some greater troops of Greeks should first fall on.
For this Atrides grievously them check'd.
Menestheus, said he, son of a king,
And you the crafty man Ulysses, why
When you your men should to the battle bring,
Stand you here shrinking from the enemy?
You hear the first when there will be a feast,
And stay for no man. For your messes are
Greater than other men's; your wine the best,
And without stint. And therefore in the war
You should strive who should be the first to fight.
But now, though ten troops were before you there,
You would not be displeased with the sight.
These words came harshly to Ulysses' ear,
And with a frowning look, what's this, said he,
Are we not making all the haste we can?
Telemachus his father you shall see
By and by fighting in the Trojan van,
And that this reprehension needless was.
But Agamemnon smiling then replied,
(Seeing his censure did not kindly pass)
Noble Ulysses, I meant not to chide,

Nor to direct you, that so skilful are.
For we are both of us of the same mind.
What's said amiss I shall again repair.
But let it now away go with the wind.
Then on he went and came to Diomed,
Whom mounted on his chariot he found
With Capaneus' son accompanied,
And other lords that him encompass'd round.
Ay me, Tydides, wherefore stand you thus,
As if you for some bridge did look about.
You do not as your father Tydeus,,
Who still before his fellows leaped out.
So said they that had seen him at the war,
Which I did not, but take it upon fame,
Which him above the rest preferred far.
But certain 'tis, he to Mycena came
With Polynices, to desire their aid
Against the Thebans. And they willingly
Had granted it, but that they were afraid.
For Jove forbad them by a prodigy.
Then to the brook Asopus back they went,
Which doth the Theban territory bound.
To Tydeus the Greeks a letter sent
To enter Thebes, and terms of peace propound.
To Thebes he went, and with Eteocles
He found the chief o' th' Thebans at a feast.
And at all manly games the prize with ease,
By Pallas' help, he carried from the best.
And when for spite they sent out fifty men

With Mæon Hæmon's son, and Lycophon
To murder him as he went back again,
Slain by Tydeus they were all but one.
For he sav'd Mæon, warned by the Gods.
Such Tydeus was, but left a son behind
That less could do, but for words had the odds.
But valiant Diomed reply declined,
Who gave t'Atrides what respect was due.
The other answered him with language rude.
You say, said he, what you know is not true.
We than our fathers there more manhood shew'd.
For we with fewer men proud Thebes did gain,
By Jove's help, and observances divine,
Whilst the Cadmeans for their pride were slain.
How from our fathers then do we decline?
But straight reprov'd he was by Diomed.
My friend, said he, are you more grieved than I?
Would you not have the army ordered?
Atrides, both i' th' loss and victory
Is most concern'd. Let us of battle think,
And down he leapt, as soon as that was said,
In complete arms, with such a sudden chink,
As might a constant man have made afraid.
As when the billows of the sea rais'd high
By some great wind, go rolling to the shore,
And follow one another to the dry,
There stopp'd and broken are, and foam, and roar:
So then the Greeks up to the Trojans come,
Obeying each his leader silently,

(You would have thought them, though so many, dumb)
In glittering arms, and glorious to the eye.
On th'other side, the Trojans made a noise,
Like ewes a milking kept off from their lambs
When in the field abroad they hear their cries,
And they again bleat back unto their dams.
But did not one another understand;
For few there were whose language was the same.
Some were of one, some of another land,
And most of them from far off thither came.
Pallas the Greeks, Mars Trojans favoured.
Then Fright came in, with (Mars his sister) Strife,
Little when born, but grew until her head
Was in the clouds; for she grows all her life.
But when the armies were together near,
Then man to man came close, and shield to shield,
And mingled in the front was spear with spear,
And horrible the noise was in the field;
Whilst some insult and others groaning die.
And th'earth they stood on covered was with blood.
As when great torrents from the mountains high
Pour down into the valleys a great flood;
The streams through thousand channels falling roar;
The trembling shepherds hear it on the hills.
So much the noise o'th' battle the air tore,
And all the region with terror fills.
A Trojan was the first man that was slain,
Echepolus son of Thalysias.
He smote was with a spear into the brain;

Antilochus the man that smote him was.
His armour rattled on him as he fell,
As if some tow'r had fall'n. But then Elphenor
(To strip him of his arms that hoped well)
Dragging him off was killed by Agenor.
For whilst in stooping he his flank unhides.
Agenor quickly his advantage spies,
And pierc'd him with his spear through both his sides.
Then down he fell, and darkness seiz'd his eyes.
And then about his body rose great strife,
And one upon another falling on,
Antheman's son, a fair youth, lost his life,
Slain by great Ajax, son of Telamon,
And Simoisius called was by name,
'Cause born upon the bank of Simois,
Whither from Ida both his parents came
To view their flocks, lest aught should be amiss;
But had no joy of him. He was unblest
To be the first that came in Ajax's way,
Who smote him with his spear quite through the breast.
There dead he fell, and by the river lay.
As when a man has fell'd a poplar tree,
Tall, straight, and smooth, with many fair boughs on,
Of which he meant a cart-wheel made shall be,
And leaves it on the bank to dry i' th' sun;
So lay the comely Simoisius,
Slain by great Ajax, son of Telamon.
At Ajax then a spear threw Antiphus,
Bright-arm'd Antiphus, King Priam's son.

Death the spear carries, but of Ajax misses,
And deadly wounds the groin of Leucus bold,
And well beloved soldier of Ulysses,
Who dragg'd the dead, but now lets go his hold.
Ulysses, angry that his friend was slain,
Went out before the rest, and coming close
To th' Trojan front, some fit revenge to gain.
Democoon, King Priam's son, he chose,
(A lawful son where nature is the law).
The Trojans when they saw him look about,
Into the shelter of the ranks withdraw.
Then soon his spear Democoon pick'd out,
And through both temples forward went the head.
Then heavily he falls, his armour chinks,
His eyes with endless night are covered,
And Hector with his Trojans from him shrinks.
The Greeks then shouted, and drew off their slain,
And on the Trojans pressing further were.
But then Apollo cried out amain
From Pergam tow'r, O Trojans, what d'ye fear?
Go on upon the Greeks; no more give way.
Their bodies neither are of stone nor steel,
Nor able are the force of brass to stay,
No less than you the wounds it makes they feel.
Nor fights Achilles here, but angry lies,
And wishes that the Greeks were overthrown.
So Phœbus. 'Mongst the Argives Pallas flies,
Through ranks and files encouraging each one.
And then Diores slain was with a stone,

By Pyros, whom the Thracians obey'd.
Crush'd of his right leg was the ankle-bone,
And in the dust upon his back was laid,
Unto his fellows holding up his hands.
Ready to die he for assistance cries.
Pyros comes quickly in, and o'er him stands,
And wounds him in the belly. Then he dies.
But Thoas then slew Pyros with his spear,
That pass'd his breast till in his lungs it stopp'd.
Then coming in he drew his sword, and there
His belly ripp'd till out his bowels dropp'd,
But to disarm him could not stay, because
So many Thracians about him stood.
Then back retir'd he, and well pelted was,
Leaving two leaders wrapp'd in dust and blood,
One an Epeian, th' other Thracian,
And many others lying by them dead.
This battle was well fought. Although a man
Through both the armies safely had been led
By Pallas, and protected by her shield,
He had no want of courage seen that day,
So many Greeks and Trojans in the field
Depriv'd of life by one another lay.

LIB. V.

And Pallas now t' ennoble Diomed

AMONGST THE GREEKS, with force did him inspire,
Whereby his heart and hands were strengthened;
And on his shield and helmet stood a fire
The first battle continued, wherein Pallas strengtheneth Diomedes to supply the absence of Achilles.
Bright as th' autumnal star above his head
And shoulders flaming. And straightway he runs
(Set on by Pallas and encouraged)
Into the throng, where were the two good sons
Of Dares, who was Vulcan's priest. Well skill'd
They both were in the war. Idæus one,
The other Phegus. These seeing him i' th' field
On foot, and not far from them, and alone,
Met him; and Phegus threw, but hit him not.
For o'er his shoulder flew the spear in vain.
Then Diomedes threw, and Phegus smote,
Clean through the breast. When Phegus thus was slain
Down leap'd Idæus from the chariot;
But durst not by his brother's body stay.
For if he had, the like fate he had got.
But Vulcan in a smoke took him away,
Not willing that his priest should childless die.

Tydides to the ships the horses sent.
To see these two, one slain, the other fly,
To the proud Trojans' very hearts it went.
But Pallas then took Mars by th' hand, and said,
Mars, bloody Mars, to what end stay we here?
Let's neuters be. For I am much afraid
We both shall too much anger Jupiter.
This said, she led him out, and set him on
Scamander's bank. And then the Trojans fled
Before the Greeks. Each leader killed one,
Pressing them at their backs uncovered.
Then Dalius first his char'ot turn'd about,
And open lay to Agamemnon's spear,
Which in at's back, and at his breast went out.
Down fell the Alizonian charioteer.
Idomeneus slew Phæstus with a thrust,
As up into his chariot he went,
The spear at the right shoulder passed just,
And back again unto the earth him sent.
And Menelaus slew Scamandrius,
That well the art of hunting understood.
I' th' hills and woods none was more dexterous,
But Dian, and his skill did him no good.
For Menelaus pierc'd him back and breast,
Between the shoulders with a deadly spear,
And down he tumbled of life dispossest,
His eyes with endless darkness covered were.
Meriones slew Phoriclus, the son
Of Harmonides, the great architect,

That, but by Pallas, taught had been by none.
But of his art unhappy was th' effect.
'Twas he that built those ships for Alexander,
That brought with him so much ill luck to Troy,
And to himself, and to his chief commander;
Not knowing what the oracles did say.
But he, as from the fight he fled, was here
O'ertaken by Meriones, and slain.
At his right buttock entered the spear;
And at his groin the point came out again.
Meges Pedæus slew, Antenor's son,
Though not his wife's, yet was his wife so kind
T' Antenor, that she bred him as her own,
And look'd upon him with a mother's mind.
Him Meges overtaking as he fled
Slew with his strong sharp-pointed spear, which lighting
Behind upon the noddle of his head,
Forward he fell, the senseless weapon biting.
And then Eurypylus, Euæmon's son,
Hypsenor slew, new made Scamander's priest,
That from him, but not fast enough, did run.
Eurypylus shav'd off his hand at th' wrist.
For at his shoulder though he aim'd the stroke,
The quick sword finding there the brass resist,
Slipt down unto his hand with force unbroke,
And there in streams of blood his soul dismiss'd.
Meanwhile Tydides, like a man enraged,
Ran up and down the field. One could not know
With whom and where he was in fight engaged,

Whether amongst the Greeks, or with the foe.
As when a torrent falling from the hills
Distends itself with fury on the plain,
And suddenly the river overfills,
Supplied by Jove with mighty showers of rain,
And beareth down the bridges as it goes;
No fence of vineyard can against it stand,
But all the husbandry of men o'erthrows,
And uncontrolled passes o'er their land;
Tydides so brake through each Trojan band,
And made them fly before him as he went.
And Pandarus then took his bow in hand,
And a sharp arrow from it to him sent,
Which pass'd through the right shoulder of his coat
Of mail, and fetch'd the blood, and with great joy,
Trojans, cried he, no more stand so remote.
For wounded is the stoutest foe of Troy,
And long he cannot the sore pain endure,
Unless my faith in Phœbus be in vain.
Thus said he boasting. For he thought 'twas sure
The wound was mortal, and Tydides slain.
Tydides to his char'ot did then retreat,
And Sthenelus alighting on the ground
(For sitting he was on the char'ot-seat)
Drew out the cruel arrow from the wound,
And out the blood gush'd. Then Tydides pray'd,
Pallas, Jove's all-conquering child, said he,
If e'er you did me or my father aid,
Within my spear's reach let me this man see,

That with his arrow me prevented has,
And boasting says, I have not long to live.
Athena to his wish indulgent was,
And to him did more strength and courage give.
Fear not, said she, to go into the throng,
And charge i' th' thickest of the enemies.
For I have made thee as thy father strong,
And taken have the mist off from thy eyes,
That thou mayst see who Gods are, who are men.
If any God oppose thee, give him way,
Except if Venus thou encounter; then
Spare her no more than mortals in the fray.
This said, away the Goddess Pallas went,
And Diomed went to the fight again,
And though before he were upon it bent,
His courage now was trebled by his pain.
As when a shepherd sees a lion come,
And wounds him slightly as he leaps the pen;
Then leaves his sheep, and frighted runneth home,
And dares not in the field appear again;
The lion now made fiercer than before,
Lays all the sheep one by another dead,
And back again the pen once more leaps o'er:
So rag'd amongst the Trojans Diomed.
Astynous there, and Hypenor died;
One through the breast he pierced with his spear;
And th' other's head did from his neck divide
With his broad sword. And slain he left them there,
And overtook Abas and Polyeide,

Sons of Eurydamas, who could tell what
Upon a dream should to a man betide,
And slew them both. No dream had told him that.
Thoon and Xanthus then he followed,
Phænop's two sons, gotten when he was old,
And of them both the vital blood did shed;
Th' estate to strangers came to have and hold.
Then Chromius and Echemon he slew,
Two sons of Priam, in one chariot,
Whom from the seat unto the ground he threw,
And till he had disarm'd them left them not.
But to the ships he sent away the horses.
Æneas seeing how he disarray'd
Before him as he went the Trojan forces,
Sought Pandarus, and having found him, said,
Lycaon's son, where are thy shafts and bow,
And skill, wherein the Lycians yield to thee?
See you the man that rages yonder now?
Aim a shaft at him whosoe'er he be,
For many valiant Trojans he has slain.
(Unless he be one of the Gods above
Neglected by us) 'twill not be in vain.
Shoot boldly then, but first invoking Jove.
Then Pandarus replying, to him said,
'Tis Diomed as far as can be guess'd.
His horses, and his shield I have survey'd,
And plaited horse-hair hanging at his crest.
Though it be he, as I believe it is,
Yet sure some God does on his shoulders sit.

For else of killing him how could I miss,
When I his shoulder with my arrow hit?
For I one arrow shot at him before,
And verily believ'd I had him slain.
His armour all besmeared was with gore,
But slew him not. Now here he is again.
I did not on a char'ot hither come,
Although Lycaon have eleven new,
With handsome curtains to each one, at home,
And horses fit to draw them not a few.
The old knight too advis'd me earnestly
That when to battle I the Trojans led,
I from a car should charge the enemy;
But to his counsel I not hearkened.
(Which I repent.) It came into my head
That when within Troy's walls we should be pent,
My horses, which were us'd to be well fed,
Would there be useless wanting nourishment.
This made me come without a chariot,
And march, as far as 'twas, to Troy on foot,
And trust unto my bow, which helps me not,
But faileth me as often as I shoot.
For two of them I have already shot,
Tydides and Atrides, and good store
Of blood have drawn from both, though killed not,
But made them fiercer than they were before.
In an ill hour sure I took down my bow
To fight for Hector and the Trojan men;
But if I safely to my country go,

And to my house and wife get back again,
Let any man that will cut off my head,
If presently my bow I do not burn,
That never yet my hopes has answered.
For why not, when it doth not serve my turn?
To Pandarus Æneas then replied:
No, say not so, but first let's to him go.
For by th' encounter soon it will be tried
Whether he be indeed a God or no.
Get up into the seat, and you shall see
The virtue of my horses on the plain,
And if some God with Diomedes be,
How nimbly they will fetch us off again.
Come, take the whip and reins in hand, and I
Descend will from the chariot and fight.
Or if you please, when to him we are nigh
I'll hold the whip and reins, and you alight.
No, no, said he, keep you the reins in hand,
The horses us'd thereto will you obey.
To me, it may be, they will restive stand,
And to the foe themselves and us betray.
Let me alight and meet him with my spear.
This said, they mounted both; and coming on
Towards Tydides, both observed were
By Sthenelus Copaneus his son,
Who warning to Tydides gave. I see
Two mighty men to fight us coming on,
Of which I know th' one Pandarus to be,
The other Venus and Anchises' son.

Come up into your chariot and retire.
But frowning he replied, I'll ne'er do that
It not becomes the children of my sire,
When they should fight to double nor to squat.
I loath to sit upon a chariot,
And as I am I will attend them here.
For of my strength deprived I am not,
And Pallas has forbidden me to fear.
I doubt not but to kill them both, or one.
If both, your reins unto the two wheels tie,
And to Æneas' horses quickly run,
And seize their reins, less frighted they should fly.
Then send them to the ships, brave steeds, well bred;
Of heavenly race they are, and got by those,
Which Jove, to make amends for Ganymed,
Was pleas'd to give unto his father Tros.
Anchises privily convey'd to these,
Six mares, and had a colt by ev'ry one;
Whereof he gave two to his son Æneas.
To take these horses now were bravely done.
While they were talking, th'other two came nigh,
And then said Pandarus, O Diomed,
Since my swift arrow could not make you die,
I come to try now how my spear will speed.
And as he spake the spear flew from his hand
And pass'd his shield, but in his armour stayed.
Y'are hit, said he, and long you cannot stand.
But Diomed, nothing at all dismayed,
No, no, cried out, your spear is thrown in vain.

But I believe before we have done here,
That one of you, if not both, will be slain.
And as he spake he at him threw his spear.
Which at his nose close by his eye went in,
And struck his teeth out, and cut off his tongue,
And out again it pass'd beneath his chin.
For Pallas from above it downward flung.
There dead he lay. Æneas to defend
His body, to him came with spear and shield,
And 'bout him went, resolv'd the man to send
To hell, that should oppose him in the field.
Tydides then took up a mighty stone
Which two men scarce could bear such as are now.
But Diomedes swinging it alone,
The same with ease did at Æneas throw,
And hit him on the huckle bone, wherein
Into the hip inserted is the thigh.
And torn was by the rugged stone the skin,
And tendons broken which the joint did tie.
Then down upon his knees and hands he fell,
And taken from him was his sight with pain.
That Venus saw him lying thus 'twas well;
Else by Tydides he had there been slain.
For then came Venus down, and with the lap
Of her celestial robe him covered,
Lest any of the Greeks should have the hap
To kill or wound him as from earth he fled.
But Stheneius rememb'ring well his order,
Tied his own steeds up to his chariot-wheels,

And led them out o'th' tumult and disorder,
And to Deiphilus that was at's heels,
(His friend) he gave the horses of Æneas
To carry them unto the Argive fleet.
But took Tydides' horses, and with these
To try went if Tydides he could meet.
But he in chase of Venus now was gone
(Knowing that she a tender Goddess was,
And for the war commission had none,
Nor had as Pallas any shield of brass.)
And had when he came to her wounded her.
For through her robe, though by the Graces made,
Without resistance quickly pass'd the spear,
And at her wrist did her fair hand invade.
And from the wound out sprang the blood divine,
(Not such as men have in their veins, but ichor.
For Gods that neither eat bread nor drink wine
Have in their veins another kind of liquor,
And therefore bloodless and immortal be.)
And Venus screaming then lets fall her son,
But by Apollo's hand preserv'd was he,
Convey'd thence in a mist perceiv'd by none,
For fear he should be by some Argive slain.
To Venus then Tydides whoop'd, and said,
Away, Jove's daughter, from the war abstain.
Go practise how to cozen wife or maid,
For I believe if here you longer stay,
(So many such as these mishaps there are)
That you therein will have but little joy,

And troubled be when men but talk of war.
This said, away she went, not knowing where
She was; and great the pain was of her hand.
But Iris from the fight conducted her,
And set her hard by Mars upon the sand.
For there by Pallas placed he had been.
His horses and his char'ot by him staid
Hid in a mist, by man not to be seen.
And Venus there before him kneeling said,
Dear brother, let me your good horses have,
To bear me to Olympus from the fray;
This cruel wound mad Diomed me gave,
And would wound Jove if he came in his way.
Mars presently his horses to her lent.
Venus and Iris mount into the seat;
Iris the reins held, and away they went;
The time they spent in going was not great.
When they were there, Iris the steeds untied,
And set them up, and gave unto them meat,
Such as immortal horses use to eat,
Ambrosian meat, till they were satisfied.
But Venus fell into Diones' lap,
Her mother, who embrac'd her lovingly,
Strok'd her, and said, how came this sad mishap?
Who used you thus? What a rash God was he?
What more could he have done, if he had found
You doing something openly amiss?
It was a man, said she, gave me this wound,
Tydides; and for nothing else but this;

I sav'd my son Æneas from his hand,
My dearest son, whom he was going to slay.
And now the war is all (I understand)
'Twixt Greeks and Heaven, not 'twixt Greeks and Troy.
Daughter (replied Dione then) 'tis hard,
For we the Gods that in Olympus dwell
Many from men as ill as you have far'd,
And many no less wrongs have put up well.
Otus and Ephialtes, Neptune's sons,
In a brass dungeon once imprison'd Mars,
And kept him in the dark there thirteen moons.
There like he was t'have stayed till now, for scarce
Could Hermes set him free with all his art
And Juno's help. And when to liberty
He was restor'd, he took it in good part,
Though with his chains he gall'd was cruelly.
When Hercules shot Juno in the breast,
Though wounded sore, yet she reveng'd it not.
And Pluto by the same man shot did rest
Contented, and no reparation got.
But to the house of Jupiter he went,
And got the arrow pluck'd out from the wound
By Pæon; who with gentle plaisters sent
The pain away, and made his shoulder sound.
But though no God of any wound can die,
Yet of Amphitryon the peevish son
(Who little cares at whom his arrows fly)
Great mischief oft unto the Gods has done.
But Pallas 'tis that thus has wounded you,

Though with Tydides spear. Fool as he was,
What 'tis to wound a God he never knew.
Not long such wicked deeds unpunish'd pass.
Such men when they return from painful war
Shall seldom set their children on their knee
Pleas'd with their half-form'd words. Let him beware
Lest he provoke some stronger Deity,
And then Ægilia Diomede's wife
Awake the household with her lamentation,
And cry, Tydides, thou hast lost thy life,
my dear husband, best of all the nation.
This said, she wip'd the ichor from her hand,
And straight her hand was well, the pain was gone.
Then Juno by, and Pallas, jeering stand.
And Pallas thus to Jupiter begun.
Shall I say what I think? O father Jove,
Venus some Argive dame has courting been
To take the Trojan's part, whom she doth love,
And stroking her, her hand scratch'd with a pin.
Jove smil'd at this, and then to Venus said,
Daughter, I gave you no command in war.
That charge on Mars and Pallas I have laid.
Of nuptials and love take you the care.
While they were thus discoursing, Diomed
Did with great speed and rage Æneas follow,
To gain his armour and his blood to shed,
Knowing he was in th' hands now of Apollo.
Undaunted then, with shield before his breast,
And sword in hand, struck at Æneas thrice,

And thrice again Phœbus his rage repress'd.
But at the fourth time gave him good advice.
Retire, said he, Tydides, and beware
You not yourself think equal to the Gods.
They sway the heav'ns, on earth men creeping are.
'Twixt mortals and immortals there's great odds.
Tydides then retir'd a little way,
Not knowing what harm might from Phœbus come.
And Phœbus thence Æneas did convey
T' a temple of his own in Pergamum.
There Leto and Diana cur'd his wound.
And then an image Phœbus like him made,
And in like arms, and set it on the ground,
For which the foes each other then invade,
And there they one another's bucklers hew.
To Mars Apollo speaking, why, said he,
Mars, bloody, murd'ring Mars, why suffer you
Tydides at the battle still to be?
Mad as he is now, he with Jove would fight.
From Venus' hand he made the blood run down,
And then at me he flew like any sprite.
This said, he sat o' th' top of Pergam town.
And Mars the Trojan bands encouraged,
Taking the shape of valiant Acamas,
Who to the war at Troy the Thracians led.
And as he through the armed ranks did pass,
Children of Priam what d'ye mean, said he;
Shall the Greeks follow killing us to Troy?
Fall'n is Æneas, the great man whom we

Like Hector honour’d. Come, let’s if we may
This good commander rescue. Thus said he.
Sarpedon likewise Hector sharpen’d. Where
Are now your kin you said enough would be
Troy to defend? I see none of them here.
Like hounds about a lion off they stand,
We your confederates the fight maintain.
The labour lieth all upon our hand;
And I myself amongst the rest would fain
Make trial of this mighty man in fight.
At least I shall, as doth a friend become,
My people’s courage all I can excite;
Since they are here, and very far from home;
And though from me the Greeks can nothing get,
Neither to carry nor to drive away.
But you to th’ Trojans have not spoken yet,
So much as to defend their wives in Troy
From being taken in the Argives’ net,
And plund’red be the stately town of Troy.
When chiefly you on this your heart should set,
And your confederates persuade to stay,
And not the fault on one another lay.
So said Sarpedon. Hector therewith stung,
Upon his chariot could no longer stay,
But armed down unto the ground he sprung.
And ‘mongst the Trojan ranks and files he goes,
Into their hearts new courage to inspire.
And then they turn’d their faces to their foes.
Nor did the Argives from their place retire.

And then, as when on Ceres' sacred floor
The winnowed chaff lies heap'd together white,
So white the troops of Argives were all o'er
With dust their horses rais'd had in the fight.
And then the Trojans boldly marched on,
And Mars to aid them dark'ned had the field,
As he was bidden by Latona's son,
When Pallas from the Greeks removed her shield.
And from the Temple fetch'd Æneas out
Alive and whole, and bold, and made him stand
Amongst the troops, that joyful stood about.
But other work now lying on their hand,
(Made them by Mars and Strife) no time had they
To ask him questions. But encouraged
The Argives were by th' Ajaxes to stay,
And by Ulysses and by Diomed.
For of the Trojans they were not afraid.
But as a cloud that resteth on a hill,
Which in calm weather there by Jove is laid,
Till boisterous winds arise it resteth still.
Then up and down went Agamemnon there,
My friends, said he, be bold, and fight like men,
Of one another's censure stand in fear.
Of them that do so, fewer perish than
Of those that fly and never think upon
The loss of fame. This said, he threw his spear
And smote Æneas' friend Democoon,
Who was unto the Trojans no less dear
Than if he one of Priam's sons had been.

For with the foremost he was still in fight.
And at his buckler went the weapon in,
And through both that and belt it passed quite.
And mortal in his belly was the wound,
And with his armour rat'ling down he fell.
Æneas then two Greeks laid on the ground,
The sons of Diocles, descended well.
For of th' immortal and fair stream Alpheus,
Orsilochus a great king was the son.
And he the father was of Diocles,
And he Orsilochus got and Crethon;
Brave men, who when they came to man's estate
With Atreus' son his honour to regain,
To Ilium sail'd, and there they met their fate,
And never to their country came again.
As when two lions in the mountains bred
And woods obscure, come down into the plain,
And sheep and cattle in the field leave dead,
Until at last by hunters they are slain;
So fell these two men by Æneas kill'd,
And like two fir trees straight laid on the sand.
And Menelaus then with fury fill'd,
With helmet on his head, and spear in hand,
Advanced boldly to Anchises' son,
In hope to have deprived him of breath.
And Mars himself it was that set him on
To bring him by Æneas' hand to death.
Antilochus then, Nestor's valiant son,
Fearing lest Menelaus should be slain,

Resolv’d he should not fight with him alone,
And all their toil at Ilium make vain.
Went after him, and overtook him as
They ready were to fight, but nothing done.
Æneas then, as valiant as he was,
Retir’d, eschewing th’ odds of two to one.
And when they had brought off the bodies slain,
And left them in their fellow-soldiers’ hands,
Unto the skirmish they returned again,
And slew the Prince of Paphlagonians
Pylæmines. Atrides threw the spear
Which near the shoulder pass’d into his neck.
By Nestor’s son slain was his charioteer,
Mydon by name that did his horses check,
As he his char’ot turning was to fly,
Antilochus him wounded with a stone
On th’ elbow, and benumb’d his hand, whereby
The sense he had to hold the reins was gone.
The reins fell down, and then with sword in hand
Antilochus divides his head in twain,
And headlong fell he where it chanc’d the sand
Was very deep, and there he did remain
With head and shoulders sticking in the sands.
But upright in the air were both his hips.
The horses laid him flat. Which by the hands
Of Nestor’s son convey’d were to the ships.
Hector saw this, and in came with great cry,
Whom bands of lusty Trojans followed,
Mars and Bellona marching furiously

Against the Argives to the fight them led.
Bellona brought in tumult and affright.
And Mars a mighty spear had in his hand.
And sometimes after Hector went i' th' fight,
Sometimes before, and oft did by him stand.
Tydides when he saw him was afraid,
As when a man in haste has lost his way,
And running on is at some river stayed,
That's deep and swift, he runs as fast away;
So he retir'd. And to his Argives said,
No wonder 'tis if Hector valiant be;
One God or other always gives him aid,
And near him stands from death to set him free.
Now Mars comes with him, like a mortal wight.
Retire. But turn your faces to the foe,
Forbearing still against the Gods to fight.
This said he, but the Trojans near were now.
And Hector there had slain two men that sat
Together, Mnestheus and Anchialus,
Both warriors good. But Ajax griev'd thereat,
(The greater Ajax, Telamonius)
Darted his heavy spear at Amphius.
Rich was he both in lands and goods, and dwelt
At Pæsus: and fought here for Priamus.
But by the spear which pass'd quite through his belt
Upon his belly took a mortal wound.
And as he fell, Ajax ran fiercely in
To strip him of his armour on the ground,
And stript him had, had he not hindered been.

For from the Trojans came a shower of spears,
Whereof his shield received not a few.
Then to be hemm'd in by the foe he fears.
His own spear he recover'd and withdrew.
Whilst they in stubborn war thus toiling were,
Unlucky fate Tlepolemus brought on
To charge Sarpedon; and when they were near
Together come, Jove's grandson and his son,
Tlepolemus said then, what need had you,
Unskilful in the war, to tremble here?
Jove's son men say you are, but 'tis not true.
No such weak men by Jove begotten were;
But such as Hercules is said t'have been,
Courageous as a lion; with few men
In but six ships, this strong town he did win,
And rifled it, and safe went off again.
But you are weak, your men a great part dead,
And can but little help afford to Troy,
And though from Lycia you were strengthened,
I mean to send you now another way.
To this Sarpedon answered, 'Tis true
That Hercules sack'd Troy, because the steeds
Laomedon kept back that were his due,
And gave him evil language for good deeds.
But you from me shall present death receive,
For which I shall have honour truly paid,
And you your soul shall now to Pluto leave.
And this Sarpedon had no sooner said,
Than from their hands the spears together started.

Tlepolemus clean through the neck was struck,
And from him presently his life departed.
But from Sarpedon Jove kept such ill luck;
Yet on his left thigh he receiv'd a wound:
For through it went the spear close by the bone.
Sarpedon, by his friends borne off the ground,
Was plac'd apart where battle there was none,
Tormented with the spear still in his thigh.
To pull it out they all had quite forgot.
In so great haste they were, the foe so nigh,
The time so little, and the fight so hot.
Meanwhile Tlepolemus his body dead
The Greeks fetch'd off. The wise Ulysses then
Within himself a while considered,
Whether to charge Sarpedon or his men.
But since by fate Sarpedon was to die
By other, and not by Ulysses' hands,
Athena made him lay that purpose by,
And turn his anger on the Lycians.
Alastor then he slew, and Cœramus,
Alcander, Prytanis, and Noemon.
And Halius he slew, and Chromius,
And many Lycians more had overthrown,
But mighty Hector now approached near
In glittering arms, and brought with him affright.
But glad Sarpedon was to see him there;
And when he was come up unto him quite,
Himself lamenting, thus to Hector said,
Leave me not, Hector, to the Greeks a prey,

But let my body in your ground be laid,
Since I my country must no more enjoy,
Nor my beloved wife and tender son.
So said Sarpedon. Hector not replies,
But to the enemy he passeth on;
And as he goes the ground with blood he dies.
Under a beech, sacred to Jupiter
Sarpedon placed was upon the ground,
And gently Pelagon pull'd out the spear;
The pain hereof put him into a swound.
Lost was his sight; but by a gentle wind
And cool, that from the north upon him blew,
He soon recover'd both his sight and mind,
And all the company about him knew.
To Mars and Hector still the Greeks gave way
And still their faces to the Trojans were,
But for to charge none durst advance or stay.
For Diomed had told them Mars was there.
Now tell me, Muse, who slain by Hector was?
Trechus, Orestes, Teuthras, Helenus,
(Whose father Œnops was) and Œnonaus;
And last of all wealthy Oresbius.
In Hyla on Cephisses lake he dwelt,
The richest pasture of Bœotia,
And known was by the gayness of his belt.
This slaughter of the Greeks when Juno saw,
She then to Pallas spake. Pallas, said she,
If we let Mars still play the madman here,
Our word to Menelaus false will be,

That he from Troy return should conqueror.
Let's courage take, and try what we can do.
Pallas contented, 'twas agreed upon.
And Juno ready made herself to go,
And quickly the coachwheels Hebe sets on.
Eight spokes each wheel had, and were all of brass,
And fixed round about at th' axle-tree.
The axle-tree itself of iron was,
The circle gold, and wonderful to see.
But arm'd it was above with plates of brass.
The naves on both sides were of silver white,
With gold and silver wire extended was
The seat, which had two silver rings and bright,
In which the beam of silver fast'ned stayed;
At the other end th' golden yoke she tied,
And on the yoke the golden reins she laid.
And Juno then no longer could abide,
But to the coach herself the horses brought,
From quarrels so impatiently she stayed.
Pallas threw off her robe, and took Jove's coat,
And with the same she there herself array'd.
And then her breast with armour covered,
And on her shoulder hung her frightful shield,
Wherein Strife, Force, Flight, Chase, were figured,
With all the horror of a foughten field;
And in the middle stood out Gorgoe's head.
Then put she on her golden helmet, that
Ten thousand men's heads might have covered,
And to the chariot up she went, and sat,

And her great heavy spear takes in her hands
The spear wherewith, when she displeased is,
She scatters of proud kings the armed bands.
Then Juno with the whip was not remiss,
And of itself flew open heaven-gate,
Though to the Seasons, Jove the power gave
Alone to judge of early and of late.
And out the Goddesses their horses drave.
Jove on the highest of Olympus tops,
Sitting alone they found, and none him nigh.
The Goddess Juno there her horses stops,
And spake unto him thus, his mind to try:
Pray tell me, Jove, if you contented be,
That Mars thus raging in the field remain;
For what unseemly work he makes, you see,
And of brave Greeks how many he has slain,
While Venus at my grief stands laughing by,
And pleased is Apollo with the sight,
And set him on. But I could make him fly
(But that I fear your anger) from the fight.
Do't then, said Jove; not you, but Pallas; she
Accustom'd is to vex him more than you.
Juno took this commission willingly.
Feeling the whip, away her horses flew,
'Twixt heaven and earth, and went at every strain
As far as coming one can see a ship,
That from a hill looketh upon the main,
So far the horses of the Gods can skip.
Arriv'd at Troy, on ground they set their feet,

And Juno there her heavenly steeds untied,
Where Simois doth with Scamander meet.
And with ambrosia, Simois them supplied.
Then swift as doves, to give the Argives aid,
They went to where they saw the greatest throng.
There was Tydides, and about him stayed
Many as lions valiant and strong.
And Juno there in shape of Stentor stood,
And spake as loud as any fifty men.
Argives, said she, cowards, for nothing good,
Although you make a goodly show. For when
Achilles went before you to the fight,
Out at their gates the Trojans durst not peep,
So much they of his spear abhorr'd the sight,
But from your ships you scarce now can them keep.
When Juno thus the Greeks encouraged,
To Diomed went Pallas; whom she found
Hard by his horses sitting, wearied.
And cooling in the open air the wound
Given by Pandarus; which with the sweat
Under his belt afflicted him the more;
And lifting up his belt some ease to get,
He from the wound was wiping off the gore.
As at the yoke Athena leaning stood,
Like him, said she, your father left no son;
A little man was he, but warrior good.
Though I not bade him, he went boldly on.
And when to Thebes alone I bade him go
Ambassador, and with the Theban lords

To sit at feast, and not provoke the foe,
And at their table to forbear harsh words,
Yet he his native courage still retained,
And them defied at manly exercises,
And from them all the victory he gained,
And won, by my assistance, all the prizes.
But when I you, as I did him, defend,
And bid you boldly with the Trojans fight,
You are afraid, or weariness pretend.
Of Tydeus sure the son you are not right.
Tydides to her then replying said,
Daughter of Jove, Pallas I know you are,
'Tis not that I am weary or afraid,
That I stand here abstaining from the war,
But in obedience to your own command,
Who gave me leave, if Venus in the wars
I met, to wound her; but not lift my hand
'Gainst other Gods. Now in the field is Mars,
And domineering fights on Hector's side;
And that's the cause why I from fight abstain,
And others by my counsel here abide.
To this the Goddess then replied again,
Nor Mars nor any of th' Immortals spare,
That shall advance against you in the field.
And for your safety trust unto my care,
And know you are protected by my shield.
But first to Mars drive up your horses close,
And strike the blockhead with your spear in hand,
That fights sometimes for these, sometimes for those,

And with the Trojans now you see him stand,
And yet to help the Greeks he promis'd me
And Juno, but a little while before,
And now amongst the Trojans fighteth he,
And thinks upon his promises no more.
This said, they mount into the chariot,
And Sthenelus descending left his seat.
The axle-tree groaned under them. Why not?
A great man he, she was a Goddess great.
And then to Mars directly they drive on,
Who had but newly slain great Periphas,
Of old Ochesius the valiant son,
And far the best of all th' Ætolians was.
Athena then puts Pluto's helmet on,
Lest she by Mars should be discovered.
When Mars there saw Tydides all alone,
He Periphas forsook, who there lay dead;
And turn'd to meet Tydides on the way;
And when to one another they were near,
Mars making full account the man to slay,
Over the yoke thrusts at him with his spear.
But Pallas with her hand the point suppress'd,
And made it light beneath the seat in vain.
Tydides then to Mars a spear address'd,
Which had he been a mortal had him slain;
For Pallas in his belly stuck the spear,
And presently the same pluck'd out again.
Mars roar'd as loud as if in battle there
Fighting had been nine or ten thousand men,

And frighted both the armies with the noise.
Then like a black cloud which some wind makes rise,
He left th' unlucky field and went his ways,
And in a little time was in the skies.
And sitting down hard by his father's throne,
Shew'd him the blood that from the wound did flow,
And grievously lamenting made his moan.
Father, said he, do you such work allow?
That we the Gods such harm from mortals take,
While some for Trojans, some for Argives fight,
And partial be for one another's sake,
The fault is to be laid on you by right.
For you brought forth this mad, pernicious maid,
Whose study is her malice to effect,
When by us other Gods you are obey'd;
And this you saw, but never would correct.
'Twas she that on the Gods set Diomed,
Who wounded Venus first, then flew at me.
And there in pain I lain had 'mongst the dead,
Or crippled been, had not my feet been free.
Uncertain Mars, then Jupiter replied,
Of all the Gods most hateful to my sight,
That quarrel lov'st to make, but not decide;
Thou hast thy mother Juno's nature right,
That oft provokes me with her peevish tongue,
And by her order, I think, this was done.
But in this pain I'll not detain you long,
Seeing you are as well mine as her son.
But had another got you, you had sure

To Pluto and th’ infernal Gods been sent.
This said, to Pæon he commits his cure;
And Pæon presently about it went.
As quickly as the milk is turn’d to curd,
When with a proper rennet it is mix’d,
And with a housewife’s hand together stirr’d,
So quickly was the wide wound clos’d and fix’d.
Then bath’d he was by Hebe, and new clad;
And that he so came off was well content.
Juno and Pallas when they driven had
Mars from th’ battle, up t’ Olympus went.

LIB. VI.

The first battle yet continued. The other Gods forbidden by Jove to assist.

THE GODS TO neither side assistance yield,
But on his own hand each man's fortune lies;
Now here, now there, they skirmish in the field,
Betwixt the streams Xanthus and Simseis.
And first great Ajax killed Acamas,
And for his fellows opened a door
For slaughter 'mongst the files and ranks to pass,
And caus'd thereby the loss of many more.
And by Tydides Axylus was slain,
That at Arisbe dwelt near the highway,
Rich, and the Greeks did often entertain;
But none of them would save him in the fray,
For slain he was by Diomedes there,
Together with his squire, Calesius,
That by him sat, and was his charioteer.
Euryalus then slew Opheltius
And Dresus. After Pedasus he runs,
And Æsepus, sons of Bucalion,
Who by Abarbarea had two sons,
But he for father had Laomedon,
And th' eldest was, but not in wedlock got;
And twins the sons were of Bucalion.

But from Euryalus they ‘scaped not,
Nor long they lay there with their armour on.
Then Polypœtes by Astyalus,
Pidytes by Ulysses, and by Teuc-
er Areton, and by Antilochus
Ablerus; by Atrides Eleteus
Was slain, that the Pedasians led
From the delightful bank of Satnius.
And Leitus Philacus slew as he fled.
Eurypylus then slew Melanthius;
And then Adrestus taken was alive
By Menelaus. For his horses frighted,
Whilst to the town they labour’d to arrive,
Upon two branches of a tree they lighted,
And brake the char’ot pole off at the head.
The horses loose away ran tow’rd the town,
As did the rest that from the battle fled.
Adrestus headlong from the seat fell down,
And by him with a spear Atrides stood.
Adrestus then lays hold upon his knee.
Save me, said he, my ransom will be good,
At any rate I shall redeemed be.
My father wants nor iron, nor brass, nor gold,
And any thing to set me free will give,
When he of my condition shall be told,
And that I am your prisoner and live.
This said, Atrides was thereto inclin’d,
And ready for to send him to the ships.
But Agamemnon came and chang’d his mind

Before he had confirm'd it with his lips.
Brother, said he, what makes you be so kind
To any of these men? Is it because
You did at home the Trojans faithful find,
And that they had well served Menelaus?
No, no, we must no quarter give at Troy,
Nor spare the child yet in his mother's womb,
But utterly the nation destroy,
And pluck up by the root proud Ilium.
Then Menelaus pitied him no more,
But violently push'd him from his knee,
Wherewith he backward tumbled o'er and o'er,
And soon by Agamemnon slain was he.
Then Nestor to the Greeks, with voice as high
As he could raise it, cried out, Let none
Yet on the spoil and booty set his eye,
But follow killing now, plunder anon:
The dead will stay till back again we come.
The Greeks by Nestor thus encouraged,
Had chas'd the Trojans unto Ilium,
But that by Helenus was hindered.
For standing near to Hector and Æneas,
Since all the work, said he, lies on your hand,
And you in fight and counsel chiefly please
Both Lycians and Trojans, make them stand;
About them go, and put yourselves between
The gates and them, lest followed by the foe
They should be by their loving wives there seen,
And the Argives stand triumphing in our woe.

And when you once have them encouraged,
Æneas and myself will with them stay,
And fight against the Greeks, though wearied.
But Hector to the town go you away,
And bid your and my mother take with her
The eldest Trojan matrons, and make haste
To Pallas' temple, and present her there
With the best robe she has; and having plac'd
It on her knee, vow to her deity
(If she protect our wives and children will,
And city from this raging enemy,
And take off Diomed) that you will kill
Twelve heifers at her altar. For in fight
He has the great Achilles much outdone,
Who never did the Trojans thus affright,
Although they say he is a Goddess' son.
Then Hector armed leapt down to the ground,
And with two spears about the army goes,
Courage inspiring to the Trojans round,
And straight they turn'd their faces to the foes.
The Greeks retiring then no longer fought.
Some God from heav'n descended was, they thought,
And t' Hector and the Trojans aid had brought.
Then Hector to the Trojans cried out,
Trojans and aids, said he, be sure to stay
And play the men, whilst I to Ilium
Return, and cause them to the Gods to pray,
And to them sacrifice an hecatomb.
And as he walk'd, the edges of his shield

By turns his ankle and his neck did smite.
Tydides then, and Glaucus, on the field
Met one another, and prepar'd to fight.
Tydides speaking first, Brave man, said he,
Who are you? Let me know your name and race,
That dares so boldly thus advance on me.
I never yet in battle saw your face.
Men mortal to provoke me thus none dare,
But they whose parents are condemn'd to woe.
But if some God come down from heaven you are,
Do what you will I'll not return a blow.
Licurgus, son of Dryas, chas'd the train
Of Bacchus with a goad at Nyssa, where
The Mænades threw from them on the plain
Their ivy-twined staves, and fled for fear;
Bacchus himself leapt into Thetis' lap,
Trembling and frighted, and the Goddess kind
Receiv'd him, and defended from mishap.
But for this act Jove struck Licurgus blind,
Who died soon after. For the Gods above
All hated him. And that's the cause that I
Dare not the anger of the Gods to move.
But if thou mortal art, come near and die.
brave Tydides, Glaucus answer'd then,
To what end serves it you to know my race?
As with green leaves, so fareth it with men;
Some fall with wind, others grow in their place.
But since you ask me (though it be well known)
My pedigree at large I shall you tell.

Within a creek of Argos stands a town
Call'd Ephyre. There Sisyphus did dwell;
The subtle Sisyphus, who Glaucus got.
Glaucus, the father of Bellerophon,
Than whom a fairer person there was not,
Nor valianter in all the land not one.
But Prætus sought to take away his life;
For so enamour'd of him was the queen
Anteia, who of Prætus was the wife,
That she a suitor to him oft had been.
But still in vain; for he would not consent.
The fury of her love then turn'd to hate.
And spitefully she to her husband went,
And weeping bitterly, down by him sate,
And to him said, O king, resolve to die
Yourself, or else Bellerophon to kill,
For he attempted has my chastity,
And would have lain with me against my will.
The king incens'd, to kill him did intend,
But loth to do it there, he thought it better
Unto the King of Lycia him to send
(Who was Anteia's father) with a letter,
Wherein he had declar'd his cruel mind,
And many ways to bring it to effect.
He, ignorant of what was then design'd,
The king's commandement did not neglect.
To Lycia he went, and coming thither,
In favour with the Gods, was honoured
And treated like a God, nine days together.

O’ th’ tenth his letter he delivered.
The letter read, the king him first employ’d
The terrible Chimæra to assail,
That by the monster he might be destroy’d.
A lion’s head it had and dragon’s tail,
And in the midst the body of a goat;
A flame of burning fire was its breath.
Bellerophon with this foul monster fought,
And put it (by the aid o’ th’ Gods) to death.
The next adventure that he set him on,
Was th’ expedition ‘gainst the Solymi.
The third when from the Amazons he won
(Those martial females) a great victory.
And as he came from thence the king had laid
An ambush for him on the way in vain,
Of choicest Lycians, whom he destroy’d,
That not a man of them return’d again.
The king receiv’d him then, believing now
That he descended was of heavenly race,
And gave him half his pow’r, and land enough,
And with his daughter’s marriage did him grace.
Bellerophon by her had children three;
Two sons, Isandrus and Hippolochus,
And one fair daughter, call’d Laodamie,
On whom by Jove Sarpedon gotten was.
Her father, by the Gods forsaken, then
Liv’d up and down in the Alean plain,
And shunn’d the conversation of men.
At Solym battle was Isander slain.

But of Hippolochus the son am I,
And he of noble ancestors descended.
To Troy he sent me, and especially
Unto me th' honour of my race commended,
Than which in Ephyre none nobler is,
Nor in the land of Lycia more renown'd.
And Diomedes, joyful to hear this,
Turn'd his spear's point and stuck it in the ground,
And to him kindly spake. There is, said he,
Between your ancestors and mine of old,
A mutual bond of hospitality.
Bellerophon, as I have oft been told,
Was by my grandsire, Œneus, freely treated,
And stayed with him twenty days and nights,
And when again he from his house retreated,
They tokens gave of hospitable rights;
Œneus to him a belt most glorious,
Bellerophon to him a golden cup,
Which I not with me brought, but in my house
When I came thence I safely left lock'd up.
My father I remember not. For he
Left me too young when last he went from home.
Henceforth my guest in Argos you must be,
I yours in Lycia, when I thither come.
Meantime, let's one another's spear decline;
For many Trojans more I have to kill,
Unless I cross'd be by some pow'r divine.
And of the Achæans kill you whom you will.
And that our friendship may the more appear,

I will present you with these arms of mine;
And you to me present the arms you wear.
This said, they lighted and their hands did join.
But Glaucus surely here bewitched was,
Or cursed by the Gods, that had forgot
His arms were gold, and Diomed's but brass.
An hundred his, nine beeves the other bought.
Hector was now come to the Scæan gates;
To him the Trojan wives and daughters run
To ask their husbands' and their brothers' fates,
But to those questions he answer'd none.
But to the temples bade them go and pray;
Inquire no more for what you will lament;
Then to the royal palace went his way.
For great the danger was and imminent.
On every side within were galleries
Magnificent, of square well-plained stones,
With fifty lodgings for the families
(One by another) of King Priam's sons;
And for his daughters twelve apartments were
(In the same court, but on the other side)
To lodge his sons-in-law when they were there,
Of the same stone in like form beautified.
Here Hecuba, as she conducted home
Laodice, her beautifulest daughter,
Met her son Hector that was newly come
In dusty bloody armour from the slaughter.
And took him by the hand, and to him said,
Why come you from the fight? Have we the worst,

And you come to solicit Jove for aid,
And after that is done to quench your thirst?
A little wine will much the strength sustain
Of one that labour'd has as you have done.
No, no, from wine (said he) I must abstain,
Lest I forget and leave my work undone.
Besides, to Jove I dare not offer wine
With bloody hands, lest I should him incense.
But, mother, go you to Minerva's shrine
With other ladies, and with frankincense;
And of the robes in your perfumed chest
Take with you that which in your judgment is
Amongst them all the largest and the best,
And lay it down upon the Goddess' knees.
And vow that at her altar you will kill
Twelve yearling heifers of the best you have,
If at your prayer condescend she will
Your children with yourselves and Troy to save,
And from the fight this Diomed remove.
To th' temple presently go you away.
But I to Paris now must go, and prove
If he th' advice I give him will obey.
Then Hecuba into the chamber came
Where many divers-colour'd vestures lay,
The work of many a Sidonian dame,
Which then from Sidon Paris brought to Troy,
When thither he from Sparta Helen brought.
Of these, to give the Goddess, she took one
The largest and most curiously wrought,

And that like to a star in heaven shone.
And when unto the temple come they were,
Theano opened the door; for she
(Antenor's wife) was Pallas' priest. And there
She took the robe, and laid it on her knee.
Then prayed she (whilst with a mighty cry
They to the Goddess lifted up their hands.)
Pallas, said she, daughter of Jove most high,
In whose protection ev'ry city stands,
Great Pallas, break the spear of Diomed,
And overthrow him at the Scæan gate,
That at thy altar may be offered
Twelve yearling heifers; and commiserate
The wives and children and the state of Troy.
Thus prayed they; but Pallas would not hear.
To th' house of Paris Hector went away
That was unto his own and Priam's near,
Built by himself the citadel within,
With all the art the Trojans understood.
There Hector with his spear in hand went in,
That was in length eleven cubits good,
And pointed at the head with polish'd brass,
Fasten'd into the staff with a gold ring.
Busy about his armour Paris was,
And Helen work to th' maids distributing.
Here Hector Paris chid. Is this, said he,
The fittest time to manifest your spite
Against the Trojans, when the enemy
Under our walls is killing them in fight?

When none but you the cause is of the war
And tumult, which surrounds the town of Troy.
I think it would become you better far
To rate those men that from the battle stay.
Brother, said Paris, what you say is right.
But hear me, too. I stayed not behind
Because I to the Trojans bear a spite,
But from their slanders to avert my mind.
And now my wife too has persuaded me,
Who of myself was ready to begone.
Not sure to any side is victory.
Stay only while I put my armour on.
Or go. I'll follow you and find you out.
Thus he. But Hector to it nothing said.
And to begone his face he turn'd about,
But Helen saw about to speak, and stayed.
Brother, said she, though I unworthy am
To call you so, I would I had been thrown
Into the sea the same day that I came
Into the world, so many shames to own.
Or that this husband sensible had been,
As men of honour should be of ill-fame;
But that's not now, nor ever will be seen,
He one day will, I fear, repent the same.
But brother, pra' ye, sit down and rest awhile,
That with the toil of battle weary are;
The cause whereof am I the woman vile,
That with me brought to Troy this cruel war.
Unlucky day that brought me first acquainted

With Alexander to our infamy,
Which through the world hereafter will be chaunted,
And make us loathsome to posterity.
Helen, said Hector, now I cannot stay,
The Trojans of my presence stand in need;
But bid you Alexander come away,
While I am in the town, and that with speed.
For hence unto my house I must go home
To see my wife, my child, and family,
And ‘t may be never back again shall come,
But by the hands of the Achæans die.
This said, home Hector went, and there was told
His wife Andromache at home was not.
For with the nurse the battle to behold,
Into the tow’r on Scæa gate was got.
Then Hector of the women ask’d again,
Is she gone to some sister or some brother?
Or to the Goddess temple in the train
Of those that thither waited on my mother?
To this one of the women said again,
She neither went to sister nor to brother,
Nor to the Goddess’ temple, in the train
Of those that thither waited on your mother.
But when I know not who inform’d her had
That th’ Argives did the Trojans overpower,
With her young son and nurse as one that’s mad
Ran to the gate, and up into the tower.
Then back went Hector passing the same streets
Through which he went when he came from the fight,

Where in the way Andromache he meets
That now was running home in great affright.
The daughter she was of Eetion,
Who of Cilicia the sceptre carried,
And dwelt at Thebe in Hypoplacion,
But unto noble Hector she was married.
Now Hector met her with their little boy
That in the nurse's arms was carried,
And like a star upon her bosom lay
His beautiful and shining golden head.
Scamandrius he called was by Hector,
Astyanax he named was in Troy.
Because his father was their sole protector,
The people from his honour nam'd the boy.
Then Hector smiling look'd upon his son.
And to him weeping said Andromache,
My dear, you'll by your courage be undone,
And this your son a wretched orphan be.
The Greeks at once on you alone will fall,
And then a woeful widow shall be I,
And have no comfort in the world at all,
But live in misery and wish to die.
Father or mother they have left me none,
For by the great Achilles he was slain
When he the goodly town of Thebe won.
But from disarming him he did refrain.
Together with his arms he did him burn,
And with such rites as did a prince become.
And having put his ashes in an urn

Buried the same, and o’er it rais’d a tomb.
The mountain-nymphs, daughters of Jupiter,
Planted about it many elmen-trees.
My seven brothers all were killed there.
In one day by Achilles slain were these,
As they defending were their kine and sheep.
My mother with the booty he brought hither,
And her he at the ships did pris’ner keep
Until her friends her ransom had sent thither.
Then to her country back they sent my mother,
Who shortly after there fell sick and died.
Now Hector you my father are and brother,
Husband and mother. In you I confide.
For pity’s sake then on this turret stay,
Lest fatherless your son, I widow be;
And set your armed people in array,
And those that aid you at the syc’more-tree,
Where to the city easiest is th’ access.
For there it was the Argives thrice fell on
Led by Idomeneus, and th’ Ajaxes,
The two Atrides, and Tydeus’ son.
Whether they had some God for their director,
Or had observ’d some weakness in the place,
I know not. And to this replied Hector,
Dear wife, this might be done. But what disgrace
Shall I be in? How will the Trojans scoff,
Both men and women, and deride my fear,
If on the tow’r they saw me standing off
When others fighting with the Argives were?

Besides, by nature I am framed so,
I am not able to abstain from fight,
But must be ‘mongst the foremost, when the foe
Invades my father’s honour in my sight.
And yet I know the evil day will come,
That Priam and his people perish must,
And utterly destroy’d be Ilium,
And all her stately buildings lie in dust.
Yet am not griev’d so much to think upon
The fate of Troy, of Priam, of my mother,
Or all my brothers, as for you alone
When by a proud Achæan one or other
You dragg’d are weeping into slavery,
And when t’ Achæa he has brought you home,
To fetch in water you employ’d shall be,
And made to labour at another’s loom.
And one that sees you weeping, there will say,
This woman was the noble Hector’s bride,
The bravest man of all that fought for Troy,
And of your tears bring back again the tide.
But dead may I be first and buried
Before I see you dragg’d or hear you cry.
And when he thus had said, his arms he spread
The childto take, who terrified thereby,
And unacquainted with a glittering crest
And horse’s mane that nodding at it hung,
Turn’d his face crying to the nurse’s breast,
And with his little arms close to her clung;
Which made his father and his mother smile.

Then Hector on the ground his helmet laid,
And took the child, and dandled him awhile,
And then to Jove and all the Gods he pray'd.
Jove and Gods, grant that this son of mine
No less in Troy may honour'd be than I,
Nor from his father's virtue e'er decline,
But hold the reins of Ilium steadily,
That men may say when he hath slain his foe,
And bringeth with him home his spoil to Troy,
In battle he his father doth outdo,
And fill his loving mother's heart with joy.
This said, he gave the child t' Andromache,
Which she receiving hugg'd, and laugh'd, and cried.
Which Hector with compassion did see,
And thus with gentle words his wife did chide.
Dear wife, do not afflict yourself for me.
No man can die before his hour is come;
And when 'tis come, put off it cannot be
By weak nor strong. Therefore I pray go home,
And tend your work, and give your women theirs,
And sit still at your spindle and your loom,
And leave to men these martial affairs,
And me that have the charge of Ilium.
Then up he takes his helmet and departs,
And homewards she; but often turn'd her head.
At home with grief she fill'd her women's hearts,
And made them mourn for Hector not yet dead.
Nor Paris at his house did longer stay
Than he must needs his armour to put on,

And up and down the streets went ev'ry way,
To see if he could Hector light upon.
As when a horse i' th' stable pampered,
And used to be washed in the river
His headstall breaks, or be delivered
From that which held him by what means soever;
Then proudly he sets up his tail and head,
And beats the plain, and with the wind he makes
His mane play in the air dishevelled,
Then to the pasture known the way he takes:
So from his house went Paris through the streets
With shining arms, and courage at his heart;
And quickly with his valiant brother meets,
Turning from where he and his wife did part.
And first to Hector Paris thus began.
Brother, I fear I've made you stay too long.
No, he replied, your courage no man can
Accuse, but such as mean to do you wrong.
But when you, out of humour, will not fight,
The Trojans that much suffer for your sake
Speak all the ill they can of you in spite.
Which, when I hear, it makes my heart to ache.
But now let's go. If e'er the powers divine
Displace the Achæan host, and give us peace,
That freely to them we may offer wine,
Your quarrel with the Trojans soon will cease.

LIB. VII.

The Greeks enclose their ships with a wall and ditch. The duel betwixt Hector and Ajax.

THIS SAID, THEY went together to the fight,
For Paris now no more the war declin'd,
And welcome to the Trojans was the sight,
As to a weary rower a good wind.
There Paris slew Menesthius, the son
Of the great clubman Areïthous
Of Arne. And by Hector overthrown
And struck clean through the neck was Eionus.
Iphinous, the son of Dexias,
As to his car he mounted to have fled,
By Glaucus through the shoulder wounded was,
And to the ground again fell backward dead.
When Pallas saw the Argives fall so fast,
She from Olympus leaped to Ilium:
Apollo then to meet her made great haste,
That saw her from his tow'r in Pergamum.
And when they were together at the beach,
He for the Trojans, for the Argives she,
Apollo to her thus address'd his speech:
Daughter of Jove, what great necessity
Brought you to Troy? Was it to please your mind,

Or give unto the Greeks the victory?
For well I know to Troy you are not kind.
But for the present be advis'd by me.
Let th' armies both give over fight to day,
And fight it out hereafter, till they know
What end the Fates assigned have to Troy,
Since you and Juno needs will have it so.
Your counsel's good, said Pallas, and the same
I thought upon. But tell me how to do it.
For to that end I from Olympus came.
Tell me but how, and I'll consent unto it.
Why then, said Phœbus, Hector I'll excite
In duel all the Argives to defy;
And they some one will choose with him to fight,
And both the armies quietly stand by.
This counsel was by both agreed upon;
And known to Helenus by augury,
To Helenus, that was King Priam's son.
And he to Hector did himself apply.
Hector, said he, will you do that which I,
That am your brother, shall advise you to?
Go to th' Achæan army, and defy
The best of all the Argives; boldly go;
For in this combat you are not to die:
The Gods have told me so. Then never fear.
Then to the front came Hector joyfully,
With both his hands o' th' middle of his spear
To keep the Trojans back and make them stand;
And straight King Agamemnon seeing it,

Unto the Argives gave the like command.
Then on the ground both Greeks and Trojans sit.
Phœbus and Pallas flew up to the tree,
The high beech-tree that sacred was to Jove,
I' th' likeness of two vultures, thence to see
How the two armies looked from above.
As when a west wind ruffled has the main,
It black and horrid to the eye appears;
So look'd the Greeks and Trojans on the plain,
Grisly and dark with helmets, shields, and spears.
Into the midst between them Hector stept.
You, Trojans and well-armed Greeks, said he,
Since 'twas Jove's will our oath should not be kept,
But that the war continued shall be
Till either you shall win the town of Troy,
Or we your army and your ships confound,
Fighting till one another we destroy;
I to you, Argives, somewhat will propound.
The best of all the Greeks are present here.
Let one of them come forth and fight with me,
On these conditions (witness Jupiter)
If by his hand I slain in combat be,
Let him do with my armour what he will,
But send my body into Ilium.
But if Apollo grant me him to kill,
His armour I will have and carry home,
And in Apollo's temple dedicate.
His body to the ships shall rendered be,
That on his urn the Greeks may elevate

A mount of earth for passengers to see
Upon the shore of Hellespont, and say,
Here lies a valiant Greek by Hector slain
Long since, when th' Argives were besieging Troy.
My honour thus for ever will remain.
So Hector said. The Greeks all silent were.
For shame the challenge they could not refuse;
And to accept it ev'ry one did fear.
But Menelaus then his valour shews,
And rising up in anger, thus he said,
Women of Argos, what a shame is this,
That you should all of Hector be afraid!
What now become of all your threat'ning is?
There (dust and water, heartless, nameless), sit.
Myself I'll arm (for I perceive no odds)
And will this sturdy champion Hector meet.
For victory comes only from the Gods.
This said, he rose and arm'd himself; and there
Depriv'd of life had Menelaus been
(So much too weak he was) by Hector's spear,
But that the princes starting up came in.
And Agamemnon seizing on his hand,
Why, Menelaus, are you mad, said he,
In fight you cannot against Hector stand,
How much soever you concerned be.
Avoid him in the field as others do.
Achilles, who than you much stronger is,
Strong as he is, considers Hector too,
And cooler grows as oft as he him sees.

Therefore, good brother, sit still at your troop.
Some other we'll oppose to Hector's might,
That, haughty as he is, shall make him stoop,
And thank the Gods if safe he come from fight.
To this good counsel yielded Menelaus.
Whereat his servants not a little joy'd,
Came in, and soon by them unarm'd he was,
And to the Greeks then Nestor rose, and said,
how unwelcome will this story be
To Greece, and Peleus king o' th' Myrmidons,
Who at his house the names enquir'd of me
Both of yourselves, your fathers, and your sons;
If he should know how much you Hector dread,
How oft would he hold up his hands, and pray
The Gods to send him down amongst the dead,
And from his body take all sense away!
that I were as young as I was then
When war was 'twixt Arcadia and Pyle,
And at the walls of Pheia stood the men
Ready for bloody fight in rank and file!
Amongst them stood one Ereuthalion,
And of the great man Areïthous
Upon his shoulders had the armour on,
Who Clubman commonly surnamed was,
Because he used neither bow nor spear,
But with an iron club the battles brake.
Lycurgus slew him though he weaker were,
(When at advantage great he did him take)
By craft, not strength. For in a narrow way

He watch'd him at a turning with his spear,
And on a sudden took his life away,
So that the club had nothing to do there.
Then took he off his arms, and wore the same
In battle when there was occasion,
But gave them, when old age upon him came,
To this his squire Ereuthalion.
Who wearing them our army did defy,
At which, when others trembling stood and shook,
Although the youngest of them all was I,
Great as he was, the man I undertook,
And slew him by the Goddess Pallas' aid,
The strongest and tallest that I e'er slew,
As when upon the ground he stretch'd was laid,
The place he covered did plainly show.
If I were now as young and strong as then,
The Greeks for Hector soon a match should find,
Though none of you that are their bravest men
To try your fortune with him have a mind.
Thus Nestor th' Argive lords did reprehend,
And nine of them in number (all that durst
In single fight with Hector to contend)
Armed, and Agamemnon was the first.
And next the strong and valiant Diomed,
And then the greater Ajax, then the less,
Then King Idomeneus, of Crete the head,
And with him his good squire Meriones,
Who as the God of battle valiant was,
Besides Eurypylus Euæmon's son,

And of Andremon the stout son Thoas,
And wise Ulysses last of all made one.
So many Greeks durst Hector undertake.
Bring in your lots, said Nestor then, and we
Will in a helmet them together shake.
And who by lot our champion shall be
Shall please us all, but please himself much more
When back again he cometh from the fight.
Then brought they in their lots; which o'er and o'er
He shook in Agamemnon's helmet bright.
Meanwhile the people lift their hands, and pray,
Jove, let now the lot to Ajax fall,
Or that on Diomedes light it may,
Or on Atrides our great general.
The helmet shaken threw out Ajax' lot,
Which th' herald took and carried about
To th' Argive princes, but they own'd it not,
Till to the hand of Ajax it was brought,
Who sign'd it had, and into th' helmet thrown.
He took it, and awhile consider'd it;
And when he was assured 'twas his own,
Rose up, and lets it fall before his feet.
And to the princes said, This lot is mine,
And glad I am, and hope for victory.
But send your pray'rs up to the pow'rs divine,
While I put on my arms; and silently,
So that, at least, the Trojans may not hear.
Or, now I think on't, plain and openly.
For I see nothing that I need to fear.

I am not forc’d to fight unwillingly,
Nor rashly undertook the enterprise.
For I was born and bred in Salamis,
And hope I am not so weak or unwise.
As soon as mighty Ajax had said this,
The people looking up to heav’n pray’d.
Jove, said one, grant Ajax victory,
Or if you be inclin’d Hector to aid,
Then let their strength and glory equal be.
When Ajax had his arms put on complete,
He walked away with a majestic pace,
As Mars goes to the war. His strides were great,
And scornful smiles with terror in his face.
And as he went he shook his mighty spear,
Which joyfully the Argives did behold;
But by the Trojans look’d on was with fear;
And Hector at the heart himself was cold,
But was ashamed back again to fly,
Since he provok’d him had into the field.
And Ajax now was come unto him nigh,
As from a tower, looking o’er his shield,
By Tychius of Hyla made it was,
And cover’d with sev’n fat bulls’ hides well tann’d,
And over them an eighth of shining brass,
And at his breast he held it with his hand,
And threat’ning said, Hector, I’ll make you see,
That in the army many yet remain,
Though from us angry gone Achilles be,
And discontent from battle now abstain,

That fear not Hector. Do the worst you can.
Ajax, said Hector, I am not a child,
Nor woman, to be threaten'd, but a man
That understands the bus'ness of the field,
And can my buckler bear from left to right,
And have whereon in battle to rely,
And know to guide my horses in a fight,
And move my feet to Mars his melody.
But no such cunning will I use with you,
My spear I'll send unto you openly.
And at that word the long spear from him flew,
And pierc'd his target to the seventh ply.
But there it staid. Then Ajax threw his spear,
Which Hector's shield, armour, and coat went thro';
But Hector shrunk his belly in for fear,
For else it pierced had his belly too.
Then from their shields the spears they plucked out,
And them no more at one another threw,
But came unto each other close, and fought,
And like two lions on each other flew.
And Hector made a thrust at Ajax' shield
Which enter'd not, resisted by the brass:
But Hector's shield to Ajax' spear did yield,
Which pierc'd it through, and so far in did pass,
That grazing on his neck it fetch'd the blood.
But Hector, not dismay'd, took up a stone.
Ajax took 't on his shield and firmly stood,
And with his hand took up a greater one,
And rougher, which did Hector's buckler tear,

And with the weight unto the ground him threw,
But up again Apollo did him rear.
Then both of them, the combat to renew,
Their swords were drawing. But the heralds then,
Idæus and Talthibius, came in,
The sacred messengers of Gods and men,
And put themselves the combatants between.
Troy's herald then, Idæus, to them spake.
Good sons, belov'd of Jove, give over fight,
For all men of your valour notice take.
And now 'tis late; we must submit to night.
Idæus, then said Ajax, let these words
From Hector come, from whom came the defy.
'Twas he that challeng'd all the Argive lords.
Let him give over first, and then will I.
Then Hector spake. Ajax, since you, said he,
The Gods endued have with strength and wit,
Let for to-day the quarrel ended be.
Hereafter let the Gods determine it,
And give which side they please the victory,
For now 'tis late. To night we must submit;
That you the Greeks may cheer, and specially
Your own friends and companions, at your fleet:
And I the Trojans from their fear relieve,
And wives, that for my safe return do pray.
But come, let's t' one another tokens give,
That Greeks and Trojans seeing them may say,
These two men fought and sought each other's death,
Yet parted friends. This said, he to him gave

His belt with his good sword and iv'ry sheath;
Ajax to him his shining girdle brave.
Thus parted, Ajax to the Argives went;
And Hector back into the troops of Troy;
Who mightily rejoic'd at the event
That past all hope they saw him come away.
The lords conducted him to Ilium:
The Greeks to Agamemnon Ajax led.
And when they all unto his tent were come,
He for them sacrific'd a bull well fed,
Which flay'd, divided, roasted, taken up,
The carvers into messes cut. This done,
King Agamemnon and the princes sup.
The chine at Ajax' table was set on,
And when their thirst and hunger were subdu'd,
Nestor, whose counsel still had been the best,
What further was to be consider'd shew'd,
And to the princes all his speech address'd.
Atrides, and you other princes, know
How Mars with Argives strewed hath the plain,
And sent their souls down to the pow'rs below,
Whose bloody bodies in the field remain.
Tomorrow, therefore, let us cease from war,
And early in the morning fetch the dead,
And burn them somewhere from the ships not far,
That t' Argos back they may be carried,
When we depart from hence; that their bones may
By their own friends and children buried be.
Let's raise a mount upon the shore of Troy,

One for them all, for passengers to see,
And fortify our good ships with a wall,
And turrets in it, and a ditch without,
Lest unawares the Trojans on us fall,
And gates for char'ots to go in and out.
Meanwhile the Trojan lords at counsel were
Loud and discordant. Then Antenor said,
Trojans and aids, I pray to me give ear,
For of the worst I greatly am afraid.
Let Menelaus have his wife again,
And all the goods she brought with her. Take heed;
Against our oath we shall but fight in vain.
Then let her go, or never look to speed.
Antenor, then said Paris, this is not
The best advice you could have given, or
(If what you say dissent not from your thought)
You are not now so wise as heretofore:
Thus much to you. But to the Trojans this:
Her wealth I'll render, with more of mine own,
But my wife Helen I will not dismiss.
And when he that had said, again sat down.
Then Priam rose. Trojans and aids, said he,
Now take your supper as you us'd to do,
And sentinels set, such as careful be;
To-morrow I will send Idæus to
The Greeks with Paris' answer, and to try
If they from battle for so long will cease,
That we may burn our slain men quietly,
And fight again hereafter when they please.

This said, the Trojans to their suppers went.
Next morn Idæus found the Argive lords
Together met at Agamemnon's tent,
And coming in, unto them said these words:
Atrides, and you Argives all, I come
With terms from Paris, and by Priam sent,
On which you may depart from Ilium,
And end the war, if thereto you consent.
The wealth which he with Helen brought ashore,
(I would before he brought it he had died)
To Menelaus he will give, and more;
But his wife Helen shall with him abide.
Besides, the people have commanded me
To ask you if you will the war suspend,
Until our dead fetch'd off and burned be,
And after fight till Jove the war shall end.
So said Idæus. The Greeks silent were
Awhile. At last Tydides rose and spake.
Let not the Greeks so much the Trojans fear
As Helen's goods, or her herself to take
At Alexander's hands. The hour is come
(As any child may manifestly see)
That must o'erthrow the state of Ilium.
So said Tydides, and much prais'd was he.
Then Agamemnon answer'd to Idæus,
You hear what the Argives say. I say the same.
As for the dead men, burn them if you please;
They're good for nothing. I contented am.
And of this truce let Jove a witness be.

This said, to Jove his sceptre up he heav’d.
Idæus back to Troy went speedily,
The answer to relate he had receiv’d.
Meanwhile the states of Troy in council sat,
And there their herald’s coming back expected.
Idæus then went in, and told them that
The offer made by Paris was rejected,
But that a truce was granted for a day.
Next morn the Trojans, early as they could,
Went some to th’ field to fetch their dead away,
And others to the hill to fetch down wood.
So did the Argives some to Ida go
For wood, and others to the bloody field,
But could not then distinguish friend from foe.
But by and by the sun began to gild
Scamander’s plain; then wash’d they off the gore
And dust, and laid their dead men upon carts.
But Priam had forbidden them to roar,
Or cry outright, though grieved at their hearts.
When they had burnt them, back they went again.
The Greeks too, when they had consum’d with fire
And done their lamentation for the slain,
Unto their ships did back again retire.
But this th’ Achæans did at break of day,
And rais’d one mighty monument for all.
And the incursion of the foe to stay,
Their navy they inclosed with a wall,
With turrets high, and a great ditch without,
(Upon the sides whereof sharp pales they fix)

And gates for char'ots to go in and out.
And all the day thus toiling were the Greeks.
Meanwhile the Gods together sat above,
And wond'ring look'd upon this work of men;
And Neptune then address'd his speech to Jove.
What mortals will the Gods consult again?
See you not what a wall the Greeks have rear'd,
And what a ditch about it made, said he,
The fame whereof 'mongst people will be heard
As far as the sun-beams extended be?
Yet to the Gods they hecatomb gave none.
Whereas the walls that I and Phœbus rais'd
About the city for Laomedon,
Obscur'd by this, no longer will be prais'd.
Then answer'd Jove. Neptune, I never thought
That such a word would e'er have come from you,
That have the pow'r to bring their work to nought.
A lesser God might have complain'd, 'tis true;
But of your pow'r Aurora sees no bound.
Stay only till the Greeks be gone away;
Then break their wall, and throw it to the ground,
And hide the place with sand. Thus talked they.
The sun now set, and finish'd was the wall.
The Greeks went back then each man to his tent,
And many good fat beeves they made to fall;
And wine they had great store from Lemnos sent.
For ships abundance laden were come in,
Which by Euneus (th' hero Jason's son,
Got on Hypsiphile) thither sent had been,

For which the army barter’d. Hides gave one,
Another th’ ox itself, another brass;
One iron, and another gave a slave,
Beside what by Euneus given was
To the two Atrides of free gift to have.
When supper ready was they all sat down,
And all night long the feast continued,
Greeks in their tents, and Trojans in the town.
And all night long aloud Jove thundered,
Meaning no good to th’ Greeks. Then pour’d they on
The ground the offer’d wine, Jove to content,
And no man durst to drink till that was done.
And when they had well drunk to sleep they went.

LIB. VIII.

The second battle; and the Trojans stay all night in the field.

THE MORNING NOW was quite display'd, and Jove
Upon Olympus' highest top was set:
And all the Gods and Goddesses above
By his command were there together met.
And Jupiter unto them speaking said,
You Gods all, and you Goddesses, d'ye hear,
Let none of you the Greeks or Trojans aid;
I cannot do my work for you. Forbear.
For whomsoever I assisting see
The Argives or the Trojans, be it known
He wounded shall return and laugh'd at be,
Or headlong into Tartarus be thrown,
Into the deepest pit of Tartarus,
Shut in with gates of brass, as much below
The common hell, as 'tis from hell to us.
But if you will my pow'r by trial know,
Put now into my hand a chain of gold,
And let one end thereof lie on the plain,
And all you Gods and Goddesses take hold;
You shall not move me howsoe'er you strain.
At th' other end, if I my strength put to't,
I'll pull you Gods and Goddesses to me,

Do what you can, and earth and sea to boot,
And let you hang there till my pow'r you see.
The Gods were out of countenance at this,
And to such mighty words durst not reply,
Till Pallas said, Well known, O father, is
Your mighty pow'r. But do not us deny,
When we so many Argives falling see,
To show we have compassion, and grieve.
And though in fight we no assistants be,
Yet let us sometimes counsel to them give,
Lest in your anger they be all destroy'd.
Dear child, said Jove, it goes against my mind.
I would not have my orders disobey'd.
'Tis granted though. For I'll to you be kind.
This said, he set his horses to his car,
Hard hoof'd, swift-footed horses two. Like gold
Their manes profound well-combed shined far.
Then arm'd himself, and on the whip laid hold.
No sooner had the horses felt the whip,
But up they start, and 'twixt the earth and sky
The winds themselves with swiftness they outstrip,
And came unto the top of Ida high
To Gargarus, and there Jove took them out,
And hiding them with air on th' hill sat down;
And as he sat he cast his eyes about
With great content upon the fleet and town.
The Argives at their tents short breakfast make,
And arm'd themselves as soon as they had done.
The Trojans, for their wives' and children's sake,

(Though fewer) arm'd and made haste to be gone.
Then open'd were the gates, and to the field
Out came they horse and man; and being met,
They man to man came up with shield to shield,
And spear to spear; and on each other set.
Some groan'd, some vaunted, mighty was the din
Of those that kill, and those that falling cry.
And this condition they continued in
Until the sun had mounted half the sky.
Then Jove took up a pair of scales of gold,
And weigh'd the fates of both the nations,
And equally suspended them did hold;
But not so equal were their inclinations.
For th' Argive scale sat still upon the ground,
While th' other lifted was up to the skies.
Heaven and earth did then with thunder sound,
And Jove threw lightning in the Argives' eyes,
Then all the Greeks amazed ran away.
Idomeneus and Agamemnon ran;
Nor either of the Ajaxes durst stay:
Except old Nestor they fled ev'ry man.
And Nestor too had fled, had he known how:
For of his horses Paris one had shot,
And pierc'd his forehead just above the brow
Into the brain, so that his chariot
Now useless was, and the horse troublesome.
Then cuts he th' harness; but so long did stay,
That Hector now was almost to him come,
And th' old man surely had been cast away,

But that Tydides saw him in this pain,
And terribly t' Ulysses cried out,
Whether d'ye fly, Ulysses? Come again,
Help to defend old Nestor; face about.
While he said this, Ulysses still ran on,
Not minding what he said. And Diomed,
To succour Nestor, to him went alone,
And with him stood before his chariot's head,
And said, O Nestor, youthful is the foe
That cometh on, and you now very old,
Your charioteer not strong, your horses slow,
Come up into my char'ot, and behold
My Trojan horses how well they can run
When there is cause t'approach or shun the fight;
From Venus' son Æneas I them won,
A man of much experience in flight:
Send back your horses, and with mine we'll go
And fight the Trojans. 'Twill not be amiss
To let the mighty champion Hector know,
A spear as mad is in my hand as his.
This said, both Sthen'lus and Eurymedon
With Nestor's horses went to Nestor's tent:
Nestor and Diomed, both mounted on
Tydides' chariot, up to Hector went.
And when they were to one another near,
At Hector Diomedes threw in haste,
And miss'd of him, and kill'd his charioteer;
Clean through his breast the spear well driven pass'd;
Down dead he fell, but Hector lets him lie,

And turns aside to seek a charioteer,
The place of Heniopeus to supply.
And Archeptolemus then being near,
Call’d up by Hector, on the reins laid hold.
Then mighty work and slaughter there had been,
And Trojans shut like lambs within a fold
In Troy, but that it was by Jove foreseen;
For in a clap of thunder Jove down threw
His bolt at Diomedes’ horses’ feet,
And th’ earth with sulphur flaming looked blue.
Nestor himself astonish’d was to see’t;
Lets go the reins, and down the horses fell.
And Nestor then to Diomedes said,
’Tis Jove, you see, that doth our force repel,
And Hector, for this day, intends to aid.
Another day to us he will be kind,
If he see cause; for no man can him tie,
Nor able is to make him change his mind,
And therefore now our best course is to fly.
’Tis true, O Nestor, said Tydides then,
But what a pain then at my heart will lie,
When Hector, speaking to the Trojan men,
Shall brag he made Tydides from him fly?
Then should I wish the earth would swallow me.
Though Hector says so, Nestor then replied,
Believed by the Trojans ‘twill not be,
So many of them by your hand have died.
And at this word his steeds he turn’d about.
A show’r of spears then from the Trojans flies,

Who them pursued with a mighty shout.
Then Hector loud unto Tydides cries,
Ho! Diomed, by th' Argives honoured
Above the most, serv'd with a greater mess,
And higher seat, and wine unlimited,
You will hereafter be esteemed less.
Unmanly Diomed. Fly, baggage, fly;
You ne'er shall come within the walls of Troy,
To freight your ship with women here; for I
Intend to send you first another way.
This said, Tydides was awhile in doubt
Whether to turn or no and Hector meet,
And thrice to turn his horses was about,
And Jove thrice thund'ring turn'd them tow'rd the fleet,
Shewing that he the honour of that day
Had granted to the Trojans. Hector then
Pursu'd them close, and roaring all the way,
Trojans, said he, and aids, now play the men,
For sure I am that Jove is on our side,
And give us will the victory this day.
And fools they are that in their wall confide;
For through their trench our horse shall find a way.
When we are at the ships, let one or other
Have fire to burn them ready, and then fall
Upon the men confounded in the smother.
This said, he did upon his horses call,
Xanthus, Podargus, Æthon, Lampus, see
You pay now what you owe me for your meat,
Laid in your mangers by Andromache,

Who always served you with pleasant wheat,
And steep'd sometimes, when she thought fit, in wine;
And very oft, though I her husband be,
Your dinner was made ready before mine.
Now, now pursue the Argives lustily,
That Nestor's shield of gold I may obtain;
Nor of Tydides' armour must we fail,
By Vulcan wrought. If we but these can gain,
The Argives will this very night hoist sail.
At Hector's speech Juno upon her throne
Unquiet sitting, made Olympus shake;
For mov'd she was with his presumption,
And looking upon Neptune to him spake.
Neptune, said she, are you not stirr'd at this?
You know at Ægæ, and at Helice,
Their liberality abundant is,
And sure I am you wish them victory.
What! cannot we, who with the Argives side,
If we our pow'rs together join in one,
Drive back the Trojans, and abate their pride,
And leave Jove here to sit and chafe alone?
Juno, said Neptune, griev'd, these words are bold:
I'll not rebel; for we shall have the worst,
And so we have by Jupiter been told.
Thus Neptune and the wife of Jove discours'd.
And now between the walls and ships, the place
With horses and with armed men was fill'd,
And crammed were within a narrow space
By Hector, that was master of the field.

And had not Agamemnon been inspired
By Juno to put courage in his men,
The Argive ships had certainly been fired,
And never had the Greeks gone back again.
Then ‘mongst the ships he went, and stayed at
Ulysses’ ship, which was the middlemost
Of all the navy, and the tallest; that
He might be heard to both ends of the host,
Both to Achilles and to Ajax’ tent,
Clad in th’ imperial robe, that all might see’t;
For these two being the most confident,
Had plac’d themselves at th’ utmost of the fleet;
And with a mighty voice to th’ Argives cried,
Disgrace of Greece, mere outsides, where are now
Your brags, that any of you durst abide
An hundred Trojans, and yet dare not show
A face to Hector, who our ships would fire?
But this was said at Lemnos in your wine,
Which rais’d your language than your nature higher;
But cooled now the battle you decline.
Was ever king afflicted as I am,
Jove, or lost a victory so near?
And yet at all your altars as I came,
My sacrifices duly payed were,
In hope that I the town of Troy should sack.
But grant at least, O Jove, that we may come
Ourselves into Achæa safely back,
And not be here destroy’d at Ilium.
This said, Jove grants them safely to depart,

And from him presently his eagle came,
And brought the tender issue of a hart,
And near unto his altar dropp'd the same.
The Argives when they saw the bird of Jove,
Were to the fight again encouraged,
And who should first repass the trenches strove.
And he that first came forth was Diomed.
And much before that any of the rest
Had any slain, he killed Agelaus,
Whom with his spear he pierc'd from back to breast,
When from him he his char'ot turning was.
Then Agamemnon came, and Menelaus,
And then the greater Ajax, then the less.
The sixth the king Idomeneus was,
And with him came his squire Meriones.
And next Eurypylus, Euæmon's son.
The ninth was Teucer with his bow unbent.
Hid with the shield of Ajax Telamon
His mighty brother, to the field he went,
Which Ajax lifting, Teucer chose his man,
And having at him aim'd, and shot, and kill'd,
As children to their mothers, back he ran,
And hid himself behind his brother's shield.
How many were the men he killed thus?
Orstolochus, Ophlestus, Lycophon,
And Melanippus, Dætor, Ormenus,
And Chromius, and last Amopaon.
All those lay dead together on the sands.
When Agamemnon saw what work was done

By Teucer's arrows on the Trojan's bands,
He to him came, and said, O valiant son
Of Telamon, so, so your shafts bestow,
Unto the Argives all an honour be,
And to your father Telamon; for though
Unto your mother married not was he,
Yet has he still maintain'd you as his own.
And if it please Jove and the pow'rs divine
To make me once the master of this town,
Your share shall be the next set out to mine,
And to your honour shall receive from me
A tripod, and two horses with the car;
Or if you will, your bed shall honour'd be
With some fair woman taken in the war.
Teucer to this then answer made and said,
Of this encouragement no need have I.
Since we came forth I have no time delay'd,
But done as much as in my pow'r did lie.
Eight shafts already have gone from my bow,
And in as many Trojans fix'd have been.
Of this mad dog I miss I know not how.
Then took he out another arrow keen,
And aim'd at Hector, but he hit him not,
But wounded on the breast Gorgythion,
Who on fair Castianira was begot,
And of King Priam's valiant sons was one.
Who falling on his knees hung down his head,
Just as a poppy charg'd with fruit and rain,
So had his casque his head o'erburthened.

And Teucer then at Hector shot again,
And miss'd again. Apollo put it by.
But Archeptolemus, his charioteer,
He missed not. Hector 'scap'd narrowly,
And Archeptolemus expired there
Shot through the breast. Hector was sorry, but
Left him. Cebriones chanc'd to be nigh,
And in his hands Hector the reins did put,
And from his chariot leap'd down suddenly,
And took a heavy stone into his hand.
Teucer the while again his bow had bent.
But drawing did so long, and aiming stand,
The stone from Hector the arrow did prevent,
And near the shoulder on the breast him struck.
And broken was the bow-string with the blow,
And his benumbed arm all sense forsook,
And sinking on his knees he dropped the bow.
Then Ajax stepp'd before him with his shield.
Mecistheus and Alastor him convey'd
Unto the Argive ships from off the field,
Grievously bruised, groaning and dismayed.
The courage of the Trojans now renew'd,
They chas'd the Argives back unto their wall,
And till the trenches they had pass'd, pursu'd,
And Hector at their heels the near'st of all.
As when a hound pursueth a wild boar,
Or lion, and presuming on his feet
Pinches his haunch or side, and then gives o'er,
Not daring if he turn the beast to meet;

So Hector chasing them still slew the last.
And many of them had the Trojans slain
Ere they the trenches and the pale had pass'd.
But being in they there themselves contain,
And comfort one another all they can;
And to the Gods and Goddesses they pray,
Lifting their hands to heaven every man;
And Hector then turn'd off and went his way.
Which Juno seeing, unto Pallas said,
Daughter of Jupiter, do you not see
What Greeks one madman, Hector, has destroy'd?
Shall we sit still in this extremity?
To Juno then Athena thus replied,
Had not my father's wits been at a loss,
This furious Hector by the Greeks had died,
But he my counsel always loves to cross.
He has forgot how oft his son I sav'd
Oppressed by Euristheus' tyranny.
For always when his father's help he crav'd,
Down to the earth from heaven sent was I.
But had I known as much as I do now,
When for the dog he went to Pluto's gate,
He had for me till this time staid below,
And by the odious Styx for ever sate.
But now he hates me. And by Thetis led,
He must Achilles honour. But my hope is,
The time will come I shall be favoured
By him again, and called his dear Glaucopis.
But make you ready now your chariot,

While I put on my arms; that we may see
If Hector will thereof be glad or not,
Or if some Trojans rather shall not be
Left dead for dogs and vultures to devour.
Then Juno to her car the horses brought.
To Jove's house Pallas went, and on the floor
Threw down her long robe, and put on Jove's coat.
And then her breast with armour covered.
And on her shoulder hung her fearful shield.
Then took her heavy spear with brazen head,
Wherewith she breaketh squadrons in the field.
Then open of itself flew heaven-gate,
(Though to the Seasons Jove the power gave
Alone to judge of early and of late)
And out the Goddesses the horses drave.
Then Jove to Iris said, Go, to them speak.
Tell them an ill match they will have of me.
I'll lame their horses and their char'ot break,
Unto the ground they both shall tumbled be;
And with my thunder wounded shall be so,
That ten years after they shall not be well.
For I would have Glaucopis well to know
What 'tis against her father to rebel.
But Juno is so us'd to cross my will,
That towards her my anger is the less.
Then Iris went her way from Ida hill,
And near Olympus met the Goddesses,
And as she bidden was did to them speak.
What fury's this? Whither d'ye go, said she.

Jove will your horses lame, your char'ot break,
And to the ground you both will tumbled be,
And with his thunder wounded will be so,
That ten years after you will not be well.
For you, Glaucopis, he will make to know
What 'tis against your father to rebel.
But Juno is so us'd to cross his will
That he affronts from her can better bear;
But, Pallas, at your hands he takes it ill
That you should dare against him lift a spear.
Iris, her errand done, no longer stay'd,
And to Minerva thus said Juno then:
Jove shall no more for me be disobey'd,
By taking part in war with mortal men.
But let one live and let another die,
As by the chance of war it shall fall out,
And let him do what he thinks equity.
This said, her chariot she turn'd about.
The horses by the Seasons freed and fed,
The char'ot was set up against the wall.
The Goddesses themselves then entered,
And took their places in the council-hall
With th' other Gods. And Jove himself from Ida
T' Olympus came, and lighted from his car,
And Neptune from the same his steeds untied,
And set them up, and of them had a care.
The chariot he set to the altar near
Cover'd with linen fine. Then to his throne,
His throne of gold, mounted the Thunderer,

And made Olympus shake as he sat down.
But Juno and Athena silent sat
Together by themselves from Jove apart
And discontent. But Jove knew well for what;
And answer made to what was in her heart.
Juno, said he, and Pallas, why so sad?
Your fight against the Trojans was not long.
And more you had been vexed if it had;
So much for th' other Gods I am too strong.
The danger scarce begun was when you fled.
But had you dar'd the battle to maintain,
You had been by my hand so thundered,
You never had t' Olympus come again.
Juno at this and Pallas grumbling sat,
And Pallas from replying did abstain,
Although no less the Trojans she did hate.
But Juno was not able to contain.
cruel Jove, said she, what words are these?
Must we unto our friends be so ingrate,
Because we know you can do what you please,
As not the Argives to commiserate?
We are content, since you will have it so,
No longer in the war to give them aid;
But let us give them counsel what to do,
Lest in your anger they be all destroy'd.
Juno, said Jove, tomorrow you shall know
If you'll be pleas'd the battle to behold,
How many martial Greeks I'll overthrow.
For Hector shall not be by me control'd

Until Achilles be fetch’d back again,
And at the Argive ships the battle be
About the body of Patroclus slain.
For so it is ordain’d by destiny.
And for your anger, Juno, I not care,
Though to the end of earth and sea you go,
(Where pent Iäpetus and Saturn are
In horrid darkness) and complain; yet so
I will not for your anger care a jot.
For you are grown extremely insolent.
Thus Jupiter; and Juno answer’d not.
Then down the sun into the ocean went,
Drawing upon the fields a cloudy night,
Which gave the Trojan army no content,
But to the Greeks more welcome was than light.
The army Hector call’d to parliament,
And led them to a clean place, free from blood,
And there they all on foot about him throng.
Hector unto them giving orders stood
With spear in hand eleven cubits long.
Hear me, you Trojans and you aids, said he,
I thought we should have now the Greeks destroy’d,
And lodged in the town with victory.
But this my hope is by the night made void,
Nor can we help it. Let us now provide,
For supper, beeves and sheep, and wine and bread
From Troy; and let the horses be untied,
And care be taken that they be well fed.
Then fetch in wood, and fires abundance make,

That with the flame light'ned may be the sky,
Lest th' Argives in the dark advantage take,
To go aboard and safe to Argos fly.
Let them embark at least in haste, and bear
Along with them their wounds uncured home,
That others who shall see't may stand in fear,
And say, This 'tis to fight 'gainst Ilium.
And let great boys and old men all night wake
Upon the walls and tow'rs, and guards be set,
And every wife at home a great fire make,
Lest into Troy the foe by treason get.
This, valiant Trojans, let be done to-night,
To morrow I shall further order give.
I doubt not but to put these dogs to flight
By th' help of Jove, and Ilium relieve.
But while 'tis night have on your guards a care,
Tomorrow early arm yourselves for fight.
For to the Argive ships I'll bring the war,
And trial make of Diomedes' might,
If from the ships he drive me shall away,
Or with my spear I him shall overthrow
And send his bloody armour into Troy.
Tomorrow he his strength will better know.
I would I were as certain not to die,
And of old age live still free from the sorrow,
As Phœbus and Athena do, as I
Am sure we shall defeat these Greeks tomorrow.
Thus ended he. The Trojans, full of joy,
Their sweating horses soon took out and fed,

And some were sent into the town of Troy,
To bring in beeves and sheep, and wine, and bread,
While others fetch'd in wood. Then to the sky
Arose the pleasant vapour of the roast.
The Trojans confident of victory
Sat cheerful at their arms throughout the host.
As many stars as in a heav'n serene
Together with the moon appear i' th' night,
When all the tops of hills and woods are seen,
And joyful are the shepherds at the sight:
So many seem'd the fires upon the plain.
A thousand fires, and at each fifty men,
That by their horses there all night remain
Expecting till Aurora rose again.

LIB. IX.

The Greeks deliberate of going home, but are staid by Diomed and Nestor.

THUS WATCH THE Trojans kept. But at the fleet
Distracted was with fear the Argive host,
And their commanders; as when two winds meet,
The sea between them into heaps is toss'd.
And Agamemnon grieved at the heart,
Bad th' heralds forthwith to th' assembly call
The prime commanders ev'ry one apart,
And not make proclamation once for all;
And some of them himself he summoned.
When met were all the leaders of the Greeks,
They sat them down with hearts discouraged,
And tears ran down on Agamemnon's cheeks.
As springs of water issue from a rock,
So fell the tears from Agamemnon's eyes,
And to th' assembly thus he weeping spoke.
My friends, what help can any man devise?
Jove told me I should conquer Ilium,
And unto Argos safe return again,
And now deceiv'd me has, and sends me home
With shame when I have lost so many men.
And thus he loves to do to show his might.
Therefore my counsel, Argives, all obey:

Let's hoist our sails and save ourselves by flight;
For we shall never take the town of Troy.
This said, the princes long time silent sit,
At last Tydides rising thus replied,
King Agamemnon, so far as 'tis fit
In such a public place I must you chide.
Take it not ill, because not long ago
You me with want of courage did upbraid
Before the Greeks, as old and young well know.
Jove giv'n you has the right to be obey'd,
And grac'd you with the title of our king,
But has denied you a courageous spirit,
Which now is the most necessary thing.
You think too meanly of your people's merit.
As for yourself, if you will needs away,
Go. That's your way. Your ships there ready lie
That from Mycene brought you unto Troy,
But leave the rest their fortune here to try.
If none else stay, yet Sthenelus and I
Will not give over fighting till we know
To what side Jove will give the victory.
The Gods, I'm sure, will favour to us show.
This speech the lords commended very much.
Then Nestor rose, and to Tydides said,
There is not of your age another such,
For counsel wise, in battle not afraid.
None will deny but what you say is right;
But you have not said all you could have done;
And no great wonder, since for age you might

(So young you are) have been my youngest son.
Yet the advice you given have is best;
I that am elder what wants will supply,
Adding thereto what you have not express'd,
To take from Agamemnon all reply.
For none but such as have no law, nor kin,
Nor house, in civil discord can delight.
But let us first our chiefest work begin,
And make the young men keep good watch all night.
And let them all from you, Atrides, take
Their orders. For you are our general.
And for the princes a good supper make,
And all the eldest captains to it call.
It best becomes you that can do it best.
For in your tents of wine you have good store,
And easlier provided than the rest,
So many ships you have to bring in more.
Hear their advice, and do what you think fit.
Good counsel now we need the most of all,
Since our insulting foes so near us sit.
By this night's counsel we must stand or fall.
Thus Nestor said, and 'twas agreed upon.
The captains of the watch then straight went forth;
First Thrasymedes, that was Nestor's son;
And after him six captains more of worth,
Ascalaphus, and then Ialmenus,
Then Aphyres, and then Meriones,
And Lycomedes, and Deipyrus:
The seven captains of the watch were these.

And with each one a hundred spearmen went
Betwixt the pale and wall, and supped there.
And the old leaders t' Agamemnon's tent,
And by him nobly entertained were.
But when they had an end made of the feast,
Nestor his counsel further open laid,
Which formerly had always been the best;
And, looking t' Agamemnon, thus he said.
King Agamemnon, I'll with you begin,
And with you end, since you the sceptre bear,
And in your care it lies to lose or win.
You chiefly should good counsel give and hear.
Hear then what now is my opinion,
Than which a better, I think, you'll not find,
Nor is it now the first time thought upon.
But heretofore I was of the same mind,
When from Achilles you Briseis took,
And I advised you to let her stay,
Though my good counsel then you could not brook,
But to your own great heart too much gave way,
Dishonouring the man of greatest might
In all the army, and most honoured
By all the Gods, and, contrary to right,
Taking the prize which he had purchased.
So that the bus'ness we have now to do
Is how to reconcile him if we can,
What gifts to give him, who shall with them go,
And with sweet language pacify the man.
This said, Atrides penitent replied,

Nestor, all you charge me with is true,
And for Achilles' sake, 'tis not denied,
Jove does th' Achæan army now subdue.
He whom Jove loves worth a whole army is.
But since I made Achilles discontent,
I'll make amends for what I did amiss,
And send a noble present to his tent.
I'll name the gifts I'll give him one by one.
Seven fire new trivets. Talents ten of gold.
Twenty black cauldrons. Twelve steeds that have won
Each one their prizes, and yet are not old.
A man that hath so many and so fleet
I think not poor, but gold may quickly win,
When I consider with their nimble feet
How many prizes they have brought me in.
And women seven, the best of women kind
For beauty and for works of housewifery.
And unto these Briseis shall be join'd,
And I'll be sworn she goes untouch'd from me.
And all this shall be sent him presently.
Hereafter, if we win the town of Troy,
Let him, before the prey divided be,
Come in and carry to his ship away
As much as it can bear of gold and brass.
And twenty Trojan women which he please,
Helen except. But if it come to pass
That safe to Argos we repass the seas,
My son in law he shall be if he will,
And as my son Orestes honour'd be;

Within my house three daughters I have still,
Iphianassa and Laodice,
And fair Chrysothemis, take which he list,
And to his father's house convey. For I
On settling of estate will not insist,
But of my own do that sufficiently.
Seven cities he shall have: Pheræ divine,
Enope, Ire, and Cardamyle,
And Pedasus that fertile is of wine,
Anthria, Æpia, all on the sea
Of sandy Pyle; and rich in sheep and kine
The people are, and will his laws obey,
And tribute pay as to a pow'r divine.
All this I'll give his anger to allay.
And this content him may if anything.
Inexorable none but Pluto is,
But hated for't. I am the greater king,
And elder man: he should consider this.
Thus Agamemnon. And then Nestor said,
The gifts, O king, no man can reprehend.
The next thing to be thought upon and weigh'd,
Is whom we shall unto Achilles send,
I think that Phœnix ought to lead the way,
Then Ajax and Ulysses, and with these
The public heralds two, Eurybates
And Odius, and here no longer stay
Ambassadors sent with gifts to reconcile Achilles in vain.
Than to bring water for our hands, that we
May first send up our prayers unto Jove,

That our embassage may successful be.
This said by Nestor, all the rest approve.
When water was brought in they wash'd and pray'd;
The young men fill'd the temperers with wine;
And round about the full cups were convey'd,
And offer'd up unto the powers divine.
When they had offer'd, and drunk what they would,
And parting were from Agamemnon's tent,
Old Nestor to instruct them how they should
Achilles best persuade, out with them went.
And one by one advis'd them what to say,
Especially Ulysses. Then they went
Saying their prayers to Neptune all the way,
Until they came unto Achilles' tent.
Who sitting, in his hand had a guitar
To pass the time, and sung unto the same
The noble acts that had been done in war
By th' ancient heroes, men of greatest fame.
Patroclus sat before him, looking when
He should have done. Ulysses then led in
Ajax and Phœnix. And Achilles then
Leap'd up as one that had surprised been.
And them receiving kindly to them said,
Welcome, my friends, whate'er your bus'ness be.
To see you I am not a little joy'd,
Although th' Achæans have provoked me.
And to his friend Patroclus order gave,
A larger temperer, said he, set up,
For these the dearest friends are that I have.

Pure be the wine, and give each man a cup.
Patroclus did so. And sets on a pot
Upon the flaming fire, and puts into't
A good sheep's chine, another of a goat,
Besides the chine of a fat boar to boot.
The blood boil'd out, Automedon it takes
And holds it to Achilles to divide,
Who of it many equal portions makes.
Patroclus makes a fire of wood well dried;
And when the flame was spent, the coals he rakes
Till they lay even; then the meat he spits
And roasts; and when 'twas roasted up it takes,
And on clean dresser-boards the same he sets;
And brought, in baskets, to the table bread;
And by Achilles was set on the meat.
Who when he saw the table furnished
Over against Ulysses took his seat,
And bade Patroclus sacrifice, who then
The first cut took and threw into the fire,
And freely to their meat then fell the men.
But when of food they had no more desire,
Then Ajax Phœnix jogg'd, which was the sign
When to begin, for which Ulysses staid.
Ulysses then fill'd up his cup with wine,
And speaking to Achilles, thus he said.
All health t'Achilles. Noble is your fare,
And by Atrides treated well we were.
Your tables plentifully furnished are,
But that's not it for which we now are here.

Our ships in danger are to be destroy'd;
The Trojans are encamped near our wall.
Unless you condescend to give us aid,
By Hector they are like to perish all;
Who threatens he will set them all on fire,
And is encourag'd to't by signs from Jove.
To see the morning rise is his desire,
And feareth neither men nor pow'rs above.
And like a dog enrag'd, and looking grim,
Assures the Trojans he our ships will burn,
And either put us for our lives to swim,
Or never to Achæa to return.
I am afraid the Gods perform it will,
And so to perish here will be our fate.
Rise, then; if but a little you sit still,
All you can do for us will come too late.
And then I am assured you will grieve,
When remedy there can be none, in vain:
Therefore, while yet you can, the Greeks relieve;
Your father's counsel call to mind again.
My son, said he (when you took leave for Troy),
May Juno and Athena strengthen you.
But this one lesson take from me. I pray
Remember still your anger to subdue;
Decline all contestation of the tongue,
And let your conversation gentle be;
So shall you win the hearts of old and young
In the Achæan host. Thus counsell'd he.
Though you have this forgot, yet now be friends,

And since he sorry is, forget th' offence,
And take the gifts he offers for amends,
Which we esteem a worthy recompence.
I'll name the gifts he offers one by one.
Seven fire-new trivets. Talents ten of gold.
Twenty black cauldrons. Twelve steeds that have won
Their sev'ral prizes, and yet are not old.
A man that has so many and so fleet
I think not poor, but gold will quickly win,
When I consider with their nimble feet
What prizes to Atrides they brought in.
And seven fair women, best of all the kind
For beauty and for works of housewifery,
And unto these Briseis shall be join'd;
And swear he will she is from blemish free.
And all this shall be sent you presently.
Hereafter, if we take the town of Troy,
You may, before the prey divided be,
Come in and carry to your ship away
As much as it can bear of gold and brass;
And twenty Trojan women which you please,
Helen except. But if it come to pass
That safe to Argos we get o'er the seas,
His son in law you shall be if you will,
And as his son Orestes honour'd be.
Within his house three daughters he hath still,
Iphianassa and Laodice,
And fair Chrysothemis, take which you list,
And to your father's house convey her; he

On settling of estate will not insist,
But of his own do that sufficiently.
Seven cities you shall have. Phæræ divine,
Enope, Ire, and Cardamyle,
And Pedasus that fertile is of wine,
Anthria, Æpia, all on the sea
Of sandy Pyle; and rich in sheep and kine
The people are, and will your laws obey,
And tribute pay as to a pow'r divine.
All this he'll give your anger to allay.
And though Atrides and his gifts you hate;
Honour'd you are by th' other Argives all,
And should have pity on their sad estate,
Who in such numbers before Hector fall;
Whom you may have the honour now to kill;
For now he will your spear no longer shun,
But stand you in the open field he will;
For'mongst the Greeks he thinks there's like him none.
To this Achilles answer'd, and thus said,
Ulysses, I perceive I must be plain.
For if I be not so, I am afraid
I shall be put to speak my mind again.
But to prevent more importunity,
What once I say I'll do. Those men I hate
Whose tongues and hearts I find to disagree,
As much as I abominate hell-gate.
I will no more persuaded be to fight
By Agamemnon or by any Greek,
Since they my labour do so ill requite,

And they that fight, and fight not fair alike.
For good and bad are equal when they die.
Then for my pain and danger in the wars,
What more than any other man have I?
With me as with a bird i' t' field it fares,
That to her unfledg'd young ones bringeth meat.
She has it in her mouth and hungry is,
Yet she forbears and gives it them to eat.
With the Atrides twain my case is this,
In blood by day I lead a weary life,
And sleepless am the great'st part of the night.
And why? That Menelaus may win his wife
Achilles must against the Trojans fight.
I did so; and from Troy twelve cities won
Upon the shore, i' th' land eleven more,
And all the prey I sent to Atreus' son,
Wherein of precious treasure was great store.
A small part he divided 'mongst the host.
Somewhat he gave for honour to the best;
But to himself made sure to keep the most.
And firm is whatsoe'er he gave the rest;
From none but me his gift he takes away.
I am content, and let him keep her still
And her enjoy. But why then came to Troy
Atrides with such strength? What was his will?
Was it not only for fair Helen's sake?
What then must no man love his wife but they?
Yes, all men of their own wives much should make,
If they have either wit or honesty.

And I love mine as well as he loves his,
Although she be my captive. But since she
By Agamemnon from me taken is,
Ne'er think, Ulysses, to prevail with me.
He shall not twice deceive me. But provide,
Ulysses, that your ships not burned be.
I know a wall, a ditch pal'd, deep and wide,
Is made by Agamemnon without me.
But all this will not Hector long keep out.
But with the Greeks when I went to the fight
He never durst to show his face without
The Scæan gate, save once. And then by flight
He 'scap'd. And since I am no more his foe,
To morrow to the Gods I'll sacrifice,
And launch and lade my ships, and homewards go.
And you shall see me, e'er the sun shall rise,
Upon the Hellespont if you think fit,
And how my lusty Myrmidons can row.
And so, if Neptune please, the wind may fit,
As in three days we may to Phthia go,
Where treasure plenty I behind me left:
And now shall carry thither gold and brass,
Iron and women fair, although bereft
Of her that given me by Atrides was.
Tell him all this, and speak it openly,
Lest other Greeks put up the like disgrace.
As for myself, though impudent he be,
He dares no more to look me in the face.
I will no more in battle or advice

With Agamemnon join. Let him be glad
He could deceive me once. He shall not twice.
There let him rest. The Gods have made him mad.
I hate his gifts. And him I value not.
Though he would twenty times as much bring forth
As now he has, or to him shall be brought,
Or all that which Orchomenus is worth,
Or Thebæ, that Egyptian town that can
Send twenty thousand chari'ts to the field,
And all provided well with horse and man;
Yet so I will not t' Agamemnon yield;
No, nor for gold so much as here is sand,
Till he has smarted for this injury,
Nor any wife will I take at his hand
Though she should fairer much than Venus be.
Nor though she could like Pallas work, or better,
I'll not his daughter take. Bid him bestow her
Upon some prince he thinks more worthy. Let her
For husband have a king of greater power.
For if the Gods to Hellas bring me home,
Peleus will there provide me of a wife.
King's daughters, not a few there are, of whom
I shall choose one, and with her lead my life,
And with my father live contentedly.
For all the wealth of stately Ilium,
Which they enjoyed in tranquillity
When yet the Argives were not hither come,
And all Apollo's sacred treasury
Laid up at Pytho, is not price enough

The life of any man though poor to buy.
Horses, and kine, and sheep, and household stuff,
May be recover'd, but man's life cannot.
My mother Thetis told me as my end,
That if I fight 'gainst Troy, 'twill be my lot
To die there, but that Fame would me commend.
But on the other side assured me,
That if 'gainst Ilium I warred not,
But back to Phthia went, my fate would be
Long time to live, and after be forgot.
And I advise you and the rest to sail
As soon as may be to your native land;
For you will not at Ilium prevail,
Since Jupiter protects it with his hand.
And now go tell the princes what I say,
That they may better counsel take to save
Their ships and men by sea, because the way
Which now they take no good effect will have.
Let Phœnix, if he will (not else), stay here.
This said, th' ambassadors were mute, and sorry
They from him could no better answer bear,
Than a denial, flat and peremptory.
At last unto Achilles Phœnix spake;
If you, said he, resolv'd are to be gone,
And leave the war for Agamemnon's sake,
In what estate shall I be here alone?
When you to Agamemnon first were sent,
You were a child, and understood not war,
Unable to say clearly what you meant,

Which the first principles of honour are.
And by your father I was with you sent,
To show you how you were to speak and do.
So that if you to go be fully bent,
You need not doubt but I shall be so too,
And should be though I were as young as when
I Hellas left, and from my father fled,
Amyntor, son of Orminus, who then
A concubine had taken to his bed;
My mother, to the end to make her hate
In such a way the old man's company,
Was with me oftentimes importunate
To court her, and I did thereto agree,
And got her love. Which when my father knew,
He fell into a mighty passion,
And many bitter curses on me threw,
And pray'd the Gods I ne'er might have a son.
His pray'r by Pluto and by Proserpine
Was heard, and I no longer would abide
At home; but cross'd awhile was my design,
By friends and nephews that my purpose spy'd,
Who pray'd me and retain'd me with good cheer;
Many good kine they kill'd and lusty sheep,
And many swine were daily singed there,
And much wine spent, and nightly watch they keep
By turns nine nights together; and fires twain.
One in the court against my chamber-door,
Another in the porch they kept in vain.
For on the tenth the court-wall I leapt o'er

And undiscerned to king Peleus fled,
Who us'd me as a father would his son,
His only son far off begot and bred;
Enrich'd, and gave me the dominion
Of the Dolopians, who are a part
Of Peleus' realm. · Now, no man like you is,
Divine Achilles, whom I love at th' heart,
And joy that I have brought you up to this,
Though painful to me were your infancy,
Who not at feast nor in the house would eat,
If first I did not set you on my knee,
And into little pieces cut your meat.
And often on my breast you puk'd your wine.
But since I knew my line with me would end,
To take you for my heir was my design,
Who in my feeble age might me defend.
Master your heart, Achilles; for you know
The Gods, though stronger and more fear'd than you,
With incense and with pray'rs are made to bow,
Although from men they not receive their due.
For Prayers of high Jove the daughters are,
Though lame their feet, and squinting be their eyes;
And follow Wrath (though she runs faster far),
And to the hurt she does give remedies,
And cure all those that show them due respect.
But when an angry man they cannot move,
That reconcilement always will reject,
They call for judgment from their father Jove.
Therefore, Achilles, give respect unto

These Goddesses, the daughters of high Jove,
As other mighty men and princes do.
Had not Atrides, to redeem your love,
Offer'd you presents great, and promised more,
I never had advis'd you to agree
To save their ships from burning on the shore.
Till that were done you could not blamed be.
But since he does so amply make amends,
And chosen has good men to intercede,
Who are of all the Greeks your greatest friends,
Refuse them not the grace for which they plead,
Such was the hero's custom heretofore,
When one had done another injury,
The damage they had done first to restore,
And then with gifts and pray'rs buy amity.
But I will tell you how it came to pass
At Calydon long since, not yesterday,
War 'twixt the Curets and th' Ætolians was,
These to defend, the other to destroy.
For Œneus having got his harvest in,
To all the Gods made a great sacrifice;
Only Diana had no part therein,
Forgot she was; he did not her despise.
But she in anger sent a great wild boar,
That wasted and made havoc of his field,
And up by the roots, his goodly fruit-trees tore.
This boar Meleager, son of Œneus kill'd,
Assisted by the youth of many a state
That to the chase with men and hounds came in.

Between them then Diana rais'd debate
About who was to have the head and skin.
While Meleager with them went to war,
The Curets never durst approach the wall,
Although they were the greater number far.
But when with choler swelled was his gall,
(Which often happens to a man, though wise)
He kept his chamber and abstain'd from fight,
Offended with his mother's injuries,
And of all company eschew'd the sight,
But Cleopatra, consort of his bed,
Child of Marpissa, who (by stealth) was bride
Of Idas, who at that time carried
For strength the reputation far and wide.
This Idas' child was Meleager's wife.
But Idas rashly for his dear wife's sake
Against Apollo did engage his life,
And him at bow and arrows undertake.
But Cleopatra then surnamed was
Halcyone, that was not so before
Her father with Apollo fought, because
She did her mother's death so much deplore.
With her now grieving Meleager lay,
And angry at the curses of his mother;
Who to the Gods continually did pray
Against his life for killing of her brother;
And from her eyes the tears ran down her breast,
And often with her hand the ground she smote.
Making to Pluto and his queen request

To kill her son; which they rejected not.
Meanwhile the uproar heard was at the gates,
And thumping of the tow'rs of Calydon.
To Meleager then came priests and states
Intreating him his armour to put on,
And save the town, and offer'd for his pain,
As much good land (so take it where he would,
One half for wine, the other half for grain)
As fifty able oxen labour could.
Then came his father rattling at his door,
His brothers, and his angry mother too:
But he persisted in his will the more;
His dearest friends could with him nothing do.
But when the cry and danger now was nigher,
And on the tow'rs the Curets mounted were,
And ready now to set the town on fire,
Then Cleopatra to her husband dear
Show'd th' image of a town won by the foe.
How butcher'd are the men, the houses burned,
Their wives and children dragg'd away; and so
Her husband's heart again to pity turned.
Then went he and repell'd the enemies,
Though what they promis'd him they never gave.
But that's not it to which I you advise;
But first the ships, and then the Greeks to save;
But not without these gifts to go to war:
For more unto your honour it will be
To give them aid when satisfied you are,
By Agamemnon for the injury.

Thus Phœnix said. Achilles then replied,
Such honour I seek none. Jove honours me,
Since by his will I at my ships abide,
And will do till I dead or strengthless be.
No more molest me for Atrides' sake,
But stay with me, and equal to me reign,
And such as are my friends for your friends take,
And do not lose my friendship his to gain.
Stay, then, this night, and take your lodging here;
My answer t' Agamemnon these will carry;
As soon as morning shall again appear,
We'll talk of whether we shall go or tarry.
And as he spake those words, he wink'd upon
Patroclus to give order for his bed,
That he himself prepare might to be gone.
Amongst them then great Ajax spake and said,
Ulysses come, our labour here is lost;
Let's carry back his answer, such as 'tis,
To Agamemnon and the Argive host,
Who us expect, since obstinate he is,
And can a thought so savage entertain,
Unkind and unregardful of his friends,
When others for a son or brother slain
Can be contented to receive amends,
And let the man that slew him live in rest,
As soon as they have paid for their misdeed.
But you, Achilles, harbour in your breast
An everlasting anger without need,
And hurtful to your friends no less than foes,

For ’tis but for one maid he took away;
And for her now he seven on you bestows,
And much beside, your anger to allay.
Regard your house. We your domestics are,
Nearer than any of the Greeks beside,
And in your honour more concern’d by far.
Thus Ajax said. Achilles then replied,
Ajax, noble son of Telamon,
I not deny but all you say is well;
But always when that man you mention,
My choler rising, makes my heart to swell.
He made me has to th’ Argives despicable,
As if I were a fool or inmate who
Of honour in a town is incapable,
And with the public nothing has to do.
Go, therefore, let Atrides know my mind.
I will no more against the Trojans fight,
Till Hector at my tents and ships I find,
And th’ Argive fleet be flaming in my sight.
For if he come unto my ships, I think,
Keen as he is, I shall his fury stay.
This said, unto the Gods above they drink,
And then they with his answer went away.
Patroclus then gave order for a bed
With woolly cov’rings soft and linen fine
For Phœnix, where he lay till day was spread.
But with Achilles slept a concubine,
Fair Diomeda, whom he brought away
From Lesbos when he had that city sack’d.

And in another part Patroclus lay,
Nor he a beautiful bed-fellow lack'd,
Fair Iphis, whom Achilles gave him when
He newly rifled had the town of Scyros,
And now th' ambassadors were come again,
And to them store of people flock, desirous
To hear the news, and wine unto them brought.
But Agamemnon first inquir'd and said,
Ulysses, will he save the fleet or not,
Or is his choler not to be allay'd?
And he Achilles' answer then related.
The man, said he, retains his anger still.
And now 'tis greater rather than abated,
And says, tomorrow put to sea he will.
And your alliance and your gifts rejects,
And says he would advise us to go home;
Since Jupiter himself the town protects,
He says in vain we stay at Ilium.
And bids you order take to save the fleet.
Thus said he, as these know as well as I,
Ajax and both the heralds, men discreet,
Who all the while he spake were standing by,
And Phœnix too. But he lies there all night,
That o'er the sea together they may go,
If Phœnix will, as soon as it is light;
But forc'd is not whether he will or no.
When thus Ulysses ended had his story,
All silent were awhile and much dismay'd
With his denial flat and peremptory.

At last Tydides to them spake and said,
king Atrides, we have done amiss
With gifts and prayers thus to seek his aid,
That proud before, by this made prouder is.
Let him go when he will. Be not afraid,
But let's refresh ourselves tonight with bread
And wine; for that gives men both strength and heart,
And see your men i' th' morn embatteled,
And at the head of them do you your part.
This said, the princes of the host admired
The gallant speech of valiant Diomed:
And every one unto his tent retired,
With a good will to sleep, and went to bed.

LIB. X.

Encounter of the scouts by night.

ALL NIGHT THE princes of the Argives slept,
Save Agamemnon, who could take no rest,
But with unquiet thoughts was waking kept,
And casting for his safety what was best.
And frequent as the lightning flashes are
When Jove is making rain or hail i' th' skies,
Or somewhere punishing the proud by war;
So frequent then were Agamemnon's sighs.
And when the fires he saw upon the plain
Made by the foe, and th' acclamation
And shouts he heard, he wondered. But again
When he his ships and people look'd upon,
Then by the roots he pluck'd off from his head
Handfuls of hair, and sigh'd and groaned more;
And thought it best then to be counselled
By Nestor how he might himself restore.
And rising up, his coat he first puts on,
And to his smooth white feet his shoes he tied;
And then, above his coat, he cast upon
His back a great and tawny lion's hide.
And Menelaus, too, that waking lay
And trembling in his bed all night, for fear

The Greeks that for his sake were come to Troy
Should fall into some great disaster there,
Rose up and to his brother's tent went in.
A spear he had in's hand, and armed was,
Having upon his back a leopard's skin,
And on his head a helmet good of brass.
And said to Agamemnon, Brother, why
So early up? Have you a mind to send
Into the army of the foe some spy?
I fear you will not find so bold a friend
As thither dares to go i' th' night alone.
Brother, said Agamemnon, you and I
Must better counsel take than we have done,
Since Jove now favoureth the enemy,
And takes in Hector's sacrifice delight.
For so much harm so soon was never done,
As he to us has done in one day's fight;
Yet nor of God nor Goddess is the son.
His this day's acts the Greeks will ne'er forget.
But go you to the princes quickly. Run.
Call up Idomeneus the King of Crete,
And the great Ajax son of Telamon,
While I call Nestor up and bring him to
The place which is appointed for the guard,
T' instruct the men with what they have to do,
Because his counsel they will most regard.
For by his son the watch commanded is,
And with him we Meriones have join'd.
Then Menelaus farther ask'd him this,

That he might fully understand his mind,
When they are call'd, what next is to be done?
Must I stay here till you come back again,
Or after you about the army run?
No, no, said he, where you are now, remain.
But going call upon each one aloud,
And by the name he from his father takes,
And praise them all, let them not think you proud;
Pain is no shame when 'tis for our own sakes.
This said, they part, and Agamemnon went
To seek out Nestor; whom he found a-bed,
And all his armour by him in his tent,
His shield, two spears, and helmet for his head,
And belt of many colours finely wrought,
Which always he was wont in war to use
When he his people unto battle brought.
No labour would he on his age excuse.
Now raised on his elbow, Who, said he,
Are you that walk abroad when others sleep?
Stay there, I say, and come no nearer me;
Until your name you tell, at distance keep.
Seek you some officer or camerade?
I Agamemnon am, said he, your friend,
Whom Jove to bear such miseries hath made,
As while I live will never have an end;
And in my bed no sleep at all I take
For fear of some unfortunate event.
Unsettled is my heart, my limbs all shake,
And in this plight I wand'red to your tent:

And now, I pray you, since you waking lie
Come with me to the watch; for since the foe
Unto our wall encamped is so nigh,
They charge us may by night for aught we know.
To this old Nestor answer made and said,
Think not, Atrides, Jove will all things do
As they are now in Hector's fancy laid?
For harder work he would be put unto
If we Achilles can but once appease.
But go, I'll follow you, and call upon
Tydides and Ulysses if you please,
Ajax the less, and Meges Phyleus' son.
I wish some other man of nimbler feet
Were to great Ajax sent to make him rise,
And to Idomeneus the King of Crete,
Whose quarter from this place a great way lies.
But Menelaus I intend to chide,
That sleeps and leaves the work to you alone.
'Tis no fit time within his tent t' abide,
But to the princes should himself have gone.
To Nestor Agamemnon then replied,
Nestor, he is often negligent,
And often I have pray'd you him to chide.
Yet 'tis not sloth; but my commandement
He always looks for, though there be no cause.
And yet tonight he has prevented me.
For up and arm'd before me now he was;
And when he came I sent him presently
To call up Ajax and the King of Crete.

And at the watch we both of them shall see,
Where I appointed have the rest to meet.
Nestor again replied. 'Tis well, said he,
The Greeks will of him have a better thought,
And readier obedience he will find.
This said, he put himself into his coat,
And tied his shoes on, and his cloak well lined,
And took his spear in hand. Then on they went
Among the Argive ships upon the sand.
And when they came unto Ulysses' tent,
To call and waken him, they made a stand.
And Nestor, with his voice stretch'd to the height,
Call'd to him by his name. Ulysses straight
Came forth and said, Why come you in the night?
Your bus'ness sure must be of mighty weight.
Laërtiades, said Nestor then,
Take it not ill. Such is our misery.
But come with us to call up other men,
That we may counsel take to fight or fly.
Ulysses then return'd into his tent,
And on his shoulders hung his painted shield;
And with them first to Diomed he went,
Whom they found armed in the open field,
His soldiers sleeping lay about him round,
And on his buckler each one had his head,
The butt-ends of their spears fix'd in the ground,
Whereof the points like lightning glittered.
But he himself slept on a good cow-hide,
His head upon a gaudy carpet laid.

Then Nestor came and standing at his side
Awak'd him with his foot, and to him said,
Awake, Tydides, hear you not how nigh
The Trojans are encamped to the fleet?
This said, Tydides leap'd up suddenly,
And when he raised was upon his feet,
Nestor, said he, unhappy restless man,
That aged as you are take not your ease,
When younger men there are that better can
Call up the Argive princes if they please.
'Tis true, said Nestor, I have at my tent
Sons of my own, and others can command,
Who might upon such errands have been sent,
But that upon the very brink we stand
Of life and death. And since you pity me,
Call little Ajax up, and Phyleus' son.
For young you are, and can do't easily.
Tydides then a lion's skin puts on
Tawny and reaching to his heels, and then
Into his hand he took a heavy spear,
And out he went and called up those men.
When to the watch they come together were,
The captains of the watch were not asleep,
But all were sitting at their arms awake.
As dogs that guarding are a fold of sheep
Hearing the noise the hounds and hunters make,
When in the woods they chase some savage beast,
And nearer still and nearer hear the cries,
They doubt the worst, and cannot take their rest,

But list'ning stand and sleep forsakes their eyes;
So watchfully spent they the tedious night,
And ever when of feet they heard the tread
'Twixt them and Troy, that way they turn'd their sight;
So much they Hector's coming on did dread.
When Nestor coming by, observ'd them had,
So, so, said he, brave lads, continue so,
And give no cause to Hector to be glad.
He and the princes then together go
(All that to counsel had been made to rise,
Except Meriones and Nestor's son,
Whom they thought worthy with them to advise)
And part the ditch, and sitting down upon
The place to which they were pursued before
By Hector, who retiring thence, left clear
The ground from dead men's carcasses and gore,
Of what they next should do consulted there.
First Nestor spake. Who dares (said he) to go
Unto the Trojan camp that lies so near,
And kill, or bring thence some outlying foe?
Or what they shall resolve upon to hear?
Whether (since they have worsted us) to stay
So near us, or retire into the town.
If this he do and safely come away,
He to himself acquire will great renown,
And by each one that has of ships command,
He for his service shall be well requited.
Each one an ewe and lamb shall give him, and
He to our public feastings be invited.

This said, they paus'd awhile, but by and by
Tydides rising spake. Nestor, said he,
To go into the Trojan camp dare I.
But 'twould be best some other went with me,
More hope and courage is where there are two;
What one observeth not the other may.
A man alone can little see or do,
And single judgments see but little way;
At these words many with him would have gone,
Ajaxes, both the greater and the less,
And stout Antilochus, old Nestor's son,
And Menelaus and Meriones.
But most of all Ulysses long'd to see
What projects in the Trojan camp were laid.
For none adventure farther durst than he.
Then to Tydides Agamemnon said,
Tydides, whom I love, now choose your man;
Regard not birth nor sceptres, but the cause.
Take him that you think best assist you can,
And this he said in fear for Menelaus.
To this Tydides answer made again,
Since of my fellows I the choice must make,
Ulysses I prefer before all men,
And him for my assistant I will take;
So much in diligence he doth excel,
And so much care Athena of him has,
That I believe we both should come off well
Though through a flaming fire we were to pass.
Then, said Ulysses, Speak no more of me,

Nor good nor ill. The Argives know me well.
Let's go. Two-thirds o' th' night are spent, you see,
As any man that sees the stars can tell.
Then put they on their arms. And Thrasymed
Gave Diomed a sword (who had forgot
To bring his own), and to defend his head
A leather cap without crest, call'd a pot.
Meriones unto Ulysses gave
His bow and quiver, sword and dogskin cap,
Pleated with thongs within, his head to save
If need should be in combat, from mishap.
For 'twixt the leathers tough inserted were
Guards of thick felt; of boar's teeth was the brim.
Eleon was the first that did it wear,
But taken by Autolycus from him,
And given 'twas unto Amphidamus,
Which he to Molon gave that was his guest,
And to Meriones then left it was,
And now upon Ulysses' head did rest.
And being both thus armed, forth they went
And by the way a heron dexter flew,
A lucky sign, and by Athena sent,
As by the sound made by her wings they knew.
Ulysses then unto the Goddess pray'd,
Hail virgin daughter of almighty Jove,
That all my labour seest, and giv'st me aid,
Now more than ever let me find your love.
Grant me that I some good exploit may do
To vex the Trojans, and come safe from thence.

And then Tydides pray'd unto her too.
Celestial maid, that with my father went'st
When he ambassador to Thebes was sent
With words of peace, and coming back achieved
By your assistance and encouragement
Such noble acts as scarce will be believed,
If you will aid me as you aided him,
Goddess, I will to you sacrifice
A heifer, and with gold her horns I'll trim.
This said, their suit the Goddess not denies.
When their devotion now was at an end,
Away they went, 'mongst carcases and blood,
Like lions that on slaughter love t 'attend.
Nor Hector and the Trojans idle stood,
But call'd a council of the chiefs, and said,
Who's he will undertake what I'll propound,
And for his pains be honourably paid,
And for his valour far and near renown'd?
I give him will two horses and a coach,
The best that shall be taken from the foe,
That will unto the Argive fleet approach,
And bring me word what they intend to do;
Whether their ships they guard as heretofore,
Or mean to quit the siege at Ilium.
And beaten thus, haul down their ships from shore,
And ere their work be finished, go home.
This said, they silent sat. But one there was,
Dolon by name, the squire Eumedes' son,
That master was of store of gold and brass,

A sorry fellow, but that well could run.
Hector, said he, I'll to the fleet approach.
Swear now by Jove, and hold your sceptre high,
I shall Achilles' horses have and coach,
And I for you will be a faithful spy.
For down to Agamemnon's tent I'll go,
Where they consult whether to fight or fly:
For there their resolution I shall know.
Then Hector held his sceptre up on high.
Jove, betwixt us witness bear, said he,
No Trojan shall these horses have but you,
And yours they shall perpetually be.
Thus Hector swore, although it prov'd not true.
Upon his shoulder then his bow he hung.
His cap of cat, a wolf's skin was his coat.
And when he gotten clear was from the throng,
With spear in hand he fell into his trot.
And first Ulysses heard the sound of feet.
I hear one come, said he to Diomed,
Perhaps a spy that sent is to our fleet,
Or one that has a mind to strip the dead.
'Tis best t' avoid him till he past us be,
And then to follow him and drive him on.
But lest he swifter be of foot than we,
And to the city back again should run,
Rise and be sure to turn him with your spear.
And when he was a land's length past them gone
They follow'd him. And he their feet did hear,
And thought some Trojans had been coming on

By Hector sent to call him back again.
But when they from him were scarce a spear's cast,
He knew then they were Agamemnon's men,
And frighted was; and then his feet mov'd fast.
As two hounds in a wood obscure and dim
Pursue a fearful doe or hare, just so
Tydides and Ulysses hunted him,
When back into the herd he could not go.
When Dolon to the watch was very near,
Athena puts into Tydides' head,
That some man else might at him throw a spear,
And be thereby before him honoured.
To Dolon then Tydides spake, and said,
Stay, or my spear shall make you stay; for long
I am assur'd you cannot death avoid.
And as he spake the word, his spear he flung,
And miss'd on purpose, but it lighted near.
Dolon affrighted, pale and trembling stands,
And in his head chatter'd his teeth with fear.
Then in they came and seiz'd on both his hands;
And Dolon weeping, then for quarter pray'd,
Great ransom for me will my father give,
For gold he has enough; and will, he said,
Give any price, when here he knows I live.
Then to him said Ulysses, Do not fear,
Nor think of death. But see you tell me true
Upon what weighty bus'ness you are here,
When others sleep, and at a time undue.
Meant you to rifle any of the dead?

Or were you sent by Hector as a spy,
Or undertook the same of your own head?
T’ Ulysses Dolon then did thus reply:
I was by Hector’s promises set on,
And should have had Achilles’ chariot
And horses, if I to the fleet had gone.
And good intelligence to Hector brought,
Whether the ships be guarded as before,
Or that the Greeks now beaten mean to fly,
And weary of their labour, watch no more.
To this again Ulysses made reply,
And smiling said, It was no small reward
You aimed at. Achilles’ horse, ye say?
To rule them for a mortal man ’tis hard.
The Goddess Thetis’ son they’ll scarce obey.
But tell me further; when you came away,
Where you left Hector, where his horses are,
And where his arms; where other Trojans stay
To sleep or watch, and whether they prepare
To go into the town, or mean t’ abide
Always so near our ships as they are now.
T’ Ulysses Dolon then again replied,
This also I will let you truly know.
I Hector left at Ilus’ sepulchre
With other lords in consultation,
The rest about the bonfires waking were.
But certain watch appointed there was none;
But those confederates that came from far
Slept at their ease all night and watched not;

For that they trusted to the Trojans' care,
Having no wives nor children with them brought.
Ulysses then examin'd him again,
How lie the strangers? mix'd with those of Troy,
Or by themselves? Inform me and be plain.
Nothing, said Dolon, but the truth I'll say.
Pæans, Pelasgians, Caucons, Leleges,
And Cars lie by the sea-side on the sands,
The rest near Thymbra quarter, and are these;
The Mæons, Mysians, Lycians, Phrygians.
But there's no need to tell you ev'ry thing;
For if upon our quarters you would fall,
There lie the Thracians new come, and their king,
Rhesus by name, and utmost lies of all.
Such horses yet I never did behold,
Swift as the wind, and than the snow more white,
With silver cover'd is his car, and gold;
Gold are his arms, and make a gallant sight,
And fitter for a God than man to wear.
But try now whether I say true or no,
And send me to the ships, or bind me here.
Then said Tydides with a frowning brow,
Think not to 'scape, though all you say be true;
For if I let you loose, for aught I know,
You may return again to fight or view;
But hurt us cannot if I kill you now.
As Dolon then beginning was to pray,
Tydides' sword lighted on's neck so just,
That from his shoulders fell his head away

As he was speaking, and lay in the dust.
And from him then they took his cap of cat,
His spear, and wolf's skin coat, and bow unbent,
And in his hands Ulysses took all that,
And to Minerva up his prayer sent.
Hail Pallas, whom we pray'd to for success
Before all other Gods, receive these gifts,
And us unto the Thracian tents address.
This said, the spoils of Dolon up he lifts,
And lays them in a tree; and for a mark,
They near the way laid store of boughs and reeds
To find them coming back, because 'twas dark.
Then with Tydides onward he proceeds,
The surprise of Rhesus.
And ev'ry step on arms or blood they tread,
And soon amongst the Thracians they were,
That sleeping lay, as if they had been dead,
And by each one his buckler and his spear.
Their horses to the chariot seats were tied.
Thus in three rows the Thracians were laid,
Rhesus i' th' midst; which first Ulysses spied,
And to Tydides speaking softly, said,
See there the horses, and see there the man
Rhesus, of whom we were by Dolon told.
Untie the horses; or kill all you can,
And I upon the horses will lay hold.
Tydides then, made by Minerva bold,
Amongst them killing went, and never staid
(Like lion fierce in a neglected fold)

Till he a dozen of them dead had laid.
And whomsoever Diomedes slew,
Ulysses following took him by the foot,
And from the place a little way him drew,
For fear the steeds, not yet accustom'd to't,
Should boggle, tremble, and refuse to pass.
To Rhesus last of all went Diomed,
And kill'd him too. So he the thirteenth was.
And panted as he slept; for at his head
He dreamt Tydides all night standing was.
Ulysses to the horses went; and now
Seiz'd, and their heads together tied has:
But for a whip he made use of his bow.
And gotten forth, whistled to Diomed
To come away, who gave no ear thereto,
But staying with himself, considered
What further hurt he might the Trojans do.
To draw away the chariot by the pole,
Wherein the golden arms of Rhesus lay,
Or thence upon his shoulders bear the whole;
Or whether he more Thracians should destroy.
While thus he studied, Pallas by him stood.
Contented be, said she, with what is done.
To go unto the ships I think it good,
For fear you thither should be forc'd to run.
Some other God awake the Trojans may.
This said, that Pallas to him spake he thought,
And from the Thracian quarter came away,
And on one of the horses' backs he got,

And tow'rds the ships at full speed then they ride,
Ulysses with his bow still switching on;
But Phœbus with Tydides Pallas spy'd,
And angrily call'd up Hippocoon;
Who, when he came and empty saw the ground
Where th' horses stood, and dy'd with blood the field,
And sprawling in their blood the Thracians found,
Ay me, said he, they have my uncle kill'd.
The Trojans then in haste and frighted rise,
And at the place in great disorder meet,
And gaze upon the mischief with their eyes,
But they that did it fled were to the fleet.
When flying they were at the tree, where lay
The spoils of Dolon, there awhile they tarry,
Until Tydides fetch'd them had away,
And to Ulysses given them to carry,
And mounted was upon his horse again.
Again Ulysses switch'd them tow'rds the fleet;
And when they near it were, old Nestor then,
Who was the first that heard the horses' feet,
Cried out, The sound of horses' feet I hear;
I wish Ulysses 'twere and Diomed.
But somewhat else and worse it is, I fear;
So many sad mishaps run in my head.
He scarce had spoken this but they came in.
When they alighted were and welcomed
With hands and speeches of their friends had been,
Then Nestor thus Ulysses questioned:
Ulysses, glory of the Greeks, said he,

Whence are these horses, beauteous as the sun?
Won from the Trojans? But that cannot be;
For such amongst the Trojans I saw none,
Though I amongst them were in ev'ry fight.
Or given by the Gods? which may be true;
For both of you are gracious in their sight,
And Jove and Pallas have a care of you.
noble Nestor, said Ulysses then,
Gods can give better horses if they please;
For richer much are they than mortal men.
Tydides from a king of Thrace took these,
Who was come newly to the Trojans' aid;
And slain him has, besides a dozen more,
And besides these a spy that them betray'd,
By Hector sent your purpose to explore.
This said, Ulysses with much people went
Triumphing, and the milk-white horses drove
Over the trenches to Tydides' tent.
There sets them up, and wheat unto them gave;
But Dolon's spoils astern his ship he plac'd,
Preparing for Athena's sacrifice.
And then into the sea they went and wash'd
The sweat from off their shoulders, legs, and thighs,
And after bathe, and 'noint themselves with oil;
That done, they sit down to their meat and dine;
And being thus refreshed from their toil,
Unto the Goddess Pallas offer wine.

LIB. XI.

The third fight.

AURORA RISING FROM Tithonus' bed,
Before both Gods and men to hold her light,
Eris from Jove the signal carried
Unto the Argive fleet of bloody fight.
And down unto Ulysses' ship she went,
That was the middlemost and high'st of all,
That heard she might be to Achilles' tent,
And Ajax's, that they might hear her call.
At th' outsides of the fleet they quarter'd were;
For they upon their prowess most relied:
Then Eris with her voice the air did tear,
And horribly to the Achæans cried,
Come quickly forth into the field and fight;
Be bold, Achæans; to the battle come.
Encourag'd thus, the Greeks took more delight
In staying at the war than going home.
Fellows, to arms, then Agamemnon cried,
And to put on his arms the first man was.
His leg-pieces he down to th' ankles tied
With silver buckles, leg-pieces of brass;
And then puts on an armour on his breast,
That had been given him by Cinyres,

(His ancient acquaintance and his guest,)
Whilst he preparing was to pass the seas:
For long before the Greeks for Troy set sail,
Their purpose was at Cyprus known by fame,
And thinking such a gift might him avail,
In kindness t' Agamemnon sent the same.
The colour was by pales distinguished,
Ten black, twelve gold, and twenty were of tin:
And in it three black serpents figured,
As if they creeping were unto his chin.
Their sides like rainbows look'd, which in the sky
Are shown by Jove for men to wonder at.
Then from his shoulder down upon his thigh
He hung his sword. Studded with gold was that.
Then took his shield which finely varied was;
Bossed in twenty places with white tin;
And round about them were ten orbs of brass;
And black the circle was enclos'd within.
Then Gorgo painted was with killing eyes,
And with her standing Terror and Affright:
His belt of silver was, and to the skies
Returned back again the glitt'ring light.
Wound up lay on it painted a great snake,
Which had three heads, and crowned was each one.
And last into his hand two spears did take,
Having his helmet on his head put on.
Thus Agamemnon armed was. And then
Juno and Pallas both rais'd such a sound
(To honour him before the Greeks) as when

A man that's slain falls suddenly to th' ground.
Then every one unto his charioteer
Commandment gave upon the ditch to stay
And ready be. The foot all armed were,
And forth into the field were march'd away.
But soon again the horses with them stood.
Then Jove amongst them Noise and Tumult sent;
And mingled was the morning dew with blood,
For on that day much blood was to be spent.
Upon a rising ground now Hector was,
Æneas with him, and Polydamas,
And three sons of Antenor, Acamas,
Agenor, Polybus, and th' army was.
And Hector with a round shield at their head,
As when a star does through the clouds appear,
And presently again is covered;
Sometimes i' th' front was, sometimes in the rear
Giving command; his arms like lightning show.
As mowers standing one rank 'gainst another,
A field of barley or of wheat to mow;
So Greeks and Trojans mow down one the other.
On neither side thought any man of flight,
But like to wolves on one another fly,
In number equal; and gave great delight
To Eris, who (and no God else) was by.
The other Gods stayed on Olympus Hill,
Within whose folds they dwell, and murmur'd at
Their father Jove for bearing such goodwill
To Ilium. But he car'd not for that.

And by himself he from them went; and then
Took pride to see the Greeks and Trojans fight,
And look on killing and on dying men,
And of their arms to see the flashing light.
Now all the while that mounting was the sun,
The number slain on both sides was the same;
But when the woodman half his work had done,
And willingly unto his dinner came,
The Greeks then brake the Trojan ranks, and on
Fell Agamemnon, and Bienor slew,
Both him and Ocles his companion,
That drove the horses which the chariot drew.
He lighting and assailing him was slain;
And Ocles had no time his spear to throw:
For Agamemnon's spear had pierc'd his brain,
Passing both through his helmet and his brow.
These there he left, stript both of arms and coat,
And Antiphus and Isus then drew near,
Both Priam's sons, one legal, th' other not,
Upon one seat, and Isus charioteer.
Once by Achilles taken were these men,
As they were feeding sheep on Ida's hills,
And for their ransom were set free again;
But both of them now Agamemnon kills.
For Isus' breast he pierc'd through with his spear;
The other with his sword he overthrew,
And seen him had when he was prisoner.
And that 'twas Antiphus (when stript) he knew.
As when a lion with his mighty teeth

Crusheth the tender issue of a hind,
Which the affrighted dam stands by and seeth,
And grieveth, but no remedy can find;
And skipping in the woods for shelter seeks
To save her own life; so the Trojans fled,
Pursu'd by Agamemnon and the Greeks,
And thought not on their fellows they left dead.
T' Hyppolochus then comes he and Pisander,
Sons of Antimachus, a person noted
For having gold receiv'd of Alexander,
And for it in the common council voted.
And these two Agamemnon took alive;
For by mischance the reins slipp'd from their hands,
And then they saw it was in vain to strive,
And Agamemnon now before them stands.
Then as they sat together on one seat,
Save us (said they) Atrides, let us live,
For we redeem'd shall be with ransom great,
Our father for us what you please will give.
Are you Antimachus's son, said he,
That gave advice to murder Menelaus,
Contrary to the laws of honesty,
When of the Greeks ambassador he was,
And with Ulysses sent into the town?
You for your father's evil deed must pay.
Then from his car Pisander he struck down;
With breast pierc'd through upon his back he lay.
Hyppolochus was lighted and on foot,
And with the sword of Agamemnon slain,

Who cuts his head off, and his hands to boot,
And then upon the Trojans press'd again.
And great the slaughter was of them that fled,
And wonderful the dust that raised was;
And both the field and army covered,
Forc'd up by troops of horses shod with brass.
As boughs fall in a wood that's set on flame,
And shaken by the violence of wind,
So fast unto the ground the Trojans came,
When Agamemnon follow'd them behind.
And many horses made their chariots rattle,
Which empty ran about when no man drives.
For they that drove them fall'n were in the battle,
A lovelier sight to vultures than their wives.
But Hector was by Jove set out of sight
Of all this dust and slaughter and disorder:
But Agamemnon still with all his might
Pursuing killed, and to kill gave order.
Then they that were encamp'd at Ilus' tomb
Retir'd in haste unto the sycamore,
Half the plain over towards Ilium,
And after them Atrides, covered o'er
With blood and dust. But when the Trojans were
Got back unto the beech near Scæa gate,
Awhile they for their fellows stayed there,
Who swiftly ran, fearing to come too late.
As when a lion falleth in the night
Upon a herd of kine, and one must die,
And all the rest are put into a fright,

So Agamemnon made the Trojans fly;
And all the way he went the hindmost kill'd.
And from their cars some forward fell, and some
Upon their backs, and lay dead on the field.
But when unto the wall they near were come,
Then Jove came down to Ida from the sky
With thunder in his hand, and t' Iris said,
Go, Iris, quickly, and tell Hector I
Command him Agamemnon to avoid
As long as in the front he raging is,
And let the fight by others manag'd be.
But when he Agamemnon wounded sees,
And leave the field, I'll give the victory
To him, and he shall put them all to flight,
And to the fleet go killing all the way,
Until the sun be set, and dark the night.
This said, away she went without delay;
And down from Ida came to Ilium,
And finding him upon his car, To you
From Jove (said she) O Hector, I am come
To warn you Agamemnon to eschew,
As long as in the front he raging is.
And let the fight by others manag'd be;
But when by spear or bow he wounded is,
And leaves the field, he'll give the victory
To you, and you shall put them all to flight,
And to the fleet go killing all the way,
Until the sun be set, and dark the night.
Having thus said, she did no longer stay.

Then Hector armed, leap'd unto the ground,
And with two spears well pointed in his hand
Exhorting went about the army round.
Their faces then the Trojans turn, and stand.
The first that did advance Atrides was.
But tell me, Muse, who first came in his way?
One of Antenor's sons, Iphidamas,
That was brought up in Thrace (though born at Troy)
By Cisseus, who his mother's father was,
From childhood till to man's estate he came,
And made his son in law. But then, because
The coming of the Greeks was known by Fame,
Was thence, although but new espoused, sent
To th' aid of Priam and his sons at Troy,
And at Percopa landing t' Ilium went,
And now was standing in Atrides' way.
First Agamemnon threw his spear and miss'd:
Iphidamas then at Atrides threw,
And hit his belt, which did the stroke resist,
For massy silver was the belt and true,
And bent the point as if it had been lead.
Then Agamemnon with his sword came on,
And smote him on the neck, and laid him dead.
Thus died Iphidamas, Antenor's son:
And much to be lamented was his case,
That far from his espoused virgin wife,
Without receiving from her any grace,
Should fighting for his country lose his life.
He given for her had a thousand kine,

And promis'd sheep and goats a thousand more.
Now slain, and stript was of his armour fine
By Agamemnon, and triumphed o'er.
But Coön then, Antenor's eldest son,
Agamemnon wounded.
Incensed by his brother's death, came in,
And pierc'd Atrides' arm close by the bone,
(Unseen) the elbow and the wrist between.
Then cold was Agamemnon's heart with fear,
But gave not over. For as Coön drew
His brother off, he came on with his spear,
And with a thrust beneath his shield, him slew,
And, on his brother, then cuts off his head.
Thus these two brothers finished their fate.
Atrides still the slaughter followed
With spear, and sword, and stones of mighty weight,
Not giving over whilst the wound was warm.
But when 'twas cleans'd, and stayed was the blood,
So cruel then the pain was in his arm,
That on the ground no longer stay he could.
Then, mounted on his chariot, he said,
Drive to the ships; for he was in great pain.
And on the princes then the charge he laid,
The fight against the Trojans to maintain.
My friends, said he, 'tis your part now to stay
The fury of the Trojans from our ships;
Since Jove not suffers me to fight all day.
This said, the charioteer his horses whips,
Which when they felt, away they swiftly went,

And stain'd with sweat and powder of the plain,
Brought wounded Agamemnon to his tent,
From off the field bestrew'd with bodies slain.
As soon as Hector saw Atrides gone,
Now Trojans, Dardans, Lycians, he cried,
Now charge the Greeks with resolution,
For he is gone on whom they most relied,
And Jove assures me that the day is mine.
This said, like hounds encourag'd by the hunter
Against a lion or a tusked swine,
The Trojans boldly marched to th' encounter,
The Greeks beaten to their camp.
And on them fell, with Hector at their head.
And as a down-right wind the sea, so he
The Argive ranks and files disordered,
And them that fled pursued furiously.
But tell me, Muse, whilst Hector, Priam's son,
By Jove assisted, did the Greeks pursue,
And great renown amongst the Trojans won,
Who and how many were the men he slew.
Assæus first, and then Antonous,
Oplites, Dolops, and Ophelitus,
And then Æsymnus, and Agelaus;
Then Orus, and the last Hipponous.
All these were princes in the Argive host.
But look how many are the drops of dew,
When into th' air the sea by winds is tost,
So many private soldiers Hector slew.
And then incurable their loss had been,

And fled had to their ships the Greeks, dismay'd,
Had not Ulysses then the same foreseen,
And to Tydides, not far from him, said,
Tydides, to what purpose stand we here?
Come hither, man, and stand close to my side,
To let our ships be lost great shame it were.
Tydides to Ulysses then replied,
Yes, yes, Ulysses, I will with you bide,
Though we shall take but little pleasure here,
For Jove I see inclineth to their side.
This said, he at Thymbræus threw his spear,
Which lighting on his left pap pierc'd him through.
Ulysses slew Molion, Priam's man;
Upon the field unstript they left these two,
And then into the Trojan throng they ran,
(Whilst th' other Greeks from Hector swiftly fly)
Like two wild boars that turn upon the hounds,
That know they may upon their strength rely,
And scatter 'mongst the Trojans death and wounds.
And there two valiant sons of Merops kill'd,
As they together on one chariot sate.
This Merops was in prophecy well skill'd,
And bade them stay, and told them had their fate.
But the two forward youths would not obey,
But led unto the war by destiny,
Unluckily came in Tydides' way,
Where by his hand their fortune 'twas to die.
Hippodamas was by Ulysses kill'd,
As also was Eypirichus; and now

None knew who had the better in the field
But Jove, who looked on from Ida's brow.
And then Agastrophus, King Pæon's son,
Was by Tydides wounded in the thigh,
Diomed, Machaon, Ulysses, and Eurypylus wounded.
And would have fled, but horses he had none,
His man that held them for him was not nigh.
Yet fought he 'mongst the foremost till he died.
This Hector saw, and towards Diomed
His horses turn'd, and to the Trojans cried,
Come, follow me, and they all followed.
And Diomed, as soon as he saw this,
Though chill with fear, unto Ulysses said,
To us this plaguy Hector rolling is;
But stand, and let him see we're not afraid.
This said, he straight at Hector threw his spear,
Which hit his helmet, but glanc'd from the brass,
And never to his tender skin came near:
This helmet given him by Apollo was.
But stunn'd he was, and resting on his knees,
He kept himself from falling with his hand.
Dark are his eyes, nothing at all he sees,
And for a while unable is to stand.
But whilst Tydides on the plain advanced,
To get into his hand again the spear,
Which from the place he aim'd at far was glanced,
Hector was mounted, and his senses clear.
Tydides then upon him look'd, and said,
Thou dog, escap'd an evil death thou hast;

And twice been saved by Apollo's aid,
But sure I shall dispatch thee at the last,
For of a God I also have the aid.
But now to other Trojans I'll go on,
Such as shall come into my way. This said,
Away he went to strip King Pæon's son.
And then, as Diomed was taking from
Agastrophus the armour of his breast,
Paris, that leaning stood at Ilus' tomb,
To him an arrow unperceiv'd addrest,
Which hit him on the foot above the toes,
And to the ground clean thorough went the shaft.
Then openly into the field he goes,
And coming nearer to him spake, and laugh'd.
Ye're hit, said he, Tydides. Would it had
Been on your belly, that you might have died;
The Trojans would of that been very glad,
That are so often by you terrified.
Proud, boasting archer, said Tydides, know,
If in your armour you before me stood,
To try your valour and your force, your bow
And arrows would not do you any good.
You value such a scratch as this too much.
The weapons of the strengthless blunted are:
Mine is not so; but whom it does but touch,
His wife lamenting tears her cheeks and hair;
His children orphans are; and red the ground
Whereon he rotting lies; and vultures more
Than women standing by him will be found.

Ulysses then, that near him was before,
Stepp'd in, and stood betwixt him and his foes
Whilst from his foot the arrow he pull'd out.
Then to his char'ot up Tydides goes,
And left the field where he had nobly fought.
And now Ulysses left was all alone,
For from him all the rest were fled for fear,
And then unto himself he made his moan.
Ay me, said he, what now shall I do here?
Though many be the foes, 'tis ill to fly,
But yet, since Jove saves all the rest by flight,
It would be worse if I alone should die.
But why dispute I, when I ought to fight?
None but a coward from the fight will run.
But he that honour loves will stand his ground,
And be content with what he cannot shun,
Whether it be to give or take a wound.
While thus Ulysses argued in his mind,
Hector was near him, and enclos'd him had
With targetiers before him and behind,
Whereof they had no reason to be glad.
As when the hounds by hunters are set on
A wild boar as he comes out from the wood,
He whets his teeth, they from him will not run;
Even so Ulysses 'mongst the Trojans stood;
Where by him slain first Deiopites was,
And Thoon then, and Eunomus he kill'd;
And after these he slew Chersidamas,
As from his car he lighted in the field.

Then leaving these, slew Charops with his spear,
Socus, his brother Hippasus his son.
Then Socus to him came, and standing near
Unto Ulysses, with a speech begun.
Ulysses, much renown'd for craft and pain,
This day you either must the honour wear
Of having Hippasus his two sons slain,
Or lose your own life, wounded by my spear.
Then threw his spear, and pierc'd Ulysses' shield,
His breast-plate, and his coat, and tore his skin.
But Pallas him preserv'd from being kill'd;
For to the vital parts it went not in.
Ulysses knew the wound not mortal was;
Made a step back, and then to Socus said,
Fool that thou art, that wouldst not let me pass
On other Trojans, hast thyself destroy'd,
I do not think you shall this hour outlive,
But from my spear's sharp point receive your death,
And unto me more reputation give,
And leave your soul unto the pow'rs beneath.
Then Socus turn'd himself about to fly,
But overtaken by Ulysses' spear,
That pierc'd him back and breast, he fell down dead.
Then scornfully Ulysses did him jeer.
Socus, gallant man at arms, said he,
By death prevented is your enterprise;
Your eyes shall not by parents closed be,
But shall be pecked out by crows and pyes.
Then from his shield and body he pull'd out

The spear which at him was by Socus thrown.
The blood then from the wound did freely spout,
Which when the Trojans saw, they straight came down
And all together tow'rds him went the rabble.
Then he retir'd, and as he going was,
Thrice called out, as loud as he was able,
For help; and thrice was heard by Menelaus,
Who t' Ajax said, Ulysses' voice I hear,
And like the voice of one that is distrest.
He hemm'd in by the Trojans is, I fear;
Come, let us to him go, and do our best
To fetch him off. For valiant though he be,
I fear, unless we aid him with great speed,
He by the Trojans will be slain, and we
Lose a good man, of whom we oft have need.
Then up they went, and found him by the foes
Environ'd round. As when a stag is shot
By some young man, he swiftly from him goes
Whilst strong his knees are, and his blood is hot.
But when he by the arrow tamed is,
The wolves feed on him in the gloomy wood;
Then comes the lion, and the prey is his.
About Ulysses so the Trojans stood,
Till Ajax, with a target like a tower,
Came to his aid; then sev'ral ways they fled.
Ulysses, now no longer in their power,
Was from the field by Menelaus led,
And mounted on his chariot again.
But on went Ajax, and slew Pandocus,

King Priam's son, and wounded three good men,
Lisander, Pylartes, and Pyrasus.
Then as a river coming to the plain,
And swell'd by Jupiter with show'rs of rain
More than the banks are able to contain,
Bears oaks and pines before it to the main,
So Ajax charg'd the Trojan troops. But this
Hector knew nothing of; for far off now
Upon Scamander's banks he fighting is,
And to the ground doth many an Argive throw.
There was the noise, there aged Nestor stood,
And there Idomeneus, with their steeds.
And Hector, that the use well understood
Of spears and horses, there did mighty deeds.
And yet the Greeks retir'd not; nor had done
If Paris had not with an arrow smote
Machaon on the shoulder to the bone.
Three-forked was the arrow which he shot;
And mightily the Argives were afraid
Since now the foe prevail'd, he would be slain.
To Nestor then Idomeneus said,
Nestor, to your char'ot mount again,
And with Machaon make haste to the ships.
A surgeon many other men is worth.
For many other men alive he keeps
By making salves and drawing weapons forth.
Then Nestor mounteth and the horses whips,
Which they no sooner feel than they are gone,
And quickly brought unto the hollow ships

Machaon Æsculapius his son.
Mean while Cebriones, the chari'teer
Of Hector, saw the Trojans were distress'd,
And to him said, To what end stay we here,
Since yonder by the Greeks our friends are press'd?
'Tis Ajax that disorders them, I see;
I know him by the largeness of his shield.
Now where they fighting are most furiously,
Let us go down to that side of the field.
This said, he crack'd his whip, his horses ran
Unto the place where greatest was the cry,
O'er many a shield, and over many a man
That gasping on the bloody field did lie.
The horses' bellies and the char'ot wheels
And axletrees with blood were cover'd o'er,
Forc'd up in drops by the swift horses' heels.
And Hector rushing in, their battles tore.
But Hector still took heed of Ajax' spear.
And fought in other places of the field.
But Ajax, struck by Jupiter with fear,
Amazed, at his shoulder hung his shield;
And staring on the foe awhile he stood,
Then turn'd and softly from them went away.
As when a lion coming from the wood
Down to a pasture, on a cow to prey,
Is hu'd by dogs and peasants in the night,
And hungry sometimes goes and sometimes stands,
But cannot have his will for all his might,
So many spears are flying from their hands,

And flaming brands which put him in a fright,
Keen as he is, then sullenly he goes
Back to the wood and comes no more in sight;
So then retired Ajax from his foes.
Or as an ass, in spite of many boes,
Is got into the corn, and there abides,
Though they upon him fall with blows and noise,
And many cudgels break upon his sides,
For he the force of boys but little feels,
He hardly will be driven out though fill'd,
And now and then kicks at them with his heels:
So Ajax at the last went off the field,
By Hector and the Trojans still pursu'd,
Upon his shield receiving many a spear;
Sometimes his back, sometimes his face he show'd,
So that they could not to the ships come near.
Thus he between the Greeks and Trojans stands,
While spears abundance at him hurled were;
Some in his shield stuck, driven by strong hands,
Some on the ground fell short and fix'd were there.
But then Eurypylus, Euæmon's son,
That saw him thus oppress'd, came to his side,
And wounded with his spear Apisaon
The liver through; and on the place he died.
But as he stripp'd him lying on the ground
Was shot by Alexander in the thigh,
And broken was the arrow in the wound,
And much increased was his pain thereby.
Then went Eurypylus into the crowd,

And cried out to the princes of the host,
Turn and save noble Ajax from this cloud
Of Trojan spears, or else he will be lost.
This said, the best commanders to him go
With spears advanc'd, and bucklers turn'd before,
And place themselves between him and the foe.
And then again the fight was very sore.
Mean while Achilles as he sitting was
On high astern his ship to see them fight,
Perceived Nestor and Machaon pass,
And to Patroclus call'd with all his might,
Come hither, friend. Patroclus heard him call,
For he was sitting in Achilles' tent,
And (which was the beginning of his fall)
Immediately rose up and to him went,
And said, Achilles, what's your will with me?
Achilles then replied, Patroclus, now
The Argives, I believe, will bend the knee,
For their condition never was so low.
But go to Nestor and informed be
Who 'tis that he brought with him from the fight.
Machaon by his back he seem'd to me,
But of his face I could not have a sight.
So many cars and horses cross'd the way.
This said, unto the ships Patroclus went;
But at the ships arrived now were they,
Alighted and gone into Nestor's tent:
The horses by Eurymedon untied
Were cooled by the sea-side in the air,

And of their sweat well cleansed were and dried,
And in the mean time Ecameda fair,
That was the daughter of Arsinous,
And taken by Achilles was when he
Conquer'd and sack'd the city Tenedus,
And by the Greeks to Nestor giv'n; and she
To Nestor and Machaon setteth up
A table with a black foot smooth and fine,
And on it set a basket, and a cup,
And to each one before him set on wine.
The cup with nails of gold was studded o'er,
Four ears it had, and two doves at each ear,
And those were gold, and at the foot two more
In posture such as if they feeding were.
Nestor to Troy had with him brought this cup.
Another scarce could lift it from the table
When fill'd with wine; though he to take it up,
Old as he was, and easily was able.
And in the same the woman made the drink,
With goat's-milk cheese, and white flour sprinkled o'er,
And left it on the board full to the brink.
Then quenched they their thirst, and drank no more,
But talking sat, to put out of their thought
Their ill success. Now at the door o' th' tent
Patroclus was, and in by Nestor brought,
And pray'd to sit, but he would not consent,
But said, Achilles bade me ask you who
It is whom you brought with you from the fight.
And this already I can answer to.

Machaon ’tis that sits there in my sight.
What need then is there of my longer stay?
Return I will with all the speed I can,
For fear he should some blame upon me lay,
Though I deserve it not. You know the man.
What makes Achilles, aged Nestor said,
Of th’ Argives wounded men to take such care?
He knows not how the army is dismay’d,
Nor yet how many of them wounded are.
Ulysses wounded is, and Diomed,
And Agamemnon, and Eurypylus,
And this man whom I with me hither led.
Achilles pity has on none of us;
Although our safety now lie in his hands.
Intends he to sit still till Hector burn
In spite of us our ships upon the sands,
And ev’ry one of us kill in his turn?
For now my strength decayed is with age.
that I were as strong as I was then
When war ‘twixt us and th’ Elians did rage,
And we our cattle fetch’d from them again,
And slew Itymoneus that took our kine,
For I then went his cattle to distrain,
And take amends for those he took of mine.
There he defending them by me was slain,
And all his people from him ran away.
And there we took of fifty herds of kine
And of as many herds of goats a prey,
As many flocks, as many herds of swine,

And horses three times fifty, females all,
Of colour sandy mix'd with sparks of light;
And most of them had foals, and to the wall
Of Pyle I brought this booty all by night.
My father Neleus joyful was to see't;
For yet he thought I was for war too young.
Next morn the criers make the people meet,
(All those to whom the Elians had done wrong)
The lords amongst them then divide the prey.
Many there were that had been injured,
And with their shares contented sent away,
Though Pylus were not well inhabited.
For Hercules not many years before
Had kill'd the best of them. And Neleus then
Had twelve good sons, whereof he left no more
Alive but me. This made th' Epian men
Despise our number small, and do us wrong.
And Neleus now unto himself did keep
The best herd of the kine, and from among
The flocks chose one that had three hundred sheep,
And justly, since so great a loss had none.
For he four steeds unto the games had sent
Of value great, which all had prizes won.
But by Augias his commandement,
When for a tripod they prepar'd to run,
Together with the cars were there detain'd.
Chari'teers related what was done.
And Neleus then the best o' th' prey retain'd;
And ev'ry man had of the rest his share.

This done unto the Gods we sacrifice.
Mean while the Elians for war prepare,
And two days after altogether rise,
And forth o' th' town went they both foot and horse,
And with them Molion's two sons, not yet
Arrived at the age of martial force,
And round about the town Colone sit.
Colone is a frontier-town, between
Elis and Pyle, upon Alphæus' side.
Passing the plain they were by Pallas seen;
And she aloud unto the Pylians cried,
To arms, you men of Pyle. Then in the night
We put on arms, and to the field we hied;
And cheerfully went ev'ry one to fight.
My horses only were convey'd aside.
For Neleus thought I was in war unskill'd:
But I at home could not be made t' abide,
But with the rest on foot went to the field,
For on the Goddess Pallas I relied.
Near to Arene falls into the main
A little brook. All night by that we lay,
And in the morn betime we march'd again,
And to Alphæus came in half a day.
And there to Jove his sacred rites we paid.
To Neptune and Alphæus each a bull;
An heifer to the heav'nly martial maid
We gave; and when the bands of foot were full,
Then sup we in our ranks, and armed slept.
Th' Epeians still the town besieging lay;

But seeing the war was now so near them crept,
They rose; then presently began the fray.
And there the first man that was slain I slew,
Which Molius was, Augias' son-in-law.
He wedded Acameda had, who knew
As many med'cines as the world e'er saw.
Him first I slew, and to his char'ot mounted.
Then fled th' Epeians scatter'd here and there:
For he the best amongst them was accounted.
And as they fled I follow'd with my spear,
And fifty char'ots took, and at each one
Two men I kill'd; for like a storm I went;
Nor had I left to Molius any son,
If Neptune had not hinder'd my intent,
That took them up and sav'd them in a cloud.
Great honour won the Pyleans that day;
For on the plains we chac'd th' Epeians proud,
Killing and gath'ring armour all the way
Until we came unto Buprasium,
Alesium, and Rock-Olene; and there
Advis'd we were by Pallas to go home.
To Pylus then we went and welcome were.
And thanks were given to the Gods, but most
To Jupiter the greatest God. And then
In general were thanked all the host,
And Nestor namely above other men.
Thus I behav'd myself amongst the Greeks,
Whereas Achilles sitting in his tent,

Patroclus is persuaded by Nestor to obtain of Achilles to be sent to the aid of the Greeks in Achilles' armour.
Neglecting us, his own contentment seeks;
Though if our fleet be lost he will repent.
But, O Patroclus, the advice was good
Menœtius your father gave you then
When I at Phthia was and by him stood,
By Agamemnon sent to levy men.
To Peleus' house Ulysses came and I,
And there we found Menœtius and you.
And you upon Achilles waited nigh,
And Peleus to the Gods fat cattle slew
I' th' court o' th' grass, a gold cup in his hand,
And pour'd wine on the burning sacrifice,
And you then saw us in the gate-house stand,
Though busy you were then to burn the thighs.
Achilles to us came and led us in,
And made us sup, and supper being done,
To tell our bus'ness then I did begin,
Which was to bring with us to Troy his son.
Both he and you desirous were to go;
And Peleus then unto Achilles said,
Strive still to be the best, and let the foe
Be always of your spear the most afraid.
Then to you spake your father; Son, said he,
Achilles is a better man of war
Than you, and higher in nobility
Of blood; but you in age before him are.
Give him good counsel therefore, and suggest

What's for his good, although he see it not:
He will obey when for himself 'tis best;
Thus he advis'd you, though you have forgot.
But do it now. For 'tis not yet too late.
Who knows but you may make him change his mind?
Or if he still continue obstinate,
Or in some oracle a scruple find,
Or Thetis told him somewhat has from Jove,
Yet let him send his Myrmidons with you,
The Trojans from the navy to remove,
And give th' Achæans time to breathe anew.
But let him give you his own arms. Then they
(When like unto Achilles you appear,
Leading fresh forces) fly will into Troy,
And rid th' Achæans of their present fear.
This said, Patroclus, grieved, went his way,
And tow'rds Achilles' tent ran back apace,
Passing by where Ulysses' vessels lay.
There were the altars, there the market-place,
There were the courts of justice. There he met
Eurypylus, with the arrow in his wound,
And from his head and shoulders dropp'd the sweat,
And bled apace, but still his sense was sound.
Then, pitying him, Patroclus spake, and said,
Ah! poor commanders of the Achæan host,
Must we be all so far from home destroy'd,
And lie for dogs'-meat on the Trojan coast?
But say, Eurypylus, is there no way
To keep off Hector, but must perish all?

Nothing I know, said he, can Hector stay,
But in our flaming ships we all must fall.
For all the best of us here wounded lie,
And still the Trojan power grows more and more.
But, O Patroclus, cut out of my thigh
This arrow-head; for it torments me sore,
And with warm water wash away the blood,
And salves apply, the same that Chiron knew,
(The best of Centaurs) to be very good,
And taught Achilles, and Achilles you.
For of two surgeons in the army, one
As much need of a surgeon hath as I,
And Podalirius to the fight is gone.
Patroclus to him then made this reply.
How can this now be done, Eurypylus,
Since to Achilles I must go with speed
With Nestor's answer? Yet to leave you thus
In torture, were but an ungentle deed.
Then in his arms he bears him to his tent,
And there, upon a many cow-hides spread,
Laid him, and with his knife to work he went,
And from his thigh cuts out the arrow-head.
And in his hands he bruis'd a bitter root,
And wash'd away the blood. When that was done.
He cleans'd the wound, applied the med'cine to't,
And straight the blood was stopp'd, the pain was gone.

LIB. XII.

The fourth fight, Hector having entered the Argive camp, at the ships.

THUS WAS EURYPYLUS of pain releas'd.
Meanwhile the Greeks and Trojans fiercely fought,
Nor could the Argive wall and trench (unbless'd,
For on a hecatomb they never thought)
Though made their ships and booty to defend,
Keep Hector and the Trojans long time out.
For very quickly cometh to an end
Whate'er without the Gods men go about.
Indeed while Hector liv'd, and angry lay
The fourth fight.
Achilles at his tent, and would not fight,
And standing were the walls and town of Troy,
The great wall of the Argives stood upright.
But when the bravest Trojans once were slain,
And many Greeks, and burnt was Ilium,
That had almost ten years held out in vain,
And what remained of the Greeks gone home.
Then Neptune and Apollo both devise
The wall to ruin, and the rivers all
That in this spacious mountain Ida rise
Upon this Argive mighty work make fall.
Aresus, Rhesus, Heptaporius,

Æsepus, Rhodius, Scamander, and
Besides these six, the river Granicus,
And Simoeis, upon whose banks of sand
Many a shield and helmet scatter'd lay,
And many a Demi-God. These rivers all
Apollo turned from their wonted way,
Directing them unto the Argives' wall.
Nine days perpetually they thither run,
And Jove nine days together pour'd down rain,
To th' end the work might be the sooner done.
And Neptune with his trident from the main
Before them went and wrenched out the stone
And timber which had there been laid with pain
The deep'st of all for the foundation,
And made it to the sea all smooth again.
And strew'd again with sand the ample shore;
And made the brooks in their own channels run
No otherwise than they were wont before:
But this not yet, but afterwards was done.
For Hector had the Greeks with show'rs of spears
Constrain'd to quit their walls and tow'rs so high,
That rattled terribly about their ears,
And back unto their hollow ships to fly.
As when a lion or a boar beset
With hounds and hunters, this and that way tries
(Close as they stand) through them by strength to get,
And passing on their spears prevails or dies,
And as he goes still makes them to give way;
So Hector 'mongst his friends went here and there,

Exhorting them the trenches to assay.
The horses when upon the brink they were
Boggled and whinnied, and refus'd to pass;
For broad it was and not to be leap'd o'er:
And to descend into, too deep it was,
And on each side bristled with stakes good store,
Fix'd by the Achæans to keep off the foe;
So that for horse and cars there was no way.
But very willing were the foot to go,
And only to receive command did stay.
And then to Hector said Polydamas,
Hector and you, the princes of our friends,
We strive in vain to make our horses pass
O'er such great stakes, so sharpen'd at the ends,
Having above our heads the enemy.
Where (though we could get down) we cannot fight,
Though Jove unto our side inclined be,
And to the Greeks should bear as much despite,
As I, that wish their name were rooted out.
Yet if the Greeks, when we encumber'd were
For want of room, should turn and face about,
And set upon us in the ditch, I fear
A man of us would not be left alive
To tell at Troy what is become of us.
But if you mean to have the bus'ness thrive,
Then hear my counsel, Let us all do thus:
Till of our horse and chariots we have need
Let servants hold them to the trenches nigh,
And we on foot fight; for if Jove indeed

Intend us victory, the Greeks will fly.
Thus he advis'd; and Hector thought it best,
And from his chariot leap'd unto the sand,
Arm'd as he was; and so did all the rest,
And to their charioteers they gave command
All in their order near the trench to stand.
The Trojans in five parts themselves divide;
And Hector of the first took the command.
But with himself he joined two beside,
Polydamas and stout Cebriones,
And left a meaner man to hold his car.
Of all the Trojan host the best were these.
O' th' second party Paris had the care,
Join'd with Agenor and Alcathous.
The third commanded was by leaders three:
First Helenus, and then Deiphobus,
The third was Asius. From Arisbe he
With mighty horses, colour'd like to flame,
Bred on the bank of Sellis, came to Troy.
The fourth command unto Æneas came;
And he likewise two seconds had, and they
Two sons were of Antenor (both well skill'd
In war), Archelochus and Acamas.
Lastly, Sarpedon led into the field
The Trojan aids; and he assisted was
By valiant Glaucus and Asterapæus.
For of the Lycians which he led thither
The ablest and the best men he thought these.
And then with bucklers joined close together,

Away they march directly to the foe,
And to the combat had a great desire.
The Greeks (they thought) as fast as they could go,
Would presently unto their ships retire,
But Asius would not his horses leave
And man, without the trench, as others did.
Fool as he was himself so to deceive.
Upon his chariot tow'rds the ships he rid;
But never came triumphant back again
For all his flaming horses and his car,
But by Idomeneus' spear was slain.
When Hector to the ships had brought the war,
The Greeks had in their wall a gate, whereat
Their horses to the field were us'd to pass,
And Asius with his chariot drave to that,
Which now left open by the Argives was,
Their people chas'd by Hector to let in.
And all his party with a mighty cry
March'd after him, as if they sure had been
The Argives to their hollow ships would fly;
But were deceived. For at the gate they found
Two mighty men that like two great oaks stood
With deep and large roots fixed in the ground,
That many winds and storms had long withstood.
And Lapiths they were both; Leontes one,
The other Polypœtes gotten by
Pirithous. Both saw them coming on,
And staying, on their hands and strength rely.
The Trojans led by Asius came on

With mighty noise, Orestes, Adamas,
(This Adamas of Asius was the son)
Thoon, Iamenus, and Œnomaus,
And o'er their heads they held their shields on high,
For fear of stones and spears from off the wall.
The Greeks within to one another cry
To save the ships, the tents, themselves, and all.
But when they saw the Trojans went about
To scale the wall, they roar'd and frighted were;
But the two Lapiths presently leap'd out,
And furiously fell on the Trojans there.
As if two boars the men and hounds withstood,
You'd often hear the boughs before them snap,
While with their bended necks they tear the wood;
So thick they did the Trojan armours rap.
For valiantly they fought, in part relying
Upon their strength, and partly on the showers
Of mighty stones perpetually flying
Upon the Trojans from the wall and tow'rs.
As thick as to the ground fall flakes of snow,
When by a cold wind stirred is the cloud,
Their weapons from their hands on both sides go,
And shields and helmets crack apace and loud.
But Asius at this vex'd to the heart,
Then spake to Jove, and clapping of his thigh,
Aye me, said he, thou too a liar art,
That mad'st us to believe the Greeks would fly;
Who like so many motly wasps or bees
That in the hollow way their houses build,

And for their young resist their enemies,
Till they repel them or themselves be kill'd,
Still sharply fight and will not quit the place.
Thus Asius said, but Jove unmoved sate,
And none that day but Hector meant to grace.
And as at this they fought at ev'ry gate,
I cannot like a God relate it all,
The flaming stones that from the Trojans flew
With fire divine up to the Argive wall
On ev'ry side. How th' Argives no way knew
To save themselves but for the ships to fight;
And how the Gods that with the Greeks took part
Sat discontent in heav'n, and full of spite,
To see Jove so severely make them smart.
But for the fight without, 'twas first begun
By the bold Lapiths, though but two they were.
For Polypœtes, Pirithous' son,
At Damasus threw first a heavy spear,
And through his helmet's brazen cheeks it went,
And through the bone into the brain went on;
And when unto the shades he him had sent,
He killed Orminus and Pyloon:
And then a deadly spear Leontes threw,
Which through the body pierc'd Hippolochus.
And on Antiphates his sword he drew
And killed him, and then Iamenus,
Orestes, Menon, one upon another.
But whilst they stay'd to strip these and the rest,
Hector, Polydamas, and many other,

That of the Trojan army were the best,
Were at the trench, and stood upon the brink
The wall to break, and set the ships on fire.
But as they stood a little while to think,
There came a bird not suiting their desire.
An eagle in his pounces held a snake,
And over Hector's soldiers carried it
Alive, but that could yet resistance make,
And by and by the snake the eagle bit.
The eagle smarting cried and flew away,
And 'mongst the Trojans lets the serpent fall,
And there amazed they, and gaping stay
To see Jove's prodigy before them crawl.
Hector, said Polydamas, though you
In courts and councils cross whate'er I say,
How good soe'er it for you be and true,
Unless in ev'ry thing I go your way,
(Which is not well done, for your counsel ought
In peace and war to have their voices free,
And never give advice against their thought,
But always for the public good to be);
Yet now I'll tell you, if this bird be sent
Unto the Trojans as a prodigy,
'Tis not uneasy to foresee th' event.
For this I think the end of it will be:
As th' eagle in his pounces bore the snake,
But could not to her young ones bear it home;
So if the Trojans this attempt shall make,
They'll back unto the city smarting come,

And many good companions leave behind,
Whom th' Argives, to defend their ships, will kill.
And this, I think, will any augur find
That in's profession has any skill.
Then Hector sourly looking thus replied:
Polydamas, this counsel I like not;
You have a better which you from me hide.
But if indeed it be your very thought,
The Gods have sure depriv'd you of your sense,
That bids me not on Jove to set my rest,
But feather'd fowls, that fly I care not whence,
Nor whither, right or left, or east or west;
But we to Jove, the greatest God, will trust,
That all the other Gods excels in might.
He one bird has, that still observe we must,
And that is, for our country well to fight.
But why are you so much afraid? For though
You ne'er so many see before you slain,
You of yourself will have a care I know,
And not adventure where you may abstain.
But if you stay or counsel other men
To stay behind, my spear shall strike you dead.
This said, he led them further on; and then
They all with mighty clamour followed.
And Jove a mighty wind from Ida sent,
Which to the ships directly blew the dust,
That to the Trojans gave encouragement,
But to the Argives horror and distrust.
Encourag'd thus, unto the wall they go

And brake down battlements, and posts pluck'd out,
And piles that had been planted by the foe,
With levers strong they wring up by the root.
Thus at the wall the Trojans laboured,
And hope they had the same to overthrow.
Before the battlements the Argives spread
Cow-hides, and thence threw stones on them below.
The Ajaxes then ran from tow'r to tow'r,
Endeavouring to give the Argives heart,
Some with sweet words, and some of them with sour,
According as they each one did his part.
Fellows, said they, you that excel in war,
And you that great strength have, and you that small
(For well you know, all men not equal are)
Now play the men, there's bus'ness for you all.
Fear not the clamour of this threat'ning man;
Endure this brunt, which if you overcome,
As (if Jove hinder not) I know you can,
We'll course him to the gates of Ilium.
Thus they encouraged the Greeks. And now,
As when great Jove to show his armory
Upon a winter's day sends down his snow,
Innumerable are the flakes that fly
And cover hills, and woods, and pastures green,
And all the fruitful works of husbandry,
And cover would, but that the sea comes in,
Both ports and shores; for there snow cannot lie;
The wall with stones resounded round about,
Yet Hector ne'er had broken wall nor gate,

But by the Greeks had still been kept without,
Had not Jove sent, the Trojans t' animate,
His son Sarpedon. With his shield of brass,
Lined with many folds of strong cow-hide,
And which with golden circles strength'ned was,
And two spears in his hand, to th' wall he hied.
And as a lion that had fasted long
Comes from the hill upon a flock of sheep,
Will try what he can do, for all the throng
Of men and dogs that them are set to keep;
So boldly goes Sarpedon to the walls,
With mighty hand the battlements to tear,
And as he going was to Glaucus calls.
Glaucus, said he, what cause think you is there
That we in Lycia more honour'd are
Than other men, and look'd upon like Gods,
And higher sit at feasts, and better fare,
And drink best wine, and more land have by odds?
Is't not because we foremost are in fight!
'Tis not in vain, they'll say, our princes have
More honour, since they are of greater might,
And their lives venture other men to save.
Glaucus, if we could death eschew and age
By running from the battle cowardly,
D'ye think I foremost would myself engage,
Or ever counsel you to follow me?
You know the ways to death are infinite.
Though we ne'er fight we cannot always live.
Therefore come on, and let us bravely fight,

And either honour gain, or honour give.
So said Sarpedon. Glaucus him obey'd;
And tow'rds the Greeks well followed they went.
Then Mnesteus was terribly afraid,
For to assault his tower he saw them bent,
And look'd about what heroes he could spy
On other towers unto his aid to call.
He saw th' Ajaxes two, and Teucer by,
But too far off to hear. For at the wall
Of shields and helmets so great thumping was,
That 'twas impossible to hear him call.
The gates resounded no less than the brass;
For fiercely they were fighting at 'em all.
Then Mnesteus to the squire, Thootes, said,
Run quickly, call the Ajaxes to me,
Both, if they can be spar'd. I am afraid
Against these men I shall not able be
To keep my place. Keen warriors they are.
But if they be themselves distressed there,
Let Telamonius of the place take care,
And Teucer use his bow and arrows here.
Thootes then unto th' Ajaxes ran
Along the Argive wall, and to them said,
Mnesteus entreats both of you, if you can,
To come unto his tow'r and give him aid.
Keen warriors, he says, these Lycians are:
But if you be yourselves distressed here,
Let Telamonius of the place take care,
And Teucer use his bow and arrows there.

This said, great Ajax said unto the less,
Æliades, stay here awhile, till I
Deliver Mnesteus from his distress.
That done, I shall be with you presently.
Ajax and Teucer then together go
Unto the tow'r of Mnesteus with all speed,
Pandion with them, carry'ng Teucer's bow,
And at their coming found him in great need.
The Lycians, like a black and low'ring cloud,
Ascended to the wall, and fiercely fought.
The Greeks resist. The noise is mighty loud.
And with a heavy stone stood Ajax out,
That two men scarce could carry, such as now
The earth brings forth, and with the same he stroke
Epicles on the helmet such a blow
As head and helmet both in pieces broke.
Down like a diver from the wall fell he
Headlong, and dead upon the ground he lay.
At Glaucus Teucer lets an arrow flee
Which through his arm unarmed made its way.
Glaucus, no longer able now to fight,
Leapt from the wall unseen unto the ground,
For fear, if of his hurt they had a sight,
The Greeks would make a triumph of his wound.
Griev'd was Sarpedon to see Glaucus gone,
But not so grieved but that still he fought,
And fix'd a heavy spear in Alcmaon,
And with the same his life and all pluck'd out.
Sarpedon then tore down a battlement,

And wider for the Lycians made the way.
But Teucer then an arrow to him sent;
But Jupiter, to save his son that day,
The shaft unto his shield and belt directed,
So that it passed not unto the skin,
The shield and belt together him protected.
And then, with spear in hand came Ajax in,
And with a push that pierc'd his shield clean through,
His coming on a little while he staid.
But with Sarpedon that could little do,
That honour sought. Then to his friends he said,
Ye Lycians, what makes ye thus remiss?
Can I make way unto the ships alone?
Strong as I am, impossible it is.
For many hands much better are than one.
This said, the Lycians heavier than before,
To please their prince, upon the Argives lay.
The Greeks within their broken ranks restore,
And terrible the battle was that day.
For neither could the Lycians passage make
Unto the ships and break the Argives' wall,
Nor Greeks compel the Lycians to forsake
The battlements, so fiercely fought they all.
As two men on the confines of their ground
At two ends of a measure tugging stand,
Contending earnestly about their bound,
And each of them would fain enlarge his land:
So for the battlement they striving stood,
And wounded one another back and breast,

And sprinkled was the battlement with blood,
Nor was it certain yet who had the best.
But as a woman that is fain to spin,
To find herself and children sorry food,
In one scale wool, in th' other weight puts in
Till they hang ev'n: so ev'n the battle stood
Till Hector came, to whom Jove chiefly meant
To give the honour of the victory.
Then Hector up the wall the foremost went,
And thence unto his Trojans loud did cry,
Trojans, come on, and break me down this wall,
And set the Argives' hollow ships on flame.
This said, he heard was by the Trojans all,
And straight unto the battlements they came.
Then Hector at the gate took up a stone,
Great and sharp pointed, two men such as now
Could scarce have lifted up so great a one:
But Hector with one hand the same could throw;
For Jupiter to him had made it light.
And as unto a shepherd is a fleece
Of wool, that to be borne needs little might;
So eas'ly borne the stone by Hector is;
And standing at the gate well fortified
With planks well join'd, and two cross-bars within,
And taking with his right foot back a stride,
Out flew the stone, and at the gate went in.
The gate then roar'd; the hinges broken were;
The bars upon the ground asunder lay;
And pieces of the planks flew here and there;

And to the ships now open was the way.
And Hector with a countenance like night
Flew in. And fire appeared in his eyes:
His armour as he marched shining bright,
And light reflected up unto the skies;
And two good spears he grasped in his fist.
And then the Greeks were mightily afraid;
For none except a God could him resist.
And then unto the Trojans turning said,
Now Trojans to the wall. And presently
Great numbers of the Trojans that way pass,
And others at the gate. The Argives fly
Unto their ships. And great the tumult was.

LIB. XIII.

Neptune encourageth the Greeks.

WHEN JOVE HAD to the ships the Trojans brought,
He left them fighting there, and turn'd his face
(Thinking th' Immortals would no more have fought)
And look'd upon the fields and men of Thrace,
And Mysians, and Hippomolgi (men
That live on milk the goodly mothers give
Of lusty steeds, and are more honest than
The rest of mortals, and do longer live.)
While Neptune from a hill in Samothrace
Look'd down and saw the Greeks and Trojans fight.
For thence of Ida hill and all the space
'Bout Troy and th' Argive fleet he had a sight.
And grieved was to see the Argives slain,
And mightily offended was with Jove,
And from the hill in haste came down again
On foot; and ever as his feet did move,
Under the same the haughty mountains shook,
And the thick woods, and unto Ægæ came.
Thither to come four steps he only took.
There stands a temple sacred to his name,
Of glistering gold and never to decay.
And there he puts his horses to his car;

Long manes of gold they had, and swift were they;
And then in gold himself array'd for war,
And mounted on his car o'er sea he drives.
The whales on both sides from the bottom rise
Their king to see. The sea her bosom rives,
But not a drop up to the axtree flies.
Thus quickly to the Argives Neptune came.
Half way 'twixt Tenedus and Imbrus is
In the deep sea a cave, and in the same
(Lest coming back his horses he should miss)
He sets them up and laid before them meat,
And tied them there with foot-locks at their feet,
Strong locks of gold, that loose they could not get.
Then up he went unto the Argive fleet,
And there he found the Trojans like a flame
At Hector's heels with mighty noise and cry,
Greedy and full of hope the Greeks to tame,
And then in flames to make their ships to fry.
Then Neptune speaking to th' Ajaxes two
In Chalchas' shape, You two, said he, can save
The ships, if you but set yourselves thereto.
For of the foe no fear at all I have
In other parts. Defended they will be
By other Greeks. The danger all is here
Where Hector like a flame you leading see,
That would be thought the son of Jupiter.
If you but think some God bids you resist,
And stand your ground when Hector cometh on,
And cheer your fellows; though Jove him assist,

He quickly from your good ships will be gone.
This said, he on them both his sceptre laid,
And presently themselves they stronger find;
Their thighs and legs and hands much lighter weigh'd.
And Neptune suddenly rose from the ground.
Just as a hawk from off a rock flies at
Some other fowl; so quickly Neptune rose.
The lesser Ajax first observed that,
And to the greater did the same disclose.
Ajax, said he, this was some Deity
That in the shape of Chalchas bade us fight.
For 'twas not Chalchas I am sure. For I
As he went off had of his legs a sight,
And of his feet and steps. For marks there are
To know a God by from a man. Withal
I find myself much more inclin'd to war.
Methinks my hands and feet for battle call.
And so do mine, said Telamonius,
And fain I would with Hector have a bout.
While they together were discoursing thus,
Neptune behind them busy was about.
Confirming those that to the ships were gone
A little to refresh themselves. For they
Had long and painful labour undergone,
And heavy at their hearts the danger lay
When Hector and his troops had pass'd the wall,
And of their safety were in great despair.
But Neptune coming soon confirm'd them all,
And gave them hope their fortune to repair.

To Teucer first he came and Leitus,
To Deipyrus and to Meneleos,
Meriones and stout Antilochus,
And standing near address'd his speech to those.
Fie, Argives, fie young men; what shame is this;
Upon your hands I chiefly did rely
To save our ships. If you be so remiss,
The day is come in which we all must die
By Hector's hands. O strange! I never thought
The Trojans durst to th' ships have come so near,
That heretofore peep out o' th' town durst not,
But like to hinds that hide themselves for fear
Of leopards, wolves, and other beasts of prey.
For so at first they did. But you'll not fight
For anger that the king had sent away
Dishonoured the man of greatest might.
But what though Agamemnon have indeed
Dishonour'd Thetis' son, must we therefore
Give over fight? Or rather with all speed
Endeavour all we can to cure the sore?
But, howsoe'er, you that excuseless are,
And of the Argive army all the best,
And bodies have and hearts well made for war,
I needs must reprehend you. But the rest
That weak or wretched are I cannot blame.
Fond men, this negligence may bring forth yet
Some greater ill. Then come away for shame.
For never were the Greeks so hard beset.
Hector has broken both the bars and gates,

And now hard by our ships he fiercely fights,
And with great noise his Trojans animates.
Thus Neptune the dismayed Greeks excites.
At th' Ajaxes the ranks stood firm and close.
Nor Mars nor Pallas could a fault have spied.
They chosen were the Trojans to oppose
Whom Hector led. And standing side by side,
Shield shield, and target target, and man man
Sustain'd, and spear by spear assisted was.
So close they stood, and labour all they can
Lest Hector to their hollow ships should pass.
And Hector with his troops went swiftly on.
As when a torrent swell'd with showers of rain
Breaks from the hill a round and heavy stone,
It makes the wood resound, till at the plain,
Swift as it hither roll'd, it rolls no more;
So Hector marching made account to pass
Through th' Argive fleet and tents to the sea-shore.
But at th' Ajaxes battle stopp'd he was;
And forced back a little to recoil,
Resisted by so many spears and swords,
And speaking to his Trojans stood awhile,
And Lycians, and Dardans in these words.
Ye Trojans, Lycians, Dardans, do not fly.
I know they cannot long maintain the fight,
If we upon Jove's promise may rely,
Who all the other Gods excels in might.
This said, Deiphobus went towards the foe,
Holding his buckler out before him high,

So that it cover'd him from head to toe.
Meriones, that on him had his eye,
His spear threw at him, which no harm did do.
For though upon the buckler fell the stroke,
It carried not th' intended mischief through,
But in the tough bull-hides the spear he broke.
Then back unto the throng he went, and fum'd
Both for the loss of the good spear he brake,
And of the victory he had presum'd,
And went to the ships another spear to take.
The rest fought on, and mighty noise there was.
There Teucer with his spear slew Imbrius
The son of Mentor, till the Greeks did pass
The sea to Troy he dwelt at Pedasus,
And to Medesicaste there was wed.
But when the Argives came to Troy, he then
Dwelt in King Priam's court, much honoured
Both by the king himself and by his men.
But now by Teucer's spear was slain. And as
Upon a hill a goodly ashen tree,
Unto the ground, cut from the roots with brass,
Brings down its boughs, so to the ground fell he.
To strip him of his arms then Teucer goes;
Which Hector seeing, at him threw his spear,
And misses him; yet not in vain he throws,
But kills another man that stood him near,
Amphimacus, that newly to the fight
Was from the ships come back t' assist the rest;
And scarcely of the skirmish had a sight,

When Hector's spear he felt upon his breast.
Then to Amphimachus came Hector near,
Meaning his helmet from his head to take.
Which Ajax seeing, at him threw his spear
That hit his shield, but passage could not make.
Yet with such strength the spear fell on his shield,
That backward he was driven from the dead;
So that the Argives bore them off the field.
Amphimachus to th' ships was carried
By Mnestheus and Stichius, that led
Th' Athenian troops. But the Ajaxes two,
One at the feet, another at the head,
Bore Imbrius from off the ground into
The throng of Greeks, like hungry lions two,
That carry in their jaws a goat which they
Had snatched from the dogs, and were to go
Through many shrubs to carry it away.
Him they disarm'd, and to let Hector know it,
The lesser Ajax cutteth off his head,
And turning round with all his strength doth throw it,
And unto Hector's feet 'twas carried.
Now Neptune for Amphimachus thus slain,
Who from his loins descended, vexed sore,
Went to the Argive ships and tents again
To cheer the Greeks, and hurt the Trojans more,
And with Idomeneus met as he went,
That had a wounded friend brought from the fight,
And straightway back again to go he meant
To them that fought, and help them all he might.

And Neptune like unto Andremon's son,
Thoas, whose father all th' Ætolians sway'd
Like Jove in Pleuron and in Calydon,
Unto Idomeneus then spake and said,
king Idomeneus, what is betide
Of th' Argive threats that Ilium they would tame?
Thoas, then Idomeneus replied,
I know not any man that we can blame.
There's none of us but understands the war,
Nor any that betray themselves with fear,
Nor that for sloth to fight unwilling are.
But Jove, it seems, will have us perish here.
But Thoas, you that always heretofore
Have fought so well, and set on other men,
Still hold that purpose never giving o'er.
T' Idomeneus then Neptune said again,
Idomeneus, may that man ne'er come back,
But in the fields lie for the dogs a prey,
That at this time is negligent or slack.
But now put on your arms and come away,
And quickly. For although we are but two,
Yet since conjoined force of men not strong
Can do as much as one good man, let's go.
This said, up Neptune went into the throng.
Idomeneus then goes into his tent
And arm'd himself, and took in's hand two spears,
And out again he came like light'ning sent
To men from Jove to fill their hearts with fears.
And scarce came forth, he met Meriones

That to his tent was going for a spear,
And speaking to him said Idomeneus,
Meriones, my friend, what make you here?
What are you wounded that you leave the fight?
Or bring you me some news? For I to hide
Myself from battle here take no delight.
Meriones then to him thus replied.
king Idomeneus, unto your tent
I forc'd was from the battle to come down,
And thence to take a spear of yours I meant,
Since on Deiphobus I broke my own.
A spear, then said Idomeneus, there are
Twenty, if you had need of them, that stand
Upright against the walls, which in this war
I took from Trojans vanquish'd by my hand.
For when I fight I stand near to the foe.
And that's the cause so many spears I have,
And can so many shields and helmets show,
And armours for the breast great store and brave.
Then spake Meriones; And I, said he,
Have many spoils of Trojans at my tent,
But fetch'd from thence so soon they cannot be.
For close up to the foe I also went
Amongst the foremost boldly. Which although
The Argives take no notice of, yet you
That how I still behav'd myself well know,
Can bear me witness what I say is true.
To him then thus Idomeneus replied,
Meriones, this need not have been said;

I know your courage were it to be tried,
And men somewhere in ambush to be laid,
Where fear and courage are discerned best;
For there 'tis seen who valiant are, who not.
A coward's heart still panteth in his breast;
And nothing but on death he has his thought;
He cannot without trembling quiet sit,
But dances on his hams, and changes hue;
And cannot hold himself upon his feet;
And shakes his chaps. These things a coward show.
But in a valiant man there's none of this.
He quietly abides without afright,
When in the danger he engaged is;
And longs for nothing but to come to fight.
If you amongst them had been there, I know
None of them such a fault in you had found.
Or if you had been hurt 'tis sure enow,
Nor in your back nor neck had been the wound,
But either in your belly or your breast.
But let's no longer talk like children here,
Lest we be blam'd. I think it therefore best
You now go to my tent and take a spear.
This said, Meriones fetch'd out a spear,
And with Idomeneus went to the fight,
As Mars, when in the field he will appear,
And with him his beloved son Affright,
And to th' Ephyrians and Phlegyans goes
From Thrace to give one side the victory;
So with Idomeneus unto the foes

Meriones went up courageously,
And to him said, Idomeneus, where now
O' th' left or right side of the Trojan host,
Or in the midst shall we our force bestow
To help the Greeks? For now they need us most.
Idomeneus then to him said again,
The middle of the battle to maintain
There ready stand enow, and able men,
Teucer good bowman and th' Ajaxes twain.
Hector shall there of fighting have his fill,
As greedy as he is. Though strong he be,
He'll find it hard that way to have his will,
And come unto the ships with victory,
And burn them, if Jove not with his own hand
Throw in the brands. He must be more than man,
Whom Ajax is not able to withstand;
Not mortal, such as live by Ceres can,
And may be killed with a spear or stone.
For Ajax with Achilles may compare
In standing fight, though able less to run.
In that, Achilles him excelleth far.
But now unto the battle let us go,
And fall on at the left side of the field,
And try what we are able there to do,
And either honour win or honour yield.
This said, they went together to the fight,
And on them presently the Trojans fell.
There was no place for victory to light,
So close they fought on both sides and so well.

And such a mighty cloud of dust they raise,
As, when great winds contend upon the plain,
Is in dry weather raised from the ways;
While one to kill another takes great pain.
And horrid of the squadrons was the sight,
That bristled was all over with great spears.
Their armours, shields, and helmets, with their light
Dazzled the eyes, and clamour fill'd the ears.
Hard-hearted had he been that with dry eyes
Had this affliction of the heroes seen,
That from the sons of Saturn did arise,
And but for their dissention had not been:
For Jupiter for Hector was and Troy,
And meant to honour Thetis and her son;
But not th' Achæan army to destroy.
But Neptune moved with compassion
To see the Argives by the Trojans slain,
And angry with his brother, secretly
In likeness of a man rose from the main
T' encourage them and give them victory.
Though they were brothers, yet Jove of the two
The elder and the wiser was, so that
Neptune against Jove's will durst nothing do
In favour of the Greeks distress'd, but what
He thought might be effected privily.
And thus the saw, from brother unto brother,
Of cruel war was drawn alternately,
And many slain of one side and the other.
And now half gray came in Idomeneus

With lusty Cretans, and the Trojan frighted.
For presently he slew Othryoneus,
Othryoneus that was by fame invited
To purchase honour in the war at Troy,
And promis'd, if Cassandra he might wed,
From Ilium to drive the Greeks away.
Which Priam to him granted if he sped.
And in this hope, strutting he went to fight.
There with his spear Idomeneus him smote.
The spear upon his belly just did light,
And down he fell; his armour sav'd him not.
Idomeneus, insulting o'er him, spake:
Othryoneus, great praise you'll win indeed,
If you can do what you did undertake.
Come fight for us, and you shall no worse speed.
For if you for us win the town of Troy,
Atrides' fairest daughter yours shall be.
Come with me to the Greeks, that there we may
Upon the wedding articles agree.
And then to be reveng'd Asius meant,
And was on foot, although his horses there,
Breathing upon his back, behind him went.
And at Idomeneus had thrown his spear,
But that to throw he time enough had not;
Because the other made the greater haste,
And with his spear had hit him in the throat,
And out again at's neck the point had pass'd.
And there, as some great oak or poplar tree,
Or pine cut down, that by a ship-wright must

Be saw’d in planks, falls down, so fell down he,
Grasping with both his hands the bloody dust.
The charioteer was so amaz’d thereat,
That he forgot to turn his car with fear,
And quiet sat. Antilochus saw that,
And going nearer, at him threw his spear,
Which through his armour and his belly went,
And gasping, fell to th’ ground the charioteer.
Antilochus to the ships his horses sent,
And by the Argives now possess’d they were.
And then Deiphobus himself advanc’d
And at Idomeneus he threw his spear,
Which, grazing only on his buckler, glanc’d
Unto the Argives that behind him were.
For as he saw it come, he sunk and hid
His body all under his shield of brass.
Yet not from out his hand depart it did
In vain; for with it slain Hypsenor was.
Deiphobus then crowing said, So, so,
Asius goes not unreveng’d to hell.
And though the place unpleasant be, I know
To have such company will please him well.
Antilochus then to the body came,
And kept the Trojans off from stripping it.
Mecistes and Alastor bore the same
Upon their shoulders to the Argive fleet.
Idomeneus still like a fury went
To kill more Trojans, or himself be kill’d.
And for the Argives thought his life well spent.

Aloathous then met him on the field,
Who was a suitor to Hippodamie,
Anchises' eldest daughter, and the best
Beloved by her parents both was she,
And of her time exceeded all the rest
In beauty, and in curious work, and wit,
And a fit consort for the best of Troy.
But Neptune now on purpose bound his feet,
And from his eyes, though bright, took sight away,
So that he could not fly, nor turn, nor fight,
But fixed stood, like to a post or tree;
And by Idomeneus, with Neptune's might,
Pierced through the armour and the breast was he,
And through the heart, as plainly did appear.
For as he bleeding on the ground did lie,
The beating of his heart did shake the spear;
And Mars took from him all his chivalry.
Idomeneus then crowed mightily.
Deiphobus, said he, is't not enough
That for your one man I have killed three?
If not, come on, and take a better proof
Of what the seed of Jove in war can do.
For Jove got Minos, and Deucalion he.
He me, and I whole shiploads bring of woe
To Troy, unto thy father, and to thee.
This said, Deiphobus considered
Whether to stay and meet him hand to hand,
Or see by whom he might be seconded.
And at the rear he saw Æneas stand.

For he not much good will did Priam bear,
Who small respect unto his virtue paid.
To him Deiphobus approaching near,
Æneas, now, said he, you must us aid.
Your brother-law, Alcathous, is kill'd,
Who oftentimes has fed you with his hand,
And naked will be left upon the field
B' Idomeneus, unless you him withstand.
This said, t' Idomeneus they came away,
And with him greedy were to enter fight.
And he as boldly did their coming stay;
Though two to one, they did not him affright.
But as a boar in unfrequented place,
By dogs and men pursu'd, stands sullenly,
Knowing his strength, and looks them in the face,
Bristled his back, and flaming is his eye;
So for Æneas staid Idomeneus,
And to his fellows call'd; Ascalaphus,
Meriones, Antilochus, and Aphareus,
Good men of war, and you, Deipyrus,
Come hither friends, said he. I coming see
Æneas towards me with mighty rage,
A valiant man at arms you know is he,
And now is in the flower of his age.
Were I so young, and of the mind I am,
I'd honour win of him or he of me.
This said, they quickly all about him came
Æneas to repel or kill. Then he
Call'd Paris to him, and Agenor, and

Deiphobus, the Argives to oppose,
And all of them of Trojans had command,
And with their spears behind him marched close.
As when a shepherd leads with a green bough
His sheep from off the pasture to the brook,
Is joy'd to see them follow him; so now
Æneas in his troops great pleasure took.
No sooner they were come unto the ground
Whereon Alcathous his body was,
But close they fought, and hideous was the sound
Of helmets, shields, and mighty arms of brass.
And there the two that far excell'd the rest,
Æneas and Idomeneus, would fain
Have fix'd their spears in one another's breast.
First threw Æneas, but he threw in vain,
For by Idomeneus declin'd it was,
And coming to the ground stuck trembling there.
And then threw he and killed Œnomaus,
And pierced was his belly with a spear,
Who falling filled both his hands with dust.
Idomeneus pull'd out again his spear,
But to take off his arms he durst not trust
Himself, so many lances flying were.
His limbs and feet not supple were and light
To throw or shun a spear. They now were past
Their best, yet good were in a standing fight,
But could not from the battle run so fast.
And as he slowly walked off the field,
Deiphobus, that always bore him spite,

A spear threw at him, but him miss'd, and kill'd
Ascalaphus, son of the God of fight,
And on his hands into the dust fell he.
But Mars yet knew not that his son was dead,
For in the golden clouds, by Jove's decree,
With all the other Gods prohibited
To meddle in the battle, quiet sat.
About Ascalaphus the strife was all,
And first Deiphobus his helmet gat,
But forc'd he was again to let it fall,
For in the arm he then receiv'd a wound,
Which by Meriones was to him sent,
Who quickly took the helmet from the ground,
And with it back unto the Argives went.
Deiphobus was by Polites (who
His brother was) borne forth unto his car,
And bleeding in his car the town into.
But still upon the field went on the war,
And Aphareus there wounded in the throat
Was by Æneas' spear, wherewith his head
On one side hanging, shield and helmet brought
Down with him to the earth. There lay he dead.
And Thoon by Antilochus was slain,
That to him turn'd his back and meant to fly;
For by the spear in two was cut the vein
Which all along the back to th' neck doth lie,
And down he fell. Antilochus stepp'd in
To strip him; but the foes about him round
Threw at him spears, but never touch'd his skin,

Although his shield received many a wound.
For he was well defended on each side
By Neptune, who unto him bore good will,
Because he ne'er would from the fight abide,
And 'mongst the foes his spear was flying still.
But as his spear at one he aiming stood,
He by Asiades observed was,
Who to him came, as near as well he could,
And threw his spear, whereof one half did pass
Clean through Antilochus his shield, and stuck
Therein; but th' other half fell to the ground,
For Neptune him preserv'd from that ill luck.
So 'scap'd Antilochus without a wound.
And Adamas retir'd into the rout,
Meriones sent after him a spear,
Which ent'ring at his hinder parts, came out
Beneath his navel, and above his gear,
Where wounds most fatal are. Then down he falls,
And like a cow that by the horns is tied
By strength of swains, a little while he sprawls,
But with the plucking out the spear he died.
And then the son of Priam, Helenus,
With a broad sword in hand, all steel of Thrace,
Upon the helmet smote Deipyrus,
Who there fell down and died upon the place.
The Greeks took up the helmet at their feet;
And griev'd thereat was Menelaus so,
That up he went with Helenus to meet,
Shaking his spear. The other draws his bow,

And on the breast-plate hit was Menelaus;
But off the arrow flew, like chaff which fann'd
Is from the corn. But th' other wounded was,
Just where he held the bow, quite through the hand,
And dragging hand and spear, himself withdrew
Into the Trojan troops; where from the wound
The heavy spear his friend Agenor drew,
And in a woollen bandage wrapp'd it round,
Which in his hand a servant held hard by.
And then Pisandrus went to Menelaus,
Betray'd thereto by cruel destiny,
For to have slain him in great hope he was,
And when they were to one another nigh,
First Menelaus threw his spear, but wide.
At him Pisandrus then his spear lets fly;
But passage being at the shield denied,
Beneath the brazen point in twain it crack'd.
Then to him with his sword went Menelaus,
And he to Menelaus with an ax,
Which cover'd with his buckler ready was,
And on his helmet crest then fell the stroke;
But he Pisandrus with his keen sword hit
Upon the forehead near the nose, which broke
The bone, and carried present death with it;
His eyes unto the ground fell in the blood.
Atrides kick'd him as o' th' ground he lay,
Then stripp'd him of his arms, and o'er him stood,
Insulting and reproaching those of Troy.
Thus, thus, said he, proud Trojans, you'll at last

Be taught to quit our ships, and have your fill
Of bloody war, and pay for what is past.
You thought, ye dogs, too little was the ill,
Against the laws of hospitality
To steal away my goods, and wedded wife;
But further will (if in your pow'r it lie)
Deprive the Argive princes all of life,
And burn their ships, although no injury
I ever did you. But I hope ye shall
Your greediness of fighting satisfy.
But father Jove, who, men say, art of all
The Gods most wise, all this proceeds from you,
That to the Trojans, false and insolent,
More favour shew than to the just and true;
So that with peace they never are content.
Of everything there is satiety.
Of sleep, of love, of dance, and pleasant song,
And all men else with war may cloyed be:
Only the Trojans still for fighting long.
This said, the armour to the ships he sent,
And 'mongst the foremost Greeks again he fought.
And there Harpalion unto him went
(Who t' Ilium was by his father brought,
But brought from thence again he never was)
And at him throws his spear, and hits his shield
Right in the midst; but through it could not pass,
The stubborn brass unto it would not yield.
Missing his purpose, he the field forsook,
And fearing to be slain, look'd still about

Until an arrow keen him overtook,
Sent from Meriones, that pass'd throughout
From buttock unto bladder. Then he sat
Expiring 'mongst the Trojans, his good friends,
And lay like to a worm benumbed, that
Upon the ground itself at length extends.
The Paphlagonians of him had a care,
And, sorry for him, carried him to Troy.
His father weeping followed the car,
But how to be revenged saw no way.
And Paris then with anger was possest,
And 'mongst the Argives lets an arrow fly,
For of Harpalion he had been the guest,
And well received in Paphlagonie.
Amongst the Argives one Euchenor was,
The son of Polydus, an aged prophet,
That knew full well how things would come to pass
Before the town of Troy, and told him of it.
You must, said he, at home by sickness die,
Or going with the Greeks, at Troy be slain.
But for all that the young man valiantly
Went with the Greeks; but ne'er came home again,
Though he behav'd himself with caution there,
In hope t' avoid both danger and diseases.
But Paris shot him 'twixt the cheek and ear,
And on his eyes there death and darkness seizes.
Thus keenly fought they here; but Hector yet
Knew not the Trojans that were fighting at
The left hand of the host were so beset,

For if he had perhaps been told of that,
He might have given the Greeks the victory;
Such courage Neptune gave unto them there.
And sometimes by his strength immediately
In battle fighting they assisted were.
But Hector yet was where he first made way,
Breaking the Argive ranks, and wall, and gate,
Where of Protesilaus the good ships lay,
And those of Ajax next unto them sate;
Where low the wall and sharpest was the fight.
Th' Epeians, Pthians, and Ionians,
Bœotians, Locrians, all oppose their might
To Hector's Trojans, Dardans, Lycians,
And led were by good men. Th' Athenians
By Menestheus, Bias, Phidas, Stichius.
Meges the leading had of th' Epians,
And with him Amphion and Dracius.
Medon and Meneptolemus brought on
The Pthians. Medon was Ajax's brother,
And of Oileus the natural son,
Not gotten by his wife, but by another.
His wife was call'd Eriopis. And he
For killing of her brother forced fled,
To save himself, to th' town of Phylacie,
Where Meneptolemus was born and bred.
And so the Phthian leaders were these two,
And 'mongst the chief of the Bœotians, sought
To keep the Trojans from approaching to
The Argive ships, to burn them as they thought.

But Ajax the swift, son of Œleus,
Not all this while departed from the side
Of Ajax, son of Telamonius,
But as two oxen which the ground divide
Go tugging of the plough with one consent,
Till underneath their horns their foreheads sweat,
So labouring in the field together went
Yok'd, both the little Ajax and the great.
But Telamonius was followed
With good companions, who, when there was cause,
His mighty buckler for him carried.
The other destitute of followers was,
For none but Locrians to the war he led,
Who have no use of bucklers when they fight,
Nor spears, nor helmets, that defend the head;
But came to Troy with bows and arrows light,
And in a standing fight durst not abide.
But from behind the Argive ranks unseen,
They Hector and his Trojans terrified
Incessantly with showers of arrows keen,
Whilst from the front with spears they plagued were.
The Trojans' courage then was so allay'd,
That into Troy they all had run for fear,
But that Polydamas to Hector said,
Hector, you are a man uncounselable.
Because in deeds of arms you so excel,
You think yourself in counsel too much able,
As if all virtues must in one man dwell.
The Gods to some have given well to fight,

And others with the muses they have graced;
Others with dance the people to delight;
And in the mind of others wisdom placed,
The fruit whereof by many is enjoy'd:
It cities saves, as they that have it know,
Which quickly would without it be destroy'd,
But what we are to do I'll tell you now,
The war now lieth only on your hand;
For since we pass'd the wall, some quite give o'er,
And armed as they were do idle stand,
And th' enemy than ours that fight are more.
Therefore retire, and call the princes hither,
That it may be determin'd by them all,
Upon mature deliberation, whether
Upon the Argives at their ships to fall
(If so it please the Gods) or otherwise,
Since Ajax there resolved is to stay,
How with most safety we may hence arise,
For they are in our debt for yesterday.
So said Polydamas, and Hector thought
The counsel not amiss, and straight obey'd.
And armed from his chariot leapt out,
And standing on the ground unto him said,
Polydamas, stay you, and here detain
The Trojan chiefs, while to the fight I go,
And give some orders there; I shall again
Be with you quickly, when I have done so.
He miss'd Deiphobus, and Helenus,
And valiant Adamas, Asiades,

And Asius, the son of Hyrtacus,
And went about the field to look for these;
Of which some wounded were retir'd to Troy,
And some in battle by the Argives kill'd;
But found his brother Paris in his way,
Encouraging his men upon the field,
And spake unto him, in ill language, thus:
Unlucky Paris, fine man, lover keen,
Where are Deiphobus, and Helenus,
And Adamas? Where are they to be seen?
And what is of Othryoneus become?
And where is Asius? Now certainly
Down to the ground burnt will be Ilium,
And thou a miserable death wilt die.
So Hector said, and Paris thus replied:
Hector, there was for such words now no cause.
Sometimes perhaps you may me justly chide.
I do not think a coward born I was,
For since unto the ships you brought the war,
We with the Greeks perpetually have fought.
But those you miss slain by the Argives are,
Save that Deiphobus was carried out,
And Helenus, both wounded in the hand.
Now lead us on to what part you think fit;
We ready are to do what you command,
As far as strength of body will permit.
This said, his brother reconciled was,
And both went to where cruelly they fought.
About Cebriones, Polydamas,

Orthæus, Polyphœtes, and about
Phalces and Palmes, and the children two,
Ascanius, Moris, of Hippotion,
Who Ilium but the day before came to,
And now to th' battle went by Jove set on.
As when a storm of wind falls on the plain,
The sea erects itself in ridges white,
And foaming rolls in order on the main;
So to the Greeks, with helmets shining bright,
The Trojans one another followed
In order with their captains to the fight,
And Hector, like another Mars, at th' head,
With buckler round and strong, and armour bright.
His buckler he before him held far out,
That cover'd was his body with the same,
And peeping under it he look'd about,
And in that posture to the Argives came.
And at the foremost ranks went here and there
To try if through them he could passage make;
But fast they stood, nor at it troubled were;
And Ajax seeing it, unto him spake,
Come nearer, man. Why think you to affright
The Greeks? We are not so unus'd to war.
Nor are we driven hither by your might;
But by the hand of Jove afflicted are.
Hector, I know, to burn our ships you think;
But we have hands as good the ships to save,
And Troy will first, I think, int' ashes sink.
And shortly, I believe, you'll wish to have

And pray to Jove and all the pow’rs on high
For horses that run faster than hawks fly,
That from the ships you may go speedily.
This said, an eagle dexter presently
Flew over them. And they Jove’s prodigy
Received gladly with a mighty cry.
Then thus to Ajax Hector did reply.
Ajax, you love to prate and brag and lie.
that the son of Jove as sure were I,
And had been certainly conceived by
Juno, Jove’s wife, and as a Deity
Like Pallas and Apollo ne’er to die,
As I am sure great woe will fall this day
Upon the Argives all and then be kill’d,
If for the coming of my spear thou stay,
And dogs and kites shall eat thee in the field.
This said, he led away. The Trojans shout,
So do the Argives, and resolv’d to try
The power of their foes with courage stout.
The noise on both sides went up to the sky.

LIB. XIV.

Now Nestor with Macaon drinking sat,

AND HEARD THE Greeks and Trojans fighting roar,
And to him said: Macaon, hear you that?
The noise is greater much than ’twas before.
Juno, by the help of Venus, layeth Jove asleep, whilst Neptune assisteth the Greeks.
Let Hecamede o’er the fire set water,
And wash away the blood from off your sore,
While I go hence and see what is the matter.
But at the wine sit you still as before.
This said, he took up Thrasymedes’ shield,
And Thrasymedes, his son, took up his,
And with a good sharp spear went to the field;
And going forth, a shameful sight he sees,
The Trojans chasing, while the Argives fly,
And down unto the ground was torn their wall.
And then, as when a wave is raised high
By secret gales, on neither side can fall,
Until some certain and prevailing wind
Commandeth in the air: so Nestor stood,
And with two thoughts distracted was his mind.
Sometimes to go t’ Atrides he thought good,
And sometimes to the battle. But at last

Resolved, unto Agamemnon goes,
Whilst shields and helmets, all the way he past,
Resounded in his ears with frequent blows.
And as he went, the wounded chiefs he met,
Ulysses, Agamemnon, Diomed.
For far off from the fight the ships were set,
And close unto the shore lay at a head.
Only the foremost haul'd were to the plain,
And close astern of those was built the wall.
For with so many ships they cross'd the main,
That near the field they could not place them all.
But side-by-side along the shore they lay,
And took up all the compass of the bay.
The wounded men, to look upon the fray,
Help'd by their spears, went softly on the way,
Griev'd at the heart, and met with Nestor there,
Who, with his coming, made them more afraid.
And when unto them Nestor was come near,
Then Agamemnon spake, and to him said:
Nestor, glory of the Argive nation,
I am afraid that Hector will make good
That which he promised once in his oration,
Before the Trojans, when he boasting stood.
I never will to Troy come back, said he,
Till I have slain these Greeks, and set on fire
Their ships. And now performed it will be.
Oh, strange! Do all the other Greeks conspire
Against me with Achilles, Thetis' son,
And therefore are resolved not to fight?

’Tis plain, said Nestor, some such thing is done,
Else Jove himself could not with all his might
Have made such work. The wall is broken down,
In which, to save ourselves we did confide;
And at the ships they fight, nor was it known,
Nor could it be observed on which side
The Greeks that fighting were, were most distrest,
So thick to th’ ground in ev’ry part they fall.
But let’s consult what course to take were best,
If counsel can do any thing at all.
But that we all should fight I’ll not advise.
For what can wounded men in battle do?
To Nestor, Agamemnon then replies, —
Nestor, since now the war is brought unto
Our ships, and that, nor wall, nor trench does good,
And much the Argives suffer’d have who thought
Their wall for all the Trojans would have stood,
And all our hopes built on it come to nought.
For though I know Jove once was to us kind,
Yet now I see our ruin he designs,
And pleasure takes in changing of his mind,
And aids the Trojans whilst our hands he binds.
Let’s all to what I saying am agree.
The ships that nearest lie to the sea-side,
Drawn down into the water let them be,
And there till night let them at anchor ride.
And if the Trojans then give over fight,
We’ll fetch away the rest. For ’tis less shame
A danger to eschew, although by night,

Than needlessly to perish in the same.
Ulysses frowning on him then replied:
Atrides, what a word have you let fall?
You ought of cowards to have been the guide,
And not of us Achæans general.
For we by Jove are fram'd for actions high,
And to achieve the wars we undertake,
How dangerous soever, or to die.
And must we now the siege of Troy forsake,
And after so much labour lost go hence?
Peace! let no other Greek hear what you say.
Who would have said this that had common sense,
And whom so great an army did obey?
Nor is, in how to fly, your counsel right.
Must we our ships draw down from off the shore,
And at the same time with the Trojans fight,
Who now rejoice, but would do then much more,
And we that fight be utterly destroy'd?
For they that were at anchor on the main
Would go their way the danger to avoid.
Thus by your counsel we should all be slain.
Atrides to him then this answer gave:
Ulysses, your reproof is very smart;
Yet not command but counsel 'twas I gave,
And better I would hear with all my heart.
And so you shall, said Diomed, and though
Amongst you all the youngest man I be,
Be not offended with it. For you know
That born I am of a good family.

For Portheus three worthy sons begat,
In Calydon and Pleuron they all dwelled;
Melas, and Agrius, and Œneus, that
The other two in deeds of arms excelled.
Of him my father, Tydeus, was the son,
But in exile at Argos led his life,
And of Adrastus' daughters married one,
And great possessions had he with his wife;
And there a rich and noble house did keep.
For corn, and wine, and fruit he had much ground,
And in his pastures had great store of sheep,
And chiefly was for chivalry renown'd.
Therefore, my counsel, if you find it good,
You should not for my person take amiss,
Since I dare fight and am of noble blood.
The counsel I shall give you now is this:
Let ev'ry man unto the battle go,
And place the wounded out o'th' reach o'th' shot,
That they encourage may against the foe,
Those discontented men that fight would not.
This said, they went together to the fight,
Which, Neptune spying, did not idle stand,
But, like unto an aged man in sight,
Came in, and took Atrides by the hand.
Achilles' heart, said he, now leaps to see
The slaughter of the Argives, and the flight,
And joys therein, so little wit has he.
May death and shame upon him for it light!
Atrides, do not all the Gods mistrust,

For sure I am you'll aided be by some,
And see the Trojans fill the air with dust,
As from your ships they fly to Ilium.
This said, amongst the Greeks he went about,
And loud, as if nine or ten thousand men
Together on a plain had made a shout,
He shouted, and the Greeks took heart again.
Now Juno standing on Olympus high,
Her brother 'mongst the Argives saw with joy,
And Jove on Ida with an angry eye;
And in her mind consid'ring was which way
To cozen him. And was resolv'd, at last,
To go to Ida to him finely drest,
And after she had by him been embrac'd,
To bind him fast, in gentle sleep to rest.
Then went she to her chamber, which her son
Vulcan had for her made, with door-posts high,
And solid doors, which of the Gods not one
Could open but herself, such mystery
Was in the lock and key. Then went she in,
And fast she lock'd the door, and there alone
She with ambrosia cleans'd her dainty skin,
Till not a speck unmeet was left thereon.
Then 'noints herself with sweet ambrosian oil,
That as unto the house of Jove she went,
The scent thereof diffus'd was all the while
Throughout the space 'twixt th' earth and firmament.
Then comb'd and plaited she her golden hair,
And cloth'd herself with her ambrosian vest,

And many figures on't embroid'red were,
And with gold buttons button'd at her breast.
A hundred tassels at her girdle hung.
And wore a precious pendant at her ear
Of three rich gems. And over all she flung
A dainty scarf, by which they cover'd were.
Then on her tender feet she tied her shoes.
And when herself she fully had array'd
From out her chamber presently she goes,
And Venus took aside and to her said,
Sweet child, I come a favour to request;
But tell me, will you grant it, yea or nay.
I fear you bear me ill will in your breast,
'Cause I for th' Argives am, and you for Troy.
And Venus to her answer made and said,
Juno, Jove's sister, do not from me hide
Your mind, which to my power shall be obey'd.
Juno to Venus then again replied,
Lend me Desire and Love, by which you tame
Both mortal men and the immortal Gods.
For to Oceanus I going am,
And Tethys, far from hence, that are at odds.
For when beneath the earth Jove Saturn sent,
I was by them receiv'd and cherished.
But now with one another discontent,
They will not come together in one bed.
If by this means I him can get within
Love's arms again, no jar shall them divide,
And I from both shall love and honour win.

And Venus then again to her replied,
Juno, Jove's wife and sister, your request
Cannot by me, nor ought to be denied.
And as she spake, she from about her breast
The fine enchanting girdle straight untied;
Wherein embroid'red were love and desire,
Soothing, and comfort, that sufficient were,
A heart, though very wise, to set on fire.
And to her hands she puts it, and said, Here,
Take it. There's nothing wanting that you need
When you would have a man or God beguiled.
Put it but in your bosom, you will speed.
So Juno did, and as she did it smiled.
And to the house of Jove then Venus goes.
But Juno o'er Æmathia, and all
Pierra, and all the Thracian snows,
And never on the ground her foot lets fall.
And from the mountain Athos o'er the deep,
And came to Lemnos where king Thoas sway'd.
And there she met the gentle God of sleep.
And took him by the hand, and to him said,
Sweet Sleep, to whom both men and Gods all bow,
If ever with my will you did comply,
Deny not what I shall request you now.
Diffuse sound sleep a while upon Jove's eye,
As soon as he with love is satisfied.
And I will thank you for it whilst I live.
And from my hand you shall receive beside,
A chair of beaten gold which I'll you give;

Vulcan my son shall make it curiously,
Together with a foot-stool for your foot.
And Sleep to Juno then made such reply,
As if he were afraid and durst not do't.
Juno, said he, if 'twere another God,
Though Ocean the great sire of them all,
I durst upon his eyes have softly trod.
But not on Jove's, unless he for me call.
Your order once, like this, I did obey
Before, when Hercules, Jove's mighty son,
Went off to sea after he conquer'd Troy.
Meanwhile the strong unruly Winds set on
By you, with mighty blasts at sea arose,
And from his best friends hurried him in pain,
And at the last threw him ashore at Coos.
But Jupiter, when he awoke again,
The Gods at home he all tost up and down,
And chiefly would of me have had a sight.
Into the sea then sure I had been thrown,
But that I fled, and was conceal'd by Night,
Till of his anger blunted was the edge.
For Night great power has with Gods and men,
And loth was Jove to break her privilege.
T'encourage him then Juno said again,
D'ye think Jove will as angry be for Troy,
As he was then for Hercules his son?
But go. Pasiphae you shall enjoy;
She's fair and young, and of my Graces one,
And with you as a wife shall always stay.

Content, said Sleep; but I will have you swear
By Styx. Come, on the earth now one hand lay,
The other on the sea, that witness bear
May all the Gods below, that Juno will
Give me the Grace Pasiphae to wife,
And that as wife she shall dwell with me still,
That love her dearly as I do my life.
Then Juno, as she was required, sware
By all the subtartarian Gods, by name
The Titans and the brood of Saturn are.
And then together both from Lemnos came
To Lectos, at the foot of Ida hill,
And o'er the woods upward their way they took.
But out of sight of Jove there Sleep stood still;
And as they went the wood below them shook.
Then Sleep went up into a high fir tree,
And there he sat in likeness of a fowl,
All cover'd o'er with boughs and leaves was he,
Call'd Chalcis by the Gods, by us an owl.
Juno went on to Gargarus, where Jove
Saw her and met her with no less desire
Than when the first time to enjoy her love
Without their parents' knowledge he lay by her.
And Jove then standing by her very near,
What made you from Olympus come, said he,
Neither your car nor horses have you here.
Deceitfully then to him answer'd she,
I going am upon a visit now
To th' father and the mother of the Gods,

Oceanus and Tethys; who, you know,
Did bring me up. For now they are at odds,
And angry he abstaineth from her bed.
But if I can I reconcile them will.
The horses that me brought unharnessed
Attend me at the foot of Ida hill.
But that I from Olympus hither came,
Was that I would not such a journey take,
And not make you acquainted with the same.
This said, to Juno Jove again thus spake.
You may, said he, at any time do that,
But let us now with love ourselves delight.
For never yet upon my heart love sat
For woman or for Goddess with such might.
Not when upon the wife of Ixion
The wise Perithous I did beget;
Nor when the fair maid Danae I won
That brought forth godlike Perseus; nor yet,
When by Europa I two children got,
Minos and Rhadamant, both famous men,
For her; nor Semele, when I begot
Bacchus, man's joy; nor for Alcmena, when
I Hercules begot, my lusty boy;
Nor Ceres, Leto, nor yourself till now,
So much I long your beauty to enjoy.
Fierce Cronides, then answered Juno, how?
On Ida top, for some o' th' Gods to spy,
And tell it to the rest to make them sport?
Then so ashamed of it shall be I,

That I shall never after come to court.
You have a chamber without chink or hole,
Made you by Mulciber, my son, whereat
Neither the sun nor any living soul
Can peep. Go thither if you will do that.
And Jove to Juno then again replied.
That man or God shall see us do not fear;
With such a cloud of gold I will us hide,
As to the Sun himself we'll not appear.
This said, within his arms his wife he caught,
Whilst under them the Earth made to arise
Great store of saffron, hyacinth, and lote.
There pleased Jupiter with Juno lies,
Closely concealed in a cloud of gold.
Away went Sleep unto the Argive fleet,
And speaking there to Neptune said, Be bold,
And help the Greeks awhile. Jove cannot see't.
I clos'd his eyes as he by Juno lay.
He'll soon awake; but help the Greeks till then,
Who now before the Trojans dare not stay.
This said, Sleep went amongst the tribes of men,
And Neptune to the Argive ranks, and cried, —
Shall Hector think to get the victory
Because Achilles is not on our side?
No. Of Achilles little need would be
If every man would his companion cheer.
But now the counsel I shall give obey:
Arm every man himself with a good spear,
And shield, and helmet strong, and come away,

And follow me. I'll lead you to the field.
Hector, though bold, my coming will not stay.
But let the best man take the largest shield,
And to a weaker put his own away.
This said, well pleased were the Argives all;
The wounded princes arm'd themselves each one;
King Agamemnon first, the general;
Ulysses and Tydides then put on
Their arms, and every way the field they range,
Surveying men and arms; and all along
Make weak men with their betters armours change,
And give their heavy arms to men more strong.
Thus armed all, and Neptune at the head,
Who with a great and long sword in his hand,
Went brandishing as if 't had lightened,
To th' fight they go; no man durst him withstand.
And Hector, with the Trojans well array'd,
On th' other side came on. And then began,
Betwixt the Greeks that had the God for aid,
And those of Troy led by a valiant man,
A cruel fight. And high the sea arose
Up to the ships and tents. And presently,
With Alalaes the mighty armies close;
And up unto the heavens went the cry.
So loud as now, the sea did never roar,
When beaten 'twas int' heaps by Boreas;
Nor wind, when in the woods great oaks it tore
Up by the roots, nor th' wood when fir'd it was.
And here did Hector first begin the fight,

And at the greater Ajax threw his spear,
Which hit him; but upon two belts did light,
Which one upon another lying were, —
One of his sword, the other of his shield.
Hector was angry that in vain he flung,
For he was in great hope he had him kill'd,
And now retired backward to the throng.
Then Ajax in his hand took up a stone,
Of those to which the Greeks their ships did tye,
For there amongst their feet lay many a one,
And at him, as he parted, lets it fly;
And as a top he made it flying spin.
It but a little o'er his buckler flew,
And hit him 'twixt his buckler and his chin,
Upon the breast, and to the ground him threw.
As when an oak is overthrown by thunder,
Which known is eas'ly by the brimstone smell,
Men look upon't with horror and with wonder;
So gazed they at Hector when he fell.
And from his hands went out both shield and spear,
And helmet from his head; and with great cry
The Greeks rush on, and in fair hope they were
To gain his body, and their spears let fly.
But all in vain. For by Polydamas,
Divine Æneas, and Agenor, and
Sarpedon, and by Glaucus sav'd he was,
Who all before him with their bucklers stand.
His friends then from the battle him convey'd
Unto his chariot and charioteer,

That close behind the squadrons for him stay'd,
And in his car tow'rds Ilium him bear.
But at the ford of Xanthus, by the way,
They poured water on his face, and then,
In little time, as on the ground he lay,
He breath'd, and came unto himself again.
Then sitting on his knees, he cast up blood;
And backward fell unto the ground again:
Upon his eyes again the darkness stood,
For of the stroke remained still the pain.
The Greeks, as soon as they saw Hector gone,
Took heart, and on the Trojans fiercer were.
Then Ajax, of Oileus the son,
Slew Satnius, son of Enops, with his spear.
His mother, Neis, was a very fine
Nymph of the river Satnius. Of the same,
Enops upon the bank sat keeping kine,
And on her got a son called by that name.
Him Ajax now struck through the flank and slew;
Then for the body there was much ado.
At him Polydamas a spear then threw,
Which Prothoenor's shoulder pierced through.
And on his hands into the dust he fell.
To th' Greeks then, boasting, said Polydamas,
I have not thrown in vain. I know full well
That one Greek or another taken 't has
To lean on as a staff i' th' way to Hell.
At this, the Greeks were griev'd, but specially
The heart of Telamonius did swell.

For Prothoenor slain did near him lie;
And with his spear threw at Polydamas,
Who nimbly leapt aside and it declin'd.
But by Archelocus receiv'd it was,
Antenor's son, whose death the Fates design'd,
Who having on his neck receiv'd the wound,
His forehead, and his eyes, and lips, and nose,
Before his legs or knees came to the ground.
Then Ajax took his turn, and at it crows.
Polydamas, said he, was Prothoenor
As good a man in your own estimation,
As this man that was brother to Antenor,
Or son? For he is not unlike that generation.
This said he, though he well knew who it was.
Then Promachus, as he drew off the dead,
Was killed by a spear from Acamas.
And in it Acamas then gloried.
Argives, said he, great threat'ners as you are
You vulnerable are as well as we,
And no less subject to the chance of war.
How quiet Promachus now lies you see,
And so I hope ere long you all shall lie.
My brother not long unrevenged lay.
'Tis good you see to have a brother nigh.
And when he this had said he went away.
Peneleus then went to throw his spear
At Acamas, but Acamas was gone.
Neptune assisteth the Greeks.
But yet he threw and kill'd another there,

Iliones, of Phorbas th' only son,
A man much favoured by Mercury.
The spear beneath his eyebrow enter'd in,
And to the ground fell down the bloody eye.
The spear went on unto the brain within,
Then sitting down with both his hands outspread,
The deadly spear yet sticking in his eye,
Peneleus with his sword cuts off his head,
Which to the ground with helmet on did fly.
Then looking up, he to the Trojans said,
Tell this in Troy. And let his parents mourn.
For Promochus's wife will not be joy'd,
When we without her husband shall return.
This said, the Trojans stricken were with fear,
And look'd about each one which way to fly.
Now tell me, Muse, who and by whom slain were
When they pursu'd the flying enemy.
Great Ajax first, the son of Telamon,
Killed the Mysian leader, Hyrtius,
Of Gyrtias the strong and valiant son;
Antilochus then killed Mermerus
And Phalces. By Meriones were slain
Hippotion and Morys. Teucer slew
Prothon and Periphetes, good men twain.
At Hyperenor then Atrides threw,
And gave him on the flank a cruel wound,
And where the spear went in, his life went out,
And suddenly he fell unto the ground,
And on his eyes sat darkness all about.

But he that far the greater number slew,
The lesser Ajax was, Oïleus' son.
'Twas hard to scape when Ajax did pursue;
For of the Argives all he best could run.

LIB. XV.

Jupiter awakes and sends away Neptune. Hector chaseth the Greeks again to their ships, and fireth one of them. The acts of Ajax. Which is the fifth battle.

WHEN FLYING THEY had pass'd the ditch and wall,
They at the horses and the chariots stay'd,
With loss of many men, and looking pale.
And Jove, awak'd, stood and the field survey'd,
And saw the Greeks pursue, and Trojans fly,
And Neptune with the Greeks, and Hector laid
Upon the plain, his friends there sitting by,
And not a little of his life afraid,
For gasping he scarce able was to draw
His breath, and blood abundance vomited,
Nor knew his friends. When Jupiter him saw,
Offended his condition pitied.
And then on Juno fiercely look'd and said,
Juno, I see all this is done by you;
And if you for it with a whip were paid,
'Twould be no more than for your work is due.
Have you forgot how once you swung i' th' air,
And had two anvils hanging at your feet,
Your hand with a gold chain tied to my chair?
Though sorry were the other Gods to see't;

Yet had I any seen but go about
Your manacles or shackles to untie,
I from the sill of heaven had thrown him out,
And strengthless made him on the earth to lie.
I was not so much griev'd for Hercules
When Boreas, set on by you, arose
As he went off from Troy, enrag'd the seas,
And at the last threw him ashore at Coos.
But I to Argos brought him safe again.
And this I now repeat, that you may try
Whether you likely are to lose or gain,
Abusing our familiarity.
This said, the Goddess Juno, struck with fear,
By Earth, said she, and Heaven about it spread,
By Styx, which is our greatest oath, I swear,
And by your life, and by our nuptial bed,
I never did to Neptune speak a word,
To hurt the Trojans, or the Greeks to aid;
But all he did was of his own accord,
By pity only and compassion sway'd.
And from henceforward I will him advise,
Seeing what way you lead, the same to take.
Then Jupiter with favourable eyes
On Juno look'd, and thus unto her spake.
Juno, if we were both one way inclin'd,
Neptune would quickly with us both comply.
Now if your words dissent not from your mind,
Go 'mongst the other Gods, and presently
Bid Iris and Apollo to me come.

For Iris unto Neptune I will send,
To bid him leave the battle and go home.
To Hector and the Trojans I intend
To send Apollo, to give Hector might,
And cure him of his pain, that he may lead
Jupiter awakes and sends away Neptune.
The Trojans on, and put the Greeks to flight,
That Thetis' son may see them scattered;
And he shall send Patroclus to the field,
Who shall the Trojans rout and kill my son
Sarpedon, and himself shall then be kill'd
By Hector's spear. And after that is done,
Achilles in revenge again shall fight,
And by his hand stout Hector shall be kill'd
Under the walls of Troy, i' th' Trojans' sight,
And beaten be the Trojans from the field,
Till Troy by Pallas' counsel taken be.
Nor till I have performed all I said
To Thetis, supplicating at my knee,
Let any God presume the Greeks to aid.
This said, went Juno to Olympus high.
As when a man looks o'er an ample plain,
To any distance quickly goes his eye;
So swiftly Juno went with little pain,
And found the Gods at wine together set.
And at her coming in they all stood up.
But Themis forward went and Juno met,
And to her hand delivered the cup,
And said, You look as if you frighted were

By Jupiter for something. But what is't?
You know, said Juno, that he is severe;
And you shall hear the matter if you list,
Together with the other Gods, though bad.
They will not all contented with it be;
But some of them will troubled be and sad.
And griev'd was she, though speaking smilingly.
Then Juno went up to her throne, and sat;
And unto all the Gods spake angrily,
How mad, said she, or foolish are we, that
Are thinking how again Jove's hands to tie,
Who, careless and unmov'd on Ida hill,
Knows his own strength, and does our plots despise.
And therefore what he sends, be't good or ill,
We'll take it patiently, if we be wise.
Nor must the God of war on Jove complain,
Or in rebellion against him rise
Because his son Ascalaphus is slain.
At this, with both his hands Mars clapp'd his thighs,
And to the Gods above complaining said,
Pardon me, Gods; I will revenge my son,
And 'mongst the Argives go and give them aid,
Though I should lie amongst the dead. Then on
He puts his armour, and gives order to
Terror and Flight his chariot to prepare;
And then there had been twice as much ado
T'appease Jove's anger ere it came to war,
If Pallas had not (for the Gods afraid)
Pluck'd off his helmet, and set up his spear,

And pull’d his buckler off, and to him said,
Fool, Bedlam, what! have you no ears to hear?
You hear what news now Juno brings from Jove.
And if you care not though yourself be lost,
Yet let the danger of us all you move.
For Jove will leave both Greek and Trojan host,
And, coming hither, seize us one by one,
And never ask who guilty is or not.
Therefore give over vexing for your son,
For better men than he, by Gods begot,
Already here have been and shall be slain.
The Gods cannot preserve their children all.
This said, she brought Mars to his place again.
And Juno to their houses went to call
Iris and Phœbus. You must go, said she,
To Jove on Ida. What you are to do,
You will by Jove himself informed be,
As soon as you his presence come into.
Her message done, Juno resumes her place,
Iris and Phœbus down to Ida fly,
And finding Jove, stood still before his face.
Nor look’d he on them with an angry eye;
For soon they did his wife’s command obey.
Then speaking first to Iris, Go, said he,
To Neptune quickly, tell him what I say.
Bid him no longer at the battle be,
But either go t’Olympus to the Gods,
Or to the sea. If he will neither do,
Bid him consider if there be no odds

As well in strength as age between us two.
He knows that all the other Gods me fear,
And for my coming dareth none to stay,
As strong as to himself he doth appear.
This said, swift-footed Iris went her way
From Ida hill, and Jove without delay,
And swift as any cloud before the winds,
Came down unto the battle before Troy,
And there amongst the Argives Neptune finds,
And going to his side, I came, said she,
To speak with you a word or two from Jove.
You must not in the war a party be.
He bids you go up to the Gods above,
Or down to th' sea, where lies your own command.
If you refuse, he threatens you with war,
And bids you have a care t'avoid his hand;
And th'elder is, he says, and stronger far,
Which you yourself, he thinks, will not deny,
Since th'other Gods of him stand all in awe.
Neptune to this replying, first spake high:
Good as he is, said he, it is not law,
Thus to usurp upon my liberty.
For sons and heirs of Saturn we were three,
Begot on Rhea. Pluto, Jove, and I.
By lot the rule o' th' waters came to me.
To Jove the government of heaven fell,
And of the clouds, and the ethereal sky.
To Pluto darkness, and the rule of hell.
Earth and Olympus did as common lie.

Let Jove then with his share contented be,
And not encroach on me. For well ’tis known
I hold not any thing of him in fee,
But live as he should do, upon my own.
He should not unto me such language use,
But to his children, that will be afraid,
And dare not what he bids them to refuse.
Thus Neptune spake. Again then Iris said,
Neptune, shall I this haughty answer carry
To Jove? And will you that I with it go
As ’tis? The wise their minds oft vary;
And Furies on the eldest wait you know.
So she to him. Then Neptune thus to her.
Iris, this word was spoken in good season.
Much worth, I see, is a wise messenger.
But I was vex’d, because thus without reason,
When I his equal am by birth and lot,
Jove uses me as if I were his slave.
Well. For the present, cross him I will not,
Though I be vex’d. That answer let him have.
And further, that if he without consent
Of me, Athena, Juno, Mercury,
And Vulcan, Troy shall spare, our discontent
For th’ Argives’ wrong implacable will be.
And when he this had said he fight forbears,
Nor any longer ‘mongst the Argives stay’d,
But div’d into the sea o’er head and ears.
Then Jove unto Apollo spake, and said,
To Hector go; for Neptune now is gone

For fear of my displeasure; had he stay'd,
The sons of Saturn of our war had known.
'Twas wisely done of him my hand t' avoid.
And better both for him and me; but go,
And shaking your great shield, the Greeks affright,
And strengthen Hector, and encourage so
That he the Argive lords may put to flight,
And follow them down to the Hellespont,
And make them for their hollow ships to fight.
What then is to be done? I'll think upon't.
For I intend not to destroy them quite.
Hector chaseth the Greeks again to their ships.
This said, Apollo left his father Jove,
And down he came to Troy from Ida hill,
Swift as a falcon flying at a dove,
And Hector on the ground found sitting still,
Not laid, but to his senses come anew,
And freely breathing, although very weak,
And very well his friends about him knew.
There Phœbus standing nigh did to him speak.
Hector, said he, why sit you here alone?
O, kindest of the Gods, said he, you know
That Ajax wounded has me with a stone,
So that I am disabled with the blow,
And once to-day I thought I should have gone
To Erebus with other shadows dim;
With such a force he threw the mighty stone.
Then thus again Apollo answered him.
Hector, I Phœbus am, and hither come

From Jove, against the Greeks to give you aid,
And ever have wish'd well to Ilium.
Lead to the ships your troops. Be not afraid.
Hector at this encourag'd was again,
And as a horse at rack and manger fed,
Breaking his headstall, scuds upon the plain,
And high into the air he holds his head,
His mane upon his shoulders plays with th' air,
And proud is in his freedom to behold
The pleasant river and the pastures fair,
To which he had accustom'd been of old,
And swiftly to the same is carried;
So swiftly now went Hector to each part,
And in the field his troops encouraged,
After Apollo once had giv'n him heart.
But as when swains with curs to chase a roe,
Go forth into the field, and with their cry
Rouse a fierce lion, they the prey let go
To save itself i' th' woods or rochers high,
And both the men and dogs are forc'd to fly;
Just so the Greeks whilst they in bodies fight,
They save themselves; but seeing Hector nigh,
They troubled were, and lost their courage quite.
Then to them spake Thoas, Andræmon's son,
Well skill'd at distance or at hand to fight.
Amongst th' Ætolians better there was none.
And few compare with him for counsel might.
strange, said he, what wond'rous sight is this!
I verily thought Hector had been slain

By Ajax' hand. But see he risen is.
Some God or other rais'd him has again.
He kill'd us has already many men,
And many more is likely now to slay.
For Jupiter defends him now as then.
But come, let all my counsel now obey.
Let us that most pretend to fortitude
Stay here embattl'd to receive the foe,
And to the ships send back the multitude.
For thither, I think, Hector dares not go:
This counsel was approv'd, and then stood out
Ajax, Idomeneus, Meriones,
Teucer, Meges, and such as were most stout,
And one battalion was made of these,
Th'impression of Hector to sustain,
Till to the ships the rest retreated were.
And Hector with his troops came on amain,
Himself the foremost shaking his long spear.
Apollo march'd before him to the field,
Concealing in a cloud his glorious head,
And carried in his hand a shining shield,
Which whosoever laid his eyes on fled.
'Twas made at first by Mulciber, and then
Given to Jove when he came down to fight
Against the squadrons of rebellious men,
To make them fly the field at the first sight.
Expecting Hector, close the Argives stand,
And loud and sharp on both sides was the cry,
And many a spear from every lusty hand,

And in the air, arrows abundant fly,
And spears; whereof some flying home did kill,
And others would have done, but short they fell.
As long as Phœbus did his shield hold still,
Many a soul on both sides flew to Hell.
When shaking it, he made the Argives see ‘t,
They stricken were with fear and suddenly
Their heavy hearts fell down into their feet,
And then they made all haste they could to fly.
And as a herd or flock is frighted when
A wolf or lion coming on they see,
And no assistance have of dogs or men;
So th’ Argives scatter’d before Hector flee.
Then slain by Hector was Arcesilaus,
And Stichius who the Bœotians led.
The other a good friend of Mnesteus was;
Both killed were by Hector as they fled;
Æneas Medon slew, and Iasus.
Medon was little Ajax’ bastard brother,
And lived from his father Oileus,
By th’ instigation of his stepmother
Eriopis, whose brother he had slain.
And Iäsus th’ Athenian leader was,
But back to Athens led them not again.
His father was Sphelus Bucalidas.
Mecestes slain was by Polydamas.
Polites Echius slew in the first fight,
And Clonius by Agenor killed was;
And Deiochus by Paris in the flight.

Whilst from the foe each one his armour takes,
The flying Greeks into the ditch leap'd all,
And there encumber'd mightily with stakes,
Were forced to retire within the wall.
Then Hector roared to the Trojans, saying,
On to the ships, and let the dead men lie.
I'll be his death whom ever I find staying,
Nor shall he buried be or burned by
His friends and kin, but in the fields of Troy
Be left for dogs to tear and haul about.
This said, unto the ships he drave away,
By th' Trojans follow'd with a mighty shout.
Phœbus before them march'd, and with his foot
Into the trench threw down the earth again,
And made an easy and plain passage through't
As far as one a spear can well hurl, when
He hurleth for a wager. To the wall
The Trojans go, Apollo there again
Before them is, and eas'ly makes it fall,
As children when themselves they entertain
With making pretty things upon the sands,
Then comes into their heads another toy,
And down they push this with their feet or hands;
So easily Apollo did destroy
The Argives' mighty work, and bring the fight
Again unto the ships. Where now they pray'd,
And one another's courage did excite.
Nestor to heav'n held up his hands and said,
Jove, if you the sacrifice accepted have

Of any Greek before he hither came,
And promis'd that the army you would save,
O, at our prayer, now perform the same;
Let us not perish by the Trojans here.
Thus Nestor pray'd, and then Jove thundered,
Declaring that his prayers granted were.
At this the Trojans were encouraged,
And by their hopes interpreting Jove's mind,
Upon the Greeks with greater fury fall.
As when a wave is thrown by some great wind
Into a ship, so pass'd they at the wall,
And to the ships they went with horse and car.
The Greeks went up into their ships to fight,
And with long spears, made for a naval war
And pointed well with brass, and shining bright,
The Greeks and Trojans push at one another,
These mounted stood upon their chari'ts high,
And higher on their black ships stood the other.
Patroclus, that till now sat quietly,
Because the fight was only at the wall,
And to Eurypylus his care applied
And med'cines fit to cure his wounds withal,
And sat discoursing with him by his side,
Now when he saw the Trojans were within,
And of the Argives heard the woful cries,
And saw the fear and danger they were in,
With both his hands then clapped he his thighs.
Eurypylus, said he, I cannot stay;
For mightily increased is th' affray.

Your wound be dressed by your servant may,
But to Achilles I must go away.
Who knows but I may win him at the last
To help the Greeks? This said, away he went,
And left Eurypylus, and made what haste
He could to get unto Achilles' tent.
Meanwhile the victory no way inclin'd.
Neither the Greeks could make the Trojans fly,
Nor yet the Trojans, as they had design'd,
Back from the ships could force the enemy;
But level hung the wings of victory,
As when two scales are charg'd with equal weight,
Made by the art of Pallas curiously,
The beam lies level in the air and straight.
And at one time at divers ships they fought.
Directly unto Ajax Hector went,
And there sharp fighting was one ship about.
Hector to burn, Ajax to save it meant.
Here Ajax, with a long spear in his hand,
Killed Caletor, Hector's brother's son,
As he was coming with a flaming brand
To fire the ship, and died before 'twas done.
This Hector saw, and to his fellows cried,
Trojans and friends, defend the body dead
Of Clytius' son, and shrink not from my side.
And as he spake his long spear from him fled,
Which, aim'd at Ajax, fell on Lycophron,
A man that was to Ajax very dear,
But born at Cythera, and Mastor's son,

That having kill'd a man durst not stay there,
But unto Ajax fled, and with him staid,
Till now by Hector's spear struck through the head
He died. Then Ajax to his brother said,
Teucer, our friend Mastorides is dead.
You know how much we honour'd him at home.
'Tis Hector that has slain him. Where are now
Your deadly arrows? And what is become
Of Phœbus' gift, your so egregious bow?
Which Teucer hearing, quickly with him was
With bow and quiver in his hand, and shot
And slew the servant of Polydamas,
That had the guiding of his chariot,
Clitus by name, who while in vain he sought
By driving to where hottest was the fight,
From Hector and the Trojans thanks t' have got,
The fatal arrow on his neck did light.
Then down he fell. The frighted horses shook
The empty car. Then came Polydamas,
And by the heads the cap'ring horses took,
And sets Astynous in Clytus' place;
And gave him a strict charge to hold them nigh,
But not to come with them into the fight.
Then Teucer lets another arrow fly
At Hector, which if it had hit him right,
He never at the ships again had fought.
But Jupiter was pleas'd to save him now,
And brake the bow-string. Then in vain flew out
The arrow, and into the dust the bow.

And Teucer to his brother made his moan.
Ajax, said he, is't not a wondrous thing?
My bow is started from my hand and gone,
Some God or other broken has the string,
Yet new 'twas made this morning purposely
To last all day. Teucer, said Ajax then,
Cannot you let your bow and quiver lie,
And fight with spear in hand like other men,
And give unto the Greeks encouragement?
No. Though the Gods above should in their hate
To let the Trojans take our ships be bent,
Yet let us sell them at a lusty rate.
Teucer then laid his bow up in his tent,
And arm'd himself with helmet and with shield,
And a good spear, and back to Ajax went,
And found him where he left him in the field.
When Hector saw that Teucer's noble bow
Was useless now, he to his squadrons cried,
Trojans and Lycians, come on boldly now,
For Teucer now his bow hath laid aside.
Jove brake the string. I saw it with these eyes.
For easily it may discerned be
To whom the hand of Jove intends the prize,
And to whom he denies the victory.
And now upon our side he is you see,
And from the Greeks their courage takes away.
Then to the ships let's go courageously,
And let the fear of death no man dismay.
For why should any of us fear to die?

When for his country ’tis, it is no shame.
And if we make the enemy to fly,
Sav’d are his wife and children, goods, and name.
Whilst Hector thus the Trojans did excite,
Ajax unto the Argives spake, and said,
We must now either put our foes to flight,
Or make account we shall be all destroy’d.
If Hector here to burn our ships should chance,
Can you go home again, d’ye think, a-foot?
He calleth on his men; ’tis not to dance,
But fire our ships, if we will let him do’t.
For us ’tis better in close fight to die
Here all at once, or get the victory,
Than here, God knows how long, consuming lie,
And peck in vain at a weak enemy.
Thus Ajax rais’d the courage of th’ Achæans.
Then Hector slew the son of Perimed,
Stichius that had command of the Phocæans.
And Ajax slew Laodamas that led
The Trojan foot, and was Antenor’s son.
And Otus by Polydamas was slain,
Otus, that led the bold Epeians on,
And was a friend of Meges. He again
A spear threw at Polydamas, and miss’d;
For Phœbus kindness had for Panthus’ son,
And with a present wit did him assist
To turn about and let the spear go on,
And Crœsmus there receiv’d it on his breast,
And down he fell. Then Dolops, Lampus’ son,

(Lampus, that was of living men the best,
And grandchild of the King Laomedon)
To be reveng'd, at Meges threw his spear,
Which pass'd his shield, but in his breastplate staid,
(The breastplate which his father used to wear,
With many plies of strong mail overlaid,
And given was to Phyleus by his guest
At Ephyre, wherewith, in martial strife,
From deadly strokes of spears to save his breast,
And of his son it now preserv'd the life),
But Meges Dolops hit upon the head,
And from his crest struck off the goodly main,
Which he but newly then had dyed red.
But Dolops still the fight did well maintain,
Till Menelaus stole unto his side,
And struck him through the shoulder with his spear.
No longer stood he then, but fell and died,
And both of them to strip him going were.
And Hector then call'd out to all his kin,
And unto Menalippus specially,
Who, while the Greeks were absent, lived in
Percote, and took care of th' husbandry,
But when the Argive fleet to Troy was come,
He then return'd his country to defend,
And liv'd in Priam's house at Ilium,
And proud the Trojans were of such a friend,
And lov'd he was by Priam as his son.
And now unto him Hector spake, and said,
Have we for Dolops no compassion,

Or to defend his body are afraid?
Come, follow me. We must no longer play
At distance with the Greeks, but either they
Must utterly deface the town of Troy,
And kill us all, or we them all destroy.
This said, away they both together went
To save the body of their cousin dead;
And Ajax, with a contrary intent,
His Argives to the fight encouraged.
Argives, said he, to honour have an eye,
And of your fellows' censures have a care;
For slain are always more of those that fly
Than those that of base flight ashamed are.
This said, though of it no great need there was
Amongst the Greeks, they presently obey'd,
And at the ships stood like an hedge of brass;
But on came Hector, not at all afraid.
T' Antilochus then Menelaus said,
Amongst us there is none that better can
Both fight and run. Why should you be afraid
To leap unto the throng and kill your man?
This said, away again went Menelaus.
Antilochus leapt out before the rest,
And threw his spear at Menalippus, as
He coming was, and hit him on the breast.
No sooner was he fallen to the ground,
Than to the spoil Antilochus ran in,
As quick as when upon a deer a hound
Runs in, that by the hunter kill'd had been.

But soon as he saw Hector coming on,
As valiant as he was, he durst not stay;
But as some wild beast that had mischief done,
Ere people could assemble, ran away.
The Trojans follow'd him with clamour loud,
And spears abundance after him they threw,
But he ran on, and got into the crowd.
But they unto the ships the Greeks pursue;
For Jupiter to make his promise good
To Thetis, hitherto the Greeks dismay'd,
And in the battle with the Trojans stood,
Until he had performed all he said;
But meant to stay no longer with them, than
To see some Argive ship with fire to shine,
And then to let the Greeks prevail again.
From the beginning such was his design
In aiding Hector, who now furiously
Went on like Mars, or like fire in a wood,
With foam about his mouth, and fire in's eye.
And Jove himself came down, and o'er him stood,
To save him when he was hemm'd in by foes,
And honour him, since 'twas his destiny
That not long after he his life should lose,
And by none but Achilles' hand should die.
Now Hector, looking where the best men stood,
And armed best, tried first to break in there.
Keen as he was, he there could do no good;
So close they join'd to one another were,
And stuck like great stones in a tow'r or rock,

That of the boist'rous winds and billows high
Which break upon it, still endures the shock.
Then Hector other places went to try,
And through he pass'd. Then as a wave high grown,
When in foul weather forced by the wind
Under dark clouds, into a ship is thrown,
The mist and roaring sails bring to the mind
Of the poor seamen nothing but to die;
So frighted were the Greeks. But forward he
Still went; and as when in the meadows by
The river's side thousands of kine there be,
And th' herdsmen see a lion to them come,
But with a wild beast know not how to fight,
Some go before them, and behind them some,
The lion falleth on them in their sight,
Between both ends, and killeth only one,
The rest all fly; so th' Argives all, before
Hector and Jupiter, dispersed run,
But only one was killed, and no more.
And Periphetes 'twas, the worthy son
Of an unworthy father, Copreus, who,
When any labour great was to be done
By Hercules, did from Eurystheus go
As messenger, to carry the commands.
But Periphetes virtue wanted none.
His feet were swift, and valiant were his hands,
A wiser man Mycena had not one.
But slain he was; for as he turn'd to fly,
He trod upon the edge of his own shield,

And overthrown, upon his back did lie;
And with a stab of Hector's spear was kill'd.
His friends, though many standing by him were,
And griev'd to see him fall, did him no good,
For ev'ry one now for himself did fear,
And out of Hector's way kept all he could.
The acts of Ajax.
The Greeks retreated were no further yet,
Than to between the first and second row
Of th' Argive ships; but fore'd that place to quit,
Near to their tents themselves they rally now,
Where Nestor them encouraged again.
Argives, my friends, be valiant now, said he,
And, if at any time, now play the men.
Of one another's censures fearful be.
Besides, by what you should be moved most,
Your parents, children, wives, and goods and land,
Whether you have them still, or have them lost,
I you conjure against the foe to stand.
This Nestor said, the Argives to excite:
And Pallas from them took the mist again,
That they might see who did, who did not fight,
Both at the ships and elsewhere on the plain.
But Ajax Telamonius thought not good
To stay with other Argives in the throng,
But up into a ship he went and stood,
With a ship's spear twenty-two cubits long.
As when a man that taught has been to guide
Four horses at a time, and in his hand

Holdeth their reins while they go side by side,
And people on the way admiring stand,
He from one horse unto another skips,
And makes them run together to the town;
So Ajax o'er the Argives' ranged ships
To save them, and the tents, ran up and down.
And terribly unto the Argives cried
To play the men. Nor Hector 'mongst his troops
Could be persuaded longer to abide;
But suddenly as a black eagle stoops
At a great flock of geese, or cranes, or swans,
So Hector of the Argive ships to one
Flew down, and Jove, with his puissant hands,
Behind him marching, always push'd him on.
Then at the ships the fight began again,
More cruel than before. You would have said
They had no sense of weariness or pain,
So mightily they all about them laid.
The Greeks were in despair of their return.
The Trojans thought the Argive lords to rout,
And all the ships that brought them thither burn.
Thus minded on each side, they fiercely fought.
Upon a ship then Hector laid his hand,
Which brought Protesilaus unto Troy,
But never back unto his native land.
For this good ship they one another slay.
Arrows and darts no longer flew about;
But now with battle-axes of great strength,
In one another's reach they stood and fought,

And with great spears, and of a mighty length,
And great keen swords, whereof from dying hands
Abundance fell on either side to th' ground;
And cover'd were with streaming blood the sands,
That gushed out from many a ghastly wound.
But Hector on the ship his hand held fast,
And to his Trojans call'd aloud for fire.
This day, said he, requites our ill days past;
To burn these ships Jove with us doth conspire.
And set on fire they had been long ago
(For I would gladly at the ships have fought)
But that the senate would not have it so,
And kept both you and me from going out.
But though by Jove then smitten were their hearts,
Yet boldly now himself he leads us on.
This said, the Trojans bravely play their parts,
And with more vigour fought than they had done.
Then on the deck no longer Ajax staid,
So many spears went singing by his head.
For if he there had stood he was afraid
That some unlucky spear would strike him dead;
And to the far side of the ship retreats,
Leaving the deck, which fenceless was and high,
And sat upon one of the rower's seats,
And still upon the Trojans kept his eye.
And thence he from the fire the ship defends,
And terribly on th' Argive heroes calls
To do their best. We have, said he, no friends
Behind to save our lives, nor better walls

Than those we made; nor any city nigh,
That can or willing are our part to take.
But far from home, in hostile ground we lie,
And hemmed in are by the briny lake;
And nothing can redeem us but our hands.
This said, he look'd about him furiously,
To see if any durst approach with brands,
Resolved to kill him that with fire came nigh.
And many to the ship with fire were sent
By Hector; but when they approached near,
Ajax continually did them prevent,
And twelve he killed with his naval spear.

LIB. XVI.

The sixth battle. The acts of Patroclus, and his death.

THUS FIERCELY FOUGHT the Trojans and the Greeks.
And with Achilles was Patroclus now,
With tears abundance running down his cheeks,
Like springs that from a high rock streaming flow.
No sooner him Achilles weeping spied,
But pitied him. Why weep you so, said he,
Like a child running by his mother's side,
And holding by her coat, would carried be?
Bring you some news that none but you can tell?
Menœtius and Peleus still do live
At Phthia with the Myrmidons, and well.
If not, we both have cause enough to grieve.
Or is it that the Greeks are slaughter'd so,
And fall before their ships? 'Tis for their pride!
Speak, what's the matter, that we both may know?
Patroclus, sobbing, to him then replied,
son of Peleus, of all Greeks the best,
Forgive me if in this necessity
I freely speak. They that excel the rest
In prowess, at the ships all wounded lie.
Ulysses wounded is, and Diomed,
And Agamemnon, and Eurypylus,

And cur’d may be, but stand us in no stead;
Nor does your virtue any good to us.
Gods, let never anger in me dwell
Like this of yours. If you cannot, who can
The Trojans from the Argive fleet repel,
And save so many lives? O cruel man!
The noble Peleus sure was not your father;
Born of the Goddess Thetis you were not.
Sprung from the raging sea I think you rather,
And that by some hard rock you were begot.
But if you stand upon some prophecy,
Or Thetis have forbidden you to fight
From Jove, yet send some Myrmidons with me,
That I may to the Argives give some light.
But in your armour let me be array’d,
That when they see me they may think me you,
And back into the city run dismay’d,
And th’ Argives wearied take breath anew.
For long the Trojans have endur’d the fight;
And if fresh enemies they coming see,
With little labour they’ll be put to flight,
And leave the Argive tents and navy free.
The sixth battle.
Thus prayed he, but ‘gainst himself he pray’d,
And rashly sued to cast his life away.
To this Achilles answer made and said,
My dear Patroclus, what is this you say?
I stand not on, nor care for prophecy,
Nor yet by Jove forbidden am to fight;

But at my heart it lieth grievously,
My equal should oppress me by mere might.
A town I won, in which we found great prey;
For my reward the Greeks gave me a maid,
Which Agamemnon from me took away,
Only because more people him obey'd,
As if I were a man of little worth.
But let that pass. Though once I never meant
My Myrmidons should with the Greeks go forth
To battle till the foes were at my tent,
Yet since the Argive ships with such a mist
Of Trojans on the shore environ'd lie,
And th' Argives, wanting room, can scarce resist,
And have the pow'r of Troy for enemy,
Take you my arms, and lead unto the fight
The Myrmidons. The Trojans shall not see
My helmet near to put them in a fright.
If Agamemnon had been just to me,
The ditches had been fill'd with Trojans dead.
But now into the very camp they break;
Nor can resisted be by Diomed.
To save the ships Tydides is too weak.
Nor can that hateful mouth of Atreus' son
Be heard for Hector, who the air doth fill
With roaring to the Trojans to fall on,
And shouting of the Trojans as they kill.
Yet so, Patroclus, charge them lustily,
For fear the ships should all be set on fire;
Then lost the Greeks are without remedy,

And to their country never shall retire.
But now what I shall say give ear unto,
To th' end the Greeks may honour me, and send
Briseis back with gifts, you thus must do.
When you have freed the ships, there make an end
And come away. If Jove give you success,
No longer without me pursue the fight,
'Twill make my honour with the Greeks the less;
Nor in the slaughter take so much delight
As to proceed up to the walls of Troy,
Lest by some God or other you be check'd;
But having freed the ships come straight away,
Apollo has for Troy a great respect,
And leave both sides to fight upon the plain
Till, grant it, O ye Gods, there left are none
But you and I the town of Troy to gain.
Thus they to one another talk'd alone.
Ajax by this time from the ship was gone,
Forc'd by the spears that from the Trojans flew,
And weak'ned by the hand of Saturn's son.
For at his head the Trojans alway threw,
And forc'd he was to hold his great shield high,
And wearied was thereby his buckler-hand.
With spear in hand no Trojan durst come nigh,
But pelting him with spears aloof they stand.
The sweat ran down his limbs, nor could he well,
Though mightily for breath he pull'd, respire,
Now tell me, Muses, that in heav'n do dwell,
How came the ship first to be set on fire?

Thus. Hector with his broad-sword, at a blow,
The spear of Ajax chanc'd to cut in twain,
Where to the staff the head was fix'd, and so
His mighty naval spear he shook in vain:
The head of brass flew humming to the ground.
This Ajax saw, and frighted was to see
Jove thus the counsel of the Greeks confound,
To give unto the Trojans victory,
And went his way. Then in the Trojans came
With brands of flaming fire; and presently
The hind part of the ship was all in flame.
Achilles with his hand then clapp'd his thigh,
And to Patroclus said, a flame I see
Rise at the ships. 'Tis time that you were gone,
Lest our retreat should intercepted be.
Away, and quickly put my armour on.
This said, Patroclus first of all puts on
His boots of war, and to his legs them tied
With silver clasps; and next of Thetis' son
The breast-plate good he to his breast applied,
With golden stars like heaven beautified.
His sword then o'er his shoulder he puts on,
With silver studs to hang down by his side;
And then his helmet, shining like the sun,
He puts upon his head; and last of all
He took two spears that fit were for his hand.
But not that which Achilles fought withal,
For that none but Achilles could command.
A great and strong and heavy spear it was,

Made of an ash cut down i' th' woody hill
Of Pelius, and by Chiron given 'twas
To Peleus, his mighty foes to kill.
Then to Achilles' car Automedon
The horses Balius and Xanthus tied,
That were by Zephyrus begotten on
Podarge, feeding by the ocean's side;
And at their heads he Pedasus did place,
(A horse he took at Thebe in the prey),
That with them both was able to keep pace,
Though he were mortal, and immortal they.
While by his car Patroclus arming stands,
Apace from tent to tent Achilles runs,
And calleth unto those that had commands,
To arm and bring away the Myrmidons.
Then came they and about Patroclus stood,
Like wolves that on a lusty stag had fed,
And lapping stain'd the river with his blood,
With bellies full and hearts encouraged.
When they together were, Achilles then
Appointed who i' th' field should them command.
To Troy he ships brought with him five times ten,
From ev'ry ship came fifty men to land.
And then five bodies he made of them all,
And captains five by whom they led should be.
But was himself the captain-general,
For of the Myrmidons the king was he.
Of these five captains one Menestius was,
Who was the river Sperchius his son,

And by the name of Boro then did pass.
His mother was of Peleus' daughters one,
And Polydora was her name. And she
To Perierus had been married,
And for his wife reputed constantly
Before she was of M'nestius brought to bed.
The second bands were by Eudorus led,
The son of Polymela, a fair maid.
Hermes of her became enamoured,
As at a dance her beauty he survey'd.
It was upon Diana's holy day
He saw her dancing, and at night he got
Unseen into her bed and with her lay,
And his brave son Eudorus then begot.
To Echecles she after married.
Her father Phylas to him took her son,
And unto man's estate him nourished,
And lov'd no less than if t' had been his own.
The third Pisandrus led, that swift could run,
And had at fighting with a spear more art
In bloody war than any Myrmidon
Amongst them all, Patroclus set apart.
The fourth was by the old knight Phœnix led.
And of the fifth, charge had Alcimedon.
When they were all together gathered,
Unto them sharply thus spake Thetis' son.
Ye Myrmidons, said he, remember now,
How all the time I kept you have from fight,
You have the Trojans threaten'd hard; and how

You said my mother fed me had with gall,
And in great tumult bid me let you go,
Or at the ships upon the Trojans fall.
Lo, there before you is the war you crave.
The Trojans are about to burn the fleet;
Do you your utmost now the same to save.
Let him that brags of valour let us see't.
This said, the Myrmidons became more keen,
Because they saw the king had chang'd his mind;
And presently into their ranks fell in,
And close themselves to one another join'd,
As close as in a wall are laid the stones,
By him that means his house shall keep out wind;
So close together stood the Myrmidons,
Helmets with helmets, shields with shields conjoin'd.
Before them all two good men armed went,
Patroclus and Automedon, to th' fight.
Achilles then returned to his tent,
Where stood a chest most beautiful to sight,
Which Thetis gave him when he went to Troy,
Wherein were carpets, coats, and cloaks laid up,
To keep him warm when he a ship-board lay;
And in the same was kept a dainty cup,
In which no other man e'er drank but he,
Though 'twere to offer to the Gods above.
Nor he himself (such was his nicety)
E'er in it drank but offering to Jove.
Achilles then with sulphur scour'd the cup,
And having rins'd it clean with water fair,

And wash'd his hands, went out and held it up
Tow'rds heav'n, and thus to Jove address'd his prayer.
Pelasgic Jove, that far from hence dost dwell,
But at Dodona men thy counsel know,
The Selli there, thy prophets, fortunes tell,
Though on the ground they sleep, and barefoot go,
That at my prayer once didst honour me,
And broughtest on the Argive host much woe,
Once more unto my prayer inclined be.
Though to the fight myself I do not go,
I thither send my dear companion.
Jove, now honour him! Let Hector know
Patroclus is a man of war alone,
And not then only when I with him go.
And when he has the Trojans driven from
The Argive ships, then grant, O Jove, he may
With all his Myrmidons safe hither come,
With all their arms, and make no longer stay!
Thus prayed he. To half of his desire
Jove nodded; but the other half denied.
The acts of Patroclus, and his death.
He granted him to save the ships from fire;
But at returning safe his neck he wried.
Achilles, when he offer'd had and pray'd,
Went with the cup again into his tent,
And safely laid it up; and not long staid,
But out again to see the fight he went.
The Myrmidons now marched orderly;
But when unto the Trojans they were near,

Like wasps incensed they upon them fly.
As when at unawares a traveller
Is going by a wasps' nest near the way,
Which to the common damage stirr'd has been,
And anger'd by a young unlucky boy,
Upon the traveller they vent their spleen,
And all at once with fury on him fly:
Just so the Myrmidons occasion take,
Provok'd by Agamemnon's injury,
To fall upon the Trojans for his sake.
Patroclus yet did further them incite.
Ye Myrmidons, said he, Achilles' bands,
Remember now courageously to fight;
Achilles' honour now lies in your hands,
The best of Greeks. Let Agamemnon see
The fault he did, and know he was unwise,
How wide soever his dominion be,
The best of all th' Achæans to despise.
Then on the Trojans all at once they fly:
With them the other Greeks by shouts conspire.
The Trojans when they saw Patroclus nigh,
With stout Automedon, Achilles' squire,
Their courage fell, their ranks disorder'd were,
They look'd about which way 'twere best to run.
For they suppos'd Achilles now was there,
And that his discontent was past and gone.
Patroclus first of all lets fly his spear
Amongst the thickest of the foes, about
Protesilaus' hollow ship (for there

The Trojans standing close together fought)
And slew Pyræchmes, who from Amydon,
And Axius' wide stream, the Pœons led.
The spear passed through his right shoulder-bone,
And when the Pœons saw him fall, they fled.
Not only these he frighted had, but all,
By killing of a captain of such fame.
Patroclus then upon the rest did fall,
And drave them from the ships, and quench'd the flame.
The Trojans towards Troy retire apace;
Patroclus and the Argives them pursue,
Leaving the ship half burnt upon the place,
And on the plain the fight began anew.
As men see all the rocks and woods about,
When than the hills the mist is gotten higher;
So when the fire was at the ships put out,
The Greeks did for a little while respire.
For yet the Trojans did not plainly fly,
But still resisting went, and losing ground.
Here Areilochus was killed by
Patroclus, that gave him a deadly wound
Upon the thigh, just as he turn'd about;
The spear went through, and passing brake the bone,
And at the wound his blood and life went out,
And on his face he fell down with a groan.
Thoas by Menelaus on the breast,
Close by his shield, a wound receiv'd and died.
To Meges Antichus a spear addrest,
But Meges, that his purpose had espied,

Prevented him, and with his spear him hits
Upon the leg, and near unto the knee,
And all the nerves thereof asunder splits,
And of the wound he died presently.
Antilochus then slew Atymnius,
The spear went through his flank and struck him dead.
And Maris then struck at Antilochus,
But was prevented by Torasymed,
And slain, pierc'd through the shoulder with his spear.
And thus by two sons of old Nestor slain
The two sons of Amisodorus were,
And of Sarpedon good companions twain;
Their sire, Amisodorus, kept at home
The foul Chimæra, that had done much harm,
Devouring people which did that way come,
Till she was slain by Bellerophontes' arm.
Cleobulus then, pester'd in the throng
By little Ajax, taken was alive,
But after he was taken, liv'd not long,
For Ajax did him of his life deprive.
For on the neck he gave him such a wound
With his broad sword as made it smoke with blood;
And presently he fell unto the ground,
And on his eyes perpetual darkness stood.
With swords Peneleos and Lycon prest
Each other hard. For both their spears had miss'd.
Lycon him hit upon the helmet crest,
And broke his sword. One part staid in his fist,
The other flew. Peneleos him hit

Upon the neck. The sword so far went in,
As from the shoulders it divided it,
Save that it hung a little by the skin.
Meriones pursued Acamas,
Amongst the Trojans that before him fled;
And overtook him as he mounting was,
And with a wound i' th' shoulder left him dead.
And by Idomeneus, the king of Crete,
Hit in the mouth was Erymas and slain.
His teeth all stricken out, fell at his feet,
And by the spear pierced through was his brain,
And fill'd with blood stood staring both his eyes,
Which through his nose and mouth he strove to void,
And gasping, seeks to cast it out, and dies.
Thus the Greek lords each one his man destroy'd:
And then as bloody wolves invade the lambs
Or kids, that by the shepherd's negligence
Are wander'd on the mountains from their dams,
And kill; for nature gives them no defence;
So fiercely on the Trojans fell the Greeks,
But they no more trust to their hands, but feet.
Ajax to throw his spear at Hector seeks,
But with him Hector has no mind to meet,
But by th' advantage of his skill in war,
Knowing of arrows and of spears the sound,
To keep aloof from Ajax still took care,
And cover'd with his shield, oft shifted ground.
And though he knew the honour of the day
Would fall unto th' Achæans in the end,

Yet from the field he went not straight away,
But staid and sought his people to defend.
And then as clouds rise from Olympus high,
And through the air to heaven tend upright
Before tempestuous winds; so rose the cry
At th' Argive ships. Then Hector left the fight,
And after him the Trojans take their heels,
But in the trench greatly encumbered were,
And many char'ot-poles they brake and wheels.
And when they of the trench were gotten clear,
Fill'd with affright was ev'ry path and way;
Thus at the ships the storm of war gave o'er.
The horses that were loose ran back to Troy;
And to the ships the Trojans came no more.
Patroclus, where he most disorder found,
Thither he drove, and trod the Trojans down,
And char'ot-seats were tumbled to the ground,
And many from their seats were headlong thrown.
But the swift horses of Patroclus, which
On Peleus by the Gods bestowed were,
Found no impediment, but leapt the ditch,
Pursuing Hector, who now was not there.
As when with stormy winds th' autumnal rain
Falls heavy on the earth, from heaven sent,
When wrested are the laws by men for gain,
Who from the Gods expect no punishment;
The rivers swell; down from the mountain's side
Innumerable currents headlong run,
Roaring and foaming, to the ocean wide;

And wash'd away is all man's work, and gone:
So fled the Trojans. These thus put to flight,
He kept the Greeks from going to the town,
As they desir'd; yet gave not over fight,
But 'twixt the ships and river overthrown
Were many more; for unrevenged yet
Were many Greeks. First Pronous he kill'd,
Whom with his spear upon the breast he hit,
Where he was not well cover'd with his shield.
The next he slew was Thestor, Enop's son,
That sate upon his seat amaz'd with fear,
And from his hand the horses' reins were gone.
Patroclus standing by him with his spear,
Struck him upon the cheek, and there it stuck
Fast in his teeth; and over the fore-wheel
To th' ground Patroclus fetch'd him with a pluck,
As to the bank a fisher pulls an eel,
And to the earth he threw him on his face.
Eryalus then to him went, in vain,
And by Patroclus slain was on the place,
For with a stone he cleft his head in twain.
Epaltes, Erymas, Amphoterus,
And Echius, Pyres, Damastorides,
Euippus, Polymelus, Iphius;
He one upon another kill'd all these.
Sarpedon saw how fast his good friends died,
And that his Lycians ready were to fly;
He them rebuking, with a loud voice cried,
Whither d'ye go? For shame, stay here; for I

Intend to meet this man myself, and know
Who 'tis that here so furiously fights,
And lays so many valiant Trojans low.
This said, he from his chariot alights.
Patroclus, seeing that, alighted too,
And presently betook him to the fight,
As keen as on a high rock vultures two.
And Jupiter was grieved at the sight,
And to his wife and sister, Juno, said,
Ay me, my son Sarpedon will be slain,
For by the Fates long since it so is laid;
And now my mind divided is in twain,
To snatch him hence, and carry him again
To Lycia, or now to let him die,
And by Patroclus' fatal spear be slain.
And Juno then to Jove made this reply.
Jove, most wilful of the Gods, what say'e?
A mortal man condemn'd is by the Fates,
And you would now the execution stay?
Do. But take heed how you offend the states.
And this I tell you further, if you do
Your son, Sarpedon, from the combat save,
The other Gods will look to do so too,
For sons at Troy many immortals have.
But since you love your son, and for him grieve,
First let Patroclus take away his life,
And then to Death and Sleep commandment give
To carry him, from out the bloody strife,
To Lycia, amongst his friends and kin,

Who see him will embalm’d and buried,
And build a tomb to lay his ashes in,
Which are the honours due unto the dead.
This Juno says; Jove to it condescends,
And for the honour of his son so dear,
For rain he drops of blood from heaven sends.
When they were come to one another near,
First threw Patroclus, and kill’d Thrasymed,
A valiant man, Sarpedon’s charioteer,
The spear into his belly entered.
Then at Patroclus flew Sarpedon’s spear,
And hit him not, but Pedasus he slew,
The fore-horse of Achilles’ car, and now
The sprawling horse caus’d a disorder new.
The yoke screeks, and Automedon lets go
The reins; whereby the combatants are parted;
Automedon soon found a remedy,
For from the char’ot-seat he nimbly started,
And cut the gears that did the fore-horse tie.
The horses two adjusted were again,
And then the combatants the fight renew.
And first Sarpedon threw, and threw in vain;
The spear just over his left shoulder flew.
But not in vain Patroclus’ spear was thrown,
That smote him through the midriff. Heavily
Sarpedon then unto the ground came down,
As if’t had been an oak or poplar-tree;
Or as a pine cut down i’ th’ hill, to be
A mast for some great ship, falls to the ground,

So fell to th’ earth Sarpedon heavily,
And with his armour made the place resound.
As when a bull is by a lion slain,
Under his paw to th’ ground he groaning falls;
So groaning fell Sarpedon, in great pain,
And to his friend, the valiant Glaucus, calls,
And to him said, Now, Glaucus, valiant be,
And set your mind on nothing but to fight.
But first, go call my best men all to me,
And to assist me here join all your might.
If of my arms I stripp’d be by the foe,
The shame thereof for ever will abide.
So therefore quickly call the people: go.
And when he thus had spoken to him, died.
Patroclus on the body sets his foot,
And out again he pull’d the bloody spear,
With pieces of the midriff sticking to’t.
And now away the horses ready were
To run, for no man was upon the seat;
But by the Myrmidons they soon were staid.
The grief of Glaucus then was very great,
For that he knew not how the king to aid;
For in great pain his arm was with the stroke
Of Teucer’s arrow, at the Argive wall,
And found no remedy but to invoke
Apollo, and upon him thus did call:
Apollo, whether thou in Troy be now
Or Lycia, unto my prayer give ear;
For when distressed men unto thee bow,

Thou dost from any place or distance hear.
I grievously am wounded in the hand,
The pain whereof up to my shoulder goes;
No longer now can I my spear command,
When most I need to use it ‘gainst the foes.
Sarpedon, the brave son of Jove, is slain;
His father of him takes no further care.
But thou, Apollo, now assuage my pain,
And cure my wound, and make me fit for war;
That I may bring the Lycians to fight,
And I with them the body may defend.
This said, Apollo, by his heavenly might,
His wound heal’d up, the pain was at an end;
The blood was gone; encourag’d was his mind,
And Glaucus knew Apollo did it all,
And joy’d such favour with the God to find:
Then out he went the Lycians to call.
That done, he to the Trojan princes goes,
Agenor, Hector, and Polydamas,
Divine Æneas, and craves aid of those;
But what he said, to Hector spoken was.
Hector, said he, your friends you now forget,
Who from their country hither came so far,
Their lives to venture for your sake. For yet
How to assist them you take little care.
Slain is the King Sarpedon in the fight,
That both with might and justice rul’d the land
Of Lycia. Let them not vent their spite
Upon the body slain; but by him stand:

The Myrmidons else, for th' Achæans' sake,
Of whom he slew so many at the fleet,
Will in revenge his armour from him take,
And do unto him other things unmeet.
This said, the Trojans all were on a flame
To be reveng'd. To Troy he was a wall,
Although he thither as a stranger came;
He many led, himself the best of all.
And to the Myrmidons they march'd away,
Hector himself before them, at the head,
As angry for Sarpedon's death as they.
Patroclus then the Greeks encouraged,
And speaking first to the Ajaxes two,
Ajax, said he, both you and you, again
Fight gallantly, as you are us'd to do,
Or better if you can. For I have slain
Sarpedon with my spear, who was the man
That mounted first up to the Argive wall.
Let's take his armour off him if we can,
And make his fellows some of them to fall.
This said, they into order put their men,
Trojan and Lycian; Greek and Myrmidon;
And to the body slain return again,
And fiercely one another fell upon.
And Jove the place with darkness cover'd round,
As long as they were fighting 'bout his son.
And at the first the Greeks forsook the ground.
For then there was a noble Myrmidon,
Epigeus, that king was formerly

Of Budeon, and forced thence away
For a man's death, to Peleus did fly,
Who sent him with Achilles unto Troy.
And now no sooner layed had his hand
Upon Sarpedon's body, but was slain
By a great stone, that flew from Hector's hand,
And broke (for all his casque) his skull in twain.
Down he upon the dead king falling, dies.
Patroclus, when he saw his friend thus fall,
Swift as a hawk that at a starling flies,
Up to the foes ran, and amongst them all
He threw a stone, which lighted on the neck
Of Stenelaus, and the tendon rent.
And this gave to the Trojan horse a check;
And back a little Hector with them went,
As far as one can for experiment,
Or at a foe in battle throw a spear;
So far back Hector with his char'ot went,
The Argives them pursuing in the rear.
But Glaucus, that did then the Lycians lead,
Pursu'd by Bathycles, and very near,
Upon a sudden to him turn'd his head,
And deep into his breast he thrust his spear,
And down he fell. The Trojans then were glad,
And at the body fallen boldly staid.
On th' other side, the Greeks were very sad
To lose so good a man, but not dismay'd.
Meriones then slew Laogonus,
Son of Onetor, priest of Jupiter,

And honour’d like a God in Gargarus,
The spear him pierc’d between the cheek and ear.
Then at Meriones Æneas threw,
And was in hopes to give him his death’s wound;
But he then stoop’d, and o’er him the spear flew,
And one end shook, the other stuck i’ th’ ground.
At this Æneas, angry, to him said,
Meriones, as well as you can dance,
My spear was like your motion to have staid,
And that it did not, think it was by chance.
To him replying, said Meriones,
Æneas, strong and valiant as you are,
You cannot kill men whom and when you please;
Yourself are subject to the chance of war
As well as I. And if my spear fall right
(As much as to your hands you trust) you’ll die
Like other men, and I win honour by’t,
And to the shades below your soul will fly.
This said, Patroclus came and him reproved.
Meriones, why talk you thus, said he,
D’ye think the Trojans can be hence removed
With evil words, till many slain there be?
In council words may somewhat signify,
But hands in war determine the event,
’Tis to no purpose words to multiply.
This said, away they both together went,
And by and by was heard a mighty sound,
As if the woods were falling on the hills,
Of men in armour falling to the ground,

And swords and spears on helmets and on shields.
Sarpedon cover'd was from top to toe,
With dust and spears, and so besmear'd with blood,
That wise he must have been that could him know,
Though who it was they all well understood,
And busy were about him as the flies
That buzz in summer time about the pans
Of milk. And all this while Jove kept his eyes
Upon the battle; and advising stands,
Whether 'twere best to let Patroclus die
Upon Sarpedon, slain by Hector, or
Let him go on, and follow those that fly,
And of the Trojans make the slaughter more.
At last resolv'd, he made the Trojans fly.
Patroclus then pursu'd them up to Troy,
And as he went, made many of them die;
And Hector was the first that fled away,
Not ignorant of Jove's apostacy.
And then the lusty Lycians also fled;
Whose king, Sarpedon, now i' th' heap did lie,
Stretch'd out on th' earth amongst the other dead.
And him Patroclus of his armour strips,
His mighty armour, all of solid brass,
And sent it by his fellows to the ships.
Thus slain and stripp'd Jove's son Sarpedon was.
Then Jove unto Apollo spake, and said,
Go, Phœbus, bear Sarpedon from the fight
A great way off, and let him be array'd
In an immortal garment, pure and bright.

But in the river clear first wash him clean,
And with ambrosia anoint his skin.
Let Death and Sleep, two sisters, bear him then
To Lycia, unto his friends and kin,
By whom his body will embalmed be,
And tomb and pillar set upon his grave,
Whereby preserv'd will be his memory,
Which all the honour is the dead can have.
This said, Apollo down from Ida came,
And bare Sarpedon's body from the fight.
And far off in the river wash'd the same,
And with ambrosia his body white
Anointed, and with garments fair array'd,
Immortal garments; and into the hands
Of Death and Sleep committed it, who laid
It down again amongst the Lycians.
Patroclus then commands Automedon
To drive to Troy. Not well; for had he then
The counsel of Achilles thought upon,
He had escap'd. But Jove knows more than men,
And quickly can take from a man of might,
And to a weaker give the victory,
Whom he himself encourage will to fight,
As now by Jove himself set on was he.
But while Patroclus chas'd the Trojans thus,
Who fell? Adrestus, and Autonous,
Epistor, Melanippus, Perimus,
Pylartus, Mulius, and Echeclus,
And Elasus. And taken had been Troy

Now by Patroclus, but that Phœbus stood
Upon the tow'r, and push'd him still away,
To vex the Greeks, and do the Trojans good.
For thrice he mounted, and was thrice put back
By the immortal hand; but when again
He mounting was, Apollo to him spake.
Retire, said he, Patroclus, 'tis in vain;
It is not you that Ilium can win,
Nor Thetis' son, a better man than you.
Patroclus, at these words, great fear was in,
And far off from the wall himself withdrew.
Now Hector was upon his char'ot seat,
I' th' Scæan gate, and did deliberate
Whether to make the Trojans to retreat,
And when they were come in to shut the gate,
Or go to th' fight. While he consulted thus,
Apollo came, and standing by his side
In likeness of his uncle Asius,
Him sharply did for standing idle chide.
Hector, said he, why stay you here? If I
Exceeded you in strength as you do me,
I teach you would, in such necessity
To quit the field thus, and unuseful be.
Go: to Patroclus now directly drive,
And doubt not but that by Apollo's aid,
You may him of his life and arms deprive.
Away went Phœbus when he this had said,
And Hector then returned to the fight,
While Phœbus did the Argive throng dismay.

Cebriones still kept his horses right
Upon Patroclus. For upon the way
Hector pass'd through the Greeks, and killed none.
Patroclus then alighting, with his spear
In his left hand, in th' other took a stone,
And with it killed Hector's charioteer,
Cebriones, King Priam's bastard son.
Above his eyes, upon his forehead just,
Patroclus hit him with the knobby stone,
Then from his seat he dropp'd into the dust.
Broke was his skull, his eye-brows crush'd int' one,
And at his feet, before him fell his eyes.
Patroclus scoff'd, and said 'tis nimbly done.
And proudly thus, insulting, o'er him cries:
Oh, that we had a man could leap like him,
And set upon one of our ships were he,
To leap into the sea, and groping swim!
How satisfied with oysters should we be!
So quickly down he tumbled to the plain,
I see that there good tumblers are in Troy.
This said, he ran unto the body slain,
Himself with his own valour to destroy.
And then unto the ground leapt Hector too,
And at Cebriones his body, fought
He and Patroclus, fierce as lions two,
That had a great stag, slain by chance, found out;
And hungry both, strove who should first be fed,
So sought these two each other to destroy.
And Hector pull'd the dead man by the head,

Patroclus by the heels, the other way.
Meanwhile the Greeks and Trojans fighting stood,
As when between two hills two great winds fight,
On both sides strongly shaken is the wood,
And boughs beat one another with great might,
And with a horrid noise together clash,
And many lusty limbs then broken are,
Of barky corme, broad beech, and lofty ash;
So did it with the Greeks and Trojans fare.
About Cebriones stuck many a spear,
And many a fledg'd arrow from the bow,
And many shields by great stones broken were,
While he along in bed of dust lay low,
And quite forgotten had his chivalry.
Now all the while that mounting was the sun,
The weapons flew, and men fell equally,
But after noon, when half the day was gone,
The Argives clearly had the victory,
And from the field Cebriones they drew,
And stripp'd there of his armour, let him lie.
Patroclus then the Trojans chas'd anew,
And there before the Myrmidons leapt out,
Like Mars himself, and thrice nine Trojans slew.
And out again he went; but at that bout,
Upon himself untimely death he drew.
For Phœbus came (Patroclus saw him not)
Wrapp'd up in air, and standing on the ground,
Between the shoulders with his hand him smote,
That all about him seemed to go round,

And from his head his helmet then he flung
Into the dust, and foul it was all o'er,
And beaten by the hoofs of horses rung,
That never had been so defil'd before,
When on Achilles' godlike head it sate.
But Jove to Hector gave it now to wear,
And only then, when near him was his fate.
Moreover, Phœbus brake Patroclus' spear,
A heavy spear, well armed at the head,
And pluck'd his mighty shield out of his hand,
And left him of his arms uncovered.
With this, Patroclus did amazed stand;
And near unto him then a Dardan came,
And in the back he smote him with his spear;
Panthorides Euphorbus was his name,
And kill'd him not, but back ran to the rear.
For though he well could fight, and ride, and run,
And going first abroad to learn the wars,
He was by no man of his age outdone,
And had o'erthrown twice ten men from their cars;
Yet for Patroclus now he durst not stay,
Although he wounded and disarmed were.
Then to the rear Patroclus went away;
And after him ran Hector with his spear,
And at the belly struck him through the side,
And down he fell. The Greeks were grieved sore.
As when at a small fountain almost dried,
Together come a lion and a boar
With equal thirst, and drink they both would fain,

But fight who shall drink first, slain is the boar;
So now by Hector was Patroclus slain,
Though many Trojans he had kill'd before.
And Hector then triumphing o'er him said,
Patroclus, you thought sure t' have stormed Troy,
And in your ships our women t' have convey'd
To Argos with you, when you went away.
Were you so simple that you could not see
That Hector, with his horses and his spear,
Protects the Trojans from captivity?
Now shall you for the dogs and fowls lie here;
Nor can Achilles do you any good,
That bad you, 't may be, when you from him went,
Not to return, till dyed in his blood,
You Hector's coat had from his shoulders rent,
And vain enough you were to promise it.
Patroclus, with a feeble voice, replied,
Hector, you now may boast as you think fit,
And in your own ability take pride.
T' Apollo first my death I owe, who threw
My armour from my body to the ground;
I could have slain else twenty such as you,
And from Euphorbus I receiv'd a wound.
To bring me down, you were but one of three.
But hear me, and remember what I say;
Hector, you will not long live after me,
And only for Achilles' hand you stay.
And at these words he was of life bereft.
His soul unto th' infernal regions fled,

Lamenting so much youth and vigour left;
And Hector to him spake again, though dead.
Patroclus, why do you foretell my death?
Who knows but that Achilles may be slain
By me first, and before me lose his breath?
This said, he pulled out the spear again,
And presently pursu'd Automedon,
Who of Achilles was the char'oteer;
But he away was carried and gone
By Peleus' horses, that immortal were.

LIB. XVII.

The seventh battle, about Patroclus's body.

AND MENELAUS UNDERSTANDING now
That slain Patroclus lay upon the ground,
Careful, as of her first calf is a cow,
To th' body went and walk'd about it round,
Couching his spear and holding out his shield,
Resolv'd to kill him, whosoe'er he was,
That durst to stand against him in the field.
Then to him said Euphorbus, Menelaus,
Retire, let me advise you, from the dead.
For I am he that gave him the first wound,
That with his arms I may be honoured;
Lest with my spear I strike you to the ground.
And Menelaus to him thus replied.
Jupiter, in lion never was,
Nor yet in panther, nor in boar, such pride
(Though other beasts in strength they far surpass)
As in these sons of Panthus. Though they know,
When Hyperenor proudly me defied,
And spitefully did value me below
All other Greeks, that by my hand he died,
And sorry were his parents and his wife.
Now you succeed will to your brother's fate.

Begone, then, if you mean to save your life,
And quickly, or you will be wise too late.
No, Menelaus, said Euphorbus then,
Since you have griev'd his parents and his wife,
'Tis best, I think, to comfort them again,
By making you pay for it with your life.
For though intolerable be their grief,
Yet when they see your armour and your head
Brought to them home, it will be some relief.
But this by fight must be determined.
This said, he made a thrust at Menelaus,
Which he received on his trusty shield,
It entered not, resisted by the brass,
Which bent the point, and passage none did yield.
Then, as he backward stepp'd to get away,
He by Atrides on the breast was hit.
The spear press'd with his hand not there did stay,
But to his neck went up and pierced it.
And then the ground he with his armour knocks,
And dyed was with blood his dainty hair,
Those fine, with gold and silver twined, locks,
Like those that Cytherea's Graces wear.
As when one planted hath an olive sprig
In open place, and where are many springs,
And stirr'd by gentle winds it is grown big,
Then comes a storm and to the ground it flings;
So by Atrides fell Euphorbus now.
As when a lion cometh from the wood
Into the herd and seizeth on a cow,

First breaks her neck, then feeds he on her blood
And bowels, dogs and herdsmen looking on
And hueing him, that dare not to go near;
So then upon Atrides ventur'd none,
So much the Trojans stricken were with fear.
And now into the hands of Menelaus
Patroclus' armour came; and borne away
Had been, but that by Phœbus cross'd he was,
That was a friend to Hector and to Troy.
And in the shape of Mentes gone was then
(Whom now the Cicon regiments obey'd)
To call back Hector to the field again,
And overtaking him, thus to him said:
Hector, you here Automedon pursue
To take Achilles' horses all in vain,
Which never will be won or rul'd by you,
And suffer good Euphorbus to be slain
By Menelaus at the body dead
Of Menœtiades. Then went his way.
And Hector grieved turn'd about his head,
And saw how on the ground Euphorbus lay,
Bleeding and naked left by Menelaus.
And Hector then, enflamed with the sight,
Like raging fire did through the squadrons pass.
And with great cry returned to the fight.
And cold was then Atrides at the heart,
And with himself he thus disputing stands;
If I should from the body slain depart,
The Greeks would say of me but little good;

But if I stay alone here ‘twill be worse
Than anything the Greeks can of me say.
For he brings with him all the Trojan force.
But wherefore do I thus disputing stay?
Who fights against him whom a God doth aid,
Draws on himself a great and certain ill.
My best course then is Hector to avoid,
And let the Greeks say of it what they will.
But if of Ajax I could get a sight,
Then he and I together would not fear
With Hector aided by a God to fight,
And to Achilles the dead body bear.
Whilst thus unto himself he laid the case,
The Trojans came with Hector at their head,
And Menelaus then forsook the place,
And going left behind the body dead.
But oft look’d back. As when a lion is
Compell’d to leave a fold by men and dogs,
He oft looks back, and runs not for all this,
But tow’rds the wood still slowly on he jogs
Unwillingly; his heart’s too big to run;
So Menelaus off went safe and sound.
And then for Ajax, son of Telamon,
Look’d round about, and ‘mongst his troops him found
Inciting them to fight. For not a man
But frighted was by Phœbus and dismay’d;
And with all speed Atrides to him ran,
And standing at his side unto him said,
Come, Ajax, quickly come away with me

To save Patroclus from the Trojans' wrath,
That to Achilles carried he may be
Though naked. For his armour Hector hath.
Ajax enrag'd at this, flies to the place
With Menelaus where Patroclus lay,
When Hector from the field him drawing was
(Having already snatch'd his arms away)
Unto the Trojans to cut off his head,
And give the body to the dogs to eat.
But when great Ajax thither came, he fled,
And to the Trojans made a quick retreat;
And order gave to bear the arms to Troy,
Achilles' arms, a noble monument
Of his great deed. But Ajax still did stay,
And with his shield about the body went.
As when a lion, his whelps following him,
Into the open fields comes from the wood,
And hunters meets, he looks upon them grim;
So Ajax looking, by Patroclus stood.
And Glaucus then, that led the Lycian bands,
To Hector went and frowning to him said,
Though you be thought a good man of your hands,
Hector, it is not so I am afraid.
Consider first if you the town can save
By Trojans only, without other guard,
And of their service how great need you have;
And then how lightly you their pains regard.
What Lycian again will for you fight?
Or how will you defend a meaner man,

That left Sarpedon to the Argives' spite
And sport, and from his body frighted ran,
That was your friend and had such service done?
So that if I were won to lead them home,
You'd find a little after we were gone,
The utmost fate of Troy were on it come.
For if the Trojans had as forward been,
As men should be that for their country fight,
Patroclus' body we in Troy had seen,
Fetch'd from the field, for all the Argives' might;
And from the Greeks in change we might have had
Sarpedon's corpse, and brought it into Troy;
And all the Greeks thereof would have been glad,
So great experience of his worth had they.
But you to Ajax never yet durst go,
And when he came to you, you from him ran
Into the throng o' th' Trojans. And why so?
But that you know he is the better man.
Then Hector, frowning on him, thus replied,
Glaucus, 'tis strange that such a man as you
Should so severely without cause me chide;
I thought you very wise, but 'tis not true.
You say I dare not with great Ajax fight,
When I do neither foot nor horsemen shun,
But only way give sometimes to the might
Of Jove when he the enemy sets on.
For he to whom he will gives victory,
And from the proud their courage takes away.
But to the fight come with me now, and see

If I be such a coward as you say;
And do not from Patroclus' body make
Some of the Argives to retire again.
This said, he turn'd and to the Trojans spake.
Trojans, said he, and Lycians, play the men
Whilst I myself in these good arms array,
Which from Patroclus' body slain I took.
This said, he from the field went toward Troy,
And quickly those that bare them overtook,
And gave to them the armour he then wore,
And th' armour of Patroclus there puts on,
Giv'n by the Gods to Peleus heretofore,
Which he when aged gave unto his son,
But were not kept by him till he was old.
Then Jove that out of sight in heaven sat,
And Hector in this armour did behold,
Poor man, said he, he knoweth not his fate,
Which now is near; and at it shook his head,
And said, though now these heavenly arms you wear
Of this great man whom all men else did dread,
Killing the gentle knight that did them bear,
And so unhandsomely, you'll never go
To show them to Andromache your wife.
Yet now you shall prevail against the foe,
To please you, since thus shorten'd is your life.
And as he said it, seal'd it with a nod.
Now Hector, having on these arms and fit,
Into his breast went in the mighty God
Of battle, and with courage filled it.

Then Hector, like Achilles shining, came
To his confederates, and ‘mongst them went,
Calling upon the best of them by name,
To give unto them all encouragement,
Mesthles, and Glaucus, and Thersilochus,
Asteropæus, and Hippothous,
Medon, Disinor, Phorcys, Chromius,
And you, the skilful augur, Ennomus,
And you, the thousands that to aid me come,
’Tis not to muster that you called are,
But to defend the wives of Ilium,
And babes, against the Greeks, that love the war;
Which to prevent, the Trojans day by day
With pay and with free quarter, tired are.
Let’s therefore fight, and either die or slay;
For there’s no other traffic at the war,
And he that shall Patroclus’ body gain,
And, spite of Ajax, fetch it off the field,
Half of his armour shall have for his pain,
And I will half the honour to him yield.
This said, the Trojans on the Argives fell
With all their weight, and made account to gain
Patroclus’ body; for they could not tell
How many Trojans there would first be slain.
And then to Menelaus Ajax said,
I fear we shall no more return from Troy;
And am not for Patroclus so afraid
(That to the dogs is sure to be a prey)
As for myself and you; with such a cloud

Of Trojans Hector thund'ring cometh on.
Go therefore, presently, and call aloud
To th' other princes. Other help there's none.
Then Menelaus cried out aloud,
you that have command in th' Argive host,
And diet with Atrides are allow'd,
And drink unstinted at the public cost,
'Tis hard to call you ev'ry one by name,
But you that hear me come away with speed;
For to us all 'twill be no little shame,
To let the dogs upon Patroclus feed.
This said, first little Ajax running came,
And with Idomeneus, Meriones,
Then many more came in; but who can name
The number great that came in after these?
And Hector with the Trojans then came in,
And as the sea that rolleth to the shore
Which by some mighty wind had driven been;
So to the fight the Trojans marching roar.
The Greeks about Patroclus' body staid,
All of one mind, all cover'd with their shields,
And on their head Jove then a great fog laid,
And all the place about with darkness fills.
For while Patroclus was alive, and serv'd
Achilles, Jove took at him no offence,
Nor thought that to be dogs' meat he deserv'd,
And therefore urg'd the Greeks to his defence.
At first the Trojans made the Greeks to fly,
And leave the body, but they killed none,

So great a fog upon the place did lie.
Then with his friends again came Ajax on,
Of all the Greeks, for person and for might,
The bravest man, excepting Thetis' son.
The Trojans, when the Greeks refus'd to fight,
The body seiz'd, and thought the bus'ness done.
As when a boar, pursu'd by hounds and men,
Upon them turns, they scatter'd are and fly;
So, when great Ajax to them came again,
The Trojans, scatter'd, let Patroclus lie.
For when Hippothous was in great hope
To drag Patroclus' body up to Troy,
And to his ankle tyed had a rope,
Arrived to him was his latest day.
For Ajax now was come unto him near,
And smote him through the helmet and the brain,
Which, stained with his blood, stuck to the spear,
And down he threw Patroclus' foot again,
And with it near unto the body fell,
Depriv'd of life by mighty Ajax' spear,
Far from Larissa, where his friends did dwell,
And never for his breeding payed were.
And Hector then a spear at Ajax threw,
Which he perceiving, did a little shun,
A very little it beside him flew,
And killed Schedius, Iphitus' son,
That of Photæans all was far the best,
And did in well-built Panopæa reign.
The spear, sharp-pointed, enter'd at his breast,

And at his shoulder out it went again.
And Ajax then the valiant Phorcys slew,
That ‘bout the body of Hippothous went.
The spear through breast-plate and through belly flew,
And as it pass’d the guts in pieces rent.
Then Hector and the Trojan lords gave way,
Retiring from the Argive lords; and thus
By th’ Argives coming in, without delay,
Stripp’d were both Phorcys and Hippothous.
And now the Trojans had, for want of heart,
Been chased by the Argives up to Troy,
And th’ Argives gotten had on th’ other part,
Without the Gods, an honourable day;
Had not Apollo, like to Periphas,
Anchises’ squire, to Æneas come disguised,
That very wise now grown, and aged was,
And standing by his side, him thus advised;
Æneas, cannot you, without the Gods,
As well as the Achæans, gain the day
By valour, since in men they have no odds?
For Jove would rather you should win than they.
Thus Phœbus said. Æneas knew ’twas he;
And with a loud voice, unto Hector said:
Hector, and you who the commanders be
Of Trojans, or have brought unto them aid,
Oh, what a shame ’tis for us thus to run
Before the Greeks, ourselves in Troy to hide!
But come, there yet amongst the Gods is one
That hath assur’d me Jove is on our side.

This said, before the Trojans he leapt out,
And with his spear in hand, stood at their head.
And when he made them had to wheel about,
Unto the body he directly led,
And with his spear Leocritus he slew,
The friend of Lycomed, Arisbas' son;
And Lycomed, displeas'd, at Hector threw,
And hit him not, but kill'd Apisaon;
Of all that from Pæonia pass'd the seas,
He was in battle of the greatest might,
Excepting no man but Asteropæus;
Who angry at his fall went to the fight.
But now the Greeks about Patroclus stood
So close, with spears advanc'd, with bucklers hidden,
That there Asteropæus did no good;
For by great Ajax so they had been bidden.
Let none from hence again retire, said he,
Nor any man before the rest skip out,
But stand together till you charged be.
Thus roaring to them Ajax went about,
And thick the Trojans and their aids now fell,
And with their blood bedewed was the ground.
Nor did the Argives come off very well;
But fewer of them 'mongst the dead were found,
For standing close, one shield sav'd more than one.
Thus keen as fire on both sides fought they here;
And such a darkness was the place upon,
As if nor sun nor moon in safety were.
But th' other places all about had light,

And brightly did the sun in Ida shine,
And gentle at a distance was the fight,
And one another's spear did oft decline.
But in the middle, where the very best
Both of the Argives and the Trojans stood,
The pain they suffer'd cannot be express'd,
Of restless labour, and of loss of blood.
But of Patroclus, by the Trojans kill'd,
Antilochus and Torasymed knew not,
But fought in other places of the field,
And that he still pursu'd the Trojans thought,
When for his body, who the same should get,
Now fighting were the Trojans and the Greeks,
And from their knees and legs ran down the sweat,
And stained were with blood their arms and cheeks.
As when men set themselves about the skin
Of some fat bull, and stretch it ev'ry way,
That th' humour may go out, the grease go in,
Just so Patroclus' body tugged they,
Trojans to Troy, and Argives to the fleet;
And thereupon arose this mighty fray.
If Mars or Pallas had been there to see't,
They had not known on whom a fault to lay,
Though angry they had been; such work was then
By Jove, about Patroclus' body, set
For Trojans and for Argives, horse and men.
But to Achilles known it was not yet,
That slain by th' Trojans was his favourite.
For now not far off from the Trojan wall,

At a great distance from him, was the fight,
So that he thought not on his death at all;
But having chas'd the Trojans to the gates
Of Ilium, that straight he would come back;
For well he knew 'twas order'd by the Fates,
Patroclus never should the city sack.
His mother, Thetis, oft had told him that,
As she before had told it been by Jove;
But quite Patroclus' destiny forgat,
Or knew it not, whom he so much did love.
The Greeks and Trojans at the body staid
Together close, and one another kill'd.
And one Achæan to another said,
'Twould be a great disgrace to quit the field,
And leave the body of Patroclus thus;
I rather had by th' earth we swallowed were,
Than they should have it and crow over us,
And to the town the noble body bear.
The Trojans likewise t' one another cried,
Though ev'ry one of us were sure to die
By this man's body, let us here abide.
And then the clamour rose up to the sky.
Achilles' steeds now, with Automedon
Upon the car, without the battle stood;
But to the fight he could not get them on.
He to them call'd, but that would do no good;
And then he flatters them, then threats, then whips,
But for Patroclus griev'd, they would not go
With th' Argives to the fight, nor to the ships,

But lay down on the ground, and wept for woe
That they had lost a gentle char'oteer.
Jove, seeing them upon the ground thus laid,
And for Patroclus how they grieved were,
Shaking his head, unto himself he said,
Poor steeds, why did I you on man bestow,
That mortal is, and you immortal are,
And make you also misery to know,
And to participate of human care?
There breatheth not upon the earth so wide,
So poor a thing and wretched as a man.
But Hector on your car shall never ride,
For he, without my leave, do nothing can.
Is't not enough for him that he hath got
Achilles' arms, to please himself in vain?
But have Achilles' horses he shall not,
For you shall to the ships return again,
And safely carry back Automedon,
Though to the Trojans I intend to-day
The victory, till setting of the sun,
And that by darkness parted be the fray.
This said, he strength and courage to them gave:
Automedon then to the troops of Greece,
As swiftly the immortal horses drave
As flies a vulture at a flock of geese.
For from the foe he quickly could retire,
And easily upon them go again,
As oft as the occasion should require;
But by his hand no enemy was slain,

For since he was upon the seat alone,
He could not both together fight and guide.
But to him came at last Alcimedon,
Laertes' son, and stood by th' char'ot side.
What God, said he, has put it in your head,
Automedon, amongst so many spears
To be alone, knowing your friend is dead,
And Hector now Achilles' armour wears?
Automedon unto him then replied:
Alcimedon, a fitter man is none
Than you are, the immortal steeds to guide,
Since Menoctiades, my friend, is gone.
Get up then you, and the good steeds command,
Whilst on the ground I with the Trojans fight.
Alcimedon then took the whip in hand
And reins; Automedon did then alight.
This Hector saw, and to Æneas spake:
Achilles' horses yonder coming are;
To us, said he, they are not hard to take,
For with them there is no great man of war;
And if we to them go, they dare not stand.
This said, Æneas well contented was,
And forward then they go, with spear in hand,
And shoulders cover'd well with hide and brass.
And Chromius with them, and Aretus went,
And made no doubt but both the men to slay;
And then to seize Achilles' steeds they meant,
And with the car triumphing drive to Troy.
Vain men, that were not sure themselves to save.

To Jupiter Automedon then pray'd,
Who heard his pray'r, and great strength to him gave.
And then unto Alcimedon he said:
Alcimedon, keep still thy horses near,
So that upon my back may fall their breath;
For quiet never will be Hector's spear,
Until of both of us he see the death,
And set himself upon Achilles' car,
And put the squadrons of the Greeks to rout,
Or be amongst the foremost slain i' th' war.
This said, he to th' Ajaxes cried out,
And Menelaus: Ajax, Menelaus,
The care of him that's dead to others give,
And shew your valour where there is more cause.
Come hither, and take care of us that live;
For Hector and Æneas both are here.
But yet, since on Jove's will dependeth all,
Both good and evil hap, I'll throw my spear,
And let him where he pleaseth make it fall.
And as he spake the spear he from him sent,
Which chanc'd to light upon Aretes' shield,
And passing through, into his belly went,
At which he starting fell upon the field.
And at Automedon then Hector threw;
But stooping forward he the spear declin'd,
And o'er his head through th' empty air it flew,
And shaking fix'd it stood i' th' ground behind.
And then the fight by Mars becalmed was;
But with their swords they had again fall'n on,

But that th’ Ajaxes two and Menelaus
Came in, that call’d were by Automedon.
Æneas then and Hector shrunk away,
And Chromius with them, but Aretes not,
But on the ground without his armour lay.
Automedon then mounts his chariot
All bloody, and the armour by him set;
And said, though this revenge be very small
For great Patroclus’ death, ’tis better yet,
Though this a worse man be, than none at all.
And at Patroclus’ body now the fight
Was greater than before, and fiercer grown.
For Pallas coming, did the Greeks incite,
By Jove himself (whose mind was chang’d) sent down.
As when to mortals Jove will signify
Th’ approach of war, or tempests cold and loud,
To make men leave their work, and cattle die,
He sets up in the sky a purple cloud;
In such a cloud wrapp’d up Athena came,
The daughter of great Jove, and martial maid,
To th’ Argive host, their courage to inflame,
And to Atrides, who stood nearest, said,
In voice and shape like Phœnix: Menelaus,
If you let dogs Patroclus’ body tear,
That of Achilles so beloved was,
You will be scorn’d. Go to him, do not fear.
Phœnix, said he, would Pallas strengthen me,
And save me from so many spears that fly,
Patroclus’ body soon should rescued be.

For no man for him griev'd is more than I,
But Hector fighteth like a raging flame,
And as he goes Jove gives him victory.
This said, Athena pleas'd was with the same,
Because to her he trusted specially,
And strengthened both his shoulders and his thighs,
And made him bold as is a busy fly,
Which, beaten off, again upon you flies,
And fears not for a little blood to die.
And to Patroclus then went Menelaus,
And 'mongst the throng of Trojans threw his spear.
It chanced that amongst them one there was,
Pydes, Eëtion's son, to Hector dear,
And at the wine his good companion.
Him Menelaus with his spear then slew
Just as he turn'd himself about to run,
And from the Trojans the dead body drew.
To Hector then came Phœbus, having on
The form of Phœnops, son of Asius,
In Hector's grace inferior to none,
And standing by his side said to him thus:
If you be so afraid of Menelaus,
What other Greek will be afraid of you?
He never yet good spear-man counted was,
Nor is, though Pydes now by chance he slew,
And vainly now he thinks alone he can
Bring off Patroclus' body from the field.
This said, unto the body Hector ran,
And Jove then lifted up his mighty shield,

And in thick clouds the mountain Ida wraps,
And dark it was upon the field as night.
And then with lightning and with thunder claps
The squadrons of the Argives puts to flight.
Menelaus, who the Bœotians led,
Hurt in the shoulder by Polydamas,
Of the Achæans was the first that fled,
And Leïtus his mate the second was,
That was by Hector wounded in the wrist,
And could no longer use make of his spear;
But from the battle forc'd was to desist,
And looking still about him ran in fear.
Him Hector as he running was pursues.
On Hector's shield then lights a heavy spear,
That thrown was at him by Idomeneus,
But brake in two; and glad the Trojans were.
And at Idomeneus then Hector threw;
Beside him but a little went the spear,
And lighting upon Cœranus him slew,
Who was Meriones his char'oteer,
And with him came to Lyctus all the way
By sea, and thence he went to Troy by land.
And much good service he had done to Troy,
For fallen had the king by Hector's hand,
And safe had been himself; but now was hit
By Hector's spear betwixt the cheek and ear,
And struck out were his teeth, his tongue was slit,
And fallen to the ground expired there.
And then Meriones took up the reins,

And to Idomeneus cried out to fly.
To little purpose now is all our pains;
You see the Trojans have the victory.
Idomeneus to th' ships then drave away
As fast as he could make the horses go,
As being certain they had lost the day.
And Ajax did the same acknowledge now.
Meriones, said he, and Menelaus,
That Jove will to the Trojans give the day,
A man may see that little judgment has,
So manifestly now he fights for Troy.
The spears thrown by the Trojans never miss,
But on one Greek or other always light;
Ours seldom hit. What cause is there of this,
But that great Jove doth for the Trojans fight?
Let's therefore here consider of some way
To fetch Patroclus off, and then go home.
For to our friends in Greece 'twill be a joy
To see us safe again from Hector come;
Who when they to the sea their faces turn,
Despair of ever seeing us again,
And think that Hector will the navy burn,
And that we there shall ev'ry man be slain.
that we had some fit man here to send
T'Achilles' tent; for nothing yet knows he,
That by the Trojans slain is his dear friend;
But 'tis so dark I no such man can see.
Jove, give us once more a sky serene;
Remove this mist that we may see to fight,

Or if to kill the Argives all you mean,
father Jove, yet kill us in the light.
This said, Jove had compassion on his tears;
The sun again his glitt'ring beams displays,
Scatters the clouds again and th' Heaven clears.
And then to Menelaus Ajax says,
About the field go Menelaus now,
And seek Antilochus, and bid him go
Unto Achilles' tent, and let him know
His friend Patroclus slain is by the foe.
This said, away Atrides went. As when
A hungry lion parteth from a fold,
Having in vain provok'd the dogs and men
That did him from th' expected prey withhold,
Watching all night, when fain he would have fed;
But all the night the darts about him fly
And flaming brands, which lions chiefly dread;
Away he goes i'th' morn unwillingly;
So from Patroclus' body parted he
Against his will, thinking the Greeks afraid
Might leave Patroclus to the enemy,
And to Meriones and th' Ajaxes said,
How good a man Patroclus was you know,
And how in our defence his blood he shed,
And therefore valiantly defend him now.
Let not the foe abuse his body dead.
And when he this had said he went away,
Amongst the Argives peeping here and there,
Like to an eagle soaring for a prey

Amongst the bushes peeping for a hare;
So he amongst the Argives look'd about
Seeking of Nestor's son Antilochus.
Nor was it long before he found him out,
Cheering his men, and said unto him thus:
Antilochus, come near, and hear from me
Sad news; I would it were not also true.
That now the Trojans have the victory,
I think it is already known to you.
But further know that slain Patroclus is.
Run therefore to Achilles quickly, and
Tell him the news. It may be, mov'd by this
To help the Argives with his mighty hand,
He'll to the naked body hither come;
For now Achilles' armour Hector wears.
At this Antilochus was stricken dumb,
And filled were and swoln his eyes with tears.
And there Antilochus no longer staid,
But to Laodocus his armour gave,
And he the same upon his char'ot laid;
For to that end he near unto him drave.
Away Antilochus then weeping went
To carry to Achilles the ill news,
And left to Thrasymed his regiment.
For Menelaus did the same refuse;
Though of a valiant commander then
The tired Pylians had the greatest need,
And to the Ajaxes return'd again
Where lay Patroclus' body, with all speed.

And when he thither came, unto them said,
Antilochus is to Achilles gone,
Although I see not how he should us aid.
How can he, seeing armour he has none?
Let's therefore now bethink ourselves, how we
Ourselves may bear the body from the field,
And also how we may secured be,
Against the Trojans, that we be not kill'd!
Ajax to this replying said, 'Tis true,
And the advice I'll give you will be right.
Take up the corpse, Meriones and you,
And on your shoulders bear it from the fight.
We two, that are of one name and one mind,
And in the field together use to be,
Will fighting with the Trojans come behind,
Till at the ships the body lain we see.
This said, Meriones and Menelaus
Up to their shoulders hoist the body dead.
Whilst towards them the back of Ajax was,
The Trojans with great shouting followed.
Just as a pack of hounds pursue a boar
Wounded by hunters, running with great cry,
Until he turn; then follow him no more,
But scatter'd are, and this and that way fly;
So did the Trojans after Ajax run
As long as towards them was not his face.
But when he turned, near him durst stay none,
But stood at a great distance from the place.
Thus fetch'd they off at last the body dead,

With at their heels of Trojans' spears great showers;
And Argives dropt abundance as they fled,
Like houses in a town on fire, and tow'rs.
As when two mules in heavy way are set
To drag down from the hills some mighty tree,
To be a beam or mast, it makes them sweat
Before into the plain it drawn could be;
So Menelaus and Meriones
Sweating and moiling with the body go;
And as a rock that keepeth off the seas;
So Ajax at their backs kept off the foe.
The Trojans, led by Hector and Æneas,
Pursue the flying Greeks with mighty cry,
As from a hawk that preys on birds like these,
A cloud of starlings cackle when they fly.
And many of them threw their arms away,
And that they came to fight had quite forgot;
In and about the ditch much armour lay
Of flying Greeks. But done the fight was not.

LIB. XVIII.

The grief of Achilles, and new armour made for him by Vulcan.

WHILST AT THE ships the Greeks and Trojans fought,
Antilochus came to Achilles' tent,
And found him to the Argive ditch gone out,
Presaging in his mind the sad event,
And saying to himself, Ah me, what's this?
The battle to the ships is come again;
Pray God it be not as I fear it is,
The Greeks are routed and Patroclus slain.
My mother told me that the best of all
The Myrmidons by th' Trojans should be slain.
I bad him not assault the Trojan wall,
Nor fight with Hector, but come back again.
As speaking to himself Achilles stood,
Antilochus unto him weeping came,
The news, said he, I bring you is not good;
I cannot without tears relate the same.
Slain is Patroclus. On the ground he lies,
And now they fighting are with swords and spears
Who shall his body have, with mighty cries,
Though naked; for his armour Hector wears.
At this sad news dark were Achilles' eyes;
And up he takes the dust with both his hands,

And throws it on his head; then down he lies,
His face and coat sullied with dust and sands,
And tore his hair. And then the lovely prey
Of captive women, that had taken been
By him and by Patroclus before Troy,
Affrighted from Achilles' tent came in,
And over him they beat they breasts and moan'd.
On t' other side Antilochus was fain
To hold his hands, so mightily he groan'd;
Lest otherwise he should himself have slain.
His mother Thetis hearing him complain,
Though sitting in the deepest of the seas,
Wept out aloud, and presently her train
About her came of the Nereiades.
Glauca, Thaleia, and Cymodoca,
Nesæa, Speio, Thoa, Halia,
And Æmioreia, and Cymothoa,
Melita Iæra, and Amphithoa,
And Doto, Proto, Actæa, Agava,
Doris, Dexamena, Dynamena,
And Callianeira, and Amphinoma,
Pherusa Apseudes, and fair Panopa,
Nemertes, and the milk-white Galatæa,
And Clymene there was, and Callianassa,
And Mæra, Orithvia, and glorious Amatheia,
And, not to name them all, fair Janassa
With all the rest, and fill'd the silver cave,
And beat their breasts, and round her stood dismay'd.
And Thetis then th' account unto them gave

Of her great grief, and thus unto them said:
Hear me, Nereiades, my sisters dear,
And be acquainted with my misery.
Ah, wretched Goddess that I was, to bear
The best of all the heroes; and when he
Was quickly grown up to a goodly height,
Send him unto the war at Ilium
Against the Trojans for the Greeks to fight,
From whence he never should again come home;
But spend his little time of life in woe,
And I can nothing do for his relief.
And now I mean to visit him, and know,
Since he not fights, what cause he hath of grief.
This said, she with her nymphs went from the cave.
The sea before them her smooth water tore,
And gentle passage to the Goddess gave,
Till they were landed on the Trojan shore,
Where lay Achilles' ships upon the sand;
And straight up to Achilles Thetis went,
The nymphs attending on her hand in hand,
And seeing him so grievously lament,
She held him by the head, and to him said,
Why weep you thus, sweet child; what is't you ail?
For that which formerly to Jove you prayed
Against th' ingrateful Greeks, I did prevail.
To th' ships they have been beaten from the field,
And know in what great need they stand of you,
And have in heaps been by the Trojans kill'd.
To this Achilles answ'ring said, 'Tis true,

But in my life what pleasure can I find,
Since sweet Patroclus slain is by his foes,
On whom of all men most I set my mind,
And Hector in his arms triumphing goes;
Those mighty arms, giv'n by the Gods that day
That you were pleas'd a mortal man to wed,
To Peleus. Oh, had you been away,
And he a mortal woman married!
You had not for your son been grieved then,
That never to you should return again.
Nor do I wish to live with mortal men,
But till I with my spear have Hector slain.
By what you say, said Thetis to her son,
Short-liv'd you are. Your own fate then is nigh.
I care not, said Achilles, when that's done
I shall be very well content to die.
For since I never must return again,
And no defence in me Patroclus found,
Nor other good men by the Trojans slain,
I but a needless weight am to the ground.
Oh that contention lost for ever were,
And choler to the heart of man so sweet,
Which often make the wisest men to err!
In Agamemnon and myself I see't.
But since 'tis past, let's put it out of mind.
For dead he is, and cannot live again.
And now I'll see if Hector I can find,
That has my dearest friend Patroclus slain,
And then let Jove do what himself thinks good.

For Hercules could not avoid his fate,
Who most of mortals in his favour stood,
But died by destiny and Juno's hate;
And so shall I, when my day shall arrive,
Lie still when dead. But now let me gain fame
Amongst th' Achæans while I am alive.
And make some Trojan or some Dardan dame
With both her tender hands to tear her cheeks,
And sigh, and with her tears her beauty blot,
And know my hand from that of other Greeks,
And when I with th' Achæans am, when not.
And therefore, mother, dearly as you love me,
Endeavour not to make me here abide.
For from my purpose you cannot remove me.
Unto Achilles Thetis then replied,
Dear child, your purpose I'll not reprehend,
Patroclus' body from the foe to save,
Nor that the Argive people you defend.
But now you know your arms the Trojans have,
And Hector weareth them; but shall not long.
The latest of his days is to him nigh.
But go not you into the bloody throng,
Till here again you have me in your eye.
This said, she turn'd to the Nereiades,
And to them said, Nereiades, dive you
To Nereus, at the bottom of the seas,
And all you see has happ'ned to him show.
For I up to Olympus must be gone
To Vulcan, if such favour I can gain,

To get a good new armour for my son.
This said, the nymphs to sea return'd again,
And Thetis to Olympus went her way.
Meanwhile the Greeks before the Trojans fly
With mighty cries, and never stopt till they
Were at the ships, and to the wide sea nigh.
Nor was Patroclus' body rescued yet;
For now afresh the Trojans to them came,
Which did another fiercer fight beget,
And Hector fell upon them like a flame.
Thrice laid he hold upon Patroclus' foot,
And forc'd he was as oft to let it fall
To kill some others, then again came to't,
But from the body went not back at all.
No more could Hector driven be away
From the dead body by th' Ajaxes two,
Than can a hungry lion from his prey
For anything the herdsmen griev'd can do.
And Hector had Patroclus' body got,
And gained had thereby a great renown,
But Juno, though the other Gods knew not,
T' Achilles in great haste sent Iris down.
T' Achilles straight she came, and to him said,
Up, terrible Pelides, to the war,
And your beloved friend Patroclus aid;
For at the ships they fighting for him are.
The Greeks to save his body are in pain,
The Trojans fain would drag him into Troy,
And Hector most of all that has him slain,

And from his shoulders take his head away
And stick it up upon the Trojan wall,
Leaving his corpse a prey to dog and kite.
Think what reproach will then upon you fall.
Lie then no longer here, but rise and fight.
Achilles then replied. Iris, said he,
Tell me what God or Goddess sent you down.
Juno, said Iris, sent me; none but she.
To all the rest my coming is unknown.
And then Achilles to her said again,
Since they have got my arms how can I fight?
And Thetis bids me from the war abstain
Till she return again into my sight,
Who is to Vulcan for new armour gone,
And here's no other armour for me fit
But Ajax's; who, I hope, has it on,
And for Patroclus now has use of it.
We know, said Iris, armour you have none.
But as you are, upon the ditch appear.
The Trojans from the corpse will soon begone,
And leave it to the Greeks for very fear.
This said, the Goddess Iris vanished.
Achilles rose, and Pallas to him came,
And on him puts her shield, and on his head
A golden cloud, from which arose a flame.
As when an isle invaded is by foes,
The citizens to call their neighbours in
Make fires, the smoke up to the heaven goes
By day; by night the flame; and far are seen;

Upon Achilles' head stood such a flame,
And then unto the ditch he went and shouted,
And farther off Athena did the same.
The Trojans, when they heard it, strait were routed.
As clear as any trumpet in the wars,
They heard Achilles' voice, and were afraid,
And in disorder turn'd about their cars,
But at his flaming head were most dismay'd.
Thrice shouted he, thrice they disorder'd were;
And slain were of the Trojans twelve brave men
By their own cars and spears encumber'd there.
In so much haste they turn'd to fly. And then
The Greeks the body laid upon a bed
And bier, and standing by his side lament.
And tears abundance there Achilles shed,
And that he sent him had did now repent.
The sun by Juno hasten'd quench'd his fire;
The Argives on the place stay quietly;
The Trojans to without the ditch retire,
And from the cars the weary steeds untie.
Then presently the chiefs to counsel call
Before they sup, and standing on their feet,
This apparition so scar'd them all,
That none amongst them had a mind to sit.
And first unto them spake Polydamas
Panthoides, Hector's friend; both born one night.
He better counsellor than Hector was,
But Hector better was than he to fight.
My friends, be well advised now, said he,

It is not safe here on the plain to stay
Until the morning light again we see,
So near the Argive ships, so far from Troy.
Whilst this man absent was in discontent
With Agamemnon, and forbore to fight,
The Greeks were easy foes; to th' ships I went
Myself, and willingly lay out all night;
But if Achilles hither now should come,
We must not only here fight for our lives;
So proud he is, he'll go to Ilium,
And for the city fight and for our wives.
Let's to the city go. 'Tis as I say,
And nothing keeps him from us but the night.
And if he here shall find us when 'tis day,
Some of us will acknowledge I say right.
And many flying, wish, when 'tis too late,
They were within the walls of Ilium,
Whom dogs and kites shall eat without the gate.
But to my ears may never such news come.
But if you will be ruled all by me,
Into the market-place of Troy by night
We'll bring our strength, and, soon as we can see,
Stand arm'd upon the tow'rs prepar'd to fight.
Then let him from the ships come fight at Troy,
And drive about the walls and do his worst,
And having tir'd his horses go away;
Take it he shall not, dogs shall eat him first.
Then Hector frowning on him, thus replies:
Again, said he, I from you must dissent,

Since you to shut ourselves in Troy advise.
We have already there too long been pent.
Troy once was counted rich in brass and gold;
But since Jove angry was, all that is gone,
In Phrygia and in Mœonia sold,
And little left in Ilium to be won;
But since the Greeks are beaten and dismay'd
By th' hand of Jove, your fear is out of season,
Nor will you by the Trojans be obey'd,
Nor shall you; though the Trojans thought it reason.
And therefore take my counsel, which is this.
Go now and ev'ry man his supper take
In rank and file there where he placed is;
And set good guards, and keep yourselves awake.
If any Trojan for his goods lament,
He may the same upon the town bestow
In service of the public to be spent,
Rather than be possessed by the foe;
And armed in the morn go to the fleet,
And sharply charge the Greeks by break of day.
And if indeed Achilles there we meet,
He were not best oppose us in our way;
For from him I will neither fly nor shrink,
But either honour from him bear away,
Or he from me. Mars common is, I think,
To them that fight; and slain are they that slay.
This said, the Trojans heard with great applause,
Fools as they were; Pallas had made them mad.
But none of them commend Polydamas,

That given them much better counsel had.
The Trojans presently to supper went,
The Greeks all night about Patroclus stand;
And there began Achilles to lament.
And on Patroclus' breast he laid his hand.
As when a lion coming to his den,
Misses the tender whelps he left behind,
He roars, and furiously goes out again,
And through the vallies hunts, the thief to find;
Such fierce thoughts on Achilles' heart then lay,
And sighing, to the Myrmidons he spake:
Oh, what did I to old Menœtius say!
How vain a promise did I to him make;
I said, when we had sack'd the town of Troy,
That I to Opus would bring back his son,
Enriched with his portion of the prey.
But all we hope from Jove is seldom done.
For both of us have the same destiny,
With our heart's blood to dye the Trojan plain,
And as he lieth now, so shall I lie,
And never to my parents come again.
But since, Patroclus, you the first are dead,
Your funeral I will not celebrate,
Till I have brought you Hector's arms and head,
Whose bloody hand deliver'd your sad fate,
And have twelve of the noble youths of Troy
Beheaded in revenge. Till then stay here,
Where Trojan captive women, night and day
Bewailing you, shall stand about the bier.

This said, he order gave for water hot,
To cleanse Patroclus' body from the gore.
Into a cauldron, said he, water put,
And make a fire, and set the cauldron o'er.
Into a cauldron water then they put,
And made a fire, and set the cauldron o'er.
The flame about it goes; the water's hot.
Then washed from the body was the gore,
And then again they laid him on the bed;
From head to foot in linen they him fold,
And on him laid a fair white coverlid,
His wounds first fill'd with unguent nine years old.
About the body of Patroclus stay'd
Achilles and the Myrmidons, all night
Lamenting him. Then Jove to Juno said,
You have Achilles brought again to fight
Against the Trojans, on the Argives' side.
Are they your children, that you love them so?
And Juno then to Jupiter replied:
Harsh Cronides, what words do you let go?
Since mortal men, that know much less than we,
May to a friend do good, and hate a foe,
Why may not I, that boast myself to be
The wife and sister of great Jove, do so,
And make my foes, the Trojans, feel my hate?
Whilst Jove and Juno were discoursing thus,
The Goddess Thetis come was to the gate
Of Vulcan's undecaying famous house
Of shining brass, with brighter stars thick set,

That ‘mongst the houses of the heaven shone.
But he was at his work-house in a sweat,
And at his bellows swaying up and down.
For tripods twenty he had laboured,
With golden wheels, to go and come again
At his command; but had not finished
The ears and chains, which he was making then.
And whilst this bus’ness Vulcan was about,
Thetis was come, and at the gate did stand.
And Charis, Vulcan’s wife, then going out,
Saw her, and straightway took her by the hand.
Thetis, said she, ’tis strange to see you here;
Much honour’d, and a welcome guest you are,
Come in, and pleased be t’ accept our cheer.
Then led her in and brought her to a chair,
A dainty chair, with foot-stool join’d thereto,
And then unto her husband’s shop she hied,
For, Thetis, said she, you have work to do.
And Vulcan, glad, to Charis thus replied:
Is Thetis here, that sav’d me from mishap!
When for my lameness thrown down from the sky,
Thetis was pleas’d to catch me in her lap,
When else I had been in great misery.
I wrought for her, and for Eurynome,
Nine years, and made them many pretty things,
Within a rock encompass’d by the sea,
As buckles, clasps, fine boxes, beads, and rings,
Which neither mortal nor immortal knew,
But only Thetis and Eurynome.

And now to Thetis I must pay what's due,
The ransom of my life, for saving me.
Go you, and entertain her well, while I
My tools take up, and bellows set away.
This said, the bellows he took and set by,
But in a chest his working tools did lay.
Then with a sponge he wip'd his hands and face,
His brawny neck, and hairy breast, and on
He puts his coat, and with his staff, apace,
Though halting goes, and waited was upon
By maids of massy gold, endu'd with wit,
And speech, and strength, and learn'd in heav'nly art;
And went to Thetis and did by her sit,
And joyful at her presence was his heart,
And laid his hand on hers, and to her said,
Thetis, so welcome to me there is none;
Tell me wherein you think I can you aid,
And if it can be done, it shall be done.
And then to Vulcan Thetis answered:
No Goddess ever was distress'd like me,
Whom Jove made subject to a mortal's bed,
And Peleus' wife constrained me to be,
Who lies at home decrepid now and spent,
And when I borne unto him had a son,
Of all the heroes the most excellent,
And of his breeding care omitted none,
And when he grown was to a goodly height,
He sent was to the war at Ilium,
Against the Trojans for the Greeks to fight;

From whence he never shall again come home.
Though yet he live, he takes therein no joy,
And I to comfort him no power have,
Since Agamemnon taken has away
Her whom the Greeks for honour to him gave.
And then my son no longer would him aid;
And by the Trojans beaten were the Greeks;
And Agamemnon then sent gifts, and pray'd,
And by ambassadors his favour seeks.
Then though to th' fight himself he would not go,
Yet he his armour to Patroclus gave,
And Myrmidons t' assist him 'gainst the foe,
And to the Scæan gate the Trojans drave.
And by Patroclus taken had been Troy,
Had he not then been by Apollo slain,
That unto Hector gave a glorious day,
And th' armour of my valiant son to gain.
Which makes me now come hither, to request
That you would make new armour for my son,
A shield, a helmet, armour for the breast,
And for the legs; for those he had are gone.
Then to her answer'd Vulcan, Do not fear.
Oh, that when for him the harsh Fates enquire,
To hide him from them I as able were
As make him arms, for mortals to admire.
This said, unto his shop he went, and bad
His golden serving statues blow the fire.
For twenty bellowses in all he had
To blow as he should, and his work require.

And then into the fire he threw in tin,
And brass, and silver fine, and precious gold;
And to the socket puts the anvil in,
And th’ heavy hammer in one hand did hold,
Into his other hand the tongs he takes,
And forges first a mighty shield and strong,
And many various figures in it makes,
And fastens to the same a silver thong,
And bound the edge about with triple brass.
The shield itself consisted of five plies,
And with great art described in it was
The surface of the earth, the sea and skies,
The sun, the moon at full, and all the train
Of heaven, Pleiades, and Hyades,
Orion, and the bear, men call the Wain,
That only never dives into the seas,
But always to Orion has an eye.
And in it were two cities. In the one
Good cheer and weddings, and great melody,
And women at their doors stand looking on
To see the bridegroom as he passed by,
And lusty youths, that dancing with them go,
To citterns and to pipes, and Hymen cry,
And turn as swift as tops upon the toe.
And full of people was the market-place,
Assembled at the hearing of a cause.
A man was slain. And this was then the case.
One said that he had satisfied the laws,
The other said that nothing he had paid;

And on this issue they will both be tried,
And have their proofs before the judges laid,
And clamour great of friends was on each side.
The cryers when they stilled had the cry,
Into the judges' hands their sceptres gave,
And in the midst, of gold two talents lie,
For him that has the better cause to have.
Before the other town two armies stood.
The foe resolved was to plunder it;
The town, to save it, offer'd half their good,
The other to accept it thought not fit.
Then up unto the walls the towns-men sent
Their women, children, and their men grown old,
And all the rest out from the city went,
And Mars and Pallas with them, all in gold,
And taller than the multitude by odds,
Who in respect of them seem'd very low,
For men are much inferior to the Gods.
Then they before the gate to council go.
The enemies themselves in ambush laid
At th' watering place upon the river's brink,
And scouts sent out, which not far from them staid,
To tell them when the cattle came to drink.
And when they were informed they were nigh,
And shepherds two, that did suspect no harm,
They on the shepherds and the cattle fly.
At which the other army took th' alarm,
And rising up from council, with their horse
Pursued, and soon they overtaken were,

And then began the fight. Without remorse
They one another slay with sword and spear.
And there disorder plac'd was and debate;
And one borne wounded out, another found,
Another dead was dragg'd away by Fate,
With bloody coat and armour on the ground.
So lively seemed to the eye their features,
In fighting and in fetching off their slain,
One would have thought they had been living creatures,
And that the fight had real been. Again
Describ'd was in the same a spacious ground,
And men at plough; and at each ridge's end,
At turning of the plough about, they found
A man that for them did with wine attend.
And then again the plough about they wind,
And lab'ring to the other end go back;
And as they plough, still what they leave behind,
Though golden 'twas, to th' eye appeared black;
A wonder 'twas. Besides, in the same shield
Pourtrayed, was a goodly close of wheat,
And many reapers working on the field,
That threw it to the ground in handfuls great;
And boys that follow'd took it from the ground,
And put it in the hands of binders three,
By whom they made were into sheaves and bound,
Which standing by, their lord was glad to see.
His squires not far off standing were aside;
And at a tree a cow kill'd of the best,
A supper for the reapers to provide,

And to the women gave it to be dress'd.
And in't a golden vineyard was pourtray'd:
The grapes that on it hung were black, and all
The vines supported and from drooping staid
With silver props, that down they could not fall.
A ditch there was about it black, and on
The same a hedge, the colour of it tin,
And path unto it there was only one,
By which the fruit in vintage was brought in.
And on it boys and girls described were,
After a fiddle play'd on by a boy,
That sing, dance, whistle, and full baskets bear,
Of Bacchus' gifts, unto the house with joy.
And in it was a herd of bulls and kine,
Part gold, part tin, and herds-men four of gold,
That to the pasture drave them with dogs nine,
T' a sedgy river; where two lions bold
Upon the horned herd came from a wood,
And 'mongst the foremost seiz'd upon a bull;
The dogs went to them near, and barking stood:
Then roars the bull. The lions tear and pull.
And in the same he pasture made for sheep
Within a valley large, with lodges good,
And folds, and cover'd houses them to keep
In safety from the wild beasts of the wood.
And in it was a dancing place pourtray'd,
Like that which Dædalus had made before
For Ariadne, while in Crete he staid,
And on it dancing youths and maidens store

Go hand in hand. The girls, some clad in fine
White linen were, and some in coats well spun
Of glossy wool, that with the oil did shine;
And ev'ry one a garland gay had on.
The boys with silver hangers were adorn'd,
And golden swords, and with their well-taught feet
Sometimes they dancing in a circle turn'd,
Sometimes divided in two ranks they meet.
And round about of people stood a throng,
And in the lovely dance took great delight.
And in the midst two tumblers sung the song,
And many wond'rous things did in their sight.
With the ocean then he all environed.
The shield now done, he went about the rest,
And made a helmet strong fit for his head,
And formed was of massy gold the crest,
And breast-plate shining brighter than the fire,
And pieces for his legs of ductile tin.
And when he all had done to his desire,
He from his forge return'd, and brought it in,
And in the hands of Thetis puts the same;
Which she received from him joyfully.
Then straightway from Olympus down she came,
As swift as at a fowl a hawk can fly.

LIB. XIX.

Achilles reconciled to Agamemnon goes forth to battle.

NO SOONER IN her saffron robe was seen
Aurora, holding light above the ground,
Than at the ships the silver-footed queen
Achilles by Patroclus weeping found,
And with him many of his friends dismay'd.
Then in, into the midst of them she went,
And laid her hand on his, and to him said:
My son, why do you thus in vain lament?
Come, since the Gods have slain him, leave him here,
And take the arms which I from Vulcan bring,
Such as yet mortal man did never wear;
Which, as she lays them down before him, ring.
The Myrmidons were troubled at the sight,
And turn'd their backs, affrighted at the show.
Achilles' wrath was more enflamed by't,
His eyes a-fire, and bended was his brow;
Yet when he had them in his hands was glad,
And with great admiration them survey'd.
And when enough beholden them he had,
Unto his mother he replied, and said:
Mother, I see such arms from Vulcan here,
As none but an immortal could have made,

And presently will put them on, but fear
Lest flies the body should meanwhile invade,
And in the wounds some filthy vermin breed.
And Thetis then replied: Son, do not fear,
For I myself to that will take such heed,
As, that although it should lie here a year,
It shall no worse, but rather better be.
Go you, and th' Argive lords to council call,
And with king Agamemnon there agree,
And put your anger off before them all;
And spend your choler boldly on your foes.
This said, she to Patroclus mov'd her feet,
And dropp'd ambrosia into his nose,
To keep his body incorrupt and sweet.
Achilles then went down unto the shore,
And there the heroes did to council call
By name, though they were ready there before.
But thither at the news came th' Argives all,
Steers-men and stewards of provision,
And all the rest to th' council thronging in,
Though but to see the face of Thetis' son,
So long they thought he absent now had been.
Tydides also, and Ulysses came,
Though of their wounds they yet not cured were,
Both halting, leaning on their spears, and lame.
The last of all was Agamemnon there,
Wounded by Coon, nor recovered yet;
But th' heroes for his coming not long staid.
And when they were together all and set,

Achilles rose, and t' Agamemnon said:
Atrides, what great profit got we by
This our unlucky strife about a maid?
I would it had her fortune been to die,
Before I siege unto Lyrnessus laid.
To Hector and the Trojans comes the gain;
The Greeks with grief will think on't while they live.
But since it is too late now to complain,
Go forth, and orders for the battle give;
That I may to them go again, and see
If at the ships they mean to stay all night.
I think they will much rather wish to be
Within the walls of Troy than stay and fight.
This said, the Greeks were glad and courage take,
Assured that Achilles would them aid,
And Agamemnon, sitting, to them spake,
(Which he excus'd), and thus unto them said:
'Twere fitter, Argive princes, I stood out,
That so my words you might the better hear;
But such a number standing are about,
My voice, though greater, would not reach your ear.
Nor were it fit for me to go about,
And tell my mind to each man in his ear.
T' Achilles therefore only I'll speak out,
But so, if you attend, that all may hear.
I often have, said he, been blamed by
The Greeks for taking from you your fair prize,
When not in me, but Jove the fault did lie,
And in Erinnys and the Destinies,

That did me of my wits that day bereave.
For what can I do when the Gods do all?
Jove's daughter Atè did me then deceive,
From whom, on men and Gods great troubles fall.
Her feet are soft, because she never treads
On th' earth; but when she mischief has to do
Walks in the air, and puts it in men's heads,
And sometimes does shrewd turns t' immortals too.
For Juno, though but of th' female sex,
That day that Hercules was to be born,
Was able Jove, the best o' th' Gods, to vex,
And labour of Alcmena to adjourn.
For Jove before th' immortals having said
That he a man that day to light would bring,
By whom his race in Greece should all be sway'd.
You jest, said Juno, you mean no such thing.
I'll not believe't, unless you first be sworn
That he shall of your seed in Greece be king,
That of a woman shall this day be born.
This said, straight Jove, no fraud imagining,
The great oath took. But after did repent.
And Juno from Olympus' lofty head
Leapt down, and t' Argos of Achaia went,
And brought the wife of Sthenelus to bed.
And there was she deliver'd of a son,
That was by Perseus of Jove's descent,
Though she but seven months had of him gone.
And then to Thebes she to Alcmena went,
And hinder'd her that day from bringing forth.

Then up to Jupiter she came again,
And said, This day is born a man of worth,
Eurysteus, in Argos fit to reign,
And of your seed. And Jove in choler then
Took Atè by the head and swung her round,
And swore she ne'er to heav'n should come again.
And having said it, threw her to the ground;
And always after sigh'd to see the pain
To which Eurysteus did put his son;
As I do, when I see the Argives slain
By Hector, grieve to think what I have done.
But since that Jove has made me to offend,
I for my error willing am to pay.
Come, then, and your assistance to us lend,
And quickly bring your Myrmidons away.
And all that by Ulysses yesterday
I to you promis'd shall performed be.
Or presently, if you will for it stay,
That you th' atoning gifts yourself may see.
Achilles then unto him thus replies.
As for your gifts, to give them me or no,
Yet only in your choice, Atrides, lies.
But now 'tis time we to the Trojans go,
To make fine speeches here is but delay.
But let your men o' th' field Achilles see
Through squadrons of the Trojans making way,
The Argives then encouraged will be.
Ulysses then t' Achilles answered:
Godlike Achilles, mighty as you are,

Urge not the Greeks to fight till they be fed;
They fasting cannot long endure the war,
And likely ’tis the battle will be long,
Especially if Gods both sides assist;
And bread and wine is that which makes men strong.
Let therefore now the Argives be dismiss’d.
Who can, d’ye think, the toil of battle bear
From morning unto night, unless he first
With food his heart and feeble limbs do cheer?
He would be heavy, hungry, and athirst.
But he that is with food well satisfied,
Courageous is, and fight will all the day;
His heart and limbs are strong, and will abide
As long as any on the field dare stay.
Come, let the people now to breakfast go.
And Agamemnon send the presents in
Into th’ assembly where we sit, that so
By the Achæans all they may be seen;
And let him take an oath before us, that
Briseis’ bed he never went unto,
Nor all this while has done unto her what
A husband to his wife is us’d to do.
And you your anger henceforth bridle must.
And you, Atrides, feast him like a friend,
And for hereafter learn to be more just,
Nor think’t a shame for men their faults to mend.
Ulysses, said Atrides, I am joy’d
The counsel you have given us to hear,
For ’tis but reason all that you have said,

And I with all my heart the oath will swear.
And let Achilles, though in haste, stay here
With all the rest, that they my gifts may see,
And witnesses be to the oath I swear.
And for the gifts, Ulysses, presently
Go you yourself with good men, whom you will,
And bring them from my tent and set them here,
For what they are, you well remember still;
The same that by you promis'd from me were.
And you, Talthybius, provide a swine,
That we may offer up a sacrifice
To Jove, the Sun, and other pow'rs divine.
This said, Achilles to him thus replies:
Renowned Agamemnon, I think yet
Another time for feast had better been,
As when in war a pause we intermit.
And whilst yet unabated is my spleen,
We see our friends lie torn upon the ground,
The Greeks to battle and revenge I prompt.
You think my counsel therein is not sound,
And seek with feasting to divert them from't.
But let us fasting to the battle go,
And make good cheer when we come back again,
And have reveng'd ourselves upon the foe;
For I will neither eat nor drink till then.
For whilst Patroclus mangled lieth here,
And they that love him stand lamenting by,
There nothing is that I can think good cheer
But slaughter, blood, and groans of men that die.

To this Ulysses did again reply:
Achilles, you have not in Greece your peer
For martial worth; yet elder much am I,
And more have seen; I pray you therefore hear.
The fare of war soon breeds satiety.
Much straw there is, but harvest none, or small.
If Jove once hold the scales unevenly,
Innumerable are the men that fall.
When then an end of weeping shall we see?
The bellies of the Argives must not mourn.
They that go to the war must patient be,
And let the dead unto their graves be borne,
And not weep over them above a day.
And we that safe from fight are come again,
When we are fed can all day fighting stay.
All other exhortation is vain.
Let therefore now the Greeks to breakfast go,
Which is the soldier's best encouragement,
Then all together fall upon the foe.
And when he this had said, away he went,
And with him took Meges, Meriones,
Theas, Antilochus, and Thrasymed,
And Menalippus, and added unto these
The martial son of Creon, Lycomed,
And brought the presents from Atrides' tent.
Sev'n tripods great, and twenty cauldrons bright,
Twelve horses, and sev'n women with them went,
And, fair'st of all, Briseis made them eight.
Talents of gold Ulysses weigh'd out ten,

And took the pains himself to carry that;
The rest was carri'd by the younger men,
And laid before the princes as they sat.
Then Agamemnon rose, and by him near
Talthybius attended with a swine,
From which Atrides clipt a lock of hair,
And lifts his hands unto the pow'rs divine.
Jove, said he, the chiefest of the Gods,
O Sun, and Earth, and Furies underground,
That in your hands carry th' eternal rods
To punish such as perjur'd shall be found,
My hand I on Briseis never laid,
Neither for bed, nor any other cause;
But always in my tent untouch'd she staid,
Nor ever by me once attempted was.
And if herein I told you have a lie,
Let all the dreadful torments that are due
To such as guilty are of perjury
Upon me fall. This said, the swine he slew.
Then out the stomach of the swine did cut,
And that Talthybius took in his hands.
And threw't into the sea the fish to glut.
That done, Achilles up amongst them stands.
'Tis thou, O Jove, said he, that spoilest all.
Briseis at my tent had stayed still,
Nor had her going from me mov'd my gall,
But that thou hadst a mind the Greeks to kill.
This said, the council he dissolv'd, and sent
Th' Achæans to their ships to break their fast.

Then ev’ry man unto his own ship went,
And busy were about their short repast.
Meanwhile the Myrmidons the presents bear
T’ Achilles’ ships, and laid them in his tent,
And thither also brought the women were.
But th’ horses to the field his servants sent.
Briseis, when she saw Patroclus lie
With many ghastly wounds dead on the bier,
She flung her arms about him and did cry,
And her white neck, and face, and breast did tear,
And weeping over him did thus complain.
dear Patroclus, whom alive I left,
Now when I to you am return’d again,
Ah me, I find you of your life bereft.
How fast my woes on one another fall!
The husband which my parents made me wed,
And three good brothers of one mother all,
I saw before Lyrnessus massacred.
And then, Patroclus, you to comfort me,
Told me that I should be Achilles’ wife,
And to him married in Pthia be.
But now since you have also lost your life,
I never of my woe shall see an end.
And then the other women wept and roar’d,
All for Patroclus, as they did pretend,
But inwardly their own fate they deplor’d.
The Greeks again about Achilles stood,
And urged him, ere he to battle went,
Himself to strengthen with a little food,

But could by no means get him to consent.
My friends, said he, importune me no more
To eat or drink before we go to fight.
My heart within me now is vexed sore;
Fear not, I shall endure from morn to night.
This said, the other princes from him went.
The two Atrides and Ulysses stay,
And Phœnix and old Nestor at his tent,
And King Idomeneus, his grief t' allay,
But nothing they could say did any good,
So fiercely he was set upon the fight.
And looking on Patroclus' body stood,
And then afresh lamented at the sight.
Sweet friend, said he, you wont were to provide
Good breakfast for me when I was to fight,
But since that comfort now I am denied,
In meat and drink I take no more delight.
For greater hurt cannot upon me fall,
Although for want of me my father die,
While absent from him at the Trojan wall,
For this accursed Helen's sake I lie;
Nor though my son Neptolemus should die,
Whom I in Scyros isle left to be bred,
Nor thinking then that here both you and I
Should lose our lives; but that when I was dead
He should by you be to my house convey'd,
And made to know my servants and estate.
For Peleus now is very much decay'd,
If quite he have not finished his fate.

When this Achilles, weeping, spoken had,
The good old men, that also had their fears
For those they left at home, were very sad.
And Jove had pity on Achilles' tears,
And speaking to Athena, Child, said he,
Your love to valiant men, I see, is gone.
Achilles must no more remember'd be.
Behold how for his friend he maketh moan,
And takes no food, though th' other princes feast,
Let not his strength by hunger be decay'd;
Distil ambrosia into his breast,
And nectar. Straight Athena him obey'd.
And swift as any harpy came away,
And arming of themselves she found the rest;
But that Achilles' strength might not decay,
She dropt ambrosia into his breast,
And nectar sweet, and out the Argives went.
As when from Jove descendeth a thick snow,
Which Boreas bloweth through the element;
Such of the armed Argives was the show;
So bright their burnish'd arms and helmets were,
The lustre up to heaven did rebound,
And smiling all about the fields appear,
And at the moving of their feet resound.
Achilles then his mighty arms puts on,
And grinds his teeth, and fire was in his eyes,
And hasted to the battle to be gone;
So much his heart did at the Trojans rise.
First to his legs the leg pieces he tied

With buckles of fine silver all along,
And next his breast-plate to his breast applied,
And on his shoulder then his sword he hung;
Then up into his hands his shield he took,
Large, strong, and mighty; radiant was the same,
And from afar it like the moon did look,
Or, as to seamen, on the wolds a flame,
That sure are of a storm when that they see,
And from their friends to scatter'd be by wind
To places where they not desire to be;
So then the buckler of Achilles' shin'd.
And next he puts his helmet on his head,
Which shined like a comet in the air,
So finely Vulcan had it polished,
And made it seem to blaze with golden hair.
And then to try his arms if fit they were,
He walk'd about, and thought he wings had worn.
And last from out a tub he took his spear
(Which by his father formerly was borne,
And made by Chiron in Mount Pelion)
Which no man but Achilles now could wield,
Since Peleus' strength decayed was and gone.
A fatal spear to heroes in the field.
And Alcimus then and Automedon,
The horses to the chariot made fast,
And harness'd them and put their bridles on,
And back unto the seat the reins they cast.
With whip in hand then mounts Automedon,
And after him Achilles not long staid,

Yclad in armour shining like the sun,
And roughly to his horses speaking said,
Xanthus and Balius take heed I pray,
A little better of your char'oteer,
Than of Patroclus you did yesterday,
Whom dead and stript you left behind you here.
This said, his sprightly head low Xanthus hung,
Till on the ground his golden mane was laid.
And Juno human speech gave to his tongue.
And to Achilles then he spake and said,
Yes, great Achilles, we will save you now:
But know ye, that your utmost day is nigh;
Not by our faults; the Gods will have it so,
And, which cannot be shunn'd, your destiny.
And that Patroclus is disarm'd and slain,
'Twas not because we lazy were or slow,
But that Priamides might honour gain,
Apollo slew him with his silver bow.
For we could have gone faster than the wind,
If that could to him any good have done.
The thread of life which for him was design'd
Was by the Destinies drawn out and spun.
This then said Xanthus, but could not proceed.
His speech the Furies from him took again.
Xanthus, replied Achilles, there's no need
For you to prophecy my death in vain.
I know already that I here must die,
Far from my parents; yet I mean to stay
Till I have made the Trojans hence to fly.

This said, his Myrmidons he led away.

LIB. XX.

The eighth battle, and the Gods permitted to assist.

WHILST WITH ACHILLES th' Argives armed stand,
And on the plain the Trojans ready all,
Jove to the goddess Thetis gave command
The common council of the Gods to call.
Then down she came, and calling went about.
Ye Gods, said she, Jove calls you to his house.
And straight the Rivers from their streams came out,
All but their father old Oceanus.
The Nymphs from ev'ry meadow, spring and grove,
Up to the Mount Olympus went in haste;
And when they come were to the house of Jove,
In porches round on polish'd seats were plac'd;
And Neptune also having heard the call,
Leap'd from the sea up to Olympus' hill,
And sitting in the midst, before them all
To Jove he spake, and said, What is your will?
D'ye call us hither our advice to hear;
To give the day to Trojan or to Greek;
For I perceive the battle now is near?
My mind, said Jupiter, you need not seek.
For of the Greeks distrest I have a care.
But on Olympus I intend to stay,

And please myself with looking on the war.
But let the other Gods go down to Troy,
And take which side they will. For else I fear,
Achilles, whom the Trojans did so dread,
When in the battle no immortals were,
And more enrag'd is since his friend is dead;
When he has driv'n the Trojans from the field,
Will then directly go to Ilium,
And overthrow the wall which you did build,
Before the time, by fate appointed, come.
This said, the fight began. On th' Argives' side
Stood Juno, Pallas, Neptune, Mercury;
And Vulcan, taking in his strength great pride,
Went halting 'mongst them with his legs awry.
On th' other side, Mars for the Trojans stood,
And Phœbus, and his sister Artemis,
Their mother Leto, and Scamander-flood,
And Venus that of all the fairest is.
And whilst they from the battle stood aside,
The Argives mightily encourag'd were,
And in Achilles' presence took great pride;
For long it seem'd they had not seen him there.
The Trojans, when they saw him, shook for fear,
So like to Mars he was, his arms so bright.
But when the Gods on both sides with them were,
Then all about was filled with affright,
And in the air heard was Athena's shrill
As from the ditch, and sometimes from the shore,
And Mars sometimes from Callidone hill,

And sometimes as at Troy was heard to roar,
The Trojans he, but she the Greeks to incite.
Thus by the Gods from heav'n encouraged,
The armies met, and cruel was the fight,
And terribly above Jove thundered,
And Neptune shook the earth on ev'ry side;
The Argive ships, and stately Trojan tow'rs,
The plain beneath, and lofty tops of Ide.
And frighten'd with it were th' infernal pow'rs;
And Pluto, starting from his ugly throne,
To Neptune cried out his hand to hold,
For fear his dismal dwelling should be shown
To men and Gods, so hateful to behold.
So great a noise the Gods make when they fight.
Phœbus to Neptune now opposed is,
And Pallas stands against rude Mars his might,
And Juno matched is with Artemis,
And Mercury against Latona stood.
But he that Vulcan had to deal withal,
Was the divine and deep swift-running flood,
Which Xanthus Gods, but men Scamander call.
Thus were th' Immortals matched one to one.
Achilles would have given any good
That he had matched been to Priam's son,
T' have made to Mars a breakfast of his blood.
And then Apollo sets Æneas on
T' encounter with Achilles; and array'd
In th' person and the voice of Lycaon
Came to his side, and thus unto him said:

Æneas, when the wine was in your head,
I oft have heard you of yourself say this,
That ‘gainst Achilles you in fight durst stand.
What say you to him now? See, there he is.
Priamides, Æneas then replied,
Why would you have me with Achilles fight?
I once already was, upon mount Ide
Keeping our cattle, by him put to flight;
And thence for safety to Lyrnessus fled.
But he the town Lyrnessus quickly won,
And Pedassus. And then I had been dead
If Jove had not enabled me to run.
For Pallas with him was and made him way,
Striking his foes before him with affright,
And urging him the Trojans to destroy.
’Tis more than man can do t’ oppose his might;
One God or other always with him is
To put aside the spears before they come.
And whom he aims at he doth never miss,
And to the mark his spear flies always home.
But if the Gods unpartial would be,
Although of solid brass his body were,
He should not eas’ly get the victory.
Æneas, then said Phœbus, do not fear,
But pray unto the Gods. Your mother is
Jove’s daughter Cytherea, as they say,
A greater Goddess by descent than his;
And therefore boldly to him go your way.
His mighty words and threats you must not fear.

This said, he courage breath'd into his breast.
Then through the foremost went he with his spear,
And helmet of strong brass with glitt'ring crest.
Now Juno of his going was aware,
And calling to her th' other Gods, she said,
Neptune and Pallas, let us have a care;
I see a danger that ought to be weigh'd.
Æneas yonder, with his spear in hand,
Goes to Achilles with a mind to fight.
Let's keep him off, or by Achilles stand,
And add both to his courage and his might,
That he may know the Gods of greatest pow'r
Are on his side, and those that stand for Troy
In virtue much to us inferior,
And dare not in the field against us stay;
And that we from Olympus hither came
To save him now; hereafter, whatsoe'er
Mischances come, he must endure the same,
Since at his birth they woven with him were.
For if unknown our purpose to him be,
To meet a God will put him into fear.
'Tis dangerous Gods as they are to see;
So terrible to mortals they appear.
And Neptune unto Juno then replied,
You are too fierce: a fight between the Gods
I would not have begin upon our side;
Nor does it need, so much we have the odds.
But let's go hence to yonder mountain top,
And leave the battle in the hands of men.

If Mars or Phœbus then Achilles stop,
We to the battle will return again,
And send them to Olympus home with shame,
‘Mongst other of the Gods at court to stay,
Well beaten at our hands, disgrac’d, and tame.
And when he this had said, he led away,
And when he come was to the castle-wall,
Which was by th’ Trojans built for Hercules
By Pallas’ help, to save him from the whale
That much annoy’d the Trojans from the seas,
He and his party of the Gods staid there,
Concealed by a cloud, and looking on.
But Mars and Phœbus, with their party, were
Sitting upon the brow of Callidon.
Thus from the field the Gods on both sides staid,
Consulting how their friends the day might win,
But neither side effectually would aid,
For not a God amongst them durst begin.
Now cover’d over was the field with men,
Both horse and foot, array’d in armour bright;
The earth resounded with their feet. And then
Two warriors in the midst stood out to fight,
Achilles and Æneas, the two best.
And first Æneas, with fierce looks, went on
With spear in hand, and shield before his breast.
To meet him then advanced Thetis’ son.
As when to chase a lion from the plain,
The people of the town with weapons rise,
The lion looks upon them with disdain,

As if he did their multitude despise;
But when a spear from any of them comes,
He whips himself int' anger with his tail,
And terribly goes on, and yawns and foams,
To kill, or to be killed if he fail:
So at the seeing of Æneas' spear,
Achilles did himself to th' fight provoke.
And when they stood to one another near,
Achilles first unto Æneas spoke.
Æneas, why, said he, come you away
So far before the rest? To fight with me?
Will Priam, think you, make you king of Troy,
If by your hand perhaps I slain should be?
No. He is wise, and sons has of his own.
Or will the Trojans set you out great lands,
Some to be planted, others to be sown,
Whenever I am killed by your hands?
But that I hope will never be. You know
How once I made you run down Ida hill,
Into Lyrnessus, in great haste; and how
You ne'er look'd back for fear of greater ill;
And how the town I won, and led away
The women captives; though 'twas then Jove's will
That from my hands you should escape that day,
You must not look that you should do so still.
And therefore I advise you to be gone,
And in the throng o' th' Trojans to abide,
For ev'ry fool his harm knows when 'tis done.
This said, Æneas to him thus replied:

Pelides, do not think you can me fright,
As if I were a child, with words of scorn;
For if in evil words I took delight,
I could as many easily return.
We one another's parents know by fame;
Peleus your father was, Anchises mine.
Your mother is divine, Thetis by name;
And Venus mine, of the celestial line;
And one of them to-day must lose a son,
For 'tis not words can fetch us off this place.
But if you'll know my generation,
I'll by my father likewise count my race;
For first by Jove was Dardanus begot,
That rul'd the Dardans under Ida hill,
In divers towns; for Ilium yet was not,
But at the foot of Ida they dwelt still.
And Dardan Erichthonius begat,
That was the wealthiest of mortal men:
Three thousand mares he had, and unto that
As many foals, all feeding on the fen.
And twelve of these were got by Boreas,
That leapt their dams in likeness of a horse,
And o'er the ears of standing corn could pass
And never make them stoop, such was their force;
And run upon the sea, and never wet
Their hoofs, which very wondrous was to see.
And Erichthonius did Tros beget.
And Tros the father was of children three,
Ilus, Assaracus, and Ganymed.

But Ganymed was taken up by Jove,
So fair he was, and t' heaven carried,
To minister unto the Gods above.
The son of Ilus was Laomedon,
And he Tithonus got, and Priamus,
And Lampus, Clytius, Icetaon.
But Capys son was of Assaracus.
Capys begat Anchises, and he me.
I need not be ashamed of my race,
Though virtue lieth not in pedigree,
But given is to them whom Jove will grace.
Then let us from reproachful words abstain,
Whereof there is great plenty ev'rywhere,
To serve all men that will them entertain,
That as a man will speak, so he may hear.
What need we, like two women in the street,
When they cannot agree, to rail and scoff?
Who, say they true or false, are indiscreet.
For from my purpose you'll not put me off
With scornful words, before your force I try,
Let's therefore here no longer talk, but fight.
And as he spake his spear he letteth fly,
Which on Achilles' mighty shield fell right,
And terribly it made the same resound,
Achilles far before him held his shield,
For fear Æneas through it might him wound;
Though heav'nly arms to mortals will not yield.
But that he thought not on. Nor did the spear,
Well driven as it was, and strong, pass through;

For of five plies that labour'd in it were
By Mulciber, it pierced only two,
And those were brass. There still remained three,
The one of gold, the other two of tin;
And stopped by the brass it could not be,
But coming to the gold it there stuck in.
And then Achilles threw his spear at him,
Which flying with great force pass'd thro' his shield,
Where thin the brass and hide was near the brim,
And over him it flew into the field.
For when Æneas coming saw the spear,
He crouched low, and held his buckler high;
And though the same proceeded but from fear,
It made the spear above his head to fly.
Æneas at the first amazed stands;
But when Achilles with his sword came on,
He stoop'd, and from the ground took in his hands,
That near unto him lay, a mighty stone,
Which two men, such as now are, scarce could bear,
And hit him had on th' head or breast in vain,
That with celestial arms defended were,
And by Achilles' sword himself been slain,
If it had not by Neptune been foreseen.
Who speaking to the Gods did thus complain.
O Gods, said he, great pain I now am in
To see Æneas by Achilles slain,
For heark'ning to Apollo foolishly;
Who will not help him though he set him on.
But wherefore should we let Æneas die,

Others to please, when he no fault has done?
Let's therefore save him, lest we Jove offend,
Who now the offspring of King Priam hates,
And that Æneas' race shall without end
The Trojans rule, 'tis ordered by the Fates.
This said, to Neptune Juno did reply:
If you Æneas have a mind to save,
Save him yourself. For well you know that I
And Pallas 'mongst the Gods sworn often have,
That neither of us shall a Trojan aid,
Though Ilium itself were in a flame.
Away went Neptune soon as that was said,
And to Æneas and Achilles came,
And o'er Achilles' eyes a mist he spread,
And drew his spear out of Æneas' shield;
And to Achilles that he carried,
And laid it at his feet upon the field.
And then Æneas, lifted by the force
Of an immortal God, skipp'd to the rear,
O'er many ranks of heroes and of horse,
Unto the Caucons, that the hindmost were,
Where Neptune standing by him spake, and said:
Æneas, who was't of th' immortal Gods,
That to engage Achilles you betray'd,
That stronger is than you by so much odds?
Henceforth take heed you come not in his way,
Lest by his hand you die. When he is gone,
You boldly on the best adventure may,
For of the rest you slain shall be by none.

This said, he to Achilles went again,
And made the mist to vanish from his eyes,
And round about him look'd Achilles then,
And to his feet return'd, his spear espies,
And said unto himself, O strange, what's this?
The man is gone, my spear come back I see.
Æneas of the Gods beloved is,
And I thought all he said was vanity.
But fare him well. He will not come again,
So glad he is that he hath 'scaped so.
Now I will first put courage in my men,
And then unto some other Trojans go.
Then through the Argive ranks he went, and said,
No longer of the Trojans be so shy,
But man to man go close. Be not afraid;
Strong as I am, you cannot think that I
Can follow such a multitude and fight;
For neither Mars nor Pallas can do that,
Though Gods immortal, and of so great might,
That mortal men cannot resist. Yet what
My strength alone, with hands and feet can do,
I think I shall not anything forbear,
But break their ranks, and make you way clean through;
Nor shall he joyful be whom I come near.
Whilst this Achilles to the Argives said,
Hector no less the Trojans did excite.
Why should you of Achilles be afraid?
With words 'tis easy 'gainst the Gods to fight,
That are too strong to fight with, with a spear;

And to Achilles now I mean to go,
Though fire his hands, and steel his body were,
For more by half he says than he can do.
When Hector to the Trojans this had said,
The fight began, and mighty was the cry;
And then for Hector Phœbus was afraid,
And presently came in, and standing nigh,
Hector, said he, return into the throng.
Take heed. With Thetis' son fight not at all,
Now nor henceforth (he for you is too strong)
Lest by his spear or sword you chance to fall.
Thus Hector, by the God admonished,
Into the Trojan troops retir'd again.
The Trojans then before Achilles fled;
And by him first Iphition was slain,
Whom the nymph Neis to Otrynteus bare,
In Ida, at the foot of Tmolus hill;
Great troops he brought unto the Trojan war,
And thought he could the great Pelides kill:
But coming on, he met Achilles' spear,
The fatal spear, that cleft his head in twain.
Achilles then triumphed o'er him there,
Though fallen to the ground he were, and slain.
So, Otryntides, die there on the earth,
Though where runs Hyllus into Hermus deep,
On the Gygean lake, you had your birth.
This said, he left him in eternal sleep,
For th' Argive char'ot-wheels to crush and grind.
And after him he slew Demoleon,

A warrior good, and of undaunted mind,
That of Antenor was a valiant son.
Him through the head, with spear in hand, he smote,
And out together came both blood and brain;
His helmet, though of brass, preserv'd him not.
And after he Demoleon had slain,
He with his spear pursu'd Hippodamas,
Who from his car had leapt unto the ground;
Frighted, and now before him running was,
And gave him on the back a mortal wound,
Whereat he blows and roars like any bull
Brought to the altar for a sacrifice,
When young men by the horns him thither pull
By violence; then down he falls, and dies.
Unluckily, then in Achilles' sight
Was Polydorus, Priam's youngest son,
And best belov'd; whom he forbad to fight,
Though swiftest of them all he were to run:
But he, the virtue of his feet to shew,
Betwixt the hosts ran up and down the field,
Until a spear Achilles at him threw,
And with a wound upon the back him kill'd;
Out at his navel went the spear again,
And for his guts to follow made a way.
But Hector, when he saw his brother slain,
Amongst his troops he could no longer stay,
But going to Achilles, shook his spear.
Then, speaking to himself, Achilles said,
The man that slew Patroclus I see here,

We must no more each other now avoid;
And sourly on him looking, said, Come near,
That I may quickly of you make an end.
And Hector to him answer'd without fear,
In vain, Achilles, your proud words you spend;
Such words as these may children terrify,
And I can speak that language when I list;
And though you be a mightier man than I,
The victory does not in that consist,
But he shall have it whom the Gods appoint,
Though he be weaker, if his spear fly true,
Which mine may do, and sharp is at the point.
This said, his spear he at Achilles threw,
Which back to Hector's feet Athena blew,
With soft and gentle breath, without a sound;
And straight Achilles, thund'ring, to him flew.
But then Apollo snatch'd him from the ground,
Which is by any God done in a trice,
And in a mist conceal'd him from his sight:
And after him Achilles leapt up thrice,
And thrice the air obscure in vain did smite.
Then whoop'd he after him, and threat'ning said,
Dog, an ill death again thou 'scaped hast,
That fighting, to Apollo pray'st for aid;
But yet I shall dispatch you at the last,
If any of the Gods for me appear;
But now I must to other Trojans go.
This said, at Dryops straight he threw his spear,
And sent his soul unto the shades below.

To meet Demuchus then he went half way,
That with his sword came toward him to fight:
Him with a wound i' th' neck he made to stay,
And with his sword then killed him outright.
Then by him slain the sons of Bias were,
Laogonus and Dardanus, the one
With his great sword, the other with his spear.
And next he killed Tros, Alastor's son,
Who not resisted, but fell at his knee,
And begg'd his life, for being of his age,
Hoping for that he pitied might be.
But that Achilles' wrath could not assuage.
He quite mistook his nature like a child,
For cruel was Achilles, and hard-hearted;
But he sweet-natur'd thought he was, and mild,
Whereas he never thought how others smarted.
And then Achilles gave him such a wound,
That with the blood his liver started out.
And there he left him dying on the ground,
And for more Trojan leaders look'd about;
Then, coming to him, he saw Mulius,
And struck him through the head from ear to ear.
Then with his sword he killed Echeclus,
Antenor's son, that to him came too near.
Then on the arm he hit Demolion,
The spear stuck in, and forc'd him there to stay;
Achilles then came furiously on,
And with his sword he skimm'd his head away,
Helmet and all. Then Regmus, with a wound

Upon the belly, he slew with his spear,
Who from his char'ot fell unto the ground;
And after him he slew his char'oteer,
Areithous, whilst he his horses turns.
As a thick coppice, on a windy day,
If set on fire, unmercifully burns;
So went Achilles killing ev'ry way.
As oxen from the straw tread out the corn,
So trampling went his horses o'er the dead,
That with their bucklers by the wheels were torn,
And th' axle-tree with blood was covered,
And spokes; in part with droppings from the wheels,
(For going on the ground the wheels were gory)
And partly beaten up with th' horses' heels,
And bloody were his hands; and all for glory.

LIB. XXI.

When to the river Xanthus they were come,

THE TROJANS AT the ford half of them pass'd,
And on the highway fled to Ilium;
The other leapt into the stream for haste,
Achilles, with great slaughter, pursues the Trojans to Scamander, and takes twelve alive to kill at Patroclus's tomb.
And with the winding flood there swimming strive.
As locusts, when by sudden tier sprung,
In swarms into the river fly and dive;
So they themselves into Scamander flung,
And filled was the stream with horse and men.
Achilles on the bank-side left his spear,
Set up on end against a tree; and then
Achilles leapt in with his sword; and there
He kill'd as fast as he could turn and strike,
And with their blood the stream was dyed red.
And grievous 'twas to hear them groan and shriek,
That in the flood were by him massacred.
As when the dolphins in a river are,
The other fish scud to the banks in shoals,
So did it with the swimming Trojans fare;
They fled to th' banks, and hid themselves in holes.
And twelve of them alive Achilles took,

And with their girdles hands behind them bound,
Then caus'd them to be led out of the brook,
And to the ships conveyed safe and sound,
To slay them at Patroclus' funeral.
Then from the river out he came again,
And Priam's son Lycaon met withal,
That from Scamander flying was in vain,
Whom prisoner he had taken once before,
When in his father's ground he was by night,
Cutting of spoke staves from a sycamore,
And on him now the second time did light.
To Lemnos first he sent him to be sold,
And bought he there was by Eetion.
Achilles for him had good store of gold.
But he got loose and home again did run.
And there eleven days he staid; and well
Was entertained in his father's house.
The twelfth into Achilles' hands he fell
Again, that sent him then to Erebus.
Achilles seeing him without a spear,
Without a shield, and nothing on his head,
(For he had cast away his arms for fear,
When almost tir'd he from the river fled.)
Achilles, grumbling to himself, then said,
strange! These Trojans are stout-hearted men,
That being sent away, will not be staid,
But to the war must needs come back again.
Here's one I sent to Lemnos to be sold,
And now he's come to fight with me again,

’Tis strange the sea could not him from me hold,
That can against their will hold other men.
But well, I’ll give him of my spear a taste,
And send him to the earth that I may see
Achilles, with great slaughter, pursues the Trojans, &c.
Whether the earth or no can hold him fast,
By which are holden better men than he.
Whilst thus Achilles said, the man came near
To beg his life, for loath to die was he.
To wound him then Achilles lifts his spear,
But under it he got unto his knee,
And with one hand laid hold upon his spear,
And on Achilles’ knee the other laid.
And kneeling down before him shook with fear,
And lamentably to him speaking said,
Achilles, I beseech you pity me,
And save my life, although ‘twere but for this,
That I your pris’ner was. Captivity
At least for life a sanctuary is.
And when you unto Lemnos sent me had,
You for me got a hundred oxen’s price;
And for my ransom now I should be glad
You would be pleas’d to take that value thrice.
’Tis but twelve days since I came back to Troy,
And all the way had been in grievous pain,
And when I thought I should my friends enjoy,
I fallen am into your hands again.
how have I so much incurr’d the hate
Of Jupiter to shorten thus my life!

Or from my mother cometh my hard fate,
Laothoe, whom Priam made his wife?
Altheus got her, king of Pedasus,
And she of Priam's many wives was one,
For many more beside had Priamus,
And by her had me and another son.
And both of us must by you now be kill'd,
For Polydore you have already slain,
Whilst like a child he ran about the field.
And for myself, I fear, I pray in vain.
But what am I that must no quarter have?
Though by my father I am Hector's brother,
That sent the good Patroclus to his grave,
Yet I am nothing to him by the mother.
Thus pleaded he. Achilles then replied:
Tell me no more of ransom or of quarter.
'Tis true, I did, before Patroclus died,
Suffer some Trojans for their lives to barter;
But now if any of the Trojans fall
Into my hands before the town of Troy,
And those of Priam's race the least of all,
Must hope from me to get alive away.
But wherefore, friend, should you think much to die?
Patroclus, a much better man, is gone.
You see how strong and tall a man am I,
And of a noble father am the son,
And have a goddess for my mother. Yet
At morn, or noon, or night, with shaft or spear,
I'm sure by one or other to be hit

And lose my life. Why therefore should you fear?
This said, Lycaon's heart and limbs both fail'd,
And of the spear let's go his hold, and wide
His hands he spread and his sad fate bewail'd.
Achilles then his sword drew from his side,
And gave him on the neck a mighty wound,
The sword's whole breadth into his neck he took,
And presently he fell dead to the ground.
Achilles threw him then into the brook,
And said insulting, Go now to the deep,
And feed the fishes that will lick your blood;
Your mother over you shall never weep,
But to the sea you go shall with the flood,
Where to the curled water leaps a fish,
Upon Lycaon's dainty fat to feed;
And until Troy be by us won, I wish
That th' other Trojans may no better speed,
But flying, by my spear be toss'd like hay.
Scamander shall afford them little aid,
Though to his stream they bulls and horses slay,
Till for Patroclus' death they all have paid.
With these his haughty words, Scamander griev'd,
Contrived how Achilles to repel,
And how the Trojans best might be reliev'd,
That to escape into his water fell.
Achilles then Asteropæus spied,
Pelegon's son, the son of Axius,
Of Axius the river deep and wide,
By th' daughter of king Acessamenus.

And to him with a mind to kill him went,
As he was newly come out of the water.
But Xanthus gave him such encouragement,
(Because Achilles fill'd his stream with slaughter),
That there Asteropæus for him staid,
And both in right and left hand had a spear,
And never sought the combat to avoid.
And when they were to one another near,
Who are you, said Achilles, and whose son,
That in my anger dares approach me so?
For I in arms encounter'd am by none
But those whose parents destin'd are to woe.
Asteropæus to him then replied:
Why ask you me whose son and who I am?
The forces of Pæonia I guide;
To whom elev'n days since I hither came.
Of my descent, the author Axius is,
The fairest stream that on the earth doth run
His son was Pelegon, and I am his.
Thus who I am 'tis told you, and whose son.
And now, Achilles, it is time to fight.
This said, from his two hands his two spears fly,
For both Asteropæus' hands were right,
The one of them his mighty shield did try,
But pierc'd it not; the plate of gold withstood.
The other gave his arm a little wound
Near to his elbow, and fetch'd out some blood,
And so beyond him went and stuck i' th' ground.
Achilles then his spear with all his strength

Incensed at Asteropæus threw,
Which missing, into th’ earth went half its length.
Then from his side his sword Achilles drew.
Asteropæus to Achilles’ spear
Went back, and at it thrice he pluck’d in vain;
Then thought to break it; but Achilles there
Was with his sword, and with that he was slain.
For by the sword his belly was so ripp’d,
That all his bowels issued at the wound.
There him Achilles of his armour stripp’d,
And o’er him crow’d as he lay on the ground.
Lie there, said he; shall rivers’ sons compare
With th’ offspring of the blessed Gods above?
The issue of a brook, you say, you are,
But I the issue am of mighty Jove;
For Peleus my father was, and his
Was Æacus, whom Jupiter begot.
But greater he than any river is,
Then equal to his race, their race is not.
A river great enough you had at hand,
But that you found had done you little good.
For nothing can the power of Jove withstand;
Not Achelous with his royal flood,
Nor th’ Ocean itself, of waters king,
From whose abundance seas their water take,
And ev’ry river, stream, and well, and spring
That goeth on the earth, and ev’ry lake;
Who, when they but a clap of thunder hear,
From Jove some danger presently they dread.

This said, from th’ earth he pulled out his spear,
And left o’ th’ sands Asteropæus dead,
Where Xanthus from the wound shall wash the blood,
And eels and other fish feed on his fat.
Achilles then pursued those that stood
Upon Scamander bank amazed at
The fury of the giddy stream; and when
They saw their leader killed in their sight
By th’ hand of terrible Achilles, then
They ev’ry one betook themselves to flight.
Then with his sword he slew Thersilochus,
And after him the stout Astypylus,
And Opholostes, Mydon, Ænius,
And after these, Mnesus and Thrasius,
And had shed yet much more Pæonian blood,
But that Scamander at it took offence,
And like a man above his water stood,
And to Achilles spake his mind from thence.
Achilles, truly you excel in might,
And acts you do of great iniquity,
And by the Gods assisted are in fight.
But though by Jove you should allowed be
To kill the Trojans, kill them on the plain.
My stream so choked is with carcasses,
I cannot drive my waters to the main.
I wonder you should do such deeds as these;
Let those you kill be killed openly.
Go therefore from me. Thus Scamander said.
And then unto the River answer’d he:

Divine Scamander, you shall be obey'd.
But to pursue the Trojans I mean still,
Till I have chas'd them up to Ilium.
And fight with Hector, if he stay, I will,
And see if his or my last day be come.
Scamander then unto Apollo spake:
Phœbus, said he, you Jove's commandment slight,
That bade you of the Trojans care to take,
And to defend them all you could till night.
Into the stream Achilles leaps again,
At which Scamander swelling lifts his waves,
And out he throws the bodies of dead men,
And from Achilles' hand the living saves.
Then throws a billow on Achilles' head,
And heavy on his shield the current lay;
And on the ground by no means he could tread,
So fast the River carried him away.
But o'er the water hung an elmen limb
Which he laid hold on. Then fell down the tree
Into the river. And that saved him,
And served as a bridge to set him free.
And swiftly then Achilles from him ran,
But after him Scamander sent his water,
Resolv'd to quench the fury of the man,
And save the Trojans in his stream from slaughter.
And then as far as one can throw a spear
Achilles from the flood obliquely flies
Swift as a hawk; but yet was ne'er the near;
For still he water has before his eyes.

As when a man makes passage with his spade
For water to his garden from a hill,
The stream outruns him that the channel made;
So Xanthus was before Achilles still.
And ever as Achilles turn'd or stood
To see if any God would by him stand,
Above his shoulders rose the mighty flood,
And while he starts from's feet removes the sand.
Achilles then himself bewailing said,
Jupiter, and look'd up to the sky,
Let some God 'gainst this River give me aid,
And any other death then let me die.
But none I know on whom the fault to lay
But my dear mother, who to flatter me,
Said I should die before the walls of Troy,
And by Apollo only killed be.
O that I had by Hector's hand been slain,
The best of all the men that fight for Troy.
But now I perish like a silly swain
Passing a torrent in a rainy day.
These words Achilles had no sooner said,
But Neptune and Athena with him were;
And on Achilles' hand their hands they laid.
Then Neptune said, Achilles, do not fear.
Encouraged by two such Gods as we,
Pallas and I, and that by Jove's command,
Retiring soon you shall the river see.
For fear of him you need not hold your hand.
But drive the Trojans all to Ilium

Save those that fly. And having Hector slain
(As we assure you you shall do) then come
Triumphantly unto the ships again.
This said, unto the Gods again they came.
Achilles boldly waded in the field,
Where many bodies dead and bucklers swam.
With so much courage Pallas had him fill'd,
And in the water stoutly lifts his knees.
For Pallas now his strength augmented had.
And Xanthus, vex'd before, when he saw this,
Foamed and roar'd as one that had been mad;
And cried out for help to Simois.
Brother, said he, assist me here, to stay
This raging man that t' Ilium going is.
I am afraid he'll take the town of Troy.
Make haste to help me; and your channel fill
With water both from torrent and from spring,
And stones and trees bring with you from the hill,
That on this furious man we may them fling;
So that his strength shall do him little good,
Nor armour, which upon the field shall lie
Concealed from the eyes of men in mud
And sand enough. Thus bury him will I,
And make his tomb. The Argives will not find
Where lie his bones. I'll earth upon him throw.
They shall not need, if they should be so kind,
More monument upon him to bestow.
This said, he foam'd, and full of bodies dead
He at Achilles a great billow bowl'd,

Which coming to him cover'd had his head,
But Juno chanc'd to see it as it roll'd,
And unto Vulcan shriek'd in great affright,
Rise quickly, dear child, Cyllipodion,
Xanthus against you coming is to fight,
And to defend yourself your flames put on.
And I will Zephyrus and Notus call
From sea, that for you so shall blow the flame;
That the armour, and the heads o' th' Trojans all
Shall not be able to endure the same.
Go to his bank, and burn up ev'ry tree,
And then throw fire on him, and never fear,
Nor by his threats or pray'rs persuaded be
To cease, until again you from me hear.
And Vulcan then made ready a huge flame.
And first the dead he burn'd upon the plain;
Then to the water with his fire he came
To send it to the channel back again.
As when a field new moist'ned is with rain
In summer-time, 'tis quickly dried again
By Boreas; so soon dried was the plain,
And burn'd the bodies were of the dead men.
And to the river then his flame he turn'd,
Where th' elms and willows, tamarisks, and lote,
Sedges, and many other plants he burn'd,
That in or by the river grew about.
And eels and fishes in the water hot
Tumbled and turn'd their bellies up with heat;
Into such pain by Vulcan they were put;

And Xanthus fainting cover'd was with sweat,
And then to Vulcan spake. Vulcan, said he,
No God is able to resist your might.
What are the Trojans or the Greeks to me?
Give over. I'll no longer with you fight.
Thus spake Scamander, boiling all the while.
As when upon a fire of well-dried wood
The grease of a fat swine is made to boil;
So boiled he, and went not on, but stood,
Making to Juno his complaint, and said,
Why does your son on me more fiercely fly,
Than on the rest that do the Trojans aid,
And to be blamed more deserve than I?
Let him give over, and I'll do so too;
And swear besides, if you my oath require,
That I will nothing for the Trojans do,
Although the Greeks should set the town on fire.
This Xanthus said; and Juno hearing it,
To Vulcan with a loud voice spake again:
Vulcan, now hold your hand. It is not fit
T' offend a God too much, to pleasure men.
And Vulcan hearing her his fire puts out;
And Xanthus back into his channel went.
Thus were they parted, and no longer fought,
And Juno, though in choler, was content.
And then the Gods amongst themselves fell out,
And one against another stood in duel,
And heav'n and earth resounded as they fought,
Giving each other many wounds and cruel.

And up unto Olympus rose the cry,
Where Jove sat on his throne in majesty,
And casting on the fields of Troy his eye,
Laughed to see them fight that could not die.
Mars first began, and to Athena said,
You, impudent, that to engage in fight
The Gods amongst themselves are not afraid,
To satisfy your pride and endless spite,
Remember how you on me set Tydide
To throw his spear at me, and openly
Unto my body you the same did guide
With your own wicked hand, and wounded me,
I'll pay you now. Which was no sooner spoken,
But Mars his spear was at Athena's shield,
Which not Jove's thunderbolt could e'er have broken.
Then took she up a stone that lay i' th' field,
Great, knobby, black, that had been heretofore
Set there, of some man's land to show the bound,
And with the same she struck Mars o'er and o'er.
There lay he, and seven acres hid of ground.
And over him insulting, then said she,
Lie there, and know I can you overcome;
And that your mother glad of this will be
For fighting 'gainst the Greeks for Ilium.
This said, she from him turn'd. Then to him went
Venus, and led him groaning from the place.
Pallas, said Juno, see that impudent
That leads him out, and do her some disgrace.
Then Pallas to her went, and with her hand

Hit her o' th' breast; then both fell on the plain,
For Mars without her could no longer stand.
Then Pallas over them insults again:
So may, said she, lie all that stand for Troy
As these do here. Had it not been for them,
The war had ended been; we come away,
And Troy destroyed, with all Priam's stem.
This Pallas said, and Juno smil'd; and to
Apollo Neptune straightway nearer came.
Why fight we not, said he, since others do?
If we stand still, we cannot without shame
Return to Jove, where scorned we shall be.
Have you forgot how to Laomedon,
To work for him, Jove once sent you and me,
And how our wages was agreed upon,
How I built houses for the Trojans all,
As he direction gave me standing by,
Besides, how hard I labour'd at the wall,
How fair I made it, and how strong and high,
And how he sent you, Phœbus, to attend
His herds of kine upon mount Ida side,
And when our work and th' year was at an end,
How proudly he our wages us denied,
And threat'ned you to bind you hand and foot,
And sell you in some island for a slave,
And cut off both your and my ears to boot,
And forc'd we were by flight ourselves to save?
Yet for his people you have ever fought,
Though by you they deserve to be destroy'd,

And will not join with us to root them out.
To Neptune Phœbus then replied, and said,
O Neptune, you would think me mad, if I
Should fight with you for such a thing as man.
They are but leaves, now fresh, to-morrow die;
And when he this had said, away he ran,
For with his uncle loath he was to fight.
His sister then, Diana, to him came,
That angry was to see him put to flight;
Apollo, said she, is it not a shame
Thus easily to give the victory
To Neptune? Wherefore carry you a bow
And arrows, and to nothing them apply?
D'ye carry them, like children, for a show?
Let me not hear you boasting any more
That you to fight with Neptune did not fear,
As in my father's house you did before.
Thus she; but Phœbus did not answer her.
Then Juno, angry, to Diana came;
Bold face, said she, how dare you with me fight,
That stronger than you are a great deal am?
D'ye think that in your bow there is such might?
I know to women you a lion are,
And Jove permits you which you will to kill;
But me to overcome 'tis harder far
Than t' hunt a stag or boar upon a hill;
But since you have a mind to understand
What I can do, I'll let you see it now.
Then both her wrists she seiz'd with her left hand,

With th’ other from her shoulders took her bow,
And beats her with the same about the ears,
And laugh’d to see her wriggling strive to fly.
At last she freed herself, and shedding tears
She fled (leaving her bow and shafts to lie
Upon the ground, dispersed here and there)
Then forth came Hermes and Latona bright,
And when they were to one another near,
Leto, said he, I will not with you fight,
That are Jove’s mistress. Boast amongst the Gods
That you have got the victory in fight,
And by no other means but the great odds
You have in strength; and I will not deny’t.
This said, Latona gather’d up the bow
And arrows of her daughter Artemis.
To Jove went Artemis, to let him know
How ill she had been us’d: and at his knees
She weeping sate. And Jove then made her rise,
And to her said, Dear child, what God was that,
That was so rash as t’ use you in this wise,
As one that openly had done a fault?
’Twas Juno, then said Artemis, your wife;
And she it was that was of all the first
To set the Gods amongst themselves at strife.
Thus Jove and she between themselves discours’d.
Then Phœbus went into the town of Troy;
For still he had a care to guard the wall,
For fear the Greeks the city should destroy.
But to Olympus th’ other Gods went all,

One part triumphing, th’ other discontent,
And sate down by their father Jupiter.
Meanwhile Achilles fiercely forward went,
Killing of men and horses with his spear.
As in a town on fire the people all
Are busy, and the most of them undone,
So did it with the Trojans then befal;
Some slain were by Achilles, and some run.
Now Priam standing was upon a tower,
And saw the Trojans by Achilles chas’d,
And that to turn again they had no power,
And down unto the gates he came in haste,
And to the porters order gave, and said,
Open the gates and let the people in,
That from Achilles hither fly dismay’d,
And shut them when you see they are within;
For if that cruel man should with them get
Within the wall, ’twould be a dismal day.
The porters then the gates wide open set.
Then to the gates the Trojans took their way,
Pursued by Achilles as they fled,
And sure he taken had the town of Troy,
But that Apollo then encouraged
Agenor to oppose him by the way;
And lest he should be by Achilles slain,
He at the beech tree near him took his stand,
When need should be to bring him off again
Unwounded from Achilles’ heavy hand.
But when Agenor saw Achilles nigh,

He troubled was, and to himself thus spake:
What shall I do? If from him I should fly
To Ilium, the way that others take,
He'll overtake me, and cut off my head,
For swifter much he is of foot than I.
What if I let him on the Trojans tread,
And I some other way to Ida fly,
And hide myself i' th' bushes there till night?
But why do I discourse thus foolishly?
I cannot pass the plain but in his sight,
And then I lost am without remedy.
But if I stay and fight with him, what then?
His body is not made of steel nor brass,
But mortal is, they say, like other men,
And like to other men but one life has;
His glorious acts are Jupiter's not his.
This said, he for Achilles' coming staid,
As when i' th' woods a panther roused is;
At hearing of the hounds he's not afraid,
But to the hunter goes for all his spear,
And though pierc'd through therewith, will to him fly
Upon the spear itself; that being near
He either may revenged be or die;
So resolutely then Antenor's son
Agenor, for Achilles waiting, staid,
And at him aim'd his spear as he came on,
And lifting up his voice, unto him said:
Achilles, Oh, you think this day to win
The town of Troy. There's yet much work to do,

For many mighty men there are therein,
And many dangers to be waded through.
They of their wives and parents will take care,
And little babes; but you shall perish here,
As terrible and mighty as you are.
And as he spake, he at him threw his spear,
Which on his leg below the knee did light,
And with the stroke resounded then the tin;
But the celestial arms were of such might,
That it rebounded back, and went not in.
And when Achilles was to throw at him,
Away Apollo snatch'd him from his sight,
Concealed in a mist obscure and dim,
And carried him in safety from the fight.
And that the flying Trojans might escape
Achilles' hand, and save themselves in Troy,
He took upon himself Agenor's shape,
And put himself into Achilles' way.
Achilles then pursues, and Phœbus flies
Along Scamander's bank upon the plain,
And kept before him still, but in such wise,
As t' overtake him he might hope in vain.
Achilles thus by Phœbus was deceived,
Till from the town he far was led away.
Meanwhile the flying Trojans were received,
And thronging got within the gates of Troy:
For none of them without the gate durst stay,
To ask who had escaped, and who not;
So glad they were of getting into Troy,

That how all others sped they never thought.

LIB. XXII.

The death of Hector, and lamentation in Troy.

THUS WERE THE Trojans driven into Troy
Like deer, and up unto the wall they went,
And from their bodies rubb'd the sweat away,
And with good wine renew'd their spirits spent,
And to the wall advancing was the foe.
But Hector, hamper'd by his cruel fate,
Into the town of Troy refus'd to go,
And staid without, before the Scæan gate.
Then to Achilles Phœbus spake, and said,
Why do you thus pursue me, Peleus' son,
That am a God? which but by passion sway'd
You might have known; but rashly you run on,
And only look how you may slaughter men.
For else, why could you not contented be,
When you had pent the Trojans up; but then
Must leave your way so far to follow me,
And cannot kill me; for I cannot die?
At this Achilles vex'd was at the heart;
And to Apollo answer'd angrily;
Apollo, thou the most pernicious art
Of all the Gods, that hast me thus misled.
For had I unto Ilium kept my way,

I strewed had the field with Trojans dead
Before they could have enter'd into Troy.
But by your fraud that honour I have lost,
Because the strength of men you need not fear.
But I would make you pay for't to your cost,
If to revenge myself I able were.
This said, to Troy he went a mighty pace,
And mighty things conceived in his mind,
And stretch'd his legs and knees, as in a race
Good horses do, to leave the rest behind.
Old Priam first upon him set his eyes;
For brightly from afar his armour shin'd
Like the fair star that does in autumn rise,
But agues brings, and is to men unkind,
And called is Orion's dog. So bright
Achilles in his armour did appear,
And put the old man Priam in affright,
And made him groan, and roar, and tear his hair.
To Hector then he cried aloud and said,
Hector, come in; come in, my dearest son;
For mightily I for you am afraid;
Fight not against that cruel man alone.
Achilles stronger is than you by odds;
Lose not your life to give him victory.
Oh that he were beloved by the Gods
No better than he is belov'd by me!
He eaten had ere now been on the plain
By dogs and fowl, and I been comforted
A little for my sons whom he hath slain,

Or in the islands far hence trafficked.
Lycaon now I miss, and Polydore;
They came not into Troy with them that fled.
Their mother brought me with her wealth good store
To pay their ransom if they be not dead.
If they be slain, 'tis then remediless.
Their parents and the people all will grieve;
But yet their sorrow will be much the less
If Hector still preserved be and live.
Come, therefore, quickly in, dear child, and save
The Trojans and their wives, yourself and wife;
And do not let Achilles th' honour have
Alone to have deprived you of life.
Besides, you should some pity take of me,
That now upon the very brink of age
The cruel slaughter of my sons must see,
And daughters dragg'd and hurried by the rage
Of the Achæans into slavery,
And chambers torn by the insulting foe,
And babes dash'd 'gainst the ground expiring lie,
Whilst into servitude their mothers go.
And after all this, slain must I be too;
My dogs will eat me raw, and lap my blood,
And pleased be (not knowing what they do),
That at my table daily take their food.
When young men slain are by the chance of war,
There nothing is whereof to be ashamed;
But when by dogs abus'd and eaten are
White heads and beards, and parts not to be named,

There's nothing to a man more miserable.
Thus said old Priam, tugging his grey hairs,
But to prevail with Hector was not able.
And to him then his mother spake with tears,
And from her bosom layed out a teat,
Hector, if this e'er pleased you, said she,
Dear son, I pray you into Troy retreat,
And have compassion on my misery.
Come in; between you let there be a wall;
For if you should be slain, your wife and I
Shall not lament you at your funeral,
But at the ships a prey for dogs you'll lie.
Thus weeping, he and she to Hector pray'd,
And nothing to them answer'd he again,
But obstinately for Achilles staid.
And as a snake roll'd up before his den,
With venom fed, when coming towards him
He sees a man, and stirred is his gall,
Looks cruelly; so Hector, looking grim,
Staid with his shield set up against the wall;
And grieving, to himself he spake, and said:
If I should now into the city go,
Polydamas the first would me upbraid,
That yesternight advis'd me to do so,
Then when Achilles in the field was seen.
But his good counsel I refused then,
Which to have follow'd had much better been;
Lost by my folly are so many men.
And now I fear the Trojans and their wives

Will censure me, and some man worse than I
Say I have cast away the people's lives,
Presuming on my strength so foolishly.
So they will say; and therefore better 'tis
To venture on Achilles, though I die,
A better way I cannot take than this;
For should I lay my shield and helmet by,
And leave my spear set up against the wall,
And to Achilles thus disarmed come,
And offer Helen to restore with all
The wealth she with her brought to Ilium;
And to the Greeks give half the goods of Troy,
And take an oath that we will nothing hide,
Nor anything out of their sight convey,
But bring it forth and faithfully divide.
But whither to no purpose runs my mind?
I will not do't, for it were but in vain.
I ne'er the sooner should his favour find,
But by him so much eas'lier be slain.
I cannot with him talk from hill nor tree,
As boys and wenches do; he is too nigh,
And therefore here I'll stay for him, and see
Whether my fate it be or his to die.
Whilst yet he spake, Achilles near him was,
As terrible as Mars, and shook his spear;
As flaming fire relucent was the brass,
Or as the sun at morning doth appear.
Then Hector durst no longer stay, but fled:
Fear nimbly made his feet and knees to move;

Achilles no less swiftly followed.
As when a hawk is flying at a dove,
The dove flies out aside, herself to save;
But by the hawk again is followed,
That gives not over till the prey he have;
Achilles so pursu'd and Hector fled,
Keeping the cart-way still under Troy wall;
And to the watch-tow'r came and sicamore,
And the two springs that into Xanthus fall,
Whereof the one is always cover'd o'er
With smoke, as if upon a fire it were,
And with hot water all the year doth flow.
The water of the other all the year
As cold is as the hail, or ice, or snow,
And two fine washing-places built were there,
To which the Trojan women used to come,
And wash their garments when they sullied were,
Before the Argives came to Ilium.
This way they ran, and swiftly mov'd their thighs;
For 'twas not for a piece of flesh or hide,
Which of foot-races is the usual prize,
But for the life of Hector that they vied.
As when race-horses run for some great prize,
That used to it are, most swiftly run;
So Hector and Achilles now ran thrice
About Troy wall, the Gods all looking on.
Then, speaking to the Gods, Behold, said Jove,
I Hector see in danger to be slain,
A good and pious man, and whom I love,

And for him now my heart is in great pain;
For he hath made me many a sacrifice,
Both in my house on Ida and in Troy,
And now before the swift Achilles flies.
Say, shall he die, or be convey'd away?
Father, said Pallas then, what's this you say?
He's mortal, and by Fate condemned is,
And will you now the execution stay?
You may; but th' other Gods will take't amiss.
And Jove to Pallas then again replied:
Sweet child, it was not seriously meant,
But only said. You shall not be denied;
Do what you please yourself, I am content.
This said, Athena, glad, leapt down to Troy.
Achilles Hector still pursued; and as
A hound in view pursueth all the way
A frighted hare, so coursed Hector was;
Nor suffer'd was to double or to squat.
For when he to the gate ran for defence,
Between the gate and him Achilles gat,
So that he could not stay for help from thence.
Achilles never would the wall forsake;
But Hector still upon the cart-way fled.
As men can neither fly nor overtake
When in a dream they think it in their bed;
So Hector from Achilles could not fly,
Nor could Achilles Hector overtake;
For Phœbus Hector did with strength supply,
But of him then no further care did take.

Achilles by a sign all else forbad
To throw a spear, for fear the greatest glory
Some other of the Argives should have had,
And he come after but as accessory.
When to the spring the fourth time they were nigh,
Jove took his golden balance up, and laid
In one o' th' scales Achilles' destiny,
And Hector's in the other, and them weigh'd.
Hector's was heaviest, and down fell the same
As low as hell, so much it overweigh'd.
Then Phœbus parted. And t' Achilles came
Athena nigh, and speaking to him, said,
Achilles, now, I think, we shall not miss
Of killing Hector, but with honour go
To th' ships, as greedy as of fight he is;
For sure I am he cannot 'scape us now,
Phœbus in vain to Jove shall for him pray.
But stay you here and breathe awhile; for I
Will to him go, and make him for you stay,
And so encourage him he shall not fly.
This said, Achilles, leaning on his spear,
Staid where he was. To Hector Pallas came.
So like Deiphobus she did appear
In shape and voice, he took her for the same.
And when she with him was, she to him said,
Brother, you still are by Achilles cours'd
About the wall of Troy. Be not afraid;
I'll by you stand, and let him do his worst.
Deiphobus, said Hector, who before

Was dearest to me of my brothers all,
I bound am now to honour you much more,
That t' aid me durst appear without the wall,
When all the rest remain within for fear.
Pallas to Hector then replied, and said,
Brother, my father and my mother dear,
And friends with their entreaties had me staid,
So dreadful is Achilles to them all,
But I would not. But come, let's go and try
Whether it be our fate by him to fall,
Or his by Hector's hand and spear to die.
This said, she went before him with her spear,
Lest he, some fraud mistrusting, should have staid.
And when they were unto Achilles near,
Hector spake first, and to Achilles said:
Pelides, though before you I have fled
Now thrice about the wall, and durst not stay,
Yet now to stand I am determined,
And fight till either I be slain or slay.
But come, let's first the Gods to witness call,
Of what shall be agreed 'twixt you and me.
If by my hand it be your chance to fall,
Your body dead shall not abused be.
I'll take your arms and send them into Troy;
Your body dead the Greeks shall have again
Entire, and not disgraced any way;
Do you the like to me if I be slain.
Achilles, sourly looking, said again,
Talk not of oaths and covenants to me,

That nothing worth ‘twixt lions are and men,
And wolves with lambs on nothing can agree;
And you and I shall one another hate,
Nor oaths and pacts between us will stand good,
Till we blood-thirsty Mars shall satiate
Either with Hector’s or Achilles’ blood.
It now behoves you all your pow’r to show,
And be an able man of war indeed.
You cannot, as you did, run from me now,
Although, I think, you never had more need;
For by Athena slain you shall be here,
And for the slaughter of the Greeks be paid.
This said, he at him threw his heavy spear,
But Hector, stooping, did the same avoid,
And o’er his head the spear then harmless flew.
But Pallas quickly snatch’d it from the sand
Invisibly, which Hector never knew,
And put the same into Achilles’ hand.
Then Hector to Achilles spake, and said,
Achilles, you have miss’d. My fate unknown
Is to you yet; and me to make afraid,
You have devised fables of your own;
Upon my back your spear shall never fall.
If by it to be slain my fate it be,
It shall be on my breast, or not at all.
But how my spear will speed now let me see;
Oh, that it would into your body go!
The Trojans would the war much better bear,
Since from your hands proceeds the greatest woe.

And as he spake away he sent his spear,
And on Achilles' shield it lighted just,
But enter'd not; and other he had none.
Upon Deiphobus lay all his trust;
But when he call'd Deiphobus was gone,
And Hector then perceiv'd his death was near;
And oh, said he, the Gods now for me call.
Deiphobus, I thought, stood by me here,
But Pallas 'twas; he's still within the wall.
I shall not 'scape. I see, Jove heretofore,
And Phœbus too, did mean it should be so;
They sav'd me oft, but will do so no more.
But let me somewhat do before I go,
That men may speak of me in time to come,
And not ignoble die: and at that word
He roused up his fainting heart, and from
His side he drew his great and heavy sword.
As when an eagle stoopeth to the plain,
From a dark cloud, a tender lamb t' invade,
Or fearful hare; so Hector went amain
T' Achilles, brandishing his shining blade.
Achilles, angry, on the other side
Came on, and cruel thoughts had in his mind,
And up he kept his shield his breast to hide,
And on his head like fire his helmet shin'd;
And as he went, at ev'ry step he trod,
His plume, by Vulcan made of golden hair,
And to his crest applied, gave a nod,
And o'er his shoulders terribly did flare.

As Hesperus at midnight does appear,
The brightest star that shineth in the sky;
So gloriously the point shone of his spear.
Thus terribly to Hector he drew nigh,
And view'd his arms to see which way his spear
Might with most ease into his body pass.
But ev'rywhere entire and close they were,
Save at the neck a little gap there was.
At that he aim'd, and with great force he smote
Him with his mighty spear clean through the neck;
And yet the spear his wind-pipe wounded not.
Then down he fell, but able was to speak.
Achilles, over him insulting, said,
Hector, you thought, when you Patroclus kill'd,
You safe were, and of me were not afraid,
Because you knew I was not in the field;
And like a fool ne'er thought of what a friend
To take revenge he left had at the fleet;
Who now has brought you to an evil end
For dogs to eat, while he has burial meet.
Then Hector feebly to him said again,
Let not by dogs my body eaten be,
But be contented that you have me slain;
My friends at any price will ransom me.
Take brass and gold, as much as you require;
And to my father send my body home,
To be consumed in the fun'ral fire,
By th' Trojans and their wives in Ilium.
Thus Hector said. Achilles answer'd to't:

Hector, you dog, speak not of price to me;
If I myself could eat thee I would do't;
But by the dogs I'm sure you'll eaten be.
If they would give me twenty times as much,
Or buy thy body, weight for weight, with gold,
And promise as much more, your deeds are such,
Your body shall not at that price be sold.
Nor shall your mother lay you on a bed,
And over you lamenting stand and howl;
But in the open field you shall lie dead,
Until devour'd you be by dogs and fowl.
Hector replied (though ready now to die),
I knew you had a heart as hard as steel;
But thus much to you I will prophecy:
The vengeance of the Gods you'll for it feel,
When one day Paris and Apollo shall,
As terrible and strong as you are now,
Make you before the Scæan gate to fall.
This said, he died; and to the shades below,
Leaving his limbs, his soul, bewailing, flew.
And yet Achilles did again reply,
And briefly to him answer'd, Now die you;
And when the Gods call for me, so will I.
This said, he from the body pluck'd the spear,
And laid it by him down upon the place,
And took his armour off. Then others near
Stood, gazing at his stature and his grace,
And wond'ring at him, t' one another said:
We safely now to Hector may go nigher;

His raging fit is very much allay'd
Since when unto the ships he came with fire.
Then spake Achilles to the Greeks and said,
My friends, that in the army have command,
Since by the Gods this great man is destroy'd,
And lies before you killed by my hand,
Who did the Argive people more annoy
Than all the other Trojans put together,
Let's armed as we are go up to Troy,
And see on what they are resolved, whether
They'll quit the city, seeing Hector's dead,
Or still defend the same without him will.
But why should this come now into my head
When unbewail'd Patroclus lieth still?
For my Patroclus I must not forget
As long as I am living and can go.
And when I come to th' house of Hades, yet
I still shall think upon him there below.
But back unto the ships we now will go.
And let the youth of Argos pæans sing,
Whilst thither we in triumph bring the foe
With whose great praise the town of Troy did ring.
This said, he full of spite on Hector flies,
And slits his legs from th' ankles to the heels,
And with a rope them to his char'ot ties.
Then drives away; and rais'd is by the wheels
A cloud of dust; and in it all the while,
Along the ground dragg'd was his comely head,
Once glorious, now by the Greeks made vile,

Since to them Jove had him delivered.
Which, when his mother from the wall beheld,
Enrag'd, she from her head pluck'd off her hood,
And threw it from her, tore her hair, and squeal'd.
And Priam lamentably sighing stood.
About him were the Trojans shedding tears,
Sighing, and sobbing, and in such affray,
As if all Troy had flam'd about their ears.
And much ado they Priam had to stay.
For down he lay, and spake to ev'ry one,
Forbear, said he; I will go to this man
As fierce and cruel as he is, alone,
And move him to compassion, if I can;
And what respect he hath to age I'll see.
For Pelius is old as well as I,
That got that mischief both to Troy and me,
To th' Trojans all, but me especially.
For he hath kill'd me many a goodly son,
Which all together make me not so smart,
Nor wounds so deep as Hector's death hath done,
Which is alone enough to break my heart.
Oh blessed Gods, that it had been your will
He in his mother's hands and mine had died,
That over him we might have wept our fill!
This said, the Trojans wept again and sigh'd.
Then Hecuba amongst the wives of Troy
Began her plaint. Hector, my son, said she,
my dear son, my glory and my joy,
Why should I 'mongst the living longer be,

Since you are dead and gone, that night and day
The Trojans, men and women, did defend,
And as a God was honoured in Troy,
And now are come to an untimely end?
Thus wail'd his mother. But Andromache
Knew not how Hector sped without the gate;
For at a shining figur'd garment she
Within an inner chamber weaving sate,
And given had her maids command to set
A trivet on the fire, that Hector might,
When he came in, wash off his blood and sweat,
Contracted by great labour in the fight,
Not dreaming of her husband's death. But when
She heard the lamentation at the wall,
And outcries both of women and of men,
She trembling stood, and let her shuttle fall.
And then unto her maids she call'd, and said,
Come hither two of you, and with me go;
I hear my mother cry, and am afraid
To Priam's sons there happen'd is some woe.
I'll to the tow'r go up myself, and see
What 'tis. My heart is at my mouth. I fear
Lest by Achilles Hector chased be
Alone, and will be killed by his spear.
Oh, how I tremble! he can never stay,
But out before the rest will always run,
And never unto any man give way,
As if his strength could matched be by none.
This said, out went she like a woman mad,

And panting, up into the tow'r she hied,
Where she no sooner look'd about her had,
But saw her husband to a char'ot tied,
And by Achilles dragg'd away, and dead.
And presently she fell into a swoon,
And all the comely dressings of her head,
Veil, kerchiefs, ribbons, knots, to th'ground came down,
And coronet unto her given by
Venus, when she with Hector married.
Her sister-laws, that stood about her nigh,
Then took her up, with sorrow almost dead;
And when again her spirits to her came,
She wept, and spake, and stopp'd, and spake again:
Hector, of women I most wretched am,
And you the most unfortunate of men;
Both born to one and the same evil fate,
You here in Ilium, king Priam's son,
And I in Thebe child unfortunate
Of the unfortunate Eëtion.
And you now to the shades below are gone,
And me a woful widow here have left,
And with me my sweet babe your tender son,
And cannot, since you are of life bereft,
Do to him any good, nor he to you.
And though he should escape the Argives now,
Yet poverty and woe will him pursue,
And other men his goodly fields will plough.
A child that is an orphan has no friend;
And, though with tears, must stoop to whatsoe'er

To the supplying of his need shall tend,
When he his want of food no more can bear.
So to your friends my child shall go, and take
One by the cloak, another by the coat,
That give him may some wine for pity's sake,
Enough to cool his lips, but not his throat.
Or else some son of them that sit at meat
May rate, or give him a good box o'th' ear,
And bid him quickly out o' th' hall to get,
And tell him that his father dines not there.
Then weeping comes Astyanax to me,
That us'd was by his father to be fed
With mutton fat and marrow on his knee,
And with his nurse repose on a soft bed.
But since his father now is dead and gone,
Astyanax (whom so the Trojans call
Because defended were by you alone,
When you were here, the Trojan gates and wall),
Intolerable grief is like to find,
Since at the ships you dead and naked lie
For worms to feed on when the dogs have din'd,
While all your precious garments here have I
Of woman's work, and burn them will, since you
Now never in them likely are to lie,
'Tis to the wives of Troy an honour due.
This weeping spoken made the women sigh.

LIB. XXIII.

Thus wail'd the Trojans then in Ilium.

TO HELLESPONT TH' Achæans straight went down;
And when they to their hollow ships were come,
Dispers'd themselves each man unto his own,
The funeral games for Patroclus.
Achilles only staid his Myrmidons
Upon the place; and thus unto them spake.
You Myrmidons, my stout companions,
You must not from your cars your horses take,
With horses and with cars we first must go,
And for Patroclus weep about his bier.
And when we have by weeping eas'd our woe,
Untie your horses and we'll all sup here.
This said, they wail'd. Achilles first began;
And thrice about Patroclus' bier they drave.
And Thetis, fallen was so great a man,
Amongst them stood, and tears unto them gave,
Which down their armour fell into the sand.
Achilles bade him then with tears, farewell.
And laying on Patroclus' breast his hand,
Rejoice, said he, Patroclus, though in hell;
For now I to you shall my word make good,
Since hither I have Hector dragged dead

For dogs to eat. And to revenge your blood,
Twelve Trojans I will at your pile behead.
This said, he Hector laid upon his face
I' th' dust before the bier disgracefully.
The Myrmidons meanwhile their arms unlace,
And th' horses from the chariots untie.
And then down by Achilles' ship they sat,
Who gave unto them all a fun'ral feast,
And for them slew both goats and muttons fat,
And swine good store, and many a well-fed beast.
But to Achilles then came in the lords,
To wait upon him t' Agamemnon's tent,
That he might try with comfortable words
If he could mitigate his discontent.
When they were there Atrides first commands
His ministers to bring in water hot,
To wash the gore from off his face and hands.
Achilles peremptorily said, Not,
And swearing, unto Agamemnon said,
By Jove, that is of all the Gods most high,
Till I Patroclus in the fire have laid,
And rais'd him have a tomb wherein to lie,
And with him burn'd these locks of mine, nor hand,
Nor face shall washed be by me. But now
Let's sup. I' th' morning I will give command
That for his pile we may have wood enough,
That speedily the body we may burn.
And when out of our sight we have it laid,
The people to their business may return.

Thus he advised, and it was obey'd.
The people then in haste to supper went,
And had good cheer, and heartily they fed.
And when their hunger and their thirst was spent,
Into their tents went every man to bed.
Down went Achilles to the water's side
Attended on by many Myrmidons,
And in a place clean washed by the tide
He laid him down to sleep upon the stones.
Nor was it long ere sleep upon him crept.
For labour'd very hard he had that day.
For Hector him in exercise had kept
Running before him round the wall of Troy.
And then the spirit of Patroclus dead,
Like him in stature, garments, voice, and eyes,
Appeared to him standing at his head,
And speaking said unto him in this wise.
You sleep, Achilles, and have me forgot,
Though when I was alive you lov'd me well.
Pray bury me, these spirits here will not
Let me come in within the gates of hell,
Nor let me mix with those beyond the river,
But make me wander 'bout the house of Dis.
Give me your hand upon't, for I shall never
Return, when once my body burned is.
We shall no more together counsel take,
Since by my fate I taken am away,
And you yourself, divine Achilles, make
Account to die before the walls of Troy.

And then the favour let me have, I pray,
That when my flesh consum'd is in the flame,
My bones with yours you will be pleas'd to lay,
And let the urn that holds them be the same;
That golden urn which Thetis gave to you.
We long with one another lived have.
For when Amphidamus his son I slew,
Unto your house I fled my life to save,
From Opus, being little past a boy,
And childishly the quarrel took at chess;
And never meant him ill before that day,
And sorry was I for my foolishness.
Your father to his house then took me in,
Made me your man, and lov'd and cherish'd me,
And since so long we have together been,
Why should not now our bones together be?
Achilles to the shadow then replied,
Sweet friend, what need had you to come from hell
To tell me this? I for you do provide,
That all you say may be performed well.
Come nearer to me, that embrace we may
A little while, and one another moan.
This said, his arms he spreads; and then away
Patroclus sunk and left him there alone.
At this amazed, up Achilles starts.
Oh, oh, said he, I see 'tis certain then,
In hell there souls are, though they have no hearts,
But idols only are, and forms of men.
For by me standing was the soul all night

Of my Patroclus to me dictating,
And wonderfully like him ’twas t’ the sight;
And what he wanted told me ev’ry thing.
This said, again about the body dead
Achilles and the Myrmidons lament,
And so continued till the day was spread;
But to the wood then Agamemnon sent
From ev’ry part of th’ army men to Ide,
Whereof some axes carried in their hands,
And others ropes. And with them goes for guide
Meriones, and, as their chief, commands.
O’er hills and dales then to the woods they went,
Driving their mules before them all the way;
And lusty oaks unto the ground they sent,
And cleft them into pieces as they lay.
And those unto the mules with ropes they tied,
And every one of them took in his hand,
Either a heavy bough, or limb beside.
For so Meriones had given command.
This done, they back descended to the plain
Fast as they could, through bri’rs and bushes store;
And quickly at the ships they were again,
And laid their wood in order on the shore.
Then to the Myrmidons Achilles spake,
You Myrmidons, put on your arms, said he,
And, horsemen, all your char’ots ready make,
And mount into your seats and follow me.
When they were ready, foremost went the horse,
And by a cloud of foot were followed.

I' th' midst between them carried was the corse
With locks of hair thrown on him covered,
Which the sad mourners from their heads had shorn.
Achilles went himself next to the bier,
Who for his friend did principally mourn.
When at the place of funeral they were,
Upon the ground they layed down the bier,
And quickly in a pile they heap'd the wood.
Then cuts Achilles off his yellow hair,
And from the body at a distance stay'd,
And towards Greece and Phthia turn'd his eye,
And speaking to Spercheius' river said.
My father to you made a vow, when I
Return'd, this hair should unto you be paid,
And to the other Gods a hecatomb,
And fifty fat rams at your spring to slay.
Thus vowed he. But I shall ne'er come home,
But here must die before the gates of Troy.
Since then my father's wish you not fulfil,
Nor I return into my native land,
My hair now to Patroclus give I will.
And at that word he puts it in his hand.
At this the Greeks a-weeping fell again,
And wept had till the setting of the sun,
But that Achilles spake t' Atrides then,
And pray'd him that the people might be gone.
King Agamemnon, will the Greeks, said he,
Be never with lamenting satisfied?
'Tis in your pow'r; let them dispersed be

Unto their ships, their suppers to provide,
For we will of the fun'ral take a care.
But let the leaders of the army stay,
And such as specially concerned are.
This said, Atrides sent the rest away.
And then the wood into a pile they laid.
A hundred foot it was from side to side;
And on the top the corpse. Then kill'd and flay'd
Both sheep and beeves, and with their fat they hide
Patroclus' body dead from head to foot.
And by it laid the cattle flay'd to burn.
To the bier Achilles went and laid into 't
Of honey one, of oil another urn.
And of Patroclus' horses four he slew;
And of nine little dogs he kept, kill'd two.
And those into the fun'ral pile he threw;
And last of all, twelve Trojans adds thereto.
This done, again he to Patroclus said,
My dear Patroclus, once again, farewell.
Twelve lusty Trojans on your pile are laid.
I'm faithful to you, though you be in hell,
But Hector for the dogs shall be a prey.
But Venus 'nointed him with oil of rose,
And so preserved him both night and day,
That not a dog did on him lay his nose.
Then Phœbus sent from heav'n a cloud obscure,
The place whereon his body lay to hide,
To th' end it might the scorching sun endure,
And not be shrivell'd up, nor shrunk, nor dried.

And then Achilles a new bus'ness finds;
He could not set on flame the new-fell'd wood,
But forc'd he was to pray to the two Winds,
Zephyr and Boreas. Then off he stood,
And to them offer'd with a cup in's hand,
And to them vowed a good sacrifice,
If they from sea would come, and by him stand,
And blow the fire until the flame did rise.
This Iris hearing, went unto the Winds,
To tell them how Achilles to them pray'd,
And at good cheer in Zephyr's house them finds,
And fain they would her with them there have staid,
And made her sit; but she refused that.
The Gods, said she, feast at a hecatomb
In Blackmoor-land, and I must be thereat,
And must make haste, or thither cannot come.
To Zephyr now and Boreas I came,
To tell them that a plenteous sacrifice
Achilles make them will, if on a flame
They'll set the pile whereon Patroclus lies.
This said, she parts. The Winds arise and roar,
And toss the clouds before them in the sky,
And at their feet tumble the waves ashore,
And then upon Patroclus' pile they fly,
And fiercely blow. Inflamed was the pile,
And whistling at it staid the Winds all night,
Achilles standing by it all the while,
Invoking solemnly Patroclus' spright;
And th' earth with wine by cupfuls watered.

As one that mourneth for his eldest son,
That then dies, when he should be married;
So did he for Patroclus sigh and groan.
When in the sky the day-star did appear
To shew that after him Aurora came,
The pile and bodies dead consumed were
To ashes, and extinguish'd was the flame;
Away the Winds went o'er the seas of Thrace,
And passing, shook the waters of the deep.
Achilles went a little from the place,
And weary, laid him down and fell asleep.
And now 'twas day, the soldiers came again.
Then with their trampling did Achilles wake,
And up he stood and look'd about. And then
He to Atrides turn'd his eyes and spake:
Atrides, let us first with wine, said he,
Put out the fire as far as it is spread,
That taken up Patroclus' bones may be
(For where they lie 'tis soon discovered;
Since in the midst we did his body lay,
But others, horse and men, at the outside lie)
That in a bason of pure gold they may
Reserved be until I also die.
And though no great tomb here I have design'd,
Yet may the Greeks that stay when I am gone,
When they think good, if they will be so kind,
And see cause for it, make a greater one.
This said, the fire they first extinguished;
Then down unto the ground the ashes came,

And up Patroclus' bones they gathered,
And in a golden pan they laid the same;
And back into the ships they carried that,
To be reserved in Achilles' tent,
Wrapp'd up within a double kell of fat.
And then about the pile to work they went,
And where the pile was, that they made their ground,
And earth abundance on the same they lay,
Till it became a mighty hill and round.
When they had done, Achilles made them stay
And sit o' th' ground, to see the games which he
Prepared had, the funeral to grace.
Then many prizes rich he caus'd to be
Brought from his ship and laid upon the place,
Brass cauldrons, tripods, and great iron bars,
Horses and mules, and cattle of great size,
And goodly women taken in the wars.
First for the horse; he tells each one his prize.
To th' first a woman that could spin and weave,
Together with a tripod deep and wide.
The next a mare of six years should receive,
Together with her young mule by her side.
A handsome kettle to the third he gave,
Which never on the fire had yet been set.
Of gold two talents was the fourth to have;
The fifth a cup and cover was to get.
Then to them spake. These prizes here, said he,
Lie waiting for the horsemen on the plain,
If any horsemen in the host there be,

That with their char'ots hope the same to gain,
Come in. Had any else these games set forth,
The greatest of these prizes had been mine;
For of my horses you well know the worth,
And that they are immortal and divine,
Which Neptune gave to Peleus, he to me.
But I'll sit out; my horses shall stay here,
Hanging their heads as they do heavily,
Since they have lost their gentle char'oteer.
Let any other of the Argives, who
Is of his horses confident, come in,
And presently prepare himself thereto,
And try which of the prizes he can win.
This said, the horsemen straight themselves present.
Eumelus first, Adrestus' noble son,
That was for horsemanship most eminent.
Then Diomed with th' horses which he won
From Venus' son, when by her sav'd he was.
Then sitting on his chariot came forth
King Agamemnon's brother Menelaus,
And at it horses two were of great worth.
The one of them, Podargus, was his own,
The other, Æthe, very swift she was,
A female, and for Agamemnon's known,
To whom, when he to Ilium was to pass,
She given was by Echepolus, who
T' excuse himself of following him to Troy
(For very rich he was, and loath to go)
And with his leave in Siryon to stay.

The fourth, with horses of the Pylian brood,
Was Nestor's gallant son, Antilochus.
His father, careful of him, by him stood
Instructing him, and said unto him thus:
Antilochus, you have been taught so well
By Jove and Neptune, young man as you are,
The rules of horsemanship, I need not tell
You of the art, but pray you to take care;
Though you know how about the goal to wind,
Their horses somewhat are than yours more swift.
I fear you will in that some damage find;
But none of them know better how to shift.
'Tis care, not strength, makes a good carpenter,
And ships at sea are governed by care;
Force in foul weather little helps to steer;
Best char'oteers are they that best beware.
A man that on his horses' speed relies,
May from the high-way sometimes drive aside,
But not come in again. But he that's wise,
Will always tow'rds the goal directly guide,
And have an eye on him that goes before.
The goal I'll tell you (lest you know it not)
A staff is, of a fathom high or more,
Of oak or pine, that is not apt to rot,
Standing between two great white stones upright,
And for a monument set up was there
In ancient time, of some deceased wight,
Or formerly there had a race been there,
And to that purpose served now again.

Be sure you drive your horses to it close,
And leaning, press a little th' inner rein,
And let the farther horse's rein go loose.
But let the near horse to it go as near
As can be, so the stones you still avoid;
You'll wound your horses else, and char'ot tear,
And be asham'd whilst others will be joy'd.
If at the staff you once but get the start,
In coming back before you shall be none,
How good soe'er their horses be or art,
Though they the steeds were of Laomedon,
Or like Arion all their horses were,
Adrestus' horse of the celestial race.
Thus Nestor his good son instructed there,
And having done, returned to his place.
The fifth and last came in Meriones.
Then up into their seats they mounted all;
And then by lots determin'd which of these
Should start the first. T' Antilochus did fall
To start the first. The next t' Eumelus came.
The third lot fell t' Atrides Menelaus.
The fourth had on't Meriones his name.
The best, and last to start Tydides was.
Then all a-row they stood. Achilles by,
Showed them the goal far off upon the plain;
And all at once hold up their whips on high,
And beat their horses each one with his rein;
And loud upon them call'd to make them run.
Old Phœnix at the staff was set to stay

And be a witness of what there was done,
And see there were amongst them no foul play.
And swiftly from the ships they part away,
In clouds of dust up to their breasts they fly,
And to the wind their spreading manes display;
Their cars sometimes are in the air a-high,
And sometimes on the ground. The char'oteers
Sit for all that still fast upon their seats,
And ev'ry one aloud his horses cheers,
While in his breast his heart with longing beats.
But when about the goal they turned were,
And coming back again unto the shore,
Then 'twas their virtue chiefly did appear,
And faster went their horses than before.
And now Eumelus' horses foremost were,
And Diomed behind him was not far
With his male Trojan horses, but so near,
As if they would have gone into his car.
So near they were their heads did on it lie,
And made Eumelus' back and shoulders hot
With breathing on them; and the victory
Had got, or doubtful made at least, had not
Apollo been to Diomed unkind,
And from his hand struck out his shining whip.
Tydides then again was left behind,
And wept to see Eumelus him outstrip.
When Pallas saw what wrong was to him done,
She puts the whip into his hand again,
And angry goes unto Admetus' son,

And of his horses breaks the yoke in twain.
On one side of the way then went one mare,
And on the other side the other goes.
Down fell the pole, and with it he; and tare
His elbows and his eye-brows, mouth, and nose.
Tydides in the meantime passed by,
And got before them all a mighty length.
For Pallas to him meant the victory,
And gave unto his horses greater strength.
Behind Tydides next was Menelaus,
And next to him Antilochus; and he
Aloud unto his horses calling was.
Now let's, said he, your utmost virtue see.
With Diomed you are not bid contend,
Whom victor now Athena means to make,
And strengthened hath his horses to that end;
But only Menelaus t' overtake.
Were 't not a shame that Æthe, but a mare,
Should leave you two such lusty steeds behind?
But if you now seek how yourselves to spare,
I tell you this, and true you will it find,
You shall be slain. Therefore use all your speed,
And when you come into a narrow place,
Leave it to me to do what I see need.
This said, the horses fearing mend their pace,
And now were close at Menelaus' heels.
Then near unto a hollow way they came;
And lest they break should one another's wheels,
Atrides turn'd aside into the same.

The other after him a little wide
The same way took. Atrides then afraid
That he would enter with him side by side,
Unto Antilochus cried out and said,
Antilochus, you drive too carelessly,
The way's too narrow. Pray a little stay
Your horses; broader 'twill be by and by,
Lest both our cars lie broken on the way.
Antilochus then whipp'd his horses on
So much the faster, seeming not to hear.
And when they were a little further gone,
Atrides held his horses in, for fear
Their cars should clashing overturned be,
And with them they be thrown into the dust,
And to him spake, reviling: Go, said he,
Of all the men I know the most unjust,
And not so wise as th' Argives thought you were.
But yet the prize you shall not so obtain,
But for it first you shall be put to swear.
And then his horses he drave on again,
And to encourage them unto them said,
His horses cannot keep before you long;
They old are both; strain hard. Be not dismay'd,
For both of you brave horses are, and young.
This said, at highest speed again they fly,
And to Antilochus came up again.
The Argives on the race now sat to spy
Who foremost coming was upon the plain.
Idomeneus sat in a place more high

Without the race, and heard a char'oteer,
Whose voice he knew, unto his horses cry,
And presently two horses did appear.
Of one of them the colour was bright bay,
But on his forehead had a spot of white,
And, as the moon at full, round ev'ry way,
And from afar conspicuous and bright.
Then to the Greeks he said, Is there no more
That see these horses coming back but I?
They are not those that foremost were before;
And 'tis another char'oteer I spy.
Eumelus some mischance has had I fear;
And yet about the goal he turned well,
But now I cannot see him any where.
Perhaps out of his hands their bridles fell;
No longer would the horses then obey,
But thrown him somewhere have o' th' field, or borne
Him in their fit by violence away,
And have his char'ot overturn'd, or torn.
Stand on your feet yourselves, and mark him well,
Whether or no it Diomedes be,
The son of Tydeus, for I cannot tell;
He like him is, and I believe 'tis he.
The lesser Ajax then, Oileus' son,
With evil words t' Idomeneus replied,
The mares upon the field are coming on,
But you must talk, though from the purpose wide.
Your eyes are now grown old, and less can see,
And yet to talk you love so much the more,

Though at discerning many better be;
Eumelus, as at first, is still before.
Ajax, said he, of all the Greeks the worst,
Except at railing, let's a wager lay,
A tripod, or a cauldron, who comes first;
Atrides judge, that you may know and pay.
And Ajax then about was to reply;
Nor had the quarrel 'twixt them there been staid,
But that Achilles, who was sitting by,
Rose from his seat, and coming to them said,
Idomeneus and Ajax, 'tis a shame
For you in evil language to contend,
That others when they do so ought to blame.
Sit down, and but a little while attend,
They'll soon be here. They strive for victory,
And driving are as fast as e'er they can;
Discerned then it will be easily
Which is the foremost, which the hindmost man.
This said, they saw Tydides very near,
Plying his whip; his horses seem'd to fly,
And cover'd was with dust the char'oteer,
And hard it was the track o' th' wheels to spy.
Then coming in, before the lords he stopp'd,
And to the ground leapt from his chariot;
With sweat his horses' breasts and shoulders dropp'd.
Then Stenelus the prize neglected not,
But nimbly from his place he to it skips,
And by his friends there standing by his side
Sent th' woman and the tripod to the ships;

And having done, the horses he untied.
Antilochus next to Tydides was,
That not by virtue of his steeds, but sleight,
Advantage gotten had of Menelaus,
When for them both he found the way too streight.
But Menelaus to him was so near,
As is a char'ot-horse unto the wheel,
Which of his tail doth sometimes touch the hair,
And makes the horse to run that does it feel.
So near unto him was Atrides then,
That was behind once a quoit's cast or more.
But quickly to him he came up again,
For Æthe now ran faster than before,
And had they but a little longer run,
Atrides by Antilochus had pass'd,
And without doubt the second prize had won.
Meriones behind was a spear's cast;
Slow steeds he had, and but small skill in courses.
Eumelus, whom Athena overthrew,
Came hindmost, and before him drave his horses,
And with his hands behind, his char'ot drew.
Achilles mov'd with pity was at this,
And spake unto the Argives in this wise:
Although he come the last, the best he is;
'Tis fit he have at least the second prize,
But Diomed the first, that has it won.
And just it seemed in the Argives' sight,
And from Antilochus the prize had gone,
Had he not pleaded for it as his right.

Antilochus then to Achilles spake:
Though well, said he, in pity you incline
T’ Eumelus, yet my prize he must not take;
I won it have, and ’tis not yours, but mine.
His horses good, and horseman good he is;
And he and they upon the ground were laid
By some mischance; I’m not concern’d in this,
He should unto th’ immortal Gods have pray’d.
But you, that pity him, and at your tent
Have gold, brass, horses, women, cattle store,
May out of that, when you think fit, content
Eumelus with the value, or with more;
For whosoever means to have the mare,
Must for her with me fight. Thus pleaded he.
Achilles, that great love unto him bare,
Was glad, and said, Since you so counsel me,
The breast-plate I will to him give of brass,
That hemm’d is all about with shining tin,
With which Asteropæus armed was.
Automedon, into my tent go in,
And quickly to me bring the breast-plate forth.
And then Automedon no longer stands,
But fetches out the armour of great worth,
And puts the same into Eumelus’ hands.
Then up Atrides Menelaus stands,
And in his hand the crier a sceptre laid,
And silence to be kept i’ th’ court commands.
T’ Antilochus then Menelaus said,
Antilochus, what made you me disgrace,

Justling my horses in the hollow way,
When there was so much danger in the place
That ‘t had been best for both of us to stay?
But you, the princes, hear the cause I pray,
And judge between us both impartially,
Lest any of the Greeks hereafter say
I did t’ Antilochus an injury,
And from him got the mare by fraud or might;
And that his horses than mine better were;
But come, I now know how myself to right.
Come, lay your hand upon the reins, and swear
By Neptune, that you did not willingly
And with prepensed malice cross my car.
To this Antilochus did then reply:
Menelaus, since you elder are,
You know our faults upon the sudden rise,
And that before-hand young men study not;
Their wits are present, but the old are wise,
To do you injury I never thought.
The mare is yours; and if you please to send
For anything I have, that too I’ll give
Rather than with an oath the Gods offend,
And out of Menelaus’ favour live.
This said, he put the mare into his hand;
Then Menelaus look’d as fresh and gay
As dew, that on the growing corn doth stand,
Then when the fields are in their best array,
And to Antilochus replied again:
Antilochus, I angry am no more;

I see you were by youth transported then;
But putting tricks upon your friends give o'er.
I not so soon forgiven had another;
But you so much have suffer'd for my sake,
Together with your father and your brother,
That I can easy satisfaction take.
And now, to shew I got it not by might,
Take you the prize, although it be my share.
This said, he took t' himself the cauldron bright,
And yielding to Antilochus the mare,
Unto Noëmon gave her to set up
(Noëmon was Antilochus his man).
One prize remain'd, which was the double cup;
Meriones the two gold talents wan.
Achilles rising then to Nestor went,
And unto him the double cup he gave.
This prize, said he, keep for a monument
Of my Patroclus lying in his grave.
You shall not for it arm your fists with lead,
Nor with young men at cast of spear engage,
Nor shall you on the foot-race need to tread;
Of all such work you are excus'd by age.
This said, the cup into his hand he laid,
Which joyfully he took, and thus replied:
Sweet son, you nothing but the truth have said.
My strength is past, it cannot be denied;
My hands I scarce can to my shoulders raise,
And heavily my feet both rise and fall.
Oh, that I were as young as in those days

When I saw Amarynceus' funeral
Set forth most nobly in Buprasion.
There many prizes were, and many a man;
But like to me amongst them there was none,
Eperan, Pylian, nor Ætolian.
At fists the prize from Clytomed I won;
And wrestling with Ancæus I him threw,
And Iphiclus, swift as he was, outrun;
And with the spears I Polydore out-threw,
And at the horse-race only was outstripp'd
By th' envy of the sons of Actor two;
For sitting on the char'ot they both whipp'd,
And from me won that prize with much ado.
Such then I was. But now to younger men
That work I leave. Old age I must obey;
But such I was amongst the Argives then.
And now, Achilles, here no longer stay,
Proceed with other games your friend to grace;
Your gift I take, and great content I find,
In that you shewn have in this public place,
Amongst the Greeks you have me in your mind.
Achilles having heard these praises all
Of Nestor, brought into the place a mule,
A prize for him that won at fist and ball,
A mule of six years old, and hard to rule.
As for the vanquish'd, he assign'd to him
A lesser prize, which was a silver cup,
That crook'd and wryed was about the brim.
Achilles then amongst the Greeks stood up.

Atrides, and you Argives all, said he,
Let two men fight for these at fist and ball;
The lusty mule shall for the victor be,
The cup for him that in the fight shall fall.
This said, Epeius, a huge man stood up,
And that had at this kind of fight great skill,
And seiz'd the mule, and said, As for the cup,
Let any one against me rise that will,
The mule is mine; at this game I am best.
Is't not enough that th' Argives value me
In fight but as a mean man like the rest?
For no man can the best at all things be.
But let him know, whoe'er with me contends,
I'll break his bones. Which being to him known,
He may about him ready have his friends,
To take him up when I have knocked him down.
This said, Mecestes' son, Euryalus,
That won the prize from the Cadmæans all,
At Thebes, upon the death of Œdipus,
When celebrated was his funeral,
Presents himself. About him, busy was
Tydides, wishing him the victory;
And gave him of strong leather well-wrought lace,
Wherewith the balls unto his wrists to tie.
The champions up their fists together have,
Which when they met so quick and mingled were,
That which was which a man could not perceive,
But how they rattled at their heads might hear.
Euryalus then chanc'd to look aside,

At which Epeius such a blow him hit,
Upon the cheek, that he was stupified,
And could no longer stand upon his feet.
As when the sea is curl'd by Zephyrus,
A little fish leaps up and falls again;
So started at the stroke Euryalus,
And fainted. To him went Epeius, then,
And took him up. His friends that by him stood,
Led him away trailing his feet behind,
His neck aside hanging, and spitting blood;
And wand'ring out of order was his mind.
Achilles other prizes then brought forth
For wrestlers; and for him that did the best,
A mighty three-foot pot esteemed worth,
By th' company, twelve oxen at the least,
And for the vanquished a lesser prize,
A woman that in many works had skill;
And to the Argives speaking, said: Arise,
You that contend for the great tripod will!
Then up rose Ajax, up Ulysses rose,
And having girt themselves stood on the place,
And presently extend their arms, and close;
And one another with twin'd arms embrace.
As when a carpenter to keep the wind
Out of a house, the timber bows and pleats;
So were their arms with one another twin'd,
And each of them keeps fast his hold, and sweats,
And squeez'd until their sides were black and blue.
And weary were the Greeks with looking on,

When neither Ajax yet Ulysses threw,
Nor he the mighty son of Telamon.
And Ajax then unto Ulysses said,
Let's lift each other; and withal him lifts,
And hop'd upon the ground to have him laid,
But he, then, not forgetful of his shifts,
Struck with his right foot Ajax on the ham,
So that to turn him Ajax strength did lack.
Then both together to the ground they came,
One on his breast, the other on his back.
And now Ulysses to lift Ajax is.
And from the ground he heav'd him, but not high,
And in he clapt one knee between both his,
Then both upon the ground again they lie.
Again they rise, and had not so giv'n o'er,
But that Achilles to them goes, and says,
You both are best; torment yourselves no more,
But equal prizes take, and go your ways,
That other Greeks for other prizes may
Their virtue show. This said, they him obey'd,
And from their bodies wip'd the dust away,
And with their coats themselves again array'd.
And then Achilles brought new prizes in, —
A silver temp'rer that six gallons held,
And by Sidonian workmen made had been,
And all that e'er they made before excell'd,
And by Phœnicians into Greece was brought,
And giv'n to Thoas, and from him it came
T' Eunæus, Jason's son. Eunæus bought

Lycaon of Patroclus with the same.
This was the prize for him that swiftest ran.
A great fat ox the second was to take;
And half a talent, gold, the hindmost man.
And then Achilles to the Argives spake.
Arise, said he, that for this prize will run.
Then Ajax rose, son of Oïleus,
The lesser Ajax. And then Nestor's son,
The swiftest of the youth, Antilochus.
Arow they stand. Achilles to them shows
The goal about the which they were to run.
Together then they start; and foremost goes
The nimble-footed Ajax, Oïleus' son.
But next him, and so near Ulysses is,
As from a woman's distaff comes the thread,
And on his steps trod ere the dust aris,
And breathed all the way upon his head.
The Greeks upon him called all the way
To do his best, and wish'd him victory.
Then to Athena did Ulysses pray.
help me, my good Goddess, now, said he.
And when almost they ended had the race,
Then chanced Ajax in the dung to fall
Of cattle which had kill'd been on the place,
B' Achilles for Patroclus' funeral,
And fill'd with cow-dung was his mouth and nose.
Ulysses on the temp'rer laid his hands.
And Ajax, spitting dung, again arose,
And with his ox before the Argives stands.

Oh, oh, said he, ’tis Pallas hath done this,
Who, as a careful mother of her child,
Upon Ulysses always waiting is.
And when he that had said th’ Achæans smil’d.
Antilochus th’ half talent took of gold,
And smil’d, and to the Argives said, You see
The Gods still give most honour to the old;
Ajax in age a little passeth me;
Again, Ulysses older is than he.
And younger men with these cannot contend
At running of a race, except it be
Achilles: whom he finely did commend.
Achilles, of that commendation glad,
Unto Antilochus replied again;
To your half-talent I’ll another add.
That word of yours shall not be said in vain.
Achilles then brought forth the shield, and spear,
And helmet of Sarpedon, for till he
Was killed by Patroclus his they were,
And said unto the Greeks: now let me see
Two valiant men, well-arm’d, contend for these;
And he that first draws blood shall bear away
This Thracian sword won from Asteropæus.
The arms in common they shall both enjoy,
And at my tent they both shall feasted be.
Up then great Ajax, up Tydides rose,
And came forth armed from the company,
And looking grimly, one to th’ other goes,
And thrice to one another fiercely leapt,

And Ajax' spear pass'd through Tydides' shield;
But by the breast-plate from his flesh was kept.
Good was his breast-plate, and not apt to yield.
But still at Ajax' neck Tydides aim'd,
Above his shield still pushing with his spear;
At which the people standing by exclaim'd;
For then of Ajax' life they stood in fear,
And to Achilles cried to part the fray
Betime, and let them equal prizes have.
And by Achilles then dismiss'd were they;
But yet the sword he to Tydides gave.
And then of iron he brought out a sough,
Such as at first it from the furnace came,
The which Eëtion was wont to throw;
Amongst whose goods Achilles found the same,
And to his ship he brought it with the rest.
And said to th' Argives, He this prize shall gain,
That lets us see he throw it can the best.
It will his plough with iron five years maintain.
He needs not to the town for iron go.
Then Polypœtes and Leontes rise,
And Ajax, and together stand arow;
And last of all unto them comes Epeius.
First threw Epeius, and well laugh'd at was.
And next to him Leontes threw the same.
Then Ajax threw and did them both surpass.
But when to Polypœtes' hand it came,
As far as doth a shepherd throw his hook
Seeing his sheep stand still or straggle out,

So far threw he. The prize his friends then took
And bare it to his tent. The people shout.
Achilles then brought other prizes in,
Ten double, and ten single axes keen,
The which the two best bowmen were to win,
And said, Now let your archery be seen.
And on the sands erects a ship-mast high,
And at the top he tied a dove unto't
With slender thread, and said, Your skill now try.
For he that dead the tender dove shall shoot,
Shall have the double axes for his prize;
The single he that breaks the thread shall win.
Then Teucer and Meriones arise,
And lots they cast which of them shall begin.
And to begin to Teucer fell the lot.
And first he shot. But should have made a vow
A hecatomb to Phœbus, but forgot.
And therefore Phœbus would not him allow
To kill the bird. But yet he brake the thread,
And tow'rds the ground, it hung down from her feet.
The frighted dove in th' air hovered,
And mightily the Argives shout to see't.
Meriones then quickly drew his bow,
For th' arrow fitted on't already lay,
And presently to Phœbus made a vow
Of his first lambs a hecatomb to pay.
And seeing how the dove amazed went
Above his head this way and that way round,
His arrow keen he quickly to her sent,

Which pierc’d her thro’, and brought her to the ground.
The wounded dove unto a mast then flies,
And there her feathers sheds, and hangs her head,
And having sitten there not long she dies.
The Argives gazing at it wondered.
And then Meriones away did bear
The double axes. Teucer took the rest.
Achilles then new prizes fetch’d; a spear,
And a new cauldron worth an ox at least.
To throw the spear then rose the king Atrides,
And after him stood up Meriones
Idomeneus his squire. Then said Pelides,
There shall be no contention for these.
We know how much you are more excellent
At this than any of th’ Achæans here.
Take you these prizes therefore to your tent,
And give unto Meriones the spear,
If you think fit. Atrides was content,
And to Meriones he gave the spear,
And by Talthybius the cauldron sent
Unto the ships; and all well pleased were.

LIB. XXIV.

The redemption of Hector, and his funeral.

THUS END THE games. The Greeks dispersed are,
And ev'ry man returned to his tent,
And busy was his supper to prepare;
And after they had supp'd to bed they went.
Achilles all the night slept not a wink,
But on Patroclus' worth, and company,
And on their common suff'rings still did think,
And lay upon his bed unquietly.
And weeping sometimes laid himself on this,
Sometimes on that side, sometimes on his face,
And sometimes on his back, and sometimes ris,
And walk'd upon the shore from place to place.
And soon as ere he saw the morning come,
He Hector to his char'ot ti'd again;
And dragg'd him thrice about Patroclus' tomb,
And then went in, and left him on the plain,
With dust all over hidden, but not rent.
For Phœbus had him cover'd with his shield,
That torn his body was not as they went.
The Gods meanwhile sat looking on the field,
And griev'd to see Achilles show such spite;
And some of them advised Mercury

To steal away the body from his sight.
To this the other Gods did all agree,
But Neptune, Juno, Pallas, angry were
With Priam and with Troy, for Paris' sake,
For that he Venus did so much prefer,
And of the others small account did make.
Thus pass'd it then. But twelve days after, came
Apollo to the Gods in council set,
And said, Ye Gods unjust, you are to blame.
What sacrifice did Hector e'er forget,
That to his father, mother, wife, and son,
That for his death lament, he must not come,
And buried be, since he is dead and gone,
And have a funeral in Ilium?
But to Achilles' fury you give way,
Whose breast is void of all humanity.
As lions on men's cattle love to prey;
Savage and proud on men so falleth he,
Asham'd of nothing. Though another man,
That had a loving brother lost, or son,
When he has wept a while, give over can,
And bear the ill that cannot be undone;
But he with Hector's death is not content,
But drags his body at his chariot,
Not caring how we may the same resent.
He'll find at last 'twere better he had not
Upon the senseless earth have shown such spite.
To this in anger Juno then replied,
If equal they had been, you had said right,

But that they equal are it is denied.
For Hector was a mortal woman's son;
Achilles' mother a great Goddess is,
Thetis, that nurs'd was and brought up by none
But by myself. The Gods can witness this,
Who, when I made her noble Peleus' bride,
Came to the wedding all, and you too then
Were with your fiddle there well satisfied,
Perfidious God, companion of mean men.
Then Jupiter to Juno spake and said,
Look not so angrily upon the Gods,
Nor for Achilles' honour be afraid.
'Twixt him and Hector I know well the odds.
But Hector we of mortals love the best,
I do at least, of all the men of Troy.
He never is behind-hand with my feast,
But flesh and wine pays duly at my day.
But we'll not Hector from Achilles steal;
Nor can, since Thetis for him is awake.
Call Thetis hither; for with her I'll deal
To make him for his body ransom take.
This said, into the sea leap'd Iris straight
Between the isles of Imbros and of Same.
The water roar'd and started at her weight;
And she to th' bottom like a plummet came,
Where in a hollow cave the Goddess sat,
Her sea-nymphs all about her sitting round,
She in the midst bewailing her son's fate,
That was to perish on the Trojan ground.

And going to her near, Thetis, said she,
Jove calls you to him. She replied, Why so?
What has that mighty God to say to me?
I am not fit amongst the Gods to go.
But well; I go. I dare not disobey.
And on her head then throws she a black hood.
Then up they went, and Iris led the way.
To let them pass the sea divided stood,
And being landed, leap'd up to the sky,
When Jove in council and the Gods were met;
Where Thetis was received lovingly,
And next himself by Jupiter was set:
There Juno nectar, Pallas gave her place.
And Jove unto her spake. Thetis, said he,
I know your grief, but such is now the case,
You could not from th' assembly spared be.
Nine days amongst ourselves we disagree
Concerning Hector's body what to do;
The most would have him stol'n by Mercury,
But for your sake I would not yield thereto.
But go you, Thetis, to your son, and say
The Gods are angry, and I most of all,
That Hector's body at the ships doth stay
Unransom'd, and without a funeral;
That he release it may for fear of me.
Meanwhile to Priam Iris shall be sent,
To bid him go t' Achilles speedily,
And with fair presents fetch it from his tent.
This said, she from Olympus took her flight

T’ Achilles’ tent, and found him sitting there,
Where he, Patroclus still lamenting, sigh’d,
And with him friends providing dinner were;
And killed had a fat sheep in his tent.
Then in she went, and sat down by his side.
How long, said she, will you yourself torment?
Be comforted, and for your health provide;
And take delight in women’s company,
For here you know you are not long to stay,
And that at hand is now your destiny.
And hear what I from Jove must to you say.
From Jupiter I come, who bade me say
The Gods are angry, and he most of all,
That Hector’s body at the ships doth stay
Unransom’d, and without a funeral.
The ransom therefore take, and let him go.
To which Achilles a short answer gave.
Let him that will, since Jove will have it so,
The ransom bring, the body he shall have.
Whilst Thetis and her son discoursing were,
To Priam Jove swift Iris sent away.
Iris, said he, this message from me bear
To Priam, and relate what now I say.
Bid him unto Achilles’ tent to go,
And carry with him other Trojans none
But one old squire, his char’ot to look to,
And bring away the body of his son;
And honourable presents with him bear,
Wherewith Achilles may be well content.

And bid him death and danger not to fear,
So good a guardian with him shall be sent.
Hermes shall guide him to Achilles' tent,
And being there he needs not fear at all.
Achilles will not kill him, but prevent
The hurt that might from others on him fall.
He wants not judgment, care, nor piety,
And pity has for them that to him pray.
This said, flew Iris from Olympus high
To Priam's house, where little was of joy.
His sons about him weeping sat, and he
I' th' midst involved in his cloak so just,
That one th' impression of his limbs might see,
His head and neck bedaub'd with dung and dust,
Which he himself had thrown upon his head.
His daughters, and his sons' wives, howling went
About, for brothers and for husbands that were dead,
And to the shades by th' Argives had been sent.
Then Iris unto Priam coming near,
With soft and gentle voice unto him said:
Priam, be bold, for no ill news I bear
(For trembling sat he, and was sore afraid),
Jove bids you to Achilles' tent to go,
And carry with you other Trojans none
But one old squire, your char'ot to look to,
And bring away the body of your son;
And honourable presents with you bear,
Wherewith Achilles may be well content.
He bids you neither death nor danger fear,

So good a guardian with you shall be sent;
Hermes shall guide you to Achilles' tent.
When you are there, past is the danger all;
Achilles will not kill you, but prevent
The harm that may from others on you fall.
He wants not judgment, care, nor piety,
And pity has on them that to him pray
In their distress, and at his mercy lie.
When Iris this had said, she went away.
Then Priam said unto his sons, Arise,
And make a waggon ready out of hand;
And to a cedar chamber down he hies,
Where his most precious household-stuff did stand,
And thither call'd his wife, and to her said,
Jove's messenger t' Achilles bids me go
With ransom for my son. I'm not afraid,
But what think you? Is't best to go, or no?
At this, aloud she shriek'd, and said, Ay me,
What now is of the wit you had become,
For which so wise you once were thought to be,
By men abroad, and by your friends at home?
Will you go put yourself into the hand
Of him that hath your sons so many slain,
A man that does not pity understand,
Nor faith? No, no, he'll not from you abstain.
But since the Fates designed had before
His birth, to th' dogs he should be made a prey
By this hard-hearted man, you may deplore
Him here at home, and from Achilles stay.

Oh, that between my teeth I had his heart,
That to revenge my son I might it eat;
It would no little ease be to my smart,
And less the loss of him I should regret.
For Hector only for his country fought,
And of his enemies was not afraid,
Nor did him wrong, but valiant was and stout.
Then Priam to his wife replied, and said,
Nay, wife, since to him I am bent to go,
Dissuade me not, nor ill bird to me be
Here in my house, and bode me ill. For know,
Whate'er you say, 'twill not prevail with me.
If now a priest or prophet to me came,
And this had said, I thought it had a lie.
But howsoever, come what will, I am
With Hector in my arms content to die.
This said, the chests he presently unlocks,
And out he lays twelve robes for womankind,
As many coats, as many single cloaks,
And unto those as many that were lin'd;
And further twelve rich carpets out he laid,
And when he that had done, he gold brought forth,
Whereof he layed by ten talents weigh'd,
And two great black three-footed pots, much worth;
And unto those he set bright cauldrons four,
And the fine cup which giv'n him was when he
From Troy to Thrace was sent ambassador,
So long'd he to set Hector's body free.
I' th' porch then standing many Trojans were,

That sorry for his grief, were thither come;
To whom he said, Rascals, what make you here?
Find you not cause of grief enough at home,
That you must hither come to trouble me,
As if too little ‘twere to lose my son?
Hereafter you will eas’lier killed be,
Since Hector, who defended you, is gone.
As for myself, before I see that day,
I hope to be within th’ infernal gates.
Then with his staff he drave them all away;
And turning in again his sons he rates,
Paris and Agathon and Helenus,
Pammon, Polites, and Antiphobus,
Argavus, Deiphobus, Hippothous.
These nine he rated, saying to them thus,
Make haste, unworthy sons. I had been glad
If you in Hector’s stead had all been slain.
how unfortunate am I, that had
So many and so valiant sons in vain!
Mestor and Troïlus both valiant men,
And godlike Hector. Sure I am accurs’d.
Since Mars of these depriv’d me has again,
And now I none have left me but the worst,
Domestic wolves, the bane of lamb and kid,
And good for nothing but to dance and lie.
Why stand you still? Were you not by me bid
The waggon to prepare? Then out they fly,
And speedily the waggon forth they bring,
And yoke well-fitted with an iron pin;

And fix'd it to the pole's end with a ring,
And cord nine cubits long, to keep it in;
Which thrice about the boxen yoke they wind,
And to the waggon laid the ransom in;
And to it then the lusty mules they bind,
Which by the Mysians given him had been.
That done, king Priam's horses to his car
Were by himself and by Idæus tied,
Of which he always taken had such care,
That while they fed he stayed by their side.
Then Hecuba came to them with a cup,
A golden cup of pleasant wine, that they
The same to Jupiter might offer up
Before unto their foes they went away.
Here, take this cup, said she, and pray to Jove
That he will let you see a lucky flight
Of that great bird which he the most doth love,
That you may be assured by the sight
That safe you shall again return to Troy.
For if that favour to you be denied
I should avise you by all means to stay.
And Priam then to Hecuba replied,
This counsel, wife, of yours with reason stands.
Jove pleased is when to him men look up.
For water then he call'd and wash'd his hands,
And from his wife receiv'd the golden cup.
Then looking up to heav'n, O Jove, said he,
Of all the Gods most glorious, high, and great,
Grant me that I may well received be

B’ Achilles at his tent, and well retreat.
And that thereof I may be confident,
Now show me of your bird a lucky flight.
This said, Jove presently an eagle sent,
Of colour spotted over black and white.
As wide as is a prince’s gate or more,
So wide her wings the mighty eagle spreads,
And as it over Ilium did soar,
The people joy’d to see it o’er their heads.
The old man then went up into his seat,
And through the city to the plain did pass.
The waggon wherein lay the treasure great
Before him driven by Idæus was.
And so far went his sons, and sons-in-law;
And then return’d again into the city.
When Jupiter upon the way him saw
In this estate, he moved was with pity;
And unto Hermes turn’d his eyes and said,
Since you men’s company do most frequent,
And whom you will can quickly hear and aid,
Go and guide Priam to Achilles’ tent.
But so as to be seen by none, until
He thither safely come. And Mercury
No sooner understood his father’s will
But sets himself about it willingly.
And first his shoes unto his feet he binds
Ambrosian shoes that over sea and land
Bear him as swift and lightly as the winds;
And then his rod he took into his hand,

Wherewith he layeth sleep on mortal eyes,
And takes it off again when he thinks good.
Then down to Troy and Hellespont he flies,
In likeness of a youth of royal blood,
When down begins t' appear upon his face.
Idæus now and Priam at the brink
Of Xanthus were, and night came on apace,
And there they made their mules and horses drink.
Idæus near them then saw Mercury,
And in great fear, to Priam cried, I see
A man, O Priam, coming. Let us fly,
Or to him go and fall down at his knee.
And horribly was Priam then afraid;
His hair with fear upon him stood upright.
Then Mercury unto him came, and laid
His hand on his, and to him said, 'Tis night;
What makes you be abroad? Do you not fear
Your foes, the Greeks? If any of them knew
That you were with so great a treasure here,
In what a pitiful estate were you?
For you, and he that's with you, both are old,
And neither of you can himself defend,
But as for any hurt from me, be bold;
I hither come t' assist you as a friend,
So like, me thinks, you to my father are.
And Priam then to Mercury replied:
'Tis true you say; and yet the Gods a care
Have of me still, to send me such a guide,
So great a man, so comely, and so wise,

That blessed are the parents you begat.
And Mercury to him again replies:
Indeed, old man, you say the truth in that.
But whither bear you your best goods away?
To some strange city, till the war be done?
Or are the Trojans all now leaving Troy,
Since killed is the best of them, your son,
That might with any of the Greeks compare?
Tell me, said Priam, pray ye, who are you,
And whence ye come, and who your parents are,
And how my son and his hard fate you knew?
You mean to try me now, said Mercury.
At th' Argive ships I Hector frighted saw,
And how he made the Greeks before him fly,
And how he toss'd them in the field like straw,
Where we stood by, with wonder looking on;
Achilles had forbidden us to fight.
His man am I, by birth a Myrmidon,
And stood amongst the rest to see the fight.
My father is Polyctor, very rich,
But now an old man is, and like to you.
And seven sons he has in all, of which
I am the last. And lots at home we drew,
Which of us with Achilles should be sent
To th' war of Troy. The lot then fell to me,
And with Achilles in his ship I went,
And hither come the place of fight to see.
The Greeks by break of day will hither come,
And try if now the city they can win;

Impatient of their stay at Ilium,
They cannot by their leaders be kept in.
Then Priam to him said again: Since you
Achilles' servant are, is Hector yet
At th' Argive ships, I pray you tell me true,
Or cut in joints, thrown to the dogs to eat?
And Hermes unto this again replies:
Nor dogs nor fowl upon him yet have fed,
But at the ships he still neglected lies,
And though he have twelve days now there been dead,
Yet is his body uncorrupt, and free
From worms that breed in other bodies slain,
And though it ev'ry morning dragged be
About Patroclus' tomb, doth whole remain,
And undefac'd, the blood all wash'd away.
You would admire to see him look so fresh,
And cleansed of the filth that on him lay,
And at his wounds how closed is the flesh,
Though many from the Greeks receiv'd he had;
So kind the Gods were after he was dead.
These words of Mercury made Priam glad,
And thus again he to him answered:
Yes, yes, 'tis good to give the Gods their due,
A thing that Hector never did omit;
And therefore to him they this favour shew,
Although his soul be in th' infernal pit.
But now t' Achilles' tent be you my guide,
And at my hand this handsome cup receive.
Again you try me, Mercury replied;

I dare not take't without Achilles' leave,
For of his anger in great fear I stand.
Without a bribe I'll with you go along
To what place you think fit, by sea or land,
Though 'twere to Argos; none shall do you wrong.
For sure, so wretchedly I do not look,
But that a man may of me stand in fear.
Then up he leapt, and in his hands he took
The whip and reins, and serv'd as char'oteer.
When they were come to th' Argive ditch and wall,
The watch that placed was the gate to keep,
Their supper to provide were busy all,
And Mercury there laid them all asleep,
Took off the bars, the gate wide open laid,
And in the char'ot and the waggon went,
With all the wealth for Hector to be paid,
And forward pass unto Achilles' tent,
Built for him by his Myrmidons, and high,
With fir-trees tall, and cover'd over head
(To keep it out of danger from the sky)
With the deep vesture of the flow'ry mead,
And to it had a great court pal'd about,
And in the pale a high two-valved door,
For cars and waggons to go in and out,
And one great bar of fir-tree and no more,
So great that it requir'd three common men
Upon the lofty gate to set it on,
And three such men to take it off again;
None but Achilles shut it could alone.

This gate then Hermes open to him laid,
And with the car and waggon in he came,
Then leaping to the ground to Priam said,
Old father, I a God immortal am,
Hermes, and hither sent to be your guide,
From heav'n, on purpose by my father Jove.
But by Achilles I'll not here be spied;
Gods must not shew to men such open love.
But go you to Achilles in, and try
What favour from him at his knees you'll find,
And put him of his son in memory,
And father. That will work upon his mind.
This said, t' Olympus Hermes went his way.
Then to the ground leapt Priam from his car,
And going in he bad Idæus stay,
And of the mules and horses have a care.
Achilles at his supper now was set,
And waiting on him stood Automedon
And Alimus, the table standing yet;
But supp'd he had, and appetite had none.
His other friends at distance from him sat,
And Priam to them then came in unseen,
And kiss'd the hands there of Achilles, that
Of many of his sons the death had been.
As when a man that kill'd another has,
And to another prince for safety flies,
Men at him stare; so he amazed was
When he saw Priam stand before his eyes.
The rest admir'd the comely man to see,

And both on him and one another look:
But Priam then upon Achilles' knee
Laid both his hands, and thus unto him spoke:
Godlike Achilles, take into your thought
Your father, that an old man is as I,
And into trouble by his neighbours brought,
And has no friend on whom he may rely.
Yet he has many intervals of joy,
And thinking on his son, is comforted
With hope to see him back return from Troy.
Undone am I; for all my hopes are fled.
When th' army of th' Achæans landed here,
I by the Gods with fifty sons was bless'd,
Whereof sixteen my wife did to me bear,
And other women in my house the rest.
But in this war the most of them are lost.
And now by Mars reduced are to few.
And Hector, which of all I loved most,
Is lately, O Achilles, slain by you.
His body to redeem I hither come,
With precious gifts, and fall before your knee,
That I may bury it in Ilium.
Upon your father think, and pity me.
Yet is my case more pitiful than his.
For what calamity can greater be
Than th' hands that have my children kill'd to kiss?
This said, Achilles wept. And from his knee,
With his, the hands of Priam gently mov'd;
And then aloud they both lamented. He

For Peleus, and Patroclus whom he lov'd,
And Priam for his own calamity,
And through the house were heard to sigh and groan.
Achilles, when his fit of tears was laid,
And eased was his heart, came from his throne,
And rais'd th' old man that on his knees yet staid,
And to him spake. Alas, old man, said he,
You much have suffer'd, and your pain I feel.
But how alone durst you to come to me,
That slew your sons, unless your heart be steel?
But come, sit down. In vain lamenting is,
The hurt that's done tears cannot take away,
Since so 'tis ordered by the Gods in bliss,
That men shall live in pain, and they in joy.
Two barrels in his cellar Jove has still,
Of gifts to be bestow'd on mortal wights,
One full of good, the other full of ill.
And usually to mingle them delights.
For they that only ill receive from Jove,
Exposed always are to injury,
And begging up and down the world shall rove,
And both by Gods and men despised be.
So Peleus at the first receiv'd much good,
And did in wealth his neighbours all surpass,
And with his subjects in great honour stood,
And join'd in wedlock to a Goddess was.
But after this the ill unto him came,
To leave no child behind him to succeed,
But only me that so short-lived am,

And from him live to vex you and your seed.
And you, O Priam, once were rich, they say,
And all that was in Lesbos did enjoy,
And over all the Hellespont did sway,
And that all Phrygia did you obey,
And with great store of children bless'd you were.
But now, you only fights and slaughter see,
And patiently you Hector's death must bear.
He cannot with your tears revived be;
Much sooner you may suffer greater ill.
T' Achilles, Priam then again replies,
Thetis' son, to sit I have no will,
Whilst at the ships my son unburied lies.
But bring him forth, that I my son may see,
And you the presents I have brought enjoy;
And prosperous unto you may they be,
And safely I again return to Troy.
Achilles, angry then, Old man, said he,
Provoke me not. I'll put into your hand
The body of your son, because to me
From Jove my mother came with that command.
And very well I know you Priam are,
And that you hither had a God for guide.
What mortal to the army come would dare?
Or could have pass'd the watch and not been spied?
Or open to you could the gates have set?
Therefore take heed, and anger me no more,
Lest the command of Jove I should forget,
And without Hector send you out adoor.

This said, old Priam was afraid and sat.
Out went Achilles with Automedon
And Axamus, his two good servants, that
He lov'd the most, Patroclus being gone.
And they the horses and the mules untied,
And from the waggon in the goods they brought,
Only, wherewith the body dead to hide,
They left behind a handsome robe and coat.
Achilles then his drudging maids appointed
To bear the body to some chamber meet,
And see the same well wash'd and well anointed,
So secretly that Priam might not see't,
Lest grieved he should something do or say,
That might so far Achilles' anger move,
That in his passion he should Priam slay,
Forgetting the commandement of Jove.
And being wash'd, anointed, and array'd,
Achilles laid the body on a bed,
Which his two servants in the waggon laid.
This done, he to Patroclus spake and said,
my Patroclus, if you hear in Hell,
That Hector's body I have sent to Troy,
Forgive me, since I for it paid am well
With gifts, whereof what's fit to you I'll pay.
This said, Achilles to his tent retired,
And sat upon the seat from whence he ris.
Your son, said he, is freed as you desired,
And on a bed laid in your waggon is.
Tomorrow with him go, by break of day.

But let us not our supper now forget;
For Niobe twelve children lost, they say;
Yet did she not for that refuse to eat.
Six lusty sons, six daughters fair they were,
And killed all, only for saying this,
[Leto but two, and she did many bear.]
By Phœbus they, and these by Artemis,
The Goddess Leto's daughter and her son.
Nine days and nights they lay unburied;
For Jove had chang'd the people into stone,
And then the Gods with earth them covered.
Yet Niobe, when she had weeping done,
Received food; and now doth somewhere lie
I' th' wolds of Sepylus, and turn'd to stone,
The hurt done by the Gods takes patiently.
Come then, old man, and lay your grief away,
And for the present think upon your meat,
And weep for Hector when you come to Troy,
For true it is your loss of him is great.
This said, forth goes Achilles, and appoints
A sheep for supper to be kill'd and flay'd;
Which straight was done, and cut out into joints,
And pierc'd with spits unto the fire was laid.
And when it was well roasted, taken up.
Automedon o' th' table laid the bread.
Achilles made the messes. Then they sup,
And on the meat they laid their hands and fed.
But when of food they had no more desire,
Priam admir'd Achilles' form and face.

Achilles Priam did no less admire,
In his aspect and speech there was such grace.
When on each other they had look'd enough,
Priam began, and to Achilles spake.
Dismiss me, if you please, Achilles, now,
That I a little sleep at last may take.
For since my son was slain, I never slept,
But rolling on the soiled grass have lain
Perpetually, and for him sigh'd and wept,
Nor until now touch'd either meat or wine.
Achilles then to th' women gave command
I' th' porch without to set him up a bed,
With handsome coverlets of purple, and
With fine soft blankets see it covered.
The women quickly his command obey'd,
And two beds ready made i' th' porch without.
Achilles smiling then to Priam said,
Old man, I from my tent must turn you out;
Lest some man should, from Agamemnon sent
With counsel, come and chance to see you here,
And let him know that you are at my tent,
And the redemption of your son defer.
But ere you go, old man, pray tell me right,
What time is needful for his obsequies?
That I so long may keep the Greeks from fight.
Then Priam to Achilles thus replies:
You know, Achilles, very well how far
The hills and woods are distant from the town,
And how afraid to go the Trojans are.

We need nine days to fetch the fuel down.
The tenth he shall be burnt and buried;
Th’ eleventh a mount upon him shall be laid;
The twelfth we’ll fight again if there be need.
To this Achilles answered, and said,
Old man, the time you asked granted is;
So long th’ Achæans shall from fight forbear.
This said, in Priam’s hand he layed his,
That of his faith he might not stand in fear.
There in the porch slept Priam and Idæus;
And then unto his bed Achilles went,
And there he slept, and with him fair Brisëis,
Within an inner chamber of his tent.
The other Gods and men slept all the night;
But sleep approached not to Hermes’ eyes,
But thinking lay on Priam, how he might
Conduct him safely from his enemies.
Then up he rose, and went to Priam’s head,
And to him said, Ho, Priam, sleep you here?
Since you redeem’d have Hector’s body dead,
You think you nothing farther have to fear.
Although you for him paid a lusty price,
Yet if alive Atrides find you here,
Your sons and friends shall pay that value thrice.
This said, he suddenly awak’d with fear,
And calling to Idæus made him rise.
Then Hermes to the waggon and the car,
Himself the lab’ring mules and horses ties.
And now into their seats they mounted are,

And through the Argive camp then Hermes drove
Unseen, till past Scamander ford they were;
Then Hermes left them and return'd to Jove.
And now the morning was display'd and clear.
Then sighing, on they went to Ilium,
But were by neither man nor woman spied,
Till up into the tow'r of Pergamum
Cassandra went, and thence she them discried,
And weeping, to the people cried, and said,
Ye men and women all of Ilium,
If ever you at Hector's coming joy'd,
Run to the gates; I see him hither come.
Then, man nor woman left was in the town,
But Hector to behold went to the gate.
First came his loving wife and mother down,
And in the waggon by him weeping sate.
The people in a throng about him staid
Lamenting and lamented had all day,
But Priam from his car unto them said,
Trojans, unto the body dead give way.
And when within the house I have it laid,
Then for him weep till you be satisfied.
When this was said, the people him obey'd,
And to make way, themselves they then divide.
Then to the house they brought the body in,
And plac'd it on a bed. Then singers by
They set, the lamentation to begin.
Their song they sung; to which the women sigh.
Then to lament Andromache began.

Oh, my dear husband, you have lost your life
Unhappily, that were but a young man,
And made a wretched widow of your wife,
And with me left behind a tender son,
To evil fate begot by you and me.
To see him grow a man I hope have none;
This city first I fear destroy'd will be,
Since you are gone that was our sole defence.
T' Achaia now the wives of Troy must go,
And with them I. And you my child must hence,
And in vile work employ'd be by the foe,
Or you may by some spiteful man or other
Be from the wall or some high tower thrown,
For Hector's sake, that killed has his brother,
Or father, or his son before the town.
For many of the Greeks has Hector slain.
He went not to the battle bashfully.
For which the Trojans now are in great pain,
And I your loving wife especially.
that you thus should in the dust be laid,
And not give me your hand before you died,
Without a word upon your death-bed said
For me to think on. Then the women sigh'd.
And Hecuba began. Hector, said she,
Of all my sons to me you were most dear.
And when arrived was your destiny,
You by the Gods, though dead, beloved were.
My other sons, when any taken by
Achilles were, beyond sea carried were

And sold, and made to suffer slavery
At Samos, Imbros, Lemnos, or elsewhere;
But when of life he had deprived you,
Because his friend, Patroclus, you had slain,
About his monument he oft you drew,
Though that could not bring him to life again.
But now he sent it to me has again,
As fresh and as well colour'd as if by
Apollo's gentle shafts he had been slain.
This said, again the people sob and sigh.
Then Helen took her turn, Hector, said she,
Whom best I lov'd of all my brother-laws,
For you were so, since Paris married me,
Though when I married him accurs'd I was,
Now twenty years 'tis since I came to Troy,
And never did an ill word from you hear;
And when your kindred of me ill did say,
You took my part, and made them to forbear.
Since you are gone my joy is at an end,
And in your death I moan my own estate,
That now amongst the Trojans have no friend,
Who hate me as the author of their fate.
This, said with tears, provok'd the people's pity;
But Priam then unto them spake, and said:
Go Trojans now and fetch wood to the city;
You need not of the Argives be afraid.
Achilles, when I parted from his tent,
Eleven days allow'd my son t' inter
And fetch down wood without impediment;

So long the Argives should from fight forbear.
This said, to th' hills with oxen, and with wains,
And mules they went, and busy were about
This work nine days together and took pains.
Upon the tenth the body was brought out,
And on the top of the great wood-pile laid,
And fire put to 't; and all day long it burned,
And all the night. When morning was display'd,
Again the Trojans to the pile returned,
And th' embers with black wine extinguished.
His bones then by his brothers and his kin,
Were from the ground together gathered,
And by them to an urn of gold laid in.
The urn, with purple robes then cover'd over,
Into a grave, which soon was made, they laid.
The grave with many and great stones they cover.
And last of all, because they were afraid,
Before their work were done the Greeks would come,
They sent out scouts on ev'ry side to spy.
And o'er his grave, in haste, they raise a tomb.
This done, away they went, and by-and-bye
To Priam's house they came again, and there
He made a splendid supper for them all.
Then home they went, well pleased with their cheer.
Thus ended noble Hector's funeral. end of the iliad.

Translation of Homer’s ‘Odyssey’

1677 EDITION

CONTENTS

LIB. I.
LIB. II.
LIB. III.
LIB. IV.
LIB. V.
LIB. VI.
LIB. VII.
LIB. VIII.
LIB. IX.
LIB. X.
LIB. XI.
LIB. XII.
LIB. XIII.
LIB. XIV.
LIB. XV.
LIB. XVI.
LIB. XVII.
LIB. XVIII.
LIB. XIX.
LIB. XX.
LIB. XXI.
LIB. XXII.

LIB. XXIII.
LIB. XXIV.

LIB. I.

In a council of the Gods (Neptune absent) Pallas procureth an order for the restitution of Ulysses, and appearing to his son Telemachus in human shape, adviseth him to complain of the suitors before the council of the Lords, and then to go to Pylus and Sparta to enquire about his father.

TELL ME, O Muse, th' adventures of the man
That having sack'd the sacred town of Troy,
Wander'd so long at sea; what course he ran
By winds and tempests driven from his way:
That saw the cities, and the fashions knew
Of many men, but suffer'd grievous pain
To save his own life, and bring home his crew;
Though for his crew, all he could do was vain,
They lost themselves by their own insolence,
Feeding, like fools, on the Sun's sacred kine;
Which did the splendid deity incense
To their dire fate. Begin, O Muse divine.
The Greeks from Troy were all returned home,
All that the war and winds had spar'd, except
The discontent Ulysses only; whom
In hollow caves the nymph Calypso kept.
But when the years and days were come about,
Wherein was woven his return by fate
To Ithaca (but neither there without

Great pain), the Gods then pitied his estate,
All saving Neptune; who did never cease
To hinder him from reaching his own shore,
And persecute him still upon the seas
Till he got home, then troubled him no more.
Neptune was now far off in Black-moor land;
The Black-moors are the utmost of mankind,
As far as east and west asunder stand,
So far the Black-moors' borders are disjoin'd.
Invited there to feast on ram and bull,
There sat he merry. Th' other Gods were then
Met on Olympus in a synod full,
In th' house of Jove, father of Gods and men.
And first spake Jove, whose thoughts were now upon
Ægistus' death, which he but then first knew,
By th' hand of Agamemnon's valiant son,
Who to revenge his father's blood him slew.
Ha! how dare mortals tax the Gods, and say,
Their harms do all proceed from our decree,
And by our setting; when by their crimes they
Against our wills make their own destiny?
As now Ægistus did Atrides kill
Newly come home, and married his wife;
Although he knew it was against my will,
And that it would cost him one day his life.
Sent we not Hermes to him to forbid
The murder, and the marriage of the wife;
And tell him if the contrary he did
Orestes should revenge it on his life?

All this said Hermes, as we bade him. But
Ægistus, for all this, was not afraid
His lust in execution to put.
And therefore now has dearly for it paid.
Then Pallas moved on Ulysses' part,
And said, O Father Jove, the king of kings,
Ægistus' fate was fit for his desert,
So let them perish all that do such things.
'Tis for Ulysses that I live in pain,
Poor man, long absent from his friends, forlorn,
In a small isle, the centre of the main;
Kept from his home, doth nought but grieve and mourn.
The isle is beautified with goodly trees,
And in it dwells a nymph. Her father's name
Atlas, that all the depths of the ocean sees,
And beareth up the pillars of the same,
And heaven and earth to boot. His daughter 'tis
That with fair words and gentle courtesy
Detains Ulysses. And her meaning is
For ever there to have his company.
Whilst he, alas! e'en dies for very grief.
To see the smoke of Ithaca he wishes,
And would take that for some, though small relief.
And yet you are not mov'd. Were not Ulysses
His sacrifices on the Trojan shore
Both free and bountiful? They were, you know:
In th' Argive camp, I dare say, no man's more.
Why, therefore, Father, should you hate him so?
To her the mighty Jove made this reply.

Child, what a word is this that you let fall?
Do I neglect Ulysses, or do I
Ulysses hate, that amongst mortals all
For wisdom and for piety excels?
Neptune, that backs and shakes the earth, 'tis he
Whose breast with anger and revenge still swells
Against him, for his son's calamity,
The godlike Polypheme, Cyclops the great,
Whom on Thoosa, Phorcys' daughter brave,
Neptune the king of waters did beget,
Embracing her within a hollow cave;
And him Ulysses has depriv'd of sight.
For which, though Neptune do not him destroy,
He crosses him with dangers day and night,
And drives him up and down out of his way.
But well, let us that are assembled now
Bethink us how to bring him home. 'Tis odds
'Twill cool his rage. He has not strength enough
T' oppose the power of all the other Gods.
Then Pallas said, O Jove, of kings the king,
Since the blest Gods have thought good, and decreed
Ulysses to his native soil to bring,
Let's Hermes send unto the nymph with speed,
In th' isle Ogygia, to let her know
Our sentence, that she may the same obey.
And I to Ithaca meanwhile will go,
And cause his son to call without delay
The common council; and to make him bold,
To warn his mother's suitors to be gone,

And feast no longer on his herd and fold,
As they before had insolently done.
To Sparta too I'll send him, and to Pyle
T' inquire about his father's navigation,
That in the world, by travel for a while,
He may acquire a greater reputation.
This said, upon her feet her shoes she binds,
Ambrosian golden shoes, that do her bear
On land and water swiftly as the winds,
And takes in hand her brazen-headed spear;
A heavy, massy, and strong spear, the same
Wherewith, when angry, she the armed bands
Of mighty men of war does eas'ly tame.
That was the spear she carried in her hands.
Then from the high Olympus leapt she down
T' Ulysses' house, and stood in the hall-door
I' th' shape of Mentes, that possess'd the crown
O' th' Taphian people, whom he reigned o'er.
And thence beheld the suitors in the court,
Sitting upon the hides of beeves, which they
Themselves had kill'd, and, wanting other sport,
Playing at chess they pass'd their time away.
Meanwhile their officers and serving-men
Were busy mingling water with the wine,
Others the meat divide, others make clean,
Set up and rub the tables till they shine.
Telemachus now with the suitors sat,
Fancying, in case his father should appear,
Brought home by the Gods or by some lucky fate,

How then these knaves would slink away for fear;
And he again recover his estate,
And in his own land rule without a peer.
He was the first that spied the Goddess, and
Then presently he hast'ned to the door;
Receives her spear and takes her by the hand,
And both go in, she after, he before.
You shall, said he, stranger be welcome here:
But first let's sup, and afterwards we'll find
Sufficient time both for me to inquire,
And you to tell your business and your mind.
When they were come into the stately hall,
Her spear within a case he sets upright,
T' a pillar, in which case the spears were all
His father left behind going to fight.
Then led her to a chair which stood upon
A dainty carpet curiously wrought,
And put t' her feet a stool to rest upon,
And for himself a handsome stool he brought:
Then did a maid, in a fine golden ewer,
Bring water for their hands, and pours it on
Over a bason large of silver pure,
And set a table to them, for both one:
From others' seats remoter than to fear
Their rudeness might offend her, or that they
Might peradventure listening overhear
What he and she did of Ulysses say.
Another sets on bread and other things
To eat, such as in her charge were at home.

But flesh of many sorts the carver brings,
And the cup-bearers often go and come.
Then came the suitors in, and took their places
All in a row. To each a table stands,
And golden bowl, one way look all their faces,
The waiters bring in water for their hands.
The maids in baskets bring both bread and meat,
On which they lay their hands with great good will,
And heartily and hastily they eat,
And to the brim their cups the servants fill.
When they of hunger had pluck'd out the sting,
The lusty suitors' thoughts converted were
To dancing, and to hear the minstrel sing,
Sports these are consecrated to good cheer.
To Phemius, the minstrel, that was by,
Unwillingly, forc'd by th' unruly throng,
They brought a cittern, and he presently
Began to play, and then to sing a song.
But to the Goddess Pallas, in her ear
Telemachus began to speak his mind,
Not being willing any else should hear.
Excuse me, friend, that I say what I find.
You see the care of these men what it is,
Singing and dancing. And no wonder, since
That which they spend is not their own, but his
Whose bones lie somewhere naked far from hence,
Unburied, it may be, on the ground,
There rotting as he lies i' th' dew and rain;
Or else at sea, perhaps, if he be drown'd,

The waves his body roll upon the main.
If him at home the best of them should meet
Safely arriv'd in Ithaca, he would
Much rather wish, I think, for nimble feet,
Than to be rich in garment or in gold.
But, oh! he's dead, and of some cruel death;
And though some tell us he is coming home,
'Tis comfortless, for he's bereav'd of breath.
To Ithaca I ne'er shall see him come.
But let this pass, and tell me truly now
Your own, your father's, and your country's name.
And further, I desire you'll let me know,
Whence are the mariners that with you came
Unto this town? and tell me this likewise,
Where rideth the good ship that brought you to't;
For verily I can no way devise
How you should come on horseback or on foot?
And tell me, were you never here before,
Nor saw my father whilst he here abode?
For strangers came to visit him good store,
As having much convers'd with men abroad.
I'll clearly speak, said Pallas, t' every thing.
My father was Anchialus, and I
Mentes, my city Taphos, and I king;
My people to the oar themselves apply.
At present bound I am to Temisa
For brass; and iron I carry with me thither.
Under Mount Neion, not near Ithaca,
My ship at Reithrus rideth safe from weather.

As for your father, we were mutual guests
(Ask the old lord Laertes) from our youth.
With one old maid alone his meat to dress,
He lives at's country house, he'll tell you truth.
There creeps he in his vineyard up and down.
And I came hither now, 'cause I was told
By some, his son Ulysses was in town.
But 'tis not so. The Gods do him withhold
From his dear wife, and native country still
Within an island, where the savage men
By force detain him much against his will:
But all in vain, he shall return again.
For I presage, and come it shall to pass,
That am no prophet, nor birds understand;
Though he were tied there with chains of brass,
He shall get loose and see his native land.
But say, are you indeed, that are so grown,
His son? Your heads and eyes are like, I mark,
For we were well to one another known;
But 'twas before he did for Troy embark
With other princes of the Argive youth;
But never saw him since. That I'm his son,
Said he, my mother says. But who in truth
Knoweth who 'twas that got him? I think none.
If I might choose my father, I would be
His son that groweth old on's own estate.
But whom they tell me is my father, he
Of all men is the most unfortunate.
Then said the Goddess, Howsoe'er that be,

The Gods will never nameless leave your kind,
That are the son of fair Penelope,
And so well fram'd in body and in mind.
But say, What feast is this, and who these be?
You have no cause to feast. Their conversation
Pleases me not. 'Tis rude, unmannerly.
What! is't a wedding, or is't a collation?
Friend, since you ask, said he, take the whole story.
This house was rich, my father being here,
But th' unkind Gods have taken hence that glory:
For where he is, a word we cannot hear.
Less had I griev'd, if he his life had lost
With other Argive lords under Troy wall,
Or, the war done, 'mongst those that love him most.
Then had he had a noble funeral,
At which th' Achæan princes would have been,
And the honour had redounded to his son.
But now, alas! devour'd by harpies keen,
Unheard-of and unask'd-for he is gone,
Leaving me here behind to sigh and groan.
Besides, the Gods have giv'n me other care,
Bitter enough. 'Tis not for him alone
My heart is rent. There other mischiefs are.
How many lords within these isles do sway!
Samé, Dulichium, Ithaca, and Zant;
So many suitors duly every day
For marriage with my mother the house haunt.
Whilst she can none put off, and will none marry,
They spend my corn and wine, and cattle kill,

And eating here and drinking still they tarry,
And me perhaps at last they murder will.
Then Pallas said, Is't so? 'Tis time indeed
Your father hither were come back again,
Having so long been absent hence, with speed
To lay his hands upon these shameless men.
Oh! that just now within the gates he stood
Of th' outer court, I would desire no more,
Arm'd with two spears, buckler, and helmet good,
Such now, as I have seen him heretofore.
From Ephyré he took our house in's way,
Where first I saw him merry drinking wine.
For he had been with Ilus, him to pray
To give him for his shafts a medicine,
Wherewith to make them all they wound to kill.
But he refus'd, fearing the powers above.
And 'twas my father gave't him for good will:
For why, he did him very dearly love.
If, such as then, Ulysses should appear
Amongst the suitors now, short liv'd I trow
They'd be, and have but bitter wedding cheer.
But when he shall come home, Gods only know,
Or whether you shall see him any more.
Meanwhile consider by what means you may
Get the unruly suitors out of door,
That so oppress you, and your house annoy.
And first observe what I shall you advise.
Convoke the people to the market-place;
Protest the Gods against their injuries,

And let the whole assembly know your case.
Say, if they needs will wed her, let her go
Back to her father, who the match should make,
And offer for her what is fit; and so
Which of them she likes best, him let her take.
And for yourself, I think it your best way,
In a good bark of twenty oars abroad
T' inquire what men can of your father say,
Or what some lucky sign from Jove may bode.
Go first to Pyle, inquire of Nestor; then
To Sparta. Ask of Menelaus, whom
Of all which had at Troy commanded men
The Gods t' Achaia brought the latest home.
If of his safety and return you hear,
How much soever they waste your estate,
Endure their riot yet another year.
If dead, come back, and fairly celebrate
His rites, and give your mother whom she will
For husband. Then bethink you, how you may
By open force, or howsoever kill
These shameless suitors that your means destroy.
Be fool'd no more. You're now at man's estate.
Ægistus slew Orestes' father. He
Ægistus slew. Who does not this relate
With honour to Orestes' memory?
And you, my friend, you are a goodly man.
Take heart. Gain honour. I must now be gone;
My crew with patience no longer can
Stay for me, therefore think what's to be done.

Your counsel, said Telemachus, is such
As might become a father to his son.
I'll not forget it. Though your haste be much,
Stay yet awhile; be not so quickly gone.
Wash and take food, and then go merrily;
And with you a fair present from me take,
Whereby to keep me in your memory;
Such as kind friends to one another make.
Then said the Goddess, Now I cannot stay.
As for your present I will not deny it,
But take it at my coming back this way,
How much soe'er you mean t' oblige me by it.
This said, she mounted from him to the sky
In likeness of an eagle, to his wonder,
Who thought it was some God, and grew thereby
Bolder, and on his father more did ponder.
And straightway to the suitors went, who were
Now come again into the house, and seated,
A song which Phemius then sung to hear,
Containing how the Grecians retreated
Unfortunately from the Trojan shore
By Pallas' doings, whom they had offended.
Penelope that heard it, and was more
Concerned than they all, straightway descended.
She ent'red not, but in the door did stand,
Veil'd with a scarf which on her head she wore,
Having a waiting-woman on each hand;
And to the singer thus said, weeping sore:
Phemius, y' have better songs, why sing you then

This sad one? Fitter ‘twere the deeds to tell
Of mighty Gods, and mighty deeds of men,
Which sure would please the company as well.
Sing one of those, and let them hear and drink;
Give over this. You touch my interest,
And wound my heart in forcing me to think
Upon my husband, of all Greeks the best.
Then said Telemachus, Good mother, why
Should not the singer choose what song to sing,
Whose part it is to please the company?
It is not he that does the evil bring.
’Tis none of Phemius’ fault, but th’ act of Jove,
Who deals to all men all things as he please.
Should he not sing the songs that men most love,
The new’st? The Greeks’ sad passage o’er the seas?
Be patient, many more besides Ulysses,
Come short from Troy by one fate or another,
Nor are you the only wife her husband misses.
Many men else are lost. Therefore, good mother,
Go to your work again above, and see
Your maids do theirs, leave censuring of songs
Unto us men, and specially to me,
To whom the greatest power here belongs.
Then to her chamber up she went again,
With her two maids, and there began to weep,
Being for her dear husband in great pain,
And wept till Pallas clos’d her eyes with sleep.
Meanwhile the suitors into clusters ran,
And one t’ another his thoughts uttered

With noise enough. But there was not a man
That did not wish to have her in his bed.
Then to them spake Telemachus: D'ye hear,
Proud suitors of my mother, let's, I pray,
Give ear unto the singer, and forbear
Clamour. To-morrow is the council day,
There I shall warn you publicly, no more
To haunt my house, but each man home to go,
And there to feast by turns on your own store;
And if you be not willing to do so,
But your own means to spare, shall think it best
To feast yourselves on one man's substance all,
And ruin his estate, go on and feast,
While I upon the Gods for vengeance call.
that the mighty Jove would so ordain,
That all men's actions might be repaid
As they deserve! Then should you all be slain
Within my doors. After he this had said,
The suitors bit their lips, and silent mused
At the strange boldness of Telemachus,
And at the language which the young man used,
To which none answer'd but Antinous.
The Gods, quoth he, have taught you a high strain
Of language, and undaunted oratory;
But if their meaning were that you should reign
Here, o'er us all, I should be very sorry.
Telemachus replied, Think what you will;
If Jove consent, why should not I be king?
What harm is it with wealth my house to fill,

Besides the honour it will with it bring?
In Ithaca there many princes be,
You'll say, would be as glad to rule as I.
No matter, whosoe'er be king, not he,
But I am king in my own family.
Who, said Eurymachus, shall have the hap
To reign in Ithaca is hard to guess,
It lies yet folded up within Jove's lap.
None shall, Telemachus, you dispossess
Of house, or land, or goods, by violence,
As long as there in Ithaca be men.
But tell me who that was, that now went hence;
Where he was born, and where he dwells, and then
His errand, whether business of his own,
Or some news from Ulysses, brought perchance,
And went so soon away, t' avoid being known?
He was no mean man by his countenance.
Then said Telemachus, My father's dead,
We never shall again see one another;
With messengers I trouble not my head,
Nor soothsayers, that do but soothe my mother.
The man my father's old acquaintance was,
Mentes Anchialides, and his town
Taphos, and he thereof the ruling has;
His people for their trade by sea well known.
Thus said he, though he doubted not at all
But 'twas some God. Meanwhile the suitors staying
For th' evening's coming on, to dancing fall,
Or listen to the minstrel's song and playing.

The evening came, the suitors went away;
Telemachus went also to his bed,
In a warm stately chamber, where he lay
Ranging the many cares he had in's head;
Euryclea a torch before him bore,
Daughter of Ops, now old, but at the time
Laertes did her purchase, herotofore,
For twenty oxen, she was in her prime.
He honour'd her as if she'd been his wife,
But from her bed perpetually forbore,
T' avoid suspicion, and domestic strife.
She'd nurs'd Telemachus, and lov'd him more
Than did the other maids, and now she stands
To light him. He unlocks the door, goes in,
Takes off his coat, puts it into her hands,
She foldeth, brusheth, hangs it on a pin.
Then forth she went, and by a silver ring
Pulls to the door. And there all night he lay
Rememb'ring Pallas' words, and pondering
Upon the business of the following day.

LIB. II.

Telemachus complains in vain, and borrowing a ship goes secretly to

SOON AS THE rosy morning did appear,
Telemachus himself array'd and shod,
Puts on his sword, and takes in hand his spear
And out he went appearing like a God.
Pyle by night, and how he was there received.
And straight unto the criers gave command,
To call the people to the public place.
The people met. And then with spear in hand
He to them takes his way; and followed was
By two white dogs. Then takes his father's throne;
His elders gave him way; all on him gaze.
For why; the Goddess Pallas of her own
Had set authority upon his face.
The first that spake was old Ægyptius,
Stooping with age, of great experience:
One son of his, whose name was Antiphus,
Went to the siege of Troy, but coming thence
He died in the savage Cyclops' jaws,
When with Ulysses he was in his den:
Euronymus one of the suitors was,
The others with their father dwelled then.
But still he grieved was for Antiphus.

The tears ran down his cheeks, and weeping he
Rose up and said unto th' assembly thus:
Ye men of Ithaca, I pray hear me;
Since we to Troy Ulysses sent with ships,
We ne'er convoked were to Parliament,
What need have young or old men of our lips?
And who is he that now doth us convent?
Has he informed been of some invasion,
And unto us the same would first report?
Or on some other public great occasion
Would give us counsel? The Gods bless him for't.
Telemachus then presently upstands,
Though well contented with his father's praise.
The crier puts the sceptre in his hands.
And to Ægyptius first he speaks, and says,
Here am I, that the people have convok'd.
Nor do I any news or counsel bring,
But by my private suff'rings am provok'd;
Which here I offer t' your considering.
Is it not grief enough, my father's loss,
That ruled like a father to us all,
But that I must yet bear a greater cross,
To see his house to utter ruin fall?
My mother's house the suitors daily fill,
And of the best of you they children are.
She wedded must be with her father's will,
But to her father go they do not dare.
But in my house continually they stay,
And sacrifice my beeves, and goats, and sheep,

My wine exhaust, and much they cast away.
For why, Ulysses lost is on the deep,
And I myself unable to defend.
But shall I so be still, or once be able
Telemachus goes secretly to Pyle, &c.
To bring upon these men unjust their end,
Whose injuries no more are tolerable?
Take it to heart. Think how ‘twill taken be
By other states. Fear from the Gods some change,
That are not pleas’d with such iniquity,
And may in closer order make you range.
By Jove I you adjure, and Themis, who
Convokes assemblies, and revokes again,
Forbear these evil deeds yourselves to do,
And of your sons the liberty restrain.
Leave me to suffer misery alone.
Hurt none but me. Unless my father have
In hatred of you some great evil done,
And for revenge these men such power you gave.
But better ‘twere for me, that you than they
Should spend my treasure and my comings in.
For if among so many men it lay,
Begging I might from them the value win.
But for my case no help can now be found.
So said Telemachus in choler high,
And from him threw the sceptre to the ground.
Nor could forbear to let fall tears and sigh.
The people pitied him, but silent sat;
None but Antinous durst answer make.

Telemachus, said he, too passionate
You are, and too much liberty you take.
The people's hatred you would very fain
Draw to the suitors, and procure them shame.
But from your mother cometh all your pain;
And therefore her, not us, you ought to blame.
Three years are gone and past, the fourth is this,
Since she her suitors baffled has with art,
Putting each one in hopes by messages,
And promises that he had gain'd her heart.
Moreover, setting up a beam to weave,
Suitors, said she, since dead Ulysses is,
Stay yet a little while, and give me leave
To make an end but of one business.
I must for old Laertes make a cloth,
Which in his sepulchre he is to wear.
T' offend the wives of Greece I should be loth;
For to accuse me they will not forbear,
But say I very hasty was to wed,
If I go hence and not provide a shroud
Wherein Laertes may be buried
Out of such wealth, that might have been allow'd.
Her suitors all were well content. And then
All day she wove, but ere she went to bed,
What she had wov'n, she ravell'd out again.
Three years her suitors thus she frustrated,
In the fourth year her woman her betrayed,
And in we came, whilst she the web undid,
And then to end it she could not avoid,

Since now her purpose could no more be hid.
To your complaint the suitors answer thus;
Take notice of it, you and all the rest:
Send back your mother to Icarius,
There let her marry whom they both think best.
But if she think to vex us longer yet,
Caring for nothing but for Pallas' gifts,
To have the reputation for wit,
And skilfulness in curious work and shifts,
Wherein th' Achæan wives she doth excel,
Both old and young, Tiro, Alcmen', Micen',
Although with us she hath not dealed well;
But if to use us so she longer mean,
So much the longer with you we shall eat,
Which to Penelope will be a glory.
But we consume shall so much of your meat,
If long we stay there, that you will be sorry.
For so long as she dodges with us thus,
No whither from your house will we depart.
Then to him answered Telemachus:
Antinous, I ne'er shall have the heart
To send my mother hence against her will.
Abroad my father is, alive or dead.
That I her father should repay, were ill,
For forcing her to leave her husband's bed.
And from the Furies I shall suffer worse,
For if I force her from my house to go,
Whether she will or not, she will me curse,
And men will of me be revenged too.

If it displease you that she stayeth here,
You have your remedy; you may go home,
And ev'ry one make all the rest good cheer
By turns, and into my house never come.
But if you needs will feed on me alone,
I can but to the Gods for vengeance call,
And reparation for what is done,
Which may enough be to destroy you all.
This said, two eagles coming were in sight,
And when they were the market-place just o'er,
Th' assembled heads surveying, stopp'd their flight,
And on their broad and levell'd wings they soar;
Then, having torn themselves both neck and cheek,
They to their right wing rise and fly away.
What this should mean th' assembly was to seek,
And to them thus did Alitherses say:
Hear me, ye men of Ithaca, said he,
And you, the suitors, that are most concern'd.
Destruction is rolling toward ye,
Although it be not by yourselves discern'd.
Ulysses from his friends will not be long,
And now from Ithaca far off is not,
Seeing what daily done is in the throng,
And how to kill the suitors lays his plot;
Nay, many more besides the suitors may
Of their misfortune chance to have their part,
If they desist not soon, and come away.
I speak not this at random, but on art;
For all must come to pass I told him then,

When with the Argive lords he went to Troy:
That after twenty years he should again
Return with pain, his men all cast away.
Then said Eurymachus, Old man, go home,
And there to your own children prophecy,
Lest to them any harm hereafter come;
A better prophet for these things am I.
Under the sun be many birds that fly,
And yet not all of them do fortunes tell;
Ulysses, far hence, dead is certainly,
I know not where. I would thou wert as well,
For then you would give over to inflame
Telemachus, who but too angry is;
In hope to get some present for the same,
If he will give it. But I tell you this.
If any old man, with his wisdom, dare
To set against us any young man here,
He shall be sure himself the worse to fare,
And when 'tis done he shall be ne'er the near;
We'll set a fine upon your head so wise,
Which you to pay will not be well content.
I myself will Telemachus advise
His mother may be to her father sent
To make the match, and on the dower agree,
Such as becomes him, to his daughter dear;
Till that be done, no hope at all I see
The suitors should desist. For they not fear
Telemachus, as haughty as he is,
And full of words; and much less do they care

For such deceitful prophecies as this,
For which you only the more hated are.
Meanwhile Telemachus his goods decay,
And he shall never make them up again,
While she persists her suitors to delay,
And makes us all expect her love in vain.
And 'tis her virtue makes us thus to strive
Amongst ourselves who shall her favour win;
For many other ladies we could wive,
And be sufficiently delighted in.
Then said Telemachus, No more will I
This matter to you press, or to the woo'rs.
You and the Gods know all I do not lie;
But I demand a bark of twenty oars,
For I intend to travel for awhile,
To hear what men can of my father say.
To Lacedæmon I will go, and Pyle,
Or seek from Jove some notice of his way,
And if alive he be, and coming home,
Though to my cost, I'll stay another year.
If dead he be, then back again I'll come,
And rites of burial will give him here,
Splendid, and well becoming his estate,
And let my mother her own liking take.
Having thus spoken, down again he sate.
And then Ulysses' old friend Mentor spake,
With whom Ulysses left his house in trust.
Hear me, ye Ithacesians, said he;
Let no king ever be hereafter just,

Nor to his people soft and gentle be,
Since you Ulysses have so soon forgot,
That ever rul'd us like a father kind.
But I the suitors so much accuse not,
Although on force and fraud they set their mind,
(For 'gainst Ulysses' goods, which they devour,
They stake their heads in hope he'll ne'er come home)
And you that many are, and have the power
To check them, sit as if you all were dumb.
And then rose up Leocritus and spake:
Mentor, said he, more busy much than wise,
That would about a supper quarrel make,
Ulysses, were he here, I'd not advise
To seek by force the suitors to remove.
For though he much be wish'd for by his wife,
She would not of his coming well approve,
But he the sooner be depriv'd of life.
And you, the people, now may hence retire;
Mentor and Alitherses will provide
A bark for what place ever he'll desire;
And if at Ithaca he mean t' abide,
No news he will hear of him a great while.
But never t' Ithaca shall come again,
If he to Lacedæmon go, or Pyle.
This said, dismiss'd and scatter'd were the men;
And to Ulysses' house the suitors went,
Telemachus to the sea-side, and pray'd:
God, that gavest me commandement
To pass the seas, canst not now be obey'd,

I am both by the town and woo'rs delay'd.
Then in the form of Mentor, Pallas came,
And standing by Telemachus, she said,
With such a voice as Mentor's seem'd the same,
If in you you retain the spirit brave
Your father had, to make his word his deed,
Then also the assurance I shall have,
To tell you in your voyage you shall speed;
But if Ulysses' son you be not right,
For aught I know you may this labour spare;
Few sons exceed or reach their father's might,
But commonly inferior they are.
But since in you I see your father's wit,
I hope your voyage shall have good success;
Therefore, no more with th' woo'rs in council sit,
Expect from fools to have no more redress,
That see not their own end that is so nigh.
Nor shall you long be forced here to stay,
For with a good ship furnish you will I,
And with you will myself go all the way.
Meanwhile go you into your house again,
And put up store of wine, and of cold meat,
And good bread, which the marrow is of men;
I'll for you mariners together get.
In Ithaca are good ships, old and new,
Good store, of which I will go choose you one,
The best of all that come within my view,
And make it ready, that we may be gone.
This said, to th' house return'd Telemachus.

The woo’rs in killing cattle were employ’d,
And straight unto him went Antinous,
And laughing, took him by the hand, and said,
Telemachus, bold and brave orator,
Fear from us neither evil word nor deed;
Eat and drink merrily as heretofore,
We’ll see you furnished with what you need,
Both ship and men, and see you soon convey’d
To Pyle, that of your father you may hear.
Telemachus then answered, and said,
Antinous, can I be merry here?
D’ye think that yet too little was the wrong
The suitors did me, my estate to waste,
When I perceiv’d it not, as being young;
But since I grown am, and my childhood past,
And somewhat know, and more hear others say,
I’ll do my best to bring them to their end,
Whether I go to Pyle, or here do stay.
And yet to go to Pyle I do intend,
And think my passage will not be in vain;
For I go like a merchant, not a guest,
As if to me no ship did appertain.
It must be so; the suitors think it best.
This said, his hand from his hand he snatch’d out;
And then the suitors that were in the court,
Some give him evil words, and others flout,
And one another with him made good sport.
He’ll come from Pyle with succours, God knows what,
Said one, or Sparta, which shall on us fall,

Or poison bring from Ephiré; and that
Put in the temperer shall kill us all.
Who knows, then said another, if he go,
But he his father's fate may also have,
Whilst seeking him he wanders to and fro,
Which would to us no little trouble save;
His goods amongst us we should soon divide,
And to his mother leave his houses free,
And him she chooses to lie by her side.
Thus they derided him. Then down went he
Into a large and high-roof'd room, where lay,
In chests pack'd up, great store of cloth of gold,
And garments very many, rich and gay,
And many barrels of sweet wine and old,
Which for Ulysses were preserved there,
When he returned to his native soil.
In the same room many brass vessels were,
And many barrels of sweet smelling oil,
And double were the locks upon the door,
Whereof the nurse, Euryclea, had the key.
Telemachus call'd for her, and says to her,
Come, nurse, this night I am to go away.
Fill me of wine twelve pitchers of the best,
Next to that which you for my father save;
And fine flour, twenty measures at the least,
In good thick leather satchels let me have,
Quickly. For when my mother is a-bed,
To Lacedæmon and to Pyle I go,
That of my father, if alive or dead,

There any news be, I the same may know.
Euryclea then wept and sobb'd, and said,
Dear child, why will you go from hence so far
Alone? Your mother you will make afraid,
Of whom so dearly you beloved are.
Your father far off is already dead,
And by the way the suitors seek to kill you,
And share your goods amongst them by the head.
I pray stay here, and do not go. Why will you?
Nurse, said Telemachus, be of good cheer;
'Tis by the counsel of a God I go,
And I require you solemnly to swear
You'll not my going let my mother know.
Telemachus to the suitors went again,
And Pallas, in his likeness, to the town,
For his transporting to procure him men,
From house to house she goeth up and down,
And of Noemon borrowed a bark,
Who not unwillingly it to him lent.
And now the sun was down, the streets were dark,
And down to the sea-side the Goddess went,
And the good ship into the sea they haul,
And in it stow all that was needful for't;
The mariners were there together all,
And tied the ship at far end of the port.
Meanwhile the suitors merrily carouse,
And Pallas then, their fancies to confound,
From the sea-side went back into the house,
And from their hands the cups threw to the ground,

And with the love of sleep possess'd their eyes,
And made them nod, and let their eye-lids down;
And not long after from their seats they rise,
And for that night took lodging in the town.
Then, like to Mentor both in form and voice,
Telemachus she called out of doors.
Your men are ready at the port, she says,
There they expecting you sit with their oars.
Then out they went, and Pallas led the way,
And found the rowers ready on the beach.
Telemachus then said, Come back, I pray,
To th' house with me, our victual thence to fetch,
Which, well put up, I there have ready laid;
But nothing of it does my mother know,
Nor any else but I and one old maid.
Then with Telemachus to th' house they go,
And to the ships at once bring all away,
And stow it as Telemachus thought fit.
Pallas and he embark without delay,
And at the stern they both together sit.
And now the mariners their tackle ply;
First, in the midst they set the mast upright,
And it unto the ship with strong ropes tie,
And then their sails they hoist up to their height,
Which Pallas, with a lusty gale from west,
Kept full all night. The ship the sea then gores;
The water, swiftly running from her breast
By both her sides, wounded and broken roars.
And then unto the Gods they offer wine,

And to them all were praying for awhile,
But specially unto their guide divine;
Then sail'd all night, and were next morn at Pyle.

LIB. III.

Nestor entertains him at Pyle, and tells him how the Greeks departed from Troy; and sends him for further information to Sparta.

UP FROM THE sea the sun leapt to the sky,
To hold the light up before Gods and men;
Telemachus, with all his company,
Unto the town of Pyle arrived then.
Then Nestor had a sacrifice in hand
To Neptune, and upon the sea-side stood,
And with him store of people on the sand.
Black bulls he eighty-one had to him vow'd:
Nine seats there were, five hundred to each seat,
And to the same nine bulls appointed were;
The entrails, broil'd upon the coals they eat,
The thighs to Neptune burnt to ashes were.
The ship then came within the port to land,
And disembark'd, upon the shore they staid;
With furled sails the ship did by them stand.
Then Pallas to Telemachus thus said:
Telemachus, by no means bashful be;
For wherefore did you undertake this task,
But of your father to hear certainty?
To Nestor then directly go, and ask
If of Ulysses anything he know.

He’ll tell you truly. He’s too wise to lie.
Mentor, said he, I’m young, and know not how
With one so old to answer and reply.
Telemachus, said Pallas, do not fear,
You’ll somewhat prompted be by your own breast
(You never by the Gods neglected were),
The God that loves you will supply the rest.
Then up to Nestor they directly went,
And Pallas foremost. All about him there
They found upon the sacrifice intent.
His sons and lords, to hasten the good cheer,
Some broaching, and some roasting were of meat,
And presently about the strangers come,
And with their hands salute them, and entreat
To sit. And then Pisistratus went to’em,
Saluted them, and took them both by th’ hands,
And for them (since there was no empty seat)
Laid sheepskins, with the wool upon the sands;
And of the entrails gave them part to eat,
And to her hand held up a cup of wine.
To Neptune, said he, offer up your vow,
For he expressly is the pow’r divine,
That we to worship be assembled now.
And having drunk, give it to this man’s hand,
That he may also give the Gods their due;
For all men of the Gods in need do stand,
And I thought fit to give it first to you,
‘Cause you are th’ elder, th’ other young as I.
Then Pallas from his hand receiv’d the cup,

And pleased was to see his equity,
And then to Neptune sent her prayers up.
Neptune, said she, have to my prayer regard;
First Nestor and his sons with honour bless,
And of his people th' hecatomb reward,
And give Telemachus and me success.
Thus prayed she, and gave for what she prayed,
And to Telemachus then gave the cup,
And he to Neptune the same prayer said.
The meat being ready now and taken up,
And into messes cut, themselves they feast,
And when of hunger extinct was the force,
Then to his guests Nestor his speech address'd:
Friends, said he, now we time have to discourse,
Tell me, Who are you? whence d'ye cross the main?
Is it for traffic? Or d'ye pleasure take,
As pirates walk at sea, to and again,
Others to spoil to set your lives at stake?
To this, Telemachus with confidence
(Which into him the Goddess did inspire,
The better to obtain intelligence,
And reputation to himself acquire)
Answer'd: O Nestor Nelëiades,
The glory of the Greeks, we hither came
From Ithaca on no state-business,
But of my father to seek news from Fame,
Unbless'd Ulysses, who at Ilium
Together with you fought before the town.
Of th' other chiefs we hear what is become,

But where Ulysses died is still unknown,
Whether at land he slain were by the foe,
Or by the sea devoured he hath been;
But at your knees we hither come to know,
What you since then have heard of him or seen,
Wand'ring about, born to calamity.
Let no respect, or pity mitigate
Your story, howsoever sad it be.
Nothing but naked truth to me relate.
And I beseech you, for my father's sake,
If he before the town of Troy did well
Perform the service he did undertake,
That nothing but the very truth you tell.
friend, said Nestor, since you bring again
To memory our miseries at Troy,
Under Achilles first by sea, what pain
We suffer'd then; and after, when we lay
And fought before King Priam's royal seat,
What we endured, what great men we lost;
The doughty Ajax, and Achilles great,
That were the chief of all the Argive host;
The valiant Patroclus, and my son
Antilochus, both valiant in fight,
And if an enemy were put to run
Before him, he could hardly 'scape by flight.
But numberless were our sad chances there;
No mortal man can count them one by one,
And if you five or six years should stay here,
You'd weary be of asking, and be gone.

Nine years we plots contriv'd to take the town,
Which Jove made prosperous with much ado.
Ulysses had for plotting the renown,
For none compar'd himself your father to:
If it be true you are Ulysses' son,
And I confess, hearing you speak your mind,
And steadfastly your person looking on,
Much respect for you in myself I find.
While we together were at Troy, we never
In council or assembly disagreed,
But what was for the Argives' good, we ever
Endeavour'd what we could to get decreed.
But when of Troy we had destroy'd the town,
And back unto our ships again were come,
Then Jove upon the Greeks began to frown,
Intending to them ill returning home,
For few there were amongst them just or wise,
But on themselves they drew down their own fate,
Which made the Goddess Pallas to devise
To set the two Atrides at debate.
Then of the people they a meeting call
At almost sunset, and the people came
(Having their heads with wine disorder'd all)
Th' Atrides told them why they call'd the same,
Where Menelaus votes to cross the seas,
And each man to his country to repass.
But this advice his brother did not please,
To stay there yet awhile his counsel was,
And first a hecatomb to sacrifice,

The Goddess Pallas' anger to appease.
But Agamemnon therein was not wise,
Men cannot change the will o' th' Gods with ease.
While they contending were with words unmeet,
One part arose, resolv'd to stay all night,
And in the morn to go aboard the fleet,
And each one tow'rds his home to take his flight.
And shipp'd our captive women, and our prey,
One half we were, and came to Tenedus;
The other half with Agamemnon stay.
And Pallas then again divided us;
And one part back to Agamemnon went,
But I, with all my own ships, homeward fled,
Knowing that Jove to the Greeks evil meant;
So did the son of Tideus, Diomed.
At Lesbos to us Menelaus came,
Where we, which way to go, consulting staid,
Chius within, or else without the same,
And for direction to the Gods we pray'd.
O'er the wide sea t' Eubœa they bid sail,
That we in safety be the sooner might;
And sent us therewithal a lusty gale,
Which brought us to Gerestus when 'twas night,
And there to Neptune we burnt many thighs.
On the fourth day the ships of Diomed
To Argos came. The same wind staid i' th' skies
Till I at Pyle was safe delivered.
So came I home, sweet child, and cannot tell
Which of the Greeks came safe home, and which not.

But what has since been told me I know well,
And so far as is reason, you shall know't.
The Myrmidons, they say, came safely home,
Conducted by stout Neoptolemus.
And Philoctetes very well did come
Unto his father's house, Pallantius.
Idomeneus to Crete brought all his men
That were not slain at Ilium in fight.
How Agamemnon, when come home again,
Was butchered, I need not to recite;
Nor how he came, nor of Ægistus' plot,
Nor yet how bitterly he smarted for't.
'Tis good, you see, to have a son begot,
That can revenge his father in that sort.
And you, my friend, that tall are and well made,
Be valiant, and get 'mongst men good fame.
Telemachus then answered, and said:
Nestor, but my case is not the same.
Sharp the revenge was of Atrides' son,
And far and wide will matter be for songs,
But from the Gods such power I have none,
To be revenged of the suitors' wrongs.
O friend, said Nestor, since I have been told
That many who your mother seek to marry,
Without your leave, do with your house make bold,
And spending of your substance daily tarry,
Is it because you are therewith content?
Or are you forc'd to bear such injury
Because your people are against you bent,

Provok'd thereto by some divinity?
But who knows but at last they may be paid
For all the injuries which they have done,
And insolence, by the Achæans' aid,
Or peradventure by yourself alone?
For if of you Pallas as careful were,
As carefully she did your father guide
At Troy (a God to man ne'er did appear
So plainly as she there stood by his side.)
If Pallas were so kind to you, you'd see
The suitors quickly would forget to woo.
Then said Telemachus, 'Twill never be,
Although the Gods should give consent thereto.
Telemachus, said Pallas, what a word
Have you let fall? A man may be with ease,
Though far off, to his native soil restor'd
By any of the Gods, if so he please.
And I at home would rather lose my life
Fighting than sitting, as Atrides died,
Slain by Ægistus and his own bad wife,
Basely by them in whom he did confide.
And yet the Gods unable are to save
A man from death, although he be a friend,
Whose end the cruel Fates determin'd have.
Then said Telemachus, Let's make an end
Of this discourse. Ulysses' latest day
Determin'd by the Gods already is,
And I to Nestor somewhat else will say;
For three men's ages do but equal his.

Nestor, I would fain informed be
How Agamemnon was of life depriv'd.
And Menelaus, where meanwhile was he?
And how Ægistus had the plot contriv'd.
Was it that Menelaus too long stay'd,
Ægistus ventur'd on a better wight?
I'll tell you all the truth, then Nestor said,
And yet what you yourself have guess'd is right.
For why, if Menelaus coming home
Ægistus in the house alive had found,
He never had at Argos had a tomb,
But eaten been by dogs above the ground,
And fowls of prey. Nor had he had the pity
Of the Argive women, nor lamented been,
But lain had i' th' fields far from the city.
For why, a viler act was never seen.
For when at Troy we ended had the strife,
Long time it was before we came away;
Then siege laid he to Agamemnon's wife,
And secretly hidden in Argos lay,
And she at first refus'd, and counsel took
Of a learn'd man, whom Agamemnon left
Going to Troy his wife to overlook,
But soon Ægistus him of life bereft;
For in a desert island he him kill'd,
And left him for a booty to the kites.
And then unto Ægistus she did yield,
And richly were perform'd the wedding rites.
Then on the altars many thighs they burn,

And with them rich men's baubles, and gold stuff,
For why, for so unhop'd-for a good turn,
They thought they could not thank the Gods enough.
Now coming Menelaus was and I,
And were as far come as to Sunium,
When Phrontis, his good steersman, chanc'd to die,
The best that in a storm ere ship brought home,
And hindrance of his coming this was some
To bury him. But when he put to sea,
And was with all his ships in safety come
Under the windy mountain of Malea,
Then an ill passage for them Jove provided;
The wind then whistled, and the water danced,
And into two parts was the fleet divided;
And one part to the coast of Crete advanced,
Where Cydons dwell, near Jardan river's mouth.
There in the sea standeth a stone upright,
That breaks the water when it rolls from south,
So that it comes to Phæstus without might;
And there the men came in and sav'd their lives,
But all the ships upon the rock were split.
The other part the wind to Egypt drives
With Menelaus. Five ships were in it.
Whilst Menelaus did in Egypt stay,
And visit princes and their gifts receiv'd;
Ægistus made the Argives him obey,
And Agamemnon of his life bereav'd;
And sev'n years in Mycene reigned he.
But then Orestes came, whom they not knew,

From Athens to them unexpectedly,
And there the slayer of his father slew,
And feasted th' Argives at the funeral
Of him and her. That very day did come
King Menelaus, his ships laden all,
From Egypt, with his costly presents home.
And you, my friend, take heed you do not stay
Too long abroad, leaving your goods among
So many knaves that waste them ev'ry day,
And will consume them utterly ere long;
But go to Menelaus, who came last,
And wand'ring has among much people been.
A bird could hardly so much sea have pass'd
In a year's time, as wand'ring he has seen.
Therefore to Sparta go with ship and crew,
Or if by land, my coach is ready for ye.
Also my son shall go along with you,
And ask of Menelaus all his story.
He's wise. Besides the truth he'll nothing say.
This said, the sun was down, and dark the sky.
Nestor, said Pallas, you before us lay
That to which we have nothing to reply.
Now slit the tongues, and let wine temper'd be,
That we may offer to th' immortals all;
The light is gone, and need of sleep have we.
So Pallas said, and they to offering fall.
The waiters then brought water for their hands,
And young men to them all brought temper'd wine.
The tongues lay on the fire, each one upstands

And offers wine unto the powers divine.
And when the offering was at an end,
Telemachus and Pallas were about
To go aboard, and there the night to spend.
But Nestor on the other side cried out,
The Gods forbid that you should lie aboard,
As if I were a man so rude or poor
As not good bedding for a friend t' afford.
Since then I have of rugs and bedding store,
And many sons alive with me at home,
That able are my friends to entertain,
And 'tis Ulysses' son that's to me come,
Surely this night he shall with me remain.
Nestor, then said Pallas, that is right,
And at your house to lodge for him 'tis best.
But at the ship I needs must lie this night,
His purpose to make known to all the rest.
Amongst them there no old man is but I,
The company t' encourage that expect
Telemachus. Not with authority,
But my advice they'll follow for respect.
The next day with the Caucons I must be,
About an old and not a little debt.
And then that he may Menelaus see,
With strong swift horses on his way him set.
This said, the Goddess Pallas went away,
In likeness of an eagle to the skies.
The people star'd, and knew not what to say,
And Nestor wond'ring saw it with his eyes,

And took Telemachus by th’ hand, and said,
A good man you will be, Telemachus,
And valiant, that are by a God convoy’d;
And this same God that guided you to us,
Is none but Pallas, daughter of great Jove,
That did at Troy your father always guide.
Let me and mine, O Goddess, have your love,
And amongst men a noble fame and wide;
A heifer on your altar shall be laid
That ne’er bare yoke, a yearling from the field;
And gilt shall be her horns. So Nestor pray’d.
And Pallas hearing, to his prayer did yield.
And Nestor to his house then led them all,
Both sons and sons-in-law, and being there,
They sat on chairs and couches in the hall;
Then Nestor bids one fill the temperer
With wine that aged was eleven year,
From out a vessel first uncover’d then.
And when the wine and water mixed were,
Then Nestor pray’d and offered. And when
The off’rings to the Goddess ended were,
The rest unto their lodgings went away.
Telemachus by Nestor stay’d was there,
And in a soft and costly bed he lay;
And near unto him lay Pisistratus,
Who of the sons of Nestor was the last.
And Nestor in the inmost part of th’ house,
Where, by the queen his wife, his bed was plac’d.
Soon as Aurora did the day restore,

The old knight Nestor rose up from his bed,
And sat upon the bench before the door,
Of marble white and smooth that glistened.
His father used to sit there before,
King Neleus, but that since he was dead,
And that King Nestor now the sceptre bore,
There sat he now, and to him gathered
Were all his sons, Echephron, Stratius,
Perseus, Aretus, godlike Thrasymed,
Pisistratus. (Dead was Antilochus.)
Along with them Telemachus they led.
Then to his children Nestor spake and said:
Do quickly, sons, what you shall from me hear.
A vow I made to Pallas must be paid,
Who did to me so visibly appear.
Let one of you unto the pastures hie
And bid a herdsman bring a heifer home;
One to Telemachus his ship quickly,
And bid his mates, save two, all hither come;
Another bid the gilder hither come,
To gild the sacred heifer's horns with speed;
The rest stay here to look to things at home,
That all things may be ready that we need,
Seats, dry wood, and fair water. So said he,
Then busy were they all. The heifer came,
And all Telemachus his company.
The gilder came, Laerces was his name,
And every tool that to his art belongs,
And necessary is, had in his hands;

His anvil, and his hammer, and his tongs.
And Pallas also now amongst them stands.
Then fell the man to work on Nestor's gold,
And so elaborate it was when done,
That it might please the Goddess to behold.
Then came in Stratius and Echephron,
And by the horns they led the heifer in.
The basin and the ewer, and barley white,
Aretus brought; and with an axe full keen
Stood Thrasymed ready the beast to smite.
Then Nestor pray'd, and from the heifer's head
Cut off some hair, and into th' fire it threw.
Then prayed the rest; and barley sprinkled
Upon the fire, and Thrasymed then slew
The heifer with his axe, and cut in twain
The tendons of the neck, and down she fell;
And Nestor's wife and daughters shout amain
To see the sacred act performed well.
Pisistratus then cuts the victim's throat,
And up they held it to let out the blood
Into a pail which Perseus thither brought,
And to that purpose ready with it stood.
The life together with the blood outflies.
Then from the body they the bowels draw,
And next cut off the shoulders and the thighs,
As is of sacrifice the ritual law;
And them slit into two parts they display,
And cover them all over with sweet fat,
Shoulder on shoulder, thigh on thigh they lay,

And Nestor on the altar burneth that;
And with it on the fire black wine he poured.
By him a spit was ready with five points.
The fire the thighs, the men th' entrails devoured,
The rest divided was in smaller joints,
To roast on spits. Telemachus the while
Into the bath retired, and was there
Well bathed, and anointed with sweet oil
By Polycaste, Nestor's daughter dear,
And in a robe and coat clad gloriously,
And came, as if no mortal he had been,
Into the hall, and sat down Nestor by.
The meat now ready straightway was brought in.
Then in the young men came to fill them wine.
When they with flesh and wine were satisfied,
Then to his sons said Nestor, Children mine,
The horses to the coach see quickly tied.
Away they go, and to the coach they set
The horses swift; and in it bread and wine
A maid laid in, and with it choicest meat,
Which none but god-fed kings eat when they dine.
Up to the seat then went Telemachus
(The seat was large and capable of two)
And after him went up Pisistratus,
And whip and reins he took his hands into.
Touch'd with the whip, the horses take the way,
And all the day long made their harness shake.
The sun went down, dark were the streets. Then they
At Pheræ were. And there their rest they take.

There Diocles, Orsilochus his son,
Son of Alphæus them did entertain,
And with fair gifts presented them each one.
But soon as morning did appear again,
Their horses to the coach again they tie,
And from the porch drive them into the way,
Touch’d with the whip again away they fly.
The sun now down, and ended was the day.

LIB. IV.

His entertainment in Sparta, where Menelaus tells him what befel many of the Greeks in their return; that Ulysses was with Calypso in the isle Ogygia, as he was told by Proteus.

AND THEN TO Lacedæmon come were they,
And drove up to the house of Menelaus.
At home they found him, for there on that day
A double wedding celebrated was.
One of his daughters, fair Hermione,
Whom he before at Troy had promised
Of Neoptolemus the wife should be,
And on this day the same accomplished,
And her he sent unto the Myrmidons,
Where reigned he. To Pthia she was brought.
And then the second wedding was his son's,
Whom on a bond-woman he had begot,
And Megapenthes nam'd (for Helen's bed
Fruitless was after fair Hermione);
And he Alector's daughter married,
Of Lacedæmon citizen was he.
And now they merry sat that bidden were,
Making good cheer, and hearing voice and fiddle,
And wond'ring at two tumblers that were there,
His entertainment at Sparta by Menelaus,&c.

That moving to the time stood in the middle.
Meanwhile by th' horses, th' utter gate without,
Telemachus stood and Pisistratus.
Then Eteoneus by chance came out,
A careful servant of Menelaus.
And, having seen them, in he went again,
And being near to where his master sate,
king, said he, there are without two men,
Like great men's sons, with their coach at the gate;
Shall I take out their horses, or shall I
Tell them where they may lodged be elsewhere?
At this, Atrides, grieved, made reply:
Eteoneus, sure once you wiser were;
Have we not oft by strangers heretofore,
In our necessity relieved been?
And I pray God it may be so no more.
Go, loose the horses, and the men bring in.
This said, he went again, with servants more,
Takes out the horses, ties them to the mangers,
And throws before them provender good store;
Sets up the coach, and then brings in the strangers,
Who at the beauty of the house amazed,
(For bright it shined as the moon or sun).
And when they had sufficiently gazed,
To where the bathing-room was, walked on.
After they were well washed and anointed,
And clothed with soft nappy cloak and coat,
That they should near him sit the king appointed,
And near unto his throne their chairs were brought.

A maid the golden bason and the ewer
To wash their hands, over a cauldron brings.
(The cauldron also was of silver pure);
Another on the table laid good things,
Another bread. The carver also cuts
Of every sort of meat the choicest bits,
And them on trenchers on the table puts.
And Menelaus, pointing to it, sits,
And heartily invites them to fall to.
Eat now, said he, we shall have time enough
When you have supp'd, to ask you where and who?
Your ancestors are not obscure I know,
Such children are not got by wretched men.
And as he spake he took from his own mess
As much as both his hands could comprehend
Of good chine-beef, and gave it to these guests,
And then they laid their hands upon their meat.
But when their hunger and their thirst was gone,
Telemachus, that near sat to his seat,
Whisper'd Pisistratus, You, Nestor's son,
Do you not mark the splendour in this house,
Of brass, gold, amber, silver, ivory?
Such sure the house is of Olympius,
So many and so glorious things I see.
But Menelaus heard him. Let, said he,
No mortal man with Jupiter compare;
His house decays not, nor goods wasted be.
What men compare with me I do not care;
For why, my goods I paid for very dear,

With pain and peril in my coming home,
And wand'ring up and down at sea eight year,
Before I could into my country come.
I was in Cyprus and Phœnicia,
Came to the Cydons and Erembians,
To Egypt, and to Ethiopia,
And to the fertile ground o' th' Libyans,
Where ev'ry year the sheep three times do breed,
And all the lambs fall horned from the dam;
Nor master nor his man there stands in need
Of cheese or milk, or tender flesh of lamb.
While I my goods amongst them wand'ring got,
I lost my brother, by his wife betray'd,
And therefore in my riches glory not.
And all this to you have your fathers said.
Absent, I lost my house, and much rich stuff;
Had I my fellows sav'd I led to Troy,
I'd been content with the third part thereof.
So, all to all, I've little cause of joy:
For all my friends at Troy lost griev'd was I,
And sometimes wept, yet sometimes also not,
For quick of tears is the satiety.
But one there is, when he is in my thought,
I neither food nor sleep desire to take;
For all the while we were besieging Troy,
None suffer'd so much for the Argives' sake
As did Ulysses, nor so oft did pray.
And more, perhaps, he is to suffer yet;
Long stays he, and whether alive or dead

He be, I can from no man notice get,
Nor from my sorrow be delivered.
Meanwhile, as for a son of life bereft,
Laertes weeps; so does Penelope.
Telemachus, whom young Ulysses left,
Spends his best age in pain and misery.
This said, Telemachus before his eyes
Held up his purple robe, the tears to hide,
Drawn from him by his father's miseries.
And Menelaus, when he that espied,
Consider'd whether best it were or no
To tell him first what he had heard or seen
About his father, or what he would know
To let him ask. But Helen then came in,
Like to Diana in great majesty.
Adreste came in with her, with a chair;
Alcippe a soft carpet layed nigh;
Her basket brought in was by Phylo fair.
At Thebes, in Egypt, it was given her
By Polybus his wife, Alcandre, when
King Menelaus travelling was there;
And Polybus gave to him talents ten
Of gold, and lavers two of silver fine,
And two three-footed cauldrons of good brass.
Then by Alcandre t' Helena divine,
A silver-brim gilt basket given was,
With fine and curiously-spun thread press'd full,
With distaff on it, more thread yet to spin,
Ready invested with soft purple wool.

This was the basket Phylo then brought in.
Then Helen sat, and by her husband told
What hitherto had pass'd: I know, said she,
King Menelaus, now I them behold,
The guests that are come to you, who they be.
But shall I tell you what I think, or no?
I'll tell you true. I never yet saw one
So like another, as this man is to
Telemachus, Ulysses' only son,
Whom, when with other Greeks to Ilium
He went, to fetch away this monkey, me,
By bloody war, he left a child at home.
Then Menelaus spake: Since you, said he,
Have put it in my mind, I think so too.
His eyes, his feet, his hands, his head, his hair,
Are like Ulysses', who I'd tell now you
What misery for me he suffer'd there,
But that it makes him weep, and hide his eyes.
Then to Atrides said Pisistratus,
The truth to you, O king, I'll not disguise;
This is Ulysses' son, Telemachus,
But jealous of his tongue, and fearful is,
Before a man experienc'd and wise,
Lest he should say something at first amiss,
And lay his weakness open to your eyes.
Nestor sent me along with him for guide,
Because he so much longed you to see,
And hear what of his father was betide,
And by you holpen and instructed be.

Unhappy is the child whose father's gone,
And this is now Telemachus his case;
For of Ulysses news he can hear none,
Who to defend him left none in his place.
How, how! then said Atrides, I have here
The son of one that I esteemed most,
And for my sake suffer'd and did more there
Than any other in the Argive host;
To whom I meant, had we come safely home,
To shew more kindness than to any one
Of all the Greeks? As soon as we were come,
I had to Argos brought him and his son,
Built them a city, made both but one state,
And laid the cities round about us waste;
And often there with one another sate,
And only death our friendship had displac'd.
But by the Gods these thoughts are render'd vain;
They have Ulysses from his country kept.
This said, they could from tears no more abstain.
Jove's daughter, Argive Helena, then wept,
And Menelaus and Telemachus;
Nor could Pisistratus his tears restrain,
But on his brother thought, Antilochus,
That by the fair Aurora's son was slain,
And him rememb'ring, to Atrides spake:
Atrides, oft have I heard Nestor tell,
(As oft as we did of you mention make)
That you 'mongst men in wisdom do excel.
I pray you think not I take any pleasure

To act at supper-time the rites of mourning;
For that another time we shall have leisure,
Unless we look no more to see the morning.
Not that I weeping for the dead condemn,
Or cutting off of hair. It is a debt
We owe to our dead friends. And one of them
My brother is, whom I cannot forget.
He was not of the Greeks the meanest man;
For swift he was of foot, and bold in fight,
(Which you than I much better witness can)
To kill his foe in battle or in flight.
Dear friend, Atrides answer'd, you have said
What might an older man have well beseemed
To say and do; and Nestor's stock bewray'd,
Whose wisdom is of all men's most esteemed.
'Tis easy to discern the race of one
To whom a happy life the Gods shall grant,
As unto noble Nestor they have done,
Long life, and sons discreet and valiant.
Let's put off for the present tales of sorrow,
And to our meat again our minds apply.
Bring water for our hands. Betimes to-morrow
We'll talk of this, Telemachus and I.
This said, Asphalion came in with water.
They wash'd, and on the meat their hands they laid;
But in the meantime Helena, Jove's daughter,
An antidote into the wine convey'd,
An antidote that virtue had to keep
The man that drank it mixed with his wine,

So as for all that day he should not weep,
Nor for whatever should befall him whine;
No, though his father or his mother died,
Or friend or brother slain were in his sight
By cruel enemies that them envied.
Such was of Helen's medicine the might,
Which t' her in Egypt Thon's wife given had,
Where many drugs of wondrous virtue grow,
Some here, some there, and some good, and some bad,
For all men there the art of physic know;
For why, from Pæan sprung are all those men.
The antidote put in, she bad the wine
Be borne about. And then she said again:
King Menelaus, offspring of Gods divine,
Descended from the Gods are also these;
And Jove good fortune gives sometimes to one,
And sometimes to another, as he please,
For he can do whatever can be done.
Feast then, and merrily together sit,
And please yourselves with stories. I'll tell one,
And which as to the time is not unfit,
Of what at Troy was by Ulysses done.
I will not tell you all the pranks he play'd,
But only how he came into the town,
With canvas mantle o'er his shoulders laid,
Bloody with stripes, from no hand but his own;
And by the name of Dectes there did pass,
And as a slave went freely up and down,
When such man in the fleet at all none was,

And was to every one but me unknown.
I question'd him, and he at first was shy;
But when I bath'd him and anointed had,
And cloth'd, and ta'en an oath of secresy,
He told me what design the Argives had.
Then, having gotten much intelligence,
And many of the Trojan people slain,
He safely to the fleet departed thence,
Leaving their wives lamenting there in vain.
But I was glad; for changed had my mind,
And griev'd, by Venus t' have been made so mad,
To leave my child Hermione behind,
And my good husband, when no cause I had.
Then Menelaus said: Your story, wife,
Is to the purpose. Countries I have seen
Many; and oft with heroes, in my life,
In councils sitten; but was never in
The place where any like Ulysses sat.
I' th' wooden horse I'll tell you what he did,
(No man did ever such a thing as that);
The princes of the army there lay hid,
Death and destruction bearing into Troy.
Some demon then, that was no friend to us,
Made you come forth, our council to destroy,
And with you also came Deiphobus.
And thrice about the wooden horse you went,
And called to us ev'ry man by name,
And our wives' voices so did represent,
As not to be discerned from the same.

I’ th’ midst Ulysses, Diomed, and I,
Heard well your call as we together sat,
And ready were to go forth, or reply;
But by Ulysses hinder’d were of that.
But Anticlus had answer’d certainly,
Had not Ulysses, when he heard her call,
Laid hand upon his mouth immediately,
And held till you were gone. That sav’d us all.
’Twas much, then said Telemachus, but this
Was not enough the man alive to keep,
Though made of steel, whose end determin’d is;
But now, O king, the time is come for sleep.
Then Helen to her women order gave
To see their beds made ready, and lay on
Fair purple rugs, and under them to have
Soft blankets, and fine coverlids upon,
Before the house, in chamber o’er the gate.
But in the inmost of the palace lay
King Menelaus with his royal mate,
And rose again together with the day.
And when he had himself attir’d and shod,
And hung his trusty sword had by his side,
Out of his chamber came he like a God,
And to Telemachus himself applied.
Telemachus, said he, what bringeth you
To Lacedæmon, o’er the sea so wide?
Public or private bus’ness? Tell me true.
Telemachus unto him then replied:
To you, King Menelaus, I am come

T’ enquire what of my father is betide.
My house is full of enemies at home,
That me consume; and there resolve t’ abide.
I’ th’ fields they fruitless make my husbandry;
My stock they eat; and would my mother wed.
This made me come to know the certainty,
Whether my father be alive or dead;
Whether you saw him after he left Troy
Wand’ring abroad (for he was born to woe),
Or of him anything heard others say,
Let tenderness hide nothing that you know.
If in the Argive host he useful were,
In council or in battle, when need was,
Tell me the truth, be’t never so severe.
To this, much grieved, answer’d Menelaus.
Yes, yes, said he, there many enter’d be
Into a strong man’s house while he’s away,
And are in hope to dwell there constantly,
Though not so valiant as he be they.
As when a stag and hind ent’ring the den
Of th’ absent lion, lulls his whelps with tales
Of hills and dales, the lion comes again,
And tears them into pieces with his nails;
So shall Ulysses all those suitors slay.
O that the Gods, Apollo, Pallas, Jove,
Amongst the suitors let him would one day,
Such as when with Philomelid he strove,
And threw him flat, and made the Argives glad.
If such as then Ulysses should be there,

Short would their lives be, and their wedding bad.
But to the matter whereof you would hear,
I can say nothing upon certainty,
And my own knowledge, but what I was told
By Proteus. And tell I will no lie,
Nor anything of what he said withhold.
Before the land of Egypt Pharos lies,
An island, and therein a haven good
Against whatever wind shall chance to rise;
And ready to depart, my ships there stood;
A day's sail distant stands it in the main;
But 'cause the hecatomb I offer'd not,
The Gods a long time did me there detain,
For they are angry when they are forgot.
There twenty days together we were pent,
Though fain we would have put again to sea;
And our provision had quite been spent,
But that I then met with Idothoë.
She daughter is of Proteus, and he
A herdsman old of Neptune is, and has
The charge his sea-calves kept and fed to see.
His daughter met me when alone I was;
My company, their dinner to provide,
With angle rods were fishing on the strand.
Then said she to me, standing by my side,
Why stay you here, and nothing take in hand
To help yourself, as if a child you were,
Or negligent, or loved misery,
Suff'ring yourself to be so long pent here?

Or can you no way find to be set free?
What God you be soever, answer'd I,
Thus much unto you I must plainly say,
That in this isle I stay unwillingly,
And for my freedom to the Gods I pray.
But tell me you (for Gods know everything)
What God is it that to this place me tied,
And what it is that must me from it bring?
I'll tell you then, said she, and nothing hide.
By an old Sea-God haunted is this isle,
Call'd Proteus, that nothing says untrue,
Servant to Neptune, whom if by some wile
You could but catch and hold, he'd answer you
To all you ask, and he my father is.
He'll tell you how to get your ships to sea,
And how you shall get home. He knows all this,
And what's there done. So said Idothoë.
But how, said I, is't possible for man
Upon a God immortal to lay hold,
When he, foreseeing it, avoid it can,
If how to do't he be not by you told?
I'll tell you, said she, how it may be done.
Hidden in the curls of the sea each day
Brought in by Zephyrus, he lands at noon,
And on the sand himself to sleep will lay;
About him will his footless sea-calves lie,
And of the brine abominably smell.
And thither bring you in the morn will I,
And how to place yourselves instruct you well;

For three more must come with you, lusty men,
Whom you shall choose from out your company.
The old Sea-God his flock will number then,
And, having done, i' th' midst of them will lie,
Just as a shepherd lies amongst his sheep.
Now waver not, but bold and constant be.
As soon as you shall see he is asleep,
Lay hold on him, and keep it constantly,
For he in divers shapes will with you struggle.
He will be any serpent that he please;
Himself he'll into fire or water juggle;
Therefore hold fast, lest he your hands disease.
When of himself he shall contented be,
In his first form the matter to debate,
Take off your hands, and set the old God free.
Then of your business him interrogate,
What God it is that hath your hurt contrived,
How you shall put to sea, which way go home.
This said, into the sea again she dived.
Then, full of thoughts, back to my ships I come,
And supp'd, and when we supped had 'twas night.
Then slept we by our ships upon the sand,
But when Aurora had brought back the light,
Then went I with my three men to the strand,
And prayed to the Gods: my men I chose,
Such men as for the purpose fit I thought.
Idothoë then from the sea arose,
And in her hand four sea-calves' skins she brought
All raw, her father thereby to betray.

And with those skins upon us on the shore,
Scrap'd hollow by her, like sea-calves we lay,
And there our lodging had been very sore,
(For so abominably do they stink,
That no man near them can endure to lie.
Is it good lying with a whale, d'ye think?)
But that she for it had a remedy.
Ambrosia she with her brought, and laid
The same unto our noses one by one,
Which the ill savour of the fish allay'd.
And thus we lay expecting till 'twas noon;
Then all at once the sea-calves came ashore,
And there themselves they bedded orderly.
At noon came Proteus, and counts them o'er,
And first were counted my three men and I.
Then lay he also down, and by and by
He fell asleep. Then we unto him ran,
And laid hands on him with a hideous cry,
And he to shew his wondrous art began.
A shaggy lion first he seem'd to be;
And then a dragon; then a leopard;
And then a boar; then water; then a tree;
But still we kept our hold, and press'd him hard.
He weary was at last, and then he said:
Atrides, how came you by so much skill
To hold me thus? What God has me betray'd?
What needed you to vex me? What's your will?
What need, said I, have you from me to hear,
That bound am to this isle, and know not how

To put to sea, nor what God holds me here,
When you can tell me (for Gods all things know)?
Then back, said he, to Greece you cannot come,
Till you to Egypt do return again,
And pay to all the Gods a hecatomb;
That done, you shall pass safely o'er the main.
Thus Proteus said. But that I must go first
Back into Egypt, an ill and long way,
My heart to hear it ready was to burst.
'Tis hard, said I, but I'll do all you say;
But tell me of the Argives first, if they
With their good ships came all in safety home,
That I and Nestor left behind at Troy,
How many by the way they lost, and whom?
Some of them 'scap'd, said he, and some are lost;
But of the princes lost are only twain
In their return. Upon the Trojan coast
You know who died; and one the Gods detain.
First Ajax' ships by winds are laid aground
At Gyræ, rocks that on the deep look down,
And 'gainst the sea protection there had found,
However Pallas did upon him frown,
But that a high provoking word he spake.
I'll pass, said he, although the Gods say no.
And Neptune then the rock he sat on brake;
Both he and it into the water go,
Where, when he had drunk brine enough, he died.
Your brother also safely pass'd the sea,
And came to Argos (Juno was his guide).

And when he was come near to mount Malea,
Forc'd by foul weather, he disbarked, where
Thyestes formerly his age had spent,
But now his son Ægistus dwelled there.
The Gods then chang'd the wind, and homeward went.
Full glad he was, and kiss'd the ground for joy,
And from him fell the tears abundantly.
Ægistus, that long sought him to destroy,
Had plac'd a man on purpose to descry
Th' arrival of the fleet, whom he had hired
To watch upon a hill a year together,
For talents ten of gold, that he required,
And tell him when the fleet from Troy came thither.
The watchman saw them, and t' Ægistus went,
And gave him notice of their coming in.
Ægistus then, t' effect his bad intent,
Chose twenty lusty men, and them within
An inner room he placed, out of sight,
And a great supper bids his men provide;
Then down went, Agamemnon to invite,
With horses and with coaches to th' sea-side,
And brought him up to supper in great state;
Then rose the traitors that in ambush lay,
And killed him, as he at supper sate,
Nor any man alive went thence away,
That with Atrides or with him took part.
When of his story he had made an end,
To break with pity ready was my heart;
In streams down on my cheeks the tears descend.

I wished never more to see the sun,
And weeping, on the sand myself I roll'd.
But when my lamentation was done,
Then Proteus said again, Your weeping hold,
Tears are no remedy, but make haste home.
There lives Ægistus, or if he be slain
Already by Orestes, you will come
To his interment. This cheer'd me again,
And then I asked further of him this:
Since you have told me what's become of two,
Tell me the third that stays abroad, who 'tis,
Alive or dead, though that will grieve me too.
It is, said he, Ulysses, whom I saw
In th' island where Calypso dwells, o' th' shore
Weeping, who fain would come to Ithaca,
But with him neither has a ship nor oar.
And you, O Menelaus, shall not die
In Argos (for 'tis otherwise decreed)
But be convey'd t' Elysium. For why,
Of Jupiter you wedded have the seed.
There humans lead their lives in greatest ease;
No snow nor frost there is; refreshed there
They are by zephyrs rising from the seas,
And Jove's son Rhadamanthus dwelleth there.
This said, into the sea he went again,
But I, with thoughts confused in my head,
Returned back unto my ships and men,
And soon as we had supp'd, the night was spread.
Then back again into the Nile we go,

And offer'd to the Gods a hecatomb;
When we their anger had appeased so,
For Agamemnon there we rais'd a tomb.
When this was done, for Argos we set sail,
And quickly to our native soil we came;
Th' immortal Gods gave us a lusty gale,
And all the way continued the same.
Telemachus, you've heard all I can say,
But must not therefore straightway take your leave;
Until th' eleventh or twelfth day you'll stay,
The presents I intend you to receive.
A chariot you shall have and horses three,
And a fair cup emboss'd to offer wine,
That in your vows you may remember me.
Then said Telemachus, I here have lien
Long time already, and my men at Pyle
Are weary of expecting me; else I
Could stay a year, and never all that while
My mind have on my house or family,
So much I taken am with your discourse.
But let my present be some monument;
To Ithaca I'll never carry horse,
They for the plains are more convenient;
Large plains, which you have here in many places,
And where store is of wheat, and rice, and lote.
In Ithaca there is no ground for races,
Nor pastures good enough to feed a goat.
In th' isles about it, gallop can no horse;
In th' isle itself, nor gallop nor be fed.

When he had made an end of his discourse,
Atrides, smiling on him, strok'd his head.
'Tis spoken, said he, like a gallant man,
And that descended is of noble blood.
I'll give you other presents, for I can,
In place of these, that shall be full as good.
A monument kept in my treasury,
Of massive silver a fair temperer,
The work of Vulcan, which was given me
At Sidon, by the king, when I was there.
Whilst they together thus discoursing staid,
The bidden guests, fat sheep, rich wine bring in,
And bread their wives upon the table laid,
And about supper busy were within.
And now the suitors at Ulysses' house
Were throwing of the stone and darts. And by
Antinous sat and Eurymachus,
Chief of the woo'rs. Then came Noemon nigh:
Unto Antinous he spake, and said,
When will Telemachus return from Pyle?
My ship I lent him, and am now afraid
I shall have need of her myself the while.
For over into Elis I must pass;
Twelve mares of mine there go, and with the same
Twelve unbroke mules, with all their foals, at grass;
And some of them I would fetch home and tame.
At this they star'd. For never dreamed they
That in good earnest he would go to Pyle,
But in the fields would with some herdsman stay,

And there from us conceal himself awhile.
Antinous then ask'd, When parted he?
What company went with him hence? His own
Servants and husbandmen, for that might be,
Or young men of the best account i' th' town?
And tell me further, was it willingly
You lent your ship, or were you forc'd thereto?
To this Noemon did again reply:
I lent it willingly. What should I do?
Who would not yield to such a man's request,
When he has need and asks, as well as I?
And with him went of Ithaca the best,
And Mentor chief of all the company;
If he it were not, 'twas some deity,
For, which is strange, I saw him yesterday
Before the sun was mounted half the sky,
Yet went the ship the night before away.
This said, he went his way. Antinous
And th' others sat there yet, and wondered.
The suitors left their sport, sat down, and thus
Antinous the case then opened,
And in an angry tone, with fiery eye,
'Tis true, said he, Telemachus has done
A work to us of great indignity.
We thought he never could that way have gone.
We many are, and men; yet he, a boy,
Has got a ship, and of our men the best.
But may Jove him, before he us, destroy.
Give me a good ship, ere we be oppress'd,

And twenty able men, and in the strait
‘Twixt Ithaca and Same I will lie,
And for their coming back from Pylus wait,
And entertain him with hot coming by.
The suitors all were pleased with the plot,
And then they rose together and went in.
But Medon had heard all, which they knew not,
For he without the court was, they within.
And to inform Penelope he went,
And when she saw him coming in a door,
Medon, said she, what, are you hither sent
To bid my maids trouble themselves no more
With how the suitors they shall entertain;
But only for themselves make ready meat?
Lest when they hither come to sup again,
It prove the last that they shall ever eat.
Telemachus his wealth you wasted have,
As if your fathers never told you how
Ulysses with them did himself behave,
That never did unkindness to them show
In deed or word. Although a liberty
Kings often take, one man to love or hate
Above another, without telling why;
But he cause of offence to no man gave.
But of good turns received heretofore
Your nature altogether senseless is.
queen, said Medon, would it were no more;
But I must tell you somewhat worse than this.
The suitors have conspir’d to kill your son,

(Which Jove avert,) as he is coming home.
For he to Pylus is and Sparta gone
T' enquire what of his father is become.
This said, Penelope was stricken dumb,
And filled were with tears her eyes. But when
Her voice at last again was to her come,
She spake to Medon, and him asked then,
Medon, said she, why went my son away?
What need had he upon the sea to ride?
Meant he his name amongst men to destroy?
And Medon to her then again replied:
I cannot tell. Perhaps encouraged
By some o' th' Gods, or presage of his own
T' enquire about his father, whether dead,
Or on what coast he is by fortune thrown.
This said, her tears she could no longer hold,
And lets herself sink down upon the sill.
Then came her maids about her, young and old.
Did ever Gods, said she, bear such ill will
To any woman as they bear to me?
Why deal they worse with me than with the rest?
O my dear husband! What a man was he!
All manly virtues lodged in his breast.
Through Hellas and through Argos known was he;
Of him the Gods unkind me first bereft;
And now away my child must taken be,
That to sustain the house at home was left.
Sluts that you are, and of his going knew,
Why was it not to me discovered?

For had I of it been inform’d by you,
I had him stay’d, or he had left me dead.
To Dolius let one or other go
(The servant which my father gave to me,
And with Laertes at the lodge is now,
And of my garden has the custody)
And tell him what the suitors are about,
That he may to Laertes tell the same;
And he unto the people may come out,
And them against these wicked men inflame.
Then spake Euryclea: Dear child, said she,
Kill me, or let me live as you think best;
No longer shall the truth concealed be.
I knew all this. So did none of the rest.
I furnish’d him with all that he commanded,
Sweet wine and flour, but first he made me swear,
I would not tell you till it was demanded,
Or that the same by others told you were;
For fear lest with much weeping hurt you take.
But wash, put on clean garments, and up go
Into your chamber, and your prayers make
To Pallas, who your son to save knows how.
The griev’d old man, why should you further grieve?
Hated is not Arcesius his seed
By all the Gods. For I cannot believe
But some of them will help them in their need,
And both their houses and their lands protect.
This stopp’d her sobbing, and her weeping stay’d.
Then went she up, herself she wash’d and deck’d,

And to the Goddess Pallas thus she pray'd:
Goddess, if you well accepted have
The victims by Ulysses sacrificed
Upon your altar here, his son now save,
And bring to nought what th' wooers have devised.
Her prayer granted was. Then shouted they.
The suitors heard it in the hall, and one
T' another said, 'Tis for her wedding-day;
She knows not we intend to kill her son.
Thus said they, but upon no ground at all.
Alcinous then spake. Madmen, said he,
Such words as these what mean you to let fall?
What if within they should reported be?
Come rise, thus, gently, and the work effect
To which we all have given our consent.
Then did he twenty able men elect,
And down unto the water side they went,
And first of all they laid their ship afloat,
And in it with white sails the mast they laid,
And fit their oars. Then in their arms were brought:
The mast then rear'd was, and the sails display'd.
Then went they t' anchor in the open sea,
And stay'd all night. And then aboard they eat.
Then to her chamber went Penelope
Grieving, and tasting neither drink nor meat,
Casting about whether more likely 't were
Her son should 'scape the suitors' hands, or die.
Just as a lion that enclosed were
With toils about, would cast which way to fly.

When her sad reck'ning sleep had blotted out,
Dissolv'd her strength, and closed had her eyes,
Pallas another bus'ness went about.
She made an Idol in a woman's guise,
Like to the daughter of Icarius,
Wife of Eumelus, (at Pheræ dwell'd he),
And sent the same unto Ulysses' house,
T' allay the sorrow of Penelope.
In at the keyhole then the Idol goes
Into her chamber, and stood at her head.
Penelope, said it, amidst such woes
How can you sleep? But now be comforted.
You must no longer weep nor grieved be,
For from the Gods you no such cause shall have,
For of your son the safe return you'll see.
To this Penelope then answer gave.
Sister, said she, 'tis strange to see you here;
You come but seldom. For far off you dwell.
And now you bid me weeping to forbear,
When how much cause I have you cannot tell.
A good and noble husband I have lost,
That had a lion's heart within his breast,
Hellas and Argos of his valour boast,
What virtue is there that he not possess'd?
And now my child at sea is in a tub,
And has no skill in fight or parliament:
I fear extremely lest he meet some rub,
For him more than for th' other I lament.
What may befal him on the sea I dread,

And what at land, if e’er to land he come,
For many foes he hath that wish him dead,
And wait to kill him as he cometh home.
To this again replied the Idol dim,
Take courage, be not frighted for your son;
He has a guide that taketh care of him;
A better would be wished for by none.
’Tis Pallas. For of you she pity takes,
And what I said, I said by her command.
Penelope again this answer makes,
Whoe’er you be, answer one more demand:
Is my poor husband yet alive, or no?
Then said the Idol, That I do not find,
Nor will I tell you what I do not know.
Then through the keyhole went, and turn’d to wind.
Then wak’d Penelope, and joyful was
T’ have had a dream so evident and clear.
Then o’er the humid plain the suitors pass,
Destruction to Telemachus to bear.
‘Twixt Ithaca and Same, middle way,
There lies an island, and but small it is,
Yet hath it on each side a good safe bay.
There watch’d the wooers. ’Tis call’d Asteris.

LIB. V.

The Gods in council command Calypso (by Mercury) to send away Ulysses on a raft of trees; and Neptune returning from Ethiopia, and seeing him on the coast of Phæacia, scattered his raft; and how, by the help of Ino, he swam ashore, and slept in a heap of dry leaves till the next day.

UP ROSE AURORA from Tithonus' bed,
Before the Gods and men to bear her light.
The Gods were then to council gathered,
And Jove amongst them of the greatest might.
And there before them Pallas open laid
The painful life Ulysses did endure.
Jove, and all ye blessed Gods, she said,
Henceforth his people let no king enure
To gentle government, but keep them down,
And to their honesty no longer trust,
That of Ulysses are forgetful grown,
Whose government so gentle was and just.
And now he pent up lieth in an isle
Where dwells Calypso; and to come away
Calypso sends away Ulysses on a raft of trees, &c.
Has neither ship nor men, and all the while
Weeping for sorrow forc'd he is to stay.
The suitors also seek to kill his son,
And lie to meet him in his coming home;

For why, to Pyle and Sparta he is gone,
To hear what of his father is become.
Why, child, said Jove, why say you this to me?
’Twas you that sent Telemachus away;
And you consenting were to our decree,
Ulysses should come back and th’ wooers slay.
Go you and bring Telemachus from Pyle,
And send the suitors home that lie in’s way;
And Mercury, said he, go you the while
And tell the nymph Calypso what I say.
The Gods in council sitting order’d have,
Ulysses shall return to Ithaca.
And first upon a raft himself shall save,
Without a convoy in Phæacia
In twenty days; and there be honoured,
And to his country richly sent away,
With brass, and gold, and garments furnished,
More than his share had mounted to at Troy,
Though he had brought it thence all safely home;
For why, by destiny ordain’d it is
That to his friends he honourably come.
No sooner Jupiter had spoken this,
But that his shoes upon his feet he binds,
Ambrosian, golden shoes, wherewith he flies
On land or water, swifter than the winds.
Then takes the rod wherewith upon the eyes
Of mortals he lays on or takes off sleep,
And with his rod in hand jump’d down to th’ hill
Pierius, and thence into the deep;

And over the wide sea he passed, till
At last he was arrived at the isle
Where was the nymph Calypso resident;
And like a cormorant was all this while
That hunts the fishes. Then ashore he went,
And coming to her rock found her within.
Upon the hearth a fire was of sweet wood,
There did she sing, and as she sung did spin.
About the cave many fair trees there stood,
Beech, poplar, and the cyprus of sweet smell,
And many birds, hawks, and sea-crows, and owls,
Within their branches used were to dwell;
And, such as haunt sea-water, other fowls.
The rock itself with vines was covered,
And grapes abundance hanging were thereon;
Four springs a-row four ways clear water spread.
Sweet meadows were about it many a one,
Stuck full of violets and flowers gay,
Which, though a God, he saw with admiration,
And for a little while he there did stay,
Pleas'd with the beauty of the habitation,
And then into the spacious cave he goes.
At the first sight Calypso knew him well,
For perfectly one God another knows,
How far soever they asunder dwell.
Ulysses now was gone out to the shore,
To look upon the sea that kept him in,
To sigh and weep as he had done before;
At Hermes' coming he was not within.

To Hermes, seated in a glistering chair,
The Goddess fair Calypso then began:
Tell me, beloved Hermes, your affair,
If it be possible it shall be done.
Come nearer, and with food yourself restore.
Then sets she him a table, and lays on
Of nectar and ambrosia good store.
Then Hermes took his food, and having done,
Goddess, said he, since me, a God, you ask,
You may be sure I tell you shall no lie.
Jove sent me ‘gainst my will; for such a task
Who undertake would, think you, willingly?
For, first, a horrible long journey ’tis;
And then no town to bait at by the way
On hecatomb or lesser sacrifice.
But what God is there dares Jove disobey?
There is, said Jove, a man that stay’d is here,
Of th’ Argives that besieged Ilium
The most unhappy. There they stay’d nine year,
The tenth they took it, and were coming home;
But by the way they Pallas had offended,
And she against them raised stormy weather,
In which Ulysses’ mates their lives all ended,
But he himself by storms was driven hither.
Him Jupiter would have you send away;
For he is destin’d not to die from home,
Nor any longer from his friends to stay,
But back unto his house and country come.
Calypso, troubled at it, answered:

Malicious ye Gods, and jealous are,
That think much Goddesses should mortals wed.
See but how hardly did Orion fare,
After Aurora was become his wife.
How angry at him, O ye Gods, were you,
Until Diana took away his life,
With shafts invisible before 'twas due.
And so when Ceres with Iäsion
Themselves delighted with the gift of love,
How soon it was by th' other Gods made known,
And with a thunder-bolt he slain by Jove!
And now they angry are with me. And why?
Because I taken have a man to bed
Who in the sea had perish'd, had not I
Receiv'd him in my house and cherished.
For when his ship with thunder Jove had split,
And all his company away were cast,
Him on the mast unto the rudder knit,
The wind and waves brought hither at the last;
And here I him receiv'd and loved well,
And meant to give him immortality.
But since Jove will not let him with me dwell,
And I cannot resist him, farewell he.
But o'er the sea I shall not him convoy,
For in my power I have no ship, nor men
That have the art to walk in liquid way;
Prompt him I will how to get home again.
'Tis well, said Mercury; send him now hence;
The manner how, is left unto your will.

Be wise, and do not Jupiter incense,
Lest he upon you bring a greater ill.
This said, away went Mercury. And she
Unto Ulysses went to the sea-side.
Himself lamenting sitting there was he,
And when she came his eyes were not yet dried.
For now he lov'd the nymph less than before,
And lay with her a-nights unwillingly;
A-days he weeping sat upon the shore,
And on th' unbounded sea oft cast his eye.
Then to him said the nymph: Poor man, alas!
No longer weep, but fall your work unto;
For on a raft you are the sea to pass,
And I will tell you what you are to do.
Cut down great trees, and them together join
With bands of brass; and on them make a deck;
And on it I will lay both bread and wine,
And water fresh, hunger and thirst to check.
And garments I will give you, and a wind,
That you may safe go home and speedily;
Unless the Gods be of another mind,
For stronger they and wiser are than I.
At this Ulysses troubled was, and said,
I looked for a convoy me to waft;
For on this sea a man would be afraid
Though in a ship; much more upon a raft.
I will not therefore pass upon a raft,
Unless to do me no more hurt you swear.
And when he had said that, Calypso laugh'd,

And of his head she stroked down the hair.
You are, she said, a true bird of the nest,
As by your answer very well I see:
By Heaven and by Earth I do protest,
And Styx, which is the greatest oath can be,
I'll never anything hereafter do
That shall procure you hurt in any case;
And what at present I advise you to,
I would myself do, were I in your place:
For why, the Fates I also must obey,
And in my breast no iron heart I bear.
This said, she turn'd and homeward took her way,
And on her steps Ulysses follow'd her.
When they were come together in the cave,
She made him sit where Hermes sat before,
And meat and wine, the best that mortals have,
The maids upon the table laid good store;
Before Calypso they laid other meat,
Ambrosia and nectar, food divine;
There face to face they sit and drink and eat.
When she refresh'd him had with meat and wine,
Noble Ulysses, said she, that long so
To see your house and wife without delay,
If what you were to suffer you did know
Before you there arrived, you would stay
And live with me here, and immortal be.
Nor than that wife, for whom you take such care,
Less fairer or less wise can you think me;
Women with Goddesses cannot compare.

Goddess, said he again, I know all this.
Penelope I not compare with you
In form or stature. For she mortal is,
And you immortal. Yet, though this be true,
I cannot chuse but wish myself at home.
And though I were to perish in the deep
By th' anger of the Gods, and never come,
I'd rather suffer that, than always weep.
For patience long since I learned have
Sufficiently in tempest and in fight.
This said, they both in one part of the cave
To sleep went, where in love they took delight.
And when the morning was again display'd,
Ulysses cloth'd himself with cloak and coat;
The nymph herself in a great robe array'd
Of dainty stuff with gold all over wrought,
Which on her loins a golden girdle tied,
And cover'd with a golden scarf her head.
And how Ulysses o'er sea so wide
Should safely pass, she there considered.
Then puts a plainer and an axe in's hand,
Two-edged, with a haft of olive-tree.
Then show'd him where the greatest trees did stand,
And all the way before him walked she.
And when they were arrived at the wood,
Beeches they find, poplars, and fir-trees high,
Already dry, that lie light on the flood.
Calypso to her cavern back did hie.
Meanwhile Ulysses twenty trees brought low,

And hewed them, and plain'd them skilfully,
And laid them on the ground all in a row,
At corners square, and of one length they lie.
And then with wimbles back Calypso came;
Then pierced them, and set them one to one,
And with strong joints and nails fast bound the same.
And by the time that all this he had done,
As a good ship as broad it was and long.
Then for his decks he placed stoops upright
On every side, and many to be strong;
And laid upon them planks at equal height.
Then made his mast, and set it up on end,
His rudder, and a place to sit and guide,
And laid on boughs from waves it to defend,
And all his cordage made of good cow-hide,
And then with levers set his raft afloat.
Four days in making of the raft he spent;
When he had done, and all his work had wrought,
Upon the fifth the nymph away him sent.
But first she bath'd him, and with clothes array'd,
Fine and perfum'd. Then wine of pleasant taste
One goat-skin full upon the raft she laid,
And one of water, greater, by it plac'd;
And sweetmeats, and good flesh of ev'ry kind.
And after he his sails had hoist and spread,
She fill'd them with a warm and cheerful wind.
Then he astern sat down and governed,
And on Bootes look'd, and Pleiades,
And on the Bear, which people call the Wain,

Which dogs Orion rising from the seas,
But she herself ne'er dives into the main.
This Bear she bade him leave on the left hand.
Then sev'nteen days he sail'd, on th' eighteenth day
He came in sight of the Phœacian land,
In that part where it nearest to him lay,
Which look'd as 'twere upon the sea a skin.
But now by Neptune, who returning was,
Ulysses' raft from Solymi was seen,
For o'er those mountains Neptune was to pass;
Who, wounded at the sight, with anger keen,
Thus said unto himself: What, what, I find,
While I in Ethiopia have been,
The Gods about this man have chang'd their mind.
The isle Phœacia is near at hand,
In which he destin'd is himself to save.
But yet, I think, before he be on land,
He struggle shall with many a lusty wave.
Then with his trident he the sea enraged,
And made a night of clouds the sea upon,
And 'gainst Ulysses all the Winds engaged,
And from their quarters they came out each one,
Eurus, and Notus, Zephyr, Boreas,
Each one a mighty wave against him rolled.
And then Ulysses' heart near broken was,
And with himself, himself he thus condoled.
Ah me, what will become of me at last!
I fear the nymph Calypso all this knew,
Who told me then that as I homeward pass'd

I should meet danger. Now I find it true.
With what thick clouds Jove cover'd has the sky!
In what a tumult is the sea! And how
On ev'ry side the winds the water ply
And storm! My death, I see, is certain now.
Thrice, four times, Argives, happy were you, who
For Agamemnon's sake were slain. Would I
At Troy in battle my life lost had too,
I' th' show'r of spears about Achilles' body;
Then had I had a noble funeral,
And great among the Greeks had been my fame.
But now a wretched death will me befal,
For ever will unheard of be my name.
This said, he dash'd was 'gainst a point of land,
Which with great force whirled the raft about.
And then the rudder flew out of his hand;
And he into the water was cast out.
Of divers winds then followed one great blast,
And sail and tackle o'er-board far off bears,
And in the middle breaks in two the mast,
While he was in the sea o'er head and ears;
At last he rais'd his head above the pickle,
(His heavy clothes awhile had hindered him),
Then from his hair into his mouth did trickle
The brine, which he spits out, and falls to swim.
And when he had his raft recovered,
And plac'd himself i' th' midst, then both together
The wind uncertainly them carried
From place to place, now hither and now thither;

Just as the wind in harvest blows pease-straw
Upon the plain field whilst it holds together;
So on the sea without a certain law
Ulysses' raft was driven by the weather.
In this distress by Ino he was seen,
A sea-nymph and immortal she was then,
Though woman, Cadmus' daughter, she had been.
And now in figure of a water-hen
She sat upon the raft and to him spake.
What meaneth Neptune that he hates you so?
Do what he can your life he shall not take;
Do what I bid you. Off your garments throw,
And quit the raft; and to Phœacia
Swim with your hands, and there you shall find rest.
For so it is ordain'd by fatal law.
Here, take this scarf; apply it to your breast,
And fear not death. But when you come to land
Throw't in the sea as far off as you can,
Then turn. This said, she put it in his hand,
And diving there alone she left the man.
Ulysses grieving to himself then says,
What is it now I am advis'd unto!
Ah me! Some other God now me betrays
To quit my raft. I know what I will do.
For since my refuge is so near at hand,
Such counsel I will not too soon obey;
But do what does with greatest reason stand.
Upon my raft I mean so long to stay
As it shall hold together and be one.

But when the wind has broken it in pieces
I'll swim; since better counsel I have none.
While with himself consulting was Ulysses,
Neptune with wind the water sets upright
Into a high and formidable wave,
And threw it on the raft with all his might,
Which all the parts thereof asunder drave.
Just as the wind scatters a cock of hay,
So scatter'd was Ulysses' raft of trees;
Whilst he on one of them astride did stay,
And of his garments there himself he frees.
Then Ino's scarf applies he to his breast,
And on the troubled sea himself he laid
With open arms. To swim he now thought best.
Which Neptune seeing, thus unto him said:
Go wander now upon the sea in woe,
And do not make account that this is all.
This said, away to Ægæ did he go,
Where many men that need him on him call.
When he was gone Pallas the winds did lay,
All but a lusty gale of Boreas,
And broke the waves before him all the way,
That to Phœacia he might safely pass.
Two nights and days perpetual he swam,
And was of drowning all the while afraid.
But when the morning of the third day came,
The air was calm, and all the winds allay'd.
And now unto the isle he was so nigh,
That from a high wave he could see the shore,

And glad he was. As when about to die,
Lien has a man long time by sickness sore,
Is by the Gods recover'd suddenly,
Glad are his children; so Ulysses was
To see the so-much wish'd-for land so nigh,
And thither made what haste he could to pass.
When he was gotten so near to the shore
That one might hear another when he calls,
Torn by the rocks he heard the water roar.
(Loud is the sea when on hard rocks it falls.)
There neither haven was nor place to land,
But upright banks and cliffs and brows of stone.
And everywhere too deep it was to stand.
And now again quite was his courage gone,
And speaking to himself he said: Ah me,
This is the island. Jove has brought me to't,
That what must help me only I might see,
But not upon it ever set my foot.
There is no landing here. Rocks high and steep,
And unaccessible are all about.
The sea below so rugged is and deep,
That from it there will be no getting out.
If I should try, some mighty wave, I fear,
Against some rugged rock will carry me,
And make me find but woful landing there,
Amongst so many sharp stones as there be.
But if I swim along the coast to find
Some port or beach, though stormy, to land on,
I fear I shall again by some great wind

Far off from shore into the sea be blown;
And there by some great fish devoured be
(For many such are fed by Amphitrite)
Which Neptune may command to swallow me;
For well I am acquainted with his spite.
While he thus doubted, came a mighty wave
That cast him to the bank amongst sharp stones.
But for the counsel Pallas to him gave,
He torn his skin and broken had his bones.
A rocher with his arms he then embrac'd,
And held it till the wave roll'd back again;
And thought the danger of it now was past,
But then the same wave bore him to the main.
As looks a polypus when he is dragg'd
From out his hole, stuck full of stone and sands;
So, when Ulysses left his hold, were shagg'd
With broken skin all over both his hands.
And now, had not Athena giv'n him wit,
He perish'd had. For up his head he puts
Above the briny sea, and having spit,
He with his stretched arms the water cuts,
And swam along the shore; but kept his eye
Continually upon the land, to see
If any landing place he could espy.
At last before a river's mouth came he;
And knew it was a river's mouth. For there
Within the land smooth water might be seen,
And 'twixt the rocks a pause there did appear;
And here Ulysses thought fit to go in.

And in his mind unto the River spake:
Hear me, O king, from Neptune's rage I fly,
And of a man distress'd some pity take,
That at your knee and stream here prostrate lie;
Th' immortal Gods their suppliants respect,
When they before them humbly lay their want;
Whate'er your name be, do not me neglect
That am afflicted, and your suppliant.
This said, the stream stood still and sav'd the man.
But weary were his knees and arms, and brine
Abundance from his mouth and nostrils ran,
And all his body swell'd was. And in fine,
Speechless and breathless was he, like one dead.
But when he came unto himself again,
The scarf he to the stream delivered,
Which carried it again into the main.
And Ino took it then into her hand.
Then on a bulrush-bed himself he laid,
And, glad he had escaped, kiss'd the land.
But fearing still, unto himself he said,
Ah me, what will become of me at length!
For in the river if I spend the night,
So much already wasted is my strength,
With frost and dew I shall be killed quite.
If up the hill I go into the wood,
And in some thicket there lie warm and sleep,
I fear I shall for beasts and fowls be food.
At last concludes into some wood to creep.
A wood there was unto the river nigh;

Two thickets in it were; of olive one,
The other was of Phylia close by,
So twin'd they were together that nor sun,
Nor wind, nor rain, to th' ground could find a way.
Between them of dry leaves a bed made he,
And over head and ears there close he lay;
For leaves there were enough for two or three,
To keep them warm although cold weather 'twere.
As when a man takes up a brand of fire
In country-house, few neighbours dwelling near,
To warm himself withal if need require;
So buried in dry leaves Ulysses lay.
And then Athena closed up his eyes
With sound and gentle sleep to take away
Sad thoughts suggested by his miseries.

LIB. VI.

Nausicaa going to a river near that place to wash the clothes of her father, mother, and brethren, while the clothes were drying played with her maids at ball, and Ulysses coming forth is fed and clothed and led to the house of her father, King Alcinous, where being received, the queen after supper taking notice of his garments, gave him occasion to relate his passage thither on the raft.

THERE SLEPT ULYSSES. But Athena went
Unto the people of Phœacia,
Who once dwelt near a nation insolent,
The great Cyclopses in Hyperia,
And by the odds of strength were there oppress'd;
But by Nausithous transplanted were
To Scheria, that they might live at rest;
Who built them houses, and a city there,
And fortified the same with strong walls round,
And temples built, and gave them shares of land.
But he departed was, and under ground,
And now Alcinous had the command.
His house it was the Goddess went unto,
And int' a chamber gay, where lay a-bed
A godlike maid asleep, with less ado
Than could a gentle wind have entered.
This the king's daughter was, Nausicaa.

Within the door shut close, on each side one,
Two of her waiting-maids asleep she saw,
And as the Graces fair to look upon.
Then standing at Nausicaa's bed's-head,
In form of Dymas' daughter, there she stay'd,
Who of her age was, and most favoured,
And to Nausicaa she spake, and said:
Careless Nausicaa, what do you mean,
When to your wedding-day you are so near,
To let so many garments lie unclean?
You would be glad yourself fair clothes to wear,
And give to them that are to lead you out.
For e'en such things as these procure good fame
Amongst the people that dwell round about;
Your parents also take joy in the same.
Come therefore, to the river let's be gone
By break of day; for I will with you go
Ulysses fed and clothed by Nausicaa, &c.
And help that you the sooner may have done.
I'm sure your wedding is not far off now,
For sought you are in marriage by the best
Of all the town where you were born and bred.
Go early to your father and request
You may with mules and coach be furnished,
That aprons, gowns, and mantles you may bear
Unto the washing-place, for far 'tis to't,
And for your person so 'tis comelier
Than to be seen to go so far on foot.
This said, the Goddess up to heaven went,

Where is the dwelling of the Gods in bliss;
A pure and undecaying firmament
Which by no wind moved or shaken is,
Nor wet nor slabber'd is with show'r of rain,
Nor clouded, nor approach'd unto by snow;
But bright and shining always doth remain.
Here dwell th' immortals, and no sorrow know.
Thither went Pallas. Then Nausicaa
Awak'd, and through the house went to relate
Unto her parents what a dream she saw.
Her mother by the fire-side spinning sate
With distaff laden with fine purple wool.
Her father going out, she met i' th' hall,
Call'd by the lords sitting in council full,
And waiting for him to consult withal.
And to him said: Pray, father, shall not I
Allowed be a coach your clothes to bear
(Which in the house sullied and spotted lie)
Unto the river side to wash them there;
For you yourself when you to council go
Would gladly have your garments clean and sweet.
Your five sons, whereof two be wedded now,
Would fain with clean clothes at the dancings meet.
So said Nausicaa. But to her father
To talk of wedding she forbore for shame,
Yet what she thought on he could eas'ly gather,
However she dissembled had the same.
Dear child, then said her father, you shall have
Both mules and coach with handsome covering.

Unto his servants then command he gave
To see it done. And out the coach they bring,
And to it set the mules. Then came her mother,
And laid in things to eat, of relish fine,
And such as eaten are with bread, much other;
And in a bag of goat-skin pleasant wine.
When in the coach the garments all were plac'd,
Nausicaa went up into her seat,
And with her took (when their toil should be past)
A cruse of oil to help wash off the sweat.
Then out, with whip and reins in hand, did drive.
And then, with strained limbs and clatt'ring feet,
The mules soon at the river side arrive,
And pasture for them there was very sweet.
And there the mules first they unharnessed,
Then push'd them off to graze on the bank-side.
The clothes, in pits with water covered,
They tread, and who shall fastest tread they vied.
Then on the beach the garments wet they spread
Upon the cast up pebbles one by one.
Then washed they, and dried themselves, and fed,
And left the garments drying in the sun.
And after they with food were satisfied,
It came into their minds to play at ball,
And spend the time so till the clothes were dried.
The tune Nausicaa sung for them all.
As when upon Mount Erymanthus high
Or on Täygetus stands Artemis,
And many rural fair nymphs playing by.

But she than all the rest much taller is;
And the wild boars and harts delights to see,
But more her mother Leda to see her,
For though they fair were all, yet fairer she;
So shew'd Nausicaa and her maidens there.
And when 'twas time that they should homewards go,
And that the clothes into the coach were laid,
And mules set to, Athena thought on how
Ulysses should awake and see the maid,
And be conducted by her to the town.
Nausicaa then throws the ball and misses,
The ball into the river falleth down;
Then shout the maids. At that awak'd Ulysses,
And sitting up, unto himself he said,
Ay me, where am I now? 'Mongst men unjust,
And such as of the Gods are not afraid?
Or good and godly men, whom I may trust?
But female are the voices which I hear.
Are they some nymphs that haunt the mountains high,
Or keep the meadows green, or waters clear,
Or are they mortals whom I am so nigh?
But why go I not out myself and see?
Then with strong hand he wringed off a bough
With many leaves upon it from a tree,
To cover what became him not to show;
Then as a lion, confident and bold,
Howe'er it blow or rain, with fiery eyes
Comes from the mountain to a herd or fold,
And on the flock at last his fortune tries;

So came Ulysses boldly from the wood
Stark naked, forc'd to't by necessity,
And in the presence of the maidens stood.
The sight was terrible and made them fly;
Nausicaa fled not, but hid her eyes.
Off stood Ulysses, with himself to weigh
Whether to speak from thence was the more wise,
Or else himself before her feet to lay.
To stay there right at last resolved he,
Lest she should take his coming near her ill:
Then said, O queen, I beg upon my knee
That you with patience hear my prayer will.
You are a Goddess, or of human race;
If Goddess, you can then no other be
Than Artemis, Jove's daughter. In your face
Such beauty is; in height such majesty.
If mortal, and of human race you be,
Thrice happy are your parents and your brothers,
How glad in the processions they will see,
How much they are more grac'd by you than others;
For such a branch I ne'er saw with my eyes
On mortal stock. To see't I am amazed.
But once a palm at Delus saw arise
In the same manner, and long on it gazed
(For that way went I once well followed,
Which the first cause was of my trouble sore);
And then, as I do now, I wondered,
For I had never seen the like before.
T' approach unto your knees I was afraid,

Or show myself. But such is my estate.
For twenty days upon the sea I stray'd,
And here in storms was thrown ashore by fate
From th' isle Ogygia last night, and fear
I am to suffer yet more misery,
And that the Gods will persecute me here.
And since my landing you the first I see;
Now pity me, O queen, and show me where
The city stands. And t' hide my nakedness,
Give me some rag if there be any here;
And may Jove you with all you wish for bless,
A husband and a house, and concord good;
For man and wife to live in unity
Is the great'st blessing can be understood:
It joys your friend, and grieves your enemy.
Nausicaa then speaks, and to him says,
You seem to be a good man and discreet,
But Jove on good and bad such fortune lays,
Happy or otherwise, as he thinks meet;
And since distress is fallen to your share,
You must contented be to suffer it.
But seeing to this place arriv'd you are,
You shall have raiment, and what else is fit.
The city I will shew you, and the name
The people of this isle are called by;
Phœacians they are call'd. And I am
Daughter of him that has th' authority,
Alcinous, the king. And then she cried
Aloud unto the maids to make them stay;

Why, said she, run you so away and hide?
D’ ye think the man will carry you away?
For why, no enemy can come in hither,
The Gods so with the sea have wall’d us in.
Nor stranger dwells here. But by evil weather
To come to land this man hath forced been;
Let’s do him good. From Jove come beggars all,
And welcome to them is whate’er they get;
Our givings to him will be very small.
Go, therefore, set before him wine and meat,
And wash him in the river, in such part
As cover’d is from wind. And then they did
(When they had given one another heart)
Set him in such a place as they were bid;
And gave him th’ oil to scour his skin withal.
And by him a good cloak and coat they laid,
And then they bade him to his washing fall.
Ulysses answer’d them, and to them said,
Stand further off, I pray, fair maids; for I
My body naked am asham’d to show.
Then stand they off, and tell their mistress why,
(For washing he must have put off his bough.)
Then washed he his head and shoulders wide,
And with his hand from’s head strok’d down the brine,
And with the clothes that laid were by his side
Array’d himself, that comely were and fine.
Then Pallas to him came, and made him look
Taller and broader than he was before;
And from his hair the colour grey she took,

And made it like the hyacynthine flower.
As one by Vulcan or Athena taught,
Gold upon silver skilfully had spread;
So Pallas on Ulysses beauty wrought,
And graceful majesty upon his head;
Then sat he on the sands. Nausicaa
Then said unto her maidens, Do you hear,
How poor he look'd the first time we him saw,
And now how like a God he does appear;
And by the Gods, it may be, he was sent,
To dwell amongst the people of this place.
With such a husband I could be content
(If he would stay) and think it no disgrace;
Go, maids, and set before him wine and meat.
Away they went and did as she them bade;
(And he fell to, and heartily did eat,
For long before he nothing eaten had);
Then harnessed the mules and set them to,
And folded and put up the garments all.
Nausicaa went up with maidens two,
And then unto Ulysses did she call,
Rise, stranger, to the city let us go,
That I may send you to my father's house,
Where all the best Phœacians you'll know;
But hear you (for I think you cautelous),
Whilst in the fields the coach is on the way,
Amongst my maidens follow it apace,
But when you see it near the city, stay;
And that you may well understand the place,

A tower there is, you'll see it, for 'tis high:
There, 'twixt two havens is a narrow way,
You'll see it by the masts, for ships there lie;
Near it the people meet o' th' market-day,
And there a temple fair of Neptune stands,
Of free-stone from the quarry hewn and fit;
For the Phœacians employ their hands
On shipping, and no other art but it.
For bows and arrows they care not a pin,
But for such things as serve to pass the seas,
Ships, cordage, oars, they take their pleasure in,
And spend their time and labour upon these.
I am afraid these men will censure me,
And say (for censurers are many here),
This handsome and tall fellow who is he,
That's with Nausicaa, from God knows where?
Where did she find him; must he marry her?
From some far country he is landed here,
Wand'ring by fortune, or a traveller;
For sure I am no such man dwelleth near.
May be some God from heaven descended is,
And to live with her always hither come,
So, then to wed a stranger better 'tis,
Since she thinks none is good enough at home;
For many seek her, and the best men here.
So will they say, and 'twill be to my shame;
For if another that had done it 'twere,
I should myself condemn her for the same;
For 'tis unseemly a fair maid to see,

That subject is t'her parents' government,
Converse with any man, unless she be
First married, or their parents give consent.
And, therefore, stranger, if you mean to be
Convoyed by my father to your home,
Do as I tell you. Near the way you'll see
A grove of poplars. When you thither come
You'll find my father's vineyard, from the town
As far as one that hollas heard can be,
And when you thither come, there sit you down
Till at my father's house you think are we.
Then to the city go; ask where does dwell
Alcinous. For you shall meet with none,
Though but a child, but can inform you well;
So well his house is known to every one.
And there go in, and on, until you find
My mother. Whom you'll by the fire-side see
Spinning; and maids at the same work behind
The pillar under which sits working she.
My father's chair by the same pillar stands,
Where, when he drinketh, like a God he is.
Pass by it to my mother, and your hands,
If you mean to get home, lay on her knees.
If once her favour you can but obtain,
You need not fear, but you your friends shall see,
And to your house and country come again.
This said, her whip upon the mules laid she.
The mules start swiftly from the river side,
For nimble was the motion of their feet:

But she for those who went afoot, did guide
The swiftness of their pace as she thought meet.
When they were come t' Athena's sacred grove,
The sun went down; and there Ulysses staid
And to the Goddess, daughter of great Jove,
That he might good reception find, he pray'd.
Hear me, Jove's virgin daughter, hear me now,
Since still you did refuse to help me then,
When Neptune sought at sea my overthrow,
Grant that I may be welcome to these men.
Thus pray'd he, and was by Athena heard,
Though to him face to face she would not come,
But of her uncle Neptune was afeard,
That ne'er forgave him till he was at home.

LIB. VII.

Alcinous entertains him, and grants him a convoy, and both he and the lords give him presents.

WHILST THERE HE pray'd, Nausicaa went on,
And stay'd her coach the outer gate without,
And like to Gods her brothers came each one,
From out the house and her stood round about.
The mules they freed, th' apparel they took in,
Nausicaa straight to her chamber went;
Eurymedusa made a fire therein;
Who, ta'en by rovers on the continent,
Was given to the king Alcinous,
That like a God was honour'd by the nation
Of the Phœacians at home. And thus
She of Nausicaa had th' education.
A fire she made her, and her supper brought.
Ulysses then into the city went,
Pallas of air had made him such a coat,
As he could not be seen; lest insolent
And sturdy townsmen should him mock and jeer,
Or ask him questions, who, what, or why.
But when he was unto the gate come near,
Pallas appeared to him openly,
Like a young maid with pail upon her head.

Ulysses then spake to her, and said thus:
Sweet pretty girl, will you be pleas'd to lead
Me to the house of king Alcinous?
For I a stranger come, and no man know,
Nor ever in my life was here before.
Yes, then said Pallas, I will you it show,
For 'tis the next unto my father's door.
Go softly, thus, and I will lead the way,
For our folk strangers do not well endure;
But in good ships their honour wholly lay,
And the wide sea to pass themselves inure:
For Neptune given to them has this gift,
That their good ships fly like to thought or wind.
This said, the Goddess led with motion swift;
And on her steps he treading went behind.
And through the people so he pass'd unseen.
For why, the Goddess Pallas, for good will,
A wondrous mist of air had wrapt him in.
Then looking at the house he there stood still.
The havens and the ships he wonder'd at;
The market-place, and walls so thick and high.
Then Pallas said, Alcinous' house is that.
There sup the king and queen now merrily.
Though you a stranger be, fear not, go in;
The bold than fearful always better speed.
And first of all the house you'll find the queen,
Arete is her name. Both from one seed
Descended are she and Alcinous,
In Perrhæa, child of Eurimedon.

The God o' th' seas begot Nausithous
Who two sons had; Alcinous was one,
The other was Rexenor, who no son
But one fair daughter only left behind.
Alcinous entertains him, &c.
Arete was her name. Besides her none.
Alcinous and she in wedlock join'd;
And he to her so much respect doth bear,
As no man living to a wife bears more,
And honour'd is by all her children dear.
The people like a Goddess her adore,
And bless her when she comes into the street;
And loving to them all is also she,
For a wise woman is she and discreet.
When they fall out she makes them to agree.
If you her favour can but once obtain,
You need not fear but you your friends shall see,
And safely to your country come again.
And when she this had said, away went she
O'er sea to Marathon in Attica,
T' Erectheus' house. And he now was to enter
Into the house. But long he laid the law
Unto himself before he would adventure.
Ent'ring he saw the walls lin'd round with brass,
And fring'd about with colour of the sky.
The door within golden all over was,
And all appear'd like heaven to the eye.
The door-posts silver, glorious to behold,
The lintle-tree upon them silver too;

The sill was brass, the ring to pull it, gold.
And by the door great dogs were standing two,
Of silver one, the other was of gold,
As watch before the royal gate to stay,
Immortal dogs that never can grow old.
And round about them all, thrones ev'ry way,
All cover'd with a dainty stuff and fine,
The work of women's hand. There us'd to eat
The king and lords, and drink and make good cheer.
His riches was a never-dying teat.
About the altar were set boys of gold,
That to the guests, as soon as it was night,
With burning torches they the light might hold;
For now the sun had borne away his light.
Fifty maid-servants were at work within,
Some at the mill were grinding wheat for bread,
And others with their distaffs sat to spin,
And others cloth were weaving with the thread;
Like to the leaves of a high aspen tree
Their fingers went. So much they did excel
In all the works, that taught by Pallas be,
The women that in other places dwell;
As do these men all other men surpass
In all things that belong to navigation;
For wit and art more Pallas given has
To them, than women of another nation.
Close by the house a dainty orchard is,
Four-square and fenc'd with hedge and pale about,
Of pear, pomegranate, apple, olive-trees,

And fig-trees. For the season ne'er goes out
Summer nor winter, for by Zephyrs some
Are made put forth, and others ripened;
Pears after pears, apples to apples come;
Grapes are by grapes, figs by figs followed;
And in it was the vineyard of the king.
Grapes in some places by the sun were dried,
In others staid till vintage ripening.
Upon some vines no flower yet was spied,
And grapes on some to blacken now began.
Green beds of herbs there were on ev'ry side,
And through it from two springs the water ran,
And to and fro the one did winding glide,
The other to the house his stream did bear,
And under ground was to the town convey'd,
And rose a fountain for the people there.
And when Ulysses had all this survey'd,
Then went he in, and found them in the hall
Sitting at supper, and to Mercury
There off'ring up of wine: which last of all
At bed-time men do offer usually.
And on he went up to the king and queen,
And both his hands upon her knee did lay.
Pallas had kept him in the mist unseen;
But thither come, the mist straight fell away.
Amaz'd they were when first they saw the man,
And like to men that had been stricken dumb.
Ulysses then t' Arete thus began:
queen Arete, to your knee I come,

And to the king, and those that with you sit:
May the Gods grant you all much happiness,
Long life, and your possessions to transmit
T' your children, and your honours still possess;
And may you me send presently away
Unto my house: long absent I have been.
This said, he sat down by the fire. And they
Said nothing, such amazement they were in.
At last old Echineus spake, that knew
Both what in former times and now was fit:
king Alcinous, is't good, think you,
To let the stranger in the ashes sit?
We silent sat to see what was your will;
Pray make him rise, and to a chair him bring,
And bid the squire to temper wine and fill,
That we to Jove may make our offering,
Who with poor strangers keepeth company;
And bid the maid before him set such meat
As she within has in her custody.
This said, Alcinous rose from his seat,
T' Ulysses went, and took him by the hand,
And to a chair him led, where sat his son
Laodamas, to whom he gave command
To give him place, although he loved none
So dearly as he lov'd Laodamas,
Who next unto him us'd to sit at meat.
Then by a maid brought in a bason was
And ewer of gold, to wash ere he did eat;
Another maid before him layed bread,

And other good things on his table laid,
And heartily thereon Ulysses fed.
Alcinous then to the squire said:
Temper the wine, Pontonous, that we
Wine-offering to Jove may offer up,
In whose protection all suppliants be,
And round about presented be the cup.
Then went about the wine from one to one;
And when the sacred offering was over,
Then said Alcinous: Since we have done,
Let's go to bed, and soon as we discover
Aurora rising, hither come again,
And make unto the Gods a sacrifice,
And this our stranger farther entertain,
And how to send him to his house advise,
That safely he may go, and joyfully,
And swiftly to the place where he would be,
How far soever hence his dwelling lie,
Nor on the sea delay or trouble see,
Until his native country he be at:
But what his fate is after he is there,
Be't good or evil, he must suffer that.
But if it be some God that sitteth here,
'Tis only our devotion t' approve;
For to that end Gods let themselves be spied,
To sit with men at holy feasts they love,
And not themselves in caves like giants hide.
To this Ulysses said: O king, lay by
That thought of yours. With Gods I'll not compare,

For body or for mind. Of misery
If man can boast, to boast ‘mong them I dare;
For I more tokens can produce of woe
Than any man that shall with me contend,
Though all I tell not that I can. Yet so
I fain would of my supper make an end.
No creature is so fierce as is the gut,
And so loud barketh when it is forgot,
That out of mind it never can be put,
But will be heard whether one will or not.
So ’tis with me, that am afflicted sore,
Yet still my belly bids me eat and drink,
And forget all I had endured before,
And on my misery no more to think.
And so, since now I hunger to go home,
Forget not with a ship me to supply
To-morrow: for were I once thither come,
I could be well contented there to die.
When this was said, he was by all commended.
He speaks discreetly; let him then, said they,
A speedy conduct have. When all was ended,
The rest unto their houses went away.
Only Ulysses stay’d, and by him sate
The king and queen. Tables removed were,
And all that to the supper did relate;
The queen then marked what garments he did wear,
And that she and her maids had made them, knew.
Stranger, said she, who are you? whence? and more,
The garments you have on, of whom had you?

Had you them on, then, when you came ashore?
Grievous, said he, O queen, is your command,
That calls again, when past it is, my pain;
Yet will I answer make to this demand.
An island lieth far hence in the main,
Ogygia 'tis call'd; Calypso there,
The daughter fair of Atlas, lives alone,
Nor God nor man she has to dwell with her;
And I by fate upon that isle was thrown,
For Jove my good ship had with thunder split:
My fellows in the sea all perished,
But I the rudder had, and held by it:
And thus nine days and nights I wandered,
And thrown was on that isle the tenth, at night.
Calypso there received me, and fed;
And immortality have had I might,
If I had with her there inhabited.
But I to that would never give consent.
Yet there by force I stayed seven years,
For want of ship and men, in discontent,
Washing the clothes she gave me with my tears.
The eighth year come, she did my going press,
Whether by Jove's command I cannot say,
Or whether 'twere because she loved me less.
Then on a raft of trees I came away.
Bread and sweet wine upon the deck she laid,
And garments gave me fair, and a good wind;
And good for seventeen days the weather stay'd.
On th' eighteenth near your coast myself I find;

And glad I was, though still unfortunate,
For more I was to suffer by and by:
For Neptune rais'd against me, in his hate,
A storm of winds, with furious waves and high,
And then I forced was the raft to quit:
The trees asunder floated here and there,
The storm so broken had and scatter'd it.
Then swam I: 'gainst the rocks the waves me bear,
And falling off, they cast me back again.
Again I swam, and to the river came,
And there I saw the landing smooth and plain,
And from the wind defended was the same:
There landed I, half dead, and now 'twas night.
Then up I went and in a thicket lay,
Cover'd with leaves abundance, dry and light,
And slept till almost spent was the next day,
For then the sun was setting. There I hear
The voice of women playing by the brook;
And going out I saw your daughter there,
That like a Goddess come from heaven did look.
To her I made my prayer in this distress:
Wisely she answered, and beyond her age,
(For th' younger commonly consider less),
And gave me food my hunger to assuage.
Of her I had the garments I have on.
Nay, stranger, answered Alcinous,
'Twas in my child an indiscretion,
That she not brought you with her to my house.
To this Ulysses answered and said:

’Twas not her fault we came not both together:
She bade me, I would not; but was afraid
What you and they would think that saw me with her,
For jealous and mistrustful mortals be.
To this again Alcinous replied:
From such ill thoughts I always have been free.
Jove and Pallas make you here abide;
Such are you, and our thoughts so well agree,
That you Nausicaa should have for bride,
If you would with me live here willingly,
And for your house and wealth I would provide.
But ‘gainst your will I will not make you stay
(From such iniquity the Gods me keep);
To-morrow shall be ready your convey,
And till then go you to your bed and sleep.
And here be men, that, when the wind shall fail,
Can row you on how far soe’er you’ll go;
Their hands can do as much as any sail,
Although beyond Eubœa they must row:
For farther no Phœacian ever went.
But thither once they carried Rhadamant,
Of Tityus to see the punishment,
Son of the earth, that terrible giant;
Yet that long voyage cost them but a day
Going and coming all the way at ease.
But you yourself, when you are on the way,
Will see how stoutly our men plough the seas.
This said, Ulysses joyful was, and pray’d,
Make all this good, O father Jove, said he,

The glory of the king will be display'd,
And quickly in my country I shall be.
Whilst they together thus discoursing stay'd,
Arete bade the maids to make his bed,
And see fair purple rugs upon it laid,
And under them soft woolly blankets spread.
Then went away the maids into the porch,
And made his bed, and soon came back again,
And stood before Ulysses with a torch.
Come stranger, said they, all is ready. Then
Ulysses to his bed went willingly.
Alcinous in a room lay far within,
Where formerly he used was to lie,
That was prepared for him by the queen.

LIB. VIII.

The next day's entertainment of Ulysses, where he sees them contend in wrestling and other exercises, and, upon provocation, took up a greater stone than that which they were throwing, and overthrew them all; and how the king asked his name, his country, and his adventure.

SOON AS AURORA was again espied,
The king Alcinous rose from his bed.
Up rose Ulysses and came to his side,
And to the public place the king him led,
To sit in counsel with his princes there;
And being there they sat together nigh.
Pallas the while, that did great favour bear,
T'Ulysses' welfare always had an eye,
In likeness of Alcinous his squire
(Who, by his office, did the counsel call)
Their favour for Ulysses to acquire,
Went through the streets, and there unto them all
Said one by one, Make haste. To counsel go.
A stranger, new come to the king, you'll see,
That like a God immortal is in show.
This said, unto the counsel house they flee.
And filled was the house, and ev'ry seat;
And of his person all admired the grace;
For Pallas made him had more tall and great,

The next day's entertainment of Ulysses, &c.
And laid more majesty upon his face.
To make him welcome to those men she meant,
And to gain him honour at their exercises
When they should put him to experiment.
Alcinous unto them then arises;
Hear, said he, princes of Phœacia,
This man (who 'tis, or whence, I cannot say)
Cast here ashore, till then I never saw.
Since 'tis our custom, grant him a convoy.
For no man yet unto my house did come,
By force of weather wandering on the main,
Lamenting and desiring to go home,
That can affirm he sought our help in vain.
Come then, let's launch a good new ship, and choose
Out two-and-fifty lusty youths to row;
And let them ready have their oars to use,
And to my house, when that's done, let them go.
And you the princes thither come with me,
That we may well the stranger entertain.
And let the singer too sent thither be,
To give us sometimes of his art a strain.
This said, the princes to his house he led.
The squire unto the house the singer sent.
The fifty-two, as they were ordered,
Down to the haven where the ship lay went.
The ship they launch, and up they set the mast;
And then the yards and sails they hoisted high;
Their oars, where they be placed should, they plac'd.

This done they let her in the water lie.
Then also to the house these men went up.
The porches, court, and rooms with men were fill'd,
Some old, some young. The king to make them sup,
Two kine, eight swine, and twice six fat sheep kill'd.
These flay'd and dress'd, and to the tables brought,
Came in the singer, whom the muses kind
Had taught to sing divinely; but, could not
Or would not him preserve from being blind.
Pontonous the squire then led him in,
And set him by a pillar in the hall,
And hung his fiddle o'er him on a pin,
And how to reach it showed him withal:
Sets him a table and a basket by,
And a great bowl of wine before him plac'd,
To drink as often as he should be dry.
And when their thirst and hunger was displac'd,
The singer sung the song in most request,
How once Ulysses and Achilles great
In high and bitter language did contest,
When at a sacred feast they sate at meat;
And how king Agamemnon pleased was,
To see the two best of the Greeks fall out.
For Phœbus told him so 'twould come to pass,
When he at Pythos asked him about
The issue of the fleet design'd for Troy.
This song Demodocus sung to them then;
Which to Ulysses was of little joy;
But he his tears to hide before those men,

Before his eyes his cloak of purple drew,
And when the singer ceas'd, his eyes he dried,
And from before his face his cloak withdrew,
And of the wine perform'd the sacrifice.
And when the lords call'd for the song anew,
(For they to hear him took no small delight),
His cloak again before his eyes he drew,
And as before again he sobb'd and sigh'd.
Alcinous, none else, observed it,
And well enough could hear him sigh and groan;
For he the nearest there did to him sit,
And would not to the princes make it known.
But speaking to them all said only this:
Since you with feasting are well satisfied,
And music (which to feasts annexed is),
Let now our men's activity be tried,
That when the stranger is where he doth dwell,
He to his friends and countrymen may tell
How much we do all other men excel
At wrestling, buffets, leaping, running well.
Then went the king and princes out a door;
The squire then took the singer by the hand,
And hung the fiddle where it hung before,
And him led out amongst the rest to stand.
Unto the place they went; and follow'd were
By people numberless the sports to see;
And many lusty youths amongst them there,
Stood out to show their great ability.
Out stood Elatreus and Acroneus,

Eretmeus, Thoon, Nautes, and Prymneus,
Ambasineus and Amphialus,
Proteus, and Ponteus, and Anchialus;
Otyalus, warlike Euryalus,
And he that of them most their eye did please,
(Except the first son of Alcinous),
For countenance and shape, Naubolides,
And then Alcinous his three sons rise,
Laodamas, Halius, Clitoneus.
And first they all contended for the prize
Of who at running could his feet best use.
Then start they all at once, and swiftly run
As if they flew. And here the victory
The king's son noble Clytoneus won,
And pass'd them all a land's length very nigh.
Euryalus at wrestling was the best.
Amphialus at leaping victor was.
Elatreus surpassed all the rest
To throw the stone. At cuffs Laodamas.
When all was done Laodamas up stood.
Come friends, said he, let us the stranger try
If he at any of these games be good;
For in his person no defect I spy.
His thighs, his knees, his arms, his neck, are strong,
Nor over aged yet he seems to me;
Only he hath endured the sea so long,
As for that cause he may excused be.
For than the sea nothing more potent is
To break a man how strong soe'er he be.

Go, said Euryalus, ’tis not amiss
T’invite him to it, and his mind to see.
Then to Ulysses said Laodamas,
Come, stranger, father, pray, your virtue show;
’Tis no dishonour for you in this place
To show your skill at any game you know,
As long as feet and hands continue strong.
Come, try, and cast your careful thoughts away:
Your convoy ready is. ‘Twill not be long
Before you shall be set upon your way.
Laodamas, then said Ulysses, why
To these your games invite you me in scorn,
Upon whose heart so many sorrows lie,
And am to nothing with much hardship worn,
And publicly a suppliant now sit,
And to the king and people grief profess?
Think you that pastimes for such men are fit,
As from their country wander in distress?
Then spake Euryalus, uncivilly:
No, no, said he, I do not think you are
Much us’d to pastimes of activity,
But rather one that of a ship takes care,
That merchantmen from place to place conveys,
And mindful of your fraught are, and can tell
Which are to sudden wealth the nearest ways,
What merchandise will not, and what will sell,
And in such boisterous games has little skill.
Ulysses frowning on him then replied:
My friend, such words are indiscreet and ill.

The Gods the gifts as they think fit divide.
To one, of beauty they deny the grace,
But give him language steady and discreet,
Whereby he honour'd is i' th' public place,
And men gaze on him going in the street.
T'another they have giv'n a fair aspect,
Like that o' th' Gods, but have denied him wit.
So find I in your person no defect;
Only you want the grace to say what's fit.
Your words have put me into passion.
In these your games you say no skill have I.
I thought myself interior to none,
Whilst on my youth and hands I could rely.
But tamed now my strength is with much woe,
Wandering at sea, and often hurt in fight.
Yet of your games I'll make a trial so,
Weak as I am. So much your words me bite.
This said, he took up a much greater stone
Than that which the Phœacians had flung,
Now hollow as a quoit, his cloak still on.
And when above his head he had it swung,
Swiftly away the stone flew with a hum,
Which made the brave Phœacian seamen couch,
As o'er their heads they heard it singing come,
And outwent all the other marks by much.
For Pallas in the likeness of a man
Did set a mark at where the stone did light,
And said the difference be discerned can
By feeling, though a man had lost his sight.

And to Ulysses said he, Do not fear
That any man i' th' town shall out-throw this.
Ulysses very glad was this to hear,
And that amongst them stood one friend of his.
Then of himself began to speak more high.
Come youths, throw first as far as I have done,
And then as far or further throw will I.
And for the other games come any one,
Since your sharp words provok'd me have thereto,
Buffets, or wrestling, or to run the race,
And see if you at these can me out-do,
Any of you except Laodamas.
For I to him have come as to a friend
Of whom I hope for succour in my need.
He were a fool that with him would contend,
Without whose help his business cannot speed.
But of the rest not any I refuse;
And will contend with them for mastery.
For I know all the games the best men use.
To use the bow none abler is than I.
When many of us had a mind to kill
Some noted foe, and all at once did shoot,
Though every one of us had the same will,
My arrow was the first that found him out.
At Ilium in trials of the bow
None found I better than myself but one;
'Twas Polyctetes. Of those that are now
I think myself inferior to none.
With those of former time I'll not compare,

As Hercules, or Eurytus that durst
Challenge Apollo. Apollo took a care
That prize should not be play'd, and kill'd him first.
As far as other men can shoot an arrow,
So far I able am to dart a spear.
But lodging I have had at sea so narrow,
That I may be out-run by some man here.
So said Ulysses; and all silent sat
Except the king, who thus unto him said:
Stranger, there's no man here offended at
The words you say. For open you have laid
Your virtue, when you were thereto constrain'd
By the unjust reproaches of this man.
For such it is as by none can be stain'd,
But those that nothing say discreetly can.
And hear me farther what I have to say,
That t'other heroes you the same may tell,
Who with you and your wife shall feasting stay,
In what from other men we bear the bell.
For cuffs and wrestling, not much praise we merit,
But our good ships and fleets are wondrous swift.
And these gifts from our fathers we inherit,
Dance, song, feasts, fiddle, and of garments shift,
And baths, and beds. Dance you that dance the best
Before the stranger, that his friends among
He may say how much we exceed the rest
Of men, in ships, in running, dance, and song.
Fetch out the fiddle. Then the squire went in
To fetch the fiddle. And the judges rise,

In number nine, who had elected been
By public vote, of games to hold assize;
And order took for large room in the middle,
And made it to be planed well and even.
When this was done, then brought out was the fiddle,
And by the squire was to the singer given.
Then came the young men that had learnt to dance,
And of their age were yet but in the flower,
And to the middest of the place advance.
Their feet play up and down like drops in show'r;
Such sparkling feet Ulysses ne'er had seen.
The singer as he played sung the song
Of Mars and Venus, and what love had been
Held secretly between them all along;
And how in Vulcan's house they used to meet;
And what he gave her; how the prying Sun,
As they embrac'd each other, chanc'd to see't,
And told her husband Vulcan what was done.
How Vulcan to his forge in anger went,
And on his anvil hammer'd out strong chains,
Which neither could be broken, nor relent;
And when he made an end had of his pains,
Into the chamber went where stood his bed.
His net o' th' bed-posts, and the beams he threw,
Like spider-webs about a chamber spread;
And then to go to Lemnos made a show.
So subtle were the chains and finely wrought,
They could by none, although a God, be seen.
How Mars to watch his going failed not.

When Vulcan was gone out, then Mars went in.
How Venus entered in, new come from Jove,
And by him sate. Mars took her by the hand,
And to her said, Let's go to bed, my love.
Vulcan is now at Lemnos gone a land.
And how they went to bed and made the net
Fall down upon, and hold them as they lay.
And how they knew no way from thence to get,
But must till Vulcan came to free them stay.
How Vulcan from hard by came quickly in;
For back he came before he was half way:
For by the Sun advertis'd he had been,
And angrily turn'd back without delay;
And roaring to the Gods, he said, D'ye see
What work is here, and how unseemly 'tis?
And how Jove's daughter does dishonour me,
Because my limbs are maim'd, and whole are his?
I grant he's fair, nor doth as I do halt;
Ought she to love him therefore more than me?
For that my parents' is, and not my fault.
But come, ye Gods all, and their posture see;
I hate the sight, yet they must not therefore
Hope e'er the sooner for that, to be free.
The net will suffer them to move no more,
How keen soever on their love they be;
And till her father shall the dow'r repay
Which for the girl, although incontinent,
I paid him down, 'cause fair she was and gay,
There they shall lie. This said, the Gods straight went

To Vulcan's house. Neptune and Mercury,
And with them, with his silver bow, Apollo,
And many others. But (for modesty)
No Goddess could persuaded be to follow.
As soon as they perceived had the craft,
Which standing in the door they had survey'd;
At first aloud they altogether laugh,
And by-and-by to one another said,
I see that evil works do ill succeed.
The slow has gotten of the swift the better;
Vulcan of Mars the God of greatest speed,
And that by arts which make his ransom greater.
And how Apollo did the question put
To Mercury, if he content would be
In such strong chains with Venus to be shut,
While all the Gods are standing by and see.
How Hermes said, O Phœbus, that I were
In Mars his place, and did with Venus lie,
And thrice as many chains about us there,
Though all the Gods and Goddesses stood by.
And how the Gods at this laugh'd out again,
Save Neptune only, who did never cease
T'importune Vulcan and his wrath restrain,
And that he would the God of war release;
And that himself would pay him what was due
If Mars did not. How Vulcan said again,
If Mars should fly, shall I imprison you?
Unsure the suretyship is of fled men.
And that again Neptune replying said,

Though Mars should run away, yet I will not.
And how that Vulcan at the last obey'd,
And Mars and Venus out of prison got,
And he to Thrace went, but to Cyprus she;
Where she a temple and an altar had,
And by the Graces that her servants be
Bath'd and anointed was and Godlike clad.
These of the merry song were the contents.
Ulysses was well pleased with the same;
And of the rest delighted was the sense.
Alcinous then called out by name
Laodamas and Halius to dance.
None else for either of them was a match.
And they into the midst themselves advance
The one to throw a ball, th' other to catch.
One threw't up high, reclining on his hip;
The other of the same the downfall watch'd,
And taking from the ground a lusty skip,
His feet above ground, in the air it catch'd.
When this was done, they laid aside the ball,
And danc'd with often changes on the ground;
Applauded much by the spectators all,
Who with their praises made the place resound.
king, then said Ulysses, what you said
Of how your men pass all the world beside
In noble dance, can never be gainsaid.
I see it to my wonder justified.
The king well pleased to the princes spake:
A worthy man the stranger seems to me;

Let's think upon what present him to make.
Twelve princes in Phœacia there be,
And I the thirteenth am. Let's ev'ry one
Bestow on him a handsome cloak and coat,
Besides a talent of pure gold. That done,
Let it be altogether to him brought,
That he at supper may sit cheerfully.
And you, Euryalus, go speak him fair,
For what you said before was injury;
Go therefore with some gift your fault repair.
This said, to fetch the gifts they sent the squire.
Then said Euryalus, O king, since 'tis,
That also I present him, your desire;
I will for reconcilement give him this
My sword, with scabbard all of ivory,
And silver hilt. The present is not poor.
And giving it: O father, though, said he,
I said amiss, pray think upon't no more;
And may the Gods restore you to your land,
Since absent from your friends you live in pain.
Ulysses took the sword into his hand,
And to Euryalus thus said again:
And you, my friend, may you still happy be,
And of this sword for ever need have none,
Which reconciling you have given me.
And as he speaking was he put it on.
The sun now set, the king no longer tarried,
But with the lords went to his house to sup.
Along with them the squires the presents carried

Unto the queen Arete to lay up.
Alcinous then said unto the queen,
Let a fair chest be straightway hither brought,
And for the stranger see there be laid in
A comely and well-wash'd cloak and coat,
And of warm water let a bath stand by,
That washing he may see the presents there,
And sit at supper the more joyfully,
And hearken to the song with better cheer;
And I will give him this my cup of gold,
That off'ring up unto the Gods the wine,
As often as he doth the cup behold,
He may both for his own health pray and mine.
This said, the maids, commanded by the queen,
Set up a cauldron with a triple foot,
Then make fire under, and pour water in.
Keen was the fire, and soon the water hot.
Meanwhile the queen came in, and with her brought
A curious chest, and into it laid in
The gold, and with it every cloak and coat,
That by the princes given him had been.
And then unto Ulysses said, Take care
You bind it fast, lest you be robb'd by one
Or other, whilst aboard you sleeping are,
Lest anything should missing be and gone.
And when she thus had him admonished,
Ulysses of the chest pull'd down the lid,
And girt it with a cord of various thread,
Thereby to know if any it undid,

For that trick he by Circe taught had been.
A woman then unto Ulysses said,
There stands your bath, which way you please go in.
Then went he in, and not a little joy'd;
For after he had left Calypso's house,
Warm and sweet water he had never seen,
But roll'd by Neptune always was in souse,
But had with her carefully treated been.
When him the maids wash'd and anointed had,
Out from the bath he came amongst the men,
With a clean cloak and comely garments clad.
To th' door the bright Nausicaa came then,
And to Ulysses said, Stranger, farewell,
And may you safely at your land arrive;
Remember that into my hand you fell,
And owe to me that you were kept alive.
O, said Ulysses, daughter of the king,
To you the ransom of my life is due,
And if the Gods me to my country bring,
As to a Goddess I will pray to you.
This said, he went and sat down by the king.
And now the meat in messes some divided,
Others the lusty wine were tempering,
And by a squire the singer in was guided,
And at a pillar in the midst made sit.
Ulysses half a chine of pork and fat
Cuts off, and in the squire's hands putteth it,
And said unto him, Give the singer that;
Singers through all the world have reputation,

And well respected be in ev'ry land;
The Muses teach them song, and love the nation.
Then went the squire and put it in his hand;
Demodocus receiv'd it and was glad.
Then fell they to the meat before them laid.
When thirst and hunger overcome they had,
Unto the singer then Ulysses said:
Demodocus, you all men else excel.
The Muses sure did teach you, or it was
Phœbus himself. For you have sung so well
The acts that did 'twixt Greeks and Trojans pass,
And all related that they did at Troy,
Or suffer'd there, or when they homeward came,
As if yourself beheld had their annoy,
Or had from some spectator heard the same.
Stand forth and sing now of the horse of wood
Made by Epeius, but by Pallas help'd,
Stuff'd by Ulysses full of warriors good,
Which in Troy town destruction to it whelp'd:
If this you sing in order as 'twas done,
I'll make the world with your just praises ring.
Then at the Gods Demodocus begun,
And how the fleet went off the shore did sing;
And how they fir'd their tents; and how the lords
Of Greece i' th' council of the Trojans sate,
Inclos'd and hidden in the horse of boards,
That by the Trojans was fetch'd in in state.
The Trojans sitting round about debate,
And many a foolish speech they uttered,

And on three points they there deliberate,
And voted what the Gods determined.
The three points which were most insisted on,
Were, whether they should cut the horse in twain,
Or throw it down the rock it stood upon,
Or let it, to appease the Gods, remain.
I' th' end they all resolved on the last.
For by the Fates it was determined
That Ilium should then be layed waste,
When o'er its walls a great horse entered,
And in his belly brought the enemy.
And how the Argives from the horse came out,
How divers ways they went and cruelly
Killed and burned as they went about.
Ulysses then, like Mars, with Menelaus
Unto Deiphobus together hie,
And for awhile there sharp the battle was,
But to Ulysses fell the victory.
This sung Demodocus. And then upon
Ulysses' cheeks the tears ran down apace.
As when in fight a woman looketh on,
And sees her husband fallen on the place,
That fought had for his town and children dear;
There sprawleth he, she o'er him falls and cries,
But back and shoulders is well basted there,
And carried captive by the enemy.
As wofully as then this woman wept,
So wofully Ulysses now sheds tears;
But from the king it was not secret kept,

Who sitting next him all his groaning hears.
And speaking to the princes sitting by,
Let us, said he, Demodocus release,
His song not pleaseth all the company;
It makes the stranger's sorrow to increase,
And brings some grief or other to his mind.
Then let him hold; that we and he together
May in this meeting equal pleasure find.
The cause we met here was his coming hither,
That we might give him gifts and send him hence.
A guest is as a brother to be used,
As all men know that but pretend to sense.
And you, my guest, you cannot be excus'd,
If you not answer truth to all I ask.
Say what's the name your parents call you by?
You must no longer now keep on your mask,
Children new-born not long unnamed lie;
Tell me your land and city where it is,
That my good ship may know where you would be,
For in Phœacia no steersman is,
Nor rudder as in other ships you see;
Whither men bid them go they understand,
And pass in clouds concealed o'er the main,
And where the havens be in every land.
No fear they have of perishing or pain,
And yet my father to me once did say,
That with our convoys Neptune was offended,
And that one day our good ship to destoy
As it returned homewards he intended,

And from men hide our city with a hill.
But whether that shall be performed now,
I cannot tell. It lies in Neptune's will,
And not concerneth you at all to know.
But tell me now what lands you wand'ring saw,
What nations, and what cities you came to;
What kind of people, civil, or without law;
Civil or kind to strangers, godly or no.
When you heard sung the woful fate of Troy,
Why did you weep? The Gods that built the town
Decreed thereat much people to destroy,
And that their fate should be sung up and down.
Lost you some kinsmen there or near ally,
Which might in time of danger you bestead?
Or some good friend? A wise friend standing by
Is worth a kinsman in a time of need.

LIB. IX.

Ulysses relates, first, what befel him amongst the Cicones at Ismarus. Secondly, amongst the Lotophagi. Thirdly, how he was used by the Cyclops Polyphemus.

TO THIS ULYSSES said: Renowned king
Alcinous, methinks delightful 'tis
To sit as we do here, and hear one sing,
And specially so good a voice as this.
I, for my part, do never more rejoice,
Than when I see men sitting at their meat
Cheerful, and list'ning to a pleasant voice,
And see the cups go often and retreat.
This is a thing that I love best; but you
Had rather hear the dangers I have pass'd,
Which fright me yet, and do my pain renew.
But which shall I tell first? which next? which last?
For they be many. First my name I'll tell,
And place, that whensoe'er you thither come
You may there lodge, although far off I dwell,
And am uncertain of my getting home.
I am Ulysses Laertiades,
And far and wide I am reputed wise
'Mongst men that love subtile conveyances,
And known I am by fame up to the skies.

My place is Ithaca, in which is store
Of wool. Mount Neriton is cloth'd with wood,
A goodly hill; and many islands more
Lie close about it, yielding store of food.
Dulichium, Same, and the woody Zant,
On th'east of Ithaca are situate.
Another island, which is called Ant,
Lies westward of it, but is low and flat.
Rocky is Ithaca, and uneven ground;
But breedeth able men. Nor have I known
The man that to his own mind ever found
A country that was better than his own.
From mine Calypso kept me in a cave,
T' have been her husband; so did Circe too:
But neither of them my consent could have,
So much could love of my own country do;
For though far off I might have better land,
Yet should I from my kindred absent live.
But now 'tis time to let you understand
What passage to me Jove was pleas'd to give.
From Troy to Ismarus we first were blown,
Within an isle, Cicons the natives are;
And soon we plundered and burnt the town,
And of the plunder each man had his share.
The wives we prisoners made, and to the sword
We put the men: and then without delay
I did command them all to go aboard;
But they, fools as they were, would not obey:
For they to kill, eat, drink, themselves apply,

Beeves, sheep, and wine, which they had on the beach.
Cicons meanwhile to Cicons so loud cry,
That to the continent their voices reach;
And presently came others, numberless
As leaves in summer; stout and men of skill,
Ulysses relates his adventures.
To fight on horseback with much readiness,
Or else on foot, according as they will.
Jove had decreed us mischief, and the hour
Was come: and just before our ships we fought,
Spears were our weapons, which with all our power
We lanced on both sides with courage stout.
Whilst the sun mounted we resisted well,
But after noon they pressed us so sore,
That with the falling sun our courage fell;
And then in haste we thrust our ships from shore.
From out of every ship six men we lost:
And then with heavy hearts our sails we hoist,
And grieved for our fellows left the coast;
But first to ev'ry of them called thrice
Whom slain by th' enemy we left behind.
Then Jove with clouds both land and water veils,
And night came on us with a furious wind
From the north part of heaven, and tore our sails
In threes and fours, and all our ships were tost
Hither and thither, sideways with their blasts,
And one another's way hindered and crost.
Then took we in our sails, and down our masts,
For fear of death, and laid them on the decks,

And with our oars rowed our ships to land;
Two nights and days we staid, while grief did vex
Each mind, and labour tired had each hand.
But when the morn had led forth the third day,
We then set sail, and left their course to th' wind;
The which (we sitting still) did them convey
According as the steersmen had design'd.
And I had safely come to Ithaca,
Had not the north wind with the tide o' th' sea,
When I was come to th' Cape of Malea,
Forc'd us without the isle of Cytheré.
The horrid winds now found me on the main,
And toss'd me into one another's hand.
Nine days together I endur'd this pain;
Upon the tenth they cast me on a land
Where dwell a people call'd Lotophagi,
That have and live upon a fruit full sweet
I' th' continent. We went ashore; there I
Made them take in fresh water for the fleet.
Then having quickly supp'd, I chose out two
Of my companions to go and see
What men they were; with them I sent also
A third, who went as messenger from me.
They quickly went; but mingled with those men,
Who meant no harm, but gave them lote to eat,
Which made them hate returning back again,
And suddenly their country to forget:
And with the people there resolv'd to stay,
Forgetting home for love of lote. But I

Sent those that quickly fetched them away
By force, and under hatches did them tie.
The rest I bade unto their ships to haste,
Lest eating lote they should return no more.
Aboard they quickly come, and each one plac'd
In order, beats the grey sea with his oar.
Then to the land of Cyclopses we row,
Men proud and lawless, that rely for food
Upon the sky, and neither plant nor plough;
Yet have they barley, wheat, wine very good,
Unplough'd, unsown, fetch'd up by show'rs of rain.
They have no courts of counsel, nor of right.
On high huge hills themselves they entertain,
And in their rocky bellies pass the night.
Each man gives law to his own wife and brood:
Nor do they much for one another care.
Before the port an isle lies clad with wood,
Not very near, nor from it very far.
Wild goats in great abundance were therein:
Because there dwelt no man that might them kill,
Nor wretched hunters ever enter in,
To tire themselves running from hill to hill.
For the good ship with the vermilion cheeks
The Cyclopses have not, nor art to make
All that is needful for a man that seeks
Trade, and to pass the seas must undertake.
The island else they quickly might adorn.
The land is good; to th' sea sweet meadows lie,
And plentifully would yield wine and corn,

If it were helped with good husbandry.
Anchors and cables in the port needs none,
Nor any rope to tie the ship to land;
And when the master thinks fit to be gone,
With the first wind they take the oar in hand.
Within the entrance riseth a sweet spring
From out a cave, shaded with poplars tall;
Thither to shore our ships we safely bring.
Some God was guide. Nothing we saw at all.
Dark night it was, and nothing to be seen;
The air about us thick, and from the sky
The moon could not shine through the clouds between;
Nor waves, nor isle appear'd to any eye.
Then took we in our sails, and went to land,
And waited for the coming of the day,
And in the mean time slumbered on the sand;
But when we saw appear the morning gay,
Admiring th' isle, we walked to and fro,
Whilst the nymphs (sprung from Jove Ægiochus)
Refreshment on my soldiers to bestow,
Down from the mountain brought the goats to us.
And presently from out our ships we take
Our bows and arrows keen and came away,
And of our company three troops we make;
Then shooting, soon we had a lovely prey.
Our ships were twelve, to which they equally
Divide the spoil; for every ship had nine,
Save only mine had ten: then merrily
All day we sit and feast on flesh and wine;

For we had wine enough as yet unspent,
Of that we got and brought away with us,
Which ev'ry man had into budgets pent,
Then when we took the town of Ismarus.
Close by we saw the land of Cyclopses,
And smoke, and heard the voice o'th'men, and sheep
And goats. 'Twas night, and on the sand o'th'sea
Ourselves till morning we refreshed with sleep.
But when the rosy morning 'gan t'appear,
My fellows I together call'd, and spake:
You, my companions, by the ships stay here;
I with my ship and crew will undertake
A trial of this people, whether wild,
And proud, and insolent their nature be,
Or whether they be men of nature mild,
Godly, and loving hospitality.
This said, I went aboard, and bade my crew
Embark themselves. Aboard they quickly come,
And sitting each man in his order due,
With stroke of oar they made the gray sea foam.
Arriv'd, we of a cavern saw the door,
Both high and wide, and sheep and goats there lay
Abundance sleeping. It was shaded o'er
With boughs that downward grew of laurel gay.
Before it was a court well fenced with stone,
And lusty oaks, and many a pine tree high.
I' th' cave a giant lodged, who used alone
His sheep to feed, no other Cyclops nigh.
It was a huge and ugly monster, and

Look’d not unlike a rocky mountain’s head
That does ‘mongst other hills asunder stand,
With a great perriwig of trees o’erspread.
Then bade I my companions to stay
And guard the ship, save that by lot a dozen
I took of them along with me, and they,
By chance, were the same men I would have chosen.
With me I took a goatskin full of wine,
Pleasant and strong, by Maron given me,
Evanthes son, priest to Phœbus divine,
At Ismarus, to save his family,
Fearing the God in whose grove he did live;
For which s’ven talents of pure beaten gold,
And a large silver bowl he did me give
Freely, besides twelve budgets of wine old,
Pure, pleasant, precious drink it was, which none
Knew of besides himself, his wife and maid;
Of the men servants that he kept, not one.
Which, when he drank, he usually allay’d
With water pure, full twenty times as much;
And when a man so temper’d had his cup,
Yet still the fragrant smell thereof was such,
He hardly could forbear to drink it up.
This goatskin I took with me in a case,
Expecting of some great and ghastly man,
That knew not law, nor right, to see the face;
And landing, quickly to the den we ran.
We entered in, but did not find him there;
But gaze we did at every thing with wonder:

Shelves full of cheese, as much as they could bear,
Pens full of sheep and goats, each sort asunder,
Old, younger, youngest; all vessels to the brim,
Pans, trays, and milking pails were full of whey.
My men desir'd me not to stay for him,
But make what haste I could to get away,
And take some of his cheeses from the shelves,
And sheep from out the pens, and then to go,
And setting up our sails to save ourselves.
But I would not, though 't had been better so.
But I desired to see the man, and try
If from him some good gift I might obtain;
But they with fear were ready for to die,
And could not think upon him but with pain.
Then kindled we a fire, and kill'd and fed
On flesh and cheese, and for his coming staid.
He came, and a great burden carried
Of wither'd boughs, which at the door he laid.
His supper with this wood he meant to dress,
And threw it down with such a hideous noise,
As frighted us to th' innermost recess
O' th' cave; there lay we, and suppress our voice.
Into the cave he comes, he and his flock,
All that was milch; the males he left without,
Rams and he goats, and the door with a rock
Stops up, which two-and-twenty carts scarce mought
Bear above ground, and then to milking fell;
But first he sets unto each ewe her lamb,
In order due, to see them suckled well,

And each young goat he puts under her dam.
Half of the milk he turned to curds, and put
Them into wicker baskets to set up:
The other half he into tankards put,
For drink to serve him when he was to sup.
When he had ended all his business,
He made a fire, and thereby spied us out.
What are you, says he, whence d' ye cross the seas?
Is it on business, or d' ye rove about
As pirates walk at sea, to and agen,
And are content to set their lives at stake,
So they may mischief do to other men?
Our hearts dismayed before, this language brake.
We fear'd his hollow voice, and body great;
But yet I made him answer, and said thus:
We are Achæans, making our retreat
Homewards from Troy, but winds have forced us
Upon this coast (for Jove would have it so.)
We are a part of Agamemnon's bands,
Whose glory for his sacking Troy is now
Renown'd both far and wide throughout all lands.
And now ourselves we prostrate at your feet,
Hoping for some good thing as visitants,
Such as all men have commonly thought meet;
Or, for the Gods' sake, as to suppliants.
As suppliants we before you here do lie,
With whom, and strangers, Jove still goes along;
He is the God of hospitality,
To punish whosoever does them wrong.

Thus I. But he replied with fell intent:
Stranger, thou art a fool, or com'st from far,
That counsel'st me to fear the punishment
Of Jove, or for the blessed Gods to care.
The Cyclopses care not at all for Jove
Ægiochus, or any other Gods.
For why, we stronger are than those above;
And if we strength compare, we have the odds.
No, no, 'tis not the fear of Jupiter
Can me from thee, or these with thee, restrain,
Unless I please. But tell me truly where
The ship that brought you rides, and do not feign.
This was to sound me. But I saw his mind,
And a deceitful answer did intend.
My ship was wreck'd by Neptune, and by wind
Thrown 'gainst the rocks at the land's furthest end,
Where all besides myself and these were drown'd.
To this he answer'd nothing, nor said more,
But snatching up a couple from the ground,
Knocks out their brains, like whelps against the floor;
Then cuts them into joints, and on them fed;
Nor did he flesh, or bone, or entrails leave,
Like hungry lion on the mountains bred.
Then weep we, and to Jove our hands upheave
To see such work, and have no remedy.
When he with human flesh his belly deep
Had fill'd, and drunk the milk that stood him by,
He laid himself along amongst his sheep,
And slept. And then I saw I might him slay:

’Twas but to draw my good sword from my side,
And gently on his breast my hand to lay,
And to the hilt my sword in’s body hide.
Upon new thoughts that purpose I gave o’er,
For certainly it had destroyed us quite;
So great the stone was that lay on the door,
That to remove it was past all our might.
So there we sighing stay’d for day: and when
The rosy-finger’d morning did appear,
He made a fire, and milk’d his flock again,
And the young kids and lambs new suckled were.
When all his work was at an end and past,
Two more of my companions he takes,
And on those two he quickly breaks his fast,
And for his flock the way he open makes.
For easily he took the stone away,
And then again with no less ease he did
Set up the same, and in its right place lay,
Than of a quiver one would do the lid.
His flock with noise he drives up to the hills,
And in the den leaves us to meditate
How to revenge, with Phœbus’ help, our ills.
At last within my breast this counsel sate.
Near one o’ th’ pens there lay an olive-tree,
Straight, and the boughs cut off, which, when ’twas dried,
Designed was a walking staff to be
Of the great Cyclops; which when we espied,
Of some good ship we thought might be the mast,
Or of a bark of twenty oars or more,

That Neptune's rugged waters might have pass'd
With a great burthen safe from shore to shore.
Of this a fathom I cut off, and gave it
To my companions to taper it:
They smooth'd and taper'd it as I would have it,
I sharpened it at point as I thought fit.
Then in the fire the same I hard'ned well,
And laid it by with dung all cover'd o'er,
Which in the cave from so much cattle fell;
For sheep and goats there always was good store.
From all my company who did not fear
To help me thrust this bar into his eye,
I took out four by lot, and such they were
As I myself did wish; and fifth was I.
At evening he returneth with his sheep,
Into the hollow cave he brings them all:
Without, he neither sheep nor goat did keep,
By presage, or upon some heav'nly call.
Then with the stone the cave's mouth up he dams,
And milks his she-goats and his ewes each one,
And suckles all his young kids and his lambs.
But after he his work had fully done,
Another couple of my men he took.
Then having in my hand an ivy can
Of good black wine, I thus unto him spoke:
Cyclops, since you have eaten flesh of man,
Here, drink this good black wine upon't, and see
What excellent good drink we had aboard,
Whereof I've hither brought a taste to thee,

Hoping you will some kindness me afford,
And some assistance in our voyage home;
But so intolerably furious
You are, that no man will dare near you come,
Knowing how cruel you have been to us.
When I had said, the good wine he drank up,
And was extremely pleased with the same;
And straightway calling for another cup,
Tell me, quoth he, right now what is thy name;
And I will give thee that shall please thy heart.
We Cyclopses have vines that yield good wine,
Which from the earth by rain from heaven start;
But this some branch of nectar is divine.
When he had said, I gave him wine again;
Three times I fill'd the can, and he as oft
Drank't off. But when it came up to his brain,
Then spake I to him gentle words and soft:
Cyclops, since you my name desire to know,
I'll tell it you, and on your word rely.
My name is Noman, all men call me so,
My father, mother, and my company.
To which he soon and sadly made reply,
Noman, I'll eat you last, none shall outlive you
Of all that are here of your company;
And that's the gift I promised to give you.
And having said, he laid himself along
With bended neck, sleeping and vomiting
Gobbets of human flesh, and wine among,
All he before had eaten uttering.

The bar with embers then I covered,
Till, green as ’twas, with heat I made it shine,
And with few words my men encouraged,
Lest any should have shrunk from the design.
The bar now hot, and ready to flame out,
And, though green wood, yet glowing mightily,
To him my fellows carried now stout,
And set the point thereof upon his eye;
But I myself erecting, with my hand
Twirled the bar about, with motion nimble,
As joiners with a string below do stand
To give a piercing motion with a wimble,
So, whilst the brand was ent’ring, I it turn’d.
The blood that down along it ran was hot,
And with his eye the lids and brows were burn’d,
And all his eye-strings with the fire did strut,
As when a smith hath heat his axe or spade,
And quickly quenches it while hot it is,
To harden it, it makes a noise; so made
His great moist eye the glowing brand to hiss.
He roared so as made the rocks resound,
And from his eye he pull’d, with both his hands,
The burning brand, and threw it to the ground;
And so awhile he there amazed stands,
And thence for more Cyclopses calls; and they,
Who dwelt about in every hollow cave,
Came in, some one, and some another way;
And from without the den ask’d what he’d have.
What ails thee, Polyphemus, so to cry

In dead of night, and make us break our sleep?
Goes any one about to make thee die,
By force or fraud, or steal away thy sheep?
Then Polyphemus answered from his cave,
Friends, Noman killeth me. Why then, said they,
We have no power from sickness you to save;
You must unto your father Neptune pray.
This said, they parted each one to his own
Dark cavern; then within myself I laugh'd
To think how with my name the mighty clown
I so deceived had, and gull'd by craft.
The Cyclops for the stone now grop'd about,
Found it, and threw it down, though pained sore;
Thinking to catch us at our coming out,
Sitting with arms extended in the door,
Such fools he thought us; but I formerly
Had thought upon the course I was to take;
And all my cunning, and my art to try,
Since no less than our lives was now at stake,
This counsel 'twas that in my breast then sat:
Male sheep there were within the cave well fed,
Fair, big, and deeply clad in wool and fat,
And these, with twigs ta'en from Cyclops his bed,
I bound together three and three; each three
Bore one under the middlemost fast bound;
One ram, by far the best of all, bore me
Under his breast, my hands in deep wool wound,
Thus hung we constantly, expecting day.
The morning came, the males to pasture hie,

(The ewes with strutting udders bleating stay),
Their master sitting there in misery,
Laid's hand upon their backs as out they pass'd,
Ne'er thinking of their bellies we were under.
Mine, heavy with his wool and me, came last,
To whom the Cyclops said, seeming to wonder,
Why, silly ram, art thou the last to come
Out of the cave, that formerly was ever
The foremost to go out, and to come home,
And foremost at the going to the river;
But now art last? Is't for thy master's eye,
Which Noman and his fellows have put forth?
couldst thou speak, and tell me where doth lie
Hidden within, that Noman, nothing worth,
I soon would with his brains besmear the floor,
And ease my vexed heart within me so,
Which Noman hath within me wounded sore.
This said, he let the ram that bore me go.
Got forth a little from the den and yard,
I left my ram, and set my fellows free;
Unto my ships I brought part of the herd,
That to our fellows we might welcome be,
We that escap'd; but they began to weep
For those we left behind us dead, till I
Commanded them to fetch aboard more sheep,
And after that their oars again to ply.
They brought in more, and each man takes his seat,
And in due order, with his oar in hand,
The water grey into a foam they beat,

And rowed us a little way from land,
As far as one that hallos can be heard;
So far I stood from shore, I hallo'd then:
Cyclops, Cyclops, why were you not afraid
To kill and eat, as you have done, my men?
For since you strangers do so ill intreat,
And of the Gods themselves no reck'ning make,
You ought to have expected vengeance great,
And that your wicked deeds should you o'ertake.
The Cyclops then provoked with this mock,
Threw a great stone at us with all his might,
And first he swing'd round o'er his head the rock,
Which just behind the rudder chanc'd to light;
And so much stirr'd the water falling in,
That what with th' eddy and tide from the main,
Brought back to th' land, and sure we dead had bin,
But that I quickly thrust it off again;
Then bade I my companions to row
Still further off, till we were out of fear.
They plied their oars again, and we were now
At twice the distance that before we were.
And then again I to the Cyclops spoke,
Though my companions would have hindered me:
Why, say they, will you still the man provoke?
How great a stone, how far he throws you see,
How near to land we were, how near to die;
If he but any one of us hear speak,
A rock will straightway from him hither fly,
And knock our brains out, and our vessel break.

So said they; but with me could nothing do,
I was resolv'd to vex him bitterly.
Cyclops, quoth I, if any ask thee who,
What was his name that robbed thee of thy eye,
Say 'twas Ulysses, prince of Ithaca,
Son to the old Laertes. He it was.
At which the Cyclops howling answered, Ha,
I see old prophecies are come to pass,
For Telemus Eurymedes, that here
Dwelled, and telling fortunes went about,
Told me I should by name Ulysses fear,
As he that one day should my eye put out;
But I some strong and mighty man expected,
Of stature great, should come to do that deed,
And never such a little wretch suspected,
Nor ever did of being drunk take heed.
But come, Ulysses, nearer, that I may
Give you a precious gift as you deserve;
And also to my father Neptune pray,
That you upon the seas he would preserve;
For I his son, and he my father is,
And to my sight again restore me can;
He, and no other of the Gods in bliss,
Nor any pow'r on earth. So said the man.
Cyclops, quoth I, I would I could as well
Send thee now down to Pluto's ugly den,
Depriv'd of life and soul i' th' deepest hell,
As I am sure thou ne'er shalt see again.
Then held he up his hands to heav'n, and pray'd:

Hear me, O Neptune, if thy son I be,
And thou my father truly, as 'tis said,
Grant that Ulysses never more may see
His native soil; or if perhaps by Fate
It be decreed he shall return again,
Let him return both wretchedly and late,
His ships and men lost, and at home meet pain.
His prayer granted was; and then he threw
A greater stone, first swing'd it o'er his head,
Which by good chance above the vessel flew,
But almost to the shore us carried.
When we were come into the isle again,
Where all the rest of our fleet then abode,
Expecting our return, in grievous pain,
And wondering why we were so long abroad;
Then with our sheep we landed on the beach,
And 'mongst the barks divided them with care,
Their just and equal number unto each,
That no ship might be wronged of his share.
On me my fellows over and above
Bestow'd a ram, which on the sand there-right
I made a sacrifice to mighty Jove;
But in my off'rings he took no delight,
And was contriving how to make away
My ship and fellows, and destroy them quite.
There on the shore we sat and spent the day,
With flesh and wine from morning unto night.
All night we slept upon the shore, and when
The morning had again the day restor'd,

I presently commanded all my men
To loose the ropes, and put themselves aboard.
Aboard they go, and beat the sea with oars,
All for their fellows that were eaten, sad,
And forward to the main we take our course,
For that we had ourselves escaped, glad.

LIB. X.

Ulysses' entertainment by Æolus, of whom he receives a fair wind for the present, and all the rest of the winds tied in a bag; which his men untying, flew out and carried him back to Æolus, who refused to receive him.

AT TH' FLOATING Isle Æolia we landed,
Where Æolus, the son of Hippotas,
Beloved of th' immortal Gods, commanded.
His house was walled all about with brass,
Th' ascent unto it was all one smooth stone.
Twelve were his children, six sons and their wives;
In wedlock he had join'd them one to one,
And with him in his house they led their lives,
And made good cheer; all day the house they make
To ring with mirth, and smoke with boil'd and roast;
At night their loyal wives to beds they take,
Richly set out with coverings of great cost.
A month he entertain'd me with delight,
Ask'd me of Troy, and th' Argive fleet, and how
The Greeks got home. And him I answer'd right
To ev'ry thing, as far as I did know.
And when I left his house, he was content
T' assist me friendly in my voyage back
With a west wind, and all winds else he pent
Ulysses' entertainment by Æolus, &c.

Into a tough and strong neat's-leather sack;
(For Jove had made him master of the winds,
To hold their breath, or blow as he thought fit),
And with a silver string the sack he binds;
No wind could stir but as I ordered it,
But all this did no good for want of wit.
Nine days we sail'd fore-right, and came so near
To th' coast of Ithaca, that we could see't
By th' light of beacons that were fired there;
But then with weariness I fell asleep;
For I had ne'er till now the helm let go,
Nor suffer'd any else my place to keep,
I long'd to see my native country so.
Meanwhile my fellows to discourse begin,
Thinking much gold and silver was i' th' sack,
By Æolus Hippodates put in,
Which now to Ithaca I carried back.
And, Oh, did one unto another say,
How much this man is lov'd where'er he comes!
He brings from Troy a great share of the prey,
Though we go empty-handed to our homes.
Now Æolus has given him God knows what;
Come quickly, let us while we think upon't,
And sleeping he upon the deck lies flat,
Undo the sack and see how much there's on't.
This wretched counsel taken by the crew,
The budget they undid, to see my store;
And then at once the furious winds outflew,
And whistling, snatch'd our ship away from shore.

My fellows wept, I studied which was best,
To fall into the sea and end my pain,
Or patiently to live among the rest?
I chose to live, as better of the twain,
And hoodwink'd laid me down i' th' ship. At last
We found ourselves upon th' Æolian shore,
On which th' unruly winds our ship had cast,
Just at the place where we set forth before:
And there we landed, and short supper made
With my companions on the rocky shore.
I one man with me and a herald take,
And went up to the porch before the door
Of th' hall, where Æolus sat banqueting
Amongst his sons and daughters. They admir'd.
What wind, said they, did you now hither bring?
We furnish'd you for what place you desir'd.
Some devil cross'd you. Softly, I replied.
Of our misfortune other cause was none
But my men's folly, who the bag untied
The whilst I slept; you can repair what's done.
Their father answer'd at another rate:
Hence, rascal, hated of the Gods above:
I entertain none whom the Gods do hate.
Away, I say, the Gods thee do not love.
Thus sighing we were sent away; and though
We were already tired with the oar,
To sea we put, and forward still we row,
Six days and nights entire, ne'er giving o'er.
Upon the seventh day we landed near

To Lestrigonia, the royal seat
Of Lamus and his race; the herd's-men there,
When from the field they bring their sheep or neat,
Hallo to those at home; then they a-field
Their cattle drive. To one of little sleep
The site o' th' place doth double wages yield,
By tending one day cows, another sheep.
For it is seated just 'twixt day and night;
Into the port we came, the which within
On each side was beset with rocks upright,
Whereof two made it narrow coming in.
My fellows with their ships were in the port,
Near to the city; for the sea was still,
And not a wind stirring of any sort.
But I kept mine without, suspecting ill,
And with a rope had tied it to the rocks.
Then up a hill I went to look about,
But could no sign espy of man or ox;
Then down I came again, and straight sent out
T' enquire what kind of people lived there.
A herald then and two men more I sent,
Who as they going on the high-way were,
That from the woody hill to the city went,
Met with the daughter of Antiphates,
That was of Lestrigonians the king.
She had fetcht water from Artracies;
Artracies the name was of a spring.
They ask'd her of the king, and of the people,
Her father's house she shows. They thither hie,

And find the queen there looking like a steeple,
And straight abhor'd her as a prodigy.
Then she her husband from the market-place
Calls home, who straight intended to dispatch 'em,
And laid his hands on one; but in that space
The rest escap'd by flight, he could not catch 'em;
But then he raised with a mighty shout
The town and country, who in numbers great,
Liker to giants than to men, came out,
And with huge stones of a man's weight they beat
My men and ships. A woful noise and wild
I heard of dying men, and tearing planks.
When they had slain my men, they them enfil'd,
And carried them like fishes hung in ranks.
While they did this, I had no other hope
To save myself, but quickly with my sword,
My ship being tied to th' rocks, to cut the rope,
And make what haste I could to get aboard.
My crew into the ship leapt all at once,
And row'd for life, till they got far enough
From land, to stand in fear of throwing stones,
And glad they had escaped, onwards row;
The rest, both ships and men, all perished.
Next at Ææa Isle ashore we run,
Where the wise Goddess Circ' inhabited,
Æetes' sister, daughter of the Sun,
And Perse daughter of Oceanus;
There in a good safe harbour quietly
We rest ourselves; some God conducted us.

There full of grief two days and nights we lie.
Soon as the morn had shown us the third day,
With spear in hand, and sword girt at my thigh,
Up to a mountain's top I took my way,
Some word of man to hear, or work to spy;
Through the thick wood I saw a smoke arise
About the place where th' house of Circe stood:
Then with myself I did awhile advise
What I should do; at last I thought it good
To make my people all to dine, and then
Safely with company to go or send.
So back I came unto my ship and men;
But by the way (some God was sure my friend)
A gallant stag came by, whom heat and thirst
Invited had down to the stream divine;
At him I quickly threw my spear, which pierc'd
Both his sides thorough, close beneath the chine.
Down dead he falls; on 's neck my foot I set,
Pluck'd out the spear, and laid it on the ground;
To make a rope, I twigs and rushes get,
And his four feet together fast I bound;
Within his legs I place my head, and bear
His body on my neck; 'twas hard to rise,
Leaning with both my hands upon my spear:
He was too great to take up otherwise.
I threw him down o' th' shore, and cheer'd my crew.
Friends, quoth I, though our present state be bad,
Death shall not come, I hope, before 'tis due:
Come, let us eat and drink, and not be sad.

This said, they straightway from the ship descend,
And gaze upon ‘t, for ’twas a mighty beast:
And when their wondering was at an end,
They wash’d their hands, and dress’d it for their feast;
And all the remnant of the day till night
We made good cheer with wine and ven’son store.
After the sun had borne from us his light,
We laid us down to sleep upon the shore;
But when the rosy morn appear’d again,
I said to all my men, who grieved were:
My mates, although I have endur’d much pain,
I must entreat you patiently to hear;
We know not where is west or east, nor where
The sun does rise or set, nor where we be;
To me does little hope as yet appear,
And therefore we must go abroad and see.
In a low island, rising through the trees,
I saw a smoke when I stood on the hill;
Though I had utter’d no more words but these,
They heard them with a very evil will.
Of Cyclops and Antiphates they speak,
That had devour’d their fellows formerly:
And ready were their hearts with grief to break;
They weep and whine, but without remedy.
Of my companions then two bands I make;
Of one Eurylochus had the command,
The charge o’ th’ other to myself I take:
And two-and-twenty men were in each band.
Who should go first abroad, and who should stay,

We were content should be by lot defin’d;
To go, fell to Eurylochus. Away
They weeping went, we weeping stay’d behind;
Down in a dale they Circe’s palace found,
Built of square stone; the place was full of shade:
Lions and wolves about it lay o’ th’ ground,
Whom Circe tame with magic arts hath made;
These flew not at my men, but laid their noses
Upon them lovingly, and wagg’d their tails,
As dogs salute their masters; Circe’s doses
So much above their natures fierce prevail.
Eurylochus i’ th’ door stood with his band.
The Goddess Circe busy was within;
For she a wondrous fine-work had in hand,
Past art of man, and sung as she did spin.
Then did Polites, whom I lov’d most dear
Of all my crew, speak out unto them all:
My friends, quoth he, somebody singeth there,
A Goddess or a woman; let us call.
This said, they call, and she sets ope the gate,
Bids them come in; fools as they were, they enter,
All but Eurylochus; without he sat,
Suspecting somewhat, therefore durst not venture.
She places them, and sets before them food,
Cheesecakes of cheese, and honey, flour and wine;
But had mix’d something with it not so good,
Of wond’rous virtue, with an ill design.
For with a wand, as soon as they had din’d,
She drove them to the sties, and there them pent:

For body, head, hair, voice, all but the mind,
Right swine they were, and grunted as they went;
There to them threw she acorns, crabs and bran,
The things wherewith swine commonly are fed.
Eurylochus stay'd long, but not a man
Came out to let him know how they had sped.
Then back he comes: at first he could not speak,
Though he endeavoured; he grieved so,
The sighs and sobs his words did often break,
Till urg'd by us that long'd the truth to know;
At last he said, Renown'd Ulysses, we
Passing the woods, as we commanded were,
In a dark vale a stately palace see;
A Goddess, or a woman, dwelleth there.
We call'd, and straight she opening the gate,
Bids us come in; they ill advised enter,
All but myself; alone without I sat,
Suspecting fraud, and durst no further venture.
Lost they are all: for if they could, I know
Some of them would have come and brought me word,
For I stay'd long enough; this said, my bow
I took, and at my side my trusty sword,
And bad him guide me back the self-same way.
Then fell he at my feet on both his knees,
And weeping me entreats to let him stay;
Your life, quoth he, amongst the rest you'll leese.
To this I said: Eurylochus, stay you
Here at the ship, since you are frighted so,
Eating and drinking with the rest o' th' crew;

Necessity compelleth me to go.
This said, I went along the shore, till I
Was at the entrance of the valley, where
The house of Circe stood. Then Mercury
Encounter'd me; in form he did appear
Of a fair youth, whose beard but now began
In a soft down to peep above his face,
Which is the prime of beauty in a man.
Alas, said he, what make you in this place
'Mongst trees and shrubs? For I can tell you this,
Your mates at Circe's house are lodg'd in sties,
They now are swine; you'll of your purpose miss;
You cannot set them free though you be wise,
But rather you will with them lie. But well;
I'll give you such an antidote as you
Need not to be afraid of any spell;
And will, besides, her purpose to you show.
To make you drink she'll temper you a cup,
Which shall not, for the antidote, bewitch you;
And when she sees that you have drank it up,
With her long wand she presently will switch you.
Then to her with your naked sword in hand,
As if you purpos'd to cut off her head;
Then she will shriek, and weep, and trembling stand,
And buy her life with proffer of her bed;
You must not then refuse the Goddess' love,
If you intend your fellows to restore:
Yet make her swear by all the Gods above
She never will attempt to hurt you more.

Then gave he me the herb; the flow'r was white,
The root was black; the Gods do call it Moly,
And gather it, who have no stint of might;
For men to think to find it is a folly.
Then Hermes parting, mounted to the sky,
And I to Circe's house went on my way,
And musing stood awhile; but by and by
I call'd, and she came forth without delay,
And calls me in. I enter with sad heart;
There in a glorious chair she made me sit,
Studded with silver nails, and carv'd with art;
Then puts a low stool to it for my feet,
And brought the potion in a golden cup,
Which she had temper'd to her bad design;
And soon as ever I had drank it up,
She switch'd and bad me go lie with the swine.
Then start I up with my drawn sword, and make
As if I purpos'd to cut off her head;
Then did she shriek most fearfully and quake,
And weeping to me these words uttered:
Who, whence are you? what is your father's name?
That this drink worketh not, is very strange,
If any else had tasted but the same,
He soon had of his figure found a change;
But you a stubborn heart have in your breast.
Are you Ulysses, that should hither come,
As Hermes told me oft, and be my guest,
When from the Trojan shore he sailed home?
Put up your sword; and that we may confide

In one another better without dread,
Let's to my chamber go, and side by side
Compose the things we differ in a bed.
Circe, said I, oh how can I be kind,
When you to swine my fellows turned have?
And now you have me here, 'tis in your mind
To make me tame, and keep me for a slave.
I'll not come near your bed, unless before
You take an oath by all the Gods above
You'll never go about to hurt me more;
This said, she swore, and I gave way to love.
On Circe waiting-women four attended
To do the service of the house, and were
From sacred rivers, springs, and groves descended;
Each had her proper work assigned her.
One does the chairs with coverings array;
Another does the silver tables spread,
And on each one of them a basket lay
Of gold, and into it she puts the bread;
The third does in a silver flagon mix
The wine and water in a silver pot;
The fourth to make a fire brings in the sticks,
And for a bath makes ready water hot.
Circe herself the water tempered
Into a just and comfortable heat,
And pour'd it on my shoulders and my head,
Washing my limbs, till I my toil forget.
And when I bathed and anointed was,
She put upon me a fair coat and vest,

And led me in, into the dining-place,
And to my chair and table me address'd.
One maid a golden bason, with the ewer,
To wash our hands over a cauldron brings,
The cauldron also was of silver pure;
Another loads the table with good things;
Another on the table sets on bread,
And then the Goddess Circe bids me eat;
But other dangers running in my head,
I had but little stomach to my meat:
Which she observing, said, Ulysses, why
Do you thus sullenly your meat refuse,
And like a dumb man sit? D'ye think that I
Intend against you some new art to use?
Have I not sworn? To which I answered:
O Circe, how can I be pleas'd d'ye think
(When you my fellows keep disfigured
And pounded up in hog-sties) t' eat and drink;
If you mean well, set them at liberty,
And in the shape of men before my eyes,
That I may look on them, and they on me.
With switch in hand then out of doors she hies,
And opens all their prisons; out they come,
And were, to look to, pigs of nine years old.
She drives them with her wand into the room,
And makes them stand there while I them behold.
Then Circe went amongst them, and each one
Smear'd with an unguent, which straightway did make
Their hair fall off, and undid all was done;

And presently a human shape they take,
Greater and fairer than they had before.
They knew me all, my hand with theirs they press'd;
So glad they were, their eyes for joy ran o'er;
The whole house wept, and Circe with the rest.
This past, the Goddess said: Ulysses, go
And bring your ship a-land, and let her lie;
Your goods within the rocky caves bestow,
And make haste back with all your company.
This pleas'd me well. Down to the sea I hie,
Where my companions I weeping find;
But soon as I appear'd, they presently
About me came, their care now out of mind.
As when from pastures fat a herd of cows
Well fed return at evening to their home,
Their calves will not be kept within the house,
But play, and skip, and round about them come;
So did my fellows, soon as they me saw,
Come skipping out o' th' ship, with no less joy
Than if they had been come to Ithaca,
Their native country, from the town of Troy.
Our joy, said they, Ulysses, cannot be
Greater when we at Ithaca arrive,
Which we so wish for, than 'tis now to see
That you from Circe are return'd alive.
But tell us, pray, how died our fellows there?
But first, said I, hale up your ship to land,
And in the rocks hide all that's loose in her,
And come with me to Circe out of hand.

There shall you see your fellows how they live,
In want of nothing that they can devise.
To these my words my fellows credit give;
Eurylochus alone thought otherwise.
Wretches, said he, what mean you? Will you go?
Have you a longing to be lions tame,
Or swine, or wolves, and being transformed so,
To live at Circe's house, and guard the same?
Remember Cyclops, and how all they sped
That dar'd to put themselves within his cave,
By too much valour of Ulysses led.
Bethink you well how you yourselves may save.
When I heard that, I drew my sword, and meant,
Although he were my kinsman very nigh,
T' have made his head fly. But of that intent
I was made frustrate by the company,
That interposing spoke me fair, and said,
Let him stay here, but we'll go every man,
While he looks to the ship, since he's afraid.
Thus having said, to march they straight began;
Nor staid Eurylochus behind, for I
Had so affrighted him he went with th' rest.
Meanwhile at Circe's house my company
Were bath'd, and oil'd, and cloth'd with coat and vest.
Feasting we found them in a stately hall.
But when we saw them, and heard everything
That had befallen them, suddenly we all
Wept out so loud, as made the house to ring.
Then Circe said: Ulysses, why d'ye weep?

I know your sufferings both at land by men,
And what you have endured on the deep;
Drink wine, eat meat, and merry be again.
Recruit your hearts with courage, till they be
As strong as when from home you first set out;
Put all your danger out of memory,
Nor trouble more your wearied minds with doubt.
These words of Circe's did our spirits cheer,
And made us willingly fall to our meat;
Both then, and ev'ry day throughout the year,
In Circe's house we freely drink and eat.
But when the season was come round about,
And months and days of th' year had made an end,
Then my impatient fellows call'd me out,
And said, Strange man, do you no more intend
To see your country Ithaca? Shall we
For ever stay with Circe here? Have Fates
Decreed that you your house no more should see,
But perish here together with your mates?
This my companions said, and said but right.
Then what remained of the day we spent
Eating and drinking merrily. At night
They to their own beds, I to Circe's went;
Where prostrate at her knees, I press her hard
To keep her word, and let me go my way;
My mind, said I, is going thitherward
Now, and my fellows ask me why I stay.
Renowned Ulysses, answered Circe, here
Against your will with me you shall not stay.

But ere you go unto your country dear,
You must a voyage make another way.
You must to the house of Hades first repair;
For with Tiresias the prophet blind,
You must consult concerning your affair.
He knows what course the Fates have you design'd,
Though blind his eye, yet is his judgment clear.
For why, to him Proserpina alone
Hath granted to peruse Fate's register,
And know the history of things not done.
The ghosts to him stand up when he goes by.
At this my heart was ready ev'n to break,
And in the bed long time I weeping lie,
And turn'd, and wish'd for death. At last I speak:
Circe, said I, who shall me thither guide?
Never man yet to Hell went in a ship.
Then to me Circe presently replied:
Ulysses, let not that thought break your sleep.
You need but set your mast up, hoist your sail,
And then sit still; you shall not want a wind;
For Boreas to waft you will not fail.
When you are come to th' Ocean's end, you'll find
The woody shore and grove of Proserpine;
There the tall poplar and soft willow grows,
And there it is your bark you must put in.
Then go along the shore to Pluto's house,
And you shall see where into Acheron
Cocytas falls, which is a branch of Styx,
And with it also Pyriphlegeton,

And a great rock where the two rivers mix.
Close by that place make with your sword a pit
A cubit wide, and round about it pour
Wine mix'd with honey, and pure wine after it;
Then water pure, and over all throw flour.
Such is the drink that's offer'd to the dead.
And further, to them you must make a vow,
That when you be at home, and out of dread,
You'll gratify them with a barren cow.
But to Tiresias you must alone
Promise at your return to kill a ewe
All over black. The ceremonies done
Which to the dead by common law are due,
Then of the ram and ewe let out the blood
Into the pit; their heads to hellward place,
And turn your back, and so go tow'rd the flood;
Then shall you see the ghosts come out apace.
Bid your companions meanwhile to flay
The slaughter'd sheep. To Pluto must you and
To his queen Proserpine your prayers say,
Then sit down at the pit with sword in hand.
Let none come near the blood until you see
Tiresias the Theban prophet come.
'Twill not be long before he with you be;
He'll tell you all the ways to bring you home.
This said, Aurora had the light display'd,
And Circe cloth'd me with a coat and vest,
And with a pure white robe herself array'd,
With a gold girdle girt beneath her breast,

And put upon her head her veil. Then I
Went through the house to make my fellows rise,
And gently said unto them severally,
Let's go, for Circe now doth so advise;
And well content they were. But safe away
I could not bring them all. For there was one,
Elpenor, neither forward in a fray,
Not yet of very much discretion;
Heated with wine o'er night, himself to cool,
Up to the house's top he went to sleep;
But, wak'd with noise the rest made, like a fool
Ne'er thought of coming down the stairs steep
Backward, and so to th' earth he headlong fell,
And broke his neck-bone, and lay dead o' th' ground,
And his soul leaving him, went down to Hell.
The rest came forth, and stood about me round.
To these I said: You think without delay
That we to Ithaca are going now;
But Circe bids us go another way,
Of old Tiresias the mind to know,
The Theban prophet, who is now in Hell.
This broke the very heart-strings of my mates;
They sob and tear their hair, but cannot tell
How to avoid what's once decreed by th' Fates.
Then to our ship we weeping went. Mean space
Circe a ram and black ewe there had tied,
Unseen to us; we found them on the place.
For Gods, but when they list, cannot be spied.

LIB. XI.

Ulysses' descent into Hell, and discourses with the ghosts of the deceased heros.

WHEN WE WERE come unto the sea-side, where
Our ship lay, which we shov'd into the deep;
We rear our mast, pull up our sails, and bear
Aboard with us one male, one female sheep.
And so for Hell we stood, with fears in mind,
And tears in eye. But the fair Circe sent,
To bear us company, a good fore-wind,
That kept our sails full all the way we went.
To winds and steerage we our way commend,
And careless sit from morning till 'twas dark;
Then found ourselves at th' Ocean's farthest end,
Where up to land the wind had forc'd our bark.
Here dwell the Cimbers, hid in clouds and mist,
Whom thou, O Phœbus, with thy golden eye,
Nor coming from the sky to earth e'er seest,
Nor when from earth thou mountest to the sky;
But live, poor men, under a horrid night.
Here seek we for the place of which the wise
Circe had told us, and soon on it light,
Ulysses' descent into Hell.
And thither fetch'd the sheep for sacrifice.

Then with my sword i' th' ground I digg'd a pit,
And round about it wine with honey pour;
And round again pure wine pour after it,
Then water pure. O'er all I sprinkle flour;
And vowed, to those feeble folk, to kill,
As soon as I to Ithaca should come,
A barren heifer, and the altar fill
With many more good things I had at home.
And promis'd to Tiresias alone
A fat black ewe, the best in all my cotes.
When I my vows and pray'rs had rightly done,
Of both the victims straight I cut the throats.
Their reeking blood streamed down into the pit;
Out come the ghosts; maids, youths, decrepid age,
And tender virgins, they all scented it;
And warriors clad in gory arms, all rage,
And rushing out of Hell, with hideous cry,
About the blood bustling they go and turn,
Which not a little frighted me. Then I
Bade flay the victims, and their bodies burn,
And say their pray'rs to Pluto and his queen.
With sword in hand I sat on the pit's brink,
Resolv'd till I Tiresias had seen,
That not a ghost a drop of blood should drink.
First came my soldier Elpenor's spirit,
Which left the body just when we set sail,
So that we had no leisure to inter it;
His heavy fate I did with tears bewail.
How now, quoth I, Elpenor? art thou here

Already? Couldst thou me so much outstrip?
I first came forth, and left thee in the rear,
Hast thou on foot outgone my good black ship?
Then said Elpenor: Issue of Jove, divine
Ulysses, I had come along with th' bark,
But that the Devil and excess of wine
Made me to fall, and break my neck i' th' dark.
I went to bed late by a ladder steep,
At top o' th' house the room was where I lay;
Wak'd at the noise of parting, half asleep,
Headlong I hither came, the nearest way.
Now I adjure you by your father, and
Your wife, and son, and all his seed to come,
(For I assured am that you will land
Where Circe dwells before your going home),
To see I have the rites due to the dead.
Fear th' anger of the Gods above, and burn
My body with my arms, from foot to head,
And cast on earth to cover o'er my urn.
This done, for men hereafter sailing by,
Raise me a little tomb of earth by th' shore,
That they may eas'ly see where 'tis I lie.
Lastly, upon it upright plant my oar.
All this, quoth I, I'll do upon my word.
Thus we discours'd amongst the shades. He stood
While I continued with my naked sword
To keep the sprites from tasting of the blood.
Then came Anticlia my mother's ghost.
Alive I left her, when to Troy I sail'd,

To fight against it in the Argive host.
Now seeing her, exceedingly I wail'd;
And though I grieved were to keep away
My mother from the loved blood, yet still
In the same posture patiently I stay,
Till I might know Tiresias his will.
Then came the soul of old Tiresias,
And of the gilded staff he had in's hand.
Poor man, quoth he, perceiving what I was,
What brought thee hither to this ugly land?
Stand back awhile, and take your sword away,
That I may drink, and the unerring word
Of Fate deliver to you. I obey,
Retire, and up I put my trusty sword.
Then said the good old prophet: You are come,
Honour'd Ulysses, to enquire of me,
What the Gods say about your going home.
I tell you true, 'twill not be easily.
I think you'll not escape at sea unseen
Of angry Neptune, who I do not doubt
Will do his worst, and make you feel his spleen,
For Polyphemus' eye which you put out.
Yet for all that, you may to Ithaca
Safely return, if you can but command
Your passion when in th' isle Thrinacia,
An island lying in your way you land;
There feed the kine of the all-seeing Sun,
And flocks of goodly sheep. Hurt none of these.
Then shall your ship her course with safety run

At length to Ithaca, though not with ease.
But if you touch them, I denounce a wreck
To your good ship, and death to all your crew.
And though yourself may happen to come back
At last, and this unhappy fate eschew,
‘Twill be alone, and in a ship not yours;
Besides that, when you are returned home
You’ll fall into the danger of the wooers,
Who for your wife’s and meat’s sake thither come.
But you will be reveng’d of these; and when
You shall have made away these wooers, go
With oar on shoulder, to a land where men
Inhabit that the briny sea not know,
Nor ever mingle salt with what they eat,
Nor ever saw the ship with crimson face,
Nor yet those wings which do the water beat,
Call’d oars, to make your good ship go apace.
Now mark me well, when thou shalt meet a man
Just at the end of Neptune’s utmost bound,
Bearing upon his shoulder a corn-fan,
Stick down thy lusty oar upon the ground;
There sacrifice to the world’s admiral,
For new admittance, a ram, boar, and bull;
Then home again, and offer unto all
The Gods by name an hundred oxen full.
Your death will not ungentle be, for which
Age shall prepare you, and your soul unglue
Insensibly. Your people shall be rich
Which round about you dwell. All this is true.

Tiresias, quoth I, when he had done,
’Tis well. My mother yonder I espy
Amongst the shades; she knoweth not her son;
What shall I do to make her know ’tis I?
That, quoth he, I can tell you easily.
What soul soever you admit to drink,
To what you ask will make a true reply;
Those you put back, back into Hell will slink.
The prophet having thus my fate foretold,
Into the house of Pluto back retir’d.
I o’er the blood my former posture hold,
But let my mother drink as she desir’d.
She knew me then, and wept. My son, said she,
How came you to this place of ours so dark?
Th’ ocean and so many gulphs there be
‘Twixt you and us, that but with a good bark
No living man can pass. Come you but now
From Troy, and all this while have wand’ring been,
You and your company? You have, I trow,
Your wife Penelope by this time seen.
Mother, said I, the cause I came this way
Was to ask counsel of Tiresias.
Since I with Agamemnon went to Troy,
In Ithaca or Greece I never was.
But, mother, tell me, pray you, how came you
Unto this place? Was it by sickness long?
Or did Diana with a death undue
Send you down hither to this feeble throng?
And tell me if my father and my son

Remain as formerly in their estate;
Or that some prince of Greece my wife have won,
Supposing me now cast away by fate?
Tell me besides, whether Penelope
Remain at home together with my son,
Assisting him to rule my family;
Or whether she be married, and gone?
Your wife, said she, does still continue there;
For your long absence weepeth days and nights.
Your son still holds his own, and makes good cheer;
Oft he invited is, and oft invites.
Your father from his vineyard never budges;
Rich coverlets and bedding he refuses;
Ne'er comes to the town; in winter with his drudges
To lay him down, sleep by th' fire he uses.
In vile array in summer-time he creeps,
Till vintage pass, about his fruit-trees round,
And visits them each one; at night he sleeps
On bed of heaped leaves upon the ground.
Thus lies he griev'd and pining with the thought
Of your sad fate; afflicted too with age.
The like sad thoughts me also hither brought:
I neither died by Diana's rage,
Nor any long-consuming malady;
But very woe, thinking that you were dead,
My noble, dear Ulysses, made me die;
My soul thus hither from my body fled.
When she had spoken, I would very fain
Have ta'en her in my arms; three times I grasp'd

At the beloved shadow, but in vain.
Mine arms I closed, but did nothing clasp.
Sore griev'd hereat, I said unto my mother,
I am your son, why do you fly me so?
Why may we not, embracing one another,
Although in Hell, give ease unto our woe?
Hath Proserpine, my sorrows to augment,
Sent me a phantom in my mother's stead?
Oh no, quoth she, my son, she'd no intent
T' abuse you. 'Tis the nature of the dead.
We are no longer sinews, flesh, and bones,
We are substances incorporeal,
All that 's consumed i' th' fun'ral fire; when once
That's done, it in itself stands several;
Flies like a dream. No, go your ways to th' light,
And tell all I have told you to your wife,
That she may know in this perpetual night
The dead enjoy an everlasting life.
When we had thus discours'd, the ladies came,
Sent out by Proserpine to taste the blood;
Daughters and wives to princes of great fame,
And round about me at the pit they stood.
But I to know each one that came to drink,
Studied awhile; then thought this counsel best,
With sword in hand t' abide upon the brink,
Whilst one was drinking to keep off the rest.
There was not one but I enquired her name
And pedigree. All told me who they were.
And first of all the well-born Tyro came,

Who said Salmoneus was her ancestor,
And that of Cretheus she had been the wife,
And on Enipeus had enamour'd been
Once on a time whilst she remained in life;
On Enipeus, fair'st stream that e'er was seen,
Upon whose bank, Neptune, that chanc'd to spy her,
On Enipeus' sweet stream drew her aside,
And at the river's mouth laid him down by her,
Between two waves rais'd high, their deed to hide.
When he love's work had done, Thou shalt, said he,
Ere th' year be ended, bring forth children twain,
Who princes both of great renown shall be.
I Neptune am; the Gods ne'er work in vain.
See you that they be educated well,
Till they shall be at man's estate arriv'd.
So go you home: my name you must not tell.
This said, into the rolling sea he div'd.
Her time being come, she was delivered
Of two great boys, Neleus and Pelias,
Who for the service of high Jove were bred.
One king of Pyle, th' other of Iolcas was.
The noble lady Tyro, besides these,
Did many other goodly children bear:
Amatheon, and Æson, and Pheres,
But these her husband Cretheus' children were.
Next came the daughter of Æsopus (who
Through Theban fertile plains and meadows runs)
Antiope. Of Jove she boasteth too,
That by him she conceived had two sons;

Their names were Zethus and Amphion. They
The founders were of Thebes; with walls and towers,
And sev'n strong gates they fenc'd it ev'ry way
Against invasion from all neighb'ring powers.
Amphitrion's wife Alcmena there I saw,
That lov'd by Jove brought Hercules to life.
And the king Cretheus' daughter Megara,
That was the mighty Hercules his wife.
I saw there also the unfortunate
Mother of Œdipus, Jocasta bright,
That blindly did a horrid act, by fate,
Which the Gods' pleasure was should come to light.
Not knowing him, she married her own son;
Not knowing him, he his own father slew:
When they perceived both what they had done,
She hang'd herself; her Furies him pursue.
Chloris I saw, whom Neleus did wed
For beauty, got by the son of Joseus,
And with great dower he gain'd her to his bed;
Her father Amphion rul'd Orchomenus.
She queen of Pyle, by Neleus had three boys;
Nestor, Chronius, Periclumenus;
And one fair daughter to make full their joys,
Pero by name, for beauty wondrous.
The princes round about were suitors to her;
But Iphiclus had Neleus' cattle ta'en,
And Neleus was resolved to bestow her
On him that could his herds fetch back again.
There was a prophet undertook the task;

But ta'en by clowns, and into prison pent,
For answering Iphyclus t' all he could ask
Was freed, and did the thing he underwent.
I saw the wife too of Tyndareus there,
Fair Leda; she two twins unto him bare,
Pollux, good cuffer; Castor, cavalier:
Twins, and alive, though under ground they are,
And have obtained of their father Jove
Both to be canonized Gods; but so,
As he that is to-day in heaven above,
Shall be to-morrow amongst men below.
Iphimedea, Alciæus' wife,
I saw, that did two sons to Neptune bear,
Otus and Ephialtes; of short life;
The greatest and the fairest that ever were
Except Orion; each at nine years old
Between the shoulders was nine cubits wide,
And was in length nine cubits four times told,
And all the Gods in heaven terrified;
And threat'ned them with war, and heav'n to storm
They Ossa set upon Olympus high,
And Pelius on Ossa, and so form
Against the sky a mighty battery;
And surely they had storm'd it had they been
At man's estate; their beards were not yet grown;
Apollo kill'd them with his arrows keen,
Ere on their cheeks appeared any down.
Phædra and Procris there I also saw,
And Minos' daughter Ariadne, whom

Theseus was bringing towards Attica
From Creta, but he could not bring her home;
Diana killed her in Dia isle
On Bacchus' quarrel. There I did behold
Mæra and Clymene, and th' woman vile
Eryphile, that her own husband sold.
To name the ladies all I saw, would make
My tale to last all night. 'Tis bed-time now,
Here or aboard, though not till you think fit;
Till you think fit, and give command to row.
This said, the company deep silence seiz'd,
Delighted with the things they heard him speak.
The queen herself, Arete, no less pleas'd,
At last resolv'd the silence thus to break.
Princes, what think you of this man so rare,
His look, his stature, and his noble heart?
My guest he is, but you have all a share
In th' honour of this visit. Ere he part
Make him a present to relieve his need.
Be liberal, have no respect to thrift;
For you the Gods from fear of want have freed
With wealth abundant. Do not pinch your gift.
Old Echinous said: The queen says right;
We shall do well her counsel to obey.
But since in king Alcinous lies the might,
'Tis better first to hear what he will say.
Then said Alcinous, It shall be so,
Unless I bear the name of king in vain;
Let not the stranger till to-morrow go;

Till we prepare our gift he must remain.
As for his passage we will all provide,
And chiefly I that do the sceptre bear.
To whom the wise Ulysses thus replied:
Renown'd Alcinous, that reignest here,
Though a whole year you should command my stay,
It will not trouble me. Nay, that I'd chuse,
Since you intend to send me rich away:
For I am sure I shall no honour lose
By coming richly home. Kings that have store
Of wealth, are better commonly obey'd,
And by their subjects are respected more,
Than those whose treasuries and chests are void.
There be, the king said, many that can lie;
But there is form and sense in all you say;
Both your own fate you tell with harmony,
And of the Greeks with whom you went to Troy.
I should be well content to sit up here
All the night long, so you would undertake
To tell me ev'ry thing that you saw there.
To him Ulysses then did answer make:
Renowned king Alcinous, you know
There is a time for talk, a time for rest;
But since you long to hear, I'll tell you now
Whom else I saw, and what fate them oppress'd.
And first the saddest end of those that had
Escap'd the fury of the enemy,
And in their countries landed were and glad,
Were murder'd by a woman's treachery.

The female ghosts scatter'd by Proserpine,
Some one way, some another; thither came
Atrides' soul, first of the masculine,
And others with him, whose fates were the same.
No sooner he the blood had tasted, but
He knew me, sorely wept, and would have cast
His arms about my waist, but could not do't,
For now, alas, his strength was gone and past.
I griev'd to see him, and thus to him said:
King Agamemnon, what fate brought you hither?
Were you by Neptune on the sea betray'd.
And hither sent by fury of the weather?
Or landing to find booty, met with death?
Or else besieging of some town were slain?
Or for fair women were bereav'd of breath?
Then Agamemnon answer'd me again:
Noble Ulysses, I lost not my life
By Neptune's fury, nor in fight at land
For booty or for women; but my wife
Did basely kill me by *Ægistus'* hand.
At my first landing he invited me,
And slew me then when I at supper sate.
Just as a man would kill a cow, so he
Kill'd me. There's no such woful death as that.
My friends were butcher'd like so many swine,
Which when within a mighty rich man's hall
Numbers of men invited are to dine
At wedding, or at feast, are made to fall.
You very many men have seen to die

In ranged battle, and in single fight,
But never felt such pity certainly
As you had felt, had you but seen this sight,
How we ‘mongst tables on the ground did lie,
That ran with blood. But my heart most did rue
To hear Cassandra, Priam’s daughter, cry,
Whom close beside me Clytemnestra slew.
Then, though I were at the last gasp, I tried
If groping I might find my fallen sword;
But the curs’d woman push’d it from my side.
I died; to close mine eyes she’d not afford.
Nothing so cruel as a woman yet
Did nature e’er produce; a thought so ill
In any other breast did never sit,
As her own loving husband’s blood to spill.
Yet this my wife, to the eternal shame
Of all the sex, (not only of the bad,
But ev’n of those that have no evil fame),
Betray’d my life, and of my death was glad.
Jove meant to Atreus’ seed, said I, great spite
By womankind. By Helen first. At Troy,
For her sake, many lost their lives in fight,
And Clytemnestra now did you betray.
Therefore, said Agamemnon, never trust
A woman more, although she be your own.
Tell her not all you think: somewhat you must;
And somewhat keep t’ yourself to her unknown.
But you, Ulysses, need not fear your wife,
Icareus’ daughter, fair Penelope;

She loves you better than to take your life:
A wife so wise will scorn disloyalty.
When we for Troy set forth together, then
She gave suck to your son; but he is grown
A man by this time, and takes place with men;
Is rich, and one day shall his father own,
And he and you at home embrace each other.
But I was not allow'd my son to see,
But was first murder'd by his wicked mother.
Now hear ye; if you will be rul'd by me,
Let no man know beforehand, when and where
You mean to land in Ithaca. Beware
Of suffering your bark in sight t' appear.
Remember still, women unfaithful are.
But tell me, have you nothing all this while
Heard of my son Orestes? Whether he
At Sparta with his uncle be, or Pyle?
For dead he is not, I know certainly.
Alas, said I, Atrides, how should I,
That wand'ring was at sea, hear any news
Whether alive or dead he be? Or why
Should I with tales uncertain you abuse?
Discoursing thus, and weeping there we stood,
When great Achilles' soul appear'd to us;
And with him also the two spirits good
Of stout Patroclus and Antilochus.
The soul of Ajax, son of Telamon,
Was also there, who 'mongst those warriors tall
The goodliest person was, except the son

Of Peleus, who did much excel them all.
Achilles drank, and presently me knew,
And said, Ulysses, what brought you to Hell?
What plot upon the dead you hither drew,
Where none but shades of wretched mortals dwell?
Achilles, said I, I was forc'd to come
T' inquire of th' wizard, old Tiresias,
What the Fates say about my going home,
Whether or no, and how 'twill come to pass.
For since I came from Troy I have not seen
Nor Ithaca, nor any Grecian shore;
For toss'd and cross'd at sea I still have been;
But you are now as well as heretofore.
Like any God we honour'd you at Troy,
And here among the ghosts you are obeyed.
Death hath not chang'd your state; you still enjoy
A regal power. To this Achilles said:
Talk not to me of honour here in Hell;
I'd rather serve a clown on earth for bread,
Than be, of all things incorporeal,
That are, or ever shall be, supreme head.
But tell me of my son, Neoptolemus;
Whether he came to Troy, and how he fought;
And of my aged father, Peleus,
Whether he keep his place, or be put out.
For since much time his vigour hath decay'd,
Some foe, it may be, hath usurp'd his place
In Pthia, and in Hellas where he sway'd,
And put him, with his people, in disgrace.

But were I now above, and strong as then,
When for the Greeks I fought at Ilium,
And slew so many of their bravest men,
And to my aged father's house should come;
If there I were, 'twould not be very long
Before I made some of their hearts to ache,
That go about to do my father wrong,
And would by force his honour from him take.
When he had done, I made him answer thus:
Concerning Peleus I can nothing say;
But of your son, stout Neoptolemus,
I know enough: 'twas I brought him to Troy
From Scyros' isle. In council, always he
First spake his mind, and never spake but well.
Nestor and I, sometimes, and only we,
Th' advice he gave were able to refel.
In fight, he sought no shelter in the throng,
But ever out he ran before the rest,
To show his courage and his strength among
Those foes that were in Troy esteem'd the best.
The names of all he slew I cannot tell;
They are too many. But 'twas by his sword
That great Eurypylus in battle fell,
Of all the Trojan aids the goodli'st lord,
Excepting Memnon. After, when we were
Within the wooden horse concealed, and I
The power had of ordering all things there,
I never saw your son to wipe his eye,
Or to wax pale, as many of us did.

He never longed to be set on land
From out the hole in which we all lay hid;
And to his hilt he often put his hand,
And often to his spear. And when at last
We won, and rifled had the town of Troy,
He home into his country safely passed,
His ship well-laden with his part o' th' prey.
And which is more, he came off safe and sound;
Though Mars each way threw deaths and wounds about
Amongst the crowd, he ne'er received wound,
Neither from them that shot, nor them that fought.
This said, the swift Achilles' soul retir'd,
Strutting into the mead of Asphodel,
Proud of his son, to hear what he desir'd.
Then other grieved souls their stories tell.
Only the soul of Ajax stood off mute
And sullen, because I did from him bear
Achilles' armour in that sad dispute,
Where Pallas and the Trojans judges were.
I would I had not had that victory,
Which cost the life of him that was the most
Admir'd by all, for form and chivalry,
Except Achilles, in the Argive host.
I gently to him spake Ajax, said I,
Forget that cursed armour now at last;
And since you dead are, let your anger die:
For why, the Gods determin'd had to cast
Those arms amongst us for a punishment,
Offended with us, what e'er was the matter,

And us'd them as an engine, with intent
Our greatest tower, which was yourself, to batter.
For whom the Argives did lament no less
Than for Achilles, Thetis' son. Come nigh,
And hear what I can answer, and suppress
Your mighty heart awhile. So ended I.
To this just nothing he replied, but went
Int' Erebus 'mongst other shadows dim;
Yet there, I think, he would have been content
To speak to me, if I to speak to him.
But I desired others' souls to see.
Then Minos there, the son of Jove, I saw,
With golden sceptre, dealing equity
To souls that stood and sat to hear the law.
Next after him, I saw the great Orion;
A mighty club he carried in his hand;
And hunted the wild boar, and bear, and lion,
Which when he lived he had kill'd on land.
There also saw I Titius. He lay
Upon his back, stretch'd out full acres nine.
He the fair Leto had, upon the way
To Pytho, injur'd; Leto, Jove's concubine.
Two vultures on his breast, on each side one,
Sate dipping of their beaks into his liver.
He stirreth not, but lets them still alone;
And thus devouring it, they stay for ever.
And Tantalus I saw up to the chin
In water clear, and longing sore to drink;
But as he bow'd himself to take it in,

Some devil always made the water sink.
Close o'er his head hung pleasant fruit, and ripe
Pears and pomegranates, olives, apples, figs,
Which ever when he ready was to gripe,
A sudden wind still whisk'd away the twigs.
And Sisyphus I saw, who 'gainst the hill,
With hands and feet, a heavy stone doth roll;
But when unto the top he brings it, still
The naughty stone falls back into the hole.
Then to 't he goes afresh, with no less pain
He heaves and sweats, and dusty is all o'er;
And when 'tis up, he labour'd has in vain,
For still it serves him as it did before.
Then Hercules I saw, — I mean his sprite,
For he is with th' immortal Gods above,
And taken has to wife Hebe the bright,
Daughter of Juno, and of mighty Jove.
The dead about him made a fearful cry,
Like frighted fowl. A golden belt he wore,
With wild beasts wrought, and slaughters cunningly,
The like shall never be, nor was before.
He saw, and knew me presently, and spake:
Renown'd Ulysses, why left you the light?
Alas, were you constrain'd to undertake
This task as I was, by a meaner wight?
Who, though Jove's son I was, did me constrain
Full many other labours t'undergo.
But he thought this would put me to most pain,
Th' infernal dog upon the earth to show.

I did it though, and dragg'd him up to th' light,
By Mercury's and by Athena's aid.
Having thus said, he vanish'd out of sight
'Mongst other phantoms. But I still there stay'd,
Hoping more heroes of th' old time to see;
And more had surely seen of heavenly race,
Theseus, Pirythous, whom t' had pleased me,
If longer I had dar'd to keep my place.
For then, from out of Hell, with hideous cry,
Thousands of souls about me gathered,
And frighted me; but most afraid was I,
Lest Proserpine should send out Gorgon's head.
Then went I to my ship and company,
And for a while our oars at sea we plied:
But after we were on the main, then we
A fair gale had, and pass'd the ocean wide.

LIB. XII.

His passage by the Syrens, and by Scylla and Charybdis. The sacrilege committed by his men in the isle Thrinacia. The destruction of his ship and men. How he swam on a plank nine days together, and came to Ogygia, where he stayed seven years.

THENCE OVER TH' ocean back we come away,
And at the isle Ææa we arrive.
There are the bowers of Aurora gay;
There 'tis that Phœbus doth the day revive:
And there we disembark upon the sand,
And having slept awhile, attend the day.
When day was come, my fellows I command
To fetch Elpenor's body dead away.
With wood from off a promontory near,
Weeping, his body we to ashes burn,
Together with his arms, and th' earth we rear,
To be a monument upon his urn;
And on the same we fix his oar upright.
These ceremonies done, came the divine
Circe, that knew we landed were that night.
Her maids brought to us bread, and meat, and wine;
And standing in the midst, Poor men, said she,
That come from Hell, and thither must again;
Twice-mortals, take your food, and merry be

With flesh and lusty wine, forget your pain.
To-morrow you shall sail again, and I
Will to you all your dangers open lay,
Lest you, by some malicious subtilty,
By land or sea, should perish by the way.
This pleas'd us well, and all day long we sate
Eating and drinking wine, until 'twas dark.
And somewhat e'er we saw it evening late,
My mates lay down to sleep beside the bark.
Then Circe led me by the hand aside,
And ask'd me all that I had seen in Hell;
Nor anything at all from her I hide.
'Tis well, said she. Now hear what I you tell:
First, you must pass the Sirens, who invite
All passengers that sail before the place
To land. But whosoever lands, that wight
Of 's wife and children ne'er more sees the face.
These Sirens in a meadow sit and sing,
Where dead men's bones in heaps about them lie
Rotting, and rivel'd skins lie scattering.
Pass on, and their enchanting music fly.
Command your mates to tie you to the mast;
And that, if you make signs to be set free,
They heed you not, but bind you still more fast.
That you alone may hear their melody,
His passage by the Syrens, and by Scylla and Charybdis.
Dam up your fellows' ears with chafed wax.
When you are gotten out of hearing quite,
And have the Sirens far off at your backs,

Another danger soon will come in sight.
Two ways there are; but which of them to take
I'll not advise you, both of them are naught.
Yourself upon the place your judgment make,
Of which I'll give you only a short draught.
Two rocks there be, that, with inclining brow,
Hang o'er the sea, which roaring runs between;
By th' name of Wanderers the Gods them know,
Because in changed posture they are seen.
Whereof the one does to such height ascend,
That never any birds that way take wing,
Nor fearful doves when they to Heaven tend,
Ambrosia to th' immortal Gods to bring.
One of these rocks doth vanish now and then,
But Jove still sets another in its stead.
This way, ne'er ship did safely carry men,
But dash'd was 'gainst the rocks, and perished.
The good ship Argo only pass'd that way
To and from Colchos safely; yet that, too,
Had perish'd, but that Juno did convey
The same, for love she bare to Jason, through.
The other rock unmov'd, with pointed head,
Pierceth the clouds, and reaches to the sky
In winter, and in summer 's covered
And wrapped up in mists perpetually.
Nor could a mortal man climb up unto't,
Although he were indued with twenty hands,
And with as many nimble feet to boot,
So smooth it is, and so upright it stands.

I' th' midst o' th' rock you 'll see a cavern dark
That looketh westward. That way you must row.
The mouth o' th' cave is more above your bark
Than th' youngest man can shoot to with a bow.
There 'tis that Scylla dwells and barks: her voice
Like to a lion's whelp's voice is; but she
A mighty monster is; 'twould not rejoice
A God, much less a man, her shape to see.
Twelve feet she has in all, and ugly ones.
Six huge long necks; and to each neck a head;
And in each head for teeth sh' has rows of bones,
And every row of them envenomed.
Half of her body in the cave she hides;
But all her heads she putteth out, and watches
For dog-fish, dolphins, and what fish besides
The sea affords, and whales she sometimes catches.
Ne'er did bold sailor boast, that pass'd that way,
That he had 'scaped safely by her den;
Or that a mouth of her's did want its prey,
But from him snatch'd away some of his men.
The rock that's opposite is not so high,
But there the passage is exceeding narrow.
For you, Ulysses, if you please to try,
From side to side can eas'ly shoot an arrow.
Out of this rock grows a great sycamore,
Under the which Charybdis hidden lies,
And suddenly the water does devour,
And suddenly again she makes it rise.
Thrice in a day the water rises high,

And thrice a day again the same doth fall.
But when it falls, take heed you be not nigh;
Keep Scylla side; better lose six than all.
When she had made an end, Goddess, said I,
Tell me, I pray you, when I have got free
From th'evil which Charybdis means me, why
On Scylla I may not avenged be?
Fie, fie, quoth she, are you at fighting still?
Dare you against the Gods oppose your might?
For Scylla is an everlasting ill.
Row on apace, and save yourselves by flight.
'Gainst such a monster, remedy there's none,
But row as fast as e'er you can away.
For if you stay to put your armour on,
She'll stoop again, and take another prey.
Row swiftly on, and to Cratais cry,
That in her belly the foul monster bore,
And she will keep her in as you go by,
That she shall not assault you any more.
Next at Thrinacia isle you shall arrive,
Where feed the Sun's broad-horned kine and sheep,
Sev'n herds there be, in each one ten times five,
As many flocks, which Sol's two daughters keep,
Phætusa and Lampetio divine;
Their mother was Neæra, that did bear
And bring them up, and to them did assign
The keeping of their father's cattle there.
These if you suffer quietly to feed,
You shall get home again, though with some pain;

But if you hurt them, know it is decreed
Your ship and men shall perish in the main;
And though yourself you save, your ship you'll lose,
And mates, and in your passage find delay.
This said, the rosy-finger'd Morning rose,
And Circe up the island went her way.
But I went to my ship, and call'd my crew
To come aboard. Aboard they quickly come,
And sitting each man in his order due,
With stroke of oars they make the grey sea foam.
The Goddess Circe also was so kind,
As when we were gone off, and sails had spread,
To fill them with a favourable wind.
So sate we while the steersman governed.
Then to my mates with heavy heart I spake:
Not one or two of you alone must hear
What Circe said, but all, that you may take
Your own advice, since 'tis a common fear.
You must not hear the Sirens' melody,
But row with all your might till we be pass'd.
To me alone, she gives that liberty,
But so as first you bind me to the mast.
Bind me you must upright both hand and foot,
And so as I may not the knot unknit:
And if I wink upon you to undo't,
Then take more cord and bind me faster yet.
Whilst I my fellows thus informing stood,
The island of the Sirens came in sight:
For nimble was our ship, and the wind good.

But suddenly we were becalmed quite;
Some demon sure had laid the waves asleep.
Then took we in our sails, and laid them by,
And with our oars in hand provok'd the deep,
And in a milky path we forward ply.
Then from a ball of wax I pinch a bit,
Chafe it, and into th' ears of one it put;
And so to all in order as they sit.
Which soon was done, the weather being hot.
Then straight they rise and bind me to the mast
At th' arms and feet: the knot behind they tie;
And then upon their seats themselves they plac'd,
And row'd till to the island we were nigh.
When to the island we were come so nigh,
As that a man that holloes may be heard,
The Sirens, knowing when we should come by,
Had tun'd themselves, and had their song prepar'd.
Come, come, much prais'd Ulysses, come away;
The brightest glory of the Greeks, come near:
No mortal man did ever come this way,
That did not to our music lend an ear;
Delight they found, and wisdom carried hence.
Stay, stay your good black ship, forbear awhile
To beat the sea; please and inform your sense.
Come disembark yourselves upon our isle.
We know what feats of arms were done at Troy
Between the Greeks and Trojans all along:
We know what's done on th' whole earth everyday.
Come, come a'land, and listen to our song.

And this they sung with so much harmony
And sweetness in their voices, that I fain
The passage by Scylla and Charybdis.
Would have recovered my liberty,
And to them wink'd, to be set loose again.
But 'twould not be. My mates regard my words,
And not my winks, and sit still at the oar.
Eurylochus and Perimede bring cords,
And bind me harder than they did before.
When we had left the Sirens at our backs,
So far as not to hear them any more,
My fellows from their ears pull out the wax,
And me unto my liberty restore.
We had not sailed far, when there appear'd
An angry sea before us all in smoke;
And thumping of the mighty waves we heard
Upon the stubborn rocks at every stroke.
Besides, the sea so mighty loud did roar,
As with one dismal hum it fill'd the ear,
And made my mates each one let fall his oar,
So much their senses were benumb'd with fear.
Still stood the bark. Then I among them go
With gentle words, new courage to convey
Into their failing hearts, to make them row;
And passing by, to every one I say:
My friends, we all have many dangers pass'd,
And greater much than what we now do fear.
Remember how from Polyphemus vast,
By my good conduct, we deliver'd were.

I do not doubt but you remember it:
My counsel, therefore, also now obey.
Row close along the shore, the Gods may yet
Deliver us, but by no other way.
But you that have the guiding of the ship,
Steersman, to you I speak, mark what I say;
Steer her without the smoke; for if she slip
Aside, though little, we are cast away.
This said, my fellows speedily obey'd.
Of th' monster Scylla not a word I told;
Lest they should throw away their oars, dismay'd,
And for their shelter run into the hold.
But Circe's counsel I had quite forgot.
I arm'd myself, and took into my hand
Two spears, though she expressly had said not;
And looking upwards, at the head I stand.
But she appeared not. I look'd so high
And long upon the hideous rock, my sight
Began to fail, and now we were close by
That dismal straight, which doth us all affright.
Here Scylla stands, and there Charybids dire
Lies vomiting the sea, which sings and dances
Like water in a kettle o'er the fire,
And vapours to the highest rocks advances.
The sacrilege committed in the isle Thrinacia.
But when the sea it sucketh in again,
It sounds like thunder in the hollow stone,
And we could see the bottom very plain;
Sandy it was, and black to look upon.

Whilst we our eyes upon Charybdis fix,
And stand amazed at the horrid sight,
Suddenly Scylla stoop'd, and snatch'd up six
Of the best men I had to row or fight.
I from the ship that never stirr'd my eye,
Soon saw their sprawling arms and legs i' th' air,
And heard them lamentably to me cry,
And name me in their uttermost despair.
As fishers in a horn mix fraud and food,
And from the bank at th' end of a long wand,
To catch the fry cast it into the flood,
Then pluck them up, and throw them on the land:
So lifted were my mates. Of my mishaps
This was the saddest I did ever see,
When she my men cham'd in her ugly chaps,
Roaring and holding out their hands to me.
From Scylla we unto the island row,
Where feeding were Sol's sacred sheep and kine.
Before we landed I could hear them low;
Which brought into my mind the prophesy
Of old Tiresias the Theban bard,
That counsel'd me this island for to shun.
Of Circe also I like counsel heard,
And not to land i' th' Island of the Sun.
Then speaking to my fellows, Friends, said I,
This island sacred is to Sol; this place
Tiresias and Circe both bid fly,
And not to disembark in any case.
For if we do, for certain they declare

The greatest mischief that e'er men befel:
Therefore keep out to seaward, and beware
Of landing here, and then we shall be well.
But then Eurylochus to me began:
You have, Ulysses, a hard heart, quoth he;
There is no labour but you bear it can;
Your limbs of stubborn steel composed be.
But you consider not your mates are tir'd
With their continual tugging at the oar,
And that refreshment is and sleep requir'd,
Which is not to be had but on the shore.
But you would have us wander in the night,
When in the night the greatest winds arise,
The bane of ships; and when depriv'd of light,
To save ourselves we can no way devise.
What if great winds should blow from south or west,
Which often happens, though their king not know,
Or not consent? Therefore I think it best
To-night to sup ashore, — to-morrow row.
So said Eurylochus, and was commended
By all my mates: and presently I knew
One demon or another had intended
To ruin me, together with my crew.
Then said I to Eurylochus, 'Twere vain
To strive against so many men alone.
But you shall take an oath that you 'll abstain
From hurting of the cattle of the Sun.
Of Circe's meat there's left us yet good store.
This said, they took the oath; which having done,

They put into the harbour, and ashore
They sup. And when their hunger now was gone,
Their mates remembering, that in th' hollow rock
By th' monster Scylla were devour'd, they weep
And wail, and with their hands they knock
Their breasts, and in that posture fell asleep.
The stars had climb'd a third part of the sky,
When with a whirlwind Jove together fetch'd
The clouds from ev'ry part, and suddenly
On sea and land a dismal night was stretch'd.
And when the rosy-finger'd Morning came,
Our ship we to a hollow cave advance,
Wherein the sea-nymphs seats and couches have,
And where they are accustomed to dance.
Thither I call'd my mates, and said again:
Friends, we have meat and drink aboard, be wise,
And from the herds and flocks of Sol abstain,
Who heareth all we say, and all espies.
To this did my companions all assent.
But for a month there blew no other wind
Than south and east; so that we there were pent
I' th' island longer than we had design'd.
My mates, whilst they had bread and meat aboard,
Forbore to meddle with the sacred kine,
And fetch'd in what the island did afford
Of fish and fowl, to have wherewith to dine.
Up I into the island went aside,
The conduct of th' immortal Gods t' implore,
That some of them t' would please to be my guide,

And me unto my country to restore.
And in a place defended from the wind
I wash'd my hands; and then with tears and sighs
Before the Gods I poured out my mind,
And they a sweet sleep poured on my eyes.
Meantime Eurylochus bad counsel gives
To his companions. All deaths, quoth he,
Are hateful to what thing soever lives;
But death by hunger is the worst can be.
Let's kill some of the fattest of these cows,
And sacrifice unto the Gods on high;
And to appease the Sun, let's all make vows
To build a temple to his Deity,
Enrich'd with gifts. If not content with this,
For a few cows displeas'd, he seek our death,
For once to gape and die, far better 'tis
Than strive with hunger till we lose our breath.
This said, my fellows all his counsel take,
And chase Sol's sacred herds, that graz'd hard by;
And then for recompense their vows they make
To build a temple to his Deity.
But when they made their vows, chaplets they wear
Of tender leaves pluck'd from the spreading oak.
White barley they had none, the which men bear,
When in their danger they the Gods invoke.
After the vow perform'd, the kine they flay,
And take their thighs and cover them with fat,
And one of them upon the other lay,
To burn upon the altar. After that,

Their offering of drink they pour'd upon
The altar, as the sacrifice they burn;
It ought t' have been of wine, but having none,
They pour'd on water fair, which serv'd the turn.
When th' entrails by my fellows eaten were,
And fire consumed had the sacrifice,
The rest they roast on spits and made good cheer.
Just then it was that sleep forsook my eyes,
And back again I walk'd down tow'rds the shore;
But coming near, perceiv'd the vapour rise
Of roasted meat. Then to the Gods I roar:
You give me sleep, and take away my life;
So strange a thing my mates the while have done.
Swiftly Lampetio to heav'n flies,
And carries up the news unto the Sun.
The Sun in choler all the Gods defies,
Unless they right him of his injury.
Jove, father, and you other powers divine,
Revenge me of Ulysses' company,
That have so insolently slain my kine.
It was my joy to see them in the morn,
And in the evening e'er I went to bed.
Revenge me, oh ye Gods! of this their scorn,
Or I'll go down to Hell and light the dead.
No, Phœbus, answer'd Jove, hold up your light,
For Gods and mortal men to see their way.
As for the men that did you this despite,
Their ship at sea with lightning I'll destroy.
At this discourse in heaven was Hermes by,

And heard his father make this sad decree;
The destruction of the ship, &c.
And he again told all this history
To the fair Calypso, and she told it me.
When to my fellows I was come, I rate
Them all full bitterly, and one by one;
But all in vain, for now it was too late:
The Gods by signs detested what was done.
The skins did creep, the flesh o' th' spits did low,
Both raw and roast. Six days in th' isle we staid,
Feasting on Phœbus' kine, the seventh we row;
For then the fury of the wind was laid.
When we were out at sea we fix our mast,
And up into the wind our sails we draw,
And had the isle so far behind us cast,
That nothing else but sky and sea we saw.
Then Jove, when far from land he saw our ship,
Just over it a dismal black cloud hung,
Which made it dark as night upon the deep,
And then our good ship run not very long.
For presently from west a sudden blast
Came roaring in, and vehemently strains
And breaks the cordage that upheld the mast,
Which falling down, beats out the steerer's brains:
He drops into the sea. The mast hangs o'er
At stern. The yards lie cross the sink:
And all the while both heaven and sea did roar
With thunder loud, which made our hearts to shrink.
And by and by into the ship Jove threw

His thunder-bolt, which whirl'd it round about.
It smelt of sulphur rank; and all my crew
Into the sea it suddenly threw out.
They like to gulls from wave to wave were borne,
But I kept still aboard, till at the last
The rudder from astern the ship was torn,
And fell into the sea, and with't the mast.
The mast had hanging on it broken ropes,
Wherewith I bound them both together fast,
And sate upon them as my latest hopes,
Until the fury of the storm was past.
The storm now laid, th' wind came about to th' south,
And carried me before it, till the sun
Next morning rose; and then we were i' th' mouth
Of dire Charybdis, just when she begun
To swallow up the sea. Then up leap'd I,
And on a spreading sycamore laid hold,
But to't I could not climb; the boughs so high
I could not reach, and far off was the root.
There by the hands I hung, expecting when
Charybdis should cast up the sea, and bring
The rudder and the mast to th' top agen.
Meanwhile, in th' air I patiently swing.
What time the judge ariseth from his seat,
Ending the brabbles of contentious men,
And all come weary home to take their meat,
Then came my mast and rudder up agen;
And I into the sea close by them drop.
Then having soon recovered them, again

I place myself astride, once more, a-top,
And with my hands I rowed on the main.
If Scylla this had seen, undoubtedly
I had been lost. But 'twas the grace of Jove,
That all this while she did not me espy,
But kept herself retir'd i' th' rock above.
Thus wander'd I at sea nine days outright;
O' th' tenth at night the Gods brought me to land
In th' isle Ogygia, where Calypso bright
Receiv'd me with a charitable hand.
But how she treated me, I need not say;
You and the queen already know it well,
From the relation I made yesterday;
Nor do I love the same tale twice to tell.

LIB. XIII.

Ulysses sleeping is set ashore at Ithaca by the Phœacians, and waking knows it not. Pallas in form of a shepherd helps to hide his treasure. The ship that conveyed him turned into a rock; and Ulysses by Pallas is instructed what to do, and transformed into an old beggar-man.

THIS SAID, ALL silent and delighted were.
Alcinous then said, Ulysses, since
You safely to me are arrived here,
You shall not lose your way in going hence.
But, princes, you that daily with me sit,
Drinking good wine and hearing music sweet,
And given to the stranger have what's fit,
I'll tell you what yet farther I think meet.
Garments he has a chest full, and good store
Of gold, plate, and of other gifts he has.
Take my advice. Let each man give him more,
A cauldron, or a three-foot pot of brass.
I know to each man 'twill be too great largess,
But by the people's contribution
We'll make amends; the town shall bear the charges.
The motion pleas'd, and 'twas agreed upon.
Then went they every man to his repose.
And soon as morning did again appear,
Aboard the ship the vessels they dispose,

Ulysses sleeping is set ashore at Ithaca.
Alcinous himself directed where.
And then into the palace they return,
And sacrifice to Jove a well-fed beast;
The thighs upon the altar there they burn,
And with the rest they make themselves a feast.
Demodocus before them sung and play'd,
Who for his art was famous in the town.
Ulysses to the sun look'd up, and stay'd
Longing and wishing that it would go down;
As one that hath at plough been all the day,
Hungry his belly, feeble is his knee,
Beholds the setting of the sun with joy;
So glad Ulysses was sunset to see.
Then to Alcinous and all the rest,
Offer, said he, unto the Gods their wine.
I have already all that I request,
And many gifts, which may the pow'rs divine
Make happy to me. Let me now depart,
That I may see my dear wife and my friends.
And blest may you stay here with joy at heart,
Comfort your wives, and obtain all your ends;
And strong and worthy children may you have,
Nor 'mongst the people trouble or disease.
This said, they prais'd him all, and counsel gave
The stranger to conduct safe o'er the seas.
Alcinous then call'd for wine, and bad
Pontonous present it to each one,
Until unto the Gods all offer'd had,

That so Ulysses the sooner might be gone.
Pontonous brought wine, and carried it
From man to man, and each man drank his cup,
Blessing the Gods in order as they sit.
When all had drunk, Ulysses standeth up,
And speaking to queen Arete, he said:
Happy for ever may you be, O queen.
I take my leave. Be you for ever joy'd
In king Alcinous as you have been,
And in your children and your people all.
And when he this had said, away he went.
Alcinous did then a squire call,
Whom with Ulysses to the ship he sent.
Arete to her women sent. One brought
Fine bread and store of black wine of the best;
Another brought with her a cloak and coat;
Another brought, to lay them in, a chest,
Which by the mariners were quickly stow'd
Aboard the good ship, with the wine and bread.
And for Ulysses many rugs they strew'd
O' th' deck, astern, with linen at his head.
And then aboard he went. When he was lain,
Their seats they take, and parted from the strand,
Reclining dash'd with oars the liquid plain,
While sleep Ulysses bound had foot and hand.
As when four horses gallop o'er a plain,
The way runs swiftly by the coach's side;
So did the good ship mount upon the main,
And to the stern the water swiftly glide,

A hawk could hardly with it have kept pace,
A hawk that of all fowl the swiftest flies;
So swiftly ran the ship on th' ocean's face,
And with her breast the rising water slice;
Bearing a man for wisdom like a God,
That pass'd had fearful billows on the deep,
And many bloody paths of war had trod,
The thought whereof was now removed by sleep.
Above the earth now risen was the star,
Day's messenger, and brightest of the sky.
The ship was then from Ithaca not far.
A port there is, which from a deity
Is called Phorcys, a sea-deity.
Two jetting rocks defend it from the wind;
When once within, a ship will safely lie,
There needs no cord a floating ship to bind.
At the port's head grows a large olive-tree,
And near it an obscure and pleasant cave,
Where the Nereiades delight to be,
And there they bowls of stone and beakers have;
The bees make honey there. Besides, there be
Long beams of stone, whereon the nymphs do weave
Rich purple garments, wonderful to see,
And fountains which their running never leave.
Two doors there are, one north, men go that way;
The other to the south more sacred is,
Th' immortals here go in, and none but they;
The Gods have to themselves reserved this.
All this Ulysses' convoy knew before;

And here the ship arrived, safely lands,
And half her length lay dry upon the shore,
Such was the strength of those Phæacian hands.
The lusty seamen, when they landed were,
First took Ulysses, sleeping as he lay,
Bedding and all, and to the land him bear,
And lay him from the sea a little way:
Then they unship his goods, gold, vestures, brass,
Gifts given him by the Phæacians;
Which at the foot of the olive-tree they place,
Out of the way, lest passengers should chance
To steal them while Ulysses was asleep.
When this was done, the convoy stayed not,
But rowed out the ship into the deep.
The ship that conveyed him turned to a rock.
Nor Neptune had Ulysses yet forgot,
But said to Jupiter, complaining then:
What honour from the Gods can I expect,
When the Phæacians, that are but men,
(Although descended from me), me neglect?
For though Ulysses I destroyed not,
Because his coming home you had decreed;
Yet that he should be brought home thus, ne'er thought,
Asleep, and painless, and with so much speed,
Enrich'd with gold, and brass, and vestures store,
As much as had come to his share at Troy.
This the Phæacians have done, and more,
In this licentiousness they take a joy.
Then answered Jove: Neptune, what's this you say?

The Gods neglect you not. It cannot be,
That are the eldest and of greatest sway
Of any of them. If man injure thee,
To take revenge enough your own pow'r is.
I will not hinder you, do what you please.
To Jupiter then Neptune answer'd this:
I could, O Jove, have been reveng'd with ease,
But that I fear'd you would offended be.
And now I'll tell you what I mean to do.
As soon as I the ship returning see,
I'll fix it, that they may no more do so;
Besides, their city with a hill I'll hide.
but, said Jupiter, were it my case,
When from the city people all espied
The ship hard by, I would a rock there place
In likeness of a ship not far from land,
To make men wonder, and then round about
The city make a mighty mountain stand.
This said by Jove, the God of Seas went out
To Scheria, where the Phæacians
First planted were. The ship came swiftly on,
And on it Neptune laid his mighty hands,
And roots it in the sea, turn'd into stone.
The rowers t' one another say, What's this?
Who hath our good ship fixed in the water?
And yet above the water still it is.
Thus said they, but knew nothing of the matter.
Then spake Alcinous. Performed, said he,
Is what long since I heard my father say,

That Neptune angry was that strangers we,
Whoe'er they were, do to their homes convey,
And threatened had with a great hill to hide
The city, and destroy the passage-boat.
This by my father then was prophecied,
And now, you see, at last about 'tis brought.
Therefore be rul'd by me. Convoy no more;
Ulysses by Pallas is instructed what to do.
But let us unto Neptune sacrifice
Twelve chosen bullocks, and his grace implore
To set no hill there. So did he advise.
And then to Neptune they their prayers make
Standing at th' altar, king and princes all.
And now Ulysses lying was awake,
But to his mind the place could not recal;
For Pallas had about him cast a mist,
That at his coming he might not be known;
But she herself instruct him as she list,
Till he the suitors all had overthrown.
All things seem'd to him other than they were,
Paths, highways, creeks, havens, trees, and rocks;
And rising up he was he knew not where,
And with his open hand his thigh he knocks.
Ay me, said he, whither am I come now?
To civil, or to wild and lawless men?
Where shall I hide my treasure? Whither go?
Would I were at Phæacia agen.
To other friends I might have gone from thence,
And t' Ithaca obtained a convoy,

Here for my treasure I see no defence.
Left here to others they will be a prey.
I see the princes of Phæacia
Are not so just as I take them to be.
They promis'd to set me at Ithaca,
But have to some place else transported me.
Jove, that sees all, and punisheth the ill,
Will be revenged also of these men.
But come, my presents number now I will,
The seamen may have ta'en some back agen.
His garments and his plate then number'd he,
And nothing missing was of all his pelf.
Then walk'd he softly along by the sea,
Lamenting and bewailing of himself.
And then came Pallas to him. She had on
The body of a shepherd young and tender,
As if she had of some prince been the son;
Lin'd was his coat, the thread was fine and slender,
With dart in hand, and fine shoes on his feet.
Ulysses, who beheld her, was much joy'd,
And forth himself advanced, her to meet.
And first he to her spake, and thus he said:
Joy to you be, and good-will towards me;
Save for me these my goods, and save me too.
You are the first I meet here; at your knee
I bow myself, as men bow Gods unto.
Tell me, I pray you, true: What land is this?
What town? Th' inhabitants what men?
An isle, or of the continent a piece?

And in the form of a shepherd, helps to hide his treasure.
To this the Goddess answered agen.
Simple you are, or very far hence dwell,
To ask what country this is. For ’tis not
A place obscure; for known ’tis very well
Both east and west, though but a little spot,
And rugged ground, nto fit for galloping;
Yet corn it bears abundantly and wine;
And is well watered both with dew and spring,
And nourisheth great herds of goats and kine.
Of wood of ev’ry sort there is good store.
Though from Achæa far men say is Troy,
Yet Ithaca is talk’d of on that shore.
These words unto Ulysses were great joy.
And to the Goddess then he answered:
(Falsely; on fables keeping still his hold,
As one that always plots hath in his head):
I have, said he, of Ithaca been told,
Far hence in Crete, and now am thither come
With these my goods; but leaving to my child
About as much as I brought out from home;
And here I am alone, a man exil’d.
For of Idomeneus I kill’d the son,
Orsilochus, for swiftness of his feet
So excellent, there was not any one
That could out-run him in the isle of Crete.
Because I had refused a command
Under his father at the siege of Troy,
And would command my own, he took in hand

To have depriv'd me of my share o' th' prey,
Which to my dangers and my deeds was due.
For which, by night, with one companion,
Near the highway, I with my spear him slew,
And in the dark escap'd when I had done.
And to Phœnicia by sea I went;
And hired with a good part of my prey
To Pylus or to Elis to be sent.
But adverse winds forc'd us another way.
And wandering, there arrived in the night.
And straight into this port we brought the bark,
Ne'er thought of food, though very well we might,
But went ashore, and lay down in the dark,
And there I slept. The mariners meanwhile
Take out my goods and lay them on the shore,
And back unto Sidonia they sail,
And after that I never saw them more.
At this the goddess smil'd, and strok'd his head,
And in a woman's shape before him stood,
Of stature tall and like to one well bred.
The craft that catches you had need be good.
You cannot, though at home, your wiles forego,
Pallas helps to hide his treasure.
And your feign'd stories, though there be no need,
So close they stick to you from top to toe.
But now no more of that; for 'tis agreed,
'Mongst mortals you, amongst immortals I,
For counsel and invention excel.
Did you not know me, that perpetually

Have at your need assisted you so well?
And now am come to help you to secure
The rich Phæacian presents you have here,
And tell you what at home you must endure?
Affronts and scorns, you shall find many there.
Then said Ulysses, Difficult it is
For any mortal man, though very wise,
To know a God, that can their form dismiss,
And, when they will, put on a new disguise.
When th' Argive army was besieging Troy,
Goddess, I know how gracious you were then;
But after (the town sack'd) we came away,
And scatter'd had the Gods our ships and men,
And I was wand'ring on the ocean wide,
I never saw you, never had your aid,
Save at Phæacia you were pleas'd to guide
Me to the town, and hasten me dismay'd.
But I beseech you (for still do I doubt
This is not Ithaca that I am at,
But some place else, and that you go about
With comforts feign'd my sorrows to abate)
Tell me if this my country be indeed?
Pallas said then, Suspicious still you are;
I cannot, therefore, leave you in your need,
Since wise you be, and willing to beware.
Another man that had been long away,
Had straight gone home to see his wife and son;
But that for you is not the safest way,
Nor had it yet been opportunely done.

Know how she'll take it first. She keeps within,
And spends in weeping both the night and day.
I know full well the Fates his coming spin,
But that his mates shall first be cast away.
But with my uncle Neptune had no mind
To be at odds, that in such choler is,
For making of his son the Cyclops blind.
But come, I'll shew you Ithaca. First, this
The port of Phorcys is; this th' olive-tree,
There near it is the gloomy cavern, where
The nymphs Naiades invoked be,
And by you in that cave much worshipp'd were.
The hill so cloth'd with wood is Neriton.
This said, the mist dissolves, and then Ulysses
His native country joyful looks upon,
And falling on his knees, the soil he kisses.
And then to the Naiades he pray'd,
Hail! Daughters of high Jove, Naiades,
Ne'er to have seen you more I was afraid;
But oft we shall again, if Pallas please
To give me life, and prosper my dear son,
Your altar fill with gifts as heretofore.
The Goddess Pallas, when his pray'r was done,
Answer'd, Let that thought trouble you no more.
But come, let's now see how your goods to save,
Now presently. 'Twere well that they were laid
Within some rock at bottom of the cave.
Then went she in, and caves in cave survey'd.
Ulysses brought into the grot his store,

Garments, and heavy brass, and golden plate;
Which Pallas plac'd, and laid a rock o' th' door,
And then in counsel both together sate
The suitors to destroy. Pallas first spake.
Ulysses, said she, think on how you may
Your just revenge of the proud suitors take,
That use your house and substance as their prey;
That marry would your wife by force. But she
Still keeps them off with hopes and promises,
Expecting your return continually,
But than of marriage thinks of nothing less.
Oh! said Ulysses, but for your advice,
I died had as Agamemnon did.
But now, O Pallas, find out some device,
How of the suitors best I may be rid,
And by me stand, inspiring courage stout,
As when we pull'd Troy's head-gear off her head.
For then to master them I should not doubt,
Three hundred though they were. Then answered
The Goddess Pallas: By you I will stand;
You cannot fight, but I shall of it know,
And bring unto you such a lucky hand,
That with their blood and brains the ground shall flow.
Come, first I'll make you to men pass unknown:
I'll shrink your skin, that 's now so fair and fresh,
And from your head take off that hair so brown,
And cover will with such array your flesh,
As men shall hate the sight of; then your eyes
I'll shrivel up, that were so full and bright,

That in this habit th' woo'rs may you despise,
Nor your wife know you standing in her sight.
Then go you to the master of your swine,
That loves you, and your son, and your consort;
And to direct you to him take this sign:
He 's at Crow-rock, thither the swine resort,
And t' Arethusa's well; for why, the oaken
Ulysses transformed into an old beggar-man.
Berries, with that sweet water, make them fat.
Stay there till to him you your mind have spoken,
And well inform'd yourself of your estate.
To Lacedæmon I the while will go,
To call your son Telemachus away,
Who thither went by sea, that he might know
What Menelaus there of you could say.
Then said Ulysses, Goddess, since you could
Have told him all yourself, why did you not?
Meant you that also he be wand'ring should,
While other men stay feeding on his lot?
Trouble not you yourself with him, said she:
I sent him, and went with him with intent
To show him to the world abroad. And he
At Sparta treated is to his content.
'Tis true, the suitors with a ship are gone
To wait for, and to kill him by the way;
But I believe, before that that be done,
Some will lie low that now your goods destroy.
And as she spake, she strok'd him with her wand,
And rivel'd seem'd his skin (which was before

So sleek and fair) as if it had been tann’d;
And gray his hair, rivel’d his eyes all o’er.
And then she gave him an ill-favoured rag,
Torn, foul, and smutted filthily with soot,
And over that the pill’d skin of a stag,
And satchel full of holes then added to ‘t
With twisted-string. And up their counsel brake.
The Goddess Pallas then to Sparta past,
To bid Telemachus his leave to take
Of Menelaus, and go home with haste.

LIB. XIV.

Ulysses in form of a beggar goes to Eumæus, the master of his swine, where he is well used, and tells a feigned story, and informs himself of the behaviour of the wooers.

BUT HE IN rugged way, o'er mountains steep,
Through woods obscure unto Eumæus went,
Whose office was the herds of swine to keep,
And of his servants was most diligent;
And found him in the porch before the door.
The house was handsome, and high-built, and great,
Nor to it was adjoined any more;
Well fenc'd from wind it was, and a warm seat,
Built by himself, on purpose for the swine
Ulysses' entertainment by his swine-master.
Of his good lord, Ulysses, that was gone,
With stone that hewn was from the rocky mine,
Besides those of Laertes and his son;
And with a quickset-hedge enclosed round,
And pales of heart of oak; the hedge without
Set close together, and stuck deep i' th' ground.
And thus the house was fenced round about;
Within the court twelve lodgings were for swine,
And ev'ry one of them held five times ten;
And there the female and the teeming lyen.

The males lay out, but much diminisht then;
For the proud suitors eaten had the rest,
Eumæus having sent in every day
One of the fattest of the herd and best,
And yet three hundred and threescore were they.
Near to the swine, four dogs were ever lying,
Like to wild beasts, and by Eumæus fed.
Himself was leather to his foot applying,
Made of a good cow-hide well coloured;
Three dogs attending were the herd; the fourth
Convoying was a swine unto the woo'rs;
The other three ran fiercely bawling forth,
When they Ulysses saw come near the doors;
Ulysses wisely then his staff lets fall,
And presently sits down upon the ground;
But had Eumæus not come in withal,
An unbeseeming fortune he had found;
Who letting fall the leather for his shoe,
Running and rating came in to his aid:
And snatch'd-up stones abundance at them threw,
And then he to Ulysses spake, and said,
Old man, yourself almost to death you brought,
By those accursed dogs, and me to shame;
As if my sorrow great enough were not,
But that there must be added to it blame.
While sitting here, I for my master weep,
And feed his swine for other men to eat;
He somewhere swallow'd up is in the deep,
Or wanders up and down for want of meat.

But come, old man, into the lodge let's go,
That when of meat and wine you have your fill,
You may then tell me whence you are, and who,
And how much you have suffered of ill.
This said, he led him in and made him sit,
And under him he store of rushes laid;
O'er that a goatskin, thick with hair was it,
Of which a speckled wild goat had been flay'd.
Ulysses, glad to see the man so kind
And very hearty, answered and said,
May all your pray'rs like entertainment find
With Jove for whatsoever you have pray'd.
Stranger, then said Eumæus, it was never
My custom any stranger to neglect;
The poor and stranger are in God's hand ever.
Few are my gifts, and but of small effect,
For servants of young masters stand in fear;
And by the Gods my old one fast is bound
From coming home. 'Twas he that gave me here
A house and fair possession of ground,
As much as fits a master to his swain,
And help'd me too contentedly to wive,
Which taketh off a great part of my pain;
Also the Gods have made my labour thrive.
How happy had I been if he had stay'd!
Accursed be that Helen and her kin;
For, for Atrides' sake he anchors weigh'd,
Himself much misery engaging in.
Having thus said, he girded on his coat,

And fetch’d in two young pigs; not long he staid,
But kill’d, singed, jointed, roasted, piping hot
Before Ulysses with the spits he laid,
Then strews them over with the flour of wheat,
And in an ivy bowl he tempers wine,
And sitting o’er against him bids him eat.
Eat, says he, servant’s food, the lesser swine;
The great ones are the pamper’d suitors’ fare;
The blessed Gods hate evil works, and love
Them that do well; but these men little care
For mercy or for vengeance from above;
Yet enemies and lawless men, when they
Disbark upon another’s land, and there
With prey their ship have laden, come away,
And of revenge stand always in great fear.
But these men know not, nor by voice divine
Assured are, Ulysses now is dead;
Yet neither will go hence, nor have design
To seek by lawful ways his wife to wed;
But stay and waste his substance without hoe.
For not a day went o’er their heads that they
Did sacrifice one only beast or two;
And wine abundance drink and cast away.
Ulysses his estate and wealth was such,
In Greece nor Argos, no prince in Epire,
Nor twenty had in Ithaca so much;
And if to have it reckon’d you desire,
Upon the Continent twelve herds of kine,
Twelve herds of goats, as many flocks of sheep,

As many swine-houses replete with swine,
Which herdsmen of the country there did keep;
And here, upon the island's farthest end
There be eleven herds of goats; of these
The goat-keeper does ev'ry day one send,
The best of all, the suitors proud to please;
And daily I the best of all my swine.
Thus said he: but Ulysses silent sate,
Eating his meat, and drinking of his wine,
And plotting in his head the suitors' fate.
When he had supp'd, Eumæus to the brim
Fill'd up his cup with wine; Ulysses then,
Glad that Eumæus so well treated him,
Drank, and the cup deliv'ring back again,
Friend, says he, that so rich and valiant man,
Your master, that was for Atrides lost,
If I have seen him, do you think you can
Know him? God knows I have seen many a coast.
Then answer'd he: There is no stranger able
Nor with his wife nor son to get belief;
The news they tell both take but for a fable,
Invented by their want to get relief;
Many poor men come to Penelope,
And make her weep in vain with tales untrue:
And where you think you shall rewarded be
With coat or other garment, so can you.
But he's devour'd by beasts or fowls at land;
Or fish at sea have on his body fed;
And on the shore his bones lie clad in sand.

But howsoe'er it be, the man is dead;
And to his friends has sorrow left behind,
But to me chiefly, who, go where I please,
Shall never such another master find,
Nor ever be again at so much ease;
No, though I should unto my country go,
And parents, that have got and nourish'd me;
To see them though I wish, I long not so
As I Ulysses long again to see;
Whom, though now absent, I call by his name,
He was so kind, and took such care of me,
That of such small respect I feel some shame;
A second father he should called be.
Friend, said Ulysses, since so hard it is
To make you hope he will so soon be here,
Know that I have not rashly told you this,
What I have spoken I will also swear;
If true, with coat and vest my news requite;
If not, then not, although ill rayed am I:
Of him as of hell-gate I hate the sight
That can by want be made to tell a lie.
Know Jove, the chief of Gods, and then the host
That hath provided for us this good cheer,
And in Ulysses' house doth rule the roast,
Ulysses will be here some time this year;
This month expired, or the next begun,
And be reveng'd of th' wooers impudent
That have dishonoured his wife and son.
Then said Eumæus, leave this argument;

For your good news nothing will be to pay,
Nor will Ulysses ever come again;
Drink wine, and no more on this subject say,
I cannot think upon him without pain:
And swear no more; true be it all you say.
To me, Laertes, and Penelope,
And to Telemachus ‘twill be great joy,
For whom my sorrows much augmented be.
He sprang up like a branch to man’s estate;
I thought he would in prowess prove no less
Than’s father was, whom he did imitate
In wit and figure and in comeliness:
But now the Gods bereav’d him have of wit,
He’s gone to Pyle, to hear what men there say
About his father, whilst the suitors sit
Waiting at sea to kill him by the way.
But him let’s leave a while with pow’rs above,
Whether to let him die, or bring him back,
Waiting upon the pleasure of high Jove.
And now of your own woes untie the sack,
That I may know them: tell me truly now
Your own, your father’s, and your country’s name;
And further I desire you, let me know
Whence are the mariners that with you came
Unto this town? and tell me this likewise,
Where rideth the good ship that brought you to’t?
For verily I can no way devise
How you should come on horseback or on foot.
Then said Ulysses, Were we here alone,

And meat and drink for so long us attend,
And all the rest about their work were gone,
The year would sooner than my story end.
Of Crete I am, and rich my father was,
And many children more he had, but they
Begotten were according to the laws;
But of a concubine the son was I.
My father was Castor Hylacides,
That was for wealth in Crete much honoured,
And for his children, but lov'd me no less
Than those he had begot in lawful bed.
When he was dead and gone, my brothers proud
Divide his state amongst themselves by lot,
And little of it they to me allow'd:
But for all that a good rich wife I got;
My virtue won her; I no shun-field was,
Nor from my stock degenerate she saw;
(Though from me now my strength be gone, alas!)
But you I think can know wheat by the straw;
For now with hardship I am much decay'd.
Mars gave me courage, and Athena skill
To beat up quarters, and by ambush laid
With stratagems my enemies to kill:
Of being slain I never had a thought,
But foremost still I leap'd out with my spear;
And of the foes to death I still one brought,
Unless his feet than my feet swifter were.
And such I was in war. But husbandry,
And keeping home, though that bred children store,

I car'd not for. But ships I lov'd to see,
And war, darts, bows, and shafts, I loved more;
Yet horrible they be to other wights;
For, for such things the Gods have temper'd me.
Many things are there wherein one delights,
Which to another man unpleasant be.
Before the Greeks went to the siege of Troy,
Nine times had I commanded on the seas,
And always our success was good that way,
And of the prey I chose what did me please
Beside my share. And wealth came in apace.
Wise I was thought, and honour'd much in Crete.
And when Jove had decreed Troy to deface,
Idomeneus and I went with the fleet,
Or else we must our credit quite have lost.
Nine years we fought, the tenth we took the town.
And setting up our sails we left the coast,
And by the Gods were tossed up and down.
But Jove determined me more trouble yet:
For needs I would to Egypt go and trade.
A month I stayed at home, then forth I set
With nine good ships, and an ill voyage made.
For when six days I feasted had my crew,
And to the Gods devoutly offer'd part;
A good strong wind from the north heaven blew,
And from the coast of Crete we then depart;
Smoothly we sail'd, safe our arrival was,
Nor man nor ship had any harm at all;
From shore to shore we did in five days pass,

And in the Nile we let our anchors fall.
Then I my fellows bad aboard to stay,
And guard the ships, and some to places high
I sent to watch; but mov'd by lucre, they
On plunder and on rapine had their eye;
The fields they waste, and kill the men, and make
Women and children captives. Then the cry
Arriving at the city, arms they take,
And next day early to the field they hie;
With horse and foot then thundered the field.
Their armour light'ned. My men frighted were:
Some taken and made slaves; some flying kill'd;
And all the rest ran scatter'd here and there.
Then I (though 't had been better there t' have died,
So many woes have since befallen me)
Pull'd off my helmet, laid my spear aside,
And buckler too, and kneel'd at the king's knee.
He rescued me, and home with him me brought,
Sitting by him that did his chariot drive:
Though in their heat many to kill me sought,
Yet the king brought me to the town alive.
Seven years I there remain'd and riches got,
For every man almost me somewhat gave.
Then thither came a merchant, that had not
His fellow in all Egypt for a knave.
His house and riches in Phœnicia were,
And he with lies entic'd me to his home.
With him I went: and there I stay'd a year;
And when the months and days about were come,

He set me in a ship for Libya;
And there together with our goods we sate,
He cracking of the profit he foresaw,
And I suspecting, though it were too late.
With him I went. And when the ship was forth,
We steer'd our course without the isle of Crete;
For by good luck we had a wind full north,
But Jove determin'd had we should not see't:
For when the island we had left behind,
And nothing else appear'd but sea and sky,
Jove fetch'd the clouds together with a wind,
Just o'er the ship, and dark 'twas presently;
And therewithal into the ship he threw
His thunderbolt, which whirl'd it round about:
It smelt of brimstone rank. And all the crew
Into the sea it suddenly cast out;
And they like gulls from wave to wave were toss'd.
But Jove, to save me, put into my hand
The ship's tall mast, which with my arms I cross'd,
And after nine days came at last to land.
And in Thesprotia was cast on land;
And the king's son, who chanc'd that way to pass,
Lifted me up as I lay on the sand;
And by king Phædon well receiv'd I was.
He cloth'd me with good garments, coat and vest.
I ask'd him of Ulysses what he knew?
As he went home, said he, he was my guest,
And what he then had gotten did me shew;
Of brass, and iron, and gold, there was so much,

As might ten ages feed a man alone,
The treasure that he show'd me there was such.
But he, he said, was to Dodona gone,
There at the holy oak to be advis'd
(Since he from Ithaca so long has been),
Whether 'twere better to go home disguis'd,
Or so as to be known when he is seen.
The king to me in holy form did swear,
That for the conduct of Ulysses home,
Both ship and mariners then ready were.
But when I went from thence he was not come.
A ship of that place in the harbour lay
Ready to part. The king bad land me there.
But they resolv'd were of another way;
Which made me yet more misery to bear.
When of that land they were got out of sight,
To sell me for a slave they did agree;
My coat and vest they take from me there right,
And gave me the torn coat and rags you see.
Late in the ev'ning they were at the land
Of Ithaca, and bound me fast i' th' ship.
But they to sup thought fit upon the sand,
And leaving me, out of the bark they skip;
But from my bonds some God sure set me free.
Then down I went and to the sea applied
My breast, and round the ship swam speedily,
And in a great thick wood myself I hide.
Sorry they were, and put to sea again,
To stay and seek me they lost labour thought.

Thus by Jove's favour I alive remain,
And to the house of a good friend am brought.
Then said Eumæus: I confess the story,
Poor man, of this your wand'ring and your pain,
Has had the pow'r to make me very sorry.
But of Ulysses what you say is vain.
I not believe a word. What needed you,
So wise a man as you appear to me,
In vain to tell me anything not true;
When I myself am sure 'twill never be?
For all the Gods have shown themselves his foes,
That neither suffer'd him to fall at Troy,
Nor, the war done, his best friends to compose
His body for the grave. For either way
He honourably buried had been
To th' honour of his son. But he is dead,
Unspoken of, devour'd by harpies keen;
And I despis'd sit here to see swine fed;
And never to the city come, but when
Some news is brought unto Penelope,
And she send one to call me. I come then,
And many list'ning to the news I see.
Some griev'd, and wishing for his coming home;
Some that seek nothing but shot-free to feed,
And these men wish that he may never come.
But I of what they say take little heed;
Especially, since an Ætolian,
As he from place to place for murder fled,
Came to my house, and I reliev'd the man,

And after found that I was cozened.
He said he saw him with Idomeneus,
In Crete, and that for certain he would come,
(His fleet much hurt repaired) to his house,
Rich, at the next spring, or the next autumn.
Therefore, old man, since you are come to me,
Think not your story anything avails,
Nor that false hopes provoke my charity;
My bounty looks on want and not on tales.
Pity, and fear of Jove, my favours guide.
Ulysses to this answers him, and saith,
Since you trust not my word, nor oath beside,
And in your breast resideth little faith,
Let's make a bargain. If Ulysses come,
Then a good coat and vest shall be my due,
And a safe conduct to Dulichium.
If not, and that I told you prove untrue,
Then make your servants throw me from a cliff,
High and upright, that others may beware
To cozen men into a false belief
Of things they know not, but uncertain are.
Then said Eumæus: Yes, 'twere a fine deed,
And noble, t' entertain a man with love,
And with good cheer relieve him in his need,
Then kill him, and beg pardon then of Jove.
But now I wish the swine from field were come,
For time it is of supper to advise.
And while they talk, the swains the swine bring home,
And with great noise they pent are in the sties.

Then did Eumæus to his servants call,
From out the herd to choose one of the best
His far-come friend to entertain withal,
And mend their own fare also with the rest.
'Tis long since others the work to us leave
To feed the swine they eat. Having said that,
Out went he, for the altar wood to cleave;
And they brought in a five-year-old pig fat,
And laid it on the hearth. Eumæus there,
Rememb'ring well the Gods, for he was wise,
First from the forehead clippeth off the hair,
And in the fire the same did sacrifice.
Then did he all the Gods above invoke,
That soon and safe Ulysses might arrive;
Next that, he takes a piece of the cleft oak,
And at a stroke did him of life deprive.
Then others take the work into their hands,
And with keen steel they quickly cut his throat.
That being done, with many flaming brands
They singe from head to tail his hairy coat,
And lay him open. Then Eumæus came,
And folded up the fleshy thighs in fat.
And then into the fire he threw the same.
The rest they cut in lesser parts; and that
They roast on spits; and being roasted well
And taken up, on chopping-boards they put it.
Eumæus then, who thereat did excel,
As he thought fit, did into messes cut it.
But one mess for the nymphs and Mercury

He set aside; and over that he pray'd;
The rest he set to each one severally.
But to Ulysses the whole chine was laid.
Jove, said Ulysses, be to you as kind
As you to me, and grant all your request.
Friend, said Eumæus, now your supper mind,
Such as it is. Gods give what they think best.
Then to the Gods he offer'd the first cut,
And fill'd a bowl, and offer'd part of that.
The bowl then in Ulysses' hand he put;
Ulysses it receiv'd, and down he sat.
Mesaulius then sets before him bread,
Which thither brought from Taphos was to sell,
And had been by Eumæus purchased.
Then heartily unto their meat they fell;
And when to eat they had no more delight,
Mesaulius took off the bread; and all
Prepared were for sleep. But cold the night
And moonless was; besides, much rain did fall.
Ulysses to the company then spake,
Tempting Eumæus; and to get a cloak
From him, or from some other for his sake.
Hear me, Eumæus, says he, and you folk,
I have a tale to tell. This foolish wine
To laugh and dance is able to provoke
Grave men sometimes that have no such design,
And to speak that which better were unspoke.
But out it shall, since I so much have said.
Oh! that I were as young and strong as when

Before the town of Troy the watch we laid,
And lodged were amongst the reeds i' th' fen,
By Menelaus and Ulysses led,
And me the third; the wind at north all night,
We lying with our bucklers covered.
With rain congeal'd, our armour all was white.
And they slept well wrapp'd up in cloak and coat,
Safe in their bucklers from the freezing wind;
But like a fool my cloak I had forgot,
I did not think I should such weather find.
And when a third part of the night was gone,
I nudg'd Ulysses, who did next me lie;
He felt me, and to him I made my moan:
Noble Ulysses, I am like to die,
The weather kills me, I have but a coat;
My cloak some demon made me leave behind,
And of such cold quite took away the thought;
I cannot tell what remedy to find.
No sooner said, but remedy he found,
For able was he both to shift and fight,
And said unto me, in a whisp'ring sound,
Peace, lest we heard be by some other wight.
And then with head on elbow, Friend, said he,
I dreamt we from the ships too far lie here.
Let some to Agamemnon go and see,
If he would have us rise and come more near.
Then up rose Thoas, son of Andræmon,
And down he laid his cloak, the which I kept,
And swiftly did to Agamemnon run;

I' th' cloak I wrapp'd myself and soundly slept.
Were I as young and strong as I was then,
Some one a cloak would lend me for respect,
Or else for kindness, 'mongst so many men;
But now my rags are cause they me neglect.
Old man, then said Eumæus, you have told
Your story well. Each word to purpose is.
To-morrow shake your rags against the cold,
Of what is needful now you shall not miss;
Of cloak or coat there's none of these has shift.
But when Telemachus from Pyle comes back,
From him you will have all you need, of gift;
And then you neither cloak nor coat will lack,
And be conveyed to what place you desire.
With that he rose, and woolly skins of sheep,
And shaggy goat-skins near laid to the fire;
And there Ulysses laid him down to sleep.
And over him a cloak Eumæus laid,
Both thick and soft it was, which he had kept,
And with it in sharp cold himself arrayed;
And thus Ulysses warmly cover'd slept.
By him the young men lay. But to the sties
Eumæus went; for fit he thought it not
To lie far from his swine, and out he hies.
Meanwhile Ulysses of his kindness thought.
Eumæus first of all his sword puts on
O'er his great shoulder: then, against the weather,
A thick warm cloak; and again, that upon,
A great goat-skin, the skin and hair together.

And then with dart in hand, for his defence
‘Gainst men and dogs, well armed at the head,
To where the tusked swine lay parted thence,
Within a rock from wind safe covered.

LIB. XV.

Pallas sends home Telemachus from Lacedæmon with the presents given him by Menelaus. Telemachus landed, goes first to Eumæus.

AND THEN TO Lacedæmon Pallas went,
To urge Telemachus his leave to take
Of Menelaus, to whom she had him sent,
And home again what speed he could to make.
Telemachus and Nestor's son she found
Within the entrance of the house abed;
The son of Nestor in a sleep profound.
Sleep came not in Telemachus his head;
Thought of his father open kept his eyes.
Then Pallas to him said: Telemachus,
To stay so long abroad you are not wise,
Leaving your goods with such men in your house,
As lawless there your substance do devour,
Lest afterward you to no purpose come.
Importune Menelaus with all your pow'r,
Or else your mother you'll not find at home:
Her father and her brethren bid her marry
Eurymachus. Of all he bids most high.
Take heed what goods out of your house they carry.
You know what thoughts in female breasts do lie;
They will their present husband's house promote,

But for their former children little care.
For he once dead, they have no longer thought
Of how his children after him shall fare.
Therefore return you, and commit to some
Maid of your own, for faith and care well known,
Such goods as in your house you have at home,
Until you have a good wife of your own.
I tell you more; remember what I say;
The bravest of the suitors lie in wait,
As you return to kill you by the way,
'Twixt Ithaca and Same, in the strait.
They'll fail, I think, of what they go about,
And sooner some of them their graves shall find.
Telemachus sent home with presents.
But, howsoever, steer the isles without,
The God that keeps you will provide a wind.
And when at Ithaca you are on land,
Unto the town your ship and fellows send,
But go you to Eumæus out of hand,
Who, though he keep your swine, is much your friend.
Then Pallas mounted to the sky, and he
Pisistratus awakens with his foot.
'Tis time, said he, that on our way were we;
Let's to the coach, and set the horses to't.
Then said Pisistratus: Too dark 'tis yet
To travel with a coach. Let's therefore stay;
'Twill soon be morning. Let's our presents get,
And by Atrides' self be sent away;
For guests use always to remember those

By whom they have been entertain’d with love.
This said, the morning by and by arose,
And Menelaus toward them did move.
Telemachus then puts on hastily
His coat and cloak to meet him on his way;
And when they were to one another nigh,
Telemachus first spake, and thus did say:
king, Atrides Menelaus, now,
Even now, dismiss me, let me go my way.
Then said Atrides: E’en now you shall go;
I purpose not to make you longer stay;
For I conceive ’tis not a good man’s part,
To make too much or little of his guest,
To hold him when he gladly would depart,
Or press him to begone e’er he thinks best.
In hospitality this rule is true:
Love him that stays, help forth the going guest.
Stay then and take my gift along with you,
And your breakfast of what we have the best.
For he that will a great day’s journey make,
Will find both joy and profit in his meat.
And if to visit Greece you pleasure take,
I’ll with you go, and with you I’ll retreat;
And to the Argive cities be your guide,
And be presented by each princely man,
With whomsoever we at night abide,
Two mules, a gold cup, a brave pot or pan.
Then said Telemachus: I needs must go,
(My father seeking lest myself I lose),

I have left none my goods to look unto,
And robb'd my treasure may be by my foes.
When that was said, forth Menelaus goes,
To give unto his wife and maids command
For breakfast of what then was in the house.
Then Boetheides, who lodg'd near at hand,
Came in; and, bidden by Atrides, cleaves
The wood, makes fire, lays down the roast;
Him to his business then Atrides leaves,
And down came to his treasure of great cost,
He, and his son, and wife Helena. There
Within a room lin'd with sweet-smelling wood,
A temperer to his son he gave to bear,
Of silver pure, which 'mongst the vessels stood;
And from a chest where robes for matrons were,
She took up one, with great variety
Wrought by herself, which she herself did bear,
Shining and bright as any star i' th' sky;
And forth unto Telemachus they come.
Then said Atrides, Jove grant your request,
And safely may you t' Ithaca come home;
See here my gift, of all I have the best:
'Tis massy silver, gilt about the brim,
By Vulcan made; but then it was possess'd
By th' king of Sidon: I had it of him
When by the way from Troy I was his guest.
Then Helen said, This gift too take from me,
Of Helen's handywork a monument,
To give to her that your dear wife shall be;

Think it meanwhile as to your mother sent;
Then gave it to Telemachus his hands.
I' th' coach Pisistratus then placed all,
And at the goodly gifts amazed stands;
Atrides then led them into the hall,
And made them sit; and while they sitting were,
A grave maid-servant from a golden ewer,
To wash their hands, pours on the water clear
Over a basin all of silver pure.
One tables sets, another lays on bread,
And from their store many good things brings out;
The messes Boetheides severed;
Atrides' son the wine delivered out.
When their desire of food was satisfied,
Up rose Telemachus and Nestor's son,
And to their coach they the swift horses tied,
And in the coach were ready to be gone;
And were already got the court without,
But after them Atrides followed,
And in his hand a gold cup he brought out
Of wine, and standing at the horses' head,
Brave youths, said he, to Nestor me commend,
That as a father was to me at Troy.
Farewell, and may you to your journey's end
With safety travel and arrive with joy.
Then said Telemachus, all this I'll say,
I wish at home I may so treated be
Within my father's house at Ithaca,
Besides the presents you have given me.

As he said this, an eagle dexter flew,
And seiz'd a great white tame goose grazing near;
The standers-by shouted and cried, Shue, shue,
But yet away the eagle bore him clear;
And none but with the sight was well content.
Then to Atrides said Pisistratus,
This prodigy, unto you is it sent
From Jupiter? Or is it sent to us?
While what to answer he was taking care,
Helen prevented him. I will, said she,
First tell you what hereon my own thoughts are,
And to my mind by th' Gods infused be;
You saw the eagle come down from the hill,
Where nature placed him to dwell and breed,
And kill that goose: so shall Ulysses kill
The suitors that upon his substance feed.
Or, it may be, already there he is
Devising for the suitors some ill end;
Gods, then said Telemachus, that this
Were so indeed! to you then should I send
As to a God my vows. This said, away
They whipp'd their willing horses through the town,
Which on the plain their harness shake all day,
And were at Pheres when the sun went down.
There Diocles, Orsilochus his son,
(Orsilochus by Alphæus begot),
Dwelt, and of entertainment want was none,
Nor acceptable presents were forgot;
And when the morning had herself array'd,

Again they put their horses to the coach,
Which when the whip they felt once, never stay'd,
Till to the town of Pyle they did approach.
Then said Telemachus to Nestor's son,
You promis'd, I your father should decline;
But since we here are, how can that be done?
And therefore let us both our counsels join.
Friends you and I, and friends our fathers were;
One age we have; this voyage is some tie;
Draw me not from my ship, but leave me here,
Lest th' old man force me at his house to lie,
In kindness, when I have such need to go.
This said, Pisistratus considered
What to make good his promise he should do.
And then this counsel came into his head.
Turn off, said he, the coach to the sea-side,
And Menelaus' gifts a-shipboard stow,
And get aboard; your small stay here I'll hide.
So your departure shall my father know.
For sure I am, if he know you are here,
So violent he is, he'll hither come,
And call you to his house and stay you there,
And be a hindrance to your going home.
And though away you'll not be empty sent,
Yet will he doubtless very angry be.
This said, unto his father home he went.
Telemachus then bade his company
To see prepar'd all things for sailing fit,
And go aboard; aboard went also he.

The rowers on their seats in order sit.
Thus they about their going busy be.
Then came a stranger, that a prophet was,
And fled from Argos then for homicide,
And by descent was of Melampus' race,
And stood near to Telemachus his side.
For this Melampus once had dwelt in Pyle,
And rich, but fled, by Neleus oppress'd,
And bound he lay in prison for awhile.
But afterward, he got himself releas'd,
And brought to Neleus his herds again,
And had his daughter Pero for reward;
But left her with his brother to remain
For wife. And then did Pyle no more regard,
But went to Argos, where a wife he got,
And children twain had: first, Antiphates.
And he the valiant Oicleus begot,
And Oicleus begat Amphlareus,
That was belov'd by Pallas and by Jove,
And yet he lived not till he was old.
He died at Thebes, betrayed by his love,
That him discover'd for a chain of gold.
Alcmæon and Amphilochus he got.
But Mantius, Melampus' second son,
Cleitus and Polyphides then begot.
Cleitus was fair, but children he had none;
Aurora snatch'd him from the earth when young,
For mortals he in beauty did excel,
And placed him th' immortal Gods among.

And Polyphides, Phœbus loved well;
And to him gave the gift of prophecy.
And since Amphiraus was dead and gone,
To foretell anything with certainty
Upon the whole earth like him there was none.
Displeased by his father, Mantius,
At Hyperesia he prophecied.
His son it was, call'd Theoclymenus,
That then stood by Telemachus his side,
When he the blessed Gods was praying to.
And said, Since worshipping I find you here,
By him you worship, tell me truly who
You are, your father who, and dwelling where?
Stranger, then said Telemachus, I dwell
At Ithaca, born there; my father's name
Ulysses, if he live; but who can tell?
And to hear news of that, I hither came.
Then answer'd Theoclymenus, And I,
From Argos town, for killing of a man,
Pursued by his kin, am forc'd to fly;
Take me aboard that only save me can.
Welcome you are, then said Telemachus;
Aboard let's go, where you shall have such cheer
As we can make, and hath contented us.
Then took and on the deck he laid his spear;
And up into the ship he went, and at
The stern he plac'd himself, and close by him
The stranger Theoclymenus down sat.
Then bids Telemachus, the ship to trim.

And straight the mast upright they set and bind,
And hoist their sails with ropes of good cow-hide;
And Pallas sent them a good strong forewind,
And swiftly did the ship the sea divide.
The sun was down, and doubtful was the light,
When he to Pheræ came and passed by;
And then by Elis coasted he all night,
And came unto the Thoæ Islands nigh;
And thought upon the suitors in his way.
Ulysses and Eumæus supping sat,
And when their hunger they had put away,
The tables gone, they leisure had to chat.
And then Ulysses had a mind to know,
Whether Eumæus rather had he stayed
I' th' lodge with him, or to the city go;
And to the company he spake, and said:
Hear me, Eumæus, and you all, his friends;
I stay here helping to consume your meat,
My mind me to the city rather bends;
For bread and wine there begging I shall get.
But I must then entreat you to provide
Some good man to go with me. Being there,
Necessity itself will be my guide
To find the houses where there is good cheer.
And if I go unto Ulysses' doors,
Unto Penelope I can tell news,
And make myself well known unto the woo'rs,
And they to give me meat will not refuse.
I can do any service that they will,

(Thank Mercury, to whom I owe that good),
Few be they can compare with me for skill
To make a fire, or to cleave out wood,
To roast and carve meat, or wine to give out,
Or anything that great men's servants do.
Ay me, Eumæus said, poor man, what thought
Is this of yours? D' ye long to perish so?
As you must do, if you among them stay;
Their insolence is known up to the sky.
You are not like their serving men; for they
Are young, and are apparell'd handsomely
With coat and vest; their heads and faces shine
With unguents sweet. Stay therefore here with me;
There's none that at your staying doth repine,
Nor I, nor any of my company.
Telemachus, when he comes home again,
Shall give you garments, a fair coat and vest,
And good shoes also to your feet, and then
See you convoy'd to what place you think best.
To this, Ulysses answered, and said,
Oh! that Jove lov'd you but as well as I.
You have me from a wretched wand'ring stayed.
The belly brings to men such misery.
Then said Ulysses, Since I am to stay,
Say, of Ulysses' parents, if you know
His father and his mother, whether they
Be both remaining yet alive or no.
To this, Eumæus said: Laertes lives,
But woefully and weary of his life;

Still for the absence of his son he grieves;
But more lamenteth the death of his wife.
The loss of her was that first made him old.
She died for grief, thinking her son was dead;
As sad a death it was as can be told.
May we from such death be delivered.
While she was living, though she grieved were,
When cause there was, I could have asked her mind
Freely. For why, with her own daughter dear
She brought me up, and never was but kind.
This daughter Ctimene, when come of age
(For she the youngest was) to Same went,
To a rich man given in marriage.
But I, well clad in coat and vest, was sent
(And shoes upon my feet) into the field;
For she a purpose had to do me good.
But now the time does no such kindness yield,
And yet the blessed Gods provide me food;
For they so well have multiplied my swine,
That we have still enough of meat and drink,
And wherewithal to make a poor man dine,
Although the suitors' riot make them shrink;
But since this woe Penelope befel,
'Tis harsh to her to hear of business:
Yet servants need her both to ask and tell
All that belongeth to their offices,
And also sometimes, maybe, need they had
I' th' house to eat, and carry somewhat home,
Of that whereof servants are most part glad,

And which unto their lodges never come.
Ho, said Ulysses, since it doth appear
You were a traveller when but a boy,
Tell me, I pray you, what your adventures were,
And what your sufferings were upon the way.
Was your town plunder'd by the enemies,
And you brought hither as a part o' th' prey?
Or been by thieves (for you were no ill prize),
As you kept sheep or cattle, brought away?
Then said Eumæus, Since to hear the story
Of how I hither came it is your pleasure,
Sit patiently, the wine there stands before ye;
For sleep and joy the long nights give us leisure,
It is not good too soon to go to bed;
For too much sleep is but a weariness;
The rest that will may go, and, morning spread,
Drive forth the swine, which is their business.
Meanwhile let us sit here, and drink and chat,
And stories of our sad adventures tell;
For much contentment there is ev'n in that,
To them that suffer'd have and come off well.
But to my story now. An isle there is
Under the tropic of the sun, not great,
Call'd Syria, but very fertile 'tis,
Well stor'd with kine, and sheep, and wine and wheat,
Where famine never enter'd, nor disease
Amongst the people. When a man was aged,
Dian' and Phœbus made him die with ease,
And gentle shafts the pain of death assuaged.

Two towns it had; their laws were not the same;
But of them both my father was the king.
Phœnician merchants, rats, then thither came,
And in their ships did many baubles bring.
There then was in my father's house a maid,
Phœnician born, that well could sow and spin;
As washing clothes she at the sea-side stayed,
One of these merchants sooth'd her into sin,
(For good workwomen may be made to do that,
If flatter'd well), and then he ask'd her name,
And whence she was. And truth she told the rat.
From Sidon, said she, a rich town, I came,
And daughter am of wealthy Arybas;
But Taphian thieves took me by force away,
As homewards from the field I going was,
And sold me to this man with whom I stay.
Then said the merchantman that did her wive,
Will you to Sidon home return with me,
And see your parents? They are still alive,
And rich as heretofore. I will, said she,
If you and all your company will swear,
At Sidon you will set me safe ashore.
And when all sworn, and agreed on it were,
The woman spake again, and this said more:
If any of you see me in the street,
Or at the well, speak not at all to me,
Lest any of the house should chance to see't,
And tell my master. Jealous he will be,
Put me in bonds, and seek you to destroy;

Buy quickly what you buy, and ready be,
And secret. When you mean to go away,
Then send a privy messenger to me;
For all the gold I can lay hand upon
I'll bring, and somewhat else boat-hire to pay;
For I the charge have of my master's son;
Much profit he will yield if brought away.
Playing without, I'll take him by the hand
And lead him to the ship; much worth he'll be,
Transported into whatsoever land.
And home again, this said, returned she.
A year it was before these merchants went.
Meanwhile they buy and lade the ship; and when
They had their freight, straightway a man they sent
To bid the maid make haste away. And then
A man unto my father's house they sent;
A crafty merchant, with a chain of gold
And shining amber, on which were intent
My mother and her maids; they much behold,
And take into their hands, and for it bid.
Meanwhile the man a nod gave with his head,
The woman quickly understand him did,
And by the hand me out a-door she lead.
Aboard went he. The woman look'd about,
Saw standing on the tables many a cup,
Left by my father and his guests gone out,
And presently she three of them took up;
Out went she, leading me, that simple was.
The sun went down, and dusky was the way,

And to the ship we unpursued pass,
To th' haven where the merchants' vessel lay.
And then go they, and with them we aboard,
And sail'd before the wind six days and nights,
And to us Jove a fair gale did afford,
Diana on the seventh the woman smites,
And suddenly into the sink she fell;
And her they throw into the sea for cheer
Telemachus landed, goes first to Eumæus.
To fishes; but the rest arrived well
At Ithaca. Laertes bought me there.
You see now how I hither came. Then said
Ulysses, Truly you have pass'd much woe;
But Jove in part your sorrows hath allay'd,
That in a good man's house at ease are now,
That gives you meat and drink with a good will;
With him you live a happy life. But I
Have longer wand'ring been, and must be still.
Thus 'twixt themselves did they say and reply,
Then went to sleep. The night was almost past,
And with the morn Telemachus was nigh;
Quickly his mates take down the sails and mast,
And row the ship to land, and there her tie;
Then on the beach they quickly break their fast,
And with fresh water temper their old wine.
And when desire of meat and drink was past,
I'll, said Telemachus, go to my swine,
But to the city will return at night,
Next morn I'll feast you with good flesh and wine,

Your labour in my passage to requite.
And then said Theoclymenus divine,
What will you do meanwhile, I pray, with me?
Unto your mother's house must I go too,
Or to some other man commended be?
Then answered Telemachus: No, no,
To bring you to my house in vain it were.
My mother in my absence you'll not see,
She seldom to the suitors doth appear,
At top o' th' house at work still sitteth she.
But I will recommend you to another,
In Ithaca of best repute; his name
Eurylochus, and best he loves my mother,
And what my father did would do the same;
But folded up it lies yet in Jove's lap,
Whether he first shall married be or dead.
As he this said, there did a falcon hap
(Apollo's bird) to fly above his head
Dexter, and in his pounces held a dove;
And as he plumed her the feathers fell
Scatter'd as they descended from above
(Which Theoclymenus observed well)
Betwixt Telemachus and the ship's side;
And to Telemachus said secretly:
This from the Gods is, and doth good betide
Both to yourself and your posterity.
I knew that it portended at first sight,
No family but yours was here to reign.
O, said Telemachus, that that were right,

Such love, such gifts, you then should from me gain,
As men that saw you should your fortune bless.
Pyræus then his friend was standing by,
To him he then his stranger did address:
You are my best friend of the company;
Unto your care this stranger I commend,
To be well treated till I come again.
Though long you stay, said he, I do intend
The best I can your friend to entertain,
And with some gift. Then to the ship he goes,
He and his mates. They on their benches sit.
Telemachus then putteth on his shoes,
And takes a spear that for his hand was fit;
The ship about they to the city row.
Telemachus pursuing his design,
On foot unto Eumæus forth did go,
His faithful servant, master of the swine.

LIB. XVI.

Telemachus sends Eumæus to the city to tell his mother of his return; and how in the mean time Ulysses discovers himself to his son.

EUMÆUS AND ULYSSES risen were,
And men, for dinner, sent out to fetch hogs,
And fire was made. Ulysses chanc'd to hear
One tread without, and whining of the dogs
That barked not, and to Eumæus said:
Some one of your acquaintance now comes in;
I hear his feet. The dogs are well appai'd.
These words scarce said, Telemachus was seen.
Eumæus, who then temp'ring was of wine,
Lets fall his cups, and meets him at the door;
Kisses his head and hands, and both his eyne,
And presently with tears his eyes run o'er.
As when a loving father sees his son
That had been ten years absent, and for whom
He had lamented long, come home alone;
So glad was he Telemachus was come,
And hugg'd him as one that had 'scap'd but then
From death; and weeping said, O are you come?
I never thought to see you more, sweet man,
Since first I knew to Pyle you went from home.
But come, come in, dear heart, that I may fill

Myself with looking, you're not oft among
Your herdsmen in the field, but almost still
I' th' city, in the suitors' dismal throng.
Telemachus sends Eumæus to tell his mother of his return.
Yes, said Telemachus, for why, I come
To see you, and to ask about my mother;
Whether she still remaining be at home,
Or gone be with a suitor one or other,
Leaving her husband's chamber and his bed
With cobwebs hung for want of furniture?
No, she yet stays, Eumæus answered,
And great the grief is which she doth endure;
And day and night the tears fall from her eyes.
Telemachus went in. His father there
To give him place did from his chair arise.
Sit still, said he, I'll find a seat elsewhere
In my own house. This man will one provide.
This said, he past unto another seat,
To which Eumæus a wool-fell applied
With rushes under it. Then brought in meat,
Trenchers of meat roasted the day before,
And in a basket sets on bread of wheat,
And in an ivy-tankard wine good store,
And o'er against Ulysses takes his seat.
Then on the meat prepar'd their hands they laid.
When thirst and hunger nothing more requir'd,
Telemachus unto Eumæus said,
And thus about his new-come guest inquir'd:
Father, said he, I pray you tell me now,

His own, his father's, and his country's name;
And farther I desire you let me know
Where are the mariners that with him came
Unto this place? And tell me this likewise,
Where rideth the good ship that brought him to't?
For verily I can no way devise,
How he should come on horseback or on foot.
To this Eumæus answered agen:
He says himself that he was born in Creet,
And seen the cities has of many men,
Wand'ring about, for Jove so thought it meet.
Thesprotian rats got him aboard their ship,
And forced were in Ithaca to land;
There he found means to give them all the slip;
So came to mine, and from mine to your hand.
I give him you, as you think best to use.
To this again Telemachus replies:
That which you say, Eumæus, is bad news.
How to receive him I cannot devise.
I am too young to save him with my hands,
If injury be done him by the wooers.
And at this time my mother doubtful stands,
Whether to stay within my father's doors,
And with the people her good name maintain,
Or with that suitor wed and go away,
That to her shall afford the greatest gain.
But since the stranger at your house doth stay,
I'll give him garments, a good coat and vest,
A spear in's hand, and good shoes to his feet,

And him convey to what place he thinks best.
Or if to keep him here you think it meet,
I'll hither for him garments send and food,
That he no charge be to your family.
To set him with the suitors 'tis not good
For me nor him, they so unruly be.
He'll be derided there, and I shall grieve,
But 'gainst so many men what can be done?
The strength of one man cannot him relieve.
Ulysses then made answer to his son.
Oh! friend, said he, it bites my heart to hear
What of the suitors in your house you say,
How 'gainst your mind they proudly domineer.
It is because you willingly give way?
Or that your people by divinity
Adverse are to you or your government?
Or are your kindred, that should stand you by
In quarrel and in battle, discontent?
Oh, were I young, and of the mind I am,
Or that I were the great Ulysses' son,
Or he himself, and wand'ring hither came,
I'd have my head cut off by any one,
If I were not reveng'd upon them all.
And though they were too hard for me alone,
I'd rather in my own house fighting fall,
Than daily see such ugly things there done.
Strangers abus'd, maids tous'd ill favour'dly,
And corn and wine consumed without end,
And to no purpose foolishly; for why,

They never shall arrive where they intend.
Then said Telemachus: No word o' th' Gods
Hath me deprived of the people's love,
Nor any brother is with me at odds,
Nor any other cause I know but Jove.
How many lords within these isles do sway,
Same, Dulichium, Ithaca, and Zant,
So many suitors duly every day
For marriage with my mother my house haunt.
Whilst she can none put off, and will none marry,
They spend my corn and wine, and cattle kill,
And eating here, and drinking still they tarry,
And me perhaps, at last, they murther will.
But what they shall do none but God can tell.
But, father, go you to Penelope,
And let her know I am arrived well.
And let no other person know but she.
Ulysses discovers himself to his son.
And after you have told her, tarry not.
Make haste. At your return, I shall be here,
For many are they that my death do plot.
True, said Eumæus, but not ill it were
To let Laertes know it by the way,
Who when his grief but for Ulysses was,
Did oversee his workmen all the day,
But since by sea to Pylus you did pass,
He neither oversees his husbandry,
Nor eats his meat, as still he did before;
But groaning and lamenting woefully

Liveth. Telemachus did thus reply:
The case is hard. But grieved though he be,
Let him alone; go not out of your way.
For first I wish my father here to see,
If in my choice to have my wishes lay.
But pray my mother thither send a maid,
To tell Laertes secretly the news.
When to him thus Telemachus had said,
Eumæus on his feet tied on his shoes.
Ulysses and his son now left alone,
Came Pallas to them. At the door she stood;
But by Telemachus she was not known.
Gods are not known but by whom they think good.
Ulysses knew her. Fair she was and tall,
And of a grave wise matron had the look;
And by the dogs perceiv'd was. For they all
Whining and terrified the place forsook.
A sign t' Ulysses she made with her brow.
Then he went forth, and she unto him spake.
Son of Laertes, wise Ulysses, now
Your son with your design acquainted make;
And when you have the suitors' fate contrived,
Go to the city both. 'Twill not be long
Before I at your combat be arrived,
And give you my assistance in the throng.
And stroak'd him over with a wand of gold,
And presently his rags were cloak and coat;
His cheeks were plump; his beard black to behold,
To which his goodly locks unlike were not.

This done, the Goddess mounted to the skies.
Ulysses to the house again retir'd;
But from him then his son turn'd off his eyes.
So much this alteration he admir'd;
He thought it was some God, and to him said,
You are some God descended from the sky;
Your colour's better, better you arrayed.
Save us. Our gifts shall on your altar lie.
And then Ulysses said, God I am none.
What ails you with the Gods me to compare?
For I your father am, whom you bemoan,
And for whom you have had such pain and care;
And then embrac'd and kiss'd his son, and wept,
So that the ground he stood upon was wet,
Though hitherto his eyes he dry had kept;
But by his son believ'd he was not yet.
You're not, says he, my father, but some spright
That flatters me into more misery.
Of mortal men there's none that has the might
To do such things without a deity.
A God indeed can man's decay redeem;
You were but now an old man ill arrayed;
And now like one new come from heaven seem;
To this Ulysses answered and said,
Telemachus, be not amaz'd too much;
Other Ulysses you shall never see.
I am the man, although my luck be such,
As after twenty year not known to be;
The change you see was by Athena wrought,

That made me what she list, for she can do’t.
A beggar old, or youth in a fine coat,
And handsome cloak, and other garment to’t;
For easy ’tis for Gods on mortal men
To lay on glory, and the same displace.
This said, Ulysses sat him down. And then
Telemachus his father did embrace,
And then they both together wept and sobb’d,
As eagles or as vultures, when they see
Their nests by country-people spoil’d and robb’d,
And young ones kill’d before they fledged be;
So wept these two, and weeping there had staid
Perhaps until the closing of the day,
But that Telemachus t’ Ulysses said,
Father, how came you t’ Ithaca, I pray?
Where are the seamen that set you ashore?
For sure I am you could not come by land.
In a good ship, said he, I was brought o’er
From th’ Isle Phœacia, and left o’ th’ sand;
That people, strangers all that thither come,
Convoy unto the place where they would be;
And when I was desirous to go home,
At Ithaca asleep they landed me,
Enrich’d with presents, garments, gold and brass;
And in a cave I hidden have the same;
And, as I by Athena counsell’d was,
The suitors’ fate to weave I hither came.
Tell me how many now they are, that we
Consider may if we two and no more

Shall be enough to get the victory,
Or must we of some else the aid implore?
father, said his son, you are renown'd
For a good councillor, a man of might;
But very hard the thing is you propound,
That two men should against so many fight.
They are not only ten, or two times ten,
But many more. Their number, let me see,
From out Dulichium two-and-fifty men;
And with them lusty serving men twice three.
From Same chosen men come twenty-four;
Twenty from Zant, and twelve of Ithaca.
Medon, the squire, a fiddler, and what more?
Two cooks that of a feast had learnt the law.
'Twill be but ill revenge to fight them all;
Therefore I think it best to look for aid,
And some good neighbour to assist you call.
To this Ulysses answered and said,
Consider then, and cast it in your mind,
Whether we two, Pallas and Jove to boot,
Will serve, or must we other succours find?
Then said his son, O father, that will do't.
Those friends indeed will serve us very much.
Immortals against mortals have great odds;
Higher they stand, and of themselves are such,
As would too hard be for all th' other Gods.
Yes, said Ulysses, if the woo'rs and I
Come but to battle once, 'twill not be long
Ere such good aids will have the victory,

And make an end of this unruly throng.
But you, Telemachus, go early home
To-morrow morning; mingle with the rabble;
I after you will with Eumæus come,
Like to a beggar old and miserable;
Where if you see me us'd ill-favour'dly,
Thrown at, or pull'd about the house by th' heels,
As unconcern'd, endure it patiently,
What pain soever thereby your heart feels;
But yet with gentle words you may persuade them;
For sure I am they will not you obey,
The Gods immortal have so stupid made them,
As on themselves to bring their fatal day.
But now to what I say attentive be.
When Pallas shall me prompt, I'll with my head
Make you a sign. As soon as that you see,
Let th' arms in th' hall away be carried,
And say, if any suitor ask wherefore,
The fire hath hurt them, and they are not now
Such as Ulysses left them heretofore,
When with the Greeks t' Ilium he did go.
Or say, for fear some quarrel should arise,
By th' indiscretion of one or other,
You thought the council would not be unwise,
To take them thence. One drawn sword draws another.
But two spears, two swords, and two shields keep still,
To take in hand when we onset make.
Jove from mistrust and Pallas keep them will:
And farther from me this instruction take.

As I your father am, and you my son,
Of my return a word let no man hear,
Father, or wife, or servant any one;
To speak of it in company forbear.
But let's of the maid-servants you and I
Endeavour what we can to know the mind;
And your men-servants also I would try,
From whom you honour or dishonour find.
Father, then said Telemachus, you'll see,
I am not loose of tongue. But 'tis not good
The men to question. 'Twill lost labour be,
Because without the house they have their food,
Though there they havoc of your substance make.
Do as you please. 'Tis a long business
Of ev'ry one of them account to take.
Inform yourself of th' women's wickedness,
I would not willingly go up and down
To ev'ry lodge, what there is done to see.
For our work done, theirs will be better known,
If you with signs from Jove acquainted be.
Thus they discours'd. The mariners meanwhile
Had brought into the haven of the town
The ship that brought Telemachus from Pyle;
Then drew it up to land, the sails pull'd down.
The presents unto Clytius they bear,
And to Penelope a man they sent,
That of her son's arrival she might hear,
And how unto Eumæus' lodge he went,
And sent the ship to put her out of fear,

Lest she should for his absence longer weep.
Eumæus was for the same business there;
He from his lodge, the other from the deep.
He told the queen th' arrival of her son;
And to her maids the other told the same.
And when they both their messages had done,
Back to Telemachus Eumæus came;
At this the suitors vex'd, look'd down and sad,
And out o' th' gates together went, where they
Amongst themselves a consultation had,
And to them thus Eurylochus 'gan say.
'Tis very strange, Telemachus is come,
We thought he never should return agen;
But since 'tis so, to call our fellows home,
Let's hire and man a boat with fishermen.
His words scarce out, Amphinomus comes near,
And turning towards th' haven them espied
Furling their sails, and laughing said, Th'are here,
You need not any messenger provide.
Some God sure told him of them, or else they
Saw the ship coming by, but were too slow
To overtake her. This said, they away
Down to the water's-side together go;
And up unto the land the ship they hale;
Their servants what was in her bear away.
And then to consultation they fall,
Nor with them suffer'd any else to stay.
To them Antinous began and said,
The Gods Telemachus have strangely kept.

Our scouts from morn to night o' th' mountains stayed,
Nor on the land by night we ever slept,
But rowed up and down until 'twas day.
We thought he could not 'scape in any wise;
And yet some dæmon brought him has away.
Come, let us how to kill him here devise:
For whilst he lives our work will not be done;
Crafty he is, and can his purpose hide;
Nor have we yet sufficiently won
The people of the town with us to side.
The multitude to council he will call,
And ranting tell them that we go about
To murther him, and so enflame them all,
That from our country they will cast us out,
And make us beg our bread. Which to eschew
Let's kill him in the fields, or in the way;
Divide his goods amongst us, as is due.
His houses to his mother leave we may,
To give to him with whom she means to marry.
If this you like not, but that he shall stay,
And have his father's state, then let's not tarry,
But each man to his own house go his way,
And there contend who shall the best endow her,
And in her favour the superior be;
Or let the fates dispose the happy hour
To whom she has a mind to. So said he.
Then spake Amphinomus, the noble son
Of the rich Nisus Aretiades,
Amongst the wooers inferior to none,

And best of all Penelope did please.
Telemachus, said he, I would not kill;
'Tis dangerous to slay the royal blood;
But let us first of Jove inquire the will;
If he command, I'll do't, and say 'tis good;
If he forbid, I wish you to desist.
So said Amphinomus, and 'twas thought fit;
And presently the council was dismiss'd:
And then into the house they go and sit.
And now Penelope resolved t' appear
Before her suitors sitting in the hall.
For to her son she knew they traitors were;
Medon, that with them was, had told her all.
Down to the hall she went, and in the door
Having a woman at each hand, she staid,
And proud Antinous rebuked sore.
Antinous, you traitor impudent, she said,
In Ithaca the glory you have got
Of wit and eloquence. You are belied.
Madman, what ails you, my son's death to plot,
And to his strangers here to show such pride?
Poor strangers have their passport from the Gods.
To do them wrong is great impiety;
And worse between themselves to be at odds.
You know your father hither once did fly,
Fearing the people whom he had offended,
Joining with Tophian thieves to make a prey
Of Thesprote cattle, and were here defended
Against the Thesprotes, though our friends were they.

They slain him had, and seized his estate,
But that Ulysses saved him; and now,
For to requite him, what d'ye, O ingrate?
You eat his cattle; and his wife you woo,
And kill my son, and daily me molest.
Desist, I tell you, and the rest persuade
To leave these evil courses, you were best.
To this Eurylochus then answer made.
Icarius' daughter, wise Penelope,
Fear not. None shall lay hands upon your son,
As long as I am living and can see;
Who does, his blood shall on my spear down run.
His father oft has set me on his knee,
And given me good wine, and good meat roast.
Afraid of any wooer you need not be;
Telemachus of all men I love most.
Of death from God's hand none can warrant you;
But as for us you may securely sleep.
So said he, and yet then his death did brew.
Away went then Penelope to weep,
And wept till Pallas came and clos'd her eyes;
And to Ulysses and his son at night
Eumæus came. A swine they sacrifice;
And then did Pallas from the sky alight,
And with her rod return'd Ulysses old,
And ill array'd, for fear he should be known
T' Eumæus or Penelope, and told
By them to others, and abroad be blown.
Telemachus then to Eumæus said:

Eumæus, are you come? what news from town?
The suitors, are they come, that me way-laid?
Or do they for me still look up and down?
Then said Eumæus, I did not inquire,
Upon my message only was my mind;
That done, to make haste back was my desire.
But there I chanc'd a messenger to find,
Sent by your mates to tell Penelope,
And he the news t' your mother first did tell.
I saw a ship that new came in from sea,
But whether that were it, I know not well.
Aboard were many arms and many men;
And though I were not sure, I thought 'twas it.
Telemachus on 's father smiled then,
But so as that Eumæus could not see 't.
Then came their supper in, which they fell to.
A supper good they had, and were well pleased;
And when their hunger had no more to do,
With gentle sleep their fear and care disseised.

LIB. XVII.

Telemachus relates to his mother what he had heard at Pyle and Sparta.

SOON AS THE rosy morning did appear,
Riseth Telemachus; his shoes puts on,
And takes into his hand his heavy spear,
And hasteth to the city to be gone;
And said unto Eumæus, Father, I
Am going to the city, there to see
My mother, that will never cease to cry
And sob, till in her sight I standing be;
But the poor stranger guide you to the town,
With broken meat and wine himself to feed,
Such as he gets by begging up and down.
I cannot maintain all men that have need.
Tak't how he will. For I love to speak plain.
Then said Ulysses: Sweet friend, nor would I
Here in the country willingly remain,
For beggars' wants great cities best supply.
Here at the lodge no service I can do;
And now to learn of others am too old.
With this man to the city I would go,
But warm me first I would, for very cold
This morning is; I fear this hoary frost.
Far hence the town is, and my garments thin;

And which I reason have to fear the most,
My rags will to the air betray my skin.
Telemachus then speedily went home,
With mischief to the suitors in his head;
And when he to the palace gate was come,
T' a pillar sets his spear, and entered.
Euryclea was cov'ring chairs i' th' hall,
And saw him first, and straight unto him went;
And then the other woman-servants all
Declared with much kissing their content;
Then, like Diana or fair Aphrodite,
Penelope came shedding tears of joy,
And on his shoulders laid her arms milk-white,
And kiss'd his head and eyes, and thus did say:
Telemachus, my dear child, are you here?
I never thought again your face to see,
Since of your father news you went to hear
At Pyle, by sea, without acquainting me.
But tell me, what at Pyle they of him say?
Mother, said he, pray let me take my breath,
My thoughts in great disorder are to-day;
I come but now from out the jaws of death;
But with your maids go to your chamber now,
And in your fairest garments you array,
And to th' immortal Gods all make a vow
A perfect hecatomb to them you'll pay,
If Jove be pleas'd our losses to restore.
But I unto the market-place must haste,
To treat a stranger whom I sent before,

And till my coming with Piræus plac'd.
Penelope then to her chamber went,
And put herself into her best array.
Her vows to all th' immortal Gods she sent
A perfect hecatomb to them to pay,
If Jove be pleas'd her losses to restore.
Telemachus in hand then takes his spear,
And with two dogs at's heels went out a door,
And Pallas made him like a God appear.
The people all admir'd him as he came;
The suitors all about him gathered,
And spake him fair, while in their hearts they frame
Plots and devices how his blood to shed.
But he his seat amongst them quickly quits,
To Mentor and his father's ancient friends,
Altherses, Antephus, with them he sits,
And there the time discoursing with them spends.
Piræus not long after cometh in,
And brings his stranger with him to the place,
Who there a very little while had been
But that Telemachus hard by him was.
Then, said Piræus to Telemachus,
Send of your women some to fetch away
The goodly presents you left at my house.
No, said Telemachus, let them yet stay,
I know not yet th' event of our affairs.
If th' wooers kill me and my goods divide,
I rather had they should be yours than theirs.
If I kill them, and God be on my side,

Then send them, and I'll take them joyfully.
And brought away the stranger with him home.
And by-and-bye the suitors thither hie;
And when they all into the house were come,
On couches and on chairs their cloaks they lay,
And presently into their baths they go;
And bath'd and oil'd, again themselves array,
And sat them down. And supper ready now,
A maid then water in a golden ewer
To wash their hands over a basin brings;
The basin also was of silver pure.
Another on the tables lays good things,
That in her keeping were, and sets on bread.
Penelope sat spinning in the door.
And then they heartily fell to and fed;
And when desire of meat and drink was o'er,
Unto her son Penelope then spake:
I will, said she, upon my bed lie down,
Though there I ever weeping lie awake,
Since he went with Atrides to Troy town,
Since you would not vouchsafe to let me know
The news you heard, before these men came in.
Mother, said he, the truth I'll tell you now;
We went to Pyle; and Nestor we have seen;
And lovingly we entertained were.
For as a father entertains his son
Come home from far, so were we treated there,
And welcome to his children every one.
But that Ulysses was alive or dead,

He met with no man that could tell him true.
But us to go to Sparta counselled,
And said, if any, Menelaus knew;
And us with coach and horses did provide,
(Where we saw Helen, bane of Greece and Troy.)
He also sent his son with us for guide,
And thither come, receiv'd we were with joy.
Atrides of my coming ask'd the reason.
I told him all the truth. He answer'd then,
Oh ho, into the strong man's house by treason
Are enter'd many weak and heartless men;
As when a stag and hind, ent'ring the den
Of th' absent lion, lulls his whelps with tales
Of hills and dales, the lion comes agen
And tears them into pieces with his nails;
So shall Ulysses all these rascals slay.
Oh! that the Gods Apollo, Pallas, Jove,
Amongst the suitors bring him would one day,
Such as when with Philomelide he strove,
And threw him flat, and made the Argives glad.
If such, Ulysses once amongst them were,
Short would their lives be, and their wedding bad.
But of the matter whereof you inquire,
On my knowledge I can nothing say,
Nor will with rash conjectures you beguile.
I told was, with Calypso he doth stay,
(By Proteus, an old sea-God,) in an isle,
And would come home, but wants both ship and men
To pass him o'er the broad back of the main.

This said, we took our leaves; a fair gale then
Quickly convey'd us o'er the liquid plain.
After Telemachus had spoken thus,
Penelope her heart was ill at ease.
And then spake to her Theoclymenus:
Wife of Ulysses Laertiades,
This man, said he, knows not; hear me, for I
Jove's mind foresee. Jove first, and then the ghost
That takes the care of this bless'd family,
And dwelling in it doth maintain the roast,
You know Ulysses is now in this isle,
Sitting or creeping, and observes these wooers,
What evil deeds they do; and he the while
The destiny contriveth of the doers.
I saw the same at sea by augury,
And said unto Telemachus no less.
Oh! that the Gods would make it true, said she,
I'd so reward you that men should you bless.
While they together thus within discourse,
The suitors were gone out to throw the stone
And darts upon the green before the doors,
As they at other times before had done.
Now supper-time drew near. Sheep home were brought
From ev'ry field. Then Medon to them spake,
Who 'mongst the suitors had most favours got;
Come in, says he, and care of supper take,
For of these games, I see you have your fill.
In supping early damage there is none.
Agreed they were; none thought the motion ill.

They then into the hall went every one.
On couches and on chairs their cloaks they throw.
Great sheep, fat goats enough they sacrifice,
And franked swine, and from the herd a cow.
Meanwhile, Eumæus to the city hies,
Ulysses with him, to whom thus he said:
Come, father, let us to the city go,
Since ’tis my master’s will. You should have staid,
If my advice you would have harkened to.
But the commands of masters are severe;
The time o’ th’ day already is much spent,
And though it will be late ere we be there,
I fear, ere it be night you will repent.
And then Ulysses to Eumæus said:
I hear, I understand, I pray go on.
Only of rugged way I am afraid;
Give me a good strong staff to lean upon.
Then on his shoulder he his scrip did throw;
Given he had a great staff to his mind,
And they two to the town together go,
Leaving the swineherds and the dogs behind.
Ulysses like a beggar old and lame,
And all his raiment ragged was and wretched.
But when they near unto the fountain came
From which the citizens their water fetched,
The fountain sweetly streaming and well made
B’ Ithacus Neritus, Polector, kings,
That flieth from a high and chilling shade,
Where in a poplar grove arise the springs,

And there an altar is, and on the same
The passengers to th' nymphs pay offerings.
When we were there, Melanthus to us came,
And goats, the fattest of his herds, he brings.
Whither now goest thou with this beggar here?
This trouble-feast, who begging scraps and snuffs,
Not swords and kettles, many blows shall bear
Of flying footstools, and get many cuffs.
Would thou wouldst give him me, my lodge to keep,
And lead my goats afield with a green bough,
And live on whey, and my goat houses sweep,
And his great knee unto to such service bow.
But hang him, he has such a custom got
Of idleness, with begging of his food,
That labour for his living he will not.
But this I tell you, and 'twill be made good:
When he within Ulysses' house appears,
Many a footstool in the hall will fly
From out the suitors' hands about his ears.
This said, he pass'd, and kick'd him going by;
Ulysses still stood firm upon the path,
Thinking to strike him with his great staff dead,
Or otherwise to kill him in his wrath.
But in the end his wrath he conquered.
Eumæus then held up his hands and pray'd:
Nymphs of these fountains, daughters of great Jove,
If the fat gifts here by Ulysses laid
Upon your altars were receiv'd with love,
Grant that he may come safely home again,

By some good spirit to his house convey'd.
Then, (to Melantheus said he,) all in vain
Will be your triumph, and your pride allay'd,
Wherewith you to the suitors daily go;
And knaves remain the cattle to abate.
Then said Melantheus again, O ho!
How boldly does this dog, this rascal prate!
Whom one day I shall from hence ship away,
And make of him somewhere abroad good gain.
Would th' wooers, or Phœbus, but as surely slay
The son, as 'tis t' expect his father vain.
When this was said, away he went apace,
And coming to the suitors in the hall,
Against Eurymachus he took his place,
Whom best he loved of the suitors all.
And there the waiters set before him meat;
The women of the pantry brought him bread.
Ulysses and Eumæus were not yet
Arriv'd, but near, for close they followed,
And of the fiddle they could hear the din.
Ulysses said unto Eumæus then:
'Tis a fine house Ulysses dwelled in,
And eas'ly known from those of other men;
The court with wall and hedge is fenced strong,
Having strong gates with two locks, great and fast.
Some feast here is; I hear the sound of song,
And fiddle, which with feast the Gods have plac'd.
Then answered Eumæus, 'Tis well guess'd,
And other things you mark as well as this.

But let us now consider what is best,
In that which at this time our bus'ness is.
Go you in first, and put yourself among
The suitors; or if you think better so,
I'll first go in, but do not you stay long,
Lest you of one or other take a blow.
I hear, I understand; go you in first;
The seas and wars have taught me patience.
Of all my suff'rings this is not the worst.
Of blows and throws I have experience;
And may the suitors henceforth have the same.
The belly forceth mortals to much woe;
But there is no force can the belly tame.
It sets the good ship on the sea to go,
Which t' one another evil fortune bears.
While they discoursed thus before the door,
Ulysses' dog held up his head and ears,
Argus by name, that had been long before
Well look'd to, ere Ulysses went to Troy.
They with him cours'd the wild goat, deer, and hare;
But all the while his master was away,
The servants of his keeping took no care,
But on the dung before the door he lay,
Which there was heap'd to manure fields and leas,
From many mules and cattle fal'n away.
There lay the old dog Argus, full of fleas;
And, as Ulysses near was, couch'd his ears,
And fawned with his tail, but could not rise;
And which Eumæus did not see, the tears

Ready to fall were from Ulysses' eyes.
And then Ulysses to Eumæus said:
This is a very well-shap'd dog I see,
'Tis strange to see him on a dunghill laid.
I know not whether also swift he be,
Or for his beauty only was he fed,
As lords make much of dogs for being fine,
And at their tables see them cherished.
Then answered the master of the swine:
The master of him is of life bereft.
If now he were the same for shape and deed
He then was when Ulysses here him left,
You'd quickly see he had both strength and speed.
There was no beast he once saw in the wood
That could escape him; for not only swift,
But also at a scent was very good:
But now himself scarce able is to lift;
For why, his master being dead and gone,
He was not left unto the woman's care;
And when the master is not looking on,
Men-servants of their duty careless are.
For half the virtue taken is away
Of whosoever is to service tied.
This said, into the house he went his way;
And Argus, having seen his master, died.
Telemachus, the first that saw him enter,
Unto him nodded to come to his seat.
A chopping-board was near him by adventure;
He took up that, whereon to eat his meat;

And near Telemachus he placed the same.
A waiter sets before him flesh and bread.
And after him Ulysses also came,
Like an old beggar, torn and tattered;
And said to Eumæus, Give the beggar this,
And bid him go and try the charity
Of all the rest; and tell him hurtful ’tis
For beggars to have too much modesty.
Eumæus then straight went unto the guest,
And said: Telemachus doth give you this,
And bids you try your fortune with the rest,
For modesty to beggars hurtful is.
And then Ulysses to Eumæus says:
God bless Telemachus, and make him great,
And always grant him that for which he prays.
And then with both his hands receiv’d his meat.
And as the fiddle with the feast gives o’er,
Ulysses when he eaten had his meat,
Sate quiet on the sill and said no more.
But still amongst the woo’rs the noise was great.
Then Pallas comes and stands Ulysses by,
And bids him try the suitors as they sat,
Which of them had, which wanted charity,
Though they the same men would be for all that.
Then rising up, before the first he stands,
And to the right hand onward still he goes
To every one, and holds up both his hands,
Like one that well the art of begging knows.
They gave him meat, and wonder’d at the man;

And one another ask'd, Who is't? and whence?
And then Melantheus to speak began:
I saw him, said he, but a little since
Brought hither by the master of the swine.
But who he is, his kindred, and his place,
It is not in my power to divine.
This said, Antinous in choler was.
Oh, noble master of the swine, said he,
What made you here to introduce this guest?
Think you that yet too few the beggars be,
That you must needs invite this trouble-feast,
Your lord's estate the sooner to eat up?
Good as you are, says he, you say not right:
No man a stranger e'er call'd in to sup,
And him on no acquaintance did invite,
Unless he were a man that most men need,
Prophet, physician, or armourer,
Or fiddler at a feast; for when men feed
A song doth add delight unto the cheer.
These use to be invited ev'rywhere.
Whoever call'd a beggar in to eat?
But to the servants you still cruel were,
And of them all you me the worst did treat.
But I care little whilst Penelope
Alive is, and Telemachus, her son.
Telemachus then bad him silent be.
Eumæus, said he, let him now alone;
He loves to quarrel, and set others on.
Then to Antinous he turn'd and spake,

Is this as from a father to his son,
To bid me make my guest my house forsake?
I'll never do 't. Give him what alms you will,
Nor shall my mother, nor I, nor any man,
Nor woman that here dwelleth, take it ill.
But eat than give, it seems you better can.
Then said Antinous: These words are great,
And passionate, but spoken without need.
If thus we all go on to give him meat,
He may himself three months together feed.
This said, his footstool to his foot he drew.
Ulysses with his scrip went to the sill,
For it was full, meaning to beg anew.
And first he tries Antinous his will.
Give a poor stranger, says he; you appear
Amongst th' Achæans here to be the best;
For like a king you look, and reason 'twere
You should in bounty exceed all the rest,
And I abroad your goodness will make known.
I could for riches once with most compare,
And kept a great and free house of my own,
And ask'd what want you, man, not what you are.
And many servants had, and things that pass
For happiness amongst us mortals all,
Till t' Egypt I by knaves persuaded was
To sail. I' th' Nile we let our anchors fall.
There I my fellows bid aboard to stay
And guard the ships; and some to places high
I sent to watch. But mov'd by lucre, they

On plunder and on rapine had their eye.
The fields they waste, and kill the men, and make
Women and children captives. Then the cry
Arriving at the city, arms they take,
And next day early to the fields they hie,
With horse and foot. Then thundered the field,
Their armour lighten'd. My men frighted were.
Some taken and made slaves, some flying kill'd,
And all the rest ran scatter'd here and there.
To th' king of Cyprus I was made a gift,
Demetor by name, the king of Egypt's guest.
And to come hither thence, I made hard shift.
Then said Antinous: Stand off you're best.
What devil to molest us sent this rogue
Unmannerly, that with such impudence
To beg presumeth here, and to cologue?
Stand off. Or ill at ease I'll send you hence.
They that have given have done foolishly,
And at another's cost been charitable.
No wonder in such superfluity.
Ulysses then retired from the table.
Oh, ho, said he, I had but little skill,
That from the aspect have inferred wit.
Not give, I see, a crum of salt you will
To a poor man that humbly asketh it.
Antinous at this enrag'd at th' heart,
Look'd on Ulysses angerly, and said,
To part hence safely thou not likely art;
Since to my face thou dar'st me thus upbraid.

This said, he threw the footstool at his head,
Which touch'd his shoulder, but remov'd him not.
Then to the sill himself he rendered,
Shaking his head with vengeance in his thought.
Ulysses then unto the suitors spake.
A man, said he, not much is griev'd, a blow
In fighting for his kine or sheep to take;
But he did for his belly at me throw.
If any care the Gods of poor men have,
Antinous, before he married be,
Is like enough to go into his grave.
Antinous replies, Sit quietly
And eat your meat, lest taken by the heels
The servants hawl and drag you out o' th' gate,
Or use you worse, your tongue so runs on wheels.
At this the rest all discontented sate,
And one among the rest unto him said,
Antinous, it was unjustly done
To use a stranger so. The Gods, array'd
In poor men's habits, men's deeds look upon,
And notice take, who well does, and who ill.
Telemachus was grieved at the heart
For what was done, but did no tear distil,
But shook his head, and hoped to make them smart.
When what had pass'd was told Penelope,
Apollo strike him to the heart, said she.
If I my wish had, said Eurynome,
No suitor of them all the morn should see.
Then said Penelope again, 'Tis true,

They all be enemies, and mean us evil;
But he the fiercest is of all the crew,
And rageth in the house like any devil.
A stranger in distress comes to the door,
Whom want constrained had to beg his bread;
The rest all give him somewhat of their store,
But he a footstool throweth at his head.
While she thus and her women talking were,
Ulysses supping sat upon the sill.
I fain, said she, would have the beggar here.
Fetch him, Eumæus, talk with him I will;
I'll ask him if Ulysses he has seen,
For many men and cities knoweth he.
Eumæus then made answer to the queen;
If once the suitors would but silent be,
You would be pleas'd his history to hear.
Three days and nights he staid with me and end;
And of his suff'rings much he told me there,
When new arriv'd; but came not to the end.
As when a man that knows the art of song,
Sings lovely words, with sweet and well-tun'd voice,
The man that hears him thinks not the time long;
So I, in his strange story did rejoice.
He said Ulysses was his father's guest,
In th' isle of Crete, where reigneth Minos' race.
Himself, he said, with many woes oppress'd,
The fates, at last, him tumbled to this place.
And that he heard Ulysses is hard by,
And that into Thesprotia he's come,

Alive and well; enriched mightily
With treasure which he now is bringing home.
Then said Penelope: Go, call me hither
The beggar. I myself will ask him all:
And meanwhile let the suitors chat together
Where they think best, without or in the hall;
For merry they must be, since they feed here,
And their own corn and wine and cattle save,
And with our cattle make themselves good cheer,
And on our corn and wine no mercy have;
For such as was Ulysses here is none,
That should defend us from their injuries;
But were he hither come, he, and his son,
Would bring destruction on these enemies.
This said, it chanced Telemachus to sneeze.
She laugh'd, and for the beggar calls agen.
You see, Eumæus, Jove with me agrees,
And certainly slain shall be all these men.
Go call the beggar, and say this from me,
If I find true what he shall to me say,
He shall with coat and vest rewarded be.
Eumæus to the beggar went his way;
And when he near him was, Father, said he,
Penelope desires to speak with you;
About Ulysses she inform'd would be,
And said, if she find all you say be true,
She clothe you will with a fair coat and vest,
Which you stand most in need of. But for food,
By begging in the town you'll get it best,

Where they relieve you will that shall think good.
Ulysses to Eumæus answered:
Penelope I quickly can inform,
For he and I have jointly suffered.
But from the suitors I much fear a storm;
Their insolence is known up to the sky;
Just now a footstool one threw at my head,
When given him no cause at all had I,
Nor could I by her son be succoured.
Therefore entreat Penelope to stay
Until the sun be set and suitors gone,
And by the fire-side hear what I can say.
You see what woful garments I have on.
Then back Eumæus went with his excuse,
And came without him to Penelope.
How now, said she, does he to come refuse?
They that are bashful but ill beggars be.
Not so, O queen, said he, he is discreet;
He prays you stay till setting of the sun,
Fearing some danger from the wooers to meet;
And for you also then ‘twill best be done.
I see, quoth she, the stranger wants not wit,
For in the world never so many men
Contriving mischief did together sit.
So said Penelope. Eumæus then
Went down and put himself into the throng,
And to Telemachus said in his ear:
I have been absent from my swine too long;
I go, and to your care leave all things here,

And chiefly of your life to have a care;
Many there are that bear you evil mind,
And how to take your life contriving are,
But may they first their own destruction find.
Then said Telemachus, And so ‘twill be.
Farewell. But I advise you first to dine;
The bus’ness here leave to the Gods and me.
Then din’d he, and went back unto his swine,
Next morning with more victims to return.
And full he left the hall and court with men,
Who there themselves to song and dancing turn,
For less than half the day remained then.

LIB. XVIII.

The fighting at fists of Ulysses with Irus. His admonition to Amphinomus. Penelope appears before the wooers, and draws presents from them.

THEN CAME A beggar to Ulysses' gate.
The man to see to was both great and tall,
Though but a lither fellow. Down he sate
Boldly within the porch before the hall.
He had a greedy gut, and named was
At first Arnæus, then Irus; for he went
On errands oft, whenever there was cause.
The wooers' favour made him insolent;
This beggar thought to drive Ulysses thence.
Dost see those princes how they wink at me,
And by the heels would have me pluck thee hence?
Though to do that I should ashamed be.
Go from the door, old man, lest I should do it.
Up therefore quickly, and be gone; arise,
Before that with my fists I force you to it.
Ulysses frowning, answer'd in this wise:
Strange man, I neither do thee harm, nor say
Thee any ill. Here's room for thee and me.
I do not envy you the meat which they
Shall give you here, how much soe'er it be.
Envy not other men; I think you are

As well as I, a beggar; but forbear
To threaten me too much. You're best beware,
Old as I am, lest I your lips besmear
And breast with blood, and so have better room.
For to Ulysses' house I'm confident
Thou never wilt be able more to come.
This made the beggar more impatient;
O, says he, how the rascal prates! 'Twere well
To beat the rascal's teeth out, while his tongue
Thus runs on wheels, till to the ground they fell.
Let these see fight the old man with the young.
Whilst in great heat they quarrell'd at the door,
They by Antinous observed were,
Who, laughing, said: There never came before
Such sport to th' house. The beggars standing there
Will go to cuffs; I pray let's hold them to it.
Then up they start, and round about them stand.
There are o' th' fire good puddings full of suet,
Of these, let him that conquers lay his hand
On which he will; (so said Antinous);
And have the privilege, and none but he,
To beg within the porch before the house,
And of our talk at meat a hearer be.
The motion pleas'd; and then Ulysses spake:
The match is hard, an old man 'gainst a younger;
Yet this my belly bids me undertake.
And I'm acquainted more with blows than hunger.
But I must first entreat you all to swear
Not to help Irus, nor a heavy hand

To lay on me, but both of us forbear,
And justly ‘twixt us both as neuters stand.
When all had sworn, then said Telemachus,
Stranger, if thou dare combat with this man
The fighting at fists of Ulysses with Irus.
None else shall do thee hurt. Antinous,
Eurymachus, and I, defend you can.
This said, Ulysses cover’d kept his gear,
But shew’d his shoulders wide, and his strong thighs.
His large breast and his brawny arms appear;
And Pallas standing by, enlarg’d his size.
At which the suitors greatly wondered,
And one unto another softly said,
Irus has pull’d an old house on his head.
And Irus then was mightily afraid;
But yet by force the servants brought him out,
His flesh still trembling on his limbs with fear.
Show not thyself a coward and a lout,
Nor fear a man worn out with many a year;
For if he get the better, thou shalt go
Unto king Takim, and there by his law
Thy nose and ears, and privy parts also,
Shall be cut off, and dogs shall eat them raw.
This made him quake more yet. Into the lists
They brought him so. Both ready were to fight.
Ulysses then thought how to use his fists,
Whether to beat him down or kill him quite;
But not t’offend the suitors, thought it best
To strike him gently. And when they were near

Irus did hit Ulysses on the breast;
Ulysses Irus struck just under th'ear.
He broke the bones, at 's mouth the blood gush'd out.
He fell, squeak'd, shed his teeth. The suitors were
With laughter almost dead, that stood about.
Ulysses dragg'd him to the utter gate,
And set him to the hedge, as 'twere a sign,
And put a staff in's hand. As there he sate,
Ulysses bade him keep out dogs and swine.
Think not thyself, quoth he, of beggars king
(That art a very wretch) and wandering souls.
This said, o'er 's head he threw the twisted string
By which his scrip hung, ragg'd and full of holes.
Then sat him down i' th' porch. The suitors enter
All laughing in, and as they passed by
Greatly congratulated his adventure.
Stranger, said they, Jove and the Gods on high,
Grant thee whatever thou shalt most desire,
That hast relieved us from the rascal there.
We'll send him to king Takim in Epire.
And glad Ulysses was his praise to hear.
Antinous a haggas brought, filled up
With fat and blood, and to't Amphinomus
Two loaves of bread, and with't a gilded cup
Of lusty wine, and said unto him thus:
Hail, father, stranger, rich and happy be
His admonition to Amphinomus.
As ere you were; though many miseries
Oppress you now. He answer'd him: I see

Amphinomus, you prudent are and wise;
So was your father. Nisus was his name,
Prince of Dulichium, both rich and wise.
You are his son, as I am told by fame;
Therefore I will a little you advise.
There's not a weaker creature lives o'th' ground,
Or goes, or creeps upon it, than a man;
Who whilst he's strong, and all his limbs are sound,
He makes account that fail he never can;
But when the Gods shall have decreed him woe,
He less endures it than another can.
Such is the nature Jove has assign'd to
This weak and short-liv'd creature called man.
For I myself was rich, and lived in
Great plenty, and was very insolent;
Bold on my strength, my father, and my kin,
Therefore let no man be too confident,
But rather quietly God's gifts enjoy.
These suitors here bring this into my mind,
Who of an absent man the goods destroy,
And that at last unto their cost they'll find.
For this I tell you (mark well what I say),
That he will soon, nay, very quickly come;
And that will be to some a heavy day.
Pray God that at his coming you keep home.
This said, he drank, and to Amphinomus
Returned the cup, who shook his head in vain;
For not long after by Telemachus
Amongst the rest of the wooers he was slain.

Then Pallas puts Penelope in mind
T’ appear unto the wooers, that she might
Before her son and husband honour find,
And further bring the suitors’ thoughts to light.
Penelope then laugh’d, not knowing why.
Eurynome, said she, my mind says, go
And show yourself before the company;
Which heretofore I never thought to do.
I hate them, yet I mean to go to th’ door,
And bid my son their company to shun,
And mix himself with those ill men no more.
Dear child, said the old woman, ’tis well done.
Go tell him whatsoever you think fit,
But wash away the tears first from your eyes,
And ‘noint your cheeks; they must sometimes remit
And hide their grief, that will be counted wise.
You have your wish, your son now is a man.
Penelope then answered her again;
Restored be my beauty never can:
Penelope appears before the wooers.
‘Nointing and washing now are all in vain.
The Gods, Eurynome, then took away
All beauty from me when Ulysses went
With Agamemnon to the siege of Troy;
Such words afford me now but small content.
Call Hippodamia and Autonoe;
For why, I am asham’d myself alone
Amongst so many men in sight to be:
They shall go with me, on each side me one.

But when th’ old woman was gone out, and staid,
Then Pallas pour’d sweet sleep upon her eyes,
And on her face a greater beauty laid,
And also made her limbs of larger size,
And whiter than the purest ivory.
Having so done, the Goddess rose to th’ skies.
Her maidens coming made a noise, and she
Awak’d, and with her hand she strok’d her eyes.
I’ve had, said she, a very gentle sleep;
that Diana such a gentle death
Would send me presently, nor let me weep
My life out, nor with sorrow give me breath;
Sorrow for my dear husband, best of all
The Grecian princes: and that said, then down
She goes to th’ porch before the door of th’ hall
With her two maids; she would not go alone;
And so stood at the door within their sight,
But with her scarf her cheeks a little shaded.
A maid stood at her left hand and her right.
When she appear’d Love all their hearts invaded.
Her speech then to Telemachus she address’d:
Telemachus, said she, your wit’s less now
Than when you were a boy. ’Twas then at best;
And backward more and more it seems to grow.
You now are tall, and come to man’s estate,
And counted are the best men’s sons among.
Of your discretion you begin t’ abate;
Why else d’ye let your stranger suffer wrong?
If you your guests thus treat, what think you, can

Men say of you that's good or honourable?
You'll be reproach'd and scorn'd of every man,
And taken for a man unhospitable.
Mother, said he, you well may angry be;
And yet I better know what's good and ill
Than heretofore. But these men hinder me;
I cannot without help do all I will.
The quarrel 'twixt my guest and Irus was
None of the suitors' act; by chance it rose,
As they sate begging, from some other cause,
And Irus only bare away the blows.
Jupiter, I wish, and all the Gods,
Penelope draws presents from the wooers.
That all your suitors were in Irus' case,
(Who yonder sits, like one that's drunk, and nods)
Either here right, or in some other place,
Unable to go home. Penelope
And her lov'd son so talk'd. And then
Eurymachus: If all the lords, said he,
Which now through Argos bear rule over men
Should see you now, more suitors you'd have here
(For you do far all woman-kind surpass)
And come betime to taste of your good cheer;
None such for fair and prudent ever was.
No, no, said she; for when Ulysses went
With th' Argive princes to the war of Troy,
The immortal Gods took from me my content,
And with it all these ornaments away;
Were he come home that took a care of me,

I should more honour have and beauty so.
But now I lead my life in misery;
The Gods some evil on me daily throw.
My husband, when he parted hence to fight
For Agamemnon ‘gainst the Trojans, laid
At taking leave on my left hand his right,
And all those words of counsel to me said:
Expect you cannot, wife, that we that go
Over the sea unto the siege of Troy
Shall all come safe away. The Trojans know
How t’ use the dart and bow too, as men say,
And are good horsemen also, and can see
All their advantages in ranged field;
Therefore I know not what my luck will be,
Either to come again, or to be kill’d.
My father and my mother I therefore
To you commend, to see them cherished,
As they are now, or (in my absence) more;
And when Telemachus is grown, then wed:
Take whom yourself like best, and leave this house.
This said, he parts. Ay me, the time is come
I must embrace a marriage odious,
And I must leave this my most blessed home.
Suitors were wont, when they a woman woo’d
Of noble parentage, to please her all
They could, and strive who most should do her good;
Mine daily eat and drink me up in th’ hall.
This said, Ulysses was well pleas’d to see
His wife draw presents from them, and was glad,

And th’ wooers by her over-reach’d to be
With her fine words, when other thoughts she had.
Then said Antinous: Penelope,
Fair and wise daughter of Icarius,
Receive whate’er by us shall offer’d be;
It is not good, good presents to refuse;
Yet, till you choose some one whom you think best
To be your husband, we resolve to stay,
And be each one of us your constant guest,
And never absent from your house a day.
And with Antinous they all agree,
Who her presented with a fair, large, rich
And divers colour’d robe, with four times three
Buckles of pure and beaten gold, and which
As many clasps of gold had joined fit.
Eurymachus his present was a chain
Of gold and amber-beads alternate; it
Shin’d bright as is the sun-shine after rain.
Eurydamas two pendants gave, of which
Each had three gems, and polish’d very bright,
And both for art and workmanship were rich,
Reflecting to the eye a lovely light.
Pysandrus, son of Polycterides,
Gave her a costly necklace. All the rest
With some good gift endeavoured to please
The fair and wise Penelope the best.
This done, unto her chamber up she went
With her two maids, that did her presents carry.
Th’ woo’rs with dancing and with merriment,

(Their wonted pastime) for the ev'ning tarry.
The ev'ning came, and then the lamps were lighted,
And torches, and the fir-staves long lain dry,
Which to that purpose had with tools been fitted,
And ready lay to light the company.
The lights the maids took up by turns and bore them.
Then said Ulysses, Maidens, if you please,
To save your pains, I'll bear the light before them;
I'm us'd to labour, and can do't with ease,
Though they should stay and sit up till to-morrow:
You may go up unto the queen, and there
Sit and spin with her, and divert her sorrow.
At this the wenches 'gan to laugh and jeer;
And one of them, Melantho, him revil'd
With bitter words. Her father Dolius hight.
Penelope did treat her as her child,
And in her company did take delight;
But yet she could not put away her grief.
The wench was fair, and too familiar was
With prince Eurymachus, one of the chief
Of all her suitors. And this woman 'twas.
And thus she said: Sure, stranger, thou art mad,
That wilt not here nor elsewhere go to bed;
Is it because thou too much wine hast had?
Or is't a humour in thy nature bred,
To prate so boldly in such company?
Thy victory o'er Irus may perhaps
Have made thee wild; a better man than he
May chance to send thee hence with bloody chaps.

Ulysses, looking sourly, answered,
You bitch, Telemachus shall straightway know
These words; he'll cause thee to be tortured.
They, fearing he would do't, away they go.
Ulysses ready stood to take in hand
A torch when bidden; casting in his mind
How he might safely carry on the grand
Mischief against the woo'rs he had design'd.
And Pallas yet not suffer'd them to keep
Themselves in any bounds of modesty,
But fix Ulysses' anger yet more deep.
Eurymachus then said to th' standers by,
To make them laugh, Ulysses to disgrace,
Hear, sirs, I pray, what now comes in my thought.
The man comes opportunely to this place;
'Tis sure some God that him has hither brought
To give us greater light; for from his head
Methinks I see arise another flame
Besides the flame the torch gives, and so spread
Upon his bald pate doubled has the same.
Then says t' Ulysses, Man, wilt thou serve me,
To pluck up thorns and briars, and trees to plant?
Thou shalt have meat enough, and clothes, and fee,
And shoes, and whatsoever thou shalt want.
But, since thou hast been us'd to idleness,
I doubt thou ne'er wilt labour any more,
But rather feed thy carcass labourless,
And wand'ring choose to beg from door to door.
This said, Ulysses answer'd him again:

Eurymachus, if we two were to try
Our labour, in a large green meadow, when
The days are long, the weather hot and dry,
With equal scythes from morning unto night;
Or with two equal oxen fed and strong
Were fasting put to plough, to try our might
Which of us labour could endure most long;
Or if an enemy to-day should land,
And I a helmet had fit for my head,
And target, and two fit spears for my hand,
Then you should see whether I fought or fled,
And not reproach m' of sloth or poverty.
You are too cruel, and you do me wrong,
And think yourself a man of might to be,
Because they weaker are you live among.
But should Ulysses come and find you here,
You'd think the door, though it be very wide,
As you are running out, too narrow were,
So glad you'ld be your heads to save or hide.
To this Eurymachus with bended brow,
And furious eye, answer'd, Wretch that thou art,
And dar'st so saucily to prate. How now!
'Twill not be long before I make thee smart.
Is it because thou too much wine hast had?
Or is't thy nature always to be bold?
Or is't t' have beaten Irus makes thee mad?
This said, upon a footstool he laid hold,
And threw it at him, but it hit him not.
Ulysses sunk on's knees, the stool flew o'er

His head, and a cup-bearer next him smote
On the right hand, and down he falls o' th' floor.
Much the disorder then was in the room,
And one unto another next him said,
I would this beggar hither had not come,
But somewhere else before had perished.
For what ado about a beggar's here!
The pleasure of our dinner all is lost.
Then, said Telemachus, Can you not bear,
Madmen, your wine and cheer both boil'd and roast?
When fill'd, why do you not go home and sleep?
Go when you will, I drive you not away.
The suitors at this boldness bit the lip,
And thought it strange, but yet did nothing say.
Then, said Amphinomus, Let's not fall out
With any man for speaking truth, nor be
Rude and unkind. Cup-bearers, bear about
To every man the cup of charity;
And so go each man home, for now 'tis late
(Leaving the stranger with Telemachus,
Whose guest he is), and ourselves recreate
With gentle sleep, each one in his own house.
Then Meleus to each man presents a cup,
Whereof unto the Gods they offer'd part.
When this was done each one his wine drank up,
And then unto their houses they depart.

LIB. XIX.

Telemachus removes the arms out of the hall.

ULYSSES IN THE house remain'd, and staid
Contriving how the suitors to destroy.
And staightway to Telemachus he said,
Carry the armour in the hall away;
Ulysses discourseth with Penelope, and is known by his nurse, but concealed; and the hunting of the boar upon that occasion related.
And tell them gently, if they ask wherefore,
The fire has hurt them, and they are not now
Such as Ulysses left them heretofore,
When with the Greeks he did to Ilium go:
Or say, For fear some quarrel might arise
By th' indiscretion of one or other,
You thought the counsel would not be unwise
To take them thence. One drawn sword draws another.
Telemachus then calls his nurse, and said,
Euryclea, shut all the rooms up fast.
Be sure to keep within door every maid,
Till I my father's arms have elsewhere plac'd;
The smoke does spoil them all; but I will now
Free them from soot. I'm glad, said she, at last
To see your husbandry. But I would know
Who 'tis shall light you when the maids are fast?

My guest, says he, this stranger whom you see.
For here he feeds, and nothing has to do;
How far soever hence his dwelling be,
I think ’tis reason he should help me too.
The nurse did what commanded she had been.
They laid up helmets, bucklers, swords, and spears;
And Pallas with a lamp came in unseen,
And up and down the light before them bears.
Then, Father, said Telemachus, I see
The walls, beams, roof, and all the pillars shine,
Like any fire; and certainly there be
Within the house some of the powers divine.
Peace, said Ulysses, be not curious,
The purpose of the Gods you cannot find.
Go you to bed. I must go through the house,
To find the women’s and your mother’s mind.
Telemachus then to his chamber went,
In which before he wonted was to lie,
Leaving his father in the house, intent
On how, with Pallas, to make th’ wooers die.
Forth comes Penelope into the hall,
More than Diana, more than Venus fair;
Her maids upon her were attending all,
And set down for her a most stately chair,
Made by Icmalius of silver plate,
And iv’ry turned, white as any snow,
And footstool thereto fix’d. And there in state
Sat down the fair Penelope; and now
The housemaids enter in and take away

The tables, and the bowls, the cups, and bread,
Which (the wooers gone) about the room still lay
And having made a fire, there went to bed.
Melantho then Ulysses bitterly
Rebuk'd again. Art thou here, said she, still,
Ulysses discourseth with Penelope.
To peep at th' women in the night, and spy
What they are doing? an't, may be, hast the will
To stay all night. Go quickly; get thee gone;
T'hast supp'd; lest thou be driven out of door
With brands of fire. To this new insolence,
Ulysses answered gentlier than before:
Why d' ye pursue me thus? Is it because
I am not fine, but have ill raiment on?
The time has been I rich and wealthy was,
And beggars I did much bestow upon;
Not looking on the men, but on their want:
And many servants had. Of that which makes
Men called rich, I knew not any scant.
But Jove not only riches gives, but takes;
Think, therefore, that your beauty will decay;
Or of your mistress you may lose the grace;
Or that Ulysses may come back one day:
And though he ne'er return unto his place,
His son, Telemachus, knows all you do,
Knows better now what 's good, and what is worse.
Then be hereafter modester: go to.
Penelope o'erheard all this discourse.
Bold bitch, said she, I know what deeds you' ve done,

Which thou shalt one day pay for with thy head:
Did not I tell thee when the woo'rs were gone,
That I to speak with him had ordered?
Eurynome, I've much to say, said she,
Unto this man; set here a chair, that so,
Sitting, I may hear him, and he hear me;
For there are many things I'd from him know.
Ulysses sat. Penelope began:
The question I will ask you first, is this;
What is your name, and who your parents be;
And, further, tell me where your country is?
When she had said, Ulysses thus replies:
queen, through all the world your praises ring,
Your virtues known are up unto the skies;
No less than of some great and happy king,
That maintains justice, and whose fertile ground
Bears store of wheat and barley, and whose trees
Are charg'd with fruit, and all his sheep stand sound,
And under him a valiant people sees.
And, therefore, ask me what you will beside,
My kin and country to myself I'd keep.
For then my grief I can no longer hide,
Or think thereon, but ready am to weep;
Which here would be no seemly thing to do,
For why, your maids might, peradventure, think,
And you yourself, it may be, think so too,
My tears came not from sorrow, but from drink.
Stranger, said she, my beauty, form, and worth,
Th' immortal Gods took from me then away,

When first Ulysses with the Greeks went forth
To that abominable town of Troy;
But were he here that had the care of me,
I should more honour have, and beauty so.
But now I lead my life in misery;
The Gods upon me troubles daily throw.
For all the lords that in these islands be,
Same, Dulichium, and woody Zant,
And Ithaca itself, suitors to me,
My house continually together haunt,
And there devour my cattle, corn, and wine;
So that of strangers I can take no care,
Nor can myself dispose of what is mine,
Nor messengers receive that public are;
But, longing for my husband, sit and pine.
They press for marriage, I, to put it by.
Then came into my thought (some power divine
Sure prompt'd me) to set up a beam; so I
A beam set up, and then began to weave.
Suitors, said I, since dead Ulysses is,
Stay yet a little while, and give me leave
To make an end but of one business.
I must for old Laertes make a cloth,
Which in his sepulchre he is to wear.
T' offend the wives of Greece I should be loath;
For, to accuse me they will not forbear.
They' ll say I very hasty was to wed,
If I go hence and not provide a shroud
Wherein Laertes must be buried,

Out of his wealth; that might have been allow'd.
My suitors all were well content. And then,
All day I wove; but ere I went to bed,
What I had wov'n I ravel'd out agen.
Three years my suitors I thus frustrated.
In the fourth year my women me betray'd;
And in they came while I the web undid.
I could the wedding now no more avoid,
But I was rated by them much and chid.
What I am next to do, I cannot tell:
My father and my mother bid me marry;
My son is weary, and takes not very well
That th' woo'rs devouring him should longer tarry.
But for all this, I long to know your stock,
For sure you come not of the fabled oak,
Nor are, I think, descended from a rock.
To this Ulysses answering thus spoke:
Wife of Ulysses, since you so much press
To know my kindred, and from whence I come,
Although the telling grieve me, I'll confess,
For I have now long absent been from home.
In the wide sea a fertile island lies,
Innumerable therein are the men,
Creta by name. Many diversities
There are of tongues; and cities nine times ten.
There dwell Achæans and Cydonians,
And ancient true Creatans, Tribachichs,
And also Dorichs and Pelasgians,
Who divers dialects together mix.

And Cnossus the prime city was of these,
Where Minos reigned; the great Minos that,
Who often used with great Chronides
Familiarly of old to sit and chat;
Minos my father's father was, and he
Deucalion begot; Deucalion
First got Idomeneus, and then got me.
He went to Troy. My name is Aithon.
There 'twas I saw Ulysses. He came in
As he went homeward, and with much ado
T' Amphisus; for by winds he forc'd had been
This place, though no good port, to put into.
Then straight went up, Idomeneus to see,
With whom he had acquaintanace, as he said.
'Twas ten days after that, or more, that he
For Troy, with th' other Greeks, his anchors weigh'd.
I entertained him kindly with my own;
Gave him a handsome present too, and then
I made him to be feasted by the town,
Upon the public charge, himself and men.
Twelve days the wind continued at north,
Which kept the fleet perforce within the bay;
On the thirteenth th' wind changed, and came south,
And then they set up sail and steer'd for Troy.
'Twas so like truth, she wept. As when the sun
Dissolving is the snow upon a hill,
Innumerable streams of water run,
And the low rivers of the valley fill:
So wept she for her husband sitting by;

Who grieved and pitied her, but never wept;
As hard as horn or iron was his eye,
And by design himself from tears he kept.
After with weeping she was satisfied,
Stranger, said she, I'll ask you somewhat now,
By which most certainly it will be tried,
If you my husband, as you say, did know,
Or entertain'd him and his company.
What kind of person was he, and how clad?
How serv'd? To this Ulysses made reply:
Though twenty year ago it be, and bad
My memory; yet, what I can recall
I will relate; he wore a purple vest,
Unshorn and lin'd. Before, embroider'd all,
Two clasps of gold; and in it was exprest
A hound, that did between his forefeet hold
A fawn, that sprall'd and labour'd to get free;
Which was so lively done, and all in gold
Performed was, that wonder 'twas to see.
His coat I mark'd, so soft it was and fine,
As is the fold of a dry onion;
And as the sun, did gloriously shine,
And women gaz'd upon him many a one.
Such were his garments, but I know not whence
He had them. You know better that than I;
Whether he so apparell'd went from hence,
Presented by some of his company,
Or given to him somewhere by some guest;
For he was much beloved far and near,

And of the Achæans all esteem'd the best;
Amongst the Greeks he hardly had his peer.
And I him gave a purple double vest,
A sword, and coat edged with fringes trim,
And brought him to his ship. Amongst the rest
A herald was; and I'll describe you him.
Round shoulder'd was he, curled was his hair,
Swarthy his face, Eurybates his name.
Ulysses to him much respect did bear,
Because their thoughts for most part were the same.
When he had done, she could no longer hold,
But wept again, and sorer than before;
For she found true the tokens he had told.
But when this show'r of tears was passed o'er,
Stranger, said she, I pitied you before;
Now as a friend you shall respected be;
'Twas I gave him th' apparel he then wore,
And the gold buckles to remember me;
But I shall never see him more at home;
In an unlucky hour he cross'd the main
To that accursed town of Ilium.
Then thus Ulysses answered her again:
noble wife of Laertiades,
Blemish no more those your fair eyes with tears
For your Ulysses; set your heart at ease.
Not that your sorrow as a fault appears.
What woman that her husband of her youth,
And to whom children she had borne, had lost,
Could choose but grieve and weep, although in truth

She could not of his virtue greatly boast?
But that you would give ear to what I say;
I say Ulysses is not far from home;
He's in Thesprotia, hence a little way,
Alive, enrich'd with presents he is come;
His ship and men all perish'd in the main,
Then when he left the isle Thrinacie;
Because Sol's sacred kine his men had slain,
Hurled they were by Jove into the sea;
Ulysses only scap'd; for sitting fast
Upon the torn-off rudder by the waves,
After much labour came to land at last
In th' isle Phœacia; there his life he saves.
Much honour there and precious gifts he got.
They ready were to have convey'd him home
Safely to Ithaca, but he would not;
Else long ago he might have hither come.
But he thought best to travel longer yet,
And pick up presents which way e'er he went,
Before his going home much wealth to get;
For at designing he was excellent.
Phidon himself, king of Thesprotia,
Swore to me this; and that both ship and men
Were ready to convey him t' Ithaca,
His country; but he could not stay till then;
For now a vessel ready to set forth
Stood for Dulichium. But he show'd me all
Ulysses' treasure, which might serve, for worth,
Ten ages to maintain a man withal.

But he, he said, was gone o'er to the main,
There at Dodona with Jove's oak t' advise
How to return to Ithaca again;
As he was openly, or in disguise;
So then he's safe, and soon he will be here;
He cannot from his house be long away.
And, which is more, I will not doubt to swear,
And witness call the Gods to what I say.
Hear, Jove, of Gods the best and high'st, and thou
The guardian of the house that we are in:
Ulysses shall come to this place you know,
Ere this month end, or when the next comes in.
Penelope then answer'd: Stranger, oh
That this would so fall out, you then should see
Such friendship from me, and such gifts also,
That men should bless, and say you happy be.
But, maids, go wash his feet, and make his bed,
Lay on warm rugs, and handsome covering,
His limbs to cherish till the day be spread.
Then wash and 'noint him that my son may bring
And set him in the hall at dinner by him;
For he that wrongs him shall not be allow'd
To come into my house another time,
How angry at it e'er he be and proud.
He is known by his nurse, but concealed.
Stranger, by this I mean to let you see
I better know how to entertain my guest
Than many women do, though poor he be,
Far from his home, and in vile garments dress'd.

To this Ulysses answer'd her again,
noble wife of Laertiades,
Since I left Crete, on ship-board I have lain,
Soft and fine bedding give me little ease;
Many a night have I passed without sleep,
And often slept have on a homely couch.
The custom I have so long kept I'll keep;
Nor shall your maidens my feet wash or touch,
Such as wait on you; but if there be any
Old women here that hath endured much,
As I have done, and years have lived many,
I am content my feet be wash'd by such.
Then said Penelope, Ne'er man came here
Within my house from foreign country yet
So prudent as you are, whose answers were
To every thing so wise and so discreet.
There is a woman such as you desire,
That nurs'd and brought up that afflicted man;
Though she be very weak, she'll make a fire,
And wash your feet, but nothing else do can.
Rise, Euryclea, wash the feet of one
That's like your lord. Such feet and hands were his,
Woe makes men old, as well as years that run.
So said Penelope; and th' old woman ris,
And weeping held her hand before her eyes.
O my dear child, O Jupiter unkind!
Who more devout, who burnt to him more thighs,
Or fatter, or doth lesser favour find?
He pray'd to live so long that he might see,

Painless, the education of his child
Telemachus, but granted ‘twill not be.
He now perhaps is where he is revil’d
And mock’d by women in some great man’s hall,
As thou, O stranger, hast been scorned here;
And wilt not suffer any of them all
Either thy feet to wash or to come near.
I’ll wash your feet, as I am bidden by
Penelope, and for your own sake too.
It is not her command alone. There lie
Thoughts on my heart that urge me thereunto.
Poor passengers come hither very many,
But one so like Ulysses never came;
For person, voice, and feet, I never saw any
Come to this house that had so near the same.
Ulysses answered, Woman, so they say
All that have seen us both. It may be so.
The hunting of the boar related.
She with her kettle bright then went her way
For water, wherewithal her work to do.
Cold water she brings in, and pours on’t hot.
Ulysses sat by the fire, but turned that thigh
That had the scar, to the dark, that she mightn ot
Find it, and force him to appear openly.
She was not long about him when she spied
The scar a boar had made above his knee
When he was hunting on Parnassus’ side,
At’s grandsires, in his uncle’s company.
His grandsire was Autolycus, that was

His mother's father, named Anticlia;
He in hermetic arts did most suppass;
And to his daughter came to Ithaca,
That newly of a son was brought to bed.
Euryclea laid the child upon his knee.
Autolycus, you are to give, she said,
Thename; how shall it named be?
Then said Autolycus, Since I of many,
Both men and women, have incurr'd the blame,
A fitter name I cannot think on any;
Therefore, I say, Ulysses be his name;
And when he's grown a man send him to me,
To Mount Parnassus; whither if he come,
He shall of what I have partaker be,
And from me go not ill-contented home.
And this the cause was that he thither went.
Autolycus and 's sons there take Ulysses
By th' hand, expressing very great content.
Antithea, his grannam, his head kisses,
And both his eyes. Autolycus appoints
His sons to have the supper very good.
A bullock fat they kill, slay, cut in joints,
Roast, and in messes distribute the food;
And so they feasted till the day was done;
And when 'twas dark parted and went to sleep.
But when Aurora had proclaim'd the sun,
Which ready was above the hill to peep,
Then to Parnassus up the hunters go,
The hounds before went searching out the see

Autolycus his sons were there also,
Ulysses with them; next the dogs he went,
And in his hand shook a long-shaded spear;
The dogs drew toward a wood; so close it was
That neither rain nor wind e'er enter'd there,
Nor yet the beams o' th' sun could through it pass,
And heaps of wither'd leaves there lay therein.
Within this thicket lay a mighty boar;
Only the noise of hounds and men came in.
When they were very near, and not before,
The boar rush'd out, and fire was in his eye;
Bristled his neck. Ulysses ready was.
The boar first wounded had Ulysses' thigh;
The spear did through the boar's right shoulder pass.
Slain was the boar. And of Ulysses' wound
His uncles took the care, and skilfully
They caus'd it to be closed up and bound,
And with a charm the blood stopp'd presently.
His wound soon cured, very glad they were,
And him with many gifts sent glad away.
At home they ask, and he relateth there
The story of the hunting of that day.
Euryclea on the wound had laid her hand,
And well assured was 'twas none but he,
Which made the water in her eyes to stand;
And now her joy and grief one passion be.
Her speech stuck in her throat; her hand lets fall
Her master's foot; that down the kettle threw;
The water runneth out about the hall;

And knowing now what she but thought was true:
You are Ulysses, said she, O my dear,
And tow'rd Penelope she look'd aside,
As if she meant to say, Your husband's here.
But Pallas, that did mean the truth to hide,
Still made the queen to look another way,
And he with one hand stopp'd the nurse's breath,
With th' other held her fast to make her stay.
Why, nurse, said he, mean you to be my death?
Since at your breast I nourished have been,
And none but you knows me in this disguise;
These twenty years I here was never seen.
Let none else know it in the house. Be wise;
For this I tell you, and will make it true,
That of the women some I mean to slay,
When by my hand the Gods the woo'rs subdue;
If you bewray me, you shall fare as they.
Then said Euryclea, What needeth this?
You know my heart can hold like stone or brass;
And who is honest, who dishonest is,
I'll tell you, if your purpose come to pass.
No, nurse, then said Ulysses, tell not me;
You need not; I shall know them every one.
Permit all to the Gods, and silent be;
For they best know what best is to be done.
Then out she went more water to fetch in,
The first being spilt. He wash'd and 'nointed was.
And covered the place where th' wound had been.
And nearer to the fire his chair he draws.

Then to them came Penelope, and said,
Stranger, I'll ask you but a little more;
'Tis almost bed-time, and when we are laid,
Our grief in gentle sleep is passed o'er.
But all the day my tears are my delight,
Or of my women's work the care I take;
And after I am gone to bed at night
A thousand dismal thoughts keep me awake;
As Philomela, sitting in a tree,
Mourns with a lamentable voice and shrill,
For Itylus, and turneth restlessly,
(Whom Zethus' son did by misfortune kill):
Just so my mind divided is in twain:
Whether to keep my servants with my son,
And my dear husband's bed, and here remain,
Or marry one o' th' suitors and be gone.
To marry and be gone I could not yet;
My son too young was yet to rule th'estate;
And now, grown up, it makes him vex and fret
To see them daily feast within his gate.
I'll tell you now a dream; expound it you:
I've twenty geese feeding i' th' yard without;
A mighty eagle from the hills down flew
And break their necks; dead they lay all about.
The eagle straightway mounted out of sight.
I dreaming wept; to see them at the trough,
Feeding on steeped wheat, I took delight;
And to bemoan me ladies came enough.
And then methought the eagle came again,

And on a beam which through the wall did start,
He sat; and said, in human language plain,
Child of Icarius, trouble not your heart;
The thing you see is real, not a dream;
The geese the wooers, I the eagle was,
And now return'd and sitting on the beam;
I am your husband, and will bring to pass
The death of all your suitors. Then wak'd I,
And went into the court my geese to see,
And found them all there feeding heartily,
Unhurt, and well as they were wont to be.
Woman, then said Ulysses, no man can
Expound this dream but as himself has done,
That says and does. Ulysses is the man.
The suitors will be killed every one.
Then said Penelope, Dreams are without
Such order as to make a judgment by;
And at two gates, men say, they issue out,
The one of horn, th' other of ivory;
Those that pass through the horn, to men of skill,
Never say anything but what is sooth;
But find a word of truth you never will
In those that come through th' Elephantine tooth.
But I much fear that my dream came this way;
For I have promised to quit this place,
And come already is th' unlucky day
That must determine who shall gain my grace.
Twelve axes here Ulysses set arow,
Like twelve boats laid along upon their sides,

And at a distance standing with his bow,
Through ev'ry one of them his arrow glides.
And this shall to my suitors be the prize.
He that most easily shall bend the bow,
And through the axes all his arrow flies,
Leaving this blessed house with him I'll go.
Then said Ulysses, Let the suitors try
If they can bend the bow, and thorough shoot
Through th' axes if they can, for sure am I,
Ulysses will be here before they do't.
Stranger, said she, whilst you discourse, my eyes
To sleep will never be inclin'd; but since
The force of nature on all mortals lies,
I up into my chamber will go hence;
There is my bed, wash'd nightly with my tears,
Since first Ulysses went to cursed Troy,
Wailing my husband's absence, wak'd with fears;
And yours in what part of the house you'll say.
This said, unto her chamber up she went,
And with her all her maids. And there she lies.
And for her husband did afresh lament,
Till Pallas threw a sweet sleep on her eyes.

LIB. XX.

Pallas and Ulysses consult of the killing of the wooers.

ULYSSES IN THE court lay out adoors
On a cow-hide; and on him skins of sheep
New kill'd and sacrificed by the woo'rs.
There lay he, but he could not fall asleep.
Eurynome a rug laid on him too.
Out came the maids that wont were to commit
With the proud wooers, giggling and laughing so,
And pleasing one another with their wit,
As made Ulysses in his mind to cast
Whether to start up quick and kill them all,
Or let them now go on and take their last
Farewell of those they had to do withal;
As when a bitch stands by her whelps, and spies
A stranger coming near, will bark and grin,
So at this sight of their debaucheries
Ulysses' heart, provoked, bark'd within.
Hold, heart, said he; when Cyclops eat my men,
Thou didst endure till counsel set thee free;
The danger now is less. Hold out again.
And so it did, though he lay restlessly.
As one that has raw flesh upon the fire,
And hungry is, is ever turning it;

So turneth he himself, with great desire
‘Gainst th’ wooers to devise some mischief fit.
Then Pallas came, and standing at his head
In woman’s shape, O wretched man, said she,
What makes you toss and turn so in your bed?
The house is yours, your wife and son here be.
Then said Ulysses, I was casting how
I might alone these suitors insolent,
That always here are many, overthrow;
And if I kill them, then again invent
How to escape and save myself by flight.
To this the Goddess answered, and said,
Another man would trust a meaner wight,
Though mortal, and rely upon his aid:
But I a God immortal am, and say,
Though fifty bands of men should us oppose,
You should their herds of cattle drive away.
Enjoy securely, therefore, your repose;
A torment ’tis to watch all night, to one
That is already drench’d in misery.
Sleep then. This said, sweet sleep she threw upon
His eyes, and from him mounted to the sky.
And now Penelope awak’d, and sat
On her bed weeping. Having wept her fill,
She to Diana pray’d, and said, O that
You would now shoot your arrow and me kill;
Or that some great wind me away might bear,
And o’er a rock throw me into the main,
Ne’er to be heard of, or as th’ daughters were

Of Pandareus, whose parents both were slain
By th' Gods; but Venus the orphans nourished
With butter, and with honey, and with wine.
Juno with form and wit them furnished;
Diana gave them stature; artifice divine
Pallas them taught; then Venus went to Jove
To get them husbands; for best knoweth he
The issue of conjunctions in love,
Whether for better or for worse they be,
While Venus absent was on that affair,
By harpies foul away they carried be,
And giv'n for slaves to th' furies in the air.
Oh that the Gods would so dispose of me;
Or else Diana send me under ground,
That I may with Ulysses be, and not
To please another meaner man be bound.
Grief all day long is but a woeful lot,
And sleep is some amends; but unto me
It evil dreams along with it doth bring.
This night, my husband seem'd i' th' bed to be;
No dream I thought it, but a real thing.
This said, the morning fringed had the sky;
Ulysses, musing, lay upon his bed
With closed eyes, and thought she certainly
Knew who he was, and stood at his bed's head.
Then rose he, and his sheep skins bare away,
And rug into the house; but the cow-hide
He carried out, and then to Jove did pray:
Hear, Jupiter, with lifted hands he cried;

Jove and Gods, if by your will divine,
Toss'd both at sea and land, I hither came;
By fatal word within, without by sign,
To me now presently confirm the same.
Jove heard his pray'r, and straight it thundered.
This made Ulysses glad. Then spake a maid
The fatal word. Twelve maids, to furnish bread,
Were to grind wheat continually employ'd:
Eleven their work had done and went to bed;
The weakest still staid grinding, and thus pray'd:
Jove, who without a cloud hast thundered,
Grant me poor maid my wish, and then she said,
Jove, that father art of Gods and men,
Let never more these wicked suitors taste
Meat in this house, nor ever come agen,
That pain me thus. This supper be their last.
Ulysses with this word, and with the thunder,
Well pleased was, and thought assuredly
With Pallas' help the suitors to bring under,
And many though they were, to make them die.
Then th' other maids came in and made a fire
Within the hall. And then too from his bed
Telemachus rose, puts on his attire,
And sword and shoes; his spear with brazen head
He took into his hand, and stood i' th' door,
And to the nurse, Euryclea, he spake:
What meat, what lodging, had this stranger poor?
Or was there none that care of him did take?
My mother's nature, wise as she is, is such

Highly to honour men of less desert;
But for this stranger perhaps cares not much.
Then said Euryclea, She has done her part;
Wine he has had as much as he thought fit,
She ask'd him if he had a mind to eat;
He answered that he had no appetite
To bread at present, nor to any meat.
She bade her maids set up a standing bed;
But he, as one in love with misery,
Would none of that, nor bed, nor coverled,
But on the ground resolved was to lie,
And make his scrip the bolster for his head,
And for a bed to take a raw cow-hide,
And sheep skins with the wool for coverled
Without the door; and we the rug applied.
This said, Telemachus with spear in hand
To council goes, and his dogs follow'd him.
Then Euryclea gives the maids command
The rooms of th' house to dress up and make trim.
Rise, maids, said she, sprinkle and sweep the hall,
Lay cushions on the chairs, with sponges make
The tables clean, the temp'rer and cups all;
And see of water that there be no lack.
Go to the spring and fetch fair water thence
Quickly. You know to-day is holiday;
The suitors will not now be long from hence.
So said the nurse. The women her obey;
For water to the fountain went twice ten;
The rest did diligently work within.

The maids that went for water came agen;
And the proud woo'rs by that time were come in.
nd then came in the master of the swine,
Eumæus: three swine frank'd and fat he brought,
There to be ready 'gainst the suitors dine;
In all his swine-sties better there were not.
And he unto Ulysses kindly spake:
Stranger, how fare you 'mongst the wooers here?
Do they more pity now upon you take
Than formerly; or still deride you there?
O, said Ulysses, that the Gods would give
These men what to their insolence is due,
Who in a house not theirs so lewdly live,
As if no modesty at all they knew.
Then came Melanthus from a place hard by;
He had the charge o' th' goats, and brought the best,
And spake unto Ulysses spitefully:
Art thou here still, to beg and to molest
The company? D'ye mean before you go
To taste my fingers? Is there no good cheer
In other places 'mongst the Greeks, and so
You mean to dwell continually here?
Then came a third, that charge had of the kine;
Philœtius by name, with him he brought
A heifer and more goats, on which to dine,
Over the water, in the ferry-boat.
Philœtius ask'd Eumæus in his ear,
Who's this, that's new come hither, and from whence?
What countryman, and what his parents were?

For, for his person he may be a prince;
God can make princes go from land to land
And beg, when he will give them misery.
This said, he took Ulysses by the hand,
And spake unto him kind and lovingly:
Father, I wish you as much happiness
As ever you enjoy'd before; but now
I see you are in very great distress.
Jove! what God so cruel is as thou?
Though born thou wert, yet pitiest not to see
The torments of mankind. To think upon
Ulysses makes me weep. It may be he
Thus begs somewhere, with such apparel on,
Or else he's dead. O then I am undone.
He set me o'er his herds when but a boy;
But infinite they're grown since he is gone,
Or man would quickly all cow-kind destroy;
But mine the suitors force me to bring in
For them to eat, and ne'er regard his son;
The goods to share already they begin
Of th' owner, that so long now has been gone.
And I devising was what I should do,
To take my cattle with me and be gone,
And one or other prince to give them to;
But that, I thought, would be unjustly done,
For they Telemachus his cattle were.
Again, I thought it labour very sour
To stay and keep my master's cattle here,
For others in his absence to devour.

So here abide I, and myself I flatter
With hope to see Ulysses one day come
Back to his house, and the proud suitors scatter.
Thus said the master of the kine. To whom
Ulysses said: Honest you seem, and wise;
I therefore will a secret to you swear,
By Jove on high, you shall see with your eyes
Ulysses, if you wish to see him, here,
And all these domineering suitors slay.
Then, O, said he, that Jove would have it so;
For I should let you see in such a fray
Quickly how much these hands of mine can do.
Eumæus also did like prayer make
To see Ulysses there. So ended they.
While they discours'd, the suitors counsel take
How they might make Telemachus away.
Then o'er their heads an eagle flew on high,
Sinister, with a fearful dove in's foot.
Then said Amphinomus, Let's lay this by,
And think of supper, for we cannot do't.
The suitors all approv'd of what he said,
And in they went, and there on bench and seat
Within Ulysses' house their coats they laid,
And set themselves to kill and dress their meat.
Then from the herd they sacrificed a cow,
And many well-grown sheep, and goats well fed,
And many a very fat and pamper'd sow;
Th' entrails they roasted and distributed.
Eumæus gave out cups, Philœtius bread,

Melanthus from the temp'rer fill'd out wine;
The suitors on the meat before them fed
With stomachs good, and drank the blood o' th' vine.
Telemachus Ulysses in the hall
Hard by the threshold sets, (and there he sat
On an ill-favour'd stool at table small),
And gave him his just share of th' entrails fat,
And for him fill'd a great gold cup with wine.
Sit here, said he, and fare like other men;
Fear neither blows nor scoffs; the house is mine;
Ulysses is the owner of it. When
He first possessed it, he gave it me.
And you, my mother's suitors, mock no more,
But keep the peace as long as here you be;
For else perhaps arise may trouble sore.
At first the suitors knew not how to take
Telemachus his words, and silent were,
Admiring that such threat'ning words he spake,
So many men provoking without fear.
But by and by Antinous said thus:
Since Jove appeared has in his defence,
Let's put these threats up of Telemachus,
Else we should quickly spoil his eloquence.
So said Antinous. But Telemachus
Car'd not at all for anything he said.
When peace within doors was concluded thus,
In other rites o' th' feast they were employ'd;
The hecatomb they bear throughout the town
Into Apollo's shady grove divine.

The upper joints in messes they divide,
So fill'd their tables and sat down to dine.
The portion of Ulysses was no less
Than other suitors had, nor more; for why,
Telemachus had order'd every mess
Should equal be, and men serv'd equally.
Amongst the suitors was a very knave,
Ctesippus was his name, a rich man's son,
And therefore hop'd Penelope to have.
This man to th' wooers made a motion:
Hear me, you suitors of Penelope,
This stranger here is equal made to us,
And therefore reason 'tis that also we
Should love the strangers of Telemachus.
Lo, here's a gift I'll give him, that he may
Bestow it, if't please him, on him or her
That empts the chamber-pots, or giv't away
To any of Ulysses' bondmen here.
With that he hurled at Ulysses' head
A cow's foot, but he turn'd his head the while,
And from the stroke himself delivered.
Then smil'd Ulysses a sardonic smile;
Telemachus his anger could not hide.
'Tis well, said he, you did not hurt him here,
For else, believe it, you had surely died
O' th' place, run through the body with my spear,
And never found a wife here, but a grave.
Therefore give over this behaviour wild;
Of good and bad I now some knowledge have,

And do not always take me for a child.
What's past I bear, the havoc of my cattle,
My corn and wine consumed lavishly;
'Tis hard for one with many t' enter battle.
Use me no longer as an enemy;
For fighting to be slain I'd rather chuse,
Than see my guests or servants harshly used;
My women, as they pass about the house,
To be so basely tugg'd, touz'd, and abus'd.
This said, awhile the suitors silent were;
But not long after, Agelaus spake.
Let's not, said he, against a truth so clear
Struggle, and what is said in ill part take;
Nor harshly use the stranger any more,
Nor any servant of Telemachus;
But yet I have a silly word in store
For him, and for his mother, and for us.
Whilst there was hope Ulysses might come home,
The suitors had done best at home to stay,
Expecting him, and not have hither come;
But since there's none, to's mother he should say,
Take one of them for husband, which you please,
And most shall give you; so shall he enjoy
His father's means, and eat and drink at ease,
And she with her new husband go her way.
To this Telemachus replying says,
By Jove, and by my father's misery,
Who now is lost and dead, or somewhere strays
Far off from Ithaca, it is not I

That do my mother keep from marrying
Whom she thinks good. I do advise her still
To take the man that shall most treasure bring;
But I'll not make her do't against her will.
So ended he. Then on the suitors' faces
Pallas sets up a laughter not their own,
Nor to be stopp'd; their senses she displaces,
Their meat was bloody, and their hearts were down.
What is't, poor men, said Theoclymenus,
Your heads and faces are wrapt up in night;
You weep and groan; the walls and beams of th' house
To me seem bloody; and left there is no light;
The hall and porch, methinks are full of sprites
Ready to go to hell; the sun has lost
His place in heaven, nor are there any lights;
And dismal darkness hath the house engross'd:
At this they laugh'd. Then, said Eurymachus,
This stranger is not very well, let him
By those that wait be guided from the house
To th' market-place; for all within is dim.
I am, said Theoclymenus, not blind,
I can go the market-place alone.
I have both eyes and ears, and feet and mind:
With these I can go hence. Guide need I none,
And go I will; for evil is hard by,
Which none of you the suitors shall escape
That have so much abused the family.
This said, he parts, and left the woo'rs to gape
On one another, and with insipid jests

To vex Telemachus, and themselves please,
And all upon Telemachus his guests.
The words that one of them then said were these:
Telemachus, of all men you're least able
To make an entertainment or a feast.
For first you for this beggar set a table,
Who eats and drinks as stoutly as the best,
But can no work do, nor has any force;
A very burthen to the earth. And this
A prophet would be, and loves to discourse
Of ill to come. My counsel therefore is,
That you would put these strangers both aboard
Some ship, and send them into Sicily.
They that way may some profit you afford.
Thus said the woo'rs, but little cared he,
But silently the sign expecting stood
His father should have giv'n of falling on.
Penelope meanwhile sat where she could
Hear plainly what was said by every one.
And now the suitors merry supper made,
And laughing sat, and fed on much good cheer:
But after supper worse none ever had,
For of the wrongs themselves beginners were.

LIB. XXI.

Penelope bringeth forth her husband's bow, which the suitors could not bend. Ulysses makes himself known to Eumaus and Philœtius. He bends the bow.

PENELOPE, THE SUITORS' strength to try,
Who soon'st could bend her noble husband's bow,
And through the axes make his arrow fly,
And whom she was to marry now to know,
To a high chamber up the stairs she went,
Wherein Ulysses' precious goods did stand.
There hung upon a pin the bow unbent;
The well-made key she carried in her hand.
This bow was given him by Iphitus
At Sparta. But Ulysses with him met
First at Messena; for it fell out thus.
Ulysses then was there about a debt.
Messena men their ships had put ashore
At Ithaca, and thence had ta'en a prey
Of sheep, which was in number fifteen score,
And, with the shepherds, carried them away.
This was the cause Ulysses thither went.
'Twas a long way, and he scarce past a boy;
But by his father and the lords was sent
T' ask reparation for this annoy.

But Iphitus twelve mares had lost; each one
A young mule had that followed her behind,
(Which of his death were the occasion),
And at Messena these he thought to find.
But as he was returning back again,
And came unto the house of Hercules,
That mighty man first did him entertain,
And after, killing him, his mares did seize.
This was the man that to Ulysses gave
The bow; and from him had a sword and spear.
But Hercules had sent him to his grave,
Ere they had tasted one another's cheer.
This bow he carried not to Ilium,
Nor ever had made use of it in fray;
Penelope bringeth forth her husband's bow, which the suitors could not bend.
But often had it in his hand at home;
For only as a monument it lay.
Penelope now standing at the door,
Quickly the bolt strook back with her great key,
The valves fly open suddenly and roar;
As when a great bull roars, so roared they.
Penelope went in, and up she stepp'd
Upon a board whereon were standing chests,
In which, 'mongst odours sweet, the clothes were kept,
The costly garments, robes, and coats, and vests.
Thence to the bow she reach'd, and from the pin
She took it as it hung there in the case;
And sitting down, her lap she laid it in.

Aloud she wept, and tears ran down apace:
And when she long enough had weeping been,
The bow she did unto the suitors bear,
And quiver with it full of arrows keen:
The axes by her women carried were.
Then with her scarf she shaded both her cheeks,
Having a waiting-woman on each hand;
Unto her gallant suitors thus she speaks:
Hear me, you lusty suitors that here stand,
Using this house, not yours, continually,
To eat and drink in at another's cost;
And for it do pretend no reason why,
But as contenders who shall love me most.
Lo here; to him I make myself a prize,
Who this good bow with greatest ease shall bend,
And whose aim'd arrow through these axes flies,
With him from this most blessed house I'll wend.
This said, Eumæus th' axes and the bow
By her command unto the suitors bears;
And as he went, his eyes for grief o'erflow,
Nor could Philœtius abstain from tears;
For which Antinous gave them this reproof:
You foolish clowns, what ails you to shed tears?
Has she not for her husband grief enough?
That you must add your sorrow unto hers.
Sit silently, eat and drink quietly;
Or if you needs must weep, go weep without.
Leave the bow here, the suitors' strength to try,
And that it may be carried round about.

Not that I think there's any man among
Us all can bend it as Ulysses could:
For I remember him though I were young.
So said he; though he thought he bend it should,
And also shoot through th' axes every one,
Though he were only the first to be shot.
For he the other suitors had set on,
And was the first contriver of the plot.
Telemachus then to the suitors spake:
Sure Jove, said he, bereav'd me has of sense;
My mother tells me she'll a husband take,
And, leaving me, depart with him from hence;
And I here merry am that should be sad.
But be 't as 't will, the game must now begin,
For such a wife as ne'er Achaia had,
Nor in Mysen or Argos was e'er seen,
Nor Pyle, nor Ithaca, nor in Epire.
But what need I set forth my mother's praise?
You know't yourselves. Therefore I you desire
To put off all excuses and delays.
And I myself will be the first to try
This mighty bow, whether I can or no,
And through the axes make the arrow fly.
'Twill grieve me less to let my mother go;
Since I have strength to bend my father's bow,
Why should I doubt of governing his state?
And from him presently his coat did throw
And sword, and then fell to delineate
The ground whereon the axes were to stand.

On one long line he set them all upright.
The wooers admir'd the justness of his hand;
For why the like was ne'er done in his sight.
Then went he to the sill to try the bow.
Thrice he essay'd it, and was near it still.
And thrice again relenting let it go.
Once more had done it. But 'twas not his will;
For then his father check'd him with a wink.
Alas! then, said Telemachus, must this
Be all my strength? Too young I am, I think.
Come, let one take the bow that elder is.
This said, the bow and arrow he laid by,
And to the seat went where he sat before.
Then, said Antinous, The bow let's try,
In order as we sit. Let him therefore
Try first, whose table next the cupboard is,
And so to the right hand up, one by one.
The other suitors all approved this.
Leiodes was the first; so he begun;
His place was low'st. He to the threshold went
To try his force; but to his tender hand
And feeble arms the bow would not relent.
Then down he laid it there, and lets it stand;
And to the suitors spake: This bow, says he,
I cannot bend, some other take 't in hand.
It's like of many lords the death to be,
When by the strongest it comes to be mann'd.
For better 'tis to die than live and miss
The hopes you hither come for ev'ry day.

Ulysses makes himself known to Eumæus and Philœtius.
And what is ‘t any of you hope but this,
That you Ulysses’ consort marry may?
But when he shall this bow have understood,
Let him some other lady woo at ease
Amongst th’ Achæans whom he shall think good,
And let Penelope take whom she please.
This said, the bow and arrow he set by,
And to the seat went where he sat before,
And by Antinous was angrily,
As soon as he had spoke, rebuk’d therefore.
What say you? That this bow the death shall be
Of many lords? Why so? ‘Cause you have not
The strength to bend it. Others have, you’ll see;
But you for bending bows were not begot.
Then to Melantheus he turn’d and said,
Let fire be made, and a great chair set by ‘t,
And let upon it cushions be laid,
And let us have good store of tallow white,
T’ anoint and warm, and supple make the bow,
And try if we perhaps may bend it then.
Fire, chair, and cushions came, and grease enough,
But to no purpose; too weak were the men.
Antinous yet and Eurymachus
Gave it not over; these two were the best
Of all the suitors that came to the house:
No hope at all remained for the rest.
Eumæus and Philœtius then went out
Together; after them Ulysses went,

And when they were the gate and court without,
Himself unto them to discover meant.
And fair he spake them: Master of the kine,
And you Eumæus, master of the swine,
Shall I keep in, or speak a thought of mine?
To speak it out my heart does me incline.
What if Ulysses should come suddenly,
Brought by some God, and stand before this rout,
On whose side, his or theirs, would you then be?
What your mind prompts you to, speak freely out.
Then answer'd him the master of the kine,
O that the Gods above would have it so,
You'ld see the virtue of these hands of mine.
The master of the swine then said so too.
When now the hearts of both of them he knew,
He spake again and said, 'Tis I am he,
That after twenty years return to you;
And know you longed have this day to see.
Of all my servants I find only you
That wish me here. If therefore it shall please
The Gods by me the suitors to subdue,
I'll give you wealth enough to live at ease,
And houses near me, and shall wedded live,
And brothers of Telemachus shall be.
And that you may assuredly believe
Ulysses speaks it, you a sign shall see.
With that he pull'd his rags beside his thigh,
And lets them see the place the boar had rent,
Then when upon Parnassus' mountain high

He with his uncle's sons a hunting went.
And then they fling their arms about Ulysses,
And kiss his hand and shoulders, weeping sore;
And he again embraced them with kisses,
Nor had till sunset weeping given o'er,
But that Ulysses hinder'd it. Give o'er, said he,
Your weeping, lest that some one come out hither,
And tell within what here without they see.
Go in, but one by one, not altogether.
First I'll go in, and then come you. Now mark.
I'll pray the suitors I the bow may try.
If to my motion they refuse to hark,
Give it into my hand as you pass by;
And you Eumæus bid the women shut
The house-doors all, nor suffer any one
O' th' men without the house his head to put.
And though within they hap to hear men groan,
That they stir not, but ply their business.
The utter gate Philœtius lock you fast,
That to the house there may be no access.
This said, into the hall again he pass'd,
And after him his servants. Now the bow
Was in Eurymachus his hand by th' fire.
He warm'd and rubb'd, and did what he could do,
But for to bend it he was ne'er the nigher.
At this he vex'd, and took it heinously,
And, O, said he, 'tis not for my own part
I troubled am, but for the company,
'Tis chiefly that I take so much to heart.

Nor is it for a wife that I complain;
For in Achaia ladies be enough;
But that we hope Penelope to gain,
Although we cannot bend Ulysses' bow.
Then, said Antinous, 'Twill not be so.
This day unto Apollo sacred is,
And not a day for bending of the bow;
Therefore to lay it by is not amiss.
And let the axes stand still as they do;
For 'tis not like they will be stolen away,
And so go in and offer wine unto
The God. The bow may till to-morrow stay.
And bid Melanthus in the morning bring
Goats of the fattest, and whereof the savour
The suitors unable to bend the bow, which is bent by Ulysses.
May from Apollo, of all archers king,
For bending of the bow procure us favour.
They all agree. Into the house they went.
The officers for hands the water hold;
The waiters fill the cups, and them present;
And when they drunk had each man what he would,
Then spake Ulysses to the suitors thus:
Hear me, ye suitors, what I have to say,
Antinous, and you, Eurymachus,
For to you two 'tis chiefly that I pray;
Since you the bending of the bow remit
To th' Gods, to give to whom they please; and they
To-morrow doubtless will determine it;
Let me now of the bow make an essay,

That I may know whether my strength be spent,
And what I could before now cannot do;
Whether I still be firm or do relent
With hardship, and with want of looking to.
These words of his made all the suitors mad
With fear that he indeed would bend the bow.
Antinous gave him language very bad.
Thou wretched stranger, is it not enough
That of our feast thou hast an equal part,
And that of our discourse (and none but thou,
Stranger and beggar) made a hearer art?
'Tis wine that makes thee not thyself to know;
For wine serves all men so that drink too much.
Wine hurt Eurytion, the centaur great;
His carriage in Perithous' house was such,
Among the Lapithæ sitting at meat,
That angry with 't they were, and all arose,
And with sharp iron cut off both his ears,
And with the same they pared off his nose.
Away the cause of his own harm he bears.
From that day on, centaurs and men are foes.
Themselves men hurt by wine immoderate.
So if you bend the bow, your ears you'll lose;
For you'll find here no prating advocate;
But to king Takim forthwith you shall go,
And he will of you make a cruel end.
Therefore sit still, and let alone the bow;
Nor with men younger than yourself contend.
Then, said Penelope, I'd have you know,

Antinous, that you did very ill
To wrong Telemachus his guest. What though
He bend the bow, d'ye think I take him will
For husband? I am sure you think not so.
Let none of you be sad with fear of that.
Then to her said Eurymachus, No, no;
That's not the thing that we be troubled at.
'Tis of our honour that we jealous be:
For how will men and women, think you, prate;
But that such suitors woo Penelope
As could not bend Ulysses' bow, but that
A beggar that pass'd by by chance could bend it?
Which unto us will be no little shame.
Who, said she, live on others' means and spend it,
Should not stand much on honour and on fame;
Besides, this stranger is well made and tall,
And of a great man says he is the son.
Give him the bow to try his strength withal;
For this I'll promise him, and see it done:
If he do bend it, I'll on him bestow
Good clothing, and a handsome coat and vest,
Shoes to his feet, dart, sword with edges two,
And send him to such place as he thinks best.
Then spake to her Telemachus her son:
Mother, to give the bow, or to deny 't,
Is in my power, and hinder me can none
In Elis, or Achaia, or here right from
From giving it unto this stranger here,
If I think fit. But mother, pray go now

Up to your chamber, and look to your work,
And leave to us to dispute of the bow.
She mused on, and thought his counsel wise;
And being in her chamber sore did weep
For the absence of her husband, till her eyes
By th' Goddess Pallas closed were with sleep.
Eumæus now had brought the bow about,
And come it was to where Ulysses sat.
The suitors all at once then cried out,
Swineherd, rogue, lout, what meanest thou by that?
If the Gods please to favour our design,
Thou shalt be slain and carried out of sight,
And there devoured be by thy own swine.
This put Eumæus into a great fright.
Telemachus then roar'd on th' other part,
Bear on the bow (t' obey all is not best),
I'll pelt thee, though that thou my elder art,
With stones home to thy hogsties, like a beast;
For I the stronger am. O that I were
But so much stronger than these suitors all,
I soon of some of them the house should clear.
They laugh'd at this, and bated of their gall.
Eumæus then took up the bow agen,
And gave it to Ulysses in his hand.
This done, Euryclea he called then.
It is, said he, Telemachus' command
To lock the doors all; and that if you hear
Noise in the house of blows, or groaning men,
Let none go forth, but at their work stay there.

This said, Euryclea went in agen,
And lock’d the doors. Philœtius likewise
Went silently and shut the utter gate,
And with a ship-rope that lay by, it ties,
And coming back sits where before he sate;
And look’d upon Ulysses, who, to know
What work the worms had in his absence made;
This way and that way turning was the bow.
At this the suitors one t’ another said,
This beggar surely has no little skill
In bows or in bow-stealing, or of ‘s own
He has one like ‘t, or make one like it will,
He doth examine it so up and down.
Another said, As he shall bend the bow,
So let him find, as he is begging alms.
So mock’d they. When he view’d it had enough,
And holden it awhile had in his palms,
He bent it. As a fiddler does not spend
Very much labour the sheep’s gut to strain,
So he, Ulysses his strong bow to bend
Did put himself to very little pain.
Then with his left hand he the string essay’d;
It sounded like the singing of a swallow.
The suitors then began to be afraid,
And mighty claps of thunder straightway follow.
Jove’s token very welcome was t’ Ulysses.
Then to the bow he set a shaft, and there
Sitting, shot through the axes, not one misses.
The rest of th’ arrows in the quiver were.

Then turning to Telemachus he said,
I have not sham'd you, nor have miss'd one axe,
Nor long a bending of the bow I staid:
You see then that the woo'rs me falsely tax.
But now 'tis time for after suppering,
Ere day be done, and taking such delights,
As cups, discourse, and pleasant music bring;
For these of feasting are the common rites.
Then to his son with 's eye he beckoned.
Telemachus that well him understood,
With spear in hand and helmet on his head,
Came unto him, and close by his chair stood.

LIB. XXII.

The killing of the wooers.

ULYSSES THEN HIMSELF delivereth
Of his foul rags, and leaps up to the sill,
With bow in hand and arrows tipt with death,
And spake to th' wooers boasting of his skill.
Suitors, said he, this match is at an end;
Jove speed me now. Another mark have at,
Which none ere shot at yet. Apollo send
Me luck to hit. As he was saying that,
T' Antinous the shaft he did address,
Who had the cup in's hand about to drink;
Than of his death he thought of nothing less.
For one amongst so many who would think,
How strong soever, durst do such a thing?
The arrow pierc'd his neck from throat to poll.
The wound receiv'd, he turns round staggering;
The blood stream'd out; away he threw the bowl;
And overturn'd the table with his feet;
Both bread and meat lay scatter'd in the hall.
The suitors bustle and in clusters meet,
Of this great man amazed at the fall.
Then one of them unto Ulysses said:
Stranger, this was ill shot; thou killed hast

The greatest man in Ithaca. Thou'st plaid
Thy last prize. To the crows thou shalt be cast.
But yet they held their hands; for why, they thought
'Twas done by misadventure, not contriv'd;
For, proud and foolish, they perceived not
The fatal hour was to them all arriv'd.
Then said Ulysses, with a sullen eye,
Dogs, dead you thought me, and spent my estate;
With you my woman you compell'd to lie;
And would have wedded, whilst I liv'd, my mate.
No fear you had neither of Gods on high,
Nor of revenge from any mortal man;
But now a vengeance to you all is nigh.
At this they frighted were, and looked wan;
And each one peep'd about what way to take
To save his own life, if he could, by flight.
None but Eurymachus t' Ulysses spake:
If you Ulysses be, you say but right;
Much harm is done you both in house and field;
But this Antinous author was of 't all;
He set us on, and here lies justly killed.
For wedding of your wife his care was small.
His care was how to make himself here king
(Which Jove not suffer'd him to bring to pass);
And to destruction how your son to bring,
He chiefly thinking and designing was.
And since that he deservedly is slain,
Spare your own people; we'll repair what's done,
And what is spent we will make up again,

And recompense with twenty cows each one;
And brass and gold till you be satisfied;
If not, there's no man can your anger blame.
To this Ulysses with a sour look replied:
Your whole estates, and added to the same
How much soever you can elsewhere get,
Too little is to bind me to desist,
Until the suitors shall have paid their debt.
Two ways before you lie, take which you list,
To fight or fly, if you will death avoid;
But fly, I think you cannot. So said he.
Eurymachus then to the suitors said:
The man will not lay down his bow you see;
But since 'tis in his hand, and arrows by,
And stands upon the threshold of the door,
His shafts will fly at us continually,
And till we are all slain will not give o'er:
Let's therefore take up tables for defence
Against his shafts, and, sword, in hand, run all
Unto the door at once and drive him thence,
And people of the town together call.
This said, his sword with double edge he drew,
And thundered him with words; but howsoever,
A deadly shaft first from Ulysses flew
That enter'd at his breast and stuck in's liver.
Down fell his sword, he turns himself quite round,
And throws his blood about him every way;
Kicks down the table, meat and cup, to th' ground,
And with his brow beating the floor he lay;

And sprawling made the seat shake with his feet,
And endless darkness lay upon his eye.
Then rose Amphinomus and death did meet,
He thought from thence to make Ulysses fly,
But by Telemachus prevented was,
That slew him with his spear upon the place.
From back to breast the well-thrown spear did pass;
Down with a thump he falls upon his face.
Telemachus i' th' body left the spear.
For why, he had good reason to mistrust
Amongst so many swords, if he staid there,
He might be killed by some blow or thrust.
Then to his father, as he by him stood,
To fetch down arms, said he, 'Twill do no harm,
Two spears, a buckler, and a helmet good,
And both Philœtius and Eumæus arm.
Run quickly, said Ulysses, while there be
Arrows remaining, lest they force me should
To quit the door. Then quickly up ran he
Unto the room wherein the armour stood.
Eight spears, four bucklers, and four helmets good
He took, and to his father came again.
And first he arm'd himself, and ready stood;
The two good servants themselves armed then.
Ulysses' arrows, till they all were gone,
Kill'd each his man, and one by one they fall;
But when they all were spent and left was none,
He sets his bow to lean against the wall.
Over his shoulder he his buckler cast,

And puts his well-made helmet on his head.
The two spears with his hand he griped fast,
And then his posture he considered.
There was i' th' wall a certain window high,
By th' sill whereof a way lay to the street,
To which he bade Eumæus have an eye,
And near it stand. But one way was to it.
Then Angelaus to the suitors said,
Why does not some man to that window haste,
And to the people cry aloud for aid,
That so this shooter may have shot his last?
Then, said Melantheus, No, no, 'tis in vain;
The street-door and the court-gate stand so close,
That one good man the place may well maintain
Against how many s'ever them oppose.
But well, I'll fetch you armour to put on,
And weapons I will bring you out of hand;
For where they by Ulysses and his son
Were laid, I know the room and where they stand.
Then up he went; twelve bucklers he brings thence,
As many spears, as many helmets too.
The suitors then prepared for their defence.
And now Ulysses knew not what to do;
But to Telemachus he turn'd and said,
Th'ill women sure, or else Melantheus has
For th' wooers gotten arms, and us betray'd.
No, father, answered he, my fault it was;
The door I left unlock'd, and but put to,
Which somebody observ'd. Eumæus, now

Go lock it fast. Withal consider who,
The women or Melantheus serv'd us so.
Whilst thus they talk, Melantheus went once more
To fetch down arms; Eumæus saw him then,
And told Ulysses: Him we thought before
To be the man, is thither gone agen.
Shall I go now and kill him (if so be
I can) or bring him hither to you, to endure
What you think fit for all his villainy?
Then said Ulysses, We two will be sure,
Telemachus and I, to keep these men
From going out, and therefore, go you two
And bind his hands and feet together; then
Betwixt his body and his legs put through
A rope, and at his back tie boards, and so
Close to a pillar hoise him up on high
Unto the beams of th' house, that he may know
His fault, and feel his pain before he die.
Then up they went, and stood without the door,
On each side one. Melantheus was within,
At the far end, looking for armour more;
And after there he long enough had been,
Out with an helmet in one hand he came,
A buckler in the other, great, but torn;
Laertes in his youth had borne the same,
But now with lying it was mouldy worn.
As he came out, they seiz'd him suddenly,
And in again they dragg'd him by the hair,
And then his hands unto his feet they tie,

And up they hoise him, as they bidden were.
This done, Eumæus said unto him jeering,
In that soft bed, Melantheus, easily
You will observe the morning's first appearing,
That for the woo'rs your goats may ready be.
Then armed both, and locking up the door,
And breathing courage, to Ulysses come;
So that on the threshold there were four;
But many were the suitors in the room.
Then down unto Ulysses Pallas came,
In Mentor's shape, to whom Ulysses said,
You are my friend, and our age is the same;
For old acquaintance let me have your aid.
Though thus he said, he thought it Pallas still.
The suitors clamour'd; Agelaus spake:
Mentor, beware, the course you take is ill,
Against us all Ulysses' part to take;
For 'tis our purpose when these two are slain,
Father and son, that you the next shall be,
And of your rashness suffer shall the pain,
And with his substance your own mix will we;
Nor shall your sons, daughters, or wife live here.
Pallas was angry at these words of his,
And chid Ulysses then, and ask'd him where
His courage was. And what, said she, is this
The man that bravely fought nine years at Troy,
And kill'd in fight so many gallant men,
And he whose prudence did the town destroy,
And whines so at his coming home again?

Come hither, milksop, says she, stand by me,
And how your old friend Mentor shall requite
The kindness you have shown him, you shall see.
Yet presently she would not end the fight;
For further yet she would the courage try
Both of Ulysses and Telemachus,
And in a swallow's shape she up did fly,
And sat upon a black beam of the house.
Meanwhile the suitors by Agelaus,
Amphimedon and Demoptolemus,
Eurynomus, Pisandrus, Polybus,
The best of all the suitors in the house,
(For many had been killed with the bow)
Encourag'd were: Friends, said he, let's be bold,
And at them all our good spears let us throw;
So shall we make the man his hands to hold;
Mentor with theirs his fortune will not mix,
He and those hopes are gone; upon the sill
There are but four; Let's throw at once but six,
That if Jove please, we may Ulysses kill.
When he is gone, the rest we need not fear.
The suitors all approved this advice,
And then they lanced ev'ry man his spear;
But Pallas made it fall out otherwise;
For from the beam she soon blew here and there
The flying staves, whereof one hit the door;
The two side-posts and the walls wounded were.
When of the spears the danger was past o'er,
Then said Ulysses, Now our turn it is

To cast our spears at this unruly rout,
That, not content with former injuries,
Do what they can to take our lives to boot.
This said, and taking aim, their spears they threw.
Ulysses killed Demoptolemus.
Telemachus Euryades then slew;
Eumæus with his spear kill'd Elatus;
Pisandrus by Philœtius was slain.
The suitors then to the room's end retreat,
And to the four gave time to take again
The spears that in the wounds were sticking yet.
Again they lanced ev'ry man his spear.
The swallow on the beam still puts them by,
And by the door, walls, posts, receiv'd they were.
Telemachus and Eumæus only
Had little scratches; one upon his wrist;
Eumæus on the shoulder: but the skin
Scarce broken was; and both the other mist.
And then the four amongst the throng threw in
Their spears again; and then Ulysses slew
Eurydamus; and by Telemachus
Was slain Amphimedon; Eumæus threw,
And killed Polybus; Philœtius
Then smote Cressipus, and through pierc'd his breast,
And over him insulting thus he said:
Bold Prætor, that in love art with thy jest,
And to say anything art not afraid,
For the cow's-foot t' Ulysses thrown, take that.
Ulysses kill'd too Damastorides;

Telemachus Leiocrates laid flat
With spear in hand. When they had killed these,
Pallas aloft held forth her frightful shield;
And then, as cattle, stung with a gad-fly,
In heat of summer run about the field,
So round about the hall the suitors fly;
As when the vultures stoop down from the hill
Upon the fowl, these couch close to the plain,
Threatened with heavy clouds, they slay and kill,
These cannot fly away, nor turn again,
So they upon the suitors fiercely fall,
And winding with them, as they shift their ground,
They killing went; all gore-blood was the hall,
And made with thumps and groans a dismal sound.
Leiodes then kneel'd at Ulysses' feet
To beg his life. I came, said he, as priest,
And told them their behaviour was unmeet,
And always gave them counsel to desist;
But nothing that I said would they obey,
And of their own destruction authors are.
There's not a woman in the house can say
I did amiss. Must I like these men fare?
To this Ulysses with a sour look said,
Did you come with the suitors as their priest?
Then surely for them you have also pray'd,
That of my coming home I should have miss'd,
That with these men you daily might here board
Yourself, your wife, and children. Therefore die.
With that he took up Agelaus' sword,

Which, when he died, fell from him and lay by.
And with it at a stroke cut off his head.
But Phemius, the minstrel, ‘scaped free,
For thither he came not for meat or bread:
The suitors forced him of necessity.
He had his fiddle in his hand, and stood
Within the door, and studied what to do,
Whether unto Ulysses go he should,
Or out a door unto the altar go
I’th’ court, whereon with many a fat beast
Ulysses oft devoutly had serv’d Jove;
And having paus’d, at last he thought it best
To go t’ Ulysses and his mercy prove.
Then down he laid his fiddle on the floor,
Between the temp’rer and a studded chair,
Then went and fell upon his knees before
Ulysses, and thus to him made his prayer:
Save me, Ulysses, and consider that
If you me slay, it after you will grieve.
I am a singer, but was never taught;
For song to me the Gods did freely give.
I sing to Gods and men, and have the skill
To sing to you as to a God; therefore,
Of cutting off my head lay by the will.
Besides, Telemachus can tell you more;
I was not hither drawn with smell of roast,
But many men and strong brought me by force.
Telemachus, that knew this was no boast,
Cried out, Hold father, ’tis not our best course

To slay the innocent, and I would fain
Save Medon too, that lov'd me from a boy,
And took care of me, if he be not slain
By coming in your or your servants' way.
Under a seat Medon himself had laid,
And wrapp'd himself up in a raw cow-hide,
And hearing what Telemachus had said,
Skipp'd nimbly out, his cow-skin cast aside,
And falling at Telemachus his knee,
He to him said, O friend, lo here I stand;
Forbear, I pray, and to your father be
A means that also he may hold his hand;
For whilst his anger 'gainst the suitors staid,
That wasted have his goods, and him despis'd,
Killing each way about him, I'm afraid
He might perhaps kill me too unadvis'd.
Ulysses hearing, answered thus agen:
Take courage, man, there is no danger nigh,
And this remember, and tell other men,
That justice better thrives than knavery.
Go now into the court, and stay without,
Both you and Phemius, that I may do
The bus'ness in the house I am about.
Then out into the court away they go,
And on the altar of the God they sat,
Looking about, still fearing to be slain.
Ulysses, to be sure that none remain
Alive, and under seats or tables squat,
Search'd well the hall, and found they all were dead,

As fishes on the shore lie out, and by
The heat of Phaethon be murdered,
So did the woo'rs one on another lie.
Then to Telemachus Ulysses said,
Tell Euryclea I would speak with her.
Telemachus his father straight obey'd,
And scraped at the door that she might hear.
Nurse, says he, mother of the maids, come out,
My father to you somewhat has to say.
She heard him well, and presently, without
More words, the door she open'd with her key;
And found Ulysses standing 'mongst the dead,
Besmear'd with blood, as when a lion has
Upon a cow at pasture newly fed,
With goary breast and chaps, so dight he was.
Th' old woman there beholding so much blood,
And carcases so many lying dead,
At such a mighty work amazed stood,
And was about to whoop, but hindered
Was by Ulysses. Hold, said he, within
Your joy, and let it not appear in vain;
To glory over dead men is a sin.
These men the Gods and their own sins have slain.
For neither from above they fear'd the Gods,
Nor men respected good or bad beneath,
And therefore now have felt the heav'nly rods,
And brought upon themselves untimely death.
But tell me, nurse, how many women be
That me dishonour and do wickedness.

Fifty, says she, do serve Penelope,
And learn to work and wait, no more nor less;
Of these there twelve be that are impudent,
And care not for me, nor Penelope;
Telemachus was young: the government
To him of maids might not well trusted be.
But now I'll to my lady's chamber go,
Where she's asleep, some God has closed her eyes,
To tell her you are here. But he said, No;
First call those women who do me despise,
And have behav'd themselves dishonestly.
Euryclea obeys, and goes her way,
And call'd those women. Come away, said she,
Telemachus i' th' hall does for you stay.
Meanwhile Ulysses call'd Telemachus
Unto him, and his faithful servants two,
Trusty Eumæus and Philœtius.
Hear me, said he, what I would have you do,
Make these lewd woman carry hence the dead,
The chairs and tables in the hall make clean,
And when that bus'ness they have finished,
Into the court make them go forth again,
Into that narrow place 'twixt th' house and hedge;
Till they forget the suitors' venery,
Make them of your sharp swords to feel the edge,
And for their stol'n unclean delight to die.
Then came the women down into the hall
Wailing, and tears abundantly they shed,
And presently unto their work they fall.

Into the porch they carry out the dead.
Ulysses giving order standeth by.
Telemachus then and Philœtius,
Also Eumæus, do with shovels ply
The pavement daub'd with blood, and cleanse the house
Scraping together dust and blood; and that
The women also carry out a door.
But when this bus'ness now an end was at,
There rested for them yet one bus'ness more.
They brought them thence into the narrow place,
From whence there was no hope at all to fly.
You, said Telemachus, for the disgrace
Done to me and my mother, must not die
An honest death. This having said, he stretch'd
Between two pillars high a great strong rope,
That with their feet the ground could not be reach'd;
Hung there, they sprawl'd awhile, but could not drop.
Then down they dragg'd Melantheus, and his nose
And ears with cruel steel from 's head they tear,
And brake his arms and legs with many blows,
And to the dogs to eat they throw his gear.
Their work now done, they wash'd their hands and feet,
And to Ulysses in the hall they went,
Who having found the place not very sweet,
For brimstone called to take away the scent.
Euryclea, said he, fetch brimstone hither,
And fire, and also wake Penelope,
And bid her maids come to me altogether,
But hasten them to come. Then answer'd she,

Dear child, ’tis well said. But first let me go
And bring you better clothes, a coat and vest.
These rags become you not. Then said he, No.
Bring me fire first, and after do the rest.
The fire she brought and brimstone presently,
Wherewith he aired both the court and hall,
The nurse then up goes to the rooms on high
To call the maids. T’ Ulysses they came all.
They weep and sob, and all embrace Ulysses,
And kiss his head and shoulders, shake his hand;
And he again saluteth them with kisses.
Weeping for joy, they all about him stand.

LIB. XXIII.

Ulysses maketh himself known to Penelope, tells her his adventures briefly, and in the morning goes to Laertes and makes himself known to him.

TH' OLD WOMAN to the upper rooms ascended,
To wake Penelope, and let her know
Her husband was return'd. Her joy amended
Much had her pace, and well she ambled now;
And standing at her head, Rise, child, said she;
The Gods at last have granted you your wishes.
Come down into the hall, where you shall see
The so long by you wish'd-for man, Ulysses.
The suitors he has killed ev'ry one,
Who needs the stewards of his house would be,
In despite of Telemachus, his son;
And live upon his substance lavishly.
To her again Penelope thus spake:
The Gods, Euryclea, sure have made you mad.
The Gods can wise men fools, and fools wise make.
The Gods have done you hurt, more wit you had.
You do me wrong, that know how little sleep
I have enjoyed since he went to Troy.
I never so well slept since, but still weep,
And now you come and wake me with a toy.
Be gone, if't had been any maid but you,

I should have sent her not well pleas'd away,
But to your age some more respect is due;
Go down again into the house you may.
Dear child, said she, I mock not, for 'tis true.
Ulysses is i' th' house. That stranger's he.
Telemachus and no man else him knew;
And known to others would not let him be,
Till they these proud and naughty men had kill'd.
Penelope then starting from the bed
Embrac'd the nurse; her eyes with tears were fill'd.
And, as yet doubtful, still she questioned.
Euryclea, is all this true you say?
Is he indeed come home? Be serious.
How could he the proud suitors all destroy,
He being but one, they many in the house?
Nor saw, nor ask'd I, but I heard the groans
Of dying men; for up we were all shut
Within our doors, and lock'd up all at once,
And of our lives into a fear were put,
Till me, your son, Telemachus, call'd out
To come t' Ulysses. In the hall he stood,
And there in heaps the slain lay him about,
That like a lion stood besmear'd with blood;
Ulysses makes himself known to Penelope.
You would have joy'd to see him. Now they lie
In th' court all in one heap. But busy he
Is airing of the house, a great fire by,
And for to call you hither has sent me.
But come, that in each other you may joy,

For now at last your wishes granted be.
Ulysses come, your son is past a boy,
And their revenge upon the woo'rs they see.
Nurse, answered she, triumph not out of season.
For to be glad to see him in the house,
You know there none is that have so much reason
As I have, and our son, Telemachus.
But 'tis not truth you tell me. What you say
Will come at last to nothing else but this,
It was some God that did the suitors slay,
Hating the sight of what they did amiss.
There never man came to them that can boast
He parted from them without injuries;
So by their wickedness their lives they lost;
Ulysses may have perish'd for all this.
Euryclea to this again replied,
Dear child, what words are these that from you come?
Ulysses stands i' th' hall at the fire's side,
And yet you say he never will come home.
But well, I'll tell you now a surer sign:
When I was washing of his legs and feet,
I saw where th' wound was giv'n him by the swine;
And had then told you had he thought it meet;
But with his hand, for that cause, stopp'd my breath.
Come, I will lay my life on't willingly;
If it be false, put me to cruel death.
To this Penelope did then reply:
The purpose of the Gods, wise though you be,
You know not, nurse; but I'll go to my son,

And there upon the place with him I'll see
What men are slain, and who the deed has done.
Then down she went, consulting in her breast,
Whether at distance it were best to try,
Or else directly go unto the guest,
And there receive and kiss him presently.
But when into the hall she enter'd was,
Where sitting was Ulysses, in the light
Of a good fire, she went and took a place
That was to where he sat just opposite.
Ulysses look'd o' th' ground, expecting what
His wife would say, but long time she spake not;
But gazing on her husband, mute she sate,
As one that's in a trance, and has no thought:
But by-and-bye, surveying him, she thought
'Twas he; but seeing him so ill-array'd,
Her mind was chang'd; she thought that he 'twas not.
Telemachus his mother chid, and said,
Mother, hard-hearted mother, and unkind,
Why sit you at such distance from my father,
And have so little care to know his mind?
When many questions you should ask him rather.
Another woman would not keep off so
From her own hushand that away had staid
Twenty years long, and suffer'd so much woe,
But at their meeting somewhat would have said.
Son, said she then, I am astonish'd so,
I cannot speak, nor look him in the face;
But whether he Ulysses be or no,

I shall be certain in a little space,
For we have signs between us of our own,
Which we shall soon know one another by,
That to none living but ourselves are known.
Ulysses to his son then smilingly
Said, Let, Telemachus, your mother try me,
Perhaps she know me better will anon.
The cause why now so little she sets by me,
Is that I have ill-favour'd garments on.
But now let you and I look well about.
Who kills one man, unless great friends he have,
Must leave his kin and country, and go out;
But we have kill'd both many men and brave,
Therefore, consider what is to be done.
Father, said he, let that be your own care;
So wise as you are, men say there is none.
Our hands to do your pleasure ready are.
Why then, I'll tell you what is best to do:
Put on your coats, and let the women all
Into the hall in their best garments go;
The minstrel play; and they to dancing fall;
That he that stands without, or dwelleth nigh
Unto the house, or travelleth that way,
When he shall hear such mirth and melody,
May think, This surely is the wedding-day.
That so before this slaughter Fame have spread,
Depart we may from hence into the field,
And 'gainst the people of the town make head,
And take such counsel more as Jove shall yield.

When this was said, the men their coats put on;
The damsels dress themselves, the minstrel sung
And played upon his fiddle, and each one
To dancing fell, with it the palace rung.
And one that heard this as he stood without,
Said to another by him, She is married.
Fie, fie, she could no longer now hold out.
So, said he, ignorant how things were carried.
Meanwhile Ulysses bath'd and ointed is
B' Eurynome, and also richly clad
With a fair robe and coat; and beside this,
Taller and greater Pallas made him had,
And varnished with black his curled head.
As one by Vulcan and Athena taught,
Gold upon silver skilfully had spread,
So Pallas on Ulysses' beauty wrought.
Then from the bath he like a God came in,
And sat him down before his wife again;
And with her to discourse did thus begin:
Woman, said he, to speak to you is vain;
Above all women harden'd is your heart.
What woman else that had her husband seen
After twice ten years' absence, thus apart
From him to sit, contented would have been?
Make me a bed, nurse; what should I do here?
Man, said Penelope, nor mightily
I magnify nor scorn you; what you were
When you went hence, full well remember I:
But go, nurse, make for him the bed that he

Himself fram’d, by the chamber-door without.
Thus said she, but to try if that were he,
Yet griev’d him to the heart, and made him doubt.
Woman, said he, who has remov’d my bed?
It cannot be but by a force divine.
With my own hands ’twas wrought and finished,
To th’ end thereby it might be known for mine.
I’ th’ court an olive-tree stood great and tall,
Thick as a pillar. I about it made
A chamber. Of good stone I made the wall;
And cutting off the boughs the roof I laid;
And in the wall a good strong door I form.
When this was done, I cut up by the root,
And smooth’d with iron tools a lusty corm,
And setting it upright, fix’d the bed to ‘t,
And pierc’d the wood with wimbles where ’twas meet;
And laid on silver, gold, and ivory.
A purple thong unto the door I fit.
This is the sign for you to know me by.
Whether it still remain I cannot tell,
Or ta’en away and down be cut the tree.
This said, and she the sign rememb’ring well,
The tears roll’d from her eyes. Thus weeping, she
Acknowledgeth and runneth to Ulysses;
About his neck her milk-white arms she lays,
And both his shoulders and his head she kisses,
And, O Ulysses, be not angry, says,
The Gods have giv’n you wisdom, but denied
To satisfy our youth with mutual joy:

Ulysses relates his adventures briefly.
Take it not ill I have you thus far tried;
Since horror hath possess'd my mind alway,
Lest some deceitful man (for such there be
Too many in the world) should hither come,
And flatt'ring, bring me into infamy.
Helen of Argos would have staid at home,
And not gone with th' adulterer of Troy,
Had she consider'd that th' Achæan lords
Might chance to come and fetch her thence away
Again into her country with their swords.
This speech inflam'd his love, and wet his eyes.
As a man shipwreck'd swimming for his life,
Rejoiceth when the land he near him spies;
So welcome was Ulysses to his wife.
She hung upon him still, nor had let go
Till morning, but for Pallas, who would not
Let Phäeton and Iampus, th' horses two
That draw the Morn, be set to the chariot.
Then said Ulysses to Penelope,
O wife! my troubles ended are not yet;
For still there many more remaining be;
Long time 'twill be ere to the end I get.
Tiresius did tell me this in hell,
When I went thither of his ghost to know,
Whether I with my mates should come home well,
Or not to Ithaca again, and how.
But come, 'tis bedtime, let us satisfy
Ourselves with sleep. Then said Penelope,

Your bed made ready shall be presently:
But since you mention'd have the prophecy,
Tell me what said Tiresias. I know
You'll tell it me one time or other, why,
If you will, may you not tell me it now?
To this Ulysses did again reply:
Because you long to know 't, I tell you then;
Tiresias advised me to go
With oar on shoulder to a place where men
Inhabit, that the briny sea not know,
Nor ever mingle salt with what they eat,
Nor ever saw the ship with crimson face,
Nor yet those wings which do the water beat
(Called oars), to make the good ship go apace.
Now mark me well. When you shall meet a man,
Just at the end of Neptune's utmost bound,
Bearing upon his shoulder a corn-fan,
Stick down your lusty oar upon the ground;
There sacrifice to the world's admiral,
For new admittance, a ram, boar, and bull;
Then home again, and offer unto all
The Gods by name a hundred oxen full.
Your death will not ungentle be, for which
Age shall prepare you, and your soul unglue
Insensibly. Your people shall be rich
Which round about you dwell. All this is true
Then, said Penelope. If this be all,
Since your old age the Gods will happy make,
The sorrow yet to come can be but small.

Whilst thus this couple t'one another spake,
Meanwhile their bed with cov'rings soft was clad;
The maids, returned i' th' hall, before them stand;
Eurynome a torch to light them had,
And carried it before them in her hand,
Then parting, left them under marriage-law.
Telemachus and the good servants two,
When they had to the dancers said Hola,
Unto their beds within the palace go.
Ulysses and Penelope their joy
Converted had into a new content;
She to Ulysses telleth the annoy
She suffer'd from her suitors impudent;
What havoc they had made of cows and sheep,
And many barrels of her wine had wasted.
And he to her, what hurt o' th' land and deep
He done and suffer'd had. While his tale lasted
Well pleas'd she was, and had no list to sleep.
He told her how the Cicons he had beaten;
How Lote from love of home his men did keep;
How Cyclops his companions had eaten;
And in revenge how he had made him blind;
How, to convey him home he did obtain
Of Æolus a leather-bag of wind,
Which breaking prison blew him back again;
And how in Læstrigonia he lost
His good ships all but one, in which he was;
Told her the wiles of Circe; what the Ghost
In Hell said to him of Tiresias,

To whom he went his fortune for to know,
In a black ship; and with his mother there
Discoursed; and saw many a one laid low
That in the Argive host had been his peer;
And how he heard the tempting Sirens sing
In concert, and scap'd safely by; and how
By th' shifting rocks, Charybdis vomiting,
And Scylla's clutches he did safely row;
How to Ogygia he came, and how
Calypso kept him in a cave, where she
To be his wife did promise to bestow
Upon him youth and immortality.
How to Phæacia he came, where he
Much honour'd was, and thence by sea did come
Enrich'd by public liberality
With brass and gold and costly vestures home.
And at these words sleep seized on his eyes.
When Pallas thought Ulysses satisfied
With bed and sleep, she makes the morning rise,
And day from mortals now no longer hide.
Ulysses rose, and speaking to his wife,
We have, said he, both of us had much woe;
You for my absence weeping out your life,
And I, because the Gods would have it so.
But since we now again united be,
Look to the goods within. My folds I'll fill
Partly with booty from the enemy,
And many also my friends give me will.
Now to my grieved father I must go,

And therefore with your maids go up again;
For ere the sun be up, the town will know
That in my house the suitors all are slain.
Do not so much as look out, or inquire.
This said, he put on arms. To arm also
His son and his two men he did require.
Then they got up, and there stood armed too.
Then open'd they the door and forth they went.
Ulysses led the way. Daylight was spread.
But Pallas out of town them safely sent
Into the field, and undiscovered.

LIB. XXIV.

The Ithacesians bury the wooers, and sitting in council, resolve on revenge; and coming near the house of Laertes, are met by Ulysses and Laertes, with Telemachus and servants, the whole number twelve, and overcome & submit.

MEANWHILE UNTO THE house came Mercury;
A golden rod he carried in his hand,
Wherewith he lays asleep a mortal eye,
And opens it again with the same wand,
And at the bloody heap he calls away
The suitors' souls. They all about him fly.
And as the rod directeth them the way,
They follow all, but screaming fearfully.
As in some venerable hollow cave,
Where bats that are at roost upon a stone,
And from the ledge one chance a fall to have,
The rest scream out and hold fast one by one;
So screaming all the souls together fly.
And first pass by Oceanus his streams,
The Ithacesians bury the wooers.
Then by Sol's gate, and rock of Leucady;
And then they passed through the town of dreams,
And in a trice to th' mead of Asphodel,
And saw the soul there of Peleiades,

For there the souls of wretched mortals dwell,
And of Patroclus and Nestorides.
The soul of Ajax son of Telamon
Was also there, who ‘mongst those warriors tall,
The goodliest person was, except the son
Of Peleus, who did much excel them all.
To these Atrides’ soul came from hard by,
And theirs whose death had joined been with his,
And by Ægistus’ hand were made to die.
Then to Atrides said Achilles this:
Atrides, we thought you of all the host
That came to fight against the town of Troy,
Had been by the high Gods beloved most;
For in the army you bore greatest sway.
Yet afterwards the first you were to fall.
T’ had better been commanding t’ have been slain.
Then had you had a noble funeral,
And tomb, whereby your glory might remain.
But now you died a miserable death.
To this Atrides’ soul thus answered:
Happy were you at Troy to lose your breath,
With other Argives; that there perished
Fighting about you, in your dusty bed
Stretch’d out, your feats of horsemanship forgot,
But fighting we all day continued,
And till we gain’d your body ceased not.
Nor had we ceased then, but for the storm.
And then we bare your body to the fleet,
And there the blemishes thereof reform

With water fair and warm, and unguents sweet.
The Greeks about you wept, and cut their hair;
Your mother and her nymphs then came and roar'd,
Th' Achæan army was in such a fear,
That they were ready all to run aboard.
But Nestor, whose advice most current was,
Cried, Stay you, Argives, this is not the noise
Of armed foes, but Thetis now doth pass
With all her nymphs; of them this is the voice.
Then they all fearless stay'd. And the nymphs stood
Mourning, and clothed him with garments meet.
The Muses nine, in turn with voices good,
Singing, made all the standers by to weep.
And seventeen days both Gods and men we mourn.
On the eighteenth we sheep and cattle slay.
And then in God-like clothes your body burn,
With many unguents sweet that on it lay.
Both foot and horse many the pile sustain,
And loudly shout, and Vulcan makes an end.
Only the bones and nothing else remain,
Which with pure wine and unguents sweet we blend.
Your mother sent the urn, by Vulcan made,
But given her by Bacchus, and therein,
Noble Achilles, your white bones we laid,
Mix'd with Patroclus you delighted in.
By yours, the ashes of Antilochus,
Whom next Patroclus was to you most dear,
We placed in an urn apart, and thus
Over you all one monument we rear,

High to be seen from sea by them that now,
Or shall hereafter sailing be that way.
Your mother also to the Gods did vow
T' have noble prizes for the lords to play.
At princes' sepultures I oft have seen
Propos'd rich prizes to provoke the strife
Of noble minds, but that like these had been,
I never any saw in all my life.
So after death renown'd your name will be;
But what am I the better, to whom Jove
Did for my pains a wretched death decree
(Such was the pleasure of the Gods above)
B' Ægistus and my own wife's bloody hand?
Thus they to one another talk'd in hell.
Then Mercury came to them with his band
Of woo'rs that in Ulysses' palace fell.
Of these Atrides knew Amphimedon,
(For he in Ithaca had been his guest),
And speaking to him first, he thus begun:
Amphimedon, what ail'd you and the rest,
To come to this dark place so in a throng,
The flow'r of Ithaca, of equal years?
If purposely a man should seek among
Your people all, he should not find you peers.
Were you by Neptune drowned in the main,
And hither sent by fury of the weather?
Or landing to find booty were you slain?
Or fighting for fair women were sent hither?
Come, tell me freely; I have been your guest.

Know you not I t' your father's house did come
With Menelaus, Ulysses to request
That he would go with us to Ilium?
Then said Amphimedon: I know it all,
And how we all deprived were of life,
I'll tell you true, and manner of our fall.
Ulysses absent, we all woo'd his wife.
She none denied, nor any married,
But casting how of life us to bereave,
To set a loom up came into her head,
As if she somewhat did intend to weave.
She sets it up, and did begin to weave.
Suitors, said she, since dead Ulysses is,
Stay yet a little while, and give me leave
To make an end but of one business.
I must for old Laertes make a cloth,
Which in his sepulchre he is to wear.
T' offend the wives of Greece I should be loth.
For to accuse me they will not forbear.
They'll say I very hasty was to wed,
If I go hence, and not provide a shroud,
Wherein Laertes must be buried.
Out of his wealth, that might have been allow'd.
The suitors then were all content. And then
All day she wove, but ere she went to bed
What she had wov'n she ravell'd out agen.
Three years her suitors she thus frustrated;
In the fourth year her women her betray'd;
And in we came while she the web undid.

She could the wedding now no more avoid.
The robe when it was finished and done
She washed clean, and it before us laid:
As bright it shin'd as either moon or sun.
And then ill-fortune brought Ulysses home
To the house were dwelt the master of the swine;
And thither too Telemachus did come,
From sandy Pylus, safely through the brine;
And both together there our death contrive.
That done, they both into the city come.
Telemachus the first was to arrive.
The master of the swine brought th' other home,
Like an old beggar with his staff in's hand,
Apparell'd in such miserable gear,
That, that was he, we could not understand,
Nor no man else, although he elder were.
We mock, we rate him, throw things at his head;
He patiently endured all his harms,
Until, by Jupiter encouraged,
From out the hall he took away the arms,
And in an upper chamber lock'd them fast.
Then craftily he bids his wife to send
To us his mighty bow, our strength to taste.
This the beginning was of our ill end;
For much too weak to bend the bow were we.
But when it was unto Ulysses brought,
Fearing by him lest it should bended be,
We all at once cried out, Hold, give 't him not.
Only Telemachus cried, Let him try.

And then ’twas put into Ulysses’ hands.
Ulysses bent it very easily.
Then leap’d he to the sill, and there he stands;
And round about he look’d upon us grim.
And first of all he shot Antinous,
At whom he took his aim, and killed him,
And with his arrows, after, more of us.
And one upon another down we fall.
’Twas plain, some present God there gave him aid,
For then he follow’d us about the hall,
Till all on heaps at last he had us laid.
Of groans and blows it made a dismal sound.
And thus, King Agamemnon, died we.
Our bodies yet there lie upon the ground;
Our friends yet unacquainted with it be,
That else would wash our wounds and us lament,
Which to the dead are ceremonies due.
Then said Atrides, O virtue excellent
Of your fair wife, happy Ulysses, you,
That with great valour have her repossess’d.
My wife, Tyndareus’ daughter, was not such.
Your consort’s fame will be hereafter dress’d
In noble songs, and the sex honour much.
But my wife’s name shall stand in ballads vile,
And, sung in filthy songs, the sex disgrace.
Thus they discoursing were in hell. Meanwhile
Ulysses cometh to Laertes’ place:
About it many lodgings were, wherein
His necessary servants all were laid;

And there they fed, and sat, and slept. But in
The house itself one old Sicelian maid,
That of his person always had the care.
Ulysses then, lest supper they should lack,
Said to his two good servants, For our fare
You must again unto the town go back,
And fetch a swine, the fattest in the sties,
Meanwhile I'll to the vineyard go, and try
Whether my father know can with his eyes,
After so long an absence, that 'tis I.
This said, his servants armed homeward hie,
And to the vineyard goes Ulysses then.
But Dolius he there could not espy,
Nor any of his sons, or of his men.
His sons and servants all abroad were gone,
For thorns to mend the hedges of the ground.
Laertes in the vineyard all alone
Placing of earth about a plant he found.
On him he had a foul coat, full of patches,
And ugly leather boots, those patch'd also;
But good enough to save his legs from scratches:
Gloves of the same against the briars too.
A goat-skin head-piece he had on to boot.
Ulysses, when he saw him in this plight,
Worn out with age, and so much sorrow to it,
Under a tree stood weeping out of sight.
And then bethought him whether it were best
T' embrace and kiss him, and directly say,
I am Ulysses, or first talk in jest,

And give him time his person to survey.
Resolv'd at last, his father he goes nigh,
Who with his head down, digg'd about a plant.
Old man, said he, your skill is good. For why,
Your garden neither art nor care does want.
Nor plant, nor fig, nor vine, nor olive-tree,
Nor so much as a leek but prospers here.
One thing there wants (I pray not angry be);
You look not to yourself. Ill cloathes you wear,
And also pale and yellow is your hue,
Which cannot be imputed to being aged.
'Tis not because you do no work, that you
He little sets by that has you engaged;
There's nothing in your aspect of a slave.
The look and stature you have of a king,
And the appearance of a king would have,
If you, what's due to age had ev'ry thing.
Whose servant are you, and who owns the ground?
And say if this be Ithaca or no;
For this man whom upon the way I found,
Is not so wise as certainly to know?
I ask'd him of a friend that I had here,
Whether alive he were or dead. But he;
Whether he dead, or living still he were,
Unable was at all to answer me.
My house a stranger on a time was at,
Which of all strangers I did love the best;
That said he came from Ithaca, and that
Laertes was his father's name. This guest

I entertained as kindly as I could,
With viands good, whereof I had good store;
And gave him talents ten of well-wrought gold,
And beside that I gave him these gifts more:
A pot for temper'd wine of silver bright;
Twelve carpets fair; twelve robes; twelve coats that were
All lined through; and twelve more that were light;
And four maid-servants, both well taught and fair,
Such as he from a greater number chose.
Then said Laertes, Ithaca this is,
Now held by wicked men. But you will lose
Your presents all, and of requital miss.
But had you found my son Ulysses here,
He would have kept of amity the law,
And well requited both your gifts and cheer.
But say, how long it is since you last saw
And entertain'd my son, if yet he be;
But he at sea devoured is by fish
Far hence, or else to beasts and fowls is he
Somewhere, poor man, at land become a dish;
Neither his father nor his mother by,
To wind him and to shed tears o'er his bed;
Nor yet his wife weeping to close his eye,
Which are the honours due unto the dead.
Tell me also your dwelling and your name,
Your parents and your city what they be;
And where the good ship lies in which you came,
And what men with you came in company,
Or with some merchants in their ship, and they

Departing hence have left you here alone?
To this Ulysses answering did say,
I'll answer to your questions each one.
My city's Alybas, and of the same
Apherdas is the king. His son am I,
And called am Eperitus by name.
Far hence at the land's end my ship doth lie.
And since Ulysses from me went away,
'Tis now five years, and with good augury
That we should meet again another day,
And joy in mutual hospitality.
This said, Laertes, overcome with woe,
Took up the scalding dust with both his hands,
And pour'd the same upon his head of snow,
And sobbing thick and weeping there he stands.
Ulysses' heart up to his nostrils swell'd
With pity to behold his father's woe,
And to him leapt; and 's arms about him held,
And said, The man you weep and mourn for so
Am I, come after twenty years again.
Give over sobbing now; for, though in haste,
I tell you must, the suitors I have slain,
And made them of their crimes the fruit to taste.
Then said Laertes, If indeed you be
My son Ulysses, let me see some sign
To know you by for certain. Then, said he,
Behold the wound received from the swine
On Mount Parnassus, when I thither went
T' Autolycus my mother's father, to

Receive the gifts he promis'd me. You sent
Me thither, and so did my mother too.
I'll tell you too what trees you gave me when
I walking once was with you there. And I
Ask'd you of all the trees the names (for then
'Twixt man and boy I was). And severally
As I the trees' names ask'd, you told the same.
Pear-trees thirteen; apple-trees half a score;
Rankles fifty (to the vines you gave that name);
All of them in their season berries bore;
And forty fig trees. Th' old man knew it all;
Embrac'd his son, and with abundant joy
Fainted, and sinking ready was to fall,
But that his son's embraces were his stay.
Then coming to himself again he said:
Jove, father, and you Gods (Gods there are yet!)
The suitors for their evil deeds have paid,
But now I fear the town will on us set,
And with themselves make all the city rise
In Cephalenia. Then said his son,
Fear not. Of that we'll by and by advise.
Eumæus and Philœtius are gone
To get a supper ready at your house.
This said, into the house they come away,
And find Eumæus and Philœtius
At work to cut out meat, and wine allay.
Meanwhile Laertes oil'd and bathed is,
And by his maid in seemly garments clad,
And Pallas, standing by him, added this,

A larger stature than before he had.
As of a God his presence did appear.
Ulysses seeing him, admir'd, and said:
Father, you greater now are than you were,
Some God has beauty on your person laid.
Then said Laertes, O ye Gods on high,
Jove, Pallas, and Apollo, had I been
Such as I was at Neritus, when I
Stormed the town, and armed had come in
When you and the proud suitors were in fight,
I had made many of them bend the knee;
And you would have rejoic'd at the sight.
So to his son Ulysses talked he.
Supper brought in, they sit; and then came in
Old Dolius, sent for, from his husbandry,
And his sons, weary. Working they had been.
The nurse had bidden them come speedily.
They wondered to see Ulysses there;
But he to Dolius then gently said,
Pray for awhile your wond'ring to forbear;
We hungry are, and long have for you staid.
Then Dolius embrac'd him, and said,
Since long'd for you are come, and unexpected,
And to us by the Gods have been convey'd;
All hail, and by the Gods be still protected.
But tell me if Penelope yet have
The news received of your coming home,
The Ithacesians in council resolve on revenge.
Or shall we send her word? That labour save,

Replied Ulysses, for she knows I'm come.
This said, he sat him down. His sons also,
With decent words, Ulysses entertain,
And lay their hands in his. That done, they go,
And by their father sat them down again.
Now fame divulged had the suitors' fate;
And people howling, came in ev'ry way,
And gather'd whereabout Ulysses' gate,
To fetch the bodies of the dead away.
And those that out of Ithaca had liv'd,
To fishermen they gave to carry home.
And staying on the place, though sorely griev'd,
Amongst themselves they into counsel come.
Eupeithes, father of Antinous,
That first of all slain by Ulysses was,
Spake first, and weeping for his son, said thus:
See how much mischief this man done us has.
He carried hence our ships, and ablest men;
And lost them all, as one that had design'd
Our utter ruin. Coming back agen,
He killed hath those whom he left behind.
Come then, let's to him quickly, lest meanwhile
He should pass over the wide sea, and get
Protection at Elis, or at Pyle,
And we so sham'd as we were never yet.
'Twill be a scorn to our posterity
To let the murder of our children so
Stay unrevenged, and put up cowardly.
For my part, to my grave I'd rather go.

Come quickly then, lest we prevented be.
This said, the people for him pity had.
Then came in Medon, who had scaped free,
And Phemius that scap'd too, and was glad.
And Medon to th' assembly spake, and said,
Ulysses of himself could not have done
This mighty deed without th' Immortals' aid.
I saw, when present I was looking on,
A God stand by that him encouraged,
In Mentor's shape he plainly did appear;
And then about the room the suitors fled,
And fell before Ulysses in their fear.
Next him spake Alitherses, who alone
Saw fore and aft. Hear me, you men, said he;
Of this great slaughter I accuse can none,
But even yourselves that gave no ear to me,
Nor yet to Mentor. We you counselled
The licence of your children to take down,
That spent the substance, and dishonoured
The wife of him that was of such renown.
My counsel, therefore, to you now is this,
Not to proceed, lest on yourselves you bring
More mischief yet, and of your purpose miss.
So said he then, but little profiting;
For more than half with alalaes up start,
And cry aloud, To arms, go on, proceed!
But quietly sat still the lesser part,
That with Eupeithes' judgment disagreed.
When they had clad themselves in glist'ning brass,

Without the town they came to rendezvous
In open field. Eupeithes leader was,
Seeking revenge where he his life shall lose.
Then Pallas to her father came, and said,
father, king of kings, what do you mean,
The war shall last between them, or be staid?
To this her father answer'd her agen:
Child, why d'ye ask me that? 'twas your request
The suitors for their insolence should pay.
Do what you please, but yet I think it best,
When you have done, that peace for ever stay;
And ever reign Ulysses and his race.
Which to confirm, oblivion I'll send
Of former acts the image to deface.
Then gladly Pallas did from heaven descend.
When now Ulysses and his company
Removed had their hunger with good cheer,
Ulysses said, Some one go forth and see
Whether the Ithacesians be near.
And then one of the young men standing there,
Went forth and saw them as he pass'd the sill;
And turning back, Arm, said he, they are here!
And then they all put on their arms of steel.
Ulysses and his son, and servants four,
Six sons of Dolius. And the old men,
Laertes, and Dolius, were two more.
Aged they were, but necessary then.
Then arm'd, Ulysses leading, out they go.
And Pallas, both in person and in voice

Resembling Mentor, in came to them too.
Ulysses seeing her did much rejoice.
And looking on Telemachus, he said,
Telemachus, this battle will declare
Who courage has, who not. Be not afraid:
That you dishonour not your stock beware.
Father, said he, you shall see by-and-bye,
You need not be ashamed of your son.
Laertes this discourse heard joyfully,
And to the Gods cried out in passion,
ye kind Gods, and happy day is this!
joy! My son and grandson are at strife
And coming near the house of Laertes, are met by Ulysses and Laertes, with Telemachus and servants, the whole number twelve, are overcome & submit.
Which of the two the most courageous is,
And ready to buy honour with his life.
Then Pallas to Laertes said, My friend,
Son of Arcesius, whom the Gods do love,
With all your force your spear now from you send.
But pray first unto Pallas and to Jove.
He pray'd, and threw his spear, which th' helmet smote
Of old Eupeithes, and went into's head.
Down dead he fell, the helmet sav'd him not.
His armour rattled, and his spirit fled.
And then fell on Ulysses and his son,
Upon the foremost, both with sword and spear,
And surely had destroy'd them ev'ry one,
Had not Jove's daughter, Pallas, then been there.

She to the people call'd aloud, and said,
Hold Ithacesians; the quarrel may
Without more blood be ended. They, afrai
Of th' heavenly voice, began to run away.
Ulysses yet not ceased to pursue
The captains of his foes, till from above,
In thunder, Jove his sooty bolt down threw.
Then Pallas said, Beware; offend not Jove;
And glad was then Ulysses to give o'er.
By Pallas were propounded terms of peace,
In Mentor's shape, and each part to them swore.
And thus it was agreed the war should cease.

FINIS.

The Poetry

A view of Chatsworth House, a stately home in the Derbyshire Dales, from the south-west, c. 1880 — in 1610 Hobbes became a companion to William Cavendish, 2nd Earl of Devonshire, and he served at Chatsworth as his private tutor for many years.

Chatsworth House today

De Mirabilis Pecci, Being the Wonders of the Peak in Darby-shire

1678 EDITION

CONTENTS

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

TO THE NOBLE LORD WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE

CONCERNING THE WONDER OF THE PEAK. A POEM.

ORIGINAL LATIN TEXT.

DE Mirabilibus Pecci: BEING THE VVONDERS OF THE PEAK IN DARBY-SHIRE, Commonly called The Devil's Arse of Peak. In English and Latine.

The Latine Written by Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury. The English by a Person of Quality.

London, Printed for William Crook at the Green Dragon without Temple-Bar, 1678.

LICENSED.

Septemb. 3d. 1677.

Rog L'estrange.

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS LATINE POEM, writ by the famous Mr. Thomas Hobs of Malmsbury, hath got such reputation, that many English Readers had a great desire to be acquainted with it, for whose sakes it is now translated into English, although without the knowledge of Mr. Hobs; who it is hop'd will not be displeased with this attempt which is left to others Idg•ments, whether done well or ill. Reader farewel, but do not forget to peruse that excellent Translation of Homer by Mr. Hobs. I think the most exact and best Translation that ere I saw.

TO THE NOBLE LORD WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE CONCERNING THE WONDER OF THE PEAK. A POEM.

ON TH' ENGLISH Alps, where Darbies Peak doth rise,
High up in Hills, that Emulate the Skies,
And largely Waters all the Vales below,
With Rivers that still plentifully Flow,
DothChatsworth by swift Derwins Channel stand,
Fam'd for it's Pile, and Lord, for both are grand.
Slowly the River by its Gates doth pass,
Here silent, as in Wonder of the place,
But does from Rocky precipices move
In rapid streams below it, and above.
A losty Mountain guards the house behind,
From the assaults of the rough Eastern wind;
Which does from far it's rugged Cliffs display,
And Sleep prolongs, by shutting out the day.
Behind, a pleasant Garden does appear;
Where the rich earth, breaths odours every where.
Where in the midst of Woods, the fruitful Tree
Fears without prune-hook, seeming now as free.
Where by the thick leav'd roof the Walls are made
Spite of the Sun were all his beams display'd
More cool than the fam'd Virgil's Beechen shade.
Where Art (it self dissembling) rough hewn stone
And craggy flints worn out by dropping on

Together joyning by the workmans tool)
Makes horrid rocks, and watry caverns cool.
The Water that from native Cliffs had source
Once free and unconfin'd, throughout it's course,
By it's own Country Metal is led on
Captive to Rocks of Artificial stone.
There buried deep, it's streams it doubly throws
Into two circling Channels as it goes,
Through thousand cranies, which by art it does.
Then girds the Rock with many a hollow vain,
Frighting all under with surprising rain.
Thence turning it a Marble font does store,
Until it's lofty brims can hold no more.
And entring the house, obsequious is
To Cook and Butler, in their services.
And gushing up within the midst does spout
His Crystal waters ev'ry where about,
Fit for the hands, from the tall Cisterns out,
And though to this but four vents we assign,
Calliroe's not so fair that spouts from nine.
The river turning off a little space,
Part of a garden's seen that fronts the place.
Two rowes of Crystal ponds here shine and dance
Which trembling wave the Sun beams as they glance,
In which vast shoales of fishes wanton float,
Not conscious of the prison where they'r shut.
How does it please when as the Nymphs fling in
The prey intic'd, to the bright flouds again,
T' observe the method that the wantons use,

First to inveigle men, and then refuse!
What can more gratefull or Surprising be,
Than gardens pend'lous on high mounts to see?
Within the midst of all the waters stand,
Caesarian Piles built by a womans hand.
Piles fit for Kings to build, and Monarchs rear,
In Cavendisian Lordships doe appear;
The petty products of a Female care.
But of fam'd Shrewsoury's great Countess this
The least of thousand commendations is.
To whom vast Structures their foundations own;
Who got great wealth with great and good renown;
Who by her candor made all friends in power,
And with her bounty shin'd upon the lower;
Who left an Off-spring numerous and great
With which the joyful Nation's still repleat;
How Sweet it is upon the Sandy shore
Of Crystall Pooles, great Nature to explore!
Or to my Lord Small gifts of verse prefer,
Wherein those happy fields I may declare
Prest by the Muses, which still urgent are.
A more commodious soile they never knew,
Nor a more friendly Lord had title to.
From hence, on rising ground, appears a neat,
And fair ascent, up to the Pallace gate.
Royall, August, sublime without tis seen;
Large, neat, commodious, splendid, rich within.
What thou may'st find in Marble figur'd out
Of Poets fables, or old Hero's stout,

Dwell not upon’t; nor cement hard as stone,
Nor count the faithful Servants, one by one.
But the great Master celebrate my Muse.
To whome descended from an antient House,
Devon gives princely Titles, Derby Cares:
Who in a constant breast, discretion bears.
Magnificent, not lavish, still he spends
His riches freely, and amongst his Friends;
He of your Quire is the only grace,
He for the Muses finds a resting place,
And pleasant shades, and gratful leisure gives,
And he from them large Eloquence receives
With a discerning mind, ‘twixt good, and ill.
Next view his Consort wistly, view her Still,
Descended from the Bruses antient line,
Whose Kingly Stock does in her visage shine.
Then view their Noble Off-spring; but above
The rest a Nymph, whom Jove himself may love.
With two Sweet Youths, who Angells might be said,
The common pledges of the Marriage bed.
These with their Parents may be wonder’d at;
What else of Miracles thou may’st repeat,
Fall short of these, and are not nigh so great.
Of the high Peak, are Seven wonders writ.
Two Fonts, two Caves, one Pallace, Mount and Pit.
To wit that Stately Pallace we have nam’d
But now, is first among the seven fam’d.
O’th’ rest discoursing, Some who long’d to know
The cause of things, to see them joyn to goe;

And I (’twas worth the while) amongst them too,
’Twas at the time the earth did tribute pay,

And the hot Sun the dew had wip’d away
From off the stubble, when we first begun
Our journy, and to Guide us hired one:
Thus we set forwards from the gates, and make
Pilsly and Hassop in a rugged track.
From thence our horse with weary feet and slow
Towards a steep Hill’s high top, doe climbing go;
And after many a tug and weary Strain,
Halfe breathless, they the Summity do gain,
Turning about with wonder we espy
The birds now lazily to creep, not fly.
And that the Pico of the Mountains brow
Had pierc’d the body of the Clouds quite through
Derwin appeares but as a crooked line,
And Chatsworth as a point it doth entwine.
W’had gone but little further, when we found
The Hills soft back, cut deep with many a wound.
And did the earth in whitish ranks espie
Cast up in heaps, upon the surface lye.
Tis a high soil; but cover’d with a crust
Of brittle earth, soon crumbling into dust;
Which least by it’s own weight it should fall down.
Nature hath propt it with a roof of Stone.
But the dark Prince of wealth divides throughout,
In thousand channels, which himself had cut,
In order’d ranks the Stone; and each so drawn

From th’ Eastern point, unto the Western one
You’d think they felt not the effects alone
Of heat and warmth, but that they view’d the Sun.
The griping hand of Dis within these beds
Had stor’d of better mettals the crude seeds:
To be hereafter to perfection brought
By the Sun beams, as they upon them wrought,
Till then for to be guarded by the Stone,
From all assaults sufficient Garrison.
But all in vain, for neither can the Sun
With oblique ray, bring to concoction
The rougher leaden lump; nor is the ground
Sufficient guardian, for it’s treasure found.
For man (wealth’s great invader wheresoe’re
It hidden lies) with fire and Steel does tear
The bowels of the earth; and rends in twain
The Stony cover of the leaden vein.
And boldly dares, if poverty compel,
To rob th’ Exchecquer, of the Prince of Hell.
Not alwayes without danger, two were caught
As in their Mothers womb they deeply wrought
By death; who suddenly o’rewhelm’d them there,
Where they themselves had digg’d a Sepulcher.
The inlets (which with narrow vents admit
But hardly down those who are forc’d to it
By want, whose bellies are by hunger fit)
With beams of wood the Natives still distend,
And prop their way, as to the veins they bend.
A people expert in experienc’d wo,

Damn’d to the Mines, for many years ago;
That all may see they fell not unawares,
But were long sought for, by infernal snares.
Which now the main supporters take away
That did the earths weak brittle surface stay,
And gather to the neighbouring shades below
The souls, prest forth from their crust bodies now.
Bodies by bodies in these deeps we sound,
Thus arrows lost, are still by arrows found.
Before our feet, a Corps digg’d up we see,
Which minds us what we are, or ought to be.
Much like the body we about us bring.
T’other lies buried in the earth, but still
Hopes an extraction when ’tis Heavens will.
Upon the earth that from the mine was thrown,
A lazy people drawn from e’ry Town,
To see the mournful spectacle came down.
Two women weeping in the croud we spi’d;
One for the loss of joyes that she had tri’d,
T’other for want of hopes are now denied.
Ones flame continual use had near expir’d,
T’other with itch of novelty was fir’d.
Both mourn, because that both their joyes have lost,
But she who last had tasted them, the most.
Let them still mourn. We in our way go on,
And now four thousand paces we had gone,
By our horse feet we count, as oft the Stone
In equal space each foot precedeing still
In equal space each foot proceeding still

Before its fellow, now hath felt their heel.
Our shadowes go before, and shortest shew
What course the Sun bear's, and what course we go,
Many small Villages on either side
We leave behind us, as we onward ride,
The last is Hope; the rest I'le not rehearse,
Their names are too too cumbersome for verse.
On hollow ground, repleat with mines below,
And fill'd with mortals, high aloft we go.
The horse with hasty feet beats on the soil,
Redoubled eccho's from their hoofs recoil.
And in an hours space, or thereabout,
To a steep Mountains precipice we're brought,
It was great odds we did not headlong go
Into the neighbouring village stood below.
But we with winding steps, and wary foot
Strive as we may with safety, come unto't.
First we the Sun upon our right hand place,
Then turning to the left, with a soft pace
We downwards going to our feet confide.
Then again mounting on the Hills left side
Into the Village we securely ride,
Which built on a high Rock commands the sight
Of all the Passengers that travel by't;
Call'd from the Castle near it, Castleton.
Not famous for the warlike Deeds there done,
Not great, nor built with Art, not ever could
Against the Canon-shot it self uphold,
Nor yet impregnable to those of old;

But ancient and built up of Stone it bears
The injuries of time, and weather dares.
Under the Lords, that kept the mines of yore
It might of Thieves repulse the sudden power.
Behind a ruin'd mountain does appear
Swelling into two parts, which turgent are
As when we bend our bodies to the ground,
The buttocks amply sticking out are found.
I'th' midst there is a Cave: and on each hand
A lofty Rock does as supporter stand
Of a vast weight of earth, which else would fall,
So to the midst with safety guards us all,
And now we're come (I blushing must rehearse)
As most does stile it to the Devils Arse;
Peaks Arse the Natives.
A noble Cave between two Rocks appears,
Unto the Sun unknown, but to the Stars
Fearing to be immerg'd, and both the Bears
Turn'd, it its mouth with horrour does present:
Just like a furnace, or as Hell they paint,
Swallowing with open Jawes the Damned croud
After the sentence is pronounc'd aloud.
On horseback we our entrance make, and spy
Horses within, and haycocks mounted high.
But we with wonder and amaze admire
The tall prodigious Rocky Hemisphere,
How without prop 'tis capable to bear
So vast a weight, how it the mountain stayes,
And the eternal Geometrician praise,

Through the thick Arch, we see the water stain'd
To fall in drops, which on the earth retain'd,
Even then to their own Country the Sea,
Seek out returns with much perplexity;
In little Channels even then they search
For fellow streams, to fortifie their march.
From whence they teaching, we these notions get,
Rivers proceed not from the earth's receipt
Of the salt billowes by the sandy shoars,
Which still imbibe them at their hollow pores,
As if the straitned waters were forc'd up,
The Main being taller than the mountain's top;
But by the Suns hot rayes the Sea on high
Mounts up in vapours, which do wandring fly
Drove by the winds, which cooling still as soon
As the heat fails them, or the Sun goes down,
In num'rous tears descend unto the earth,
From which collected, Rivers have their birth.
To view the dark recesses of the Cave
We thought it not amiss good lights to have.
Dismounting, a she-Native of the place
Leads us on forwards, with a gentle pace,
Handsome enough, and Girle enough she was;
Who with her steady foot, and accent clear,
As guide emboldens us with many a cheer.
Making our entrance with a confus'd light,
Two Rocks with crooked backs drive from our sigh
The beams of day, and bending down below,
On all four force us through their Arch to go.

Sometimes erect, then grov'ling tow'rds the ground,
In figures both of beasts, and men, we're found.
Until at length the slow and humble source
Of a dark River crossing, stopt our course.
A stream whose Channel ran tili now beneath
The earth, here under the low Arch does breath.
And winding in its Channel to and fro,
Not alwayes does irrevocably go.
Sometimes it bosomes you within its bay,
Then jetting out, it drives you far away.
Thus far we go; beyond it none can have
The least admittance, who e're credit gave
To the old Womans Fable of the Father,
Who did forsooth well fraught with lights swim over
A little ford, but durst not further roame,
Lest sunk in night, he ne're should backward come;
But we return, and with wet feet tread o're
The Sand again, that we had trod before.
The night and shades we now behind us leave,
And the blest day-light once again receive.
Got out, as is the pole a Mountain tall
Lifts up his head, like an old ruin'd Wall
Ready made weak by breaches now to fall.
Tis said eternally the Sand falls down,
Without the hills least diminution;
Strange this if true; and yet the Pyrami'd
Of falling sand, still gathering to a head,
Gives tacite Items that the Flux begun
By some great ruine, and will ever run

Until the mountains top and that be one.
And though the most call't Mam Tor, nev'rtheless
Maim'd for the cliff I rather should express.
Which does in English a torn Rock denote,
And the decrepit hill gives favour to't.
Turn'd to the left a thousand pace or so,
To the Peak-Forrest without Tree we go,
Hem'd in with Stony fence the naked Deer
Cold Winter pinches, not a leaf does here
To shelter them upon these hills appear.
Summers fierce heat does scorch them, not a shade
From the Suns ray, to cover them is had.
Many the bloody wantonness of man
Destroy's with Dog his lov'd companion.
Many the changes when the Heavens frown,
Some Elden with wide jawes does swallow down.
Of the torn earth a dire hiatus 'tis
Which should I labour truly to express,
The Ancients I to councel call in vain,
For no such thing the Poets e're could feign,
How e're my Muse, we some essayes must make.
And first the figure of its mouth let's take:
Let the apt fimily be but compleat,
To small things, so, thou may'st compare what's great:
Tell me, tell't me alone, tell't in my ear.
Whisper't, that none but thou and I may hear;
She's dumb, as conscious of the form obscene.
Upon the side of a fair hill that's green,
Its rim descending with the mountain's seen.

Driving off herds that graze around it far,
And sucking with dark lungs the pliant air.
While from the edge we prostrate view't, the sight
O'th' vast abyss does each of us afright.
With fear and dread the bold spectator spies.
No bounds to stop the progress of his ey's.
And though the stony battlements assure.
Whos' ere leans on them, may have sight secure,
Yet still distrust our fearful minds invades,
And we retire from the dreadful shades.
But through the field we diligently search
For stones; thrown in, long is their silent march,
At lenght by stroaks their Journies end they speak,
(If any end, they in their journies make.)
Cast in they sink, and in their sinking knock,
After long pauses, on a hidden Rock.
Thence tilting, ten times they the stroaks repeat
In vain, not center'd on a bottome yet.
And now so oft deceiv'd, we strive at length
Whole towers to throw in, had we but strength,
Whole buildings, roofs and all, vast mountains tall,
(Hid they been there, for 'twould have swallow'd all)
But a vast weighty stone, such we could get,
We by main strength, force from its Native seat.
And rowling it along th'enclining land,
Upon the sacred brink, we let it stand.
Then this repeat. Thou God to shades below,
Praefect in chief of torments, see we go
Of our chance certain, and high seats of glee,

(if they say true are rob'd in black like thee)
This torment add unto those many more
Thou hast invented, for the damn'd in store.
In thy dominions if a soul thou hast
Fam'd for rebellion, or for breach of trust,
Beneath this Chasme let it streight be put.
Say it be Simon; or Iscariot.
Or place the Gyants in a trice you'l see,
Bruis'd they the shadows, of a shade will be.
But O ye Soul's who shut up with them sweat
Known and belov'd by us, make quick retrat,
And slight not our advice. This said the stone
We drop, whcih circled in thick mist is thrown
Against a Rock, the Cavern groans the while,
Loud sighs are vented from the shaken Pile.
From Rock to Rock, the sound goes downward still,
Less heard by us but the more heard by Hell,
The third and fourth percussion's nearer made,
With awful sound affright each list'ning shade.
In short against Avernus craggy throat
At the eleventh stroak, it whispers out
Its journey only; what 'tis more you hear
After that blow, brought faintly to your ear,
Does but the Image of a sound appear.
Away the shades, swift as the winds do glide,
In vaults of Erebus strive to be hid,
In silence the mean while descends the Stone;
Through the infernal Spheres it post doth run
And passes them in order one by one.

Into the confines of dread Dis it goes
And empty seats in Limbo overthrows.
From thence by intense flames it moves in hast,
And Souls red hot in Heaven to be plac'd
(Purge from their dross as are the Pipes by fire
Tobacco er'st had sullied) and the Sphere
Of Infants unregenerate it flyes.
(Unconscious of its fault which tortur'd cryes)
Thence sinking to the utmost Hell it goes
And center passes; where the wise suppose
Or Aristotles Sect should top, and so
Ascending to the t'other side does go.
Now the affrighted Ghosts turn back again
Freed from the object which had giv'n them pain.
Amongst which number Sysiphus alone
Does the approach lament of such a Stone,
More busky and more weighty than his own
'Tis said great Dudly to this Cave came down
In fam'd Eliza's Reigna a Peer well known.
He a poor Peasant, for a petty price
With Rope around his middle does entice,
And pole in hand, like to Sarissa tight,
And basket full of Stones down to be let
And pendulous to hang i'th' midst o'th' Cave;
Thence casting stones intelligence to have
By listning, of the depth of this vast hole.
The trembling wretch descending with his pole
Puts by the Stones, that else might on him rowl.
By their rebounds casts up a space immence,

Where every stroak does death to him dispence
Fearing the thread on which his life depends
Chance might cut off, e're Fate should give commands
After a hundred yards he had below
I'th' earth been drown'd, far as the Rope would go
And long enough hung by't within the Cave;
To th' Earl (who now impatient was to have
His answer) He's drawn up, but whether fear
Immoderate distracted him, or 'twere
From the swift motion as the Rope might wreath,
Or Spectrums from his fear, or Hell beneath
Frighted the wretch, or the Souls cittadel
Were storm'd or taken by some Imp of Hell,
For certain 'twas he rav'd; this his wild eyes,
His paleness, trembling, all things verifies.
Where venting something none could understand,
Enthusiastick hints ne're to be scand,
He ceasing dies after eight daies were gone.
But th' Earl inform'd, how far the Cave went down
He trembling from it hasts, not willing now,
Nor yet this way, down to the shades to go.
From hence within a Vale that hidden lyes;
A thousand paces off, a Fount doth rise.
From the low caverns of a grassie hill;
With double mouth it's waters gushing still.
Which since th' admir'd flux o'th' greater Sea
Doth by report in its small Channel play,
We thought it good (although the Sun made haste
And drove his Chariot quick into the West)

To stay a while, and haply so to see
When that the wonder of the Flux would be
With fame co-witnesses o'th rarity.
That which boils up with trembling waters bright
O'th' two the bigger, cheifly worth our sight,
A font receives not equal unto those
Are made by art, but yet by much out goes
What Fountain head; ere from wild chance arose.
Thence flowes, unless what doth at bottom keep
Two Cubits broad, three long, one Cubit deep.
One when no more then's own it doth contain,
But to it by the forreign floud doth gain.
A mark is by the swelling waters made,
Which gives the stony brink a signal shade.
Which by its blackness to have ebb'd of late
Discerning it uneasie seem'd to wait
So long until the tide again came on.
So we our Horse heads turn for to be gone.
When we're call'd back by th' gushing waters noise,
And see them plainly on the Stones to rise.
Now the full Fountains waters boil apace,
As when fierce fires we under Cauldrons place,
The water cannot rest that is above,
But shuns the mettle, and does volant prove.
When near the Font from the aforesaid head
A rivulet does suddainly proceed,
And pouring from above its streams deep in,
Helps the augmenting waters to attain
There wonted height, which got, decrease again

When streight the rivulet that with such force
Powr'd from above it's waters, stops its course.
And the dry Earth now thirsty grown for more
Drinks off the cups she had disgorg'd before.
Part of the Channel now dispers'd doth flow
Forth from the well, part under ground doth go.
Small thefts of Moss from off the Stones were there,
Grass, Chaff, torn bits of paper, and such geer.
Or what 'tis else its shallow stream can bear,
That we fling in, returning it doth come
Together with it, to earths hollow womb.
And now the humble Fount so low was grown
It scarce retain'd the waters were its own.
When as the tides return, again they swell,
Again to wonted Feavers trembling boil,
Increas't by forreign flouds so far to gain
Their bounds, and Tropick stations to attain,
Lading their shoars still with a fresh supply
So far, and then again they falling fly.
But the encreasing shades forbid our stay
Which monstrous grown Gigantick forms betray.
Our journey we hast on, but as we go,
We searching strive by ev'ry sign to know
From what hid cause, so great a strife should Spring.
For neither saltness, nor yet any thing.
That's common to the Water of the Sea
Are in this Fountain ever found to be.
On the Moons influence it don't depend,
Nor does it at set times its flouds extend,

(As does the Sea) unto these tides there is
No Rules from any Ephemerides.
What then should be the cause? in short ’tis this.
The water which from under ground doth rise
And with its forreign stream fills up the Well,
Does not come thither brought by ‘ts own Cannel,
And willingly anothers right invades.
But while the footsteps of the floud that leads
It followes, seeking through the womb of earth
For Fountains, whence its waters may have birth,
On subterraneous Caves its flouds do fall,
With narrow vent, and entrances but small.
Hither as oft as that the waters flow,
With swelling tides, and stop the vents below
With their swift currents, suddenly the air
Shut up within, does for the place prepare
Defence against the waters, and deny
Their entrance, having no where for to fly.
And as there’s nought then air inclos’d more strong,
It bears against the watry croud that throng;
Then as thick troops through narrow portal strain.
The first stick at the threshold, the remain
In a condenced croud before the gates
Make a full stand; part urges on their mates,
Part wandring seek out for some other way;
So the excluded waters at their stay
Impatient grown, and swelling, go astray;
Then roving, to this Font are slowly brought,
Hence ’tis with show’rs when the earth is fraught,

The fluxes happen ever and anon,
As now, three times they rise, three times go down;
With constant droughts but when the earth hath been
Bu•nt monthly then the wonder scarce is seen.
Now out of sight daies waggoner was gone,
And the Antipodes had shun upon.
The Sun burnt clouds but glimmer to the sight,
When at fam'd Buxton's hot bath we alight.
Unto St. Ann the Fountain sacred is:
With waters hot and cold its sources rise,
And in its Sulphur-veins there's med'cine lies.
This cures the Palsied members of the Old.
And cherishes the Nerves grown stiff and cold.
Crutches the Lame unto its brink convey,
Returning the ungrates fling them away.
The Barren hither to be fruitful come,
And without help of Spouse, go pregnant home,
Into a Cistern square, the water flowes;
And seldome higher than five foot it goes,
The prying gazer's view the Walls prevent,
To th' R•in the Roof is an impediment.
One common Wall with open doors doth joyn.

While therefore turfie fewel does prepare
Our supper, jointly we resolved are
Our wearied limbs in the warm bath to cheer.
Soon stripp'd, the clearer waters round us glide,
And our naked limbs, with Christal covers hide,
Upon our face we swim, then backward try,

But fail. ’Tis known some others may outvy.
After an hours sport i’th’ troubled floud,
Come out, dry sheets does our wet bodies shroud.
Then each again is cloth’d in’s own array,
And the spread table speaks our suppers stay,
Night the mean time breaks forth from ëry glade
And conqu’ress covers all with darksome shade,
Till in by Candle-light our meats convey’d.
Where a small bowl, but not whole baths of broth
At our request is plac’d to be supt off.
The Mutton taken from’t apart is laid;
From the same Sheep a smoaking loyn is had
Hot drawn from off the Spit, With a young fowl
From the demolish’d egg was lately stole.
And butter’d Pease by Spoonfuls. But rich Wine
In vain we seek; Ale in black pots that shine,
Good nappy Ale we drink. Thus supt, afar
We with Tobacco drive off sleep and care.
Aurora’s Charriot had not driven on
And by her march spoke the approaching Sun,
By the eclipse of Stars that now were gone,
When we arose from sleep, again repair
To the warm bath, and amply tinged are
Now double dip’t in its all healing floud,
Then once again, we our wet bodies shroud
Now dewy grown within our beds, and so
After nine hours sleep arise and go.
One thing remain’d, but highly worth our view,
Pool’s hole, a Care so call’d, and near us too.

Pool was a famous thief, and as we're told
Equal to Cacus, and perchance as old.
Shrowded within this darksome hid retrieve
By spoils of those he robb'd, he us'd to live,
And towards his den poor travellers deceive;
But murder he with thefts did introduce
Thus they, and thus the Author lay abstruce.
This to behold a skilful guide we take,
And Captain in our darksome journeys make.
To a green hill on foot then bend our way
From Buxton near a thousand paces lay,
At bottom of the Hill to th' hollow ground
Stooping by a small vent a way is found;
More passable the further in you go.
At length we all with crablike gesture slow,
And light in hand, the passage do get through,
And with it gain an upright posture too,
A monstrous, horrid, shapeless den appears
Where the divided night, gives greater fears.
Now on the Court of the great Pool we look
Horrid, and rough with Rocks. The Ceiling struck
Shines with bright fiery sparks. We further yet
With mounted lights go on, and wary feet.
Vast, slippery, moist, and Stones to climb full hard
Loose, once to fall, now therefore to be fear'd,
Mountains and vallyes wild o'th' Stony Cave
We pass, with a blind River which each wave
With murmures flings, against the Rocks it meets

To th’top of a steep Mountain who doth get
From the low River rising, may with sweat,
And wearied hands, and weari’d feet, mount on
(Bolder by far than we) the utmost Stone
Of this dark Cave; three stadiums distant from
The entrance, by which to it we did come.
This Cave by Gorgon with her snaky hair
You’d think was first possest; so all things there
Turn’d into Stone for nothing does appear
That is not Rock. What from the ceiling high
Like hams of Bacon pendulous you spy,
Will scarce yield to the teeth; stone they are both
That is no Lyon mounts his main so rough,
And sets as a fierce tenant o’th’ dark den,
But a meer yellow Stone. That grave old Man
That leaning lyes on his hard Rocky bed,
Himfelf may truly part of it be said.
Those Stars from the clear roof that shine so bright
Are nought but Stones which sparkle ‘gainst the light.
The drop which hangs upon the pointed Stone
Is that so to? it is or will be one.
Took up between our fingers it is seen
To be nor Stone, nor Water, but between.
Of such a substance as a leaven’d Mass.
But on the flying water as we gaze,
Our lights perswade us now grown tow’rds decay,
To haste from the Caves labarinth away.
But turning first on the left hand, behold
The bed-chamber of Pool the robber bold;

All of plain Stone, ne’re water’d with the dew,
Furnish’d with bed and chamber-pot we view.
And thence returning, to the day get clear.
Laborious climbing and of falls the fear,
Our wearied joints had now bedew’d with sweat,
Our creeping hands with the moist earth were wet.
When ready crouds at the Caves mouth attend
And waters mixt with flowers re-commend
Our hands to wash. Something indeed there is
Expected for these their civilties.
And justly too, were we wash’d ne’re so clean,
Something of Dirtiness would still remain,
Unless by some rewards (although not great)
Their courtesies we should remunerate.
W’had seen now all the wonders of the Peak;
To Buxton we return, and dining quick,
Our horse are brought; and we through clouds convey’d
By Sheldon, (whilst two thousand pace are made)
And Ashford, with Shelmarton, petty towns,
To Chatsworth fam’d, where the swift Derwin runs.

THE END

ORIGINAL LATIN TEXT.

AD NOBILISSIMUM DOMINUM GULIELMUM COMITEM DEVONIAE, &C. DE MIRABILIBUS PECCI. CARMEN.

ALPIBUS ANGLIACIS, UBI Pecci nomine, surgit,
Darbensis Regio, montes ad sidera tollens,
Foecundasque rigans, non uno flumine, valles,
StatChatsworth praeclara domus, tum mole superba,
Tum Domino, Magnis, celeremDeroentis ad undam.
Miranti similis portam praeterfluit Amnis,
Hic tacitus, saxis, infra supraque, sonorus.
At Mons terga domûs rapidis defendit ab Euris,
Ostendens longè exertis juga consita saxis,
Praesectoqûe die, producens tempora somni.
Summovet à tergo rupes gratissimus hortus,
Pinguis odoratis ubi tellus floribus halat;
Arbor ubi in mediis silvis sibi libera visa,
Dat fructus injussa suos; ubi frondea tecta
Arboreis praebent invito frigorasole
Porticibus, potioratuae (Maro) tegmine fagi,
Ars ubi (dissimulans artem) simulavit (ineptos
Consocians ferro lapides guttaque peresos)
In formes scopulos, & frigida fontibus antra.
Libera nativis veniens a rupibus unda
Accedit positis, patrio captiva met allo,
Et tellure latens, duplicem jaculatur in orbem,

Jussa, suum laticem per mille foramina caeca,
Et scopulum complexa tenacibus undique venis,
Jussa fugat misso subeuntes desuper imbre.
Hinc avecta creat sublimen marmore fontem,
Atque ingressa domum Promos conserva Cocosque
Ad juvat; in mediis surgitque penaltibus, alto
In fudens nitidam manibus de marmore lympham,
Et quamvis tubulis tantum effluat illa quaternis
Non tamCalliroe pulchrè fluit Enneacrune.
Reject o paulum suvio, sese ingerit horti
Angulus Alterius, tecta alta à fronte videntis.
Disposita hic gemino collucent ordine stagna,
Immersum tremulis undis quatientia solem,
Queis magno numero salit & lascivus inerrat
Non intellecto conclusus carcere piscis.
Quàm juvat hic, quoties piscatrix candida praedam
Abjicet illectam, morem observare puellis
Innatum, captare viros, & spernere captos!
Quàm libet in mediis mirari fluctibus, alto
Aggere suspensos hortos! quae Caesare moles
Digna Cavendisiâ certè est in gente, pusillum
Foemineumque opus. At quota pars ea laudis Elizae
Salopicae? quae multa, & magna palatia struxit;
Magnas divitias; magnamque bonamque paravit
Famam; quae magnos sibi conciliavit amicos,
Ornavitque humiles; Multam, magnamque reliquit
Prolem, qua regio late nunc usque beatur.
Quam dulce est, inter, circumque nitentia stagna
Insternete vias, aestivâ semper, arena,

Discipulum memet naturae tradere rerum;
Aut Domino exiguum meditari carmineMunus,
Et multum Musis, describere rura, rogatis.
Commodiore loco non usquam habitare, nec usquam
Candidiore frui Musae censentur amico.
Hinc, ad tecta, solo surgente, ascendiur, Extra,
Augusta aspectu, sublimia, Regia; & intrae
Commoda, culta, capacia, splendida, ditia tecta.
At tu marmoreis quae sint descripta figuris
Ficta Poetarum, priscorum aut fact a virorum,
Ne cures, duro nec certans marmore Gypsum.
Ingenuos nec tu cupias numerare ministros,
Sed Dominum, mea Musa, colas, cui gente vetustâ
Orto, dat titulos Devonia, Derbia Curas.
Acrem judicio; constantem pectore; lautum,
Vtentemque opibus, luxu sine, & inter amicos.
Ille Chori vestri summum decus; ille benigna
Otia dat Musis; sed & illi Musa diserto
Ore loqui, atque animo secernere turpia honestis,
Tum Dominam spectes, alta de gente Brusorum
Magnanimo proavos spirantem pectore Reges.
Amborumque vide Sobolem, imprimis{que} Puellam
Dignam, qua caleant Superi, binos{que} Puellos
Angelicos, casti communia pignora lecti.
Hos tu mireris, sobolem{que} & utrum{que} parentem;
Caetera quae referes miracula, sunto minoris.
Alti censenter septem miracula Pecci.
Aedes, Mons, Barathrum, binus Fons, Antra{que} bina.
Scilicet illae ipsae, quas jam memoravimus, Aedes

Ornatae, tot sunt inter miracula, primae,
Intra has, ne Reliquis orto sermone quibusdam
Est visum, promptis rerum perdiscere causas,
Et mihi (nam{que} operae pretium est) ea visere mira.
Anni tempus erat quo tellus foenora solvit;
Et vitreum sectis absterserat altus aristis
Jam Phoebus rorem, cum tecto excedimus, Ipsi,
Dux{que} viae servus{que} (sed ille vicarius) unus.
Egressi auferimur portis, petimusque propinquam
Pilsley, dein Hassop salebroso tramite. Montem
Hinc celsum, acclivemque, gradu lento, & pede lasso
Scandit equus, summum{que} jugum mox calcat anhelus.
Conversi miramur aves jam repere segnes,
Atque humiles claro transfigi vertice nubes.
Chatsworth jam punctum, Deroen jam linea curva est.
Vix iter inceptum sequimur, cum levia montis
Aspicimus crebro lacerari vulnere terga
Late{que} egesta liratim, albescere terrâ,
Est sublime solum, tenui{que} friabile gleba,
Quod ne quando sua possit subsidere mole,
Natura ingenito suffulcit provida saxo.
At saxum innumeris divisit in ordine rimis,
Ater opum Dominus. Cunct as{que} it a solis ab ortu,
Duxit in occasum, non ut sensisse calentem
Lampada Phoebaeam, sed & aspexisse putares.
Condidit his sulcis melioris cruda metalli
Semina, solari post perficienda calore,
Tutanda interera durae munimine rupis
Ditis avara manus frustra. Nam nec satis igne

Concoquit obliquo Sol Plumbi terrea frusta,
Nec custodit humus sibi credita. Viscera terrae
(Certus opum quacunque latent regione repostae,
Insidiator) homo, ferro pervadit & igne,
Saxea plumbiferae rescindit tegmina venae
Exhauritque audax jam, paupertate jubente,
Tartarei praedo fiscum spoliare Tyranni.
Haud impune aliquando. Duos telluris in imo
Deprensos gremio, Mors occupat, at{que} profundo
Oppressos tegit, ipsi quod fodêre, sepulcro.
Spiramenta (tubis aegrè admittentia iniquis
Quos castigato detrudit inedia ventre)
Ligniculis intus vincit, venam{que} sequutas
Materie fossas sustentat, gnara pericli,
At{que} experta, diu jam gens damnata metallis;
Vt non incautos scires periisse, sed Orco
Quaesitos. Terrae hic subducit fulcra caducae,
Expressas{que} animas, vicinis congregat umbris.
Corpora corporibus quaerunt. Sic credita saepe est
Emissa amissam monstrasse sagitta sagittam,
Ante pedes unum terra jacet ecce cadaver
Effossum; nostri{que} monet meminisse. Cadaver,
Marcida, iners, putris, nostri{que} simillima res est
Alterum adhuc tectum tellure, resurgere corpus
Expectat. Sedet egestae super aggere terrae
Turba supina, locis spectatum egressa propinquis;
Plorantes{que} duae mulieres. Altera sueta
Gaudia perdiderat; spem amiserat altera dulcem.
Alterius flammam, longus restrinxerat usus;

Alterius, spes effraenis{que} libido sciendi
Foverat ardentem. Plorant utrae{que} Maritum.
Illa quidem luget, luget magis altera sponsum.
Deploranto. Viâ qua coeptum est pergimus ire
Jam pede mille quater passus numer amus equino.
Et toties socium spatiis pes quilibet aequis
Praeteriens, terram alterno percusserat ictu.
Anteit umbra pedes, monstrat{que} brevissima, qua sta•
Titan parte poli, & quam nos spectamus euntes.
Linquimus opidula hinc at{que} illinc plurima. Quorum
Postremum tantum Romane dicereSpes est.
Caetera non referam impedientia nomina versum,
Per loca transversis longe late{que} sodinis
Plena, solo{que} cavo, & pleno mortalibus intus,
Ingredimur superi; medio tonat ungula Campo
Festinantis equi; at{que} una, aut paulo amplius, hora,
Praecipitis ferimur subita ad declivia Montis.
Pronum erat hinc vicum subjectum intrare cadendo.
Sed nobis ambage viam & cauto pede tritam
Ire placet, primum{que} ad dextras Sole recepto,
Et mox conversis laevo descendere eodem,
Paulatim, & pedibus nosmet concredere nostris.
Conscensis hic rursus equis, sub Monte sinistro,
Intramus pagum qui summa in rupe locatum
Aspect are jubet, deducto nomine, Castrum.
Castrum non aliquo bellorum insigne labore;
Non magnum, non arcis opus spectabile; nostris
Impar tormentis, nec inexpugnabile priscis.
Antiquum tamen, & saxo super aedificatum,

Sustinet annorum, ventorum incommoda temnit.
Forsitan & Dominis sub plumbi-potentibus olim
Latronum potuit subitos arcere tumultus.
A Castro statim mons scissus, detumet ambas
In partes; velut inclinato Corpore nostro
In crura extantes deturgent utra{que} clunes.
In medio sinus est: at{que} erectissima utrin{que}
Rupes quae ingenti redituram pondere terram
Destinet, & tutis succedere ad intima praestat.
Jam ventum est (pudet effari)Piutonis ad anum,
(Vt vocitant pleri{que}) loci vocat incola, Peak's ars.
Nobile suspensis aperitur rupibus Antrum,
Ignoto tibi Phoebe loco, sed segnibus Vrsis
Obverso, & reliquis mergi metuentibus astris.
In speciem{que} patet furni, vel qualiter Orci
Ora perhorrifico pinguntur hiantia rictu
Post Ite auditum, turbam sorbentis abactam.
Sublimes intramus equis. Tecta intus, & altos
Suspicimus cumulos detonsi maner a prati.
Sed coelum attoniti miramur saxeum, ut ingens
Sustineat montis nullo fulcimine pondus;
Laudamus{que} tuas aeterne Geometer artes.
Cernimus & denso colatam fornice lympham
Guttatim elabi, & solidâ tellure receptam,
Aequoream in patriam reditum jam nunc meditari;
Jam nunc exiguis properare canalibus, undas
Quaerentem soeias, & fortius ire parantem.
Jam{que} Amnes ipsis videor didicisse magistris,
Non fieri, salsum terra potante, liquorem

Littora adipsa maris, quasi celsis montibus ipse
Celsior Oceanus conclusam expelleret undam;
Sed mare Phoebaeâ tenuatum surgere flammâ
In Caelum; actum{que} Eoliis err are ministris;
Mox Phoebo fallente algens, tota{que} recepta
Natura, in terras fletu descendere; & esse
Flumina collectas lachrymas. Placet ima cavernae
Vmbrosae, illatâ penetralia visere luce.
Descensos ab equis, antri virguncula civis
Praecedit, formosa satis, nimiumque puella;
Dat{que} animos, gressusque regit jucunda Celeustis.
Primumque ingressis confuso lumine sensim
Accedunt cantes utrin{que} diemque recurvis
Extinguunt sinubus, Tum demittentia sese
Arcto quadrupedes admittunt fornice saxa.
Erecto rursum rursum mox corpore prono
Pergimus, alterna pecudes homines{que} figura.
Donec transverso tandem prohibemur ab amne.
Amnem quem clausum fert sub tellure canalis
Hactenus, hic humili patitur spirare sub arcu;
Exit{que} inter dum non irrevocabilis unda.
Nunc speculatores propius, nunc longius arcens.
Huc nobis, ultra nulli licet ire, Nec est fas
Credere narranti vetulae de patre, quod olim
Lychnorum ingressus librali fasce, fluentum
Tunc modicum tranavit, & ulteriora sequutus,
Tantum ivit, quantum licuit remeare timenti
Incidere in noctem. Remeamus, & altius ante
Signatis, uda imprimimus vestigia arenis.

Exuimus noctem, dias{que} recepimus oras
Cum emersis, ante ora, poli mons aemulus alti
Tollitur, avulso praeceps ceu fragmine murus.
Defluere aeternum perhibent a vertice terram,
Nec tamen imminui montem. Mirabile dictu.
Constaret si certa fides. Sed acutus arena
Labente, agnoscens tumulus, tacito indicat auctu,
Continuum hunc fluxum primum caepisse ruina
Ingenii, aequato{que} habiturum culmine finem.
Quem{que} vocant alii correpto nomine Mam-Tor
Rectius hunc Clivum videor mihi dicere Maim'd-Tor
Quod sonat Angligenis Clivus Mutilatus, & ipse
Mons, nomen magnâ Mutilatus parte fatetur.
Progredimur, versi ad laevam, duo millia passum
Ad septam muris, dict amque, sine arbore, Sylvam,
Peccanam, Cervos nudis in montibus urit
Acris hyems, nulla tectos à frigore fronde;
Sicca aestas, nulla tectos à solibus umbra.
Saeva hominum, canibus sociis, lascivia multos,
Multos saeva necat varii inclementia coeli,
Et Fovea absorbet non magnam Eldenia partem,
Est ea terribilis scissae telluris hiatus,
Quem digne ut memorem veterum undi{que} convoco frustra

Concilium, nam tale nihil finxere Poetae
Tentandum tamen; & primum quam formam habet oris
Musa refer; formae simili componito. Magno
Nam potes exemplo parvis componere magna,
Dic tandem; dic summisso soli mihi, in aurem

Obticet obscoenae sibi conscia virgo figurae.
In latere herbosi collis, pascentia circum
Distituens armenta solum, rima{que} secundo
Monte patens, auras atro inbibit ore sequaces.
Quod procumbentes oculis de margine pronis
Cum inspicimus, vastum inspect antes terret inane,
Subjectum{que} horrens animus videt infinitum.
Et quamvis tutos jam securos{que} tueri
Continuo stantes hortentur marmore ripae,
Non animis eadem spondentibus, ora Barathro
Demimus, & diro regnatis Dite tenebris,
At lapides toto sparsos conquirimus agro,
Verbere qui tandem per longa silentia missi
Quis sit eis doceant (si quis sit) finis eundi.
Missisubsidunt lapides, feriunt{que} cadentes
Caecam (sed longo feriunt post tempore) rupem.
Inde docent decies repetitio verbere lapsi.
Deceptos decies necquicquam quaerere fundum.
Tum vero ardemus, si vis respondeat aequa.
Ingerere integras turres, & tect a (si adessent,
Et non angusto tellus nimis ore negaret)
Tota simul, totos{que} altos ibi perdere montes.
Quod licet, immani defixum pondere saxum,
Vi multa eruimus, prona & tellure volutum
Sistimus ad sacrum limen. Tum talia famur.
“ Umbrarum praefecte Deus cruciatibus, Ecce,
“ Securi nostrae sortis, certique supernae
“ Jampridem sedis (ni nos tibi concolor author
“ Fallat) tormentum jam inventis addimus unum.

“ Pone sub hac rimâ, tibi siqua sit umbra rebellis,
“ Insignilve fide violatâ. Subde Simonem,
“ Aut Judam (Judam Iscarioten,) Subde Gigantes.
“ Contriti fient Umbrarum protinus umbrae.
“ At vos, O animae, quibus incaluere retentis
“ Cognita amicorum, dilecta{que} corpora nobis,
“ Ferte pedem retro monitae, & non temnite dictâ.
Sic fati, lapidem demittimus. Ille per aur as
Stagnantes, densa mersus caligine fertur
In scopulum. Gemit horrendum percussa Caverna,
Collisae{que} cient alte suspiria moles.
Excussum primo, scopulus mox excipit alter,
Audito sonitu nobis minus, at magis Orco,
Territat arrectis jam stantes auribus umbras
Tertius, atque minis quartus propioribus ictus.
Quid moror? undeno dentatum guttur Averni
Verbere dum transit, se & tunc lapis ire susurrat.
Post id quicquid iners aer vix auribus adfert,
Non sonus est, sed imago soni. Vento ocyus umbrae
Diffugiunt, Erebi{que} tegi sub fornice certant.
Interea infernas percurrit in ordinae Sphaeras,
Descendens tacite saxum. Confinia Ditis
Attingit, vacuna evertitq, sedilia Patrum.
Inde per intensum festinans labitur ignem,
Candentesque animas (tubulorum more recoctas
Fictilium, quos, tramsmissa fuligine, pinguis
Infecit Peti fumus) coelo{que} locandas.
Infantumque semelnatorum pervolat orbem.
(Inscius admissi poena luit inscius, infans.)

Ultima tum subiens, infanda{que} Tartara, centrum
Transit (at haesurum promiseratEntelechia,
Credenda umbra tamen) fundum{que} ascendit adimum.
Et redeunt trepidi Manes residente favilla;
Quos inter timet, & fertunus Sysiphus aegre
Succesisse suo graviori pondere saxum.
Fertur ad hoc Antrum venisse Lecestrius heros,
Dudleius, notus Comes is regnantis Elizae,
Ille inopem quendam parvo (sic eredimus) ae•e
Conductum & longo succinctum pectora fune,
Instructum conto, Pelleam imitante Sarissam,
Exploratores cophino{que} ferente lapillos
Demitti, & media ussit pendere Caverna.
Inde jaci lapides, at{que} auribus aera pronis
Captari, inde cavum propius scrutarier altum.
Descendens pavide miser, accedentia saxa
Nunc removet conto, nunc desiliente lapillo
Calculat immensum spatium, numer atque, quot ict us
Tot mortes; & fila timet pendentia vitae,
Ne quis lascivus secet, injussu{que} Sororum.
Postquam bis centum sub terram circiter ulnas
Mersus substiterat, funemq, tetenderat omnem,
Satque diu tenso de fune pependerat, Antro
Extrahitur, cupido Heroi responsa daturus.
Verum, sive metus mentem expugnaverat ingens;
Sive celer motus torti vertigine funis
Immodica, Solio Rationem excusserat alto;
Sive Erebi, sive ipsa sui jam spectra timoris
Pallida terruerant; sive arcem mentis abactae

Spiritus inferni possederat improbus Orci;
Haud dubie furit infoelix. Sic lumina torva,
Mutatusque color, pallor, tremor, omnia monstrant
Ergo ubi non cuiquam intellect a profuderat, & quae
Aequabat magnis sententia nulla Prophetis,
Conticuit, Manes{que} dies post octo revisit.
At Comes audito quo pertinet us{que} Caverna,
Horruit, & (non hac, ne{que} nunc subiturus) abivit.
Hinc centum passus decies numer amus, & ecce,
In valle occulta, radicibus exilit imis
Graminei Collis, gemino Fons ore perennis.
Quem quoniam immensi mirandos aequoris aestus
Ludere in exigua fama affirmaverat unda,
Visum est (quantumvis Phoebo properante) morari
Paulisper, si forte aquulae miracula detur
Aspicere admotis, & famae testibus esse.
Quae vitreis ebullit aquis tremula unda, duarum
Major, splendidiorque & poscens sola videri,
Excipitur pu•eo, structis non aequiparando,
Sed qui fortuito quovis ornatior ortu est.
Inde soluta fluit, nisi quae fundo retinetur
Lata duos cubitos, tres longa, unum{que} profunda.
Vnum dico suo quando contenta liquore
Subsidet, at binos quando hospite tollitur undae.
Labra reclinatae signabat saxea ripae
Linea, quam latices ipsi fecere tumentes,
Subnigris saxis modo detumuisse reperti.
Ergo cessatos iterum expectare labores
Taedet, & improbius visum est. Discedere prorsu•

Admotis properamus equis. Jam jam{que} abeuntes
Concussis revocamur aquis. Liquidos{que} videmus
Attolli latices; sensim{que} irrepere saxis.
Jam{que} fere pleno saltabat fervida fonte
Lympha, velut rabidus cum subditur ignis ahen•,
Nescia stare loco, refugit saevum unda metallum
Cum juxta fontem, condicto rivulus ortu
Erumpit subito, super infuso{que} liquore,
Praestat aquae solitos auctae contingere fines.
Quo perducta iterum decrescit, & illico rivi
De super immissirestinguitur impetus, & quae
Respuerat repetit sitiens sua pocula Tellus.
Distracti laticis pars effluit altera ripis
Fontis; pertuso infertur pars altera fundo.
Furtague muscosis erepta levissima saxis,
Gramina{que} & paleam & tenuis praesegmina chart•,
Sive aliud quicquam parva superabile lympha
Injicimus, rediens infert in viscera terrae,
Jam{que} humili fonti, proprius vix constitit humor,
Cum redeunt fluctus; Iterum ceu febre laborat
Vnde tremens; iterum aestuat; aucta{que} lymphis
Externis iterum tropicam contingere metam
Sufficit, accepto velans sua littora fluctu;
At{que} iterum residet, Sed nos vetat umbra morari,
Vmbra gigan•eas mentita Colossea formas,
Maturamus iter, sed quaerimus inter eundum,
Conamurque, omni collato discere signo,
Abdita quae tantum concivit causa tumultum.
Nam neque Salsedo, neque quid commune marinis,

His reperitur aquis; Phoebes nil imputat astro
Fons hic, temporibus nec tollitur (ut mare) certis,
Aestibus his nullam praefigit Ephemeris horam.
Ergo quid in causa est? Paucis sic accipe. Prodit
Quae tellure cavâ, fonti{que} ill abitur unda
Advena, non istuc proprio delata canali
Pervenit, at{que} volens alienos occupat ortus,
Sed dum ductricis sequitur vestigia lymphae,
Longinquosque petit, per terrae viscera, fontes,
Intratin angustis subeunda meatibus antra.
Huc quoties humor tumefactâ de fluit undâ,
Praecipitique aditum comprendit flumine totum,
Protinus aura locum conclusatuetur, aquis{que}
Pernegat ingressum, nec habens quo cedere, pugnat,
Vtque est deprensa nihil obfirmatius aura,
Sustinet urgentes exili corpore lymphas,
Tum, conferta velut si portis irruat arctis
Turba, haerent, ipso defixi in limine, primi;
Quae sequitur stat pro foribus stipata caterva,
Parsque urget socios, alias dilabitur & pars
Quaesitura vias: Exclusus defluus humor
Intumet, impatiens{que} morae, expatiatur, & errans
Fertur in hunc fontem, lentarum impulsor aquarum.
Hinc fit post magnos guttis pluvialibus imbres
Transmissis, aestus fieri crebros, & in horas,
Fluctum (ut nunc) vicibus tolli, & subsidere ternis.
Sed post continuis tellurem ardoribus ustam,
Vix semel in toto cerni haec miracula mense.
Jam nostres fugiens visus, Auriga diei

Antipodas tota lustrabat Lampade; nobis
Languida succensae praebebant lumina nubes
Et simul ad celebrem tepidis deponimur undis
Buxtonam. Divae sacer est fons inclytus Annae:
Ambas miscet aquas calidae gelidae{que} ministra
Tellus; sulphureis{que} effundit Pharmac a venis,
Haec resoluta senum confirmat membra trementum,
Et refovet nervos lotrix haec lympha gelatos.
Huc infirma regunt baculis vestigia claudi;
Ingrati referunt baculis vestigia spretis.
Huc, Mater fieri cupiens, accedit inanis,
Plenaque discedit, puto, nec veniente marito.
Excipitur, ferme quadrato fonte, serena
Nascens unda & quin{que} pedes vehit alta natantes.
Spectator muris, & tecto excluditur imber.
Hospitioque eadem gratissima balnea nostro

Conjungit foribus paries communis apertis.
Ergo placet, coquitur dum cespite coena cremato,
Defessos lymphis refovere tepentitbus artus.
Protinus exuti, nitidis illabimur undis,
Nudaque perspicuis velamus corpora lymphis.
Nunefacie prona namus; nunc nare supini
Tentamus. Bibimus. Nec enim omnia possumus omnes.
Postquam vexatis per totam fluctibus horam
Lusimus; egressi siccis lodicibus udi
Induimur. Mox quisque suo vestimur amictu,
Vestitos stratis expect at coenula mensis.
Nox atra interea simul evolat omnibus antris.

Et victrix tenebris involverat omnia caecis,
Donec succensis infertur coena lucernis.
Jam nobis lixae non integra balnea ovillae,
Sed modicum juris, consultis ponitur. Ipsa
Tum caro conditis thermis educta, seorsim.
Atque ovis ejusdem fumans à cuspidelumbus.
Et nuper rupto gallinaefilus ovo.
Pisaque quae nobis converrat cochlear uncta.
ditia cùm frustra quaerantur pocula Bacchi,
Ollâ subridens bibitur cervisia nigrâ.
Coenati peto somnos arcessimus hausto.
Postera Phoebaeos ducens Aurora triumphos
Nondum vulgares Caelo dimoverat ignes,
Cùm somno excusso tepidis immergimur undis
Rursus, & infieimur penitus medicante liquore
Jam dibaphi; atq iîerum rorantia corpora lecti•
Reddimus, & nonâ de somno surgimus horâ.
Vnica restabat, verum dignissima visu,
Haud procul hinc Spelunca Poli, sic dicta Caverna.
Insignis latro Polus, &, si credere famae
Debemus, furipar Caco, & forte coaevus.
Hac usus latebra consuevit vivere rapto;
Atque viatores spoliandos ducere in Antrum.
Verum & eisolenne fuit conjungere furtis
Caedem; Sic texit scelera authoremque Caverna.
Hanc inspecturi penitus, ductore perito
Caecarum assumpto ima sub tellure viarum,
Eximus, pedites collem petimus{que} virentem,
Distantem nostra vix passus, mille taberna.

Ipsas ad montis radices, concava tellus
Prostratis aditum pertusa foramine praebet
Exiguo, minus at praemissis invia plantis.
Omnes cancrino gressu, sumpta{que} lucerna
Quisque sua, tandem transmittimur, erigimur{que}
Antrum, horrendum, informe, ingens aperitur. Et atra
Divisa in partes nox dissilit atrior ambas.
Asperaque apparei Latronis, & horrida Saxis
Regia. Percussum rutilo micat igne lacunar.
Progredimur. Pedi bus{que} admoto lumine cautis,
Saxa ingentia, roscida, lubrica, & ardua scansu,
Libera, corruitura semel, nunc ergo timenda,
Saxosaeque feros montes valles{que} Cavernae
Transimus; fluvium{que} suas qui dissipat undas
Caecus in object as impingens murmure rupes.
Qui scandet rauco surgentem à flumine montem,
Ille licet sudet{que}, pedes{que} manus{que} fatiget,
Dissita ab introitu stadiis tribus, ultima opaci
Pertinget (multo nobis audacior) Antri.
Speluncam hanc credaes habitatam Gorgone primùm
Anguicomâ, & versa in rigidum sic omnia Saxum,
Nam lapis est, quodcun{que} vides. Laquearibus altis
Quae sicci tibi terga Suis pendere videntur,
Dentibus haüd cedent. Durum sunt utra{que} saxum.
Non est ille Leo, Leo, quamvis erigat hirta
Colla jüba, sedeat{que} Antri ferus incola caeci,
Sed fulvus lapis. Ille Senex qui rupibus aspris
Innisus recubat cubito, pars rupis & ipse est.
Quaeque lacunari scintillam Astra micante,

Sunt nitidi illata gemmantes luce lapilli:
Guttaque quae saxi mucro nunc pendet acuti,
Numquid & illa lapis? lapis illa vel est, vel erit mox
Admoti exceptam digito deprendimus esse
Nec lapidem, nec aquam, verum media inter utrum{que}
Natura, quali{que} tenax humore farina.
Detinet intentos dum transfuga lympha, lucernae,
Curtae perplexâ suadent exire Cavernâ.
Sed prius ad laevam remeantes, undiq, saxo
Obductum plano, Furis, nullo{que} madentem
Rore Poli thalamum, lecti, lasani{que} capacem,
Inspicimus. Superis tum demum reddimur oris.
Jam tepido fessos sudore rigaverat artus,
Scandendique gravis labor, & formido cadendi.
Reptantumque manus obleverat humida tellus.
Verum ante ora speeus turba officiosa, lavandis
Praebebat manibus permistam floribus undam.
Scilicet exigitur tacite pro munere nummus.
Recte. Nam{que} haerent sordes ut cun{que} lavemur
Ni (quamquam levibus) referatur gratia donis.
Omnia jam Pecci Miracula vidimus Alti,
Buxtonamque iterum perlatis, & cito pransis
Adducuntur equi, nos qui inter nubila vectos,
Solliciteque decem numerantes millia passûm,
Per non insignes Chelmarton, Sheldon, & Ashford,
Ad Chatsworth referunt celerem Deroentis ad undam.

FINIS.

The Life of Mr. Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury

1680 EDITION

Written by himself In a LATINE POEM.

And now Translated into ENGLISH.

LONDON: PRINTED for A. C.

and are to be sold in Fleetstreet,

and without Temple-bar. 1680.

THE LIFE OF MR. THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.

IN FIFTEEN HUNDRED eighty eight, Old Style,
When that Armada did invade our Isle,
Call'd the Invincible; whose Freight was then,
Nothing but Murd'ring Steel, and Murd'ring Men;
Most of which Navy was disperst, or lost,
And had the Fate to Perish on our Coast:
April the fifth (though now with Age outworn)
I'th' early Spring, I, a poor worm, was born.
In Malmesbury Baptiz'd, and Named there
By my own Father, then a Minister.
Many things worth relating had this Town;
And first, a Monastery of Renown,
And Castle, or two rather it may seem,
On a Hill seated, with a double Stream
Almost environ'd, from whence still are sent
Two Burgesses to sit in Parliament.
Here lie the Bones of Noble Athelstane,
Whose Stone-Effigies does there remain;
Who for reward gave them the Neighbouring Plains,
Which he had moistned with the Blood of Danes.
Here was the Roman Muse by Adelm brought,
Here also the first Latin Schole was taught.
My Native place I'm not asham'd to own;
Th'ill Times, and Ills born with me, I bemoan:
For Fame had rumour'd, that a Fleet at Sea,

Wou'd cause our Nations Catastrophe;
And hereupon it was my Mother Dear
Did bring forth Twins at once, both Me, and Fear.
For this, my Countries Foes I e'r did hate,
With calm Peace and my Muse associate.
Did Learn to speak Four Languages, to write
And read them too, which was my sole delight.
Six years i'th' Greek and Latin Tongue I spent,
And at Fourteen I was to Oxford sent;
And there of Magd'len-Hall admitted, I
My self to Logick first did then apply,
And sedulously I my Tutor heard,
Who Gravely Read, althou' he had no Beard.
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralypton,
These Modes hath the first Figure; then goes on
Caesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti,
This hath of Modes the same variety.
Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison,
These just so many Modes are look'd upon.
Which I, tho' slowly Learn, and then dispense
With them, and prove things after my own sense.
Then Physicks read, and my Tutor Display'd,
How all Things were of Form and Matter made.
The Aëry Particles which make Forms we see,
Both Visible and Audible, to be
Th'Effects of Sympathy, Antipathy.
And many things above my reach Taught me.
Therefore more pleasant studies I then sought,
Which I was formerly, tho' not well Taught.

My Phancie and my Mind divert I do,
With Maps Celestial and Terrestrial too.
Rejoyce t'accompany Sol cloath'd with Rays,
Know by what Art he measures out our Days;
How Drake and Cavendish a Girdle made
Quite round the World, what Climates they survey'd;
And strive to find the smaller Cells of Men.
And painted Monsters in their unknown Den.
Nay there's a Fulness in Geography;
For Nature e'r abhor'd Vacuity.
Thus in due time took I my first Degree
Of Batchelor i'th' University.
Then Oxford left; serv'd Ca'ndish known to be
A Noble and Conspicuous Family.
Our College-Rector did me Recommend,
Where I most pleasantly my Days did spend.
Thus Youth Tutor'd a Youth; for he was still
Under Command, and at his Father's will:
Serv'd him full twenty years, who prov'd to be,
Not a Lord only, but a Friend to Me.
That my Life's sweetest Comfort was, and made
My Slumbers pleasant in Nights darkest shade.
Thus I at Ease did Live, of Books, whilst he
Did with all sorts supply my Library.
Then I our own Historians did peruse,
Greek, Latin, and Convers'd too with my Muse.
Homer and Virgil, Horace, Sophocles,
Plautus, Euripides, Aristophanes,
I understood, nay more; but of all these,

There's none that pleas'd me like Thucydides.
He says Democracy's a Foolish Thing,
Than a Republick Wiser is one King.
This Author I taught English, that even he
A Guide to Rhetoricians might be.
To Forrain Countries at that time did I
Travel, saw France, Italy, Germany.
This Debonaire Lord th' Earl of Devonshire,
I serv'd complete the space of twenty year.
His Life by Sickness Conquer'd, fled away,
T'exchange it for a better the last day.
But yet provided ere he di'd for me,
Who liv'd with little most contentedly.
I left my pleasant Mansion, went away
To Paris, and there eighteen Months did stay,
Thence to be Tutor I'm cal'd back agen,
To my Lord's Son, the Earl of Devon then.
This Noble Lord I did instruct when young,
Both how to Speak and Write the Roman Tongue;
And by what Arts the Rhetor deceives those
That are Illiterate; taught him Verse and Prose;
The Mathematick Precepts too, with all
The Windings in the Globe Terrestrial;
The whole Design of Law, and how he must
Judge between that which Equal is and Just.
Seven years to him these Arts I did Explain:
He quickly Learnt, and firmly did retain.
We spent not all this time in Books alone,
Unless you'l take the World for to be one;

Travel'd through Italy and France, did view
The sweet Retirements of Savoy too.
Whether on Horse, in Coach, or Ship, still I
Was most Intent on my Philosophy.
One only thing i'th' World seem'd true to me,
Tho' several ways that Falsified be.
One only True Thing, the Basis of all
Those Things whereby we any Thing do call.
How Sleep does fly away, and what things still
By Opticks I can Multiply at will.
Phancie's Internal, th'Issue of our Brain,
Th'internal parts only Motion contain:
And he that studies Physicks first must know
What Motion is, and what Motion can do.
To Matter, Motion, I my self apply,
And thus I spend my Time in Italy.
I scribbled nothing o'er, nor then e'r wrought;
I ever had a Mistriss that me taught.
Then leaving Italy, return we do
To Paris, and its stately Fabricks view.
Here with Mersennus I acquainted grew,
Shew'd him of Motion what I ever knew.
He both Prais'd and Approv'd it, and so, Sir,
I was Reputed a Philosopher.
Eight Months elaps'd, I return'd, and thought good
For to Connect what e'r I understood.
That Principles at second hand more clear,
By their Concatenation might appear.
To various Matter various Motion brings

Me, and the different Species of Things.
Man's inward Motions and his Thoughts to know,
The good of Government, and Justice too,
These were my Studies then, and in these three
Consists the whole Course of Philosophy.
Man, Body, Citizen, for there I do
Heap Matter up, designing three Books too.
I'th' interim breaks forth a horrid War,
Injurious to my Study, and a Bar.
In the year sixteen hundred forty, then
Brake out a Sickness, whereof many Men
Of Learning, languishing, gave up their breath
At last, and yielded to impartial death.
Wherewith when seized, he reputed was
The Man that knew Divine and Humane Laws.
The War's now hot, I dread to see it so,
Therefore to Paris well-belov'd, I go.
Two years elaps'd, I published in Print
My Book de Cive; the new Matter in't
Gratifi'd Learned Men, which was the Cause
It was Translated, and with great Applause
By several Nations, and great Scholars read,
So that my Name was Famous, and far spread.
England in her sad Pangs of War, and those
Commend it too, whom I do most oppose.
But what's disadvantageous now, who wou'd,
Though it be Just, ever esteem it Good?
Then I four years spent to contrive which way
To Pen my Book de Corpore, Night and Day;

Compare together each Corporeal Thing,
Think whence the known changes of Forms do spring.
Inquire how I compel this Proteus may,
His Cheats and Artifices to Display.
About this time Mersennus was (by Name)
A Friar Minorite, yet of Great Fame,
Learned, Wise, Good, whose single Cell might be
Prefer'd before an University.
To him all Persons brought what e'r they found
By Learning, if new Principle, or Ground,
In clear and proper Phrase, without the Dress
Of Gawdy Rhet'rick, Pride, Deceitfulness.
Which he imparts to th' Learned, who might there
Discuss them, or at leisure, any where.
Publish'd some Rare Inventions, to the Fame
Of their own Author, with each Authors Name.
About Mersennus, like an Axis, here
Each Star wheel'd round, as in its Orb or Sphere.
England, Scotland, and Ireland was the Stage
Of Civil War, and with its four years Rage,
Harras'd and wasted was; Perfidious Fate
Exil'd the Good, and Help'd the Profligate.
Nay, Charles, the Kingdom's Heir, attended then,
By a Retinue of Brave, Noble Men,
To Paris came, in hope Times might amend,
And Popular Fury once be at an end.
My Book de Corpore then I design'd
To write, all things being ready to my Mind.
But must desist: such Crimes and Sufferings I

Will not impute unto the Deity.
First I resolv'd Divine Laws to fulfil;
This by Degrees, and carefully I will.
My Prince's studies I then waited on,
But cou'd not constantly attend my own.
Then for six Months was sick; but yet at length,
Though very weak, I did recover strength,
And finish'd it in my own Mother-Tongue,
To be read for the good of old and young.
The Book at London Printed was, and thence,
Hath visited the Neighbouring Nations since;
Was Read by many a Great and Learned Man,
Known by its dreadful Name, LEVIATHAN.
This Book Contended with all Kings, and they
By any Title, who bear Royal sway.
In the mean time the King's sold by the Scot,
Murder'd by th'English, an Eternal Blot.
King Charles at Paris who did then reside,
Had right to England's Scepter undeny'd.
A Rebel Rou• the Kingdom kept in aw,
And rul'd the Giddy Rabble without Law,
Who boldly Parliament themselves did call,
Though but a poor handful of men in all.
Blood-thirsty Leeches, hating all that's good,
Glutted with Innocent and Noble Blood.
Down go the Miters, neither do we see
That they Establish the Presbytery.
Th' Ambition of the stateliest Clergie-Men,
Did not at all prevail in England then.

Hence many Scholars to the King did go,
Expel'd, Sad, Indigent, Burthensome too.
As yet my Studies undisturbed were,
And my Grand Climacterick past one year.
When that Book was perus'd by knowing Men,
The Gates of Janus Temple opened then;
And they accus'd me to the King, that I
Seem'd to approve Cromwel's Impiety,
And Countenance the worst of Wickedness:
This was believ'd, and I appear'd no less
Than a Grand Enemy, so that I was for't
Banish'd both the King's Presence and his Court.
Then I began on this to Ruminate
On Dorislaus, and on Ascham's Fate.
And stood amazed, like a poor Exile,
Encompassed with Terrour all the while.
Nor cou'd I blame th'young King for his Assent
To those Intrusted with his Government.
Then home I came, not sure of safety there,
Though I cou'd not be safer any where.
Th'Wind, Frost, Snow sharp, with Age grown gray,
A plunging Beast, and most unpleasant way.
At London, lest I should appear a Spy,
Unto the State my self I did apply;
That done, I quietly retired to
Follow my Study, as I us'd to do.
A Parliament so cal'd did Govern here;
There was no Prelate then, nor Presbyter.
Nothing but Arms and Souldiers, one alone

Design’d to Rule, and Cromwel was that one.
What Royalist can there, or Man alive,
Blame my Defence o’th’ Kings Prerogative?
All Men did scribble what they wou’d, Content
And yielding to the present Government.
My Book de Corpore through this Liberty
I wrote, which prov’d a constant War to me.
The Clergy at Leviathan repines,
And both of them oppos’d were by Divines.
For whilst I did inveigh ‘gainst Papal Pride,
These, though Prohibited, were not deny’d
T’appear in Print: ‘gainst my Leviathan
They rail, which made it read by many a man,
And did confirm’t the more; ’tis hop’d by me,
That it will last to all Eternity.
‘Twill be the Rule of Justice, and severe
Reproof of those that Men Ambitious are.
The King’s Defence and Guard, the peoples Good,
And satisfaction, read, and understood.
I, two years after, Print a Book to show
How every Reader may himself well know.
Where I Teach Ethicks, the Phantomes of Sense,
How th’Wise with Spectres, fearless may dispense.
Publish’d my Book de Corpore withal,
Whose Matter’s wholly Geometrical.
With great Applause the Algebrists then read
Wallis his Algebra now Published,
A Hundred years that Geometrick Pest
Ago began, which did that Age Infest.

The Art of finding out the Numbers sought,
Which Diophantus once, and Gheber Taught:
And then Vieta tells you that by this,
Each Geometrick Problem solved is
Savil the Oxford Reader did supply
Wallis with Principles Noble and High,
That Infinite had end, and Finite shou'd
Have parts, but yet those without end allow'd.
Both which Opinions did Enrage and Scare
All those who Geometricasters were.
This was enough to set me Writing, who
Was then in years no less than Seaventy two,
And in Six Dialogues I do Inveigh
Against that new and Geometrick way,
But to no purpose, Great Men it doth please,
And thus the Med'cine yields to the Disease.
I Printed then two Treatises that stung
The Bishop Bramhal, in our Mother-Tongue.
The Question at that Time was, and is still,
Whether at God's, or our own Choice We Will.
And this was the Result proceeding thence,
He the Schools follow'd, I made use of Sense.
Six Problems, not long after, Publish'd I,
A Tract but small, yet pure Philosophy.
Wherein I Teach how Nature does cast down
All weighty Bodies, and huge massy Stone:
How Vapors are exhaled by the Sun;
How Winds engender Cold, when that is done:
The Reason of their Levity, and how

The Barren Clouds do hang on Heaven's Brow;
How move, and when that they are pregnant grown
With Moisture, do in violent Showers pour down.
By what Cement hard Matter is conjoyn'd,
And how Hard Things grow Soft, the Cause do find:
Whence Lightning, Snow, Ice do proceed, and Thunder,
Breaking through wat'ry Clouds, even to wonder:
How Loadstones Iron attract: how, and which way
They th' Arctick and Antarctick Poles obey.
Why from the Sea unequal Waves do glide,
I'th' Year, or Month, each Day a double Tide;
And why a Ship doth Sail against the Wind,
In that small Treatise all these things you find,
Which may in time tread with applause the Stage,
As yet unblam'd in such a Carping Age.
The Nature of the Air I do discry
In a small Volume; and most pithily,
Compos'd on purpose for to obviate
An Inanifick Machin form'd of late.
Then, leaving Physicks, I return again
To my Beloved Mathematick strain:
For now the Barb'rous, Bloody Enemy
Had left the place, where my Estate did ly.
The Truth I cou'd not Teach; for none but Foole
May hope t'Instruct in their declaming Schools.
Another Book of Principles I Print,
Nothing cou'd be more clear than what was in't.
Whereby the Nature of Proportion is
Explain'd so fully, none can say amiss.

Upon this Subject most agreed that I
Of every one had gain'd the Victory;
Others seem in it to find Errors store,
But they are crazy grown, and I the more
Press upon them; then do ascend the high
And lofty Summet of Geometry.
The Circles Quadrature I Publish then;
The Pythian God's Porisma Teach all Men.
By a new Method I thought to o'rcome,
Though not by the same Reasons neither, some
O'th' Former Demonstrations, but in vain.
Mathematicians Half-Witted complain,
Who blush for to Subscribe; but I'll not lose
My Labour any longer, thinking those
Indocil Brutes will ever master Sense,
Or with good Literature ever dispense.
Then my Rosetum was put forth, which I
Stor'd with Rare Flowers of Geometry.
Wallis opposes, and I lost the day,
As both Divines and Algebrists do say.
The Army then Discamp'd, and gone, thereby
Wallis of nothing thinks, but Victory;
Who having chosen an unpleasant Field,
Which Thick and Troublesome deep Roots did yield,
Liking the Combat, I turn, scatter quite
All in a moment, Numbers Infinite.
These were my Wars; what more have I to say?
How Rich am I, that is, how wise, I pray?
No matter for my Money or my Land;

If any ask that, let him understand,
A small parcel of Ground I had to show,
My own Inheritance, and let him know,
That This I on my Brother did bestow:
Of small Extent, but a most Fertil Ground,
Which did with store of bladed Wheat abound
Fit for a Prince; and had not ev'ry thing
Run cross, I had been counted a great King.
When I the Civil War approaching find,
And people led by every breath of wind,
I sought than this a more commodious place
To live and study in, and that Paris was.
Stock'd with five hundred pounds of Coin before
I did desert, or leave my Native Shore;
To these two hundred added, but withal,
A Weighty Lasting Grief did me befal.
(Thou'rt Dead, Godolphin, who lov'dst Reason, true
Justice and Peace, Soldier Belov'd, Adieu)
Twice forty pounds, a yearly Pension, then
I from my own Country receiv'd; and when
King Charles restored was, a hundred more
Was allow'd me out of his private Store.
A Noble Gift: I slight Reproaches, when
I know I'm Good, from other Black-mouth'd Men.
Content with this, desire no more Pelf;
Who but a Mad-man lives beneath himself?
Let my Estate by yours Computed be,
And greater seem; if not, it's enough for me.
My Sums are small, and yet live happy so,

Richer than Croesus far, and Crassus too.
Verdusius, thou know'st my Temper well,
And those who read my Works, and with thee dwell.
My Life and Writings speak one Congruous Sense;
Justice I Teach, and Justice Reverence.
None but the Covetous we Wicked call,
For Avarice can do no good at all.
I've now Compleated my Eighty fourth year,
And Death approaching, prompts me not to fear.

FINIS.

Historia Ecclesiastica Carmine Elegiaco Concinnata

CONTENTS

LECTORI SALUTEM.
HISTORIA ECCLESIASTICA. DIALOGUS.

HISTORIA ECCLESIASTICA CARMINE ELEGIACO CONCINNATA.

AUTHORE THOMA HOBBIO Malmesburiensi.

Opus Posthumum.

— Fraudesque dolique
Insidiae{que} & vis, & amor sceleratus habendi.

Ovid. Met.

AUGUSTAE Trinobantum: Anno Salutis, MDCLXXXVIII.

LECTORI SALUTEM.

ENTIBI, LECTOR BENEVOLE, Historiam Ecclesiasticam; non à Monacho, non à Clerico; sed à Libero, à Philosopho homine, à Thoma Hobbio Malmesburiensi conflatam: qui neque Scholae, neque Sectae, neque Partibus, neque Magistris juravit uspiam; & cui tuto credas decurrenti hunc campum, ubi illi neque seritur, neque metitur hilum.

Non haec juvenis lusit; sed bene senex per totam vitam cogitata, jam tandem versibus ligata maluit. Phoebi oracula, primae leges versibus: nec non primus sapiendi Magister Pythagoras nil, nisi carmine sancitum, voluit.

Limatiori versu Fastorum libros Ovidius; & alii Historias pompâ quâdam, & Heroico flatu tumentes procuderunt. At quin liceat, Horatio duce, aliquando dare Sermoni propiora? &, iisdem avibus, Ridentem dicere verum!

Visum est res Christi, & quae Piscatores docuere tractanti, humilem Stylum magis idoneum esse & popularem. Et proinde nudâ indigená{que} simplicitate omnia fluunt, sic ut nulla vox quae non Memoriae praesens paratiórque sit, in versum venit: Ut pii doctique viri, Alter Enchiridion Fidei, Alter Mnemosynon Biblicum, Alter Memoriale Biblicum, & id genus Carminice prolata concinnarunt; non alio fine, quam ut memoriae inserviretur. Noster quidem mole rerum mentem occupatus, & materia tutus, flores & pigmenta poetica parvi fecit. Non tamen, quod omnia tam siccè, tam religiosè, quin aliquando incalescat, aliquando illucescat illa Mens divinior, atque Os magna sonaturum.

Quae philosophice scripsit magna in vestibulo ferunt Mersenni & Gassendi nomina; quin & in his poeticis memoretur Edmundus Waller, nobilissimus poeta Anglus, & apud suos quasi Numerorum pater, qui

authori Nostro semper inter amicissimos fuit; & Monitor non defuisset, si Materia Culpam non protelasset.
Praeter paròdias nonnullas, nihil hîc cum Virgilio, Ovidio, reliquisve poetarum principibus. Noluit de toties recoctis phrasibus, & de communi penu quicquam apponere. Quid Nobis servum pecus Imitatores, cum ipsosmet, quos imitantur, praesentes habemus? Quis guttam quaerit, cui ad manum est ut toto se proluat auro?

Avia Pieridum, ut & ubivis aliquid novum, & minime tritum meditari amavit. Si in Syllabarum Modulo quandoque negligentior sit, profecto apud veteres poetas (Christianos velim) hoc non insolens fuit. Fortasse & alia sunt quibus non tanti habuit criticorum plebi in omnibus abblandiri.
Si quaerant Historici unde ista de Aethiopibus; de Neptuno, de Jove, diisque reliquis convivantibus ; videant Homerum testem satis luculentum. De Rege Ergamene; & famosâ illâ Sacerdotum strage consulant Diodorum Siculum lib. 4. De more isto Aegypti dirimendi lites per Collare, & Gemmam, veri indicem, eundem habent Diod. Sic. & Aelianum, à quibus V. V. C. C. Seldenus, & Marshamus, & plures alii in sua traduxerunt.

Quoad caetera, neque Chronologos, neque Philosophos moramur multum. Theologis vero ut quodammodo satisfiat nonnulla incumbit cura. Non quod Thomistas, Scotistas, aut nescio quos Seraphicos, tanti habeamus; sed Nicaeni Patres, sapientia Graeca, & magnus ille Athanasius authori nostro horrida bella interminantur. At dicendum est eum in istis mysteriis poeticè aliquando (potius quam Catholicè) delirare.

Sed vero & istius Saeculi Divus ille Hilarius, ad Constantinum Augustum libro, eadem queritur; Conscii sumus quod post Nicaenam Synodam nihil aliud quam fidem scribimus, dum in verbis pugna est, dum de novitatibus quaestio est, dum de ambiguis occasio est, dum de Autoribus querela est, dum de studiis certamen est, dum in consensu difficultas est, dum alter alteri Anathema esse coepit, prope jam nemo Christi est. Incertis

enim Doctrinarum verbis vagamur; & aut dum docemus perturbamur, aut dum docemur erramus. Proximi anni fides quid immutationis in se habet? primum quae Homousion decernit taceri, sequens rursus Homousion decernit & praedicat; tertium quae Usiam simpliciter à patribus praesumptam per indulgentiam excusat, quartum non excusat, sed condemnat. Tandem eo processum est, ut ne{que} penes nos, ne{que} penes quenquam ante nos sanctum exinde aliquid aut inviolabile perseveret; annuas atque menstruas de Deo fides decernimus, decretis poenitemus, poenitentes defendimus, defensos Anathematizamus, aut in nostris aliena, aut in alienis nostra damnamus: & mordentes invicem, jam absumpti sumus ab invicem. Et ipsemet Constantinus quam dissentiens fuit à sacris hujus temporis rixis, & quam aegre tulit Graeculorum altercandi ingenium, Index sit illa ad Alexandrum, &c. Epistola apud Eusebium: ubi dolet pro parvis & valde modicis causis, propter leviculam quaestionem, propter parva & vana Sermonum Certamina, inanem verborum strepitum, subtilitates, futilitates, infantum fatuitates, fratres fratribus committi; & ad necessitatem blasphemiae, aut Schismatis impelli.
Ad eadem concinit inter Catholicos istius saeculi Poetas Aurelius Prudentius:

Fidem minutis dissecant ambagibus,
Ut quisque lingua est nequior.
Solvunt ligantque quaestionum vincula
Per Syllogismos plectiles.
Vae Captiosis Sycophantarum strophis,
Vae versipelli astutiae.
Nodos tenaces recta rumpit regula
Infesta dissertantibus.
Idcirco Mundi stulta delegit Deus,
Ut concidant Sophistica.

Utcunque autem illius saeculi Poetae novum prospicientes campum, in arenam descendunt fervidi: non jam Laestrygonas, Harpyiasque premunt, aucupantur; sed Monothelitas, Pneumatomachos, Homuncionistas (nova Monstra) Haereticos toto Marte confodiunt.

Et quàm avide ubique sectantur aenigmata illa Sacra, Oidipodas agere delectati! Nova Mysteriorum segete luxuriantes, & insolito caecutientes lumine, mirifico alite aethera petunt. Bellè Noster ille Sedulius Presbyter, in uno versiculo totum spirans Athanasium!

— una manens deitatis forma perennis
Quod simplex triplicet, quodque est triplicabile simplet.
Haec est vera fides —

Nos profectò longe sequimur; entheus ille tandem deferbuit ardor; tali oestro non rapimur; & Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.
Maluit hic Noster inter primos & piscatores Apostolos simplicitatem discere Christianam, quam apud Nicaenos patres, & Graeculos Theosophistas cerebellum perdere attonitus. Contentus nomine Philosophi, laïco ingenio, & ultra rationale animal parùm sapientis. Sed nollem te, Lector, ulteriùs detineri. Vale, & fruere.

HISTORIA ECCLESIASTICA. DIALOGUS.

SECUNDUS,
PRIMUS,
Interlocutores.

Sec.
QUID fers, Prime, novi? Visendae quae fuit urbis
Causa tibi, modò qui ruris amator eras?

Pr.
Rus mihi carcer erat; quo quamvis non male clauso,
Intravit bello praetereunte Metus.
Verum tu quid agis, qui magnâ tutus in urbe
Invito, Musis, Marte, Secunde, vacas?

Sec.
Non facio magni Musas, doctasve sorores,
Sunt illae nostri tristis origo mali.
Nonne vides rerum totus mutetur ut ordo?
Utque pium dicunt, quod fuit ante scelus?
Perfidiam, caedes, perjuria, furta, rapinas,
Nonne vides civis dicier acta boni?
Quam Christus dixit sinceram Relligionem
Monstrant perspicuè tradita jussa Dei:
Addas à Christi sperandam morte salutem,
Munera servatae Relligionis habes.

Pr.
Nunc impossibilem quandam formatur in artem,
Non Pietas vitam, Theiologia dabit.
Deque Dei dicunt naturâ dogmata vana
Pastores, populo non capienda rudi.
Excutitur natura Dei secreta. Sciendum est
Quid, Quando, Quare, Quomodo vult & agit.
Praeter Opus, Leges sanctas, Nomen{que} timendum,
Scire valent homines de Deitate nihil:
Sed nostri voluere viri praescire videri,
Quid Deus extremum judicat ante diem.
Unus, ab aeterno pendere, ait, omnia verbo,
Alter, ab arbitrio multa venire suo:
In partes veniunt omnes quibus utile bellum est:
Sic Doctis debes inde sequuta mala.
Nec miror, Natura homines raro facit ipsa
Egregiéve bonos, egregiéve malos,
Egregiè stultos, aut egregiè sapientes;
Perficit inceptum quodque Magister opus.
Ostendit Natura Deum; summeque colendum,
Sed cultus veri non docet illa modum.

Sec.
Quae nescit Natura, potestne docere Magister?

Pr.
Quid ni, Doctorem si docet ipse Deus?

Sec.
Quem vero docuit Deus, & quo teste sciemus

Credibili, quenquam sic docuisse Deum?

Pr.
Primus erat Moses, cui testes Signa fuere
Edita in Aegypto, retrogradoque mari;
Proximus huic Aron frater; summúsque sacerdos
Doctus voce Dei est, ordine quique suo.
Tum Testamenti veteris his adde Prophetas,
Et Jesum Christum, qui fuit ipse Deus;
Postremò Paracletus, id est, Ecclesia Christi
Credenda est veri verba docere Dei.

Sec.
Adde & Phanaticos hujus nova lumina secli;
Et Romae, si vis, adjice Pontificem,
Sed scio, non docuit pugnantia dicere secum

Verba Deus. Lex sunt, & nisi clara nihil,
Perspicuè descripta tenet quaecunque requirit,
In libris sacris, lex Vetus atque Nova.
Quorsum igitur doctae lites? Sententia dispar
Doctorum parti demit utrique fidem:
Me sequere ad Regnum Coelorum clamitat Alter,
Imo me potius, clariùs Alter ait.
Vela ratis sanctae jactantur in aere scisso:
Ejicitur Pietas simplicitasque foras.
Rex noster nobis & Moses est, & Aäron;
Nescio, Doctores qualia regna volunt.
Omnes alloquitur Dominus per Biblia sacra;
Verbaque, clam nobis, nulla susurrat eis.

Dié mihi, Prime, precor, secli studiose vetusti,
Et severe satis Censor in Historia,
Quis fuit ille hominum qui se (nisi Rex fuit idem)
Esse Deo-doctum dicere primus erat?

Pr.
Scis ut Aristotelis trutinata cacumina rerum
In duo divisit, Stultitiam, atque Dolum.
Est Dolus in rebus, sunt certi denique stulti,
Utris conveniunt Regia sceptra magis?
Et melius defendet uter Stultusne Dolosum,
Anne Dolosus eum qui caret ingenio?

Sec.
Arma Deo-doctis ipsorum Lege negantur;
Vita truces gladios tam pretiosa fugit.
Ergo quibus telis, quibus artibus, & quibus armis
Nos hi defendent, bellaque nostra gerent?

Pr.
Quos tu forte times hostes, non dico nec arma;
Sunt hostes alii, terribilesque magis.
Est Mundo nostro Mundus conterminus alter,
Nostri dissimilis, pe•petu•sque comes:
Qui Phoebum nunquam vidit nunquamque videbit,
Quantuncunque gradum grandiat ille suum;
Quem{que} habitat populus numerosus, qui ne{que} mortem
Nec morbum norunt; Spirituale genus;
Umbri, Somnites, Amenenees, Astheneentes,
Et Cacodaemonii, Daemoniique alii;

Quotquot & hinc homines nostri moriuntur ad illos,
Nec Regum Leges id prohibere valent.
Hi nobis hostes, hi nos terroribus implent,
Defessos animos nec relevare sinunt.
Invadunt homines noctu, somnoque ligatos
Terribiles oculis, unguibus, atque minis.
Attamen ad lucem, percussi pectoris agmen
Spectrorum, ventis ocyùs, omne, fugit.
Sed quoniam metuebat ab his, quod erat metuendum,
Et sperabat ab his omnia, turba levis,
Ars non magna fuit, jam fraenis ore receptis,
Ducere perdomitos quâ voluere viâ.
Sufficiebat enim, conjunctis foedere agyrtis
Cum sibi sit populi concilianda fides,
Alter ut alterius virtutem magnificaret,
In speciemque Artis verba locare nova:
Hinc Magus, Astrologus, Divin•s, Sortilegusque,
Creditur indoctis, esse Propheta Dei;
Talibus & cupiunt Regni committere jura.
Aut Praeceptores Regis habere sui.

Sec.
Scire velim fontem sceleratae qui fuit artis,
Primaque quae tantae fraudis origo fuit.

Pr.
Orbe fuit toto quondam sapientia vultu
Uno, jus Patriae scire & amare suae;
Quam docuit Natura, peritior Arte Magistra,
Commoda quae jussit quaerere quemque sua.

Ergo suae causa conspiravere salutis
Exigui multi magnus ut esset homo;
Cunctorumque opibus communem ut pelleret hostem,
Servaret pacem, justitiamque domi.
Regibus hinc vires, populo sunt otia nata;
Artibus ingenuis otium origo fuit.
Tunc astra, & coelum mirantibus, orta libido est
Quaerere quid faciunt, quo properantque loci;
Qua nobis facit arte diem Sol, Lunaque mensem,
Annum complures aedisicantque Dies.
Nec leges tantum Stellarum quaerere; frontes
Inspiciunt; utrum prospera, necne ferant.
Dama viatorem sic spectat praetereuntem,
Fortuitus quoniam nescit, an hostis eat.
Hinc primo nobis Ars utilis Astronomorum,
Ingenii puri filia nata fuit;
Haec cum Deliquium certa praediceret hora
Phoebi vel Phoebes, res faceretque fidem:
Si quo, quodque, loco coeli se ostenderet astrum,
Et quando, & nomen dicere promptus erat,
Quantus erat stupor bipedum, quanti faciebant
Astronomum! Socius creditur esse Dei.
Attamen ut tritici, crescunt zizania, in arvis,
Ambitio ingeniis gaudet adesse bonis.
Nam cum se tanto senserunt esse in honore,
Et sua dicta, velut dicta valere Dei,
Uti stultitiâ populi voluere, timeri
Quaerunt, humanum despiciuntque genus.
Credi scire futura volunt quaecunque; quia astris

Sunt inscripta, aiunt, nec legit astra alius.
Nec modo praedicunt adversa & prospera Regum,
Sed modicis etiam fata parata viris.

Sec.
Dic quibus in terris primùm, quo sole, lutoque
Egregio ingenia haec nata fuisse putas?

Pr.
Ne dubites, illic ubi summa potentia solis
Semper erat, tellus & bene cocta fuit;
Multus ubi serpens & corpore nascitur ingens,
Ingenio vincens quicquid habebat ager.

Sec.
Aethiopas dicis, quos, sunt qui dicere primos
Non dubitant hominum, quos generavit humus.
Ast ego cum multis deductas esse putavi
Artes Aegypto quasque Mathematicas:
Cernere ubi stellas longus concedit Horizon;
Adnictant quoties, quo coeuntque loco.
Nonne Aegyptia erat pretio sapientia quondam
Ingenti? Et Graecis non erat inde sua?
Quo nisi in Aegyptum Plato, Thales, Pythagorasque,
Atque alii plures, eximiique viri,
Et vacuus, nec habens longas quo falleret horas,
Ad mercandum artes ibat & ingenium?
Haec etiam Mosi placuit sapientia, cum vix
Nomen fama satis noverat Aethiopum.

Pr.
Aegyptus Graecos, Graeci docuere Latinos,
Artes; atque etiam (non nego) sacra sua.
Sed tamen Aethiopes priùs Aegyptum: Fuit illa
Limus, quando ingens fama erat Aethiopum.
Aethiopes coluere Deos, Urbes habuere,
Rexerunt, & erant artibus egregii,
Aegypto nondum prognatâ: Nam pietatis
Mercedem hanc illis apposuere Dii.
Nam quantis, quotiesque, Deos epulis meruere,
Essent ut placidi, submadidique sibi:
Neptunum imprimis, si vis cognoscere, testis
Natus in Aegypto certus Homerus erit.
Gratus ob haec, limum delatum flumine Nilo
Neptunus ripis addidit Aethiopum;
Firmavit Phoebus; missoque à montibus altis
Ignoto nobis Jupiter imbre rigat.
Nam surgens Nilus dum campos contegit undis
Nunc etiam Aegyptum dum rigat aedisicat.
Quam simulatque pati potuit, coepere colonis
Exercere suis Aethiopes Domini.
Atque suas populo leges, ritusque dedere,
Et sibi subjectos sic tenuere diu.

Sec.
Quis fuit Aethiopum status? Tum summa potestas
Cujus erat? Regis solius an populi?

Pr.
Nomine Regis erat, sed regnavere Sophistae,

Quos deceptores diximus Astrologos.
Hos quia sermones cum Dîs conferre putabat
Plebs stupida, ignorans atque futura tremens,
Regum electores voluerunt esse suorum;
A solis, ipsi, Dîs voluere regi.
Et sic Sacrifici Regem, fictique Prophetae
Per multos annos dantque reguntque suum.
Quid faceret Rex quoque die, quid qualibet hora,
Quando dormiret, quosque cibos caperet;
Quodque magis mirum est, quando discedere vita
Debebat Rex, nec quaerere quî meruit,
Audax dictabat Nebulonum Ecclesia stultis:
Parebant Reges, Lex valuitque diu.
Donec Alexandri paulò post tempora magni,
Rex fuit Aethiopum nobilis Ergamenes;
Qui regum vitam pendere à gentis iniquae
Arbitrio, indignum censuit esse viro.
Hic igitur misso delevit milite stirpem
Omnem, latrones anticipatque sacros.
Sic ratione dolum detexit, & ense abolevit
Ergamenes sapiens, nobilis Ergamenes.
Ex illo Aethiopum fit tempore pectus apertum,
Humanaeque capax gens rationis erat.
Et simulatque Dei coepit doctrina doceri,
Christi cum primis hi subiere jugum.
Ad Graecos artes venere bonaeque, malaeque,
Ante ex Aegypto quam fuit Ergamenes.
Una sacerdotis gens semper habebat honorem
Aegypto, Sophiae sanguis origo fuit.

Natos quisque sua pater instituebat in arte;
Ingenii fuit his una Magistra domus.
Sed numerosa domus, namque illis tradita alendis
Ex tribus Aegypti partibus una fuit:
Doctaque stillabant praecepris ora profundis,
Quae sitiens hausit Graecus, & Assyrius.
Mos erat unus eis ad sydera laude ferendus,
Nempe, in judiciis quem tenuere modum.
Nullus erat strepitus, nec vox audita clientis,
Patronis nullus, causidicisque locus.
Nam triginta viri jus cognitionis habebant
De re quae nondum, cuja liquebat, erat.
Conspicuis totidem delecti ex urbibus omnes;
Unus & adjectus, Praesidis esse loco.
Distinctum gemmis Praeses collare ferebat,
Quod vix credibili luce micasse ferunt.

Ergo (Index Veri) Veri quoque nomen habebat,
Victrici causae nomen ubique datum.
Illud enim Praeses cum scriptis applicuisset,
Vera an falsa (legens) sint ea scripta videt.
Ergo suam quicunque petit rem quam tenet alter,
Et patriâ lege ut restituatur Agit,
Is Quid sit factum, quo Pacto, & Quando, simul{que}
Quid Testes dicant, quid Ratione ratum est,
Et documenta sui juris ferre omnia scripto,
Et non ambiguo, debuit hisce viris.
Hique legunt secum, quo vult petitore beante;
Nullus non scripti pensitat omnem apicem.
Copia Scripturae sit; respondere jubetur

Qui tenet & causam verificare suam.
Tum scripto rursus petitor respondet, & ille
Qui tenet huic iterum. Denique ter fit idem.

Se.
Nil video hic magni, nec magna laude ferendum;
In qua parte orbis non reperitur idem?

Pr.
Sed neque miror ego. Fertur sententia. Nemo

Obloquitur. Praeses judicat, at tacitus.
Nam{que} ut consessum est, scriptu¯ effert Praeses utrum{que}
Collocat in mensam, separat atque manu.
Detractum collare sacrum scripto admovet uni:
Et certus litis terminus ille fuit.
Justitiam tacitam sine tempestate forensi
Miror; quam nunquam vis aliena movet.

Se.
Hoc rectè, sed utrum legissent scripta priusquam
Collare appositum est, noscere difficile est.
Parcere enim tanto cur non potuere labori,
Cum nil referret pars utra justa fuit?

Pr.
Tune ita inhumanos potuisti credere lectos
Spectatae fidei, praecipuosque viros?

Se.
Non ego inhumanos homines dico, sed iniquos.

Ut quid cuique libet sic quoque quisque facit.
Sed quia non multùm refert aequine, an iniqui
Hi fuerint, fuerint ut sibi cunque placet.
Sed dic, Aegyptum mos hic, venit•e ab Hebraeis,
An contra? quoniam par fuit his, & eis.

Pr.

Nescio. At alterutrum si fortè necesse putarem,

Aegypti (dixîm) mos fuit ille prius.
Et maribus pueris praeputia scindere circum,
Author Niliacus, non Abrahamus erat.

Se.
Verumne est ergo quod rerum sola novarum
(Ut vulgo dicunt) Africa mater erat?

Pr.
Deinde Sacerdotum numerus, cum crescere coepit
Doctorumque fuit turba molesta sibi,
Ibat in Assyriam pars magna vocata. Sciendi
Sortem venturam tanta libido fuit.
His multas urbes terrasque dedere colendas

Assyrii. Cura his Relligionis erat,
Nomine Chaldaeis: Nomen venerabile quondam,
Ut Magus, ut Sapiens, ut{que} Mathematicus.
Sed quando gentem Romanus vicerat illam,
Niliacum populum subdideratque levem,
Venerat & Romam Chaldaeus; tunc inhonestum

Chaldaei nomen, Philosophique fuit.
Nam Regum mortes, audax, bellique futuros
Eventus, promptus dicere solus erat.
Persidiae coeptis audacibus atque pericli
Plenis, spem solitus vendere solus erat,
Matronis suasor, vates, adjutor & idem
Chaldaeus semper turpis amoris erat.
Astrologus, Leno, Chaldaeus, Philosophusque,
Judaeus, mendax atque Mathematicus,
Sortilegus, Vanus, Deceptor, Veneficusque,
Nomina certa scias unius esse viri;
Quem Româ Reges potuerunt pellere saepe,
Pulsum non potuit Roma tenere foras.

Sec.
Claudius, ut nosti, Ptolemaeus qui fuit author
Magni operis, minimè vanus habetur homo;
Astronomus priscoque & nostro tempore clarus,
Ille Genethliacae conditor artis erat.
Is, quod ab astrorum dependent omnia nutu,
Fortunam & sobolem syderis esse docet.
An stellas torpere putas sine viribus; aut vim
Non efferre satis posse putabo suam,
Quae tamen ad nos us{que} ferunt lucem at{que} calorem,
Et mutant faciem temperiemque soli?
Nilne frequens coeli facit observatio, nonne
Id quod saepe fuit, nos docet id quod erit?

Pr.

Non. Scit enim quid erit nisi qui sciat omnia nemo;
Omni contribuunt omnia namque rei.
Nescit Ephemeridum confector postera quid sit
Allatura dies; decipit ille sciens.
Et cùm praedicit mala publica, cogitat illa
Quo pacto faciat; dignus & est laqueo.

Sec.
Verum cur habuit Chaldaeos Graecia nullos,
Graecia Romanis nota Magistra viris?

Pr.
Ob multas causas. Non fallit Aruspicem Aruspex;
Callida Graecorum natio tota fuit;
Nec deceptores fictos habuere Prophetas,
Sed proprios sibimet; nempe genus Logicum;
Ars erat hisce malam, victricem reddere, causam
Dicendo, quarto propria & illa modo.
Adde quod & pauper dominis subjecta Latinis
Natio tota fuit; non erat unde darent.
Namque Impostori non est locus ille salubris
Qui lucri sterilis, fertilis ingenii est.
Aegyptus Graecis ultro non attulit artes
Ingenuas; Graeci sed petiere viri.
Pythagoras, Thales, Plato, plures; nec petiere
Aegypti fraudes, nec sacra Niliaca,
Nec demonstrandi praecepta, nec Officiorum;
Sed mensurandi quicquid in orbe fuit.

Se.
Quis Graecos reliquas artes docuit? Quis Elenchos?
Quis morum normam, justitiaeque dedit?

Pr.
Socratis inventum Dialectica dicitur esse,
Una quidem, dici quae solet Ironia.
Nam tantum rogat, & vult se nil scire videri,
Perpetua atque atrox hostis alazonibus,
Quae ducebat eos sensim, quaerendo, sequendo,
Non perceptibiles molliter in laqueos,
Mulciber ut Martem quondam fertur tenuisse,
Turpiter implicitum ridiculumque Deum.
Inde fuit magnis exosus civibus, atque
Ingenio vitam perdidit ipse suo.
Primus & ille fuit patrias concludere in Artem
Leges, mensurans jus ratione sua.
Et quia rem populi malè curans, sed sua rectè,
A populo Sapiens audit ubique loci.
Rectores stultos ridens nimis ambitiose,
Nec juvit, civis nec bonus ipse fuit.
utinam, matulâ, mortem prius oppetiisset,
Ictus ab insana conjuge turpe caput,
Quam de Justitiâ coepisset sermocinari,
Et vitae dominis scribere jura suae.
Namque ab eo multi didicerunt, publica primò
Censuris, cives, subdere jura suis,
Scribereque ad vulgus praecepta Politica stulti
Certatim, ut stultos gloria vana jubet,
Et, Libertatis specioso nomine, Leges

Negligere, & Reges esse putare lupos.
Quos inter Stagyrita fuit, licet ipse Tyranni
Doctor erat magni, magnus Aristoteles.
Quem Cicero, & Seneca, Tacitus{que} & mille secuti,
Reges nos nostros dedocuere pati.
His Democraticis lectis Authoribus, & qui
Nil Libertatem significare putant
Praeterquam vice quemque sua regnare, nefanda
In Regem cives arma tulere suum:
Quo bello periere virûm prope millia centum,
Et victus tandem Rex jugulatus erat.
Quod fieri facinus plebs nunquam passa fuisset,
Maxima ni Cleri pars animasset eos;
Grex Aristotelis fuit hic; Metaphysicus atque
Physicus, & Logicus, Rhetoricusque simul;
Et quorum mandris nunc est Academia nomen,
Noster erat Pastor summus Aristoteles.

Se.
Non tanti puto scire fuit Graecè atque Latinè;
Nec nova vox pretio sanguinis empta placet,
Quo nobis minus esse licet felicibus absque
Linguis externis, quàm fuit Assyriis?
Cur contenta sua fuit unâ Graecia Lingua
Garrula, nec petiit verba Latina prior?
Quare qui linguam solam addidicere Latinam,
Illam nec valde, praetereaque nihil,
Dicuntur Docti; qui scit bene pluribus uti
Dicitur Indoctus, Plebs, Idiota, Rudis?

Pr.
Quaeritur hoc rectè; nempe hac latet anguis in herba;
Fons erat hic nostri principiumque mali.
Nam Graecis, Sapiens, simul ac virtute virorum
Septem, praeclari nomen honoris erat,
Incoepit multis quibus otia suppetiere
Libertasque animi Philosophia coli,
Mundum hi, non libros legerunt, ingenioque
Incoepit causas quaerere quisque suo,
Nullius addictus jurare in verba Magistri,
Solus enim his primis Author erat Ratio,
Horum Epicurus erat, Plato, Zeno, Democritusque,
Pyrrho, Aristoteles, nescio quotque alii,
Digni laude viri, quorum sapientia juvit
Humanum multâ commoditate genus.
Hujus, post illos, devenit gloria laudis
Ad quotquot primos hi docuere viros.
Hos tamen equales ne credas esse Magistris;
Ingenio quoniam non sapuere suo.
His successerunt alii, verùm inseriores;
Atque artes lento sic periere pede.
Philosophis sed honos habitus non omnibus idem est
A cunctis; unum hic praetulit, ille alium.
Et distinxit eos nomen quandoque Magistri,
Et quandoque Scholae, quo docuere loco.
Hinc Stoa, & hinc Peripatus, multarum haeresiumque
Obvia sunt veteri nomina in historia.

Se.
Haeresis, oro, quid est? Nam me convicia tantum

Fecerunt magnum crimen ut esse putem.

Pr.
Doctorum Docti pugnans cum Dogmate Dogma,
Haeresis à Graeca gente vocata fuit.

Se.
Cujus erat quaeso legis violatio? natae,
Haeresis, an positae? Crimen ut esse sciam?

Pr.

Neutrius. Errat homo quia nemo libenter; & omnis
Libera apud Graecos Philosophia suit.
Hi converterunt Pietatem in Theiologiam
Primi, spernentes tertia verba Dei.
Mox illis bellum peperit sententia discors,
Pugnari & coeptum est fustibus & baculis.
Nec Graecis tantùm fuit haec sapientia cordi,
Semina dissidii sparsit ubique loci.
Quantum orbis patuit Romanus, rixa erat inter
Coecos, de, Quis habet lumina clara magis.
Quorum olim mores, lepidus, depinxit ineptos
Lucius, & postquam desiit esse Asinus.
De quorum vitiis, ut dignum est, stultitiaque,
Quantumvis Rhetor, dicere nemo potest,
Vile genus, lucri cupidum, nil turpe recusans
Auri suaveolens unde veniret odor;
Insima faex plebis, pauper gens, atque superba,
Nullius frugi, nil nisi barba gravis.

Frontibus austeris obsceni, totaque vita
Ipsorum, contra quam docuere, fuit.

Se.
Nunc quo{que} Centauros videor, Lapithas{que} videre,
Clamosae quoties audio verba Scholae.
Nec non Theiologûm libris convicia foeda
Miror, & indignor, cumque rubore lego.
Nam qui Theiologis dissentit, protinus audit
Passim Blasphemus, Atheus, Haereticus.
Improba non dicet mulier convicia summa,
Si non se laesam sentiat esse priús.

Pr.
Non laesum credis Clerum, sapientia quorum
Spernitur, & parvi ducitur ingenium?
Virtute Ingenii dominari est summa voluptas;
Te, quibus hanc tollis, posse placere putas?
Et quibus est commissa teipsum cura docendi,
An diversa putas hisce docere leve?
Sunt quibus est etiam doctrinae gloria, Panis;
Non laedis, faciens hosce perire fame?
Si mandrita, pecus subreptum viderit iri,
Non vis ut fures clamet adesse gregi?

Sec.
Pastorem verò rectè non increpat alter
Pastor, nec furem fur bene, parque parem.

Pr.

Confiteor. Verum quid agemus? Relliquiae sunt
Antiquae nobis insipidaeque Scholae.
Tempore namque illo, quo nostrae Praeco salutis,
In Graecis sparsit semina, Paulus, agris,
Maxima erat mundo salsorum Philosophorum
Copia; nequitiae Plemmyris, illa fuit.
Quorum non paucos Ecclesia sancta vocavit

Ad mensam. Crevit sic parasita Fides,
Victum communem ut Christi cultoribus esse
Sensit egens nebulo, nomine Philosophus,
Rebus in adversis succurrere & omnibus omnes,
De grege Christicolûm se simulavit ovem.

Acceptusque fuit. Quid ni? Fuit utilis ille
Militiae Christi; dux fuit & sapiens.
Nam{que} Orator erat, doctusque abducere ab hoste,
Si cui forte duces non placuere sui.
Idem doctus erat duri vibrator Elenchi,
Et dilemma anceps torsit utraque manu.
Eminus è Cathedra telis pugnare peritus,
Cominus & furcis vincere doctus erat.
His igitur multis usa est Ecclesia Christi;
Nam docti multo sunt in honore bonis;
Et curanda ferè traduntur ovilia magna
His solis, sanctas hi Synodosque regunt.
Nam licet in Synodis Patres, Sanctique piique,
Atque proba noti simplicitate viri,
Philosophos numero superarent, attamen illos
Vincere sussragiis non potuere suis.

Attonitus verbis peregrinis Philosophorum
Vir simplex contrà dicere non potuit.
Christi vera Fides, Essentia quid sit ab Ente
Abstracta, ignorans, obstupefacta tacet.
Non ita Philosophi Patres; sed quisque Magistri
Dogmata conatur reddere vera sui.
Scinditur in partes Ecclesia; risit at hostis
Elanguitque jacens debilitata Fides.
Esse novae princeps fuit ingens gloria Sectae
Philosopho, sine qua non erat unde ederet.
Sic doctrinarum nascuntur mille colores,
Dum nebulo fama nobilis esse cupit.
Nascitur hinc odium, & pugnandi magna libido;
Sed pacem servant arma negata Gregi.
Mutua sed jaciunt convicia; credit utrique
Ethnicus, & Christi dulce jugum refugit.
Alter & alterius dum damnat dogmata, natum est
Nomen & Haeretici, Catholicique viri.
Nam cum sinisset Synodi sententia litem,
Vincere Catholicum, vinci erat Haereticum.
Consensere tamen signati nomine Christi
Contra Gentiles lignicolasque viros.
Ergo miles erat quoties bellum fuit inter
Ipsos Romanos Christicola egregius.
Hi Constantinum fecerunt vincere, & ille,
His, non credentum sanguine lavit humum;
Cunctaque falsorum destruxit templa Deorum,
Unius & sanxit publica sacra Dei;
Pastoresque gregum magno dignatus honore est

Praecipuos; Christi cultor & ipse fuit.
Summe temporibus Ecclesia floruit illis,
Agrorum sanctis proprietasque redit.
Inque dies crevit grex Christi; accessit ad illos
Omnibus è terris innumerus populus,
Principis exemplo, vel prosperitate vocati
Temporis, aut aliqua voce Ministerii.
Jamque nihil deerat quod gentem reddere Christi
Foelicem posset ni sibi deesse velit.
Sec

Desuit (haud dubium est) quod erat. Qui non bona norit
Ipse sua, aut nescit quid juvet aut noceat,
Hunc nec agri nec opes foelicem reddere possunt,
Nam sibi divitiis ipse molestus erit.

Pr.

Est ita. Divitias dederit si numen avaro
Quantum optat magnas, ambitiosus erit.
Si rerum curam commiserit ambitioso,
Vult dici sapiens, atque superbus erit.
Esse datam dicet, sicut par est, sapienti,
Debitaque ingratus, quae capit, esse putat.
Annis usa fuit paucis Ecclesia pace,
Quando commisit lis nova Philosophos.
Inter Alexandrum certatur, & inter Arium,
Inter, id est, Ephorum, Presbyterumque suum,
Christus an aequalis Patri fuit, an minor illo,
Illi, par visus, huic, minor esse Deo.

Ad mensam coeptum est, at{que} inter pocula quaeri:
(Ad mensam esse solet libera lingua mero.)
Hinc abit ad Cathedras sacra controversia sanctas,
Sectumque in partes concitat inde gregem.
Mox & Alexandri celebri pugnatur in urbe,
Et diversa furens miles in arma ruit:
Rex Constantinus multos jam, militiaeque
Florem, civili clade perire videns,
Ut Regem decuit prudentem, tollere causam
Dissidii studuit, & stabilire Fidem;
Convocat ex omni terrarum parte suarum
Doctos Rectores, Presbyterosque viros.
Ordinis & primi tunc convenere Trecenti
Octodecimque graves eximiique Senes.
Haec Nicena fuit Synodus Patrum generalis,
Primaque Romani totius orbis erat.
Cum consedissent, in Bouleuterion intrat
Princeps, in medio stansque salutat eos.
Consurgunt Patres, sed eos jubet ille sedere;
Nec voluit Princeps ipse sedere prior.
Ingenium nunc disce virorum Philosophorum
(Si modo Philosophus, Simius esse potest.)
Disce quid ad mores confert legisse Platonem,
Aut Aristotelem, aut Biblia sacra Dei,
Si legis ut doceas, & non ut vivere discas;
Virtutem nihil est scire, nisi sacias.
Urbem Nicenam venere à finibus orbis,
Ut fieret cunctis unica certa Fides,
De Christo, cultuque Dei per saecula Patris

Aeterni, libris conveniensque sacris.
Sed quid fecerunt? Pastoris crimina Pastor
Accusat, Patrem dedecoratque Pater.
Desert ad Regem sua quisque inscripta libellis

Jurgia. Doctrinae cura nec ulla fuit.
Hac iter esse putas ad pacem? Ecclesia numquid
Moribus his sponsa est immaculata Dei?
Quid Constantinus fecit? Capit ille Libellos,
Atque legit, lectos condidit inque sinum.
Sanctorum invidiam miratur, & ambitionem,
Sordes, mollitiem, & facta pudenda virûm,
Deinde gravis culpae, sed leniter, admonet illos,
Et docet ut ridens Ethnicus illa videt.
Certè ego si vestro vidissem ex ordine quemquam
Talia peccantem qualia fertis, ait,
Non modo rem turpem tacuissem, veste sed ista

Texissem. Christi sic puto poscit honor.
Vos precor ergo Patres nunc uni incumbite paci;
Cumque unus simus Grex, sit & una Fides.
Consulite ergo Gregi. Fidei componite formam;
At{que} illam faciam ne sit inanis ego.

Dixit. Et illato coram omnibus igne libellos
Comburi Patrum jussit edace nigros.

Sec.
Heu, quantum experti praestat sapientia Regis
Doctorum libris, ingenioque Scholae.

Quid fecere Patres postquam essent igne libelli
Combusti, nec erat jam locus invidiae?

Pr.

Nescio. Non extant Synodi decreta. Quod extat
Indignum multis creditur esse fide.
Quorsum Philosophi spectat Comoedia victi?
Cur hostis sicto vulnere succubuit?
Dogmata sed constat Synodum damnasse Ariana,
Nam visum est, Jesum, Patribus, esse Deum.
Doctrinas etiam ante Arium damnasse fere omnes,
Adversas Fidei quam Sacra Scripta docent.
Sed dum verba Dei tentant exponere frustra
Verbis Graecorum, Philosophoque modo,
Non intellectae periere Patrum rationes,
Haeresis & crevit tanto Ariana magis.
Jussus Ab-aeterno genitum, si dixeris, ecquid
(Multoties repetens) concipis inde rei?

Sec.
Quî possum? superat captum generatio Christi
Nostrum, quâ Deus est, utque puto, Angelicum.
Sed possum jussus non contradicere. Possum
Credere, si dederit qui jubet ipse sidem.

Pr.
Dicit Aristoteles Ens est Essentia; dicunt
Doctores nostri quod Deus est Deitas.
Inque Deo Sapiens Sapientia, velle volens est,

Quodque Deo tribui debeat id Deus est.
Quem potes ex verbis sic junctis sculpere sensum?

Sec.
Audio verba, meras sed video tenebras.
Tune Fidem Christi stabilitam dixeris esse
Principis imperiis, ingeniisve Patrum,
Per nova, prolatam, nil significantia verba,
Et quae divinis sunt aliena libris?
Istane perpetuam procurant credita vitam,
Perpetuamve dabunt ista negata crucem?
Antiquos Dominus nos jussit adire Prophetas,
Cum sit salvatrix inde petenda Fides?
In Veteri sacro legiturne Essentia libro?

Non. Neque repperies talia verba Novo.
Nam ne{que} Christus eo, Christi nec Apostolus usquam
More loqui jussit, sicve loquutus erat.
Progenies Noachi sic est fortasse loquuta,
Tunc cum cessarent aedificare Babel.
Sed missa haec facio, desidero namque quid actum est
Scire, quod Haeresium spectat ad Historiam.
Dic nunc quas isto signarunt nomine Patres
Doctrinas, & quae poena statuta quibus.

Pr.
Haereticum primò faciunt, qui, dicere nullos,
Aut uno plures, auserit, esse Deos.
Hoc expellebant Decreto Idololatriam,
Manetis, rerum Principiumque duplum.

Haereticum faciunt qui Mundum dixerit esse
Aeternum; aeterni quique opus esse negat;
Qui Jesum negat esse Deum, Genitumque, & eundem
Cum Patre; & ingenitum qui negat esse Patrem;
Qui{que} alium natum esse Deo Patre praeter Iesum
Dixerit; aut ipsum tempore natum aliquo;
Quique ipsum dicet, solido sine corpore, spectrum,
Vel rationalem non habuisse animam;
Aut illo negat esse modo Genitum quali generatur
Lumen ab accenso Lumine, & ambo simul;
Quique Deum carnem quo sumpsit tempore nostram
Descendisse negat Virginis in gremium;
Quique negat Genitum genitori esse
Ingenito; aut natum Virgine Matre negat;
Et qui pro nobis passum nostraque salute
Esse negat; vel qui mortem obiisse negat;
Et qui post mortem non surrexisse •atetur;
Vel negat ad dextram nunc residere Patris;
Aut negat inde iterum venturum, ut judicet omnes
Viventesque homines, quique obiere diem.
Hos facit Haereticos Synodus Nicena. Sed Acta
Nicenae Synodi non valuere diu.
Nam Constantini Successor illud
(Areii fautor) noluit esse ratum.
Sic nec habebat adhuc constantem Ecclesia pacem,
Nec certam Patres quam voluere Fidem.

Sec.
Non rectè Patres mysteria dicere verbis
Tentarunt, animis non capienda suis.

Namque hominem esse Deum, factis cognoscere solis;
Testibus & solis cernere facta, licet;
Facta ferebantur Christi miracula multa,
A solo fieri quae potuere Deo.
Illa quibus mediis siunt comprendere mente
Nemo, praeter eum qui sacit illa, potest.
Omne genus morbi verbi virtute fugavit,
Illum jussa levis sustulit unda gravem.
Illius ad vocem posucrunt stabra protervi
Venti, compressis & siluere animis.
Defunctis vitam; privatis lumine visum
Restituit, claudis (voce) gradumque dedit.
In vinum mutavit aquam. Bis multiplicatum
Ad populum panem numine fertque suo.
Quorum Factorum testes habuere probatos
Niceni Patres, queis habuere fidem,
Matthaeum, Marcum, Lucam, Petrum, at{que} Johannem,

Discipulosque alios. His habuere Fidem.
Quî potuere Patres igitur de re manifesta,
Et tam confessa, credere non eadem?

Pr.
Scis Graecos numero reliquos superasse, & in illis
Sectam Aristotelis praevaluisse aliis.
Judaeus Signis; Graecus cedebat Elenchis,
Ut qui quaerebat non sed ,

Sec.
Sed quo fine, Dei dum propria facta fatentur,

Quaerebant fieri quo potuere modo?

Pr.
Scilicet in Synodo docti, indoctique fuerunt;
Doctos quos fecit lectio Aristotelis.
Indocti verò, qui nil aliud didicissent
Quam pro se Christum mortem obiisse crucis,
Et quorum nullos servabant scrinia libros,
Excepto tantum Codice utroque sacro.
Hi quia non audent adversum dicere Doctos;
Dicere nec contra Biblia sacra volunt,
Contenti sanctam Triadem firmasse, simulque
Non uno plures in Triade esse Deos;
Solliciti nimium de verbis esse timebant,
Ne quis eos Doctus diceret esse rudes.
Namque ignorabant peregrina vocabula quantum
Ad res mutandas, dissidiumque valent.

Sec.
Damnatos autem quae tandem poena sequuta est?
Cujus ad arbitrium? Principis anne Patrum?

Pr.
Aspera poena satis, citraque gravissima mortem.
Peccanti Clero poena erat exilium.
Peccanti Laico via claudebatur ad omne
Civilis vitae, militiaeque decus;
Nec Patrum arbitrio (quibus accusare dabatur)
Legibus at scriptis Principis Imperio.

Sec.
Crimen erat, fateor, Synodi contraria dictis,
Cum fuerint lata lege probata, loqui.
Cur tamen impietas dicenda sit, haud bene cerno;
Nam non es, si non impius esse velis.
Et qui credebant se Biblia sacra sequutos,
Esse proculdubio se voluere pios.
Illo, damnati quam magnos, tempore, honores,
Quantas divitias deseruere, puta;
Quo vixere metu, quantos subiere dolores,
Ut conservarent quam tenuere Fidem!
Anne Fidem quisquam tanti facit Impius? Illis
Regnare est summum, divitiaeque bonum.

Errarunt. Synodi doctrinam cernere sanctae
In scriptis caeci non potuere sacris.
Ergone caecus homo damnabitur Impietatis,
Quando non (jussus Lege videre) videt?
Cur non & patria jubeatur cedere simus,
Si non & nasum corrigat ille suum?
Aequum erat, in tenebris verborum, ignoscere si quis
Cavit ne plures diceret esse Deos.
Inter Non-genitum, Genitumque in tempore nullo,
Quid sit dissidii non capit omnis homo.
Nec quorum lingua Verbum substantia dici,
Aut animo possit qua ratione capi.
Vox Hypostasis sonat ut substantia Graecis;
Qui dicit tres sunt, tres ait esse Deos.
Regnorum medici, verborum discite vires,
Dementem populum Lex sine mente facit.

Dic nunc cur Synodus non sanxit & Haeresin esse.
Verbum, Scripturas esse negare, Dei.

Pr.
Jus Indicendi Synodum tunc Caesar habebat
Solus, & indixit cum Synodo esset opus.
Tunc opus est autem cum turbant Dogmata pacem.
De Libris Sacris quaestio nulla fuit.
Quaestio talis enim Scriptura judice nunquam
Finiri, aut (alio judice) teste potest.
Quare si Patres certassent, Haereticique,
Dictavit libros quos Homo, quosque Deus,
Vir bone nonne vides, ut Judice Caesare, Verba
Essent nulla Dei non placitura sibi?
Si Nunc Haereseos Synodus damnasset & illum,
Scripturas, verbum, qui negat esse, Dei,
Consilium Patrum periisset Philosophorum,
Resque ignota foret spirituale forum.
Ergo Fidem tenebris visum est involvere densis,
Proque Dei verbo subdere verba sua;
Ut sic dum Reges regeret Scriptura Fideles,
Scripturam regerent, ut voluere, Patres.
Primus ad Imperium Clero fuit hic gradus, unde
Sacra vident placitis subdita scripta suis.

Sec.
Dic mihi quam causam populi conversio tanti,
Regibus invitis, tam celeremque habuit?

Pr.
Imprimis fecit numeroso cognita teste,
Occiso Domino reddita vita fidem.
Tum quòd tot Christus miracula fecerat ipse,
Tantaque discipuli tam manifesta sui.
Quodque suam lucem Christi doctrina ferebat
Secum, cogentem simplicitate sua.
Adde quòd ad Christum populo veniebat ab omni,
Si cui Sacrifici non placuere sui.
Israelitarum sic regnum transtulit olim
Fastus Elidarum junctus avaritiae.
Turba frequens erat haec & habebat nomina multa
Nobilium, notos divitiisque viros.
Traxit & (ut dixi) multos aequatio vitae,
Mensaque communis queis erat una Fides.
Doctis, Indoctis, Fidis simul & Simulatis,
Haec paupertatis dulce levamen erat.
Crescentem numerum jam non mirabere; Nam{que}
Crevit vera Fides, Hypocrisisque simul.
Denique summus honor Doctis fuit in grege Christi;
Maxima Christicolis haec fuit ambitio.
Sed quod non fuerant eadem, at contraria docti,
Principium primum seditionis erat.

Sec.
Quos doctos narras? Quonia¯ nec Apostolus ullus,
Discipulusve fuit, quod scio, Philosophus.
An quibus ingenium breve erat sed barba profunda;
Quorum asper sermo, lubrica vita fuit;

Et quos ad fraudes damnarat Inedia viles,
Re stultos, falso nomine Philosophos?

Pr.

Hos ipsos. Quorum multos Ecclesia habebat.
Quicquid cepissent re•ia, Piscis erat.
Ex horum numero siebat Episcopus, ut quis
Insignis Logicus, Rhetoricusve fuit.
Qui veteris certant imbuti errore Magistri,
Verba Dei ad Sectam ducere quisque suam.
Verborum pugnam parit ignorantia discors,
Quam nexus rerum conciliare solet.
Horum quisque tamen sapiens sibi tam vehementer
Esse videbatur, tamque superbus erat,
Ut non-Philosophos prae se contemneret omnes,
Ut pecudes totidem, quae ratione earent.

Philosophos (iisdem si non didicere Magistris)
Spurcabant ipsos, quo potuere, luto.
Qua freti virtute? Modo quoniam, atque Figura
Scibant disserere, & ludere in ambiguo.
Haec illis Logica, Ratio, Sapientia, Virtus,
Ambitio, Spes, & gloria summa fuit.
Deque sacris verbis dum disceptatur, in Artem
Vertitur ignotam debilitata Fides.
Ars ignota fuit, quae nunc est Theiologia.
An circumscripsit quis sine sine Deum?
Quae, de Natura Divina dicere fas est,
Quaeque tacere decet, Pagina Sacra docet.

Discipulus Christi discernitur agnitione,
Et cultu, Sacri quem docuere libri;
Et vitâ, quae sit divinae congrua Legi.
Non à Naturae cognitione Sacrae.

Sec.
At cur Niceni tanto conamine quondam
De Christo, Physicè disseruere Patres,
Cum nihil in tota Scriptura clarius extet
Quàm Salvatoris cùm Caro, tùm Deitas?

Pr.
Cur nisi quod puduit quicquam nescire videri
Philosophum, aut victum discere, vera licet?
Dum pugnant freti veteris ratione Magistri,
Non tenuere novam vasa vetusta fidem.
Causa Potestatis tamen haec discordia Patrum,
Principium & Regni Spiritualis erat.
Nam Constantinus populis dum reddere pacem
Nititur, atque unam constabilire Fidem,

Lex (inquit) fiet quicquid statuetis; & illam
Curabo ne quis transgrediatur ego.
Hinc vulgò visum est, in rebus Relligionis,
Consensu Regis non opus esse sui.
Unus, habebatur Princeps quoque, de grege, Caesar,
Seque suae Synodo subdere visus erat.
Utque alii, poterat, si dissensisset ab illa,
Haereticus dici Legibus ipse suis.
Non illum Domini sancta depellere Coena

Hactenus audebant. Spes (sed inermis) erat.
Hinc quo{que} praesumptum est conscripta Oracula libris
Sacra, Sacerdotis solius ore loqui.
Quaeque, ad Scripturas spectarat libera Sacras,
Ad Patres spectat nunc pavefacta Fides.
Lege Dei dupla facta est Ecclesia biceps,
Lex una est animis, altera corporibus.
At{que} duplex homines terrebat poena misellos,
Cognita poena omnes, credita poena pios.

Sec.
Magna suit, fateor, Synodorum prisca Potestas;
Atqui res, Synodus, rara brevisque fuit;
Nec Papae potuit concedere, Regia jura;
Nec quamvis poterant, id voluisse puto.

Pr.
Per quatuor Synodos primas, centum{que} per annos,
Per Regum inscitiam, per populum{que} levem,
Creverat obscurè Papae furtiva Potestas,
Donec Romano Principe major erat.
Nimirum, Piscator erat, piscemque petivit;
Et Piscatorum coetus erat Synodus.
Sed pro pisce fuit rerum suprema potestas;
Capturam facilem turbida praebet aqua.
Cuncta fuere priùs tenebris turbis{que} replenda,
Terrarum Domini quam potuere capi.
Et partes aliquas sibi vult fortuna relinqui,
Quae summi tacita est actio certa Dei.

Sec.
Verum quo pacto, de paupere Philosophastro,
Obtinuit, terris, proximus esse Deo?

Pr.
Historiae filum quod nunc subtile retexo,
Ostendet breviter, perspicuéque satis.
Finita Synodo statim nova dogmata surgunt,
Quamque priùs fuerat acrior ira redit.
Post Constantinum, rexit Constantius Orbem,
Catholicos vexans; namque Arianus erat.
Ille & Athanasium Magnum terroribus implens,
Martyrium, vitâ, fecit amare minus.
Exul ab Aegypto, Constantis castra per Alpes,
Gallorumque adiit frigida rura senex.
Judice te, meritò, latas à Principe Leges,
Ausus, doctrinae post-posuisse suae.
Proximus huic, mundi tenuit Julianus habenas,
Antè quidem Christi qui simularat ovem;
Sanctorum nunc hostis erat; verùm ille pepercit
Fortunis, sacri corporibus{que} gregis.
Sed fecit quod pejus erat. Nam Templa Deorum
Surdorum pridem diruta restituit;
Atque Idolorum cultum revocavit ineptum.
Sic iterum ritus convaluere mali.
Christicolas autem sanxit non esse docendos
Ingenuas artes, bella paratque animis.

Sec.
Non tutam forsan Pietatem viderat inter

Grammaticos, Logicos, Rhetoricosque viros.
Scilicet, his, patrias amor est reprehendere leges,
Et statum rerum vertere, summa Venus.
Non minùs ingenii committit gloria Doctos,
Quàm Reges rapti dedecus imperii.

Pr.
At frustra cultum permisit Rex Julianus
Gentibus antiquum, nemo ubi sacra dabat.
Quis{que} suum Taurum, Vitulum, comedebat & Agnum;
Sacrisicus rarus, victima cara fuit.
Frigebant arae, desertaque Templa silebant:
Catholicum, de Diis dicere pauca, fuit.
Et dum quisque suam rem solam curat & urget,
De dubia dixit Relligione nihil.
Et quia desuerat populus Diis sacrisicare,
Fit nova Relligio, quae fuit antè vetus.
At mox à Persis Rex caeditur hostibus (hostis,
Dicebat clerus, quod fuit ille Dei.)
Tunc etiam Gotthi coeperunt arma movere,
In sibi vicinos Imperii populos.
Forsitan injustè, sed non tamen absque colore
Justitiae; satis est Regibus ipse color.
Gentibus & tandem posuerunt nomina victis,
Non audita priùs, quae voluere Duces.
Vandalus hinc, Gotthusque, Herulusque, Hunnusque, & Alanus
Ad Boream fines occupat Imperii.
Nominibus variis, una sed origine Gotthi,
Nascitur ex una pustula multa lue.
Et tandem Italiam crebris successibus implent,

Et miscent verbis verba Latina suis,
Et Gentem genti. Romanam possidet urbem
Gotthus; sed doctus sacra Latina priùs.
Atque sui Gotthis (ut Graecis atque Latinis)
Catholici{que} inerant, Haeretici{que} viri.
Post hunc regnavit Jovianus mensibus octo,
Christicolis demptas reddidit ille Scholas.
Catholicus fuit ille quidem, sed legibus uti
Aequis Catholicos, Haereticosque jubet.
Quo facto moritur; tanquam si sceptra tulisset,
Esset ut in tuto libera cuique Fides.
Romana accipiens tunc sraena Valentinianus
De sacra mutat Relligione nihil.
Nec qui successit cui nomen Gratia fecit.
Paci juncta fides dulcis utrique fuit.

Sec.
Quem tulit effectum concessa licentia tanta?

Pr.
Nec pax consequitur nec bene certa Fides.
Qui non audebant Deitatem tollere Christo,
Spiritui Sancto tollere non dubitant.
Impietatis erat tantae Macedonius Author,
Qui Byzantinas ore regebat oves.
Audax Orator; torrentis more sonorus,
Turbidus atque celer, non tamen altus erat.
Jamque iterum in partes Ecclesia scinditur. Iras
Aeternae vitae mutua cura facit.

Sec.
Unde meae vobis commissa est cura Salutis
Theiologi? Sine me consulitisne mihi?
Cur non & sine te liceat mihi cogere quemque
Vestrum, quod sperat, quaerere more meo?
Quod si praeceptis rem tantam credere vestris
Insanus cupiam, quis mihi ductor erit?
Nam dum continuò pugnatis, nescio cujum
Sum pecus; & videor neutrius esse mihi.
Hoc scio, sum Christi, qui jussit regibus omnes

Auscultare suis. Rex mihi rector erit,
Rex mihi rector erit Vocis; Mens libera soli
Parebit domino, quo velit ille modo.
Jam Divina Libro desixit Gratia Sacro
Quam servabo Fidem; si tamen ille velit.

Quam (puto) Doctorum sententia nulla resiget;
Sed nec eo Patriae jura tenebo minus.
Quid nobis Arius, quid Athanasius? Reperitur
In solo sacro Codice plena salus.
Unde igitur Patrum discordia tanta profecta est,
Si non ambitio maxima causa fuit?
Indignum Doctis non Reges esse putabant
Philosophi; pecudum nos habuere loco.

Pr.
Post hunc Theudosiusque, puer{que} Valentinianus
(Theudosius Magnus) Sceptra habuere simul.
Vicerat hic Gotthos, & eos servire coegit

Victos, sed certa conditione, sibi.
Hic & •berinis victas ejecerat arvis
Gentes Vandalicas, Haereticum populum;
Imperii summa meruit virtute coronam;
Jure etiam tenuit cum sibi dante pari.
Catholicus fuit & multum praebebat honorem
Praelatis sanctis de grege Catholico.
Nec nisi concordi censebat milite bella
Contra concordes, prospera, posse geri.
His Synodum causis indixit. Episcopus omnis
Constantinopolin, jussus adire, venit.
Spiritus hîc Sanctus decernitur esse colendus
Ut Deus, & credi de numero esse Dei.
Hic quoque firmantur Synodûs decreta Nicenae
Omnia; Christicolûm perficitur{que} Fides.
Post hunc successit Honorius, Arcadiusque,
Principe Theudosio natus uterque patre.
In partes iterum Regnum discinditur. Ille
Occiduas Aquilas, hic Orientis habet.
Tunc Gotthis ducibus concessa à Caesare pridem
Audent Romani jura negare Duces.
Corripiunt e•ses Gotthi, Romamque petentes
Accipiunt Urbem sub ditione sua;
Aequassetque solo fortassis Alaricus Urbem
Dimidii mundi quae caput antè fuit,
Si non Romanus venientibus obvius isset
Papa, ferens Christi jura, precesque suas.
Sed flexus pietate viri, Rex cessit, & ipsum
Protegere incolumi jussit in urbe gregem;

Sic tamen ut tantum jus danti subditus esset,
Et successuris Regibus Italiae.
Hoc quoque nactus erat, dum miles crederet illi
De Verbo Domini; deque salute sua,
De Fidei mercede; quot essent gaudia coelis,
Et bona Catholicis quanta parata viris;
Quantus amor sratrum; quam suavis cantio, quando
Concinit Angelicus, Catholicusque Chorus.
Haereticis contrà quas servant Tartara poenas;
Quas ignis flammas, quas tenebrasque simul;
Ardentesque animas, etiam clam corpore, quàmque
Aeterni colubri vulnera saeva dolent.
De forma & vultu tortoris, ut illius ore
Spiret saevities, emineantque minae.
Haec inquam miles cum crederet, eligeretque
Idem, cui Romae sceptra gerenda daret;
Ne dubita quin eligeret quem Papa volebat,
Dummodo Catholicum; si numerusque sinat;
Si quoque non alii Regni tribuisset habenas
Qui prior in manibus jure tenebat eas.

Sec.
Theiologi verò concordes, credo, fuere
Jam de Personis in Deitate tribus;
Vel tacuere metu legum, quas sanxerat antè,
Theudosius, multas, Haereticisque malas.

Pr.
Verum ut Theudosius naturae Legibus ille
Magnus concessit, sitque timente minor,

Veste nova rursus prodit vetus Haeresis; Unà
Secum prodibat docta caterva virûm.
Hi clamant Christos plures non esse, sed unum;
Naturasque negant unius esse duas.
Dicite utram vultis, nam possum credere utramvis;
Res est difficilis credere utramque simul.
Catholicus regerit cur non potes impie utramque?
Anne ignota tibi est Unio Hypostatica?
Nota Et ob hoc ipsum non possum credere utramque;
Una est, quas unit Unio Hypostatica.
Concilium rursus placuit generale vocari;
Et resonat rixis u•bs Ephesina sacris.
Unde redit tristis ter victaque pars Ariana,
Non convicta tamen; sed neque muta diu.
Pòst etenim, Synodum tenuit pars illa, vocante
Principe, quo dubium, sed tenuere tamen;
Quae sua suffragiis stabilivit dogmata multis.
Sic lance aequata Theiologia stetit.
Et nisi Catholici Chalcedone consuluissent,
Essent nunc illi forsitan Haeretici.
Cuncta sed ad normam Synodo revocantur ab illa
Nicenae Fidei, Catholicumque modum.
Haeresin, in plures formas quae vertitur una,
Quam quondam Proteus, vincula nulla tenent:
In Chalcedonia Synodo damnata repressa est,
Sed tamen ut verbis mox reditura novis:
Namque unam jussi Personam dicere Christi,
Scilicet ut nobis esse, nec esse duas;
Non plures una voluerunt dicere Christi

Esse voluntates; unica quippe Patri est.
Graeca vocavit eos Ecclesia Mounothelitas;
(Haeresis Imperio posthuma at illa fuit,
Nataque cum Synodos generales Papa vocabat,
(Neglecto dudum Principe) jure suo.

Sec.
Ille Voluntatem Christi qui fecerit unam
Ut debet, quamvis crederet esse duas,

Salvus erit. Nihil haec vitae subtilia prosunt;
Zona viatoris respuit hanc maciem.
Non populum Veteris docuit sic Foederis author;
Tale nihil dixit Sancta Cathedra Sinae.
Sed contrà; De me frustra quicunque loqueris,
Non impunè feres. Sum. Tibi sit satis hoc.
Vos, ô Doctores Graeci, cur dicitis uni
Tres Hypostases simplici inesse Deo?
Qui scitis? Si non scitis, ne dicite frustra:
Nuda Libri Sacri sint tibi verba satis.
Esse Deum Christum liber hic declarat apertè,
Atque Deo-genitum: Quî queat esse rogas?
Stulte, prius videas, an possis noscere ab actu
Ipse tui Patris, quòd generandus eras.
Tu, qui musca quid est, aevum nescibis in omne,
Quid siet, expectas, improbe, scire, Deus?
Pharmaca peccatis summo ne tange palato.
Sanari si vis, injice fortis hians.
Nam sacra qui Logico mandit mysteria dente,
Hunc vertigo capit, nauseaque, & vomitus.

Pr.

Philosophis illis Nicenis nota fuerunt
Haec satis, & scibant quid sacra verba docent.
Sed Doctrina Dei non expediebat eorum
Consiliis, mundi quos agitabat amor.
Nec populum mundi ranta dulcedine cepit,
Quantâ venalis gratia Pontlsicum.
Namque suos Christus jubet omnes invicem amare,
Et bona vicinis omnia velle suis.
Quae bona non tua sunt, Formae spectator & Auri,
Ne cupias, inquit, si meus esse cupis.
Omnibus ô legem duram moechis & avaris,
Quam, mundanorum quis tolerare potest?
Irasci vetat, & veniam donare petenti,
(Et puto si veniam non petat) ille juber.
Christe, vetas, ne quis sapientem se puter esse,
Despiciatve rudem simplicitate virum;
Aequa quidem, verùm tibi dura, Scholastice, lex est,
Qui cupis ingenio subdere cuncta tuo.
Discipulis Dominus, non, dixit, cogite quemquam,
Invitis quoniam gratia spreta perit.
Condere nec Leges jussit, nec habere tribunal
In terris; sed eos ire, docere, jubet.
Non placet hoc munus sapientibus; esse meretur
Qui Rex summus (ait) ludimagister erit?
Si peccatorum quem poenitet, atque salutem
Concredat Christo non variante fide,
Salvus erit, sacris si fas est credere libris,
Durum est Romanus Clericus omnis ait.

Illene salvus erit qui non intelligit utrum
Christus homo fuerit factus, an induerit?
Qui Genitum esse nequit distinguere ab esse Profectu¯,
Aut nescit Genitus quî Deus esse potest?
Si datur hoc Laicis, frustra est sapientia nostra,
Atque animas nostras corpora crassa regent.
Semina, Christus ait, bona quidam severat arvis
Agricola, at veniens mox inimicus homo,
Nocte latens, agro Zizania sevit eodem.
In segetem semen crevit utrumque simul.
Mirantes servi, dubiique quid esset agendum,
Ut mos est, Dominum consuluere suum.
Evelline jubes istas radicitus herbas?
Vel si non placet hoc, dicito quid facimus.
Ille, simul crescant dum Messis venerit, inquit,
Igni fasciculos inde parate meo.
Haereticos Christus vetat hac sub imagine tolli,
Ante diem extremum, judiciumque Dei.
Doctrinae vestrae si frater forte repugnet;
Molliter hunc verbis instrue, Paulus ait,
Si Deus illius velit illucescere menti,
Ne non inveniat gratia sera locum.
Non magni fecere Patres textum hunc, ne{que} multo
Pluris eis rectae Lex rationis erat.
Maxima quando meo mea res sit agenda periclo,
Mene vetas uti, tu, ratione mea?
Daemonis inferni si te duce labor in ignem
(Quod ne contingat nescio quid prohibet)
Praecipit, ut redimas, Lex aequi, corpore corpus,

Proque salute mea perdere velle tuam.
Haec dictat ratio si coget. Det mihi qui vult
Consilium; sed qui coget iniquus erit.

Sec.
Haereticis leges tibi non placet esse molestas,
Doctrinae nulli crimen inesse putas?
Quas caedes, nescis, nuper doctrina nesanda
Egressa Oxonio, Cambrigiâque dedit?
Occidit Carolum doctrina Academica Regem,
Multosque insignes nobilitate viros.
Necnon Henrici, doctrina Pontificali,
Gallorum Reges occubuere duo.
Curam qui pacis suscepit cunque tuendae,
Doctorum duris legibus ora premat.

Pr.
Quid potuit doctrina mali ex hoc tempore vidi,
Et vidi Leges quàm valuere parùm.
Infecto sed sera venit medicina popello
Multo; qui, quae sunt Principis, arma tenet.
Regi cui praesens non est exercitus, illi
(Seu vult, seu non vult) Ensifer est populus,
Ut nil sit quod agant leges. Nihil est resecandum;
Optima demulcens est medicina manus.
Exigat ad Leges pacem, convicia tollat
Rex; dubitare potes quin Schola inermis erit?
Caetera sit calamus liber, sit libera lingua,
Si mores saltem non docet illa malos.
Non loquitur Pietas perplexa. Sed insidiarum

Signum non fallax est tenebrosa phrasis.
Nam Christus lux est; ad eum venientibus ipse
Praelucens claro lumine monstrat iter.
Numquid divinae, sunt pars, aenigmata, legis,
Ingeniovè salus est tribuenda meo?
OEDIPODAS solos salvandos credimus esse?
Aut Christi tenerae Sphinge regentur oves?
At Sphinges nequeunt, aenigmata Conciliorum
Primorum quatuor, solvere mille decem.
Cur agit ergo (putas) Nicena Ecclesia Sphingem,
Si non ut tollat Regibus imperium?
Sustulit imperium, passus non debita jura,
Constantinorum primus, habere Patres.
Inde suos populus coepit contemnere Reges,
Portantes unâ Pontificale jugum.
Atque utri vellet, Domino servire, duorum,
Suetus, vix patria lege regendus erat.
Nam quoties patrias leges sibi frangere visum est,
Fracturae, leges opposuere Dei.
Et quoties servire Deo minus expediebar,
Excussit populus liber utrum{que} jugum.
Exitiosa fuit nimia ista licentia paci;
Sed populo Lotus, militibusque fuit.
Prona igitur facilisque fuit victoria Gotthis,
Qui Romam Mystae supposuere suo.
Jamque potestatis Papa esset culmen adeptus,
Si non Gotthorum Rex metuendus erat.
Namque à Romanis Aquilis Oriente remotis,
Non ulla apparens causa timoris erat.

Illas miles aves fecit quacunque volare,
Vellet; sunt & aves quas jubet ille bonae.
Non caret auspicio quodcunque inceperit ille
Cui non invitae subjiciuntur aves.
Jamque probans vires Papa excommunicat ipsum
Induperatorem, nomine Anastasium.

Se.
Cur?

Pr.
Chalcedoniae Synodi decreta teneri
Non fecit, quantum Catholicum decuit.
Post hunc Justinus, post illum Justinianus
Regnavit, Papis & placuere suis.
Quorum hic imprimis Romani Codice juris
Insignis, longo tempore jura dedit.
Foelix eximiis belloque & pace ministris,
Quorum virtutes credidit esse suas.
Huic Gotthos Latiis Belisarius expulit arvis,
(Quanquam uxore minor) maximus ille ducum.
Pontificum pulsis Effulsit gloria Gotthis;
Sub coelo rerum maxima, Papa fuit.
Cedunt arma mitrae, concessit Episcopus omnis,
Etsi quisque sibi jus cupiebat idem.
Cessit, sed tardè, Constantinopolitanus,
Aequali quanquam dignus honore fuit.
Leviathan naribus, Behemoth{que} receperat hamum;
Et Rex & Populus servus uterque fuit.

Sec.
Amplius ergo nihil Papae restabat agendum
Quàm genus humanum luce beare sua;
Et post terrarum, coelorum quaerere regnum,
Ut serpens, sapiens; simplicitate puer.

Pr.

Nempe datum prius est, posterius minimè.
Omnia Pontifices superarunt cnodula quotquot
Producit tellus calliditate sua.
Sed Regnum duplex, Carnale, & Spirituale,
Non nimiae signum simplicitatis erat.
Nec Papas credas egisse per otia vitas,
Nec quod agendum ultra nil habuere putes.
Vota hominum semper votis augentur adeptis;
Accedens partas copia servat opes.
Piscator solitam non spernit callidus artem,
Quantavis praeda retibus implicita.
Res agit ille suas semper. Vel retia sarcit,
Si quo perrupit magna balena loco.
Aut hamos fortasse novas mediatur, & escas
Piscibus, aut aliquod nectere fraudis opus.
Aut illis placitos escarum adhibere colores,
Noxia vel nitidis Pharmaca quaerit aquis.
Omniaque emissis scrutatur litora servis,
Quae fugit, & quae, quis litora piscis amat.
Tum quos, & quibus, & quanti vendat nova cura est;
Et mensae pisces quos retinere suae.
Quos sale conspergat, compluri quos sale duret;

Et quis marcescens abjiciendus erit.
Adde quod & multis cura est, & maxima, natis
Perduraturas aedisicare casas.
Circumstant similes curae Papam; similisque
Ars est; & semper res agit ille suas.
Principibusque parat nova vincula relligionis
Tenuia, quae faciet fortia stultities.
Doctrinisque novis sarcit, si postulat usus,
Aut levius reddit relligionis onus.
Aut aliquod monstrum doctrinae, è pyxide Circes,
Ornat, ita ut Pytheus crederet esse suum.
Absurdumve aliquod sustentat dogma bifurcis,
Unde stupens capitur, qui fuit ante catus.
Debet & ad gentes longinquas mittere scitum
Quales sunt; illis qualis & esca placet.
Indo, namque Scythae, divisoque orbe Britanno,
Est anima, & salvam rem cupit esse suam.
Et Novus Orbis habet, tellusque Incognita, multas
Nec nigras animas, corpora nigra licet.
Argentique habet illa, & flavi frusta metalli;
Haec sibi ne pereant Papa cavere solet.
Quos premet, & quibus indulgebit, id est, sale sparget
Reges & proceres, abjicietve, putat,
Et quos post mortem (sed longo tempore) Divis
Debet sacratos adnumerare suis.
Ut sale durati, durant hi pluribus annis,
Non magno pretio quos sibi pauper emat.
Denique, quod primum est claras non negligit ille
Natis, cognatis, aedificare casas.

Plures Pontificum sunt curae; quas numerare
Difficile est, mentem ni juvet ordo meam.
Ostia sed susci stabo Polyphemus ad antri,
Utque foràs tendit quemque notabo dolum.

Sec.
Hac nimium vereor ne sit narratio longa;
Fraus potuit doctos nulla latere Senes.
quantum fraudis, sexcentos posse per annos,
Milleque ab ingeniis surgere, credis, opus?
Tempus adest coenae, serum est percurrere cuncta;
Crastina, si vis tu, finiet illa dies.
Pr
Non serum est, meus ecce bonus Chronometra quid inquit;
Praecisè sextam dimidiamque notat.
Septima sermoni finem faciet nota nostro,
Otia ne non det crastina forte dies.
Praeter Judaeos, Gentes Idola colebant,
Omnes, & domibus plura habuere suis.
Aurea divitibus stabant, & eburna Sacellis,
Aut ex argento, aut aere Corinthiaco,
Aut stabat summi Parius lapis arte Magistri

Factus. Materiam nam superabat opus.
Ingenium nullum, potuit facundia nulla
Eripere haec avidis tam pretiosa viris.
Quid faciet Praeco (quoniam miracula cessant.)
Quî potuit verbo conciliare fidem?
Nam si non illis simulachra indulta fuissent,
Judaeum Graecus vix coluisset homo.

Ergo coli sapiens permisit Doctor; at illa
Sub certa tantum conditione coli.
Nempe ut mutarent divorum nomina. Nolunt
Vel Solis dici, vel simulachra Jovis,
Vel Phoebi, Martis, Lunae, Veneris, vel Amoris,
Mercurii, Bacchi, Palladis, aut Cereris.
Sed Christi, Petri, Pauli, Sanctaeque Mariae,
Aut alio quovis nomine Apostolico.
Sic Fidei verae comes ire Idololatria
Permissa est; vera plus placuitque Fide.
Quam nullus Princeps est ausus tempore longo
Laedere, nec sibi grex senserat esse male.
Sed veluti properae curae subnascitur ulcus
Acre, quod ad tempus non breve saepe latet,
Et tandem erumpit; sic morbum Rex Leo primus
Sensit, nec potuit jam superare malum.
Sed tamen hinc natum est bellum calamare Sophistis.
Temporis illius qui docuere Fidem.
Hoc bello victi cessarunt Iconomachi,
Non concedentes, sed siluere diu.
Hac arte effectum est, ne quando cerneret artem
Stulta, stupens, & hians plebs in Imaginibus.
Numina nec tantùm Gentes sictilia amabant,
Sed Festos etiam concelebrare dies;
Tollere quos quicunque esset conatus ineptus,
Fecisset madidum saxeus imber cum.
Hinc Chronicus festus (tunc Saturnalia) nunc est
Catholicus festus, nomine Carnevale.
Nonne etiam mensis Maii primum meministi,

Te puero, juvenes concelebrare diem?
Ut Phallum arboreum (membrum navile) ferebant
E sylvis, medio quem statuere foro;
Utque illum circa juvenes duxere Choreas
Aptus vir bellis, apta puella viris?
Hunc festum Gentes olim Priapeia vocabant,
Optatum pueris Virginibusque diem.
Nondum defecit vetus Ambervalia festus
(Festus, at innocuus, permanet ille dies.)
Et quem rurales sinita messe coloni
Cum Baccho Cereris concelebrare solent,
Temporibus priscis sunt Bacchanalia dicta,
Cum Vini colerent ebrietate Deum.
Multa tulere patres legi contraria Christi,
Dum populum properant conciliare sibi.
Nec sic venisset fortasse Proselyta multus,
Si non à causis pluribus actus erat.
Vita Sacerdotum cunctis odiosa erat, illis
Ingenii aut morum gratia nulla fuit.
Nam tristi gravitate superbus Hypocrita quem non
Offendit, quamquam caetera doctus homo?
Qui spretis aliis sapiens vult solus haberi
Et dici, quamvis nil sciat ille boni;
Justa tibi solvi qui postulat omnia, summo,
Adque datum punctum, jure Geometrico;
Ipse tamen solvit sua, libertate Poetae;
Hunc socium vitae dixeris esse bonum?
Compulit ad Christum, vita improba Sacrisicorum
Multos foelices ingenuosque viros.

Quippe parùm possunt insulsos ferre, pudico
Ingenio nati, non inopesque viri.
Sed multò plures traxit communio victus,
Quanquam illos inopes, contiguos{que} fami.

Sec.
Siste gradu¯. Quonia¯ nec adhuc, in imagine Christi,
Aut Sancti, quicquam cerno ego inesse mali.
Non ego, si flector, si verba effundo precantum,
Sique meos oculos detinet effigies;
Non illi flector, non alloquor, aut colo. Solum
Oro Deum, nomen cogito mente Dei.
Tune Deos Romae credis simulachra videri?
Quid faciunt ergo tot simulachra? Monent.
Quod fuit olim Serpens Aeneus Israelitis,
Atque Sacerdoti quod Cherubinus erat,
(Ante illos, Domino{que} Authore, precatio facta est)
Hoc sancto, Sancti praestat imago, viro.

Pr.
Difficile esse putas homini, praesertim Idiotae,
Credere in Effigie posse latere Deum?
Naturam humanam nimium nescire videris.

Credere (crede mihi) quidlibet ille potest.
Nam simul ac hominem possedit cura futuri
Temporis, ipse suum consuluit{que} metum,
Credere pronus erit spem qualemcun{que} ferenti,
Atque sequi multos quâ videt ira via.
Credebant Gentes habitare in Imagine numen,

An minùs illorum est vivida nostra fides?
Quòd simulachra monent, color est è pyxide Circes
Sumptus, & Idolo cuilibet aptus erit.
Nil facit exemplum Serpentis, nec Cherubini,
Quos fieri & statui jusserat ipse Deus.
Respice mandatum Domini. Tibi sculptile, dixit,

Non facies. Populus fecerat illa Deo.
Cessantis quondam pluviae signum fuit Iris;
Sanatimorsus Aeneus ille Draco.

Sec.
Nec colui Simulachra, nec esse colenda putabam;
Attamen assensu laetus abibo tuo.
Persequere inceptum, quibus insuper artibus usi
Sunt Piscatores ordine quasque refer,

Pr.
Est aliud genus Idoli subtilius omni
Materia, quali vita carere nequit.
Aëre simplicius, subtilius aethere puro;
Mobile; sed nullo quod queat esse loco.
Talibus Idolis non est macilentior umbra;
Nam{que} patente oculo cernitur umbra nigra.
Illa Idola oculis nunquam cernuntur apertis,
Sed tantum clausis, attonitisve metu.
Sicut subtilis magis est sapientia per se
Quam quisquam sapiens, re bonitas{que} bona;
Sic etiam subtilior est Idololatria
Quam dico, quàm quae materialis erat.

Sec.
Haec aenigmaticè quamvis narrasse videris,
Attamen ut capiam non opus OEDIPODE est.
Namque mera indoctae coluerunt Somnia Gentes
Picta Sacerdotes quo voluere modo.
Nocturnum populum nemo non viderat. Unde
Advenere tamen nescius omnis erat.

Pr.
Hinc metus ignoti, doctrinaque Daemoniorum,
Subdita corruptis Philosophisque Fides.
Respexitque Fides ex illo tempore Patrum
Dogmata, non Sacri quae docuere Libri.
Sic populus trepidus pendebat ab ore Magistri;
Coeperunt Regum jussa valere parùm.
Cara nimis pauci versabant Biblia. Nondum
Artis erat libros multiplicare Typis.
Inque Patrum manibus mansere Oracula Sancta,
Quorum praeceptis tunc didicere loqui.
Deinde quod in Templis curabant commemorari
Doctorum quaedam nomina amica sibi,

Expediebat eis. Spes ostentata triumphi,
Militiae est semper maxima causa bonae.

Sec.
Sed quid, an in Templis, & dum celebrantur honores
Divini, fas est concelebrare hominem
Quem pius ignoras sit an impius, ignibus atris
Subtùs, an in coeli luce beatus agat?

Regibus infesto signabis nomine Fastos?
Becchetti stabit Fatum in Ephemeride?

Pr.
Quod stetit id stabit, vim legis dum tenet Usus.
Et populos recta pro ratione regit.
Papa sed ad magnam spem cor dilatat, & orbis
Totius imperium cogitat esse suum.
Et juris titulos extorquet Codice sacro;
Supponi sibi vult omnia Jure Dei.
Nominibusque capit Regum Regalia jura.
(Saepe Fidem gignit nomen inane rei.)
Pontificem dici vult se, quo nomine quondam
Augustus Romae coeperat Imperium.
Quodque fuit Moses Judaeis, & quod Aaron
In toto Christi postulat esse grege.
Utque vocant trepidae summi Jovis arma Tonantis
Gentes, Censuras sic vocat ille suas.
Nec Majestatis contentus nomine, nomen
Sanctius assumit, conveniensque Deo.

Sec.
Quin siet impietas nec parva haec, nolo negare.
Censuras rectè fulmina forte vocat.
Nam sicut Fulmen, si quando se insinuarit
In commissuras parjetis igne suo,
Disjungit lapides, si non & disjicit, & sic
Quod fuerat firmum debile reddit opus;
Sic quoque dissociat cives Censura timenda
Illis qui stultè Phasmata vana timent.

Pr.
Ad genus omne boni mundani carbasa praebent;
Ad visas, velis omnibus, itur opes.
Ut capiant populos, cogant & ovescere Reges,
Quoque modo possint parta tenere student;
Queis opus est multo stratagemate perficiendis,
Nequitia docta, Philosophaque Fide.
Suevit ut in Templis, audisti, Ecclesia Patrum
Prima, satellitium commemorare suum.
Nunc autem Papis dominantibus, adnumeratur
Divis, quisquis eis profuit arte sua.
Reddita sic rursus populo est Idololatria,
Nemoque non Divum coepit habere sibi.

Sec.
Romani moris suit haec imitatio prisci
Ut qui Caesaribus par tribuere decus.
Sed non tam temerè tantos concedit honores
Papa, sed ut vitas Signa probare videt;
Nec subitò, sed cum vita decesserit annis
Permultis quemquam sanctificare solet.

Pr.

Nec mirum. Praesens mendacia respuit aetas,
Ad quae posteritas sera coacta tacet.
Jam fuit aeternae nimium via commoda vitae.
Durum erat in tota Relligione nihil.
Externus labor omnis erat, nec erat gravis. Intus
Nescitum est cujus Relligionis erant.

Qui servit Clero, qui Clero praedia donat,
Clero magnificas aedificatque domos,
Is Pius est. Divum{que} olim referetur in Album;
Aeterna est illis vita in Ephemeride.
Papa licet rigidus divini exactor honoris
Non erat, & facilem praestitit esse Fidem,
Non ita neglexit placidè sua jura & honorem;
Sed summus, si quis deroget, ultor erat.
Gentis Anastasius Romanae erat Induperator,
Ille tamen sacro fulmine tactus erat.
Cur? Quia passus erat violari Chalcedonensis
Articulos Synodi, saepius admonitus.
Sed confirmata est Synodus sub Justiniano,
Haereticae Fidei terribilisque fuit.
Namque is Theiologus doctus cupiebat haberi,
Atque suo Princeps Codice plenus erat.
Ille tulit leges primus, quibus Haeresis (etsi
Congrua Scripturis) morte luenda foret.
Ille sibi, & Papis multos jugulavit honestos
(Quales nos hodie dicimur) haereticos.
Ille metu solvit, detraxit fraenaque Papis,
Expulsis Ghottis Regibus Italia.
Ille Potestatem Papalem Spiritualem
Inflavit, pestis quae fuit imperii.
Alter damnabat sanctos, spoliabat & alter;
Regnum Papa petens; Rex, ut avarus, opes.
Jamque animo Papae dolor unicus haesit, habere
Constantinopoli Praesulem honore parem.
Attamen obtinuit paulò post, Principe Phoca,

Primatum ad nostros quem tenet usque dies.
Nam Rex Tiberius successit Justiniano,
Cui vitam dempsit Sceptraque Mauritius;
Mauritio Phocas; Phocaeque Heraclius armis.
Proditor is fuit, hic mounothelita fuit.
Phocas Catholicus Primatum Spiritualem
Papae concessit; participi sceleris.
Plus ultra nihil est. Res est altissima terris
Papa, sibi visus vix-minor esse Deo.
Solaque cura manet quo pacto debeat uti
Fortunae fluxu, muneribusque frui;
Quantos induerat radios splendoris, & esset
Stella quibus foelix, stella maligna quibus;
Regna quibus deceat dare, vendere, tollere, quique
Exaltandus erat, quique premendus erat.
Promere sed lumen Libri, atque abscondere, Sacri,
Ipsius arbitrio, maxima cura fuit.
Nam{que} per hoc tempus cessavit lingua Latina
Romae, quae longo tempore Babel erat;
Inque unam linguas multas conflaverat aetas;
Italica haec vulgo nomine dicta fuit.
Sic qui doctrina caecus fuit antè popellus,
Cogitur officiis surdus adesse sacris.
Clerus cognoscet solus Scriptura Precesque

Quid dicunt. Populus dicere discat Amen.
Uni cunctorum commissa est cura salutis,
Romani loquitur Praesulis ore Deus.
Quod si concedas, quid prosunt Biblia sancta?
Salvus eris, si quae jusserit ille facis.

Sec.
Non erat ambitio, sed erat sapientia, vulgò
Scripturas sacras quod vetuere legi.
Nonne Dei populum vetuit conscendere montem
Flammantem Moses inde videre Deum?
Nuper ut in partes fracta est Ecclesia nostra
Vidisti; Sectae quotque fuere hominum?
Independentes, Tremuli, Presbyteriani,
Quintimonarchistae, Praesulici, Dibaphi.
Quàm multo saevum satiabant sanguine Martem.
Scituri bello judice verba Dei.
Qui cupit in celsum Sinae conscendere montem,
Antè in Parnasso fabricet ille scalam.

Pr.
Tune adeo bonus es, tantorum ut causa malorum
Visa sit esse tibi Biblia Sacra legi?
Sederat in Clero veteris faex ambitionis;
Non illis nostrae cura salutis erat:
Quis Fidei nostrae, certabant, imperitaret,
Et caperet lucrum, quod venit inde, sibi.
Nam cum naufragium passa est Romana potestas
Ad scopulos nostros, juraque perdiderat,
Evasere tamen Praelati, & fragmina pauca
Antiqui juris salva tulere sui.
Hoc lucrum quamvis non magnum Presbyter illis
Invidet, & partem clamat habere suam.
Dumque illi bello certant de Relligione,
Jus Regni Populus certat habere sibi.
Non erat in culpa divini lectio Libri,

Nec vacuum est populo ruris, adesse libris.
Sed redeo Romam quae nil nisi grande sepulchrum est,
Et Papa ad tumulum Caesaris umbra minax,
Regnans in tenebris quas fecerat, & facit ipse;
Verborumque dolis regia jura petens.
Nicenae Synodi Patribus concesserat olim
Rex Constantinus (sed nimium temerè)
Ne Fidei lites alio sub Judice sinem
Acciperent, praeter Spirituale forum.
Pro se, dumque mererentur concesserat ille;
Hi semper poscunt, & quasi jure suo.
De causis Fidei tantùm concesserat ille;
Isti personis applicuere suis.
Desiit ex illo jam longo tempore Clerus
Formidare minas Caesaris, atque forum.
Nec de criminibus vult respondere vocatus
Coram Civili Judice Clericulus.
Cur? Quia Paulus ait, Nonne inter vosmet habetis
Solvere qui justè jurgia vestra sciat?

Sec.
Quae Deus indulsit crudeli jura sub hoste,
Non eadem Sanctis semper habenda dedit.
Vivere vix licuit; licuit jus dicere? Sancte,
Nunc quoque si placeant accipe utrum{que} simul.

Pr.
Si fur, si latro, si moechus Clericus esset,
Regum Judiciis eripiendus erat;
Sique suum Regem jugulasset proditor ipsum,

Aut compilasset delubra sancta Dei;
Tunc moderabatur poenas Ecclesia Judex,
Non inconsulta commoditate sua.
Sed si quis Laicus, non dico laeserat illos,
Sed si, quod dicunt, dicere nolit idem;
Ure, Ure, exclamant, & vociferantur ad ignem,
Mortemve atrocem, siqua sit, igne magis.
Sancti, soli qui Sancti vultis haberi,
Commendat vobis saevitiemne Deus?
Non tamen ingenii sunt haec, sed facta timentum,
Quae conabantur ne patefacta forent.
In populum láqueos pluerant, ideoque timendum,
Si populus sciret, ne plueret lapides.
Crimina criminibus celantur prima secundis;
Ultima sed tandem non erit unde tegant.
Nempe Lutherus erit qui fraudes deteget omnes;
Et Papas feriet fulmine Saxonico.
Ambitio in longos perrarò prospicit annos,
Quantumvis, praesens utile, acuta videt.
Nec sua', Philosophi credebant posse refelli
A Laicis unquam, dogmata docta, viris.
His quia temporibus turbabant Mounothelitae,
Cum Christi Sanctum distraherentque gregem;
Principis injussu tunc primùm Papa vocavit,
Ipsius arbitrio, Catholicam Synodum:
Coeperunt Reges tunc primum posse putari
Haeretici; & vinctos legibus esse Scholae.

Sec.
Legibus esse Scholae subjectos non puto Reges;

Subjectos nosti Legibus esse Dei.

Pr.
Lex divina nihil de nugls continet istis;
Nam Lex haec lux est, recta jubendo, docens.
Sed doctrinarum tenebras has, nec videt ipse
Umbrarum dominus, qui sine luce videt.
Mille voluntates habet unus, dum modo vult hoc,
Deinde aliud; nullam, si nihil optat, habet.
Christus ait clarè, Sumus unus Egoque Paterque;
Visne Voluntates Unius, esse duas?
Haec provenerunt ab inani Philosophia
Temporis illius, quam coluere Patres.
Namque animae lepidam narrabant Oeconomiam
Illis temporibus, Philosophi veteres:
Quod domus est Animae Corpus, fit quod jubet illa;
Non homo, non corpus, non opus ipsa facit:
Sed bene dispositis peraguntur cuncta ministris;
Fungitur & promptè munere quisque suo;
Olfacit, & Gustat, Tactu sentit, Videt, Audit,
Non homo, sed Sensus proprius ista facit.
Nempe suum mittit simulachrum res in ocellos,
Idque videt Visus; non videt illud Homo.
Nec sonus auriculas penetrat quin audiat illum
Auditus; nihil est ipse quod audit Homo.
Acceptas species, considerat Intellectus;
Supputat & Ratio; Visque memor retinet.
Sic quoque Judicium discernit; vult{que} Voluntas;
Sic verè dictum est, Est Microcosmus Homo.

Sec.
Nil facit ad nostram comoedia slulta salutem;
Nec nos salvabunt Physica, vera licet.
Sunt credenda quidem libris quaecunque leguntur
Sacris; sed Codex non habet ista, Dei.
Non tollit peccata hominum Sapientia Graeca,
Nec facta est tardis poena Gehenna animis;
Sed fastu plenis, mendacibus, atque hypocritis,
Ingratis, avidis, omnibus atque nigris.
Nam bene moratum Physicus si perderet error,
Quo staret Doctor discipulusque loco?

Pr.
Post hanc suppressam, statim venit altera major,
Quam Reges multi sustinuere diu.
Christicolis dederat primis Ecclesia prima

Idola (at verso nomine) habere sua.
His populus fudere preces, & honore colebant
Quem dederat falsis Ethnicus antè Deis.
Id quod Pastores, regnante Leone secundo,
Innumeri, & docti non potuere pati.
Certatum est centum, scripto{que} & voce, per annos,
An licitè in sacris possit Imago coli.
Sed victi tandem cesserunt Iconomachi,
Et simul Eoum languiit Imperium.
Nam circa hoc tempus coepit Saracenica Secta
Fortiter armari, cum Mahomete suo;
Inque dies crescens, Turca duce, tandem Orientis
Sustulit Imperium, Catholicam{que} Fidem.

Haeresis interea longùm lassata quievit
Partibus Occiduis, pòst valitura tamen.
Sed quantum Papae derasum est partibus illis,
Partibus his tanto durius incubuit.
Ut ferrum candens subitum si frigus ab una
Sensit parte, magis fervet ab opposita;
Sic quoque conatus Paparum Oriente repulsi,
Partibus Occiduis invaluere magis.
Credi namque jubent fieri miracula ab illis
Quorum sunt usi simplicitate virûm.
Sed non ante obitum, nec post, nisi tempore longo:
Non patitur praesens ficta valere dies.
Non tot Moeonius narravit monstra Poeta,
Quot populo Christi Papa Legenda dedit.

Sec.
Nicenae Fidei subscripsit Episcopus unus
Qui paulò, ut dicunt, mortuus antè fuit.
Nam{que} Patres ipso posuerunt Acta sepulchro,
Orantes subtùs scribere ut ille velit.
Discessere boni Patres, saxoque reposto
Cauti signa omnes applicuere sua
Postridiè redeunt, subscriptum nomen & Actis
Inveniunt, gaudent, magnificantque Deum.

Pr.
Audiit hoc etiam Rex Constantinus? An ingens
Miraclum solus nesciit ille Dei?

Sec.

Nescio.

Pr.

Ne Credas. Cur non testatus & ipse est
Rem certam, ut posset certa valere Fides.
Sed nec tem vidit Princeps, nec id audiit unquam:
Multo posteriùs fabula ficta fuit.
Dein quod Daemoniis infernis imperitarent
(Nomine nam populus Spectra vocabat eo)
Quodque locis sacris illos expellere Epodis
Possent, possessis corporibusque hominum
(Cuncta videbatur quia sanctus scire Sacerdos)
Antiqua didicit crederé turba side.

Sec.
At Daemon mendax, qui nunc possederat ipsos,
Si credi cuperent, ejiciendus erat.

Pr.

Spiritus (adde) & avaritiae, fastûsque superbi,
Litis, vindictae, saevitiaeque ferae.
Sed nunc ridiculae miracula mitto Legendae;
Ut quae jamdudum sunt tibi nota satis.
Hoc aevo terrae spoliavit parte Latinae
Rex Lombardorum, Pontificem Laicus.
Tum Rex Chilpericus, stupidus cognomine, Regnum
Gallorum tenuit; fecit at ipse nihil:
Omnia erat Pipinus; opemque oravit ab illo
Contra Lombardos Papa; nec ille negat.

Armis Italiam petiit, superavit & hostem;
Pontifici glebam restituitque suam.
Digna rogas operae quae cepit praemia tantae?
Fit Rex Pipinus; Chilpericus Monachus.
Nec dum finis erat Pipino morte remoto,
Lombardus victus rursus in arma ruit.
Ablatas iterum Romanas occupat Urbes,
Quas iterum miles Gallicus eripiet.
Nam Carolus Magnus, Pipini filius, armis,
Lombardum ereptos reddere cogit agros.
Et veniens Roman turbatis Schismate firmam
Romanis pacem, Pontisicemque dedit.
Sic Papam fecit, victoris jure, Leonem;
(Tertius ille fuit cui Leo nomen erat.)
Nec fuit ingratus Leo; nam Carolo dedit ille
Caesaris antiqui nomen & Imperium.

Sec.
Talia dona solet producere gratia rarò;
Contracto potius foedere pacta puto.
Italus, aut Gallus quid in Anglos juris habebat?
Non sua Rex Carolus, non sua Papa dedit.

Pr.
Nil refert Quo Jure; sed actum est; & fuit alter
Terrarum Dominus; Rex Fidei alter erat.
Nec tot ad Imperii potuit tuba signa ciere
Tela, quot ad Fidei castra venire volunt.
Namque tubae clangor mortales indicat hostes;
In Sibilo Fidei creditur esse Deus.

Ipse caput Caroli cinxit diademate clarum
Papa suus (populo conspiciente) Leo.
Nec facile exultans populus sua gaudia texit,
Corde uno Reges laetus habere duos.
Ut verò capiti Regis Leo Papa coronam
Imposuit, verbis & benedixit ei;
Unus & alter erat qui clara voce DEUS DAT
Dixit, fortuitus, nescio, an appositus,
Tunc veluti quando nimium ferventia ligna
Intûs saevo ardent igne, latente tamen;
Admota facula collucent omnia flammis,
Monstrat & ardorem libera flamma suum;
Sic vulgus simul ac sensisset verba DEUS DAT,
Vocibus extensis, DAT DEUS omne sonat.
Post haec Christicolûm coeperunt regna videri
Esse data à Papis omnia, Jure Dei.
Sed non prospexit verborum posteritatem,
Aut parvi fecit Rex generosus eam.
Quae tandem neglecta in Legem transiit Usu,
Et Regum fecit jura valere parùm:
Quae Caroli soboles conatur reddere firma,
Frustra; nam Caesar nil nisi nomen erat:
Nomen, amicitiis, regnique vigore paterni,
Egregiis factis, vix tenuere tamen.
Una, Potestatem partam nunc cura manebat,
Ut, quantis, colerent artibus esset opus.
Altera, ne possent sua jura reposcere Reges;
Ne populi saperent, tertia cura fuit.
Ergo Sacerdotum statuerunt ne quis haberet

Uxorem propriam. (Sed statuere senes.)
Sec
A stupro veniens potuit celebrare Sacerdos?
A propria veniens conjuge non potuit?
Pr
Non quo tu reris Legem tinxere Colore,
Sed qui de Sacro Codice sumptus erat.
In Regno, Christus, Coelesti, dicit aperte,
Conjugium nullum; non Vir & Uxor erit.
Omnibus at Regni, Sanctis Haeredibus, hujus,
Angelico, vitam vivere, more datur:
Clericus & (docti dicunt) Haeredicus idem est;
Atque hinc est Clero quod Venus omnis abest.
Sed Color hic falsus, fugiensque in luce diei;
Et nisi sub noctem fallere ineptus erat.
Ingeniosa fuit, meditataque machina, contra
Reges, ne possent Ordinis esse Sacri.
Nam duo conjuncti tituli, Rex atque Sacerdos,
Regnum Civile, & Spirituale dabant.
Quod ne quando foret, provisum hac lege videre
Pontifices, Reges non potuere boni.
Regibus, hoc Pacto, vel Regni haerede carere,
Ordinibusve Sacris, stante, necesse fuit.

Sec.
Nonne sui populi Rex, Pastor summus & idem est?
Et Sub-Pastores nonne creare potest?
Ipsa gregis Christi (data sit cuicunque) regendi
Cura, Sacerdotem solaque (credo) facit.

Pr.
Cernere sed Pythico velaras carmine technas,
Magnanimi Reges quo potuere modo?
Nullus erat Princeps, ad sancta oracula Papae,
Quin stupidus fieret, Chilperico{que} magis.

Sec.
Sed quare populus non sensit fraudis odorem?
Anne illo nasus tempore nullus erat?

Pr.
Nasus erat, toto sed tunc Epidemicus orbe
Nasorum morbus praevaluit Polypus.
Qui ne cessaret, subtilem excogitat artem,
Callidus ut Vulpes ambitione Leo.
Ingenio, studioque solet sapientia quaeri;
Hanc generi humano tollere Papa parat.

Sec.
Nescio qui stultus sieri queat ex Sapiente;
Ex stulto sapiens erudiendo potest.

Pr.
Stultitiam fortasse putas non posse doceri:
Difficile est •urum (credo) docere senem:
Sed teneris annis, ceu mollis cera, figuram
Quamlibet accipiet, sit bona sitve mala.
Stultior esse potest quisquam, quam qui sapientem,
Et doctum egregiè se putat esse, nec est?

Sec.

Certum est. Stultitias in sese possidet omnes,
Qui nimio ingenii est captus amore sui.

Pr.
Attamen hic stultus, non Naturalis, at arte
Est factus, gignet persimilesque sui.
Qui bene composito loquitur disiria vultu,
Sermones vacuos fundit & ore gravi,
Anne in Catalogo quaeres hunc classis euntis
Anticyram, an sanis adnumerandus erit?
Nam juvenes etiam diliria discere possunt,
Aut accusandus ludimagister erit.

Sec.
Posse quidem stultos fieri concedo docendo,
Verum sic factos nemo fuisse putat.
Dic quare, Quando, quibus artibus, atque Magistris,
Effectum est foedum pestiferumque scelus.

Pr.
Pontisicis suasu, Carolus, novus Induperator,
Artibus ingenuis ferre volentis opem,
Inscius includi curavit moenibus omnes,
Ut quae cui placita est, inde petenda foret.
Et primò foelix studiorum Gallus amator
Festinat Musis aedisicare domum.
Parisiis surgit, quae nunc Sorbona vocatur,
Theiologûm studiis appropriata Schola.
Hujus ad exemplum, Reges, alii{que} Potentes
Christicolûm studiis tecta superba dabant,

Hortosque & libros, & quae tibi singula dici
Non opus est. Quae sunt, qualia, quot{que} vides.
Solus Papa tamen Leges dabat atque' Magistros.
Laedere ne posset Philosophia Fidem.

Sec.
Non placet hoc. Animis quos non infigere sensus
Venturi populi, si voluit, potuit?
Nam cum carceribus vinctas concluserat artes,
Atque Fidem servam fecerat esse sibi,
Quid veruit, si quas sibi posse nocere putaret,
Aut prodesse parum, quin jugularet eas.

Pr.

Sic fecit. Nam qualis erat doctrina per orbem
Sparsa, à Lombardo, quae tenebraeque Scoti?
Quos Praeceptores habuit Schola Parisiensis

Primos. Illorum gloria durat adhuc.

Sec.
Fama, parum sana es, tantundem dando Sophistis,
Qui virtute carent, insipidisque viris,
Quantum illis quorum populos sapientia juvit,
Aut virtus ingens, vel decoravit eos:
Nil tibi Pelides, nil nunc tibi debet Homerus.
Vilia dona tibi jam periere tua.
Sufficit ergo mihi, si quid bene fecero, vivo
Aemulus oblatret, laudet amicus homo.

Pr.
Hi primi (dicunt) Lombardusque, & Scotus à Duns,
Cum sociis primae quos habuere Scholae,
Ex Patribus, Sacris Scripturis, & Stagyrita
Mixtis, doctrinam composuere novam.
Linguam Romanam vertêre in Gallimatiam.

Sec.
Sermo quis?

Pr.

Appositè. Ducocalanus erat.

Sec.
Quoru¯ hominu¯ sermo?

Pr.
Somnitûm, non procul Umbris.
Scripsit eo multos Musa Lalia libros.
Quorum doctrinam pleno quicun{que} bibisset
Haustu, mutatus, non erat id quod erat.
Potus ut in mensa geminas putat esse lucernas;
Sic Regem ille suum concipit esse duos.
Ut qui veneficae gustarat pocula Circes,
Illic è puero sit lupus, ursus, aper.
Et cicures vigilare jubentur ad atria Circes;
Sic Papis debent advigilare Scholae.
Sicut amor Loti socios mutavit Ulissis,
Ne vellent patriae plus meminisse suae;
Sic Papis cives adjunxit vita Scholaris,

Fecit{que} aversos regibus esse suis.
Hoc quo{que} par Ithaci sociis est, at{que} Scholari,
Mutatus specie ut, se putet esse virum.
Egressus{que} Scholae tenebris, quos convenit omnes,
Communis vitae nescius ipse, docet.
Exclamat, clamat, declamat fortiter; omnes
Intempestivè corrigit atque docet.
Simpliciter, , Typicè, Topicè, Tropicéve
Omnia, quae libitum est dicere, vera facit
Huic hominum generi mandatum est justificare
Omnia, quae voluit Papa vocare Fidem;
Obsequium{que} Sacrae dare tunc sine limite Sedi,
Jussaque Pontificis, jussa vocare Dei.
Haec omnes sonuere Scholae, docuere Cathedrae,
A cunis didicit sic puer esse pius;
Contemptus Regum surgit cum Relligione;
Et plebs civili libera lege furit.
Nempe Deo visum est tunc solvere cingula Regum,
Qui mox stultitiae verbera digna ferent.

Sec.
Non ego Alexandri Magni, nec Caesatis acta
Amplius admiror, Hannibalisve dolos,
Qui sibi larga quidem, sed sanguine, regna pararunt;
Parta tenere tamen non potuere diu:
Quod potuit subjectus inertibus esse Magistris
Perdomitus mundus, dum reputo, stupeo.
Castra quidem video; nam sunt Collegia castra,
Arma tamen desunt, & quibus arma darent.

Pr.

Erras. Pontisicum fuit unusquis{que} satelles,
Quae{que} dabant Reges arma, ferebat eis.

Sec.
Heu, Schola qualis erat capiendis Machina Regnis!
Ingenii plusquam Mercurialis opus.
Vincula, quae mollem tenuerunt ferrea Martem,
Firma fuere minus, crassa fuere magis.
Tanta meâ nunquam sapientia laude carebit,
Qui sum stultitiae conscius ipse meae.

Pr.
Vasa quidem & nummos facile est subducere furto,
Et sceptrum, si vis, & Diadema simul;
Regnum, difficile est; fieri sed tempore longo

Possibile est. Aetas omnia, longa potest.
Movisset Terrae Siculus mirabilis orbem,
Si locus esset ubi staret in orbe alius.
Partem operis si dat breve tempus, tempore multo
Perficiet totum, qui tenet id quod habet.
Unco fur noctu subducit stragula lectis;
Pastorale pedum, crede, quod uncus erat.
Furtum ne laudes; non est sapientia, sed fraus,
Quae nunquam magnis insidet ingeniis.

Sec.
Sed quid agas? Nolles Collegia habere tot agros,
Aut tam magnisicas, tot{que} habitare domos?

Ergo cave, si vis, ne forte fuga vitiorum
In majora ruas, barbariem{que} meram.
Non fama pejore videbere Templa deorum,
Doctrina celebres quam spoliare Scholas.

Pr.
Non illis, studio quibus est sapientia, & artes,
Tecta superba, libros, invideo nec opes.
Opto sed in primis ut vera scientia crescat,
Ut{que} sciens omnis sit manus artificis.
Ut{que} omnis Doctor quid justum est norit & aequum,
Quoque Deum deceat conciliare modo;
Et quae conducunt, quae sunt contraria Paci,
Quaelibet & virtus unde sit & vitium;
Noverit & factu quid turpe sit, & quid honestum;
Quosque onerat rerum copia, quos{que} levat;
Quid sperare facit, quid terret, quid{que} pudere
Cogit; quique humilem noverit erigere.
Haec si quis rectè, scierit, poteritque paterno
Ore, quasi ad natos, cum gravitate loqui;
Nec propriae suevit contraria dicere voci,
Nec, quae non quadrant cum ratione, docet;
Et norit Methodu¯ rectam qua quae{que} docenda
Ars est; illius & prima Elementa sciat.

Sec.
Verùm quis tam doctus in ipsa est Arte Docendi,
Omnibus ut mereat scribere jura Scholis?

Pr.
Judicii res est & doctrinae mediocris;
Et facere hoc possem forte (vocatus) ego.
Hunc ego quantovis, meritò, dignabor honore;
Hunc merui, populi postulat utilitas.
Nondum se, Reges satis afflixisse, putabat
Papa; fuere amplae quas metuebat opes.
Quas ut pro Christo possent fudisse videri,
In bellum Eoum sub Cruce mittit eos.
Nam{que} armis Asiam Saraceni tunc tenuere
Papae subductam, quae repetenda fuit.
Inde mali Martis crudelia verbera passi,
Exhausti redeunt, ad mala multa, domi.
Mox majora audet, regum feritate subacta,
(Gesta priora meri gesta fuere hominis.)
Humano majus jus postulat, atque videri
Posse aliquid, solus quod Deus ipse potest.
In summum commissa Deum peccata remittit
Maxima, nescio quo Jure Tribunitio;
Quamvis in Sedem sacram commissa remitti
Aut nunc, aut post haec secula, posse negat.
At peccata idem pretio sine, nulla remittit;
Sed vult divinas vendere Sector opes.
Ut promus condus Divini, factus, Amoris,
Distribuit variis fata futura locis.
Egregiè meritos de Sacra Sede locabat
In summo coeli culmine stelliferi.
Deinde Patres veteres, ut Noen, ut{que} Abrahamum,
Davidem, Mosen, inferiore loco.

Post hos, Infantes nondum Baptismate lotos,
Expertes poenae Tertius Orbis habet.
Perpetuis Quartus consumit crimina nummis,
Et nisi quae non sunt igne levanda, levat.
Ultimus, horribilis Serpentibus atque tenebris,
Est datus Haereticis, Daemonibusque locus.
Spe summae Sedis vanos mulcebat amicos,
Atque hostes Imo terruit Orbe leves.
Prosuit, & prodest nunc Purgatorius ignis
Pontifici multùm, Sacrificisque suis.

Sec.
Sed Patribus quare visum est puerisque seorsim
Assignare orbes? Nil venit inde boni.

Pr.
Non summo hos Patres coelo posuere, quod illi
De Papa Romae nil meruere boni.
Non imo foedo{que} loco posuere, quod illi
De Papa Romae nil meruere mali.
Infantes Limbo neutro posuere, quod illi
Nil potuere boni, nil potuere mali
Sed simulatque animas decrerant esse animatas,
Debebatur eis certus in orbe locus.
Nec dum credebat Reges satis esse subactos,
Sed Nova Castra parat, Militiam{que} novam.
Infundit Regum terris examina Fratrum,
Mendicos sacros, quos aleret populus.
His quo{que} vermiculis Reges homines{que} opulenti
Magnificas certant aedisicare domos.

Unde volant, alis enatis, Templa{que} bombo
Implent; nam musca est quae modo vermis erat;
At{que} per ora virûm volitans non multa scientum,
Illorum patulis insidet auriculis;
Corrumpens mores Civiles, nec sinit illos,
Ut debènt, fidos Regibus esse suis.
Parendum esse Deo, potius quam Regibus, inquit,
Nil dubii est: Eadem Papa Deusque jubent.
Sedulus ad lectum morientibus adstat, & audit
Quae sua quis{que} velit non bene facta loqui.
Consilioque juvat, pia Testamentaque dictat;
Da{que} Deo, dicit, Qui tibi tanta dedit.
Inde tot & tanti sacris Donaria Templis,
In Reges videas arma parata, Deo.
Explorator erat quo{que} Confessarius omnis,
Et confessa Deo dicere doctus erat:
Nam Deus in terris hoc tempore Papa fuisset,
Si non per Regum jura creandus erat.
Papa Leo Carolus{que} agnus sibi mutua regna
Tradiderant pacto, Carnis & Ingenii.
Sed pactum hoc Papae non servavêre sequentes;
Non aequum est par jus Carnis & Ingenii.
Namque, inconsulto, Papas, Induperatore,
Est ausus Clerus saepe creare sibi.
Hinc sub Conrado (sed quaere quoto) ferus ille
Longusque occiduo motus in orbe fuit.
Pro Papa Guelphi, pro Caesare stant Gibelini,
(Temporis istius nomina forte ducum)
Exiit hoc bellum Frederico Caesare capto,

(Illo qui primus nomine Caesar erat.)
Hunc Veneti vicere, Fugatus Papa triumphat;
Nomine Alexander Tertius ille fuit;
Qui capta Roma, Veneta latitabat in Urbe,
Detectus{que} ipso Caesare major abit.
Cujus & in collum steterat, dictis{que} superbis
Insueto dederat vulnera saeva animo.

Sec.
Crescere plus ultra terrena potentia nescit,
Omnis & ambitio sic satiata perit.
Nil habuere ultra sperandum, nil metuendum
Pontifices; cessit spes{que} metus{que} simul.
Ridebat quoties spectabat aruspicem aruspex,
Ingenii miro captus amore sui.

Pr.
Quod risere parum est. Humilis sublatus in altum,
Insultans victis Iudere saeva solet.
Regibus imponit duram contra Saracenos
Militiam; ipsorum sumptibus id{que} suis.
Deinde animi causa, Reges populi{que} subacti
Experiebatur quid potuere pati.
Lascivire solet nimiùm secura potestas;
Regnantumque facit jussa superba quies.
Nam{que} super Panem sanctum si quando Sacerdos
Verba Dei rectè Sacra Ioquutus erat,
Credi Papa jubet Panem non amplius esse,
Sed veri Carnem, Sanguinem, & Ossa Dei.
Qui non credebat, Christi pellendus ovill

Et vita (nisi se credere juret) erat.
Nec tamen hac crevit jam summa potentia Papae
Lege; sed ob pulchrè gesta Triumphus erat.
Nam voluit toti manifestum reddere mundo
Obsequium simplex se sibi velle dari,
Nec passurum impunè loqui sua dogmata contra
Quemqua¯ hominem; Fidei nam dabit ipse modu¯.
Etsi tu Panem esse putas, si dixerit ille,
Caseus est, dices tu quo{que} Caseus est.
Sensit idem tecum; non indiget ut doceatur,
Indiget officiis obsequio{que} tuo.
Post multos cyathos stomachu¯ movet ultimus, & quod
Antè erat ebibitum redditur omne simul.
Moverat haec multos sic Transmutatio Panis,
Ut scita à Papis plurima rejicerent.
Waldus erat quidam vir Lugdunensis, & idem
Ingenio at{que} opibus clarus in urbe sua,
Scripturaeque sciens sacrae Laicus, solitusque
Non quid sit Dominus quaerere, sed quid ait;
De{que} Fide sensit quae nunc Ecclesia sentit
Nostra ferò; non est nunc nova nostra Fides.
Nec sensus narrare suos metuebat amicis,
Haereticis quanquam tunc grave tempus erat.
Ergo per innumerum populum doctrina volare
Waldi, & paulatim crescere vera Fides;
Donec ad ingentem strepitum perculsus, in illos,
Immisit Reges Papa quibusque suos.
Waldenses tandem multi anni, praelia multa
Extinx•re. Dei non sine consilio;

Nam{que} animis hominum tunc semina jacta fuere,
Quae surgent Papis exitiosa seges.
Territus his turbis multo crudelior exit;
Suspectum Haeretici nomine quem{que} rapit.
Suspectum abjurare facit (si vult) vel ab igne
(Si non vult) vivus vertitur in cineres.
Qui falsò abjurat, resipiscere dicitur; at si
Quem juramenti poenitet, ille perit.

Sec.
Nonne quibus vellent potuerunt parcere Reges?

Pr.

Non. Non credebant Juris id esse Sui.
Et mox Concilio Legem tulit in Laterano,
Ne quis Rex esset mitis in Haereticos;
Qua, nisi post annum, monitus purgaverit omnis
Haereseos regnum, dejiciendus erat.
Hoc est si Reges Papis parere recusent,
Civibus obsequii vincula nulla sient.
Quo potuere loco securi vivere Reges,
Cum percussori Lex daret ista sicam?
Sed solitos repetit securus Papa triumphos
Ad nomen quamquam palluit Haeretici.
Caetera fortis erat vacuusque superstitione.
An Romae Clerum Spectra timere putas?
Illorum nemo est, etiam sino Aqua Benedicta,
Qui dubitat noctu solus, & in tenebris;
Ad defunctorum monumenta quiescere sacra;

Inque adytis Templi; si jubet utilitas.
Sed metuunt potius ne nos ea non metuamus;
Hoc est, Haereticos, atque patere timent.

Sec.
Cur non in Clerum Laicis saevire Latinum
Principibus licuit, par{que} referre pari?

Pr.
Non patiebatur tempus. Papalis arundo
Haesit crudeli non quatienda manu.
Post haec Wiccliffus (regeret cum Tertius Anglos
Edwardus) doctus disputat Oxoniae,
Plera{que} defuncti defendens dogmata Waldi,
Ingeniis rectis vincere visus erat.
Mox{que} rei gestae commovit fama Bohemos,
Unde ortum bellum est Haereticale novum.
Perdidit Haereticos tandem victoria crebra,
Pontifices{que} auxit miles utrin{que} cadens.

Sec.
Sed miror potuisse homines tot ad arma vocari

Haereticos. Nemo lege coactus erat.
Nec, puto, cura fuit sincerae Relligionis,
De qua securus rusticus esse solet.
Paucis scire datur Verborum sensa Sacrorum;
Uno emptum (sine re) scire, nec asse, velint.
Vulgo nulla mali nota est mensura bonique;
Juris & Injusti nomina sola tenent.
Justum quis{que} vocat quicquid tutò facit ipse;

Quod patitur Nolens, id putat esse Nesas:
Impia sumpserunt in Reges ergo Bohemi
Arma suos stulti, nec placitura Deo.

Pr.
Nec placuere Deo; qui lucem reddere mundo
Lege parat Justa, non populi facibus.
Wiccliffum texit Dux Lancastrensis, & idem
Insignis sastûs spiritualis osor.
Secta tamen mansit, Lollardorum{que} vocata est,
Territa sed duris Legibus obticuit.
Nam Rex Henricus, Rex illo nomine Quartus
Adjutus populi sceptra favore rapit;
Invidiam{que} volens Cleri placare, quod hostis
Verticibus rasis Dux pater ejus erat,
Haereticis nostris Vivi-comburia festum
Lege dedit primus; expediebat enim.
Sed post centum annos, decimo Papante Leone,
Sub Duce Saxonico Principe legitimo,
Exurgit damnata Fides, clamante Luthero,
Qui magno populos permeat ore loquens;
Discidit{que} locis plus centum retia Papae,
Texta à Nobilibus, sed male texta Scholis.
Unde quot elapsi Reges, Urbesque Potentes,
Papali portant libera colla jugo;
Quàm sit ubi{que} ferè Papae nunc tonsa Potestas,
Dicere non opus est pluribus; ipse vides.

Sec.
Quod restat video. Sed te volo pauca rogare,

Et respondebis tu brevitate tua.
Gloria erat quondam Romani Praesulis ingens;
Calcavit pedibus Regia colla suis.
Illius innumeri Reges mandata manebant,
Et Regum cicurum bella gerebat ope.
Ut Jovis, illius tremuere ad fulmina gentes,
Sacro figentes oscula blanda pedi.
Divitias omnis cogebat ventus ad illum,
Frigidus Eurus, Afer, Vesperus, & Boreas.
Ille sedens nutu librabat cuncta verendo.
Quod curaret erat praeter hiare nihil.
Adde quod in tuto fuit illi tanta Potestas;
Si potes in terris quid reperire ratum.
Stabat nam{que} super populum fundata volentem:
(Quod, non fert populus si bene junctus, onus?)
At populum sensu varium res unica jungit,
Jussa sui Regis, jussa putare Dei.
Jussa Dei populis cum solus Papa ferebat,
Et credebatur vix minor esse Deo;
Quis tantum imperium, tam sido milite fultum,
Rupe situm celsa, posse perire putet?
Verum nunc minus est. Quodcunque attriverit aetas,
Tandem & conficiet, dente licet tacito.
Magna{que} jampridem periit pars ense resecta
Machummet, quam nunc Turcica Luna regit.
Pars quo{que} defecit doctis abducta Lutheri
Scriptis, qui servam noluit esse Fidem.
Longos saepe dies sine Solibus ire videmus,
Cuncta{que} perpetua sydera nube tegi;

Quam Sol mox altus penetrans vibrantibus armis
Discutit, & varios cogit adire locos;
Sic nova Saxonici exoriens doctrina Lutheri
Discussit Papae Spirituale jugum.
Agricolis igitur missis ambos arat Indos,
His{que} novi Imperii semina condit agris;
Tanquam si migrare velit, sedem{que} locare,
Secula post aliquot, fertiliore loco.
Et Fidei fontem surgentem forte videbunt
Monte Potossino secula sera sacrum:
Nos autem Christi populus portabimus istuc
Pontificis pedibus basia danda nigri.
Quas habuit tanti causas Ecclesia damni,
Tingendi{que} novo retia sicca mari?

Pr.

Dicam. Saevitiem, Fastum, gladium Mahometis,
Contemptum Regum, Dogmata surda, Typos.

Sec.
Scire etiam cupio Christus cui, quae facienti
Donat foelices, & sine fine dies.

Pr.
Foelicem fore Christus ait qui non petit alta,
Contentus paucis ambitione procul.
Qui{que} sit ingenio mitis nec pronus ad iram;
Qui sorti alterius compatitur{que} malae;
Vivere qui justè toto conamine tendit:
Et peccata libens corrigit ipse sua.

Cor quibus est mundum, simplex{que} dolo sine turpi;
Et qui certantes conciliare studet;
Et qui condonat facilis peccata aliena;
Atque animo si quis fert sua damna bono.
Denique salvus erit quisquis peccata sua odit
Corditùs; & Christi fixerit illa Cruci.

FINIS.

The Autobiography

Fetter Lane, City of London — Hobbes took up lodgings here in 1651 and he was living on this street on the publication of 'Leviathan'.

Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF, BY WAY OF LETTER TO A LEARNED PERSON.

SIR,

I AM ONE of them that admire your Writings; and having read over your Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos, I cannot hold from giving you some account of the causes why I admire it: And first I considered how you handle him for his Disloyalty, in these words, pag. the 5th. His great *Leviathan* (wherein he placed his main strength) is now somewhat out of season; which, upon deserting his Royal Master in distress, (for he pretends to have been the King's Tutor, though yet, from those who have most reason to know it, I can find but little ground for such a pretence,) was written in defence of Oliver's Title, (or whoever, by whatsoever means, can get to be upmost,) placing the whole Right of Government meerly in strength, and Absolving all his Majesties Subjects from their Allegiance, whenever He is not in a present capacity to force Obedience.

That which I observe and admire here first, is, That you left not this passage out, for two reasons; One, because Mr Hobbes could long for nothing more than such an occasion to tell the world his own and your little stories, during the time of the late Rebellion.

When the Parliament sate, that began in April 1640. and was dissolved in May following, and in which many points of the Regal Power, which were

necessary for the Peace of the Kingdom, and the safety of His Majesties Person, were disputed and denied, M^{r}. Hobbes wrote a little Treatise in English, wherein he did set forth and demonstrate, That the said Power and Rights were inseparably annexed to the Sovereignty; which Sovereignty they did not then deny to be in the King; but it seems understood not, or would not understand that Inseparability. Of this Treatise, though not Printed, many Gentlemen had Copies, which occasioned much talk of the Author; and had not His Majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought him into danger of his Life.

He was the first that had ventured to write in the King's defence, and one, amongst very few, that upon no other ground but knowledge of his Duty, and Principles of Equity, without special Interest, was in all points perfectly Loyal.

The 3^{d} of November following, there began a new Parliament, consisting for the greatest part of such men as the People had elected only for their adverseness to the Kings Interest. These proceeded so fiercely in the very beginning against those that had written or preach'd in the defence of any part of that Power, which they then intended to take away, and in gracing those whom the King had disgrac'd for Sedition, that Mr. Hobbes doubting how they would use him, went over into France, the first of all that fled, and there continued eleven years, to his dammage some thousands of pounds deep. This (Dr.) was your time of harvest: You were in their favour, and that (as you have made it since appear) for no goodness.

Being at Paris, he wrote and published his Book de Cive, in Latine, to the end that all Nations which should hear what you and your Concovenanters were doing in England, might detest you, which I believe they do; for I know no Book more magnified than this is beyond the Seas.

When His Majesty that now is came to Paris, Mr. Hobbes had the honour to initiate him in the Mathematicks; but never was so impudent or ignorant

as to call, or think himself the King's Tutor, as you (that understand not what that word, out of the University, signifies) do falsly charge him with; or ever to say, that he was one of His Majesties domestique Servants. While upon this occasion he staid about Paris, and had neither encouragement nor desire to return into England, he wrote and published his Leviathan, far from the intention either of disadvantage to His Majesty, or to flatter Oliver, (who was not made Protector till three or four years after) or purpose to make way for his return: For there is scarce a page in it that does not upbraid both him, and you, and others such as you, with your abominable hypocrisie and villany.

Nor did he desert His Majesty, as you falsly accuse him, as His Majesty Himself knows. Nor was His Majesty (as you unmannerly term it) in distress. He had the Title, Right and Reverence of a King, and maintained His faithful Servants with Him. It is true, that Mr. Hobbes came home; but it was because he would not trust his safety with the French Clergy.

Do you know that ever he sought any benefit either from Oliver, or from any of his Party, or was any way familiar with any of his Ministers, before or after his Return? or curried favour with any of them (as you did by Dedicating a Book to his Vice-Chancellor Owen?)

Did you ever hear that he took any thing done to him by His Majesty in evil part, or spake of him otherwise than the best of His Servants would do; or that he was sullen, silent, or sparing, in praising His Majesty in any company, upon any occasion?

He knew who were his enemies, and upon what ground they misconstrued his writings.

But your indiscretion appears more manifestly in giving him occasion to repeat what you have done, and to consider you, as you professedly have considered him: For with what equity can it be denied him to repeat your manifest and horrible Crimes, for all you have been pardoned; when you

publish falsly pretended faults of his, and comprehended in the same pardon?

If he should say, and publish, That you decyphered the Letters of the King and His Party, and thereby delivered his Majesties secrets to the Enemy, and His best Friends to the Scaffold, and boasted of it in your Book of Arithmetick (written in Latin) to all the World, as of a Monument of your Wit, worthy to be preserved in the University Library: How will you justifie your self, if you be reproached for having been a Rebel and a Traytor? It may be you, or some for you, will now say, You decyphered those Letters to the King's advantage: But then you were unfaithful to your Masters of the Parliament: A very honest pretence, and full of gallantry, to excuse Treason with Treachery, and to be a double Spy. Besides, Who will believe it? Who enabled you to do the King that favour? Why hearded you with His Enemies? Who brought the King into a need of such a fellows favour, but they that first deserted him, and then made War upon him, and which were your friends, and Mr. Hobbes his enemies. Nay more, I know not one enemy Mr. Hobbes then had, but such as were first the Kings enemies, and because the King's therefore his. Your being of that Party, (without your decyphering,) amounts to more than a desertion. Of the Bishops that then were, and for whose sakes (in part) you raised the War, there was not one that followed the King out of the Land, though they loved him, but lived quietly under the Protection, first of the Parliament, and then of Oliver, (whose Titles and Actions were equally unjust) without treachery. Is not this as bad as if they had gone over, and (which was Mr. Hobbes his case) been driven back again? I hope you will not call them all desertors, (or because by their stay here openly they accepted of the Parliament's and of Oliver's Protection) defenders either of Oliver's, or of the Parliament's Title to the Sovereign Power.

How many were there in that Parliament at first that did indeed and voluntarily desert the King, in consenting to many of their unjust actions? Many of these afterwards, either upon better judgment, or because they pleased not the Faction, (for it was a hard matter for such as were not of Pymms Cabal to please the Parliament,) or for some other private ends, deserted the Parliament, and did some of them more hurt to the King than if they had staid where they were; (for they had been so affrighted by such as you, with a panick fear of Tyranny, that seeking to help Him by way of Composition and sharing, they abated the just and necessary indignation of His Armies, by which only His Right was to be recovered.)

That very entring into the Covenant with the Scottish Nation against the King, is by it self a very great Crime, and you guilty of it. And so was the imposing of the Engagement, and you guilty of that also, as being done by the then Parliament, whose Democratical Principles you approv'd of.

You were also assisting to the Resemblance of Divines that made the Directory, and which were afterwards put down by Oliver for counterfeiting themselves Ambassadors. And this was when the King was living, and in the head of an Army, which with your own endeavour might have protected you. What crime it is (the King being Head of the Church of England) to make Directories, to alter the Church-Government, and to set up new Forms of Gods Service, upon your own fancies, without the Kings Authority, the Lawyers could have told you; and what punishment you were to expect from it, you might have seen in the Statute printed before the Book of Common-Prayer.

Further he may say, and truly, That you were guilty of all the Treasons, Murders, and Spoil committed by Oliver, or by any upon Oliver's or the Parliament's Authority: For, during the late trouble, who made both Oliver and the People mad, but the Preachers of your Principles? But besides the wickedness, see the folly of it. You thought to make them mad, but just to

such a degree as should serve your own turn; that is to say, mad, and yet just as wise as your selves. Were you not very imprudent to think to govern madness? Paul they knew, but who were you? Who were they that put the Army into Oliver's hands, (who before, as mad as he was, was too weak, and too obscure to do any great mischief) with which Army he executed upon such as you, both here and in Scotland, that which the Justice of God required.

Therefore, of all the Crimes (the Great Crime not excepted) done in that Rebellion, you were guilty; You, I say, Dr. (how little force or wit soever you contributed) for your good will to their Cause. The King was hunted as a Partridge in the Mountains; and though the Hounds have been hang'd, yet the Hunters were as guilty as they, and deserved no less punishment. And the Decypherers, and all that blew the horn, are to be reckoned amongst the Hunters. Perhaps you would not have had the prey killed, but rather have kept it tame. And yet who can tell? I have read of few Kings deprived of their Power by their own Subjects, that have lived any long time after it, for reasons that every man is able to conjecture.

All this is so manifest as it needs no witnesses. In the mean time Mr. Hobbes his behaviour was such, that of them who appeared in that Scene, he was the only man I know (except a few that had the same Principles with him) that has not something more or less to blush for; as having either assisted that rebellious Parliament, without necessity, (when they might have had Protection from the King, if they had resorted to him for it in the field,) by Covenanting, or by Action, or with Money, or Plate, or by Voting against His Majesties Interest, in Himself, or His Friends; though some of them have since by extraordinary Service deserved to be received into favour: But what's that to you? You are none of them; and yet you dare to reproach the guiltless, as if after so ill fruits of your Sermons, it were not impudence enough to preach.

I admire further, That having been forgiven these so transcendent Crimes, (so great a debt to the Gallows) you take Mr. Hobbes by the throat for a word in his Leviathan, made a fault by malicious or over-hasty construction: For you have thereby, like the unmerciful debtor in the Gospel, (in my opinion) forseited your pardon, and so, without a new one, may be hanged yet.

To that other Charge, That he writ his Leviathan in defence of Oliver's Title, he will say, That you in your own conscience know it is false. What was Oliver when that Book came forth? It was in 1650, and Mr. Hobbes returned before 1651. Oliver was then but General under your Masters of the Parliament, nor had yet cheated them of their usurped Power: For that was not done till two or three years after, in 1653. which neither he nor you could foresee: What Title then of Oliver's could he pretend to justifie? But you will say, He placed the Right of Government there wheresoever should be the strength; and so by consequence he placed it in Oliver. Is that all? Then primarily his Leviathan was intended for your Masters of the Parliament, because the strength was then in them: Why did they not thank him for it, both they and Oliver in their turns? There (Doctor) you decypher'd ill: For it was written in the behalf of those many and faithful Servants and Subjects of His Majesty, that had taken His part in the War, or otherwise done their utmost endeavour to defend His Majesties Right and Person against the Rebels; whereby, having no other means of Protection, nor (for the most part) of subsistence, were forced to compound with your Masters, and to promise Obedience for the saving of their Lives and Fortunes, which in his Book he hath affirmed they might lawfully do, and consequently not lawfully bear Arms against the Victors. They that had done their utmost endeavour to perform their obligation to the King, had done all that they could be obliged unto; and were consequently at liberty to seek the safety of their Lives and Livelihood wheresoever, and without

Treachery. But there is nothing in that Book to justifie the submission of you, (or such as you) to the Parliament, after the King's being driven from them, or to Oliver; for you were the King's Enemies, and cannot pretend want of that Protection which you your selves refused, denied, fought against, and destroyed. If a man owe you money, and you by robbing him, or other injury, disable him to pay you, the fault's your own; nor needs this exception, Unless the Creditor rob him, be put into the Condition of the Bond. Protection and Obedience are Relative. He that says a man may submit to an enemy for want of Protection, can never be construed, but that he meant it of the Obedient. But let us consider his words. They are in pag. 390. Where he puts for a Law of Nature, That every man is bound as much as in him lieth, to protect in War the Authority by which he is himself protected in time of Peace; which I think is no ungodly nor unreasonable Principle. For confirmation of it, he defines in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to obey an unjust Conquerour: And defines it thus; It is that point wherein having liberty to submit to the Conquerour, he consenteth either by express words, or by other sufficient signs, to be his Subject.

I cannot see, Doctor, how a man can be at liberty to submit to his new, that has not first done all he could for his old Master: Nor if he have done all he could, why that liberty should be refused him. If a man be taken by the Turk, and brought by terrour to fight against his former Master, I see how he may be kill'd for it as an Enemy, but not as a Criminal: Nor can I see how he that hath liberty to submit, can at the same time be bound not to submit.

But you will say, perhaps, That he defines the time of that liberty to the advantage of Oliver, in that he says, that for an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his Life are within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no protection but from the Enemy, for his

Contribution. It was not necessary for him to explain it to men of so great Understanding, that you and other his Enemies pretend to be, by putting in the Exception, Unless they came into those Guards and Garrisons by their own Treason. Do you think that Oliver's Party, for their submission to Oliver, could pretend the want of that Protection?

The words therefore by themselves, without that exception, do signifie no more than this, That whosoever had done as much as in him did lye to protect the King in War, had liberty afterwards to provide themselves of such Protection as they could get; which to those whose means of life were within the Guards and Garrisons of Oliver, was Oliver's Protection.

Do you think when a Battel is lost, and you at the mercy of the Enemy, is it unlawful to receive Quarter with condition of Obedience? Or if you receive it on that condition, do you think it honesty to break promise, and treacherously murder him that gave you your life? If that were good Doctrine, he were a foolish Enemy that would give Quarter to any man.

You see then, that this submission to Oliver, or to your then Masters, is allowed by Mr. Hobbes his Doctrine only to the King's faithful Party, and not to any that fought against him, howsoever they coloured it, by saying they fought for the King and Parliament; nor to any that writ or preached against His Cause, or encouraged His Adversaries; nor to any that betrayed His Counsels, or that intercepted or decyphered any Letters of His, or of His Officers, or of any of His Party; nor to any that by any way had contributed to the diminution of His Majesties Power, Ecclesiastical or Civil; nor does it absolve any of them from their Allegeance. You that make it so heinous a crime for a man to save himself from violent death, by a forc'd submission to an Usurper, should have considered what crime it was to submit voluntarily to the Usurping Parliament.

I can tell you besides, why those words were put into his last Chapter, which he calls the Review. It happened at that time that there were many

Honourable Persons, that having been faithful and unblemished Servants of the King, and Souldiers in His Army, had their Estates then Sequestred; of whom some were fled, but the Fortunes of them all were at the mercy (not of Oliver, but) of the Parliament. Some of these were admitted to Composition, some not. They that Compounded, though they help'd the Parliament less by their Composition, than they should have done (if they had stood out) by their Confiscation, yet they were ill spoken of, especially by those that had no Estates to lose, nor hope to Compound. And it was for this that he added to what he had written before, this caution, That if they would compound, they were to do it bonafide, without intention of Treachery. Wherein he justified their Submission by their former Obedience, and present Necessity; but condemned Treachery. Whereas you that pretend to abhor Atheism, condemn that which was done upon necessity, and justifie the Treachery: And you had reason for it, that cannot otherwise justifie your selves. Those struglings which happened afterwards, lost His Majesty many a good and able Subject, and strengthened Oliver with the Confiscation of their Estates, which if they had attended the Discord of their Enemies, might have been saved.

Perhaps you will take for a sign of Mr. Hobbes his ill meaning, that His Majesty was displeased with him. And truly I believe He was displeased for a while, but not very long. They that complained of, and mis-construed his writings, were His Majesties good Subjects, and reputed Wise and Learned men, and thereby obtained to have their mis-construction believed for some little time: But the very next Summer after his coming away, two Honourable Persons of the Court that came over into England, assured him, that His Majesty had a good opinion of him; and others since have told me, that His Majesty said openly, That He thought Mr. Hobbes never meant him hurt. Besides, His Majesty hath used him more graciously than is ordinary to so humble a person as he is, and so great a Delinquent as you would

make him, and testified His esteem of him in His bounty. What Argument now can you draw from hence more than this, That His Majesty understood his writings better than his Accusers did.

I admire in the next place, upon what ground you accuse him (and with him all those that have approved his Leviathan) with Atheism. I thought once, that that slander had had some (though not firm) ground in that you call his new Divinity: But for that point he will allege these words of his Leviathan, pag. 238. By which it seemeth to me (with submission nevertheless both in this and all other Questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the Interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Commonwealth, whose Subject I am,) That, &c. What is there in these words but Modesty and Obedience? But you were at this time in actual Rebellion. Mr. Hobbes, that holds Religion to be a Law, did in order thereto condemn the maintenance of any of his Opinions against the Law; and you that reproach him for them upon your own account, should also have shewn by your own Learning, wherein the Scripture, which was his sole proof, was mis-cited, or mis-construed by him; (for he submitted to the Laws, that is to say, to the King's Doctrine, not to yours;) and not have insulted for the Victory won by the power of the Law, to which you were then an enemy.

Another Argument of Atheism you take from his denying immaterial, or incorporeal Substances. Let any man impartially now compare his Religion with yours, by this very measure, and judge which of the two savours most of Atheism.

It is by all Christians confess'd, that God is incomprehensible; that is to say, that there is nothing can arise in our Fancy from the naming of him, to resemble him either in shape, colour, stature, or nature; there is no Idea of him; he is like nothing that we can think on: What then ought we to say of him? What Attributes are to be given him, not speaking otherwise than we think, nor otherwise than is fit, by those who mean to honour him? None

but such as Mr. Hobbes hath set down, namely, Expressions of Reverence, such as are in Use amongst men for signs of Honour, and consequently signifie Goodness, Greatness, and Happiness; and either absolutely put, as Good, Holy, Mighty, Blessed, Just, Wise, Merciful, &c. or Superlative, as most Good, most Great, most Mighty, Almighty, most Holy, &c. or Negative, of whatsoever is not perfect, as Infinite, Eternal, and the like: And not such as neither Reason nor Scripture hath approved for honourable. This is the Doctrine that Mr. Hobbes hath written, both in his Leviathan, and in his Book de Cive, and when occasion serves, maintains. What kind of Attribute I pray you is immaterial, or incorporeal substance? Where do you find it in the Scripture? Whence came it hither, but from Plato and Aristotle, Heathens, who mistook those thin Inhabitants of the Brain they see in sleep, for so many incorporeal men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things corporeal? Do you think it an honour to God to be one of these? And would you learn Christianity from Plato and Aristotle? But seeing there is no such word in the Scripture, how will you warrant it from natural reason? Neither Plato nor Aristotle did ever write of, or mention an incorporeal Spirit; for they could not conceive how a Spirit, which in their Language was ... (in ours a Wind) could be incorporeal. Do you understand the connection of substance and incorporeal? If you do, explain it in English; for the words are Latine. It is something, you'l say, that being without Body, stands under — . Stands under what? Will you say, under Accidents? Almost all the Fathers of the Church will be against you; and then you are an Atheist. Is not Mr. Hobbes his way of Attributing to God, that only which the Scriptures Attribute to him; or what is never any where taken but for honour, much better than this bold Undertaking of yours, to consider and decypher Gods nature to us?

For a third Argument of Atheism, you put, That he says, Besides the Creation of the World, there is no Argument to prove a Deity; and, That it

cannot be evinced by any Argument that the World had a Beginning; and, That whether it had or no, is to be decided not by Argument, but by the Magistrates. Authority. That it may be decided by the Scriptures, he never denied: Therefore in that also you slander him. And as for Arguments from natural Reason, neither you, nor any other have hitherto brought any (except the Creation) that has not made it more doubtful to many men than it was before. That which he hath written concerning such Arguments, is in his Book De Corpore. Opinions (saith he) concerning the nature of Infinite and Eternal, as the chiefest of the fruits of Wisdom, God hath reserved to himself, and made Judges of them, those men whose Ministery he meant to use in the ordering of Religion; and therefore I cannot praise those men that brag of Demonstration of the Beginning of the World from natural Reason. And again, pag. 238. Wherefore I pass by those Questions of Infinite and Eternal, contenting my self with such Doctrine concerning the Beginning and Magnitude of the World, as I have learn'd from the Scripture, confirmed by Miracles, and from the Use of my Countrey, and from the Reverence I owe to the Law. This, Doctor, is not ill said, and yet 'tis all you ground your slander on, which you make to sneak vilely under a crooked Paraphrase.

These Opinions, I said, were to be judged by those to whom God has committed the ordering of Religion; that is, to the Supreme Governours of the Church, that is, in England, to the King: By His Authority, I say, it ought to be decided, (not what men shall think, but) what they shall say in those Questions. And me thinks you should not dare to deny it; for it is a manifest relapse into your former Crimes.

But why do you stile the King by the name of Magistrate? Do you find Magistrate to signifie any where the Person that hath the Sovereign Power, or not every where the Sovereign's Officers. And I think you knew that; but you and your fellows (your fellows I call all those that are so besmeared all

over with the filth of the same Crime, as not to be distinguished,) meant to make your Assembly the Sovereign, and the King your Magistrate. I pray God you do not mean so still, if opportunity be presented.

There has hitherto appeared in Mr. Hobbes his Doctrine no sign of Atheism; and whatsoever can be inferr'd from the denying of Incorporeal Substances, makes Tertullian, one of the ancientest of the Fathers, and most of the Doctors of the Greek Church, as much Atheists as he: For Tertullian in his Treatise De Carne Christi, says plainly, Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis. Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. That is to say, Whatsoever is any thing, is a body of its kind. Nothing is Incorporeal, but that which has no Being. There are many other places in him to the same purpose: For that Doctrine served his turn to confute the Heresie of them that held that Christ had no Body, but was a Ghost: Also of the Soul he speaks, as of an invisible Body. And there is an Epitome of the Doctrine of the Eastern Church, wherein is this, That they thought Angels and Souls were Corporeal, and only called Incorporeal, because their Bodies were not like ours. And I have heard that a Patriarch of Constantinople, in a Council held there, did argue for the lawfulness of painting Angels, from this, that they were Corporeal. You see what Fellows in Atheism you joyn with Mr. Hobbes.

How unfeigned your own Religion is, may be argued strongly, demonstratively, from your behahaviour that I have already recited. Do you think, you that have committed so abominable sins, not through infirmity, or sudden transport of Passion, but premeditately, wilfully, for twenty years together, that any rational man can think you believe your selves, when you preach of Heaven and Hell, or that you do not believe one another to be Cheaters and Impostors, and to laugh at silly People in your sleeves for believing you; or that you applaud not your own wit for it; though for my part I could never conceive that very much wit was requisite for the making of a knave. And in the Pulpit most of you have been a scandal to

Christianity, by preaching up Sedition, and crying down Moral Virtue. You should have preach'd against unjust Ambition, Covetousness, Gluttony, Malice, Disobedience to Government, Fraud, and Hypocrisie: But for the most part you preach'd your own Controversies, about who should be uppermost, or other fruitless and unedifying Doctrines. When did any of you preach against Hypocrisie? You dare not in the Pulpit (I think) so much as name it, lest you set the Church a laughing: And you in particular, when you said in a Sermon, That Sophos was not in Homer; what edification could the People have from that, though it had been true, as 'tis false? (For it is in his Iliade, lib. 15. v. 363.) Another I heard make half his Sermon of this Doctrine, That God never sent a great Deliverance, but in a great Danger: Which is indeed true, because the greatness of the Danger makes the greatness of the Deliverance, but for the same cause ridiculous; and the other half he took to construe the Greek of his Text: And yet such Sermons are much applauded. But why? First, Because they make not the People ashamed of any Vice. Secondly, Because they like the Preacher, for using to find fault with the Government or Governors. Thirdly, For their vehemence, which they mistake for Zeal. Fourthly, For their zeal to their own ends, which they mistake for zeal to Gods Worship. I have heard besides divers Sermons made by Phanatiques, young men, and whom by that, and their habit, I imagined to be Apprentices; and found little difference between their Sermons, and the Sermons of such as you, either in respect of Wisdom, or Eloquence, or Vehemence, or Applause of Common People.

Therefore I wonder how you can pretend (as you do in your Petition, for a Dispensation from the Ceremonies of the Church) to be either better Preachers than those that Conform, or to have tenderer Consciences than other men. You that have covered such black Designs with the Sacred words of Scripture, why can you not as well find in your hearts to cover a black Gown with a white Surplice? Or what Idolatry do you find in making

the Sign of the Cross, when the Law commands it? Though I think you may conform without sin, yet I think you might have been also dispensed with without sin, if you had dispensed in like manner with other Ministers that subscribed to the Articles of the Church. And if tenderness of Conscience be a good Plea, you must give Mr. Hobbes also leave to plead tenderness of Conscience to his new Divinity, as well as you. I should wonder also how any of you should dare to speak to a multitude met together, without being limited by His Majesty what they shall say, especially now that we have felt the smart of it, but that it is a Relique of the Ecclesiastical Policy of the Popes, that found it necessary for the dis-joyning of the People from their too close adherence to their Kings, or other Civil Governours.

But it may be you will say, That the rest of the Clergy, Bishops, and Episcopable men, no Friends of yours, and against whose Office Mr. Hobbes never writ any thing, speak no better of his Religion than you do.

'Tis true, he never wrote against Episcopacy; and it is his private opinion, That such an Episcopa y as is now in England, is the most commodious that a Christian King can use for the governing of Christs Flock, the misgoverning whereof the King is to answer for to Christ, as the Bishops are to answer for their mis-government to the King, and to God also. Nor ever spake he ill of any of them, as to their Persons: Therefore I should wonder the more at the uncharitable censure of some of them, but that I see a Relique still remaining of the venom of Popish Ambition, lurking in that seditious distinction and division between the Power Spiritual and Civil, which they that are in love with a Power to hurt all those that stand in competition with them for Learning (as the Roman Clergy had to hurt Galileo) do not willingly forsake. All Bishops are not in every point like one another. Some it may be are content to hold their Authority from the King's Letters Patents; and these have no cause to be angry with Mr. Hobbes. Others will needs have somewhat more, they know not what, of

Divine Right, to Govern by vertue of Imposition of Hands, and Consecration, not acknowledging their Power from the King, but immediately from Christ. And these perhaps are they that are displeased with him, which he cannot help, nor has deserved; but will for all that believe the King only, and without sharers, to be the Head of all the Churches within His own Dominions; and that he may dispence with Ceremonies, or with any thing else that is not against the Scriptures, nor against natural Equity; and that the consent of the Lords and Commons cannot now give Him that Power, but declare for the People their advice and consent to it. Nor can he be made believe that the safety of a State depends upon the safety of the Church, I mean, of the Clergy: For neither is a Clergy essential to a Common-wealth; and those Ministers that preached Sedition pretend to be of the Clergy, as well as the best. He believes rather that the Safety of the Church depends on the Safety of the King, and the entireness of the Sovereign Power; and that the King is no part of the Flock of any Minister or Bishop, no more than the Shepherd is of his Sheep, but of Christ only; and all the Clergy, as well as the People, the King's Flock. Nor can that clamour of his adversaries make Mr. Hobbes think himself a worse Christian than the best of them. And how will you disprove it, either by his disobedience to the Laws Civil, or Ecclesiastical, or by any ugly action? Or how will you prove that the obedience which springs from scorn of Injustice, is less acceptable to God, than that which proceeds from fear of punishment, or hope of benefit. Gravity and heaviness of Countenance are not so good marks of assurance of Gods favour, as cheerful, charitable, and upright behaviour towards men, which are better signs of Religion than the zealous maintaining of controverted Doctrines. And therefore I am verily perswaded, it was not his Divinity that displeased you or them, but somewhat else, which you are not willing to pretend. As for your Party, that which angred you, I believe, was this passage of his Leviathan, pag. 89.

Whereas some men have pretended for their Disobedience to their Sovereign, a new Covenant made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: For there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Sovereignty under God: But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye (this is it that angred you) even in the pretenders own Consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.

Besides his making the King Judge of Doctrines to be preach'd or published, hath offended you both; so has also his Attributing to the Civil Sovereign all Power Sacerdotal. But this perhaps may seem hard, when the Sovereignty is in a Queen: But it is because you are not subtle enough to perceive, that though Man be male and female, Authority is not. To please neither Party is easie; but to please both, unless you could better agree amongst your selves than you do, is impossible. Your differences have troubled the Kingdom, as if you were the Houses revived of York and Lancaster. A man would wonder how a little Latin and Greek should work so mightily, when the Scriptures are in English, as that the King and Parliament can hardly keep you quiet, especially in time of danger from abroad. If you will needs quarrel, decide it amongst your selves, and draw not the People into your Parties.

You were angry also for his blaming the Scholastical Philosophers, and denying such fine things as these, That the Species or Apparences of Bodies come from the thing we look on, into the Eye, and so make us see; and into the Understanding, to make us understand; and into the Memory to make us remember. That a Body may be just the same it was, and yet bigger or lesser. That Eternity is a permanent Now; and the like. And for detecting, further than you thought fit, the fraud of the Roman Clergy. Your dislike of

his Divinity was the least cause of your calling him Atheist. But no more of this now.

The next Head of your Contumelies is to make him contemptible, and to move Mr. Boyle to pity him. This is a way of railing too much beaten to be thought Witty. As for the thing it self, I doubt your Intelligence is not good, and that you Algebricians, and Non-conformists, do but fain it, to comfort one another. For your own part, you contemn him not, or else you did very foolishly to entitle the beginning of your Book, Mr. Hobbes considered; which argues he is considerable enough to you. Besides, 'tis no Argument of Contempt, to spend upon him so many angry lines as would have furnisht you with a dozen of Sermons: If you had in good earnest despised him, you would have let him alone, as he does Dr. Ward, Mr. Baxter, Pike, and others, that have reviled him as you do. As for his Reputation beyond the Seas, it fades not yet: And because perhaps you have no means to know it, I will cite you a passage of an Epistle, written by a learned French-man to an eminent Person in France, a passage not impertinent to the point now in question. It is in a Volume of Epistles, the fourth in order, and the words, page 167. concerning Chymists, are these: Truly, Sir, as much as I admire them, when I see them lute an Alembick handsomely, philter a Liquor, build an Athanor, so much I mislike them when I hear them discourse upon the Subject of their Operations; and yet they think all they do, is nothing in respect of what they say: I wish they would take less pains, and be at less charges; and whilst they wash their hands after their work, they would leave to those that attend to the polishing of their discourse, I mean, the Galileo's, the Descarteses, the Hobbeses, the Bacons, and the Gassendi's, to reason upon their work, and themselves to hear what the Learned and Judicious shall tell them, such as are used to discern the differences of things. Quam scit uterque libens censebo exerceat artem. And more to the same purpose.

What is here said of Chymists, is applicable to all other Mechaniques.

Every man that hath spare money, can get Furnaces, and buy Coals. Every man that hath spare money, can be at the charge of making great Moulds, and hiring Workmen to grind their Glasses; and so may have the best and greatest Telescopes: They can get Engines made, and apply them to the Stars; Recipients made, and try Conclusions; but they are never the more Philosophers for all this. 'Tis laudable, I confess, to bestow money upon curious or useful delights; but that is none of the praises of a Philosopher. And yet, because the multitude cannot judge, they will pass with the unskilful, for skilful in all parts of natural Philosophy. And I hear now that Hugenius and Eustachio Divini are to be tried by their Glasses, who is the more skilful in Optiques of the two; but for my part, before Mr. Hobbes his Book De Homine came forth, I never saw any thing written of that subject intelligibly. Do not you tell me now, according to your wonted ingenuity, that I never saw Euclid's, Vitellio's, and many other mens Optiques; as if I could not distinguish between Geometry and Optiques.

So also of all other Arts; not every one that brings from beyond Seas a new Cin, or other janty device, is therefore a Philosopher: For if you reckon that way, not onely Apothecaries and Gardeners, but many other sorts of Workmen, will put in for, and get the Prize. Then, when I see the Gentlemen of Gresham-Colledge apply themselves to the Doctrine of Motion, (as Mr. Hobbes has done, and will be ready to help them in it, if they please, and so long as they use him civilly,) I will look to know some Causes of natural Events from them, and their Register, and not before: For Nature does nothing but by Motion.

I hear that the reason given by Mr. Hobbes, why the drop of Glass so much wondred at, shivers into so many pieces, by breaking onely one small part of it, is approved for probable, and registred in their Colledge: But he has no reason to take it for a favour, because hereafter the Invention may be taken by that means not for his, but theirs.

To the rest of your Calumnies the Answers will be short, and such as you might easily have foreseen. And first, for his boasting of his Learning, it is well summ'd up by you in these words: 'Twas a motion made by one (whom I will not name) that some idle person should read over all his Books, and collecting together his arrogant and supercilious Speeches, applauding himself, and despising all other men, set them forth in one Synopsis, with this Title, Hobbius de se. What a pretty piece of Pageantry this would make, I shall leave to your own thoughts.

Thus say you: Now says Mr. Hobbes, or I for him, Let your idle Person do it, and set down no more than he has written, (as high praises as they be) I'll promise you he shall acknowledge them under his hand, and be commended for it, and you scorned. A certain Roman Senator, having propounded something in the Assembly of the People, which they misliking made a noise at, boldly bad them hold their peace, and told them he knew better what was good for the Common-wealth than all they: And his words are transmitted to us as an Argument of his Virtue; so much do Truth and Vanity alter the complection of self-praise. Besides, you can have very little skill in Morality, that cannot see the Justice of commending a mans self, as well as of any thing else, in his own defence: And it was want of prudence in you, to constrain him to a thing that would so much displease you. That part of his self-praise which most offends you, is in the end of his Leviathan, in these words: Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. Let any man consider the truth of it. Where did those Ministers learn their seditious Doctrine, and to preach it, but there? Where therefore should Preachers learn to teach Loyalty, but there? And if your Principles produced Civil War, must not the contrary Principles, which are his, produce Peace? And consequently his Book, as far as it handles Civil Doctrine, deserves to be taught there: But when can

this be done? When you shall have no longer an Army ready to maintain the evil Doctrine wherewith you have infected the people. By a ready Army I mean Arms, and Money, and men enough, though not yet in pay, and put under Officers, yet gathered together in one place or City, to be put under Officers, armed, and payed on any sudden occasion; such as are the people of a great and populous Town. Every great City is as a standing Army, which if it be not under the Soveraigns command, the people are miserable; if they be, they may be taught their duties in the Universities safely and easily, and be happy. I never read of any Christian King that was a Tyrant, though the best of Kings have been call'd so.

Then for the Morosity and Peevishness you charge him with, all that know him familiarly, know 'tis a false accusation. But you mean, it may be, onely towards those that argue against his Opinion: But neither is that true. When vain and ignorant young Scholars, unknown to him before, come to him on purpose to argue with him, and to extort applause for their foolish Opinions, and missing of their end, fall into undiscreet and uncivil expressions, and he then appear not very well contented, 'tis not his Morosity, but their Vanity that should be blamed. But what humor (if not Morosity and Peevishness) was that of yours, whom he never had injured, or seen, or heard of, to use toward him such insolent, injurious, and clownish words, as you did in your absurd Elenchus?

Was it not impatience of seeing any dissent from you in opinion? Mr. Hobbes has been always far from provoking any man, though when he is provok'd, you finde his Pen as sharp as yours.

Again, when you make his Age a reproach to him, and shew no cause that might impair the faculties of his minde but onely Age, I admire how you saw not that you reproached all old men in the world as much as him, and warranted all young men, at a certain time, which they themselves shall define, to call you fool. Your dislike of old age, you have also otherwise

sufficiently signified, in venturing so fairly as you have done to escape it. But that is no great matter to one that hath so many marks upon him of much greater reproaches. By Mr. Hobbes his Calculation, that derives Prudence from Experience, and Experience from Age, you are a very young man; but by your own reckoning, you are older already than Methuselah.

Lastly, Who told you that he writ against Mr. Boyle, whom in his writing he never mentioned? And that it was because Mr. Boyle was acquainted with you? I know the contrary. I have heard him wish it had been some person of lower condition that had been the Author of the Doctrine which he opposed, and therefore opposed because it was false, and because his own could not otherwise be defended. But thus much I think is true, that he thought never the better of his Judgment, for mistaking you for Learned. This is all I thought fit to answer for him and his manners. The rest is of his Geometry and Philosophy, concerning which, I say only this, That there is too much in your Book to be confuted: Almost every line may be disproved, or ought to be reprehended. In sum, it is all Errour and Railing, that is, stinking wind, such as a Jade lets flie when he is too hard girt upon a full belly. I have done. I have considered you now, but will not again, whatsoever preferment any of your friends shall procure you.

FINIS.

The Biographies



Thomas Hobbes by John Michael Wright, c. 1670

Thomas Hobbes by George Croom Robertson

From '1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 13'

HOBBES, THOMAS (1588-1679), English philosopher, second son of Thomas Hobbes, was born at Westport (now part of Malmesbury, Wiltshire) on the 5th of April 1588. His father, vicar of Charlton and Westport, an illiterate and choleric man, quarrelled, it is said, with a brother clergyman at the church door, and was forced to decamp, leaving his three children to the care of an elder brother Francis, a flourishing glover at Malmesbury. Thomas Hobbes was put to school at Westport church at the age of four, passed to the Malmesbury school at eight, and was taught again in Westport later at a private school kept by a young man named Robert Latimer, fresh from Oxford and "a good Grecian." He had begun Latin and Greek early, and under Latimer made such progress as to be able to translate the *Medea* of Euripides into Latin iambic verse before he was fourteen. About the age of fifteen he was sent to Oxford and entered at Magdalen Hall. During his residence, the first principal of Magdalen Hall, John Hussee, was succeeded by John Wilkinson, who ruled in the interest of the Calvinistic party in the university. Thus early was he brought into contact with the aggressive Puritan spirit. Apart from this, Hobbes owed little to his university training, which was based on the scholastic logic then prevalent. We have from himself a lively record of his student life (*Vit. carm. exp.* p. lxxxv.), which, though penned in extreme old age, may be taken as trustworthy. He tells how, when he had slowly taken in the doctrine of logical figures and moods, he put it aside and would prove things only in his own way; how he then

heard about bodies as consisting of matter and form, as throwing off species of themselves for perception, and as moved by sympathies and antipathies, with much else of a like sort, all beyond his comprehension; and how he therefore turned to his old books again, fed his mind on maps and charts of earth and sky, traced the sun in his path, followed Drake and Cavendish girdling the main, and gazed with delight upon pictured haunts of men and wonders of unknown lands. Very characteristic is the interest in men and things, and the disposition to cut through questions in the schools after a trenchant fashion of his own. He was little attracted by the scholastic learning, though it would be wrong to take his words as evidence of a precocious insight into its weakness. The truth probably is that he took no interest in studies which there was no risk in neglecting, and thought as little of rejecting as of accepting the traditional doctrines. He adds that he took his degree at the proper time; but in fact, upon any computation and from whatever cause, he remained at Magdalen Hall five, instead of the required four, years, not being admitted as bachelor till the 5th of February 1608.

Translation of Thucydides.

In the same year Hobbes was recommended by Wilkinson as tutor to the son of William Cavendish, baron of Hardwick (afterwards 2nd earl of Devonshire), and thus began a lifelong connexion with a great and powerful family. Twice it was loosened — once, for a short time, after twenty years, and again, for a longer period, during the Civil War — but it never was broken. Hobbes spoke of the first years of his tutorship as the happiest of his life. Young Cavendish was hardly younger than Hobbes, and had been married, a few months before, at the instance of the king, to Christiana, the only daughter of Edward, Lord Bruce of Kinloss, though by reason of the bride’s age, which was only twelve years, the pair had no establishment for

some time. Hobbes was his companion rather than tutor (before becoming secretary); and, growing greatly attached to each other, they were sent abroad together on the grand tour in 1610. During this journey, the duration of which cannot be precisely stated, Hobbes acquired some knowledge of French and Italian, and also made the important discovery that the scholastic philosophy which he had learned in Oxford was almost universally neglected in favour of the scientific and critical methods of Galileo, Kepler and Montaigne. Unable at first to cope with their unfamiliar ideas, he determined to become a scholar, and until 1628 was engaged in a careful study of Greek and Latin authors, the outcome of which was his great translation of Thucydides. But when he had finished his work he kept it lying by him for years, being no longer so sure of finding appreciative readers; and when he did send it forth, in 1628, he was fain to be content with "the few and better sort." That he was finally determined to publication by the political troubles of the year 1628 may be regarded as certain, not only from his own express declaration at a later time (*Vit. carm. exp.*), but also from unmistakable hints in the account of the life and work of his author prefixed to the translation on its appearance. This was the year of the Petition of Right, extorted from the king in the third parliament he had tried within three years of his accession; and, in view of Hobbes' later activity, it is significant that he came forward just then, at the mature age of forty, with his version of the story of the Athenian democracy as the first production of his pen. Nothing else is known of his doings before 1628, except that through his connexion with young Cavendish he had relations with literary men of note like Ben Jonson, and also with Bacon and Lord Herbert of Cherbury. If he never had any sympathy with Herbert's intuitionalist principles in philosophy, he was no less eager, as he afterwards showed, than Herbert to rationalize in matters of religious doctrine, so that he may be called the second of the English deists, as Herbert has been

called the first. With Bacon he was so intimate (Aubrey's *Lives*, p, 602) that some writers have described him as a disciple. The facts that he used to walk with Bacon at Gorhambury, and would jot down with exceptional intelligence the eager thinker's sudden "notions," and that he was employed to make the Latin version of some of the *Essays*, prove nothing when weighed against his own disregard of all Bacon's principles, and the other evidence that the impulse to independent thinking came to him not from Bacon, and not till some time after Bacon's death in 1626.

Philosophic Inquiry.

So far as we have any positive evidence, it was not before the year 1629 that Hobbes entered on philosophical inquiry. Meanwhile a great change had been wrought in his circumstances. His friend and master, after about two years' tenure of the earldom of Devonshire, died of the plague in June 1628, and the affairs of the family were so disordered financially that the widowed countess was left with the task of righting them in the boyhood of the third earl. Hobbes went on for a time living in the household; but his services were no longer in demand, and, remaining inconsolable under his personal bereavement, he sought distraction, in 1629, in another engagement which took him abroad as tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton, of an old Nottinghamshire family. This, his second, sojourn abroad appears to have been spent chiefly in Paris, and the one important fact recorded of it is that he then first began to look into Euclid. The engagement came to an end in 1631, when he was recalled to train the young earl of Devonshire, now thirteen years old, son of his previous pupil. In the course of the next seven years in Derbyshire and abroad, Hobbes took his pupil over rhetoric, logic, astronomy, and the principles of law, with other subjects. His mind was now full of the thought of motion in nature, and on the continent he sought out the philosophical speculators or scientific workers. In Florence in 1636 he saw Galileo, for whom he ever

retained the warmest admiration, and spent eight months in daily converse with the members of a scientific circle in Paris, held together by Marin Mersenne (q.v.). From that time (the winter of 1636-1637) he too, as he tells us, was numbered among philosophers.

His introduction to Euclid took place accidentally in 1629 (Aubrey's *Lives*,). Euclid's manner of proof became the model for his own way of thinking upon all subjects. It is less easy to determine when he awoke to an interest in the physical doctrine of motion. The story told by himself (*Vit.* p. xx.) is that, hearing the question asked "What is sense?" he fell to thinking often on the subject, till it suddenly occurred to him that if bodies and their internal parts were at rest, or were always in the same state of motion, there could be no distinction of anything, and consequently no sense; the cause of all things must therefore be sought in diversity of movements. Starting from this principle he was driven to geometry for insight into the ground and modes of motion. The biographies we possess do not tell us where or when this great change of interest occurred. Nothing is said, however, which contradicts a statement that on his third journey in Europe he began to study the doctrine of motion more seriously, being interested in it before; and as he claims more than once (*L.W.* v. 303; *E.W.* vii. 468) to have explained light and sound by a mechanical hypothesis as far back as 1630, the inspiration may be assigned to the time of the second journey. But it was not till the third journey that the new interest became an overpowering passion, and the "philosopher" was on his way home before he had advanced so far as to conceive the scheme of a system of thought to the elaboration of which his life should henceforth be devoted.

Hobbes was able to carry out his plan in some twenty years or more from the time of its conception, but the execution was so broken in upon by political events, and so complicated with other labours, that its stages can hardly be followed without some previous understanding of the relations of

the parts of the scheme, as there is reason to believe they were sketched out from the beginning. His scheme was first to work out, in a separate treatise *De corpore*, a systematic doctrine of Body, showing how physical phenomena were universally explicable in terms of motion, as motion or mechanical action was then (through Galileo and others) understood — the theory of motion being applied in the light of mathematical science, after quantity, the subject-matter of mathematics, had been duly considered in its place among the fundamental conceptions of philosophy, and a clear indication had been given, at first starting, of the logical ground and method of all philosophical inquiry. He would then single out Man from the realm of nature, and, in a treatise *De homine*, show what specific bodily motions were involved in the production of the peculiar phenomena of sensation and knowledge, as also of the affections and passions thence resulting, whereby man came into relation with man. Finally he would consider, in a crowning treatise *De cive*, how men, being naturally rivals or foes, were moved to enter into the better relation of Society, and demonstrate how this grand product of human wit must be regulated if men were not to fall back into brutishness and misery. Thus he proposed to unite in one coherent whole the separate phenomena of Body, Man and the State.

Hobbes came home, in 1637, to a country seething with discontent. The reign of "Thorough" was collapsing, and the forces pent up since 1629 were soon to rend the fabric of the state. By these events Hobbes was distracted from the orderly execution of his philosophic plan. The Short Parliament, as he tells us at a later time (*E.W.* iv. 414), was not dissolved before he had ready "a little treatise in English," in which he sought to prove that the points of the royal prerogative which the members were determined to dispute before granting supplies "were inseparably annexed to the sovereignty which they did not then deny to be in the king." Now it can be proved that at this time he had written not only his *Human Nature* but also

his *De corpore politico*, the two treatises (though published separately ten years later) having been composed as parts of one work; and there cannot be the least question that together they make "the little treatise" just mentioned. We are therefore to understand, first, that he wrote the earliest draft of his political theory some years before the outbreak of the Civil War, and, secondly, that this earliest draft was not written till, in accordance with his philosophical conception, he had established the grounds of polity in human nature. The first point is to be noted, because it has often been supposed that Hobbes' political doctrine took its peculiar complexion from his revulsion against the state of anarchy before his eyes, as he wrote during the progress of the Civil War. The second point must be maintained against his own implied, if not express, statement some years later, when publishing his *De cive* (*L.W.* ii. 151), that he wrote this third part of his system before he had been able to set down any finished representation of the fundamental doctrines which it presupposed. In the beginning of 1640, therefore, he had written out his doctrine of Man at least, with almost as much elaboration as it ever received from him.

In Paris.

In November 1640 the Long Parliament succeeded to the Short, and sent Laud and Strafford to the Tower, and Hobbes, who had become, or thought he had become, a marked man by the circulation of his treatise (of which, "though not printed, many gentlemen had copies"), hastened to Paris, "the first of all that fled." He was now for the fourth and last time abroad, and did not return for eleven years. Apparently he remained the greater part of the time in or about Paris. He was welcomed back into the scientific coterie about Mersenne, and forthwith had the task assigned him of criticizing the *Meditations* of Descartes, which had been sent from Holland, before publication, to Mersenne with the author's request for criticism from the most different points of view. Hobbes was soon ready with the remarks that

were printed as “Third” among the six (later seven) sets of “Objections” appended, with “Replies” from Descartes, to the *Meditations*, when published shortly afterwards in 1641 (reprinted in *L.W.* v. 249-274). About the same time also Mersenne sent to Descartes, as if they came from a friend in England, another set of objections which Hobbes had to offer on various points in the scientific treatises, especially the *Dioptrics*, appended by Descartes to his *Discourse on Method* in 1637; to which Descartes replied without suspecting the common authorship of the two sets. The result was to keep the two thinkers apart rather than bring them together. Hobbes was more eager to bring forward his own philosophical and physical ideas than careful to enter into the full meaning of another’s thought; and Descartes was too jealous, and too confident in his conclusions to bear with this kind of criticism. He was very curt in his replies to Hobbes’ philosophical objections, and broke off all correspondence on the physical questions, writing privately to Mersenne that he had grave doubts of the Englishman’s good faith in drawing him into controversy (*L.W.* v. 277-307).

Meanwhile Hobbes had his thoughts too full of the political theory which the events of the last years had ripened within him to settle, even in Paris, to the orderly composition of his works. Though connected in his own mind with his view of human nature and of nature generally, the political theory, as he always declared, could stand by itself. Also, while he may have hoped at this time to be able to add much (though he never did) to the sketch of his doctrine of Man contained in the unpublished “little treatise,” he might extend, but could hardly otherwise modify, the sketch he had there given of his carefully articulated theory of Body Politic. Possibly, indeed, before that sketch was written early in 1640, he may, under pressure of the political excitement, have advanced no small way in the actual composition of the treatise *De Cive*, the third section of his projected system. In any case, it

was upon this section, before the others, that he set to work in Paris; and before the end of 1641 the book, as we know from the date of the dedication (November 1), was finished. Though it was forthwith printed in the course of the year 1642, he was content to circulate a limited number of copies privately; and when he found his work received with applause (it was praised even by Descartes), he seems to have taken this recognition of his philosophical achievement as an additional reason for deferring publication till the earlier works of the system were completed. Accordingly, for the next three or four years, he remained steadily at work, and nothing appeared from him in public except a short treatise on optics (*Tractatus opticus, L.W.* v. 217-248) included in the collection of scientific tracts published by Mersenne under the title *Cogitata physico-mathematica* in 1644, and a highly compressed statement of his psychological application of the doctrine of motion (*L.W.* v. 309-318), incorporated with Mersenne's *Ballistica*, published in the same year. Thus or otherwise he had become sufficiently known by 1645 to be chosen as a referee, with Descartes, Roberval and others, in the famous controversy between John Pell (q.v.) and the Dane Longomontanus (q.v.) over that problem of the squaring of the circle which was seen later on to have such a fatal charm for himself. But though about this time he had got ready all or most of the materials for his fundamental work on Body, not even now was he able to make way with its composition, and when he returned to it after a number of years, he returned a different man.

Leviathan.

The Civil War had broken out in 1642, and the royalist cause began to decline from the time of the defeat at Marston Moor, in the middle of 1644. Then commenced an exodus of the king's friends. Newcastle himself, who was a cousin of Hobbes' late patron and to whom he dedicated the "little

treatise" of 1640, found his way to Paris, and was followed by a stream of fugitives, many of whom were known to Hobbes. The sight of these exiles made the political interest once more predominant in Hobbes, and before long the revived feeling issued in the formation of a new and important design. It first showed itself in the publication of the *De cive*, of which the fame, but only the fame, had extended beyond the inner circle of friends and critics who had copies of the original impression. Hobbes now entrusted it, early in 1646, to his admirer, the Frenchman Samuel de Sorbière, by whom it was seen through the Elzevir press at Amsterdam in 1647 — having previously inserted a number of notes in reply to objections, and also a striking preface, in the course of which he explained its relation to the other parts of the system not yet forthcoming, and the (political) occasion of its having been composed and being now published before them. So hopeless, meanwhile, was he growing of being able to return home that, later on in the year, he was on the point of leaving Paris to take up his abode in the south with a French friend, when he was engaged "by the month" as mathematical instructor to the young prince of Wales, who had come over from Jersey about the month of July. This engagement lasted nominally from 1646 to 1648 when Charles went to Holland. Thus thrown more than ever into the company of the exiled royalists, it was then, if not earlier, that he conceived his new design of bringing all his powers of thought and expression to bear upon the production of an English book that should set forth his whole theory of civil government in relation to the political crisis resulting from the war. The *De cive*, presently to be published, was written in Latin for the learned, and gave the political theory without its foundation in human nature. The unpublished treatise of 1640 contained all or nearly all that he had to tell concerning human nature, but was written before the terrible events of the last years had disclosed how men might still be urged by their anti-social passions back into the abyss of

anarchy. There was need of an exposition at once comprehensive, incisive and popular. The State, it now seemed to Hobbes, might be regarded as a great artificial man or monster (*Leviathan*), composed of men, with a life that might be traced from its generation through human reason under pressure of human needs to its dissolution through civil strife proceeding from human passions. This, we may suppose, was the presiding conception from the first, but the design may have been variously modified in the three or four years of its execution. Before the end, in 1650-1651, it is plain that he wrote in direct reference to the greatly changed aspect of affairs in England. The king being dead, and the royalist cause appearing to be hopelessly lost, he did not scruple, in closing the work with a general "Review and Conclusion," to raise the question of the subject's right to change allegiance when a former sovereign's power to protect was irrecoverably gone. Also he took advantage of the rule of the Commonwealth to indulge much more freely than he might have otherwise dared in rationalistic criticism of religious doctrines; while, amid the turmoil of sects, he could the more forcibly urge that the preservation of social order, when again firmly restored, must depend on the assumption by the civil power of the right to wield all sanctions, supernatural as well as natural, against the pretensions of any clergy, Catholic, Anglican or Presbyterian, to the exercise of an *imperium in imperio*.

We know the *Leviathan* only as it finally emerged from Hobbes' pen. During the years of its composition he remained in or near Paris, at first in attendance on his royal pupil, with whom he became a great favourite. In 1647 Hobbes was overtaken by a serious illness which disabled him for six months. Mersenne begged him not to die outside the Roman Catholic Church, but Hobbes said that he had already considered the matter sufficiently and afterwards took the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. On recovering from this illness, which nearly proved

fatal, he resumed his literary task, and carried it steadily forward to completion by the year 1650, having also within the same time translated into English, with characteristic force of expression, his Latin treatise. Otherwise the only thing known (from one or two letters) of his life in those years is that from the year 1648 he had begun to think of returning home; he was then sixty and might well be weary of exile. When 1650 came, as if to prepare the way for the reception of his *magnum opus*, he allowed the publication of his earliest treatise, divided into two separate small volumes (*Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, E.W.* iv. 1-76, and *De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politic*, p-228). In 1651 he published his translation of the De Cive under the title of *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society* (*E.W.* ii.). Meanwhile the printing of the greater work was proceeding, and finally it appeared about the middle of the same year, 1651, under the title of *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (*E.W.* iii.), with a quaint frontispiece in which, from behind hills overlooking a fair landscape of town and country, there towered the body (above the waist) of a crowned giant, made up of tiny figures of human beings and bearing sword and crozier in the two hands. It appeared, and soon its author was more lauded and decried than any other thinker of his time; but the first effect of its publication was to sever his connexion with the exiled royalist party, and to throw him for protection on the revolutionary Government. No sooner did copies of the book reach Paris than he found himself shunned by his former associates, and though he was himself so little conscious of disloyalty that he was forward to present a manuscript copy “engrossed in vellum in a marvellous fair hand” to the young king of the Scots (who, after the defeat at Worcester, escaped to Paris about the end of October), he was denied the royal presence when he sought it shortly afterwards. Straightway, then, he saw himself exposed to a double

peril. The exiles had among them desperadoes who could slay; and, besides exciting the enmity of the Anglican clergy about the king, who bitterly resented the secularist spirit of his book, he had compromised himself with the French authorities by his elaborate attack on the papal system. In the circumstances, no resource was left him but secret flight. Travelling with what speed he could in the depths of a severe winter and under the effects of a recent (second) illness, he managed to reach London, where, sending in his submission to the council of state, he was allowed to subside into private life.

Return to London.

Though Hobbes came back, after his eleven years' absence, without having as yet publicly proved his title to rank with the natural philosophers of the age, he was sufficiently conscious of what he had been able to achieve in *Leviathan*; and it was in no humble mood that he now, at the age of sixty-four, turned to complete the fundamental treatise of his philosophical system. Neither those whom his masterpiece soon roused to enthusiasm, nor those whom it moved to indignation, were likely to be indifferent to anything he should now write, whether it lay near to or far from the region of practice. Taking up his abode in Fetter Lane, London, on his return, and continuing to reside there for the sake of intellectual society, even after renewing his old ties with the earl of Devonshire, who lived in the country till the Restoration, he worked so steadily as to be printing the *De corpore* in the year 1654. Circumstances (of which more presently), however, kept the book back till the following year, and meanwhile the readers of *Leviathan* had a different excitement. In 1654 a small treatise, "Of Liberty and Necessity" (*E.W.* iv. 229-278), issued from the press, claiming to be an answer to a discourse on the same subject by Bishop Bramhall of Londonderry (afterwards archbishop of Armagh, d. 1663), addressed by Hobbes to the marquis of Newcastle. It had grown out of an

oral discussion between Hobbes and Bramhall in the marquis's presence at Paris in 1646. Bramhall, a strong Arminian, had afterwards written down his views and sent them to Newcastle to be answered in this form by Hobbes. Hobbes duly replied, but not for publication, because he thought the subject a delicate one. But it happened that Hobbes had allowed a French acquaintance to have a private translation of his reply made by a young Englishman, who secretly took a copy of the original for himself; and now it was this unnamed purloiner who, in 1654, when Hobbes had become famous and feared, gave it to the world of his own motion, with an extravagantly laudatory epistle to the reader in its front.

Controversy with Bramhall.

Upon Hobbes himself the publication came as a surprise, but, after his plain speaking in *Leviathan*, there was nothing in the piece that he need scruple to have made known, and he seems to have condoned the act. On the other hand, Bramhall, supposing Hobbes privy to the publication, resented the manner of it, especially as no mention was made of his rejoinder. Accordingly, in 1655, he printed everything that had passed between them (under the title of *A Defence of the True Liberty of Human Actions from Antecedent or Extrinsic Necessity*), with loud complaint against the treatment he had received, and the promise added that, in default of others, he himself would stand forward to expose the deadly principles of *Leviathan*. About this time Hobbes had begun to be hard pressed by other foes, and, being never more sure of himself than upon the question of the will, he appears to have welcomed the opportunity thus given him of showing his strength. By 1656 he was ready with his *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance* (*E.W.* v.), in which he replied with astonishing force to the bishop's rejoinder point by point, besides explaining the occasion and circumstances of the whole debate, and reproducing (as Bramhall had done) all the pieces from the beginning. As

perhaps the first clear exposition and defence of the *psychological* doctrine of determinism, Hobbes' own two pieces must ever retain a classical importance in the history of the free-will controversy; while Bramhall's are still worth study as specimens of scholastic fence. The bishop, it should be added, returned to the charge in 1658 with ponderous *Castigations of Mr Hobbes' Animadversions*, and also made good his previous threat in a bulky appendix *entitled The Catching of Leviathan the Great Whale*. Hobbes never took any notice of the *Castigations*, but ten years later replied to the charges of atheism, &c., made in the non-political part of the appendix, of which he says he then heard for the first time (*E.W.* iv. 279-384). This *Answer* was first published after Hobbes' death.

Controversy with Wallis and Ward.

We may now follow out the more troublesome conflict, or rather series of conflicts, in which Hobbes became entangled from the time of publishing his *De corpore* in 1655, and which checkered all his remaining years. In *Leviathan* he had vehemently assailed the system of the universities, as originally founded for the support of the papal against the civil authority, and as still working social mischief by adherence to the old learning. The attack was duly noted at Oxford, where under the Commonwealth a new spirit of scientific activity had begun to stir. In 1654 Seth Ward (1617-1689), the Savilian professor of astronomy, replying in his *Vindiciae academiarum* to some other assaults (especially against John Webster's *Examen of Academies*) on the academic system, retorted upon Hobbes that, so far from the universities being now what he had known them in his youth, he would find his geometrical pieces, when they appeared, better understood there than he should like. This was said in reference to the boasts in which Hobbes seems to have been freely indulging of having squared the circle and accomplished other such feats; and, when a year later

the *De corpore* (*L.W.* i.) finally appeared, it was seen how the thrust had gone home. In the chapter (xx.) of that work where Hobbes dealt with the famous problem whose solution he thought he had found, there were left expressions against Vindex (Ward) at a time when the solutions still seemed to him good; but the solutions themselves, as printed, were allowed to be all in different ways halting, as he naively confessed he had discovered only when he had been driven by the insults of malevolent men to examine them more closely with the help of his friends. A strange conclusion this, and reached by a path not less strange, as was now to be disclosed by a relentless hand. Ward's colleague, the more famous John Wallis (q.v.), Savilian professor of geometry from 1649, had been privy to the challenge thrown out in 1654, and it was arranged that they should critically dispose of the *De corpore* between them. Ward was to occupy himself with the philosophical and physical sections, which he did in leisurely fashion, bringing out his criticism in the course of next year (*In Th. Hobbii philosophiam exercitatio epistolica*). Wallis was to confine himself to the mathematical chapters, and set to work at once with characteristic energy. Obtaining an unbound copy of the *De corpore*, he saw by the mutilated appearance of the sheets that Hobbes had repeatedly altered his demonstrations before he issued them at last in their actual form, grotesque as it was, rather than delay the book longer. Obtaining also a copy of the work as it had been printed before Hobbes had any doubt of the validity of his solutions, Wallis was able to track his whole course from the time of Ward's provocation — his passage from exultation to doubt, from doubt to confessed impotence, yet still without abandoning the old assumption of confident strength; and all his turnings and windings were now laid bare in one of the most trenchant pieces of controversial writing ever penned. Wallis's *Elenchus geometriae Hobbianae*, published in 1655 about three months after the *De corpore*, contained also an elaborate criticism of

Hobbes' whole attempt to relay the foundations of mathematical science in its place within the general body of reasoned knowledge — a criticism which, if it failed to allow for the merit of the conception, exposed only too effectually the utter inadequacy of the result. Taking up mathematics when not only his mind was already formed but his thoughts were crystallizing into a philosophical system, Hobbes had, in fact, never put himself to school and sought to work up gradually to the best knowledge of the time, but had been more anxious from the first to become himself an innovator with whatever insufficient means. The consequence was that, when not spending himself in vain attempts to solve the impossible problems that have always waylaid the fancy of self-sufficient beginners, he took an interest only in the elements of geometry, and never had any notion of the full scope of mathematical science, undergoing as it then was (and not least at the hands of Wallis) the extraordinary development which made it before the end of the century the potent instrument of physical discovery which it became in the hands of Newton. He was even unable, in dealing with the elementary conceptions of geometry, to work out with any consistency the few original thoughts he had, and thus became the easy sport of Wallis. At his advanced age, however, and with the sense he had of his powers, he was not likely to be brought to a better mind by so insulting an opponent. He did indeed, before allowing an English translation of the *De corpore* (*E.W.* i.) to appear in 1656, take care to remove some of the worst mistakes exposed by Wallis, and, while leaving out all the references to Vindex, now profess to make, in altered form, a series of mere "attempts" at quadrature; but he was far from yielding the ground to the enemy. With the translation, in the spring of 1656, he had ready *Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics, one of Geometry, the other of Astronomy, in the University of Oxford* (*E.W.* vii. 181-356), in which, after reasserting his view of the principles of geometry in opposition to Euclid's, he proceeded to repel Wallis's

objections with no lack of dialectical skill, and with an unreserve equal to Wallis's own. He did not scruple, in the ardour of conflict, even to maintain positions that he had resigned in the translation, and he was not afraid to assume the offensive by a counter criticism of three of Wallis's works then published. When he had thus disposed of the "Paralogisms" of his more formidable antagonist in the first five lessons, he ended with a lesson on "Manners" to the two professors together, and set himself gravely at the close to show that he too could be abusive. In this particular part of his task, it must be allowed, he succeeded very well; his criticism of Wallis's works, especially the great treatise *Arithmetica infinitorum* (1655), only showed how little able he was to enter into the meaning of the modern analysis. Wallis, on his side, was not less ready to keep up the game in English than he had been to begin it in Latin. Swift as before to strike, in three months' time he had deftly turned his own word against the would-be master by administering *Due Correction for Mr Hobbes, or School Discipline for not saying his Lessons right*, in a piece that differed from the *Elenchus* only in being more biting and unrestrained. Having an easy task in defending himself against Hobbes' trivial criticism, he seized the opportunity given him by the English translation of the *De corpore* to track Hobbes again step by step over the whole course, and now to confront him with his incredible inconsistencies multiplied by every new utterance. But it was no longer a fight over mathematical questions only. Wallis having been betrayed originally by his fatal cleverness into the pettiest carping at words, Hobbes had retorted in kind, and then it became a high duty in the other to defend his Latin with great parade of learning and give fresh provocation. One of Wallis's rough sallies in this kind suggested to Hobbes the title of the next rejoinder with which, in 1657, he sought to close the unseemly wrangle. Arguing in the *Lessons* that a mathematical point must have quantity, though this were not reckoned, he had explained the Greek word στιγμή,

used for a point, to mean a visible mark made with a hot iron; whereupon he was charged by Wallis with gross ignorance for confounding στιγμή and στιγμα. Hence the title of his new piece: Στιγμαὶ ἀγεωμετρίας, ἀγροικίας, ἀντιπολιτείας, ἀμαθείας, or *Marks of the Absurd Geometry, Rural Language, Scottish Church Politics, and Barbarisms of John Wallis, Professor of Geometry and Doctor of Divinity* (*E.W.* vii. 357-400). He now attacked more in detail but not more happily than before Wallis's great work, while hardly attempting any further defence of his own positions; also he repelled with some force and dignity the insults that had been heaped upon him, and fought the verbal points, but could not leave the field without making political insinuations against his adversary, quite irrelevant in themselves and only noteworthy as evidence of his own resignation to Cromwell's rule. The thrusts were easily and nimbly parried by Wallis in a reply (*Hobbiani puncti dispunctio*, 1657) occupied mainly with the verbal questions. Irritating as it was, it did not avail to shake Hobbes' determination to remain silent; and thus at last there was peace for a time.

Before the strife flamed up again, Hobbes had published, in 1658, the outstanding section of his philosophical system, and thus completed, after a fashion, the scheme he had planned more than twenty years before. So far as the treatise *De homine* (*L.W.* ii. 11-32) was concerned, the completion was more in name than in fact. It consisted for the most part of an elaborate theory of vision which, though very creditable to Hobbes' scientific insight, was out of place, or at least out of proportion, in a philosophical consideration of human nature generally. The remainder of the treatise, dealing cursorily with some of the topics more fully treated in the *Human Nature* and the *Leviathan*, has all the appearance of having been tagged in haste to the optical chapters (composed years before) as a makeshift for the proper transition required in the system from questions of Body Natural to questions of Body Politic. Hobbes had in fact spent himself in his earlier

constructive efforts, and at the age of seventy, having nothing to add to his doctrine of Man as it was already in one form or another before the world, was content with anything that might stand for the fulfilment of his philosophical purpose. But he had still in him more than twenty years of vigorous vitality, and, not conscious to himself of any shortcoming, looked forward, now his hands were free, to doing battle for his doctrines. Rather than remain quiet, on finding no notice taken of his latest production, he would himself force on a new conflict with the enemy. Wallis having meanwhile published other works and especially a comprehensive treatise on the general principles of calculus (*Mathesis universalis*, 1657), he might take this occasion of exposing afresh the new-fangled methods of mathematical analysis and reasserting his own earlier positions. Accordingly, by the spring of 1660, he had managed to put his criticism and assertions into five dialogues under the title *Examinatio et emendatio mathematicae hodiernae qualis explicatur in libris Johannis Wallisii*, with a sixth dialogue so called, consisting almost entirely of seventy or more propositions on the circle and cycloid. Wallis, however, would not take the bait. Hobbes then tried another tack. Next year, having solved, as he thought, another ancient *crux*, the duplication of the cube, he had his solution brought out anonymously at Paris in French, so as to put Wallis and other critics off the scent and extort a judgment that might be withheld from a work of his. The artifice was successful, and no sooner had Wallis publicly refuted the solution than Hobbes claimed the credit of it, and went more wonderfully than ever astray in its defence. He presently republished it (in modified form), with his remarks, at the end of a new Latin dialogue which he had meanwhile written in defence of another part of his philosophical doctrine. This was the *Dialogus physicus, sive De natura aëris* (*L.W.* iv. 233-296), fulminated in 1661 against Boyle and other friends of Wallis who, as he fancied, under the influence of that malevolent spirit,

were now in London, after the Restoration, forming themselves into a society (incorporated as the Royal Society in 1662) for experimental research, to the exclusion of himself personally, and in direct contravention of the method of physical inquiry enjoined in the *De corpore*. All the laborious manipulation recorded in Boyle's *New Experiments touching the Spring of the Air* (1660), which Hobbes chose, without the least warrant, to take as the manifesto of the new "academicians," seemed to him only to confirm the conclusions he had reasoned out years before from speculative principles, and he warned them that if they were not content to begin where he had left off their work would come to nought. To as much of this diatribe as concerned himself Boyle quickly replied with force and dignity, but it was from Hobbes' old enemy that retribution came, in the scathing satire *Hobbius heauton-timorumenos* (1662). Wallis, who had deftly steered his course amid all the political changes of the previous years, managing ever to be on the side of the ruling power, was now apparently stung to fury by a wanton allusion in Hobbes' latest dialogue to a passage of his former life (his deciphering for the parliament the king's papers taken at Naseby), whereof he had once boasted but after the Restoration could not speak or hear too little. The revenge he took was crushing. Professing to be roused by the attack on his friend Boyle, when he had scorned to lift a finger in defence of himself against the earlier dialogues, he tore them all to shreds with an art of which no general description can give an idea. He got, however, upon more dangerous ground when, passing wholly by the political insinuation against himself, he roundly charged Hobbes with having written *Leviathan* in support of Oliver's title, and deserted his royal master in distress. Hobbes seems to have been fairly bewildered by the rush and whirl of sarcasm with which Wallis drove him anew from every mathematical position he had ever taken up, and did not venture forth into the field of scientific controversy again for some years, when he had once

followed up the physical dialogue of 1661 by seven shorter ones, with the inevitable appendix, entitled *Problemata physica, una cum magnitudine circuli* (*L.W.* iv. 297-384), in 1662. But all the more eagerly did he take advantage of Wallis's loose calumny to strike where he felt himself safe. His answer to the personal charges took the form of a letter about himself in the third person addressed to Wallis in 1662, under the title of *Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Thomas Hobbes* (*E.W.* iv. 409-440). In this piece, which is of great biographical value, he told his own and Wallis's "little stories during the time of the late rebellion" with such effect that Wallis, like a wise man, attempted no further reply. Thus ended the second bout.

After a time Hobbes took heart again and began a third period of controversial activity, which did not end, on his side, till his ninetieth year. Little need be added to the simple catalogue of the untiring old man's labours in this last stage of his life. The first piece, published in 1666, *De principiis et ratiocinatione geometrarum* (*L.W.* iv. 385-484), was designed, as the sub-title declared, to lower the pride of geometrical professors by showing that there was no less uncertainty and error in their works than in those of physical or ethical writers. Wallis replied shortly in the *Philosophical Transactions* (August 1666). Three years later he brought his three great achievements together in compendious form, *Quadratura circuli, Cubatio sphaerae, Duplicatio cubi*, and as soon as they were once more refuted by Wallis, reprinted them with an answer to the objections, in compliment to the grand-duke of Tuscany, who paid him attentions on a visit to England in 1669 (*L.W.* iv. 485-522). Wallis, who had promised to leave him alone henceforward, refuted him again before the year was out. In 1671 he worked up his propositions over again in *Rosetum geometricum* (*L.W.* v. 1-50), as a fragrant offering to the geometrical reader, appending a criticism (*Censura brevis*, p-88) on the first part of Wallis's treatise *De*

motu, published in 1669; also he sent *Three Papers* to the Royal Society on selected points treated very briefly, and when Wallis, still not weary of confuting, shortly replied, published them separately with triumphant *Considerations on Dr Wallis's Answer to them* (*E.W.* vii. 429-448). Next year (1672), having now, as he believed, established himself with the Royal Society, he proceeded to complete the discomfiture of Wallis by a public address to the Society on all the points at issue between them from the beginning, *Lux Mathematica excussa collisionibus Johannis Wallisii et Thomae Hobbesii* (*L.W.* v. 89-150), the light, as the author R. R. (Roseti Repertor) added, being here "increased by many very brilliant rays." Wallis replied in the *Transactions*, and then finally held his hand. Hobbes' energy was not yet exhausted. In 1674, at the age of eighty-six, he published his *Principia et problemata aliquot geometrica, ante desperata nunc breviter explicata et demonstrata* (*L.W.* v. 150-214), containing in the chapters dealing with questions of principle not a few striking observations, which ought not to be overlooked in the study of his philosophy. His last piece of all, *Decameron physiologicum* (*E.W.* vii. 69-180), in 1678, was a new set of dialogues on physical questions, most of which he had treated in a similar fashion before; but now, in dealing with gravitation, he was able to fire a parting shot at Wallis; and one more demonstration of the equality of a straight line to the arc of a circle, thrown in at the end, appropriately closed the strangest warfare in which perverse thinker ever engaged.

Later Years.

We must now turn back to trace the fortunes of Hobbes and his other doings in the last twenty years of his life. All these controversial writings on mathematics and physics represent but one half of his activity after the age of seventy; though, as regards the other half, it is not possible, for a reason that will be seen, to say as definitely in what order the works belonging to

the period were produced. From the time of the Restoration he acquired a new prominence in the public eye. No year had passed since the appearance of *Leviathan* without some indignant protest against the influence which its trenchant doctrine was calculated to produce upon minds longing above everything for civil repose; but after the Restoration "Hobbism" became a fashionable creed, which it was the duty of every lover of true morality and religion to denounce. Two or three days after Charles's arrival in London, Hobbes drew in the street the notice of his former pupil, and was at once received into favour. The young king, if he had ever himself resented the apparent disloyalty of the "Conclusion" of *Leviathan*, had not retained the feeling long, and could appreciate the principles of the great book when the application of them happened, as now, to be turned in his own favour. He had, besides, a relish for Hobbes' wit (as he used to say, "Here comes the bear to be baited"), and did not like the old man the less because his presence at court scandalized the bishops or the prim virtue of Chancellor Hyde. He even went the length of bestowing on Hobbes (but not always paying) a pension of £100, and had his portrait hung up in the royal closet. These marks of favour, naturally, did not lessen Hobbes' self-esteem, and perhaps they explain, in his later writings, a certain slavishness toward the regal authority, which is wholly absent from his rational demonstration of absolutism in the earlier works. At all events Hobbes was satisfied with the rule of a king who had appreciated the author of *Leviathan*, and protected him when, after a time, protection in a very real sense became necessary. His eagerness to defend himself against Wallis's imputation of disloyalty, and his apologetic dedication of the *Problemata physica* to the king, are evidence of the hostility with which he was being pressed as early as 1662; but it was not till 1666 that he felt himself seriously in danger. In that year the Great Fire of London, following on the Great Plague, roused the superstitious fears of the people, and the House of Commons embodied the

general feeling in a bill against atheism and profaneness. On the 17th of October it was ordered that the committee to which the bill was referred "should be empowered to receive information touching such books as tend to atheism, blasphemy and profaneness, or against the essence and attributes of God, and in particular the book published in the name of one White, and the book of Mr Hobbes called the *Leviathan*, and to report the matter with their opinion to the House." Hobbes, then verging upon eighty, was terrified at the prospect of being treated as a heretic, and proceeded to burn such of his papers as he thought might compromise him. At the same time he set himself, with a very characteristic determination, to inquire into the actual state of the law of heresy. The results of his investigation were first announced in three short Dialogues added (in place of the old "Review and Conclusion," for which the day had passed) as an Appendix to his Latin translation of *Leviathan* (*L.W.* iii.), included with the general collection of his works published at Amsterdam in 1668. In this appendix, as also in the posthumous tract, published in 1680, *An Historical Narration concerning Heresy and the Punishment thereof* (*E.W.* iv. 385-408), he aimed at showing that, since the High Court of Commission had been put down, there remained no court of heresy at all to which he was amenable, and that even when it stood nothing was to be declared heresy but what was at variance with the Nicene Creed, as he maintained the doctrine of *Leviathan* was not.

The only consequence that came of the parliamentary scare was that Hobbes could never afterwards get permission to print anything on subjects relating to human conduct. The collected edition of his Latin works (in two quarto volumes) appeared at Amsterdam in 1668, because he could not obtain the censor's licence for its publication at London, Oxford or Cambridge. Other writings which he had finished, or on which he must have been engaged about this time, were not made public till after his death — the king apparently having made it the price of his protection that no

fresh provocation should be offered to the popular sentiment. The most important of the works composed towards 1670, and thus kept back, is the extremely spirited dialogue to which he gave the title *Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England and of the Counsels and Artifices by which they were carried on from the year 1640 to the year 1660*. To the same period probably belongs the unfinished *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* (*E.W.* vi. 1-160), a trenchant criticism of the constitutional theory of English government as upheld by Coke. Aubrey takes credit for having tried to induce Hobbes to write upon the subject in 1664 by presenting him with a copy of Bacon's *Elements of the Laws of England*, and though the attempt was then unsuccessful, Hobbes later on took to studying the statute-book, with *Coke upon Littleton*. One other posthumous production also (besides the tract on Heresy before mentioned) may be referred to this, if not, as Aubrey suggests, an earlier time — the two thousand and odd elegiac verses in which he gave his view of ecclesiastical encroachment on the civil power; the quaint verses, disposed in his now favourite dialogue-form, were first published, nine years after his death, under the title *Historia ecclesiastica* (*L.W.* v. 341-408), with a preface by Thomas Rymer.

For some time Hobbes was not even allowed to utter a word of protest, whatever might be the occasion that his enemies took to triumph over him. In 1669 an unworthy follower — Daniel Scargil by name, a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge — had to recant publicly and confess that his evil life had been the result of Hobbist doctrines. In 1674 John Fell, the dean of Christ Church, who bore the charges of the Latin translation of Anthony Wood's *History and Antiquities of the University of Oxford* (1670), struck out all the complimentary epithets in the account of his life, and substituted very different ones; but this time the king did suffer him to defend himself by publishing a dignified letter (*Vit. Auct.* pp. xlvii.-l.), to

which Fell replied by adding to the translation when it appeared a note full of the grossest insults. And, amid all his troubles, Hobbes was not without his consolations. No Englishman of that day stood in the same repute abroad, and foreigners, noble or learned, who came to England, never forgot to pay their respects to the old man, whose vigour and freshness of intellect no progress of the years seemed able to quench. Among these was the grand-duke of Tuscany (Ferdinand II.), who took away some works and a portrait to adorn the Medicean library.

His pastimes in the latest years were as singular as his labours. The autobiography in Latin verse, with its playful humour, occasional pathos and sublime self-complacency, was thrown off at the age of eighty-four. At eighty-five, in the year 1673, he sent forth a translation of four books of the *Odyssey* (ix.-xii.) in rugged but not seldom happily turned English rhymes; and, when he found this *Voyage of Ulysses* eagerly received, he had ready by 1675 a complete translation of both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (*E.W.* x.), prefaced by a lively dissertation "Concerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem," showing his unabated interest in questions of literary style. After 1675, he passed his time at his patron's seats in Derbyshire, occupied to the last with intellectual work in the early morning and in the afternoon hours, which it had long been his habit to devote to thinking and to writing. Even as late as August 1679 he was promising his publisher "somewhat to print in English." The end came very soon afterwards. A suppression of urine in October, in spite of which he insisted upon being conveyed with the family from Chatsworth to Hardwick Hall towards the end of November, was followed by a paralytic stroke, under which he sank on the 4th of December, in his ninety-second year. He lies buried in the neighbouring church of Ault Hucknall.

Personal characteristics.

He was tall and erect in figure, and lived on the whole a temperate life, though he used to say that he had been drunk about a hundred times. His favourite exercise was tennis, which he played regularly even after the age of seventy. Socially he was genial and courteous, though in argument he occasionally lost his temper. As a friend he was generous and loyal. Intellectually bold in the extreme, he was curiously timid in ordinary life, and is said to have had a horror of ghosts. He read little, and often boasted that he would have known as little as other men if he had read as much. He appears to have had an illegitimate daughter for whom he made generous provision. In the National Portrait Gallery there is a portrait of him by J. M. Wright, and two others are in the possession of the Royal Society.

Place in English thought.

As already suggested, it cannot be allowed that Hobbes falls into any regular succession from Bacon; neither can it be said that he handed on the torch to Locke. He was the one English thinker of the first rank in the long period of two generations separating Locke from Bacon, but, save in the chronological sense, there is no true relation of succession among the three. It would be difficult even to prove any ground of affinity among them beyond a desposition to take sense as a prime factor in the account of subjective experience: their common interest in physical science was shared equally by rationalist thinkers of the Cartesian school, and was indeed begotten of the time. Backwards, Hobbes' relations are rather with Galileo and the other inquirers who, from the beginning of the 17th century, occupied themselves with the physical world in the manner that has come later to be distinguished by the name of science in opposition to philosophy. But even more than in external nature, Hobbes was interested in the phenomena of social life, presenting themselves so impressively in an age of political revolution. So it came to pass that, while he was unable, by

reason of imperfect training and too tardy development, with all his pains, to make any contribution to physical science or to mathematics as instrumental in physical research, he attempted a task which no other adherent of the new "mechanical philosophy" conceived — nothing less than such a universal construction of human knowledge as would bring Society and Man (at once the matter and maker of Society) within the same principles of scientific explanation as were found applicable to the world of Nature. The construction was, of course, utterly premature, even supposing it were inherently possible; but it is Hobbes' distinction, in his century, to have conceived it, and he is thereby lifted from among the scientific workers with whom he associated to the rank of those philosophical thinkers who have sought to order the whole domain of human knowledge. The effects of his philosophical endeavour may be traced on a variety of lines. Upon every subject that came within the sweep of his system, except mathematics and physics, his thoughts have been productive of thought. When the first storm of opposition from smaller men had begun to die down, thinkers of real weight, beginning with Cumberland and Cudworth, were moved by their aversion to his analysis of the moral nature of man to probe anew the question of the natural springs and the rational grounds of human action; and thus it may be said that Hobbes gave the first impulse to the whole of that movement of ethical speculation that, in modern times, has been carried on with such remarkable continuity in England. In politics the revulsion from his particular conclusions did not prevent the more clear-sighted of his opponents from recognizing the force of his supreme demonstration of the practical irresponsibility of the sovereign power, wherever seated, in the state; and, when in a later age the foundations of a positive theory of legislation were laid in England, the school of Bentham — James Mill, Grote, Molesworth — brought again into general notice the writings of the great publicist of the 17th century, who, however he might,

by the force of temperament, himself prefer the rule of one, based his whole political system upon a rational regard to the common weal. Finally, the psychology of Hobbes, though too undeveloped to guide the thoughts or even perhaps arrest the attention of Locke, when essaying the scientific analysis of knowledge, came in course of time (chiefly through James Mill) to be connected with the theory of associationism developed from within the school of Locke, in different ways, by Hartley and Hume; nor is it surprising that the later associationists, finding their principle more distinctly formulated in the earlier thinker, should sometimes have been betrayed into affiliating themselves to Hobbes rather than to Locke. For his ethical theories see Ethics.

Sufficient information is given in the *Vitae Hobbianae auctarium* (*L.W.* i. p. lxv. ff.) concerning the frequent early editions of Hobbes' separate works, and also concerning the works of those who wrote against him, to the end of the 17th century. In the 18th century, after Clarke's *Boyle Lectures* of 1704-1705, the opposition was less express. In 1750 *The Moral and Political Works* were collected, with life, &c., by Dr Campbell, in a folio edition, including in order, *Human Nature*, *De corpore politico*, *Leviathan*, *Answer to Bramhall's Catching of the Leviathan*, *Narration concerning Heresy*, *Of Liberty and Necessity*, *Behemoth*, *Dialogue of the Common Laws*, the Introduction to the *Thucydides*, *Letter to Davenant and two others*, the Preface to the *Homer*, *De mirabilibus Pecci* (with English translation), *Considerations on the Reputation, &., of T. H.* In 1812 the *Human Nature* and the *Liberty and Necessity* (with supplementary extracts from the *Questions* of 1656) were reprinted in a small edition of 250 copies, with a meritorious memoir (based on Campbell) and dedication to Horne Tooke, by Philip Mallet. Molesworth's edition (1839-1845), dedicated to Grote, has been referred to in a former note. Of translations may be mentioned *Les Élémens philosophiques du citoyen* (1649) and *Le Corps politique* (1652),

both by S. de Sorbière, conjoined with *Le Traité de la nature humaine*, by d'Holbach, in 1787, under the general title *Les Œuvres philosophiques et politiques de Thomas Hobbes*; a translation of the first section, "Computatio sive logica," of the *De corpore*, included by Destutt de Tracy with his *Élémens d'idéologie* (1804); a translation of *Leviathan* into Dutch in 1678, and another (anonymous) into German — *Des Engländers Thomas Hobbes Leviathan oder der kirchliche und bürgerliche Staat* (Halle, 1794, 2 vols.); a translation of the *De cive* by J. H. v. Kirchmann — *T. Hobbes: Abhandlung über den Bürger, &c.* (Leipzig, 1873). Important later editions are those of Ferdinand Tönnies, *Behemoth* (1889), on which see Croom Robertson's *Philosophical Remains* (1894), ; *Elements of Law* (1889).

Biographical and Critical Works. — There are three accounts of Hobbes' life, first published together in 1681, two years after his death, by R. B. (Richard Blackbourne, a friend of Hobbes' admirer, John Aubrey), and reprinted, with complimentary verses by Cowley and others, at the beginning of Sir W. Molesworth's collection of the *Latin Works*: (1) *T. H. Malmesb. vita* (pp. xiii.-xxi.), written by Hobbes himself, or (as also reported) by T. Rymer, at his dictation; (2) *Vitae Hobbianae auctarium* (pp. xxii.-lxxx.), turned into Latin from Aubrey's English; (3) *T. H. Malmesb. vita carmine expressa* (pp. lxxxi.-xcix.), written by Hobbes at the age of eighty-four (first published by itself in 1680). The *Life of Mr T. H. of Malmesburie*, printed among the *Lives of Eminent Men*, in 1813, from Aubrey's papers in the Bodleian, &c. (vol. ii. pt. ii. p-637), contains some interesting particulars not found in the *Auctarium*. All that is of any importance for Hobbes' life is contained in G. Croom Robertson's *Hobbes* (1886) in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, and Sir Leslie Stephen's *Hobbes* (1904) in the "English Men of Letters" series, both of which deal fully with his philosophy also. See also F. Tönnies, *Hobbes Leben und Lehre* (1896), *Hobbes-Analekten* (1904 foll.); G. Zart, *Einfluss der*

englischen Philosophie seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18ten Jahrh. (Berlin, 1881); G. Brandt, *Thomas Hobbes: Grundlinien seiner Philosophie* (1895); G. Lyon, *La Philos. de Hobbes* (1893); J. M. Robertson, *Pioneer Humanists* (1907); J. Rickaby, *Free Will and Four English Philosophers* (1906), p-72; J. Watson, *Hedonistic Theories* (1895); W. Graham, *English Political Philosophy from Hobbes to Maine* (1899); W. J. H. Campion, *Outlines of Lectures on Political Science* (1895).

Thomas Hobbes by Leslie Stephen

From 'Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, Volume 27'

THOMAS HOBBES (1588–1679), philosopher, second son of Thomas Hobbes, vicar of Charlton and Westport, was born at Westport (now part of Malmesbury, Wiltshire) on 5 April 1588. His mother, of whom it is only known that she came of a race of yeomen, gave birth to her second son prematurely, owing to her agitation at the reports of the Armada. The father, described by Aubrey as ignorant and choleric, was forced to fly for an assault made at the church door on a neighbouring parson. He died in obscurity 'beyond London.' His children, two boys and a girl, were brought up by his brother, Francis, a flourishing glover at Malmesbury. The eldest son, Edmund, a plain, sensible man, entered the glove trade. He lived to old age, and left a son, who was kindly treated by his uncle Thomas, but turned out ill, and died in 1670, leaving five children, remembered in their granduncle's will. Thomas Hobbes was sent to school at Westport Church when four years old, and at the age of six was learning Latin and Greek. At eight he was sent to Malmesbury school, and afterwards to a private school kept by Robert Latimer at Westport. Latimer, a 'good Grecian,' afterwards Aubrey's schoolmaster, took an interest in his pupil, who translated the 'Medea' of Euripides into Latin iambics before he was fourteen, and already showed a contemplative turn. About January or February 1602–3 his uncle entered him at Magdalen Hall, Oxford. The discipline was at that time much relaxed, and ecclesiastical disputes were caused by the rising energy of the puritans, who were very strong at Magdalen Hall. Hobbes found the teaching, still conducted on the old scholastic methods,

uncongenial, amused himself with snaring jackdaws (according to Aubrey), and took to reading books of travel. He graduated B.A. on 5 Feb. 1607–8. The principal of the hall recommended him to William Cavendish (d. 1626) , afterwards first earl of Devonshire, who required a tutor for his eldest son, William Cavendish (1591?–1628) , afterwards second earl. Hobbes says that the next twenty years, spent with the young earl, were the happiest part of his life (*Vita carmine expressa*). He became the friend, rather than the teacher, of the youth, who took him out hunting and hawking, and employed him in borrowing money. Amid such occupations his Latin grew rusty. In 1610 they set out on the grand tour, and visited France, Germany, and Italy. Hobbes learnt to speak French and Italian, and found that the philosophy of Oxford had gone out of fashion on the continent. He resolved to become a scholar, and after his return, while living with his pupil as secretary, devoted his leisure to the study of classical literature. He delighted chiefly in poets and historians, and especially in Thucydides, of whom he made a translation, published, after long delay, in 1629. He had already, according to his later statement, the political purpose of showing how much wiser is one man than a crowd. The death of his patron in 1628 left him for a time to his own resources. The widow was engaged in energetically repairing the family affairs, injured by her husband's extravagance, and dispensed with Hobbes' services, although allowing him to remain for some time in the house. In 1629 he became travelling tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton, and spent eighteen months, chiefly, it seems, at Paris, though he also appears to have visited Venice. In 1631 he was recalled from Paris to become tutor of his first pupil's eldest son, William Cavendish (1617–1684) , third earl of Devonshire. He instructed the boy in rhetoric, logic, astronomy, the principles of law, and other subjects. In 1634 he took the earl on a third foreign tour, visiting Italy, and spending much time at Paris, where he was now beginning to be known to the philosophic

circles of the time. It was probably during his second tour (1629–31) that he had the intellectual experience described most fully by Aubrey. He accidentally opened a copy of Euclid's 'Elements' at the forty-seventh proposition of the first book. Reading it, he exclaimed, 'By God, this is impossible.' Examining the proofs, he was at last convinced, and fell 'in love with geometry.' Another story, told by himself (Latin Works, i. xx), is of uncertain date. He heard some one inquire, in a company of learned men, what sense was. No one being able to answer, he reflected that sensation was only made possible by motion. He was thus led to the mechanical explanation of nature, which became a leading principle of his philosophy, and studied geometry in order to understand the modes of motion. It is doubtful (see Robertson, p–5) whether this should be referred to the second or third tour. A tract (in Harl. MS. 6796) contains an early statement of his theory of sense, which probably shows his first attempts at working it out. In any case, Hobbes was now interested in the philosophical movements of Europe. He had gained the intimacy of Galileo at Florence about 1636, and always retained the profoundest respect for the old philosopher, who was in his last period of retirement. At Paris Hobbes was received in the circles of which Mersenne, the friend of Descartes, was the centre, and in which all the new philosophical and scientific theories were most eagerly discussed. At a later period he became intimate with Gassendi, whose philosophy was congenial to his own, though they appear to have reached their conclusions quite independently. Hobbes acquired many other eminent friends at different periods. Before his first foreign tour, presumably during the period between the chancellor's fall and his death (1621–6), he had been known to Bacon. Hobbes, according to Aubrey, wrote from Bacon's dictation, showing, as may be believed, more intelligence than other amanuenses, and helped in turning some of the essays into Latin. Hobbes, however, makes very slight reference to Bacon, and does not seem to have been directly

influenced by his philosophy. Among other friends mentioned (see list in *Vitæ Auctarium*, Latin Works, i. lxii) are Herbert of Cherbury, whose rationalism would be congenial to him, Kenelm Digby, Chillingworth, and Harvey; while among literary friends were Sir Robert Ayton , Ben Jonson, Cowley, D'Avenant, and Waller. He was admitted, probably after his third tour, to the circle of Falkland, Hyde, and Sidney Godolphin (1610–1643) , the last of whom was especially dear to him. After his return to England with Devonshire in 1637, Hobbes continued to live with the earl, and set about composing the systematic treatises in which he had now resolved to embody his philosophy. He contemplated three treatises: the 'De Corpore,' containing his first principles, as well as his mathematical and physical doctrines; the 'De Homine,' upon psychology; and the 'De Cive,' giving his political and religious theories. The growing troubles led him to interrupt the systematic development of his philosophy by writing a treatise called 'The Elements of Law, Natural and Politique,' afterwards published in two separate parts, as 'Human Nature' and 'De Corpore Politico.' This treatise, which already contains his characteristic positions in psychology and politics, was circulated for the present in manuscript. The dedication to the Marquis of Newcastle, cousin of the second Earl of Devonshire, is dated 9 May 1640 (copies are preserved at Hardwick Hall and in the British Museum). The Short Parliament had been dissolved on 5 May. Hobbes, however, said long afterwards that his treatise had 'occasioned much talk of the author, and had not his majesty dissolved the parliament it had brought him into danger of his life.' He may have forgotten the order of events, and no doubt exaggerated the effect produced by his treatise. At any rate, when the Long Parliament met in November and impeached Strafford, Hobbes took fright and went over to Paris, 'the first of all that fled, and there continued eleven years, to his damage some thousands of pounds deep.' At Paris he took up his old friendships, and transmitted through Mersenne, in

January 1641, sixteen objections to various points in Descartes's 'Meditationes de primâ philosophiâ,' and afterwards objections to some of Descartes's physical positions in the 'Dioptrique.' He concealed his name and the identity of the two objectors. Descartes received both criticisms contemptuously, and declared finally that he would not continue a correspondence with the author. The development of the struggle in England now led Hobbes to give a fuller exposition of his political theories. He composed his 'De Cive,' printed in 1642, and with a dedicatory epistle to the Earl of Devonshire, signed T. H., and dated 1 Nov. 1641. It is a developed statement of the doctrine already set forth in his unpublished treatise; he gives more explicitly and elaborately his favourite theory that peace could only be obtained by the complete subordination of the church to the state. Few copies were printed, and the book is now very rare. There are copies in the Bodleian (formerly Selden's) and Dr. Williams's Library. The authoritative edition was published, with notes in reply to objections, at Amsterdam in 1647, under the supervision of his friend Sorbière, a French physician. A preface explained its relation to his general scheme.

Although Hobbes contributed some scientific papers to books published by Mersenne, his interest in political events induced him again to postpone the systematic exposition of his philosophy, and to set about the composition of his great book, the 'Leviathan.' Refugees from England were coming over and discussing politics with him. He carried 'a pen and inkhorn' about with him, according to Aubrey, and entered any thoughts that occurred to him in a note-book. He was occasionally pressed for money. He had left England with five hundred pounds. Hyde afterwards brought him two hundred pounds, bequeathed to him by his friend Godolphin, and he received eighty pounds a year from the Earl of Devonshire (*Vita carmine expressa*). The earl had taken the royalist side, and had left England on being impeached before the House of Lords in July

1642, when his estates were sequestrated. Hobbes' salary would probably be precarious at this period. In 1645, however, the earl returned to England, submitted to the parliament, and in 1646 compounded for his estates. Hobbes was about this time on the point of retiring to Languedoc to live with a French friend and admirer, Du Verdus (Robertson,). The arrival of the Prince of Wales in the summer of 1646 induced him to stay at Paris where he was engaged to teach the prince the elements of mathematics. The position, as he explained to Sorbière (letter of 4 Oct. 1646), had no political significance, and was a mere engagement by the month (22 March 1647). The last letter shows that he had already thoughts of returning to England, where his patron was now settled. In 1647 Hobbes had a dangerous illness. His old friend Mersenne came to his bedside and begged him not to die outside the catholic church. Hobbes observed that he had long ago considered that matter sufficiently, and turned the conversation by asking 'When did you last see Gassendi?' Some days later he welcomed Cosin (afterwards bishop of Durham), and took the sacrament according to the Anglican rites, a fact to which he afterwards referred in proof of his orthodoxy.

While the 'Leviathan' was progressing, Hobbes' unpublished treatise of 1640 was published in two parts, 'Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy,' and 'De Corpore Politico, or Elements of Law, Moral and Politic,' and in 1651 he published an English translation of the 'De Cive.' His 'Leviathan' was now being printed in London, and appeared in the middle of 1651. When Charles II reached Paris about the end of October, Hobbes presented him with a beautifully written copy on vellum (now in the British Museum, Egerton MS. 1910). His position in Paris had become difficult. His orthodoxy was suspected, not without reason. In 1646 he had had a private discussion with Bramhall upon freewill in presence of the Marquis of Newcastle, which some years later produced a keen

controversy. The ‘Leviathan’ was not likely to conciliate churchmen, and shortly after presenting his manuscript to the king he was denied access to the court, and told by the Marquis of Ormonde that he was suspected of disloyalty and atheism. His usual timidity was excited by the murders of Isaac Dorislaus and Anthony Ascham in 1649 and 1650, and he thought that similar dangers might await the author of the ‘Leviathan.’ The French clergy, irritated by his bitter assaults on the papacy, were also thought to be meditating an attack. His flight to England soon afterwards gave credit to the suspicion that he had written the book in the interests of Cromwell. Clarendon tells a story of a conversation with Hobbes, who, in answer to remonstrances against the forthcoming book, said: ‘The truth is, I have a mind to go home.’ The ‘Leviathan,’ however, would hardly recommend its author to either party. Its abstract principles might no doubt be applied in defence of the protectorate when definitely established, which, however, did not become an accomplished fact till the end of 1653. The only passages alleged in support of the imputation of subservience to Cromwell were some phrases in the brief ‘Review and Conclusion.’ These, it may be remarked, are in the copy presented to Charles. They endeavour to define the circumstances under which submission to a new sovereign becomes legitimate. Hobbes argues in favour of those who had compounded for their estates, saying that by submitting in order to retain a part of their rights they were really more detrimental to the usurper than if by not submitting they enabled him to seize the whole. He defended this position when afterwards attacked by Wallis, and said truly that he had never justified rebellion. It was indeed idle to blame an elderly and timid philosopher, upon whom the exiled court looked with disfavour, for submitting with so many others to the new government then thought to be permanently established. His defence of the compounders applied to his patron, who had himself compounded in 1646, and to whom he was soon to return. He fled secretly

to England at the end of 1651, suffering from the hardships of the frontier journey after a second severe illness (described in Guy Patin's *Letters*, 1846, ii. 593–4); submitted to the council of state, and was allowed to live quietly in private. An intimation, apparently sanctioned by Clarendon's language, that he received some offer from Cromwell appears to be groundless. The charge was first expressly made by John Dowel in 'The Leviathan Heretical' in 1683. Hobbes, indeed, in 1656 ventured to boast of his having reconciled 'a thousand gentlemen' to submission to the government (*Six Lessons*, &c. E. vii. 336); but, in any case, he received nothing, and in 1653 resumed his position in the household of his old patron. He remained, however, in London, in Fetter Lane, in order to have the advantage of intellectual society while completing the exposition of his system. Selden and Harvey were at this period his chief friends. He received a legacy of 10*l*. from each, from Selden in 1654, and from Harvey in 1657 (for a doubtful story about Hobbes' visit to Selden when dying see Aubrey, *Lives*, ii. 532; Macray, *Annals of the Bodleian*, *n.*) He took pains to find a church where he could take the sacrament according to the rites of the church of England.

Hobbes ultimately published the 'De Corpore,' representing the first part of his plan, in 1655. It had been delayed for a year by his difficulty in meeting objections raised by his friends to certain unlucky solutions of impossible geometrical problems. Finally the 'De Homine' should have completed the system by giving his psychology. The treatise, however, published under that title in 1658 was a mere makeshift, containing some psychology less systematic than that which he had already published, and a Latin translation of some chapters on optics from an unpublished treatise written by him in 1646 (now in Harleian MS. 3360). Hobbes' labours had been interrupted, not only by the advance of age, but by a number of controversies which lasted the rest of his life. After the discussion in

presence of the Marquis of Newcastle Hobbes had answered a written statement of Bramhall's position by a reply which remained in manuscript. He had allowed a translation to be made by a young Englishman for the satisfaction of a French friend. The translator had taken a copy, which he published in 1654 without Hobbes' privity, prefixing a letter in denunciation of priests and ministers. Bramhall, indignant at this proceeding, which he naturally ascribed to Hobbes, printed in 1655 all that had passed, including a long rejoinder to Hobbes' argument. Hobbes in 1656 published a reply to Bramhall, called 'Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance,' clearing himself of the personal charges, and replying with remarkable vigour upon the philosophical question. Bramhall replied in 'Castigations of Hobbes' Animadversions' in 1658, with an appendix called 'The Catching of Leviathan the Great Whale.' Hobbes did not carry on the argument, but in 1668 replied to the charges of atheism and blasphemy (of which he declared that he had now heard for the first time) in 'An Answer to … Dr. Bramhall,' not published till 1682. The argument upon necessity shows Hobbes at his best.

A more unfortunate dispute arose with the mathematicians. The group of scientific men who after the Restoration founded the Royal Society were already meeting at Oxford. Seth Ward was Savilian professor of astronomy during the protectorate, and in his 'Vindiciæ Academicæ' (1654) asserted against John Webster's 'Examen of Academies' that the university had now made advances in science which, as he added in an appendix, would enable it to judge the geometrical novelties of which Hobbes had already boasted. Hobbes, in his 'De Corpore' (1655), retorted upon Ward, and produced his solutions of some ancient puzzles, especially the squaring of the circle. Ward replied by an 'Exercitatio' upon Hobbes' philosophy a year later; but turned over the mathematical argument to another of the circle, the famous John Wallis, Savilian professor of geometry. Wallis's 'Elenchus Geometriæ

Hobbianæ' showed unsparingly the manifold absurdities of Hobbes' solutions, and by an ingenious examination of an early copy of the book, exposed his hopeless attempts, made in consequence of Ward's remarks, to patch up the faulty demonstrations. Further replies and rejoinders followed, in which, while Wallis was clearly victorious as to the mathematical questions, the disputants rivalled each other in abuse and verbal quibbling. The controversy was renewed by Hobbes in 1660, by an examination in dialogue form of Wallis's mathematical works, which, failing to bring Wallis into the field, was succeeded by a solution of the duplication of the cube brought out anonymously by Hobbes in Paris. As soon as Wallis refuted this Hobbes acknowledged it, and reproduced it at the end of a 'Dialogus Physicus, sive, de Natura Aeris,' an attack upon Boyle's 'New Experiments touching the Spring of the Air.' Hobbes resented his exclusion from the founders of the Royal Society, and attributed their coldness to the malignity of Wallis. He made an unpleasant allusion to Wallis's achievement in his deciphering the king's papers taken after Naseby. Boyle answered Hobbes, and Wallis, out of regard (as he said) for Boyle, once more demolished Hobbes' mathematics in 'Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos' (1662). He ventured, however, to add that Hobbes had written the 'Leviathan' in support of Cromwell, to which Hobbes replied effectively in his 'Considerations upon the Refutation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion of Thomas Hobbes,' 1662. In 1666 Hobbes once more took up the hopeless task of defending his own fantasies and attacking Wallis. Wallis published his last retort in 1672. Hobbes in 1674 again published some of his pretended solutions, and as late as 1678, at the age of ninety, fired his last shot in the 'Decameron Physiologicum.'

Hobbes lived after the Restoration at his patron's houses in London and the country. Charles II, two or three days after his return to England, saw Hobbes in the Strand, and spoke kindly to him. Afterwards, while sitting to

Samuel Cooper, the miniature-painter, the king amused himself by talking to Hobbes. Hobbes could match the courtiers at repartee, and the king would say, ‘Here comes the bear to be baited’ (Aubrey and *Sorberiana*, 1694,). Charles also gave him a pension of 100*l*., which was paid as irregularly as other pensions of the time (see Hobbes’ *Petition*, E. vii. 471). The bishops and Clarendon, however, looked upon the author of the ‘Leviathan’ with suspicion. In 1666 a committee of the House of Commons, appointed to consider a bill against ‘Atheism and Profaneness,’ was empowered to receive information about offending books, and especially the ‘Leviathan.’ According to Aubrey, Hobbes was so alarmed as to burn his papers. A report given by White Kennett (*Memoirs of Cavendish Family*) says that he now frequented the chapel and took the sacrament, though he ‘turned his back upon the sermon.’ He argued (in an appendix to a Latin translation of the ‘Leviathan’ in 1668) that since the abolition of the high commission there was no court which could try him for heresy. He found protectors in Arlington and in the king. Charles, however, would not permit him to publish any work of political or religious tendency. ‘The Behemoth’ (finished about 1668) was suppressed by Charles’s orders, though a surreptitious edition appeared in 1679, and some other books were silenced. In 1669 the Cambridge authorities forced one Daniel Scargil, who had defended some theses from the ‘Leviathan,’ to recant publicly, and assert that his vicious life had been due to his Hobbist principles. John Fell (1625–1686) , dean of Christ Church, introduced some contemptuous remarks upon Hobbes into a Latin translation of Wood’s ‘History and Antiquities,’ and persisted, in spite of a remonstrance from Hobbes. Many attacks upon his doctrines by distinguished writers were also appearing; but his fame was spreading abroad, and distinguished foreigners were eager to pay him homage during visits to England. Among them was the Grand

Duke of Tuscany, who saw him in 1669, and to whom he dedicated his ‘Quadratura Circuli.’

When eighty-four he wrote his autobiography in Latin verse, and at eighty-six completed his translation of Homer’s ‘Odyssey’ and ‘Iliad.’ In 1675 he finally left London, passing the rest of his time between Hardwick and Chatsworth, the seats of the Devonshire family. As late as August 1679 he was still writing, but had an attack of strangury in October. He insisted upon travelling with the family from Chatsworth to Hardwick during November, but soon afterwards was attacked by paralysis, and died quietly on 4 Dec. 1679. He was buried in the chancel of Hault Hucknall Church.

Hobbes’ health was weak in youth, but improved after he was forty. He was over six feet high, and in old age erect for his years. He had good eyes, which shone ‘as with a bright live coal’ under excitement. His black hair caused him to be nicknamed ‘Crow’ at school. He had a short bristling auburn moustache, but shaved what would have been a ‘venerable beard,’ to avoid an appearance of philosophical austerity. He took little physic, and preferred an ‘experienced old woman’ to the ‘most learned but inexperienced physician.’ He was generally temperate, though he calculated that he had been drunk a hundred times during a life of ninety-two years. His diet was regular; he drank no wine after sixty, and ate chiefly fish. He rose at seven, breakfasted on bread and butter, dined at eleven, and after a pipe slept for half an hour, afterwards writing down his morning thoughts. He took regular exercise, playing tennis even at seventy-five, and in the country taking a smart walk, after which he was rubbed by a servant. He is said to have had an illegitimate daughter, for whom he provided. He was affable and courteous, a pleasant companion, though it is recorded that he sometimes lost his temper in arguing with Thomas White or ‘Albius’ (Wood, Athenæ, ‘Joseph Glanville’). A common story of his fear of ghosts is denied in the ‘Vitæ Auctarium’ (see also Bayle, s. v., note N). He read not

much, but thoroughly, and was fond of saying that if he had read as much as other learned men he would have been as ignorant. He was charitable and very liberal to his relations. His long connection with the Cavendishes is creditable to both, and he appears to have been a faithful friend. He was constitutionally timid, though intellectually audacious, and always on his guard against possible persecution. But the charges of time-serving seem to be disproved. There is a portrait of him by J. M. Wright in the National Portrait Gallery, and two in the possession of the Royal Society. A portrait by Cooper was formerly in the royal collections.

Hobbes produced a fermentation in English thought not surpassed until the advent of Darwinism. While, however, the opponents of Hobbes were countless, his biographer could discover only a single supporter. 'Hobbism' was an occasional name of reproach until the middle of the eighteenth century (he is mentioned on the title-page of 'Deism Revealed,' 1751), although his philosophy had long been eclipsed by Locke's 'Essay.' He is one of Kortholt's 'three impostors' (1680) along with Spinoza and Herbert of Cherbury. In Farquhar's 'Constant Couple,' 1699, the hypocritical debauchee carries Hobbes in his pocket; and among 'Twelve Ingenious Characters,' 1686, is a dissolute town-fop who takes about 'two leaves of Leviathan' (D'Israeli, *Miscellanies*, 1840,). Atterbury holds him up as a warning in a sermon 'on the terrors of conscience' (*Sermons*, 1734, ii. 112). He was reviled on all sides as the typical atheist, materialist, political absolutist, and preacher of ethical selfishness. Hobbes was in truth a product of the great intellectual movement distinguished by such names as Bacon (1561–1629), Galileo (1564–1642), Kepler (1571–1630), Harvey (1578–1657), and Descartes (1596–1650). He mixed in the scientific circles of Paris and London. He shared in the general repudiation of scholasticism. In his so-called 'Philosophia Prima' he touched hastily upon first principles, but failed to recognise the significance of the ultimate problems the answer

to which by Descartes founded modern philosophy. His thorough-going nominalism is his most remarkable characteristic. At the same time he was scarcely influenced by Bacon's theory of the importance of systematic induction and experiment. He conceived of a general scientific scheme of universal knowledge, deducible by geometrical methods from the motions of matter which he assumed to be the ultimate fact. The conception recalls in some respects that of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Hobbes was very ill qualified for elaborating his scheme. His self-confidence was so great and his intellect so rigid when he began Euclid that he mistook blundering for original discovery, and wasted his old age in the obstinate defence of absurdities. De Morgan, however, observes (*Budget of Paradoxes*,) that he was not such an 'ignoramus' as is sometimes supposed, and that he makes 'acute remarks on points of principle.' His psychology remained fragmentary, though affording abundant indications of sagacity. His short statement of the associationist theory influenced his successors. His great achievement, however, is his political philosophy, especially as given in the 'Leviathan.' It was the edifice under which he endeavoured afterwards to introduce the foundation of philosophy, doubtless congenial, but not the real groundwork of his doctrine. Like all the great thinkers of his time, he had been profoundly impressed by the evils caused by the sectarian animosities of the time. His remedy was the entire subordination of the ecclesiastical to the secular authority — a theory which made the religion of a state dependent upon its secular sovereign, and therefore not derivable either from churches or philosophers, and shocked equally the rationalists and the orthodox. It is disputable how far Hobbes carried his own scepticism. He ostensibly accepted the creed of the national church, but in virtue of obedience to the law. He argues from texts as confidently as a puritan, but, besides twisting them to strange uses, incidentally suggests many of the leading criticisms urged by later rationalists. In support of his absolutism he

interprets the doctrine of the social compact (which had been recently expounded by Hooker and Grotius) not as a compact between the sovereign and his subjects, but as between the subjects to obey the sovereign. Virtually he argues that states have been formed as the only alternative to the state of nature, or, on his showing, to anarchy and barbarism. The supremacy and unity of the sovereign power is therefore an expression of the essential condition of civilised life. To this, though with some reserves, he subordinates even the moral law; and his characteristic theory of human selfishness reduces the only sanction to fear of force or each man's hopes of personal advantage. Hobbes loves to display his paradoxes in the most extreme form, and has the force of a sublimely one-sided thinker. The effect is increased by an admirable style, sententious and weighty, terse and lucid in the highest degree, and enlivened by shrewd strokes of wit and humour. In spite of occasional archaisms, the 'Leviathan' is a model of vigorous exposition, unsurpassed in the language. Among the prominent assailants not hitherto noticed of Hobbes were Clarendon in his 'Brief View and Survey of the … Errors … in … "Leviathan"' 1676, written by 1670; Thomas (afterwards Archbishop) Tenison in the 'Creed of Mr. Hobbes examined,' 1670; and John Eachard in two dialogues (1672 and 1673), which went through many editions. More serious philosophical criticisms came from the Cambridge Platonists. Cudworth, whose 'Intellectual System' is an elaborate examination of Hobbes' materialism, had already attacked Hobbes' principles in his academical thesis in 1644, and left many manuscripts, one or two of which [see under Cudworth, Ralph] have been published, directed against Hobbes' ethics and doctrine of necessity. Henry More criticised Hobbes' materialism in his 'Immortality of the Soul,' 1659. Richard Cumberland (1631–1718) , in his 'De Legibus Naturæ,' 1672, attacks chiefly Hobbes' theory of selfishness. Samuel Clarke, in his two courses of Boyle lectures (1704–5), also defends immutable morality and

free-will against Hobbes. His first purely political assailant was Sir Robert Filmer in 1652; and he is frequently mentioned by Harrington in the 'Oceana,' 1656, who, however, respected him, and pays him a very high compliment in the 'Prerogative of Popular Government' (*Works*, 1700,). Locke has been accused of plagiarising from Hobbes, and there are points of coincidence, although it cannot be doubted that Locke struck out his new way under the influence of Descartes, and owed little to Hobbes. Hobbes' influence is remarkably shown in Spinoza's political treatises. The impression upon Leibniz appears in the 'Theodicée' and many of his writings, early and late. His later influence in Germany is described in G. Zart's 'Einfluss der englischen Philosophie … auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18ten Jahrhunderts.' In France Diderot expressed enthusiastic admiration for Hobbes in the 'Encyclopædia,' and Rousseau's interest in him appears in the early discourse on 'Inequality and the Contrat Social.' De Maistre's 'Du Pape' is a curious application of Hobbes' logic to an antagonistic conclusion. After being much neglected in England Hobbes' fame was rehabilitated by the utilitarians, who found much that was congenial to them in his unflinching clearness and rationalism, his doctrine of association, his recognition of utility as the aim of social action, and his theory of sovereignty. Their interest was proved by Molesworth's edition of Hobbes' works, which, unfortunately, was not completed by any general survey or biographical investigation.

Hobbes' works are as follows (the letters E. and L. refer to their places in Molesworth's edition of the English and Latin works respectively): 1. 'Translation of Thucydides,' 1629, 1634, 1676, &c.; E. viii. and ix. 2. 'De Mirabilibus Pecci,' 1636? (n. d.), 1666, 1675, 1678; L. v. 321–40. 'A Latin Poem on the Peak,' an English translation, by 'A Person of Quality,' was added to the edition of 1678. 3. 'Objectiones ad Cartesii Meditationes' (placed third in the sets published in the 'Meditations'), L. v. 249–74. Ib.

275–307, gives the correspondence upon them with Descartes and Mersenne, 1641. 4. ‘De Cive,’ Paris, 1642; Amsterdam (as ‘Elementa Philosophiæ de Cive’), 1647, 1650, 1660, 1669, in English, 1651; two first parts, translated by Du Verdus, Paris, 1660, as ‘Eléments de la politique de M. Hobbes;’ L. 133–432, E. ii. 5. Part of preface to Mersenne’s ‘Ballistica,’ 1644; L. v. 309–18. 6. ‘Tractatus Opticus’ in Mersenne’s ‘Cogitata Physico-Mathematica,’ 1644, L. v. 215–48. 7. ‘Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy,’ 1650, E. iv. 1–76. 8. ‘De Corpore Politico,’ 1650, E. iv. 177–228 (Nos. 7 and 8 are the original unpublished treatise of 1640; the first part of No. 8 being removed to it from the last part of No. 7. The prefatory epistle, dated 9 May 1640, is prefixed to No. 7. The original treatise, called ‘The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic,’ was republished in 1889 by Dr. Ferdinand Tönnies, after a careful collation of six manuscripts, resulting in many corrections). 9. Epistle to D’Avenant on Gondibert, 1651, E. iv. 441–58. 10. ‘Leviathan; or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil,’ 1651. A Latin version of the ‘Leviathan,’ partly modified, and with three apologetic dialogues, in place of the old ‘Review and Conclusion,’ was prepared by Hobbes for the edition of his works published at Amsterdam in 1668; E. iii. and L. iii., the last from the 1668 edition. The ‘Leviathan’ was also reprinted in 1680, and recently at Oxford by J. Thornton, in 1881 and again in 1885, as a volume in Morley’s ‘Universal Library.’ 11. ‘Of Liberty and Necessity,’ 1654 (surreptitious), E. iv. 229–78. 12. ‘Elementorum Philosophiæ sectio prima. De Corpore,’ 1655, L. i. An English translation (E. i.), corrected by Hobbes, appeared in 1656, with ‘Six Lessons’ to the Savilian professors of astronomy and geometry appended (E. vii. 181–356), in answer to Ward’s ‘In T. H. Philosophiam Exercitatio Philosophica,’ and Wallis’s ‘Elenchus Geometriæ Hobbianæ.’ (answered by Wallis’s ‘Due Corrections for Mr. Hobbes’). 13. ‘Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance,’ in

reply to Bramhall's 'Defence of the true Liberty of Human Actions,' &c.; 1656, E. v. 14. ''Στίγμαι Ἀγεωμετρίας Ἀγροικίας Ἀντιπολιτείας Ἀμαθείας, or Marks of the Absurd Geometry, Rural Language, Scottish Church Politics, and Barbarisms of John Wallis,' E. vii. 357–428 (including letter from Henry Stubbe), 1657. Wallis replied in 'Hobbiani puncti Dispunctio.' 15. 'Elementorum Philosophiæ, sectio secunda de Homine' (partly from an unpublished manuscript now in Harl. MS. 3360; see Robertson, n.), 1658, L. ii. 1–132. 16. 'Examinatio et emendatio Mathematicæ Hodiernæ, qualis explicatur in libris Johannis Wallisii … distributa in sex dialogos,' 1660, L. iv. 1–232. 17. 'Dialogus Physicus de Natura Aeris' (with a duplication of the cube, previously printed anonymously at Paris), 1661, L. iv. 233–96. Answered by Boyle in 'Examen of Mr. Hobbes' and 'Dissertation on Vacuum against Mr. Hobbes,' and by Wallis in 'Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos.' 18. 'Problemata Physica,' 1662, L. iv. 297–384. An English version, 'Seven Philosophical Problems,' was presented to the king at the same time, but not published till 1682, E. vii. 1–68. 19. 'Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion of Thos. Hobbes,' 1662, E. iv. 409–40 (in answer to Wallis's 'Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos'). 20. 'De Principiis et Ratiocinatione Geometrarum,' L. iv. 385–484, 1666. 21. 'Quadratura Circuli; Cubatio Sphæræ; Duplicatio Cubi,' 1669. 22. 'Rosetum Geometricum,' L. v. 1–88, 1671. 23. 'Three Papers presented to the Royal Society against Dr. Wallis, with Considerations on Dr. Wallis's Answer to them,' E. vii. 429–38, 1671. 24. 'Lux Mathematica: excussa Collisionibus Johannis Wallisii et Thomæ Hobbesii,' L. v. 89–150, 1672. 25. 'Principia et Problemata aliquot Geometrica, ante desperata nunc breviter explicata,' L. v. 151–214, 1674. 26. 'Odyssey,' translated into English verse, 1674, and with the 'Iliad,' 1675, 1677, 1686, E. xi. 27. 'Decameron Physiologicum,' 1678, E. vii. 69–180. 28. 'Behemoth; History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England;' finished about 1668,

suppressed by the king's desire, surreptitiously published in 1679, and authoritatively in 1681, E. vi. 161–416. An edition by Dr. F. Tönnies, from the original at St. John's College, Oxford, appeared in 1889, under the old title, 'Behemoth, or the Long Parliament.' 29. 'Vita, carmine expressa,' 1679, 1681, L. i. lxxxi–xcix. 30. 'Historical Narrative concerning Heresy,' E. iv. 385–408 (written about 1668), 1680. 31. 'T. H. Malmesb. Vita,' L. i. xiii–xxi; written by himself or dictated to T. Rymer; published with the last and 'Vitæ Hobbianæ Auctarium' (by Richard Blackburne), in 1681. 32. 'Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law of England,' E. vi. 1–160, 1681. 33. 'An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall … called "The Catching of the Leviathan,"' E. iv. 279–384 (written about 1668), 1682. 34. 'Historia Ecclesiastica, Carmine Elegiaco concinnata,' with anonymous preface by T. Rymer, 1688. A 'Whole Art of Rhetoric,' vi. 419–510, corresponds to a free version of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,' dictated to his pupil about 1633. The boy's book is in the 'Hardwick Papers' (Robertson, *n*.) A letter to E. Howard, prefixed to the 'English Princes,' 1669, is in E. v. 458–60. Bishop Laney wrote a tract about Hobbes' views of free-will in 1672, but an answer by Hobbes, mentioned in the 'Vitæ Auctarium,' is not discoverable (Robertson,). 'Hobbes' Tripos,' 1684, contains Nos. 7 and 8, and the 'Liberty and Necessity' (No. 11). A collection called 'T. H. M. opera Philosophica, quæ Latine scripsit omnia,' was published by Blaeu at Amsterdam in 1668, Hobbes being forbidden to publish them at home. It included the amended 'Leviathan' (see above), the three systematic treatises, and reprints of mathematical pieces from 1660. The 'Moral and Political Works of T. H. of Malmesbury' were published in 1750, with life by John Campbell (1708–1775) from the 'Biographia Britannica.' The 'Human Nature' and 'Liberty and Necessity' were republished in 1812, with life by Philip Mallet. The

standard edition is Sir W. Molesworth's, 1839–45, the Latin works in 5, and the English in 11 vols. 8vo.

[The admirable monograph by Professor G. C. Robertson in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1886, collects all the information, including that contained in the Hobbes MSS. at Hardwick, belonging to the Duke of Devonshire, and gives a very full and concise criticism of Hobbes' writings. A special study of Hobbes, has been made by Dr. F. Tönnies, who has published (from the originals in the National Library at Paris) seventeen letters between Hobbes and Sorbière in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, iii. 58–71, 192–232, reproduced (with trifling omissions) in Mind, xv. 440. See also Sir Leslie Stephen's monograph in Men of Letters series, 1903. Original authorities are three lives prefixed to the Latin works in Molesworth's edition, first published in 1681, by R[ichard] B[lackburne], M.D. The first is by Hobbes himself, or dictated by him to Rymer; the second, Vitæ Hobbianæ Auctarium, with lists of works, friends, and opponents, was written by Blackburne from the notes of his friend Aubrey; the third, T. H. Malmesb. vita carmine expressa, was written by Hobbes in Latin at the age of eighty-four (Bayle's letter to Coste, 8 April 1704, in Œuvres Diverses, 1711, iv. 841). The life by Aubrey was first published in 1813, in Letters and Lives of Eminent Men, ii. 592–637. See also Wood's Athenæ (Bliss); White Kennett's Lives of the Cavendishes, 1708, p–16; Clarendon's Brief View and Survey … of the Leviathan, 1676; Boyle's Works, v. 533; Sorbière's Voyage en Angleterre, 1664, p, 66, 95–100. The lives by Campbell and Mallet are mentioned above. Two articles upon Hobbes are in D'Israeli's Quarrels of Authors. See also Masson's Life of Milton, vi. 279–91. In Bayle's Dictionary is an interesting article.]

Saint John the Baptist's Church, Ault Hucknall, Derbyshire — Hobbes' final resting place

Hobbes' tomb. In October 1679 Hobbes suffered a bladder disorder, and then a paralytic stroke, from which he died on 4 December 1679, aged 91. His last words were said to have been "A great leap in the dark."